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14. ABSTRACT With the Publication of Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1 (FMFM-1) Warfighting in 1989, which largely borrowed ideas from retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd, the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its philosophical doctrine. FMFM-1 intended to change the way Marines thought about war. Vigorous discourse in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and a deliberate educational effort aided in the initial understanding of maneuver warfare. Over time the discourse and educational efforts waned and institution developed a misunderstanding of maneuver warfare, reducing it from a cognitive approach to a physical concept in action. It is time to correct this misunderstanding.												
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United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

No Room for Maneuver

**The Reduction of Maneuver Warfare from Cognitive Approach to Physical Concept in
Marine Corps Doctrine, Discourse, and Education**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

Major Scott H. Helminski

AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: SHAWN P. CALLAHAN

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 26 APRIL 2017

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: [Signature] Louise Antonoff

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 26 April 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Nathan Packard, PhD

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 25 April 2017

Executive Summary

Title: No Room for Maneuver: The Reduction of Maneuver Warfare from Cognitive Approach to Physical Concept in Marine Corps Doctrine, Discourse, and Education

Thesis: In order to make necessary corrections and realize the Commandant's vision, the Marine Corps must first identify the original essence of the maneuver warfare concept, diagnose its current misunderstanding, and appreciate how that misunderstanding came into being following the adoption of FMFM-1.

Discussion: With the publication of Fleet Marine Force Manual-1 (FMFM-1) *Warfighting* in 1989, the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrinal philosophy following disillusionment with the Vietnam War and a decade-long debate in the service's hallways, classrooms, and professional journal, *The Marine Corps Gazette*. On direct order of then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, a young captain, John Schmitt, developed the manual to encapsulate a new fighting philosophy. The manual was largely based on retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd's concept of moral-mental-physical conflict, as presented in his brief *Patterns of Conflict*. Boyd's conception suggests that the aim of maneuver warfare is to incapacitate the mind of the enemy, and that practitioners must integrate all actions, physical or otherwise, to serve this end. Concepts such as Sun Tzu's *cheng* and *ch'i*, and the German *Auftragstaktik*, *Schwerpunkt*, and *Nebenpunkt* are essential components, based on the use of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative.

The doctrinal philosophy presented in FMFM-1 closely approximated Boyd's ideas but allowed room for misinterpretation. The continued vigorous debate and clarification in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* and a deliberate educational focus aided in the institutional understanding of maneuver warfare by identifying and attempting to correct the misunderstandings. However, the discourse became episodic and the educational effort quickly waned. In 1997, The Marine Corps revised and re-designated FMFM-1 as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP-1), which clarified several misunderstandings of FMFM-1 presented in the discourse in the *Gazette*, including the explanation of maneuver warfare and some of its key concepts. Unfortunately, MCDP-1's publishing did little to renew the long-term discourse in the *Gazette* or the deliberate educational effort on the topic. Twenty years later, the doctrine has stagnated, debate has trickled to a one-sided discussion of the true meaning of maneuver warfare, and professional military education has ceased to focus on it. Along the way, as one may infer from the current Commandant's initial guidance and the Marine Corps Operating Concept, and as professionals with Combat Development Command confirm, the Marine Corps has come to focus on spatial movement and has lost sight of the cognitive aspects of maneuver.

Conclusion: Declining debate and educational effort have allowed the Corps's current physical/spatial approach to maneuver warfare to displace the doctrine's original intent, and most importantly the original essence of the concept. Given the Commandant's call for disruptive thinking and for reinvigoration and reaffirmation of maneuver warfare's primacy in the Marine Corps, the time is ripe to correct the misunderstanding.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

My journey to better understand maneuver warfare started with the guidance and mentorship of Colonel Tom “Sumo” Hobbs while I was a young captain serving as a company commander at the School of Infantry-East. Colonel Hobbs introduced me to John Boyd’s ideas and his dedication to our doctrinal philosophy and the development of his officers sparked my interest in the study of maneuver warfare. Since then, I have sought to understand more completely, not only our doctrine as presented in MCDP-1 *Warfighting*, but the theories and theorists that led to its development. Through my personal studies, my experiences in the operating forces, and as an instructor at The Basic School, I developed a sense that the Marine Corps as an institution did not fully appreciate or understand the concept of maneuver warfare. The publication of the General Neller’s guidance in FRAGO 01/2016 and the Marine Corps Operating Concept demonstrated that the Marine Corps may recognize this shortfall, which sparked this project to determine how and why this misunderstanding developed.

I would like to acknowledge and thank Colonel Hobbs for starting me on the path that led me to explore our doctrine and its foundational theories. I would also like to thank two key individuals whose intellect, support, and passion served as an inspiration and guiding force as I worked on this project—Lieutenant Colonel Shawn P. Callahan, USMC (Ret) and Dr. Anne-Louise Antonoff. Thank you for your encouragement and continued dialogue over the past year. I am convinced that I could not have completed this project without you. To Dr. Nathan Packard, thank you for your time and insights, they helped me cross the finish line. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Medora, for her encouragement and devotion to our family, which enabled countless hours of research and writing. Your support throughout my career has undoubtedly influenced where I am today.

“Maneuver—A mental approach to conflict, born of opportunism, variety, and cunning, by which we create and exploit advantage as a means for success by creating a rapidly and continuously changing situation in which our enemy cannot effectively cope. We do this by focusing strength against critical enemy vulnerability, generating superior speed and distracting or disorienting our foe through ambiguity or deception.” --Major John Schmitt, USMC¹

Introduction

The Marine Corps has identified a problem. Shortly after his appointment as the 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps in September 2015, General Robert Neller released Fragmentary Order (FragO) 01/2016: *Advance to Contact*, as his essential and immediate guidance to his service, and as refinement to the guidance issued by the previous Commandant, General Joseph Dunford. One of the three major themes in this FragO is a call for decentralized training and revised preparation for combat in accordance with the principles of maneuver warfare. In the FragO, General Neller calls on the Marines to “reinvigorate a maneuver warfare mindset for the 21st century.”²

The following year, General Neller approved the release of the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC), as the vision for the how Marine Corps will operate in the future, thus solidifying the guidance provided in the FragO. The MOC echoes the FragO’s call to reinvigorate maneuver warfare, taking it a step further towards “reaffirming the primacy of maneuver warfare and combined arms for the 21st century...”³ The language in these official documents, referencing maneuver warfare rather than MCDP-1, suggests that, to re-establish the concept’s primacy and vigor, the Marine Corps needs to revisit the original essence and theory of maneuver warfare, rather than rely on its most recent interpretation, which itself is two decades old. The current Commandant’s guidance and the subsequent release of the MOC confirm the continued institutional commitment to maneuver warfare. However, at the same time they suggest to readers that the institution has identified a problem.

To adhere to the Commandant's guidance and embrace maneuver warfare as the key to current and future success, the Marine Corps must appreciate the original essence of the maneuver warfare concept and the way its original champion, General Alfred M. Gray, envisioned its institutionalization. The Corps must then recognize the gap between original vision and current practice, and trace the development of any misunderstandings that emerged following the adoption of FMFM-1. Understanding the theoretical foundations of the concept, its codification in maneuver warfare doctrine, and its shifting fortunes in both professional discourse in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and professional military education are all essential steps to frame the current problem. Only then can the Corps make the necessary corrections to organize, train, educate, and equip its forces to fight as a true maneuver warfare force.

Historical Context: The Adoption of Maneuver Warfare

A brief look at the historical events in the decade leading up to the adoption of FMFM-1 in 1989 provides the necessary context to understand the original spirit of the maneuver warfare concept. In his 2008 master's thesis, *The Road to FMFM-1: The United States Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, 1979-1989*, Marine Reserve officer Fideleon Damian posits that following the Vietnam War, the United States military, reeling from the recent conflict, needed a new direction. Drug use and racial issues plagued its ranks. The demands of public opinion for major reforms among the services, coupled with dissatisfaction within the officer corps, exacerbated these existing issues and drove internal discussions among the services on how to improve their respective branches.⁴ Enlisted Marines and officers returning from the Vietnam War who were disillusioned with the war's conduct contemplated a new and more effective way to fight the next war. The ideas of individuals who presented a fresh way of thinking about warfare inspired and fueled discussions about a nascent concept—maneuver

warfare.⁵ Several thinkers from outside the Marine Corps, including retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd and senate staffer William Lind—who was inspired by Boyd’s ideas—introduced the concept of maneuver warfare to the service in the late 1970s as a potential theoretical foundation for the Corps. Over the following decade, an intellectual debate between those who believed in the maneuver warfare concept and those who did not ensued, centering on defining the concept and advocating or disproving its merits in future conflicts.

Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel and fighter pilot, was known as much for his raucous and confrontational personality as for his intellectual achievements in the Air Force. In the end, his intellectual achievements would win the day. While in the Air Force, he developed the “Aerial Attack Study,” which fundamentally changed the way the Air Force thought about and taught air-to-air combat, and the Energy-Maneuverability theory to aid in the development and testing of fighter planes. However, it was Boyd’s exhaustive study of conflict, entitled *Patterns of Conflict*, that led to his development of the concept of maneuver warfare and his enduring legacy within the United States Marine Corps.⁶

Lind, although lacking military experience, was an American historian who studied Germany, a legislative aide, and a participant in the Military Reform Movement during the tumultuous times following the Vietnam War. Influenced by his understanding of German military history and the work of Boyd, he focused his military reform efforts on maneuver warfare and the United States Marine Corps. He was an early contributor to the debate in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* and explicitly directed his 1985 *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* at the United States Marine Corps. Additionally, the *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, which Boyd reviewed prior to its publication, provides reinforcement to Boyd’s *Patterns of*

Conflict.⁷ In fact, Lind devotes much of his first chapter on maneuver warfare theory to Boyd's findings.⁸

Boyd and Lind's work inspired young Marine officers, who, lacking an institutional organization to address their concerns, began organizing small group to study maneuver warfare. They also began discussing Boyd's ideas in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the professional journal of the Marine Corps, which started a dialogue over the new concept. However, the concept of maneuver warfare met with resistance and an intense debate ensued in the pages of the *Gazette* between a group of advocates and a group of skeptics. The debate pitted the new "maneuverist" way of thinking about war against the traditional fire-power based warfare labeled by maneuverists as attrition warfare.⁹

Maneuver warfare advocates sought to define the concept and convince dissenters that it was superior to attrition warfare. Maneuverists introduced the concept of attrition as the opposite of maneuver. In attrition warfare, a military uses firepower and maneuver toward the enemy's physical destruction. The maneuverists introduced maneuver warfare as the counterpoint to the concept of attrition warfare, utilizing firepower and maneuver bring about not just the enemy's physical destruction but also his psychological demise.¹⁰ They created the dichotomy between the two "types of war" to illuminate the difference between the United States' historical affinity for bringing mass and concentrated fires to kill as many enemy fighters as possible—epitomized by the "body count" metric of supposed success in the Vietnam War—and the concepts of maneuver warfare that its advocates deemed essential. The intense debate continued in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* throughout the 1980s.

Damian argues that the proponents of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps utilized three main mechanisms to "[b]ring about the intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps..."

with the publication of FMFM-1 at the end of the decade.¹¹ Debate in the *Marine Corps Gazette* increased Corps-wide knowledge and acceptance of the maneuver warfare concept. Large free-play training exercises involving the Second Marine Division, under the command of maneuver warfare proponent Major General Alfred Gray, then tested the concept. Lastly, the institutional authority provided by the appointment of now General Gray, as the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, cemented the maneuver warfare concept as Marine Corps doctrine.¹² General Gray commissioned the writing of FMFM-1 and subsequently signed the manual, making it the official doctrine of the Marine Corps, although many opponents still existed in the Corps's ranks.

Yet the doctrine itself is only one aspect of General Gray's intent to effect an intellectual transformation within the Corps. After signing the concept of maneuver warfare into doctrine, Gray recognized the central role that education should play in the transformation of the Corps, creating the Marine Corps University and instituting widespread educational reforms. General Gray anticipated resistance and viewed an improved educational system as a way to tie efforts together and achieve consistency and harmony within the Corps.¹³ The discourse in the *Marine Corps Gazette* would continue to play an important role in the Marine Corps's understanding of its new doctrine throughout the 1990s, however, educational inculcation, much as the discourse in the pages of the *Gazette*, fell off over time.¹⁴

To understand how this negative trend could develop, it is first necessary to grasp the original essence of the concept as introduced by John Boyd in *Patterns of Conflict*. This understanding will enable comparison of the Marine Corps's current approach to and perceptions of maneuver warfare against the original essence of the concept. A stunted intellectual transformation in the Corps then becomes apparent, traceable back to deficiencies in doctrine, discourse, and education.

Patterns of Conflict: The Theoretical Underpinnings of Maneuver Warfare

Since the ideas in Boyd's briefing, *Patterns of Conflict*, were central to the development of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, they provide the intellectual context for the concept and serve as the basis for defining its essence. However, the intellectual journey that led Boyd to *Patterns of Conflict*, began with his only published work, *Destruction and Creation*. According to Frans B. Osinga, an officer in the Royal Netherlands Air Force:

The heart of the essay is the discussion about the nature of knowledge. It is highly philosophical and obviously rooted in the epistemological debates that raged in the 1960s. Boyd associates these epistemological issues with struggles for survival. The fundamental, unavoidable and all-pervasive presence of uncertainty is the starting point. It leads to the requirement to learn, to develop adequate models, and to continually assess the adequacy of these models as a basis for survival for any organism. The process requires both analysis and synthesis, both induction and deduction.¹⁵

Boyd's theory on knowledge and learning significantly shaped his method of study for *Patterns of Conflict*. In researching for *Patterns of Conflict*, Boyd analyzed 2,500 years of conflict to identify trends or patterns that led to success. From this analysis, he then synthesized his theory around three types of conflict: attrition warfare, maneuver conflict, and moral conflict.¹⁶ The flow of the brief itself also follows this approach to learning, which pulls the audience along and allows them to walk the path of analysis leading to synthesis with Boyd.¹⁷ With Boyd's view of learning in mind and a better understanding of the construct of the brief itself, an analysis of *Patterns of Conflict* will enable an understanding of the original essence of maneuver warfare.

When delivering the *Patterns of Conflict* brief, Boyd led the audience on an intense intellectual journey that intended to "make manifest the nature of Moral-Mental-Physical Conflict; to discern a Pattern for Successful Operations; to help generalize Tactics and Strategy; to find a basis for Grand Strategy," to identify the "character of conflict, survival and conquest."¹⁸ The extensive verbal explanations Boyd provided and his energetic style of

delivery were critical to helping the audience understand his central ideas; the slides themselves are difficult to interpret. As Boyd's ideas evolved, *Patterns of Conflict* became part of Boyd's larger work, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*, and the length of the brief grew to six hours or longer. Realizing that audiences required the whole journey to grasp his intent, Boyd closely guarded the integrity of the brief and refused to deliver anything other than the complete brief.¹⁹ The few surviving recordings of Boyd's briefing of *Patterns of Conflict* are therefore the best sources for understanding the concept behind Marine Corps doctrine, and will enable a comparison of the Marine Corps's current understanding and perceptions of maneuver warfare against the original essence of the concept. Ultimately this comparison will show that an institutional misunderstanding does exist.




Figure 1. *Patterns of Conflict* Slide 7, Boyd's "New Conception"²⁰

Boyd's "new conception," or starting point, clearly focused on the mind of the adversary, as seen in Figure 1. Thinking and conducting actions at a faster tempo creates uncertainty and causes rapid change in the environment, while deception, surprise, and shock interfere with

adversary's cognition. As a result, he becomes unable to adapt appropriately in a timely manner, which compounds his confusion and disorder, and ultimately leads to his breakdown as a system.²¹ While physical or spatial maneuver may contribute to this collapse of the enemy system, it is neither the only element, nor the most important. This conception stands in stark contrast with the typical view of maneuver as movement in relation to the enemy.




Figure 2. *Patterns of Conflict* Slide 115, Boyd's "Essence of Maneuver Conflict"²²

After tracing patterns and strategies used in conflict from Sun Tzu to the German *Blitzkrieg*, Boyd refines his initial concept. Though Boyd identifies three types of conflict—attrition, maneuver, and moral—this study will focus on the portions of the brief relevant to maneuver conflict. As seen in Figure 2, maneuver conflict²³ focuses on the mind of the adversary. By creating, increasing, and exploiting a seemingly incoherent and rapidly changing situation, one can disorient, disrupt, and overload the adversary's ability to interpret unfolding

events. He makes untimely and inappropriate decisions, thus becoming complicit in his own demise. As a result, the adversary's systemic cognition—his organizational ability to think, decide, act, and communicate as a whole—slows and eventually shatters. Ideally, this accelerating breakdown results in paralysis of the adversary's ability to continue fighting or collapses the system into uncoordinated and ineffective smaller fighting elements.²⁴

Boyd uses the analogy of a basketball team to provide the audience a familiar example of a system that is dealing with a situation that is changing too rapidly for it to cope. He explains:

Many of you people have seen a basketball game, here. And you see, you ever notice when one team starts getting ahead of the other? Christ, they come unglued, you can't measure that. All you know is they aren't working together. What do they do? First thing, they call time out so they can get their act back together. You can't measure that.²⁵

In short, the mental paralysis of the team that needed to call a time out is the aim of maneuver conflict. In war, however, there are no timeouts, only defeat, whether through continued fighting or surrender.

Based on a brief discussion of human nature, Boyd posits that “[v]ariety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative (and their interaction) seem to be the key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment.”²⁶ These four concepts are enmeshed in the concept of maneuver conflict, the goal being to gain the initiative to capitalize on variety and rapidity, which increases adversary disorientation and the friendly force's ability to adapt. Friendly forces can then exploit the advantage gained by the adversary's disorientation.²⁷ Additional underlying concepts that exhibit the validity of these traits are Sun Tzu's concept of *cheng* and *ch'i* and the German concepts of *Auftragstaktik*, *Schwerpunkt*, and *Nebenpubkt*.

Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher of war, heavily influences Boyd's concept of maneuver conflict with the ideas contained in his classic work *The Art of War*. Along with an

explicit focus on the mind of the enemy, Sun Tzu's thoughts throughout *The Art of War* emphasized the importance of concepts Boyd distinctively considered central, such as variety, harmony, rapidity, and initiative. Sun Tzu's concept of *cheng* and *ch'i* is essential to creating uncertainty and confusion in the mind of the adversary, by maximizing variety and harmony to seize the initiative. Sun Tzu defines *cheng* as the expected and *ch'i* as the unexpected.²⁸ *The Art of War* advocates using these concepts in tandem to create an advantageous situation, ideally allowing friendly forces to exploit an enemy weakness. One shows the enemy what he expects to see and then executes the unexpected.²⁹

Boyd also emphasizes the German concepts of *Auftragstaktik*, *Schwerpunkt* and *Nebenpunkt*, which are complementary to Sun Tzu's concept of *cheng* and *ch'i*. *Auftragstaktik* is commonly interpreted as mission-type orders.³⁰ Although Boyd only uses the term once in the brief, he clearly defines and stresses its importance. When utilizing mission-type orders, commanders provide clear guidance of what they want accomplished, but allow subordinates to determine how to accomplish their intent. In turn, each subordinate must conduct actions to achieve the commander's intent. This arrangement allows for the subordinate to exercise initiative in execution, which results in variety based on the subordinate's individual decisions, increased rapidity, and harmony of action toward a single commander's intent.³¹

Boyd introduces the concept of *Schwerpunkt* and *Nebenpunkt* to further unify effort horizontally across multiple units. *Schwerpunkt*, as the point of focus, provides unity of effort from the strategic to tactical level. It allows commanders to focus their main effort to achieve success by exploiting a developed advantage, chosen to avoid the adversary's strength and to diminish or eliminate his will to continue fighting. *Nebenpunkte*,³² or secondary points, are other elements of the enemy system related to the *Schwerpunkt*. Supporting efforts aimed at

Nebenpunkte serve to occupy or distract the adversary and thus allow the main effort to accomplish its mission. The main and supporting efforts work together, in harmony, based on the commander's intent that is given through mission-type orders and realized through subordinate unit initiative. Harmony and initiative together thus generate rapidity in the sense of tempo in relation to the enemy, and also allow the commander to shift among a variety of *Schwerpunkte* while achieving intent.³³

Boyd's approach combined *Schwerpunkt* and *Nebenpunkt* with the concepts of *cheng* and *ch'i*. The supporting efforts aimed at the *Nebenpunkte* present the *cheng*, the expected, as feints or diversions in order to enable the employment of the *ch'i*, the unexpected, through the main effort aimed at the *Schwerpunkt*. Friendly actions may appear incoherent and confusing but actually follow an internal logic. As a whole, friendly actions harmonized through initiative, variety, and rapidity impede the adversary's accuracy of observation and efficiency of orientation on friendly actions. As friendly units gain tempo in action, the adversary's perception of the situation becomes increasingly disoriented and slower, eventually leading to its paralysis and collapse, preventing any further actions. Thus, the aim of physical or any other form of maneuver serves the cognitive aim, in that it targets the mind and will of the enemy commander., hence the phrase, "get inside an adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loop."³⁴

Even though it does not appear graphically in *Patterns of Conflict*, Boyd introduced the observation-orientation-decision-action loop (OODA Loop) early in his delivery of the brief and wove the concept throughout.³⁵ The phrase "getting inside an OODA loop," and derivations thereof are commonly used to describe maneuver warfare. Lind described operating within the enemy's OODA loop in his *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* as a simplified summary of *Patterns*

of *Conflict* and tantamount to the theory of maneuver warfare itself.³⁶ The OODA loop is indeed important to the concept of maneuver warfare. However, Lind's characterization is overly simplified and may underlie some of its misunderstandings.³⁷ To be sure, Lind acknowledges this simplification, presumably to make the book accessible to a wide range of readers during the concept's infancy. Despite the over simplification, Lind's book provides the first definitive writing on maneuver warfare outside of journal articles, as Boyd never published *Patterns of Conflict*, and both men remained focused on the mental demise of an adversary.

Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare Held by Today's Marines

One only need turn to the pages of the MOC and the *Marine Corps Gazette* to see the difference between the original concept of maneuver warfare and its current meaning in the Marine Corps writ large. The MOC explicitly discusses the physical focus of maneuver among today's Marine Corps. Recent professional articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* either confirm this misunderstanding, whether by directly pointing out shortfalls, by indirectly reinforcing these incorrect views, or by a combination of the two. Even many of those who have thought more deeply about the mental/cognitive aspect of maneuver warfare appear to think they are discovering a new application for the original concept. Only after establishing the difference between the Corps's current understanding of maneuver warfare and its original essence in *Patterns of Conflict*, is it possible to determine the roots of the misunderstanding.

The MOC acknowledges the Marine Corps's current physical focus when conducting maneuver warfare, explicitly stating, "In the past, we successfully conducted maneuver warfare primarily in the physical dimension and employed combined arms in the air, land, and sea domains. Now, changes in the operating environment and adversary capabilities drive us to increase emphasis on maneuver in the cognitive dimension and expand our employment of

combined arms to the domains of space and cyberspace.”³⁸ If maneuver heretofore could be understood as successful yet limited to the physical, rather than the cognitive dimension, then clearly something has gone wrong in the Marine Corps’s institutional understanding of maneuver warfare.

After criticizing the physical focus the of the Marine Corps in the past, the MOC defines its current capstone concept:

The 21st Century MAGTF conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages over the adversary. The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains-air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The 21st century MAGTF avoids linear, sequential, and phased approaches to operations and blends maneuver warfare and combined arms to generate the combat power needed for simultaneity of action in its full range of missions. The 21st Century MAGTF operates and fights at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated part of the Naval force and larger Combined/Joint force.³⁹

While this explanation of the MOC more closely approximates the original essence of maneuver warfare, it explicitly restates points contained in MCDP-1, the Corps’s current doctrinal interpretation of the original concept. Yet despite the similarities, the MOC lacks a unified purpose aimed at shattering an enemy system. This discrepancy may suggest that, beyond misunderstanding the original essence of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps as an institution has lost its grounding in its doctrinal philosophy. The presentation of definitions from MCDP-1 as new ideas, implies that Marines need reacquaint themselves with the concepts in the publication, and serves as an indicator of a greater misunderstanding of the underlying concept and theory.

To make matters worse, the MOC’s critical task to and associated subordinate tasks focus less on the cognitive effect and more on the physical aspects of spatial maneuver.⁴⁰ The critical task states that the Marine Corps “must be able to maneuver equally well in the both [physical

and cognitive] dimensions to achieve psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages.”⁴¹ However, in its original intent, maneuver warfare unified and integrated all actions, physical or otherwise, in support of weakening the enemy’s ability to perceive, adapt, and act or react to a given situation. If the Marine Corps had completely understood maneuver warfare, the focus of maneuver would have already been on the cognitive dimension because the aim of its doctrinal philosophy is to shatter the enemy’s ability to operate as a cohesive whole. Admittedly, the emergence of new technology and development of tactics, techniques, and procedures may change the available means, but the ways—the incapacitation of enemy’s mind and spirit—remains unchanged.

The subordinate tasks later in the MOC display misunderstandings of concepts central to maneuver warfare such as combined arms. For example, the subordinate task that identifies the broader concept of combined arms and information warfare gives examples of cognitive maneuver as a supposedly novel approach to combined arms. As we have seen, however, Boyd had always advocated the use of ambiguity, deception, and novelty to disrupt, disorient, and overload the adversary.⁴² The explanations of combined arms provided in both FMFM-1 and MCDP-1 make clear this original focus:

In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation.⁴³

Moreover, the Marine Corps’s doctrine does not specify which arms to use; rather, it encourages the use of all available means.

Recent professional articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* echo the misunderstandings illuminated in the MOC. Two recent articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* written by members

of the Ellis Group, the Commandant's hand-selected strategic thinking group, provide examples of both understanding and misunderstanding maneuver warfare. In the first article, the authors demonstrate at least a partial understanding of the essence of maneuver warfare. However, when discussing the concept of maneuver in the later article they treat the cognitive focus as a novel concept. Additionally, both articles cite only MCDP-1 in relation to maneuver warfare, equating the Corps's most recent encapsulation of the concept to the concept of maneuver warfare itself. This approach may serve to hook the younger readers on the relevance of maneuver warfare, but it does so at the risk of distancing the present-day Corps from the original concept.

A November 2016 article, entitled "21st Century Maneuver Warfare," provides several points of evidence of the Corps's misunderstanding. First, the authors devote a large portion of the article to summarizing MCDP-1, which suggests the belief that a misunderstanding of the Marine Corps's doctrine has taken hold.⁴⁴ The authors also conclude that the Marine Corps has failed to achieve its stated objectives in MCDP-1's chapter on preparing for war. Like the Commandant, they perceive a need for the reinvigoration of maneuver warfare.⁴⁵ Their call for "reconceiving a few concepts" demonstrates their belief that a full understanding may not exist. The Ellis Group authors emphasize focusing on the enemy's mind and seeing one's own actions from his perspective. They advocate the idea that maneuver elements and main efforts should not be limited to ground forces. They also call for an increased focus on investing in mental power as opposed to technological purchases.⁴⁶ While the Ellis Group's focus on doctrine is warranted and understandable, their article only references MCDP-1, and does not capitalize on the theoretical foundations that led to its development and adoption. This suggests that their own understanding lacks depth.

In a February 2017 article, “21st Century Maneuver,” the Ellis Group echoes the MOC and acknowledges, “In the years since the adoption of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corp’s warfighting philosophy, spatial maneuver has been favored.”⁴⁷ Unfortunately, the majority of the remainder of the article remains focused on physical components of maneuver, such as maneuver forces, combined arms strictly in the sense of fire support, and up-to-date technology. It also contradicts their earlier position, as stated in their November article, on what constitutes maneuver forces. In the February article, they equate maneuver forces with infantry units, which is not always the case if a true understanding of the maneuver warfare concept exists. Perhaps this is due to the belief that “maneuver is the core of the maneuver warfare philosophy.”⁴⁸ This belief tends to confuse the historical understanding of maneuver as a physical/spatial concept, rather than maneuver as a philosophy aimed to paralyze the mind of the enemy.

The Ellis Group only a devotes a small portion of their 2017 article to what they call alternative maneuver spaces—psychological, technological, temporal, spatial, and informational. This portion of the article provides the closest approximation to the original essence of maneuver warfare, even making the distinction of creating a rapidly changing situation that slows the enemy down and shapes their reaction based on a false perception of the unfolding situation.⁴⁹ This approach is not new, however, and MCDP-1 itself mentions four of the five “alternative maneuver spaces” to provide context for the definition of maneuver warfare.⁵⁰

However, the perception that a misunderstanding of maneuver warfare exists in the Corps is not limited to the Commandant’s strategic thinkers. In an August 2016 *Gazette* article, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Thiele, a Marine infantry officer, asserts, “Understanding of maneuver warfare and its integral concepts has sunk to an abysmal level in the last few years....the lack of serious thought and discussion about military affairs within the military is

extremely troubling.”⁵¹ In a 2014 article, Captain Daniel O’Hara, an infantry officer and instructor at The Basic School, which trains all newly commissioned Marine officers declares, “The Corps needs to enforce its standards, but appears to be neglecting its most advantageous and most decisive one: its warfighting philosophy.”⁵² In a 2015 joint article with Lind, Captain Daniel Grazier, a Marine Corps armor officer, asserts, “Individual commanders of units and schools have here and there attempted to change what the Marine Corps does to match what it says, creating ‘islands’ of maneuver warfare. But these usually last only until the next commander arrives...”⁵³ In a later issue that year, Captain Grazier continues his argument, “Few people appear to understand the real significance of Col Boyd’s work anymore.”⁵⁴ He references the confusion surrounding the term maneuver, citing the spatially focused definition in Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A (MCRP 5-2A), *Operational Terms and Graphics* and comparing it to the philosophical definition in MCDP-1. Captain Grazier elaborates on MCDP-1 definition:

...nothing in this definition refers to physical movement...The goal is to collapse his entire system. This process begins first in the enemy’s mind. Far too many officers have been conditioned to understand manoeuvre as a matter of pinning the enemy down with fire with one element while ‘maneuvering’ with another to close with and complete his destruction. Such thinking betrays a basic lack of understanding.⁵⁵

Perhaps just as damning as these accusations from Marine Officers is the lack of contradictory articles, which implies either agreement with the accusations at or, perhaps worse, a lack of interest. A letter in reply to the Grazier and Lind article, by Major Ian Brown, a Marine pilot, commends the two for renewing the discussion on maneuver warfare and expresses his opinion that agrees that “the fullness of General Gray’s reforms remain unrealized.”⁵⁶ The only argument in response to the Grazier and Lind article by Major Brown is that the article merely restates Lind’s initial approach to developing the Marine Corps’s understanding. He argues that

the Marine Corps needs to take a new approach, as he believes that the initial approach was not completely successful. This is an important argument, but before one can undertake a new approach, one must first understand *how* the first attempt at inculcation went awry.

Roots of the Misunderstanding: FMFM-1

The comparison of the theoretical underpinnings of maneuver warfare in Boyd's *Patterns of Conflict* to the tasks set out in the MOC and the views of today's Marines in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* sets the problem by illuminating the Marine Corps's current physical/spatial misunderstanding of maneuver warfare. However, it is necessary to determine the cause of the current misunderstanding before attempting to propose or develop solutions. This effort requires an exploration of three primary means of disseminating new ideas—doctrine, discourse, and education—with respect to embedding maneuver warfare in the Corps as an institution. All three functions played a significant role in the Marine Corps's early understanding of maneuver warfare and their dwindling interaction would play a similar role in its failed inculcation over time.

In his foreword to FMFM-1, General Gray states that the manual provides his philosophy for fighting war in an easy to read format that is intended to be read cover to cover.⁵⁷ As opposed to a prescriptive set of rules and formulas, a philosophy provides a “theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity or thought.”⁵⁸ As a foundational set of ideas, the manual had to remain abstract in order to allow the reader to apply the ideas to a wide range of situations. General Gray goes further, stating that the philosophy should shape the way Marines think in everything they do, not just in combat. FMFM-1 was not intended as a reference manual; rather, General Gray encourages Marines to read, *and reread* the manual, which further suggests he sought to instill a deep understanding of its contents among all Marines. It does not provide set

solutions or actions; rather, it offers common concepts and ideals that require Marines to think and to use judgment in action.⁵⁹

The philosophy and its key concepts are consistent with the original vision behind maneuver warfare. However, the intent for Marines to read the book from cover to cover, coupled with the manual's abstract philosophical nature, requires the reader to understand its intellectual context before he or she can fully internalize the concept. FMFM-1 acknowledges the Marine Corps's challenge is to adopt and develop its new concept of warfare. The manual therefore seeks to clarify and explain the concept of maneuver warfare, while remaining easily readable. These twin goals create a dilemma: On the one hand, easy absorption demands a fairly superficial treatment; on the other hand, sound understanding demands a certain depth of theoretical information. The solution was to favor the former goal over the latter. Therefore, while the manual provides an overview of the theoretical concepts, it requires supplemental education and discussion to develop a complete understanding of the concepts and their origins.

The text of FMFM-1 itself is open to misinterpretation. It defines Maneuver Warfare as, "a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."⁶⁰ Yet, while this commonly cited definition is consistent with Boyd's original conception, the immediately preceding explanation of maneuver may prompt an orientation to the physical realm of actions in space and time:

The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver we must consider maneuver *in time* as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in *both* dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.⁶¹

The manual does also address the use of mission-orders, commander's intent, and the application of strength against weakness, obviously drawing from the original essence of the concept presented by Boyd. However, as seen in the above quote, the cognitive aims of some of these points remain potentially unclear unless the reader understands the underlying theory.

As Boyd was battling cancer at the time of writing, he was not directly involved in the writing of FMFM-1.⁶² Boyd's direct involvement might have alleviated some of these ambiguities. Further, since Gray intended his Marines to read the manual in its entirety, those readers only referencing specific portions of the manual or seeking to point out flaws here and there may not have grasped the whole picture. While FMFM-1 captured the overall essence of maneuver warfare when read in its entirety with an understanding of its theoretical underpinnings, these ambiguities led to potential misunderstandings, confirmed existing misperceptions, or at the very least presented opportunities for those opposed to maneuver warfare to argue against the concept.

Robust Debate in the *Marine Corps Gazette*

General Gray's appointment as the Commandant rekindled the vigorous debate in the pages in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, which General P.X. Kelley had suppressed during his Commandancy. The original high volume of discourse dwindled in mid nineteen-eighties with Kelley's appointment to the Corps's top post. The renewed debate in the late nineteen-eighties enabled FMFM-1's initial success in achieving its goal, but fell short in the long term.⁶³

Figure 3, a graphic representation of the discourse in the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* surrounding the term "maneuver warfare," depicts how the quantity, nature, and content of that discussion changed over the last thirty-eight years. The author reviewed 1110 *Marine*

Corps Gazette articles containing the search term “maneuver warfare” to determine substance of surrounding the term’s use.⁶⁴ Dependent on the level of substance, the author placed the articles in one of three categories. An article ruled a mere mention consists of the term’s use within the article with no supporting context. An article determined to contain minor discussion with substance contained anywhere from at least a sentence of clarification up to a specific section surrounding the use of the term. An article determined to contain substantive discussion devoted a majority of the article to the discussion of the term. Appendix A, contains the complete list of the search returns.




Figure 3: Appearance of “Maneuver Warfare” in the *Marine Corps Gazette* 1979-2016

Although somewhat episodic in the years following the publication of FMFM-1, opposition to maneuver warfare in the *Marine Corps Gazette* sought to challenge the new doctrine, describing perceived flaws and challenging the concept itself. In response, maneuver warfare proponents deployed articles and letters to clarify and sell the concept. As a result, many

of the initial misgivings about FMFM-1 were clarified in stride throughout the pages of the *Gazette*. However, these clarifications were limited to the *Gazette*'s readership.

The majority of substantive discourse in the *Gazette* in 1988 aimed to clear up existing misperceptions or advocate a better maneuver warfare doctrine. Lind published an article in January titled "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare," which sought to clarify existing misperceptions. In addition to other misperceptions, he refuted the assertion that the concept is simply a recipe to conduct flanking attacks, or pinning the enemy down with fire and then moving to a position outside the enemy's front to attack an exposed flank.⁶⁵ The need to refute these claims demonstrates that a physical/spatial perception of maneuver warfare has been present since the early days of the Corps's acceptance of the concept. Several other articles published in 1988 reviewed current doctrine and the Marine Corps's current understanding, both of which were found lacking.⁶⁶

In 1989, the discourse began to reintroduce counterarguments to maneuver warfare in addition to continuing to clarify the concept and apply it to various functional areas of the Marine Corps. As seen in Figure 3, 1989 also marked the significant increase of the number of articles that merely refer to maneuver warfare, a pattern that continues to this day. This trend suggests that even as much of the Corps was attempting to improve its understanding of the new doctrine, some Marines began to advocate for its replacement, while others began invoking the term as a way to sell their own ideas as linked in some way to the new concept. Well into the 1990s, the denunciation, clarification, application, and misappropriation of maneuver warfare—and sometimes mere reference to the phrase—continued in the pages of the *Gazette*.

Although the discourse had ebbed by the mid-1990s, entering a noticeable decline with the end of Gray's Commandancy and the increased operational tempo generated by the Persian

Gulf Conflict, substantive debate still continued. An article published by Captain John Schmitt, the author of FMFM-1, in August of 1990 sought to differentiate physical/spatial maneuver from the concept of maneuver that formed the basis for the Corps's new doctrine.⁶⁷ The article demonstrated that maneuver warfare proponents were still fighting against traditional physical/spatial focus of maneuver. In November of 1991 on the heels of Operation DESERT SHEILD/DESERT STORM, in his article, "An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare," Marine Major Andrew D. Walker argues that fire power is decisive in combat and maneuver is secondary. He defines maneuver as movement to gain a positional advantage, demonstrating that he views the word in its traditional meaning, counter to Schmitt's argument the previous year.⁶⁸ The same year, in an article entitled "Misnamed Doctrine Misleading," Marine Captain David C. Anderson argues that the concepts of maneuver warfare are sound, but the use of maneuver in the title generates confusion.⁶⁹ This discourse enabled the authors and readers alike to observe both sides of the argument. With each article, the opportunity arose for deeper insight.

Educational Reform

The publication of maneuver warfare doctrine in FMFM-1 and continued discourse in the *Marine Corps Gazette* could only go so far in solidifying the institutional understanding of maneuver warfare. Since the *Gazette* is not required reading, its contents do not reach all Marines. Similarly, while the Marine Corps published an authoritative doctrinal manual, its understanding requires institutional follow-through. Professional education provided such an opportunity, as a crucial institutional compliment to the intellectual vigor of ongoing debates, in establishing the central importance and understanding of the doctrinal philosophy, its underlying theory, and its historical context at a foundational level. While the debate was ongoing in the

Gazette, General Gray initiated institutional reforms in professional military education, including a heavy emphasis on maneuver warfare.

General Gray provided his guidance for training and education in an undated signed letter to the Commanding General of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Marine Corps's senior command for training and education.⁷⁰ As in his foreword to FMFM-1, General Gray offered his philosophical direction for the Marine Corps, this time with regard to the development of a concept for professional military education.⁷¹ He directed the development of the Marine Corps University to provide "a focal point for planning, doctrine, training, education, etc."⁷² The philosophical guidance for education stressed maneuver warfare in its first bullet and emphasizing how to think in the second.⁷³ This emphasis suggests that both points are closely related and central to his vision for education. Documents from Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) and Command and Staff College (CSC), the Marine Corps's formal schools for educating Captains and Majors respectively, confirm that the schools both received and began to act on General Gray's guidance for education.

Both AWS and CSC conducted curriculum reviews, known as Course Content Review Boards (CCRBs), around the time that the Commandant released his guidance. Even though the CSC CCRB for Academic Year 1988-1989 (AY-88-89) took place in early 1988, prior to General Gray's written guidance, the CCRB results show an addition of ten hours of maneuver warfare instruction, including a lecture and discussion about *Patterns of Conflict*, and also refers to a meeting with the Commandant earlier in the year. In addition to the ten hour package the CCRB discussion states "...[W]e need to take a broad approach at implementing Maneuver Warfare instruction throughout the entire curriculum...Maneuver Warfare is fundamentally a thought process...classes in isolation about the subject will never be understood in the broader

context [emphasis added].”⁷⁴ In the guidance to his Academic Year 1990 (AY-90) CCRB, the Director of the AWS emphasized:

The requirement to immediately recognize the importance of FMFM-1, Warfighting, and to incorporate its strictures into the curriculum is evident. It is now the keystone document on not only the nature and theory of war, but also on the preparation and conduct of war. Of particular significance is both this document and the Commandant’s emphasis on maneuver warfare. Although maneuver warfare is already an integral part of our instruction, there is a need to specifically address maneuver warfare at the beginning of the year, sandtable it, and then nurture its understanding throughout the year by emphasizing it in all instructional packages.⁷⁵

This quote demonstrates the centrality of maneuver warfare surrounding its adoption. The AWS director sought to introduce the concept early in the academic year and then thread it through the remaining instruction, providing a maneuver warfare link throughout the year.

The early centrality of maneuver warfare in professional military education aided in the Marine Corps’s understanding of the concept in two ways. First, it demonstrated the importance of the concept to the institution, which should positively impact the other two focus points of education in the manual—the commander and the individual. Second, it provides clarification of the concept to those selected to attend the schools. Those individuals returned to the operating forces able to continue the discourse outside of the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* with fellow Marines. Additionally, those selected and educated at the schools have always been likely to become commanders at varying levels, thus empowered to stress the concepts inside their units.

General Gray’s emphasis on professional military education was evident in his deliberate education plan, developed upon publication of FMFM-1. First, he sent the author, Captain John Schmitt, and a small team on an educational tour. This team, armed with hard copies of the manual, proceeded to work their way, regiment by regiment through the entire Marine Corps.⁷⁶ Second, Gray conducted an instructor symposium at The Basic School, the Marine Corps school

for educating its newly commissioned officers. Instructors from across the Marine Corps participated in a several-day educational effort to familiarize themselves with maneuver warfare concepts and ease the addition of these concepts into the existing programs of instruction.⁷⁷




Figure 4: CSC Maneuver Warfare Instruction by Hour⁷⁸

Unfortunately, if the CSC curriculum is representative of the other PME schools, the explicit educational focus was inconsistent at best and quickly faded.⁷⁹ As seen in Figure 4, its presence was strong at the start, while the Commandant's interest in promoting change was still high. According to the CSC Planning Calendar for AY 89-90, at the beginning of the year six and a half hours were dedicated to *Patterns of Conflict*, three and a half hours were dedicated to maneuver warfare concepts, and three hours were dedicated to a maneuver warfare practical application.⁸⁰ The length of the *Patterns of Conflict* lectures directly coincide with Boyd's briefing length and indicate that he perhaps delivered the brief in person to the CSC students. Additionally, there was a four-hour block of instruction on changing doctrine with a panel

discussion that included Lind and Schmitt. The readings included selections from Sun Tzu, retired German officers, FMFM-1, and other selected maneuver warfare readings.⁸¹ This intense education was short lived, however. The following year the curriculum was reduced to a thirty-minute lecture, hour-and-a-half discussion, and an hour-and-a-half decision game. The assigned readings were limited to FMFM-1 and “Maneuver Warfare Articulated,” an article written by Marine Major R. K. Dobson, that referenced the then obsolete OH 6-1.⁸² The school increased the amount of instruction the following year. The AY 91-92 course consisted of a two-hour lecture, an hour-and-a-half seminar, and a four-and-a-half-hour practical application with the same two readings from the prior year.⁸³ By 1997, the scheduled time involving maneuver warfare was reduced to two-hours of lecture midway through the academic year.⁸⁴ CSC’s movement of the course to mid-year, which it had deliberately placed near the beginning of the academic year less than a decade prior, suggests the fading centrality of the concept. The inconsistencies may have indicated that the school either assumed that the students were familiar enough with the concept or that individual instructors wove the theme throughout the program of instruction by 1997. However, the assumption of familiarity with maneuver warfare stood in stark contrast with the discourse in the *Gazette* and with the Marine Corps’s 1997 revision of its doctrine, which inadvertently served to enable existing misunderstandings of maneuver warfare.

Doctrinal Revisions: MCDP-1

In 1997, even as the institution’s explicit educational focus was dwindling, the Marine Corps rewrote and republished FMFM-1 as MCDP-1 to clarify its descriptions of the nature of war, the styles of warfare, and critical concepts of maneuver warfare.⁸⁵ The impetus to make the corrections in these three major categories suggests that the Marine Corps acknowledged the misunderstandings surrounding its doctrinal concept. Then a Major, John Schmitt, the

publication's author, also acknowledged that Boyd was more directly involved in the writing and publication of MCDP-1, as his cancer was then in remission.⁸⁶ Involving Boyd in the rewrite also illuminates Schmitt's desire to capture the original essence of maneuver warfare more accurately.

While MCDP-1's definition of maneuver warfare remained the same as the original in FMFM-1, only removing the masculine pronoun in reference to the enemy, the supporting explanation was greatly expanded. The publication expands on the physical and temporal by suggesting "maneuver in other dimensions as well...to exploit some kind of advantage...That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial."⁸⁷ It goes on to use language recognizable from Boyd's *Patterns of Conflict*, "...in order to *penetrate* the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion."⁸⁸ These changes and specific choices of language clearly represent the Marine Corps's attempt to capture the original essence of the maneuver warfare concept more accurately, as focused on the mind of the enemy.

The publication clarified the descriptions of the nature of war, the styles of warfare, and the critical maneuver warfare concepts without changing General Gray's original intent for the publication to remain easily readable by all Marines. General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant at the time of MCDP-1's publication, intended to "[retain] the spirit, style, and essential message of the original."⁸⁹ The new publication was still philosophical in nature and intended to be read in its entirety. By maintaining the original intent, MCDP-1, like FMFM-1, required its readers to develop an understanding of the concepts beyond the pages of the publication, but this was even less likely to occur nearly twenty years after the concept began to appear in the pages of the *Gazette*, especially with the "Cliff notes" provided by FMFM-1 being readily at hand. This

generational gap increased the need for discourse and education to establish the theoretical foundations of the concept. In fact, both General Krulak and General Gray acknowledged the importance of the supporting discourse in the publication's foreword and preface respectively.⁹⁰

The Atrophy of Debate and Educational Efforts

Unfortunately, as seen in Figure 3, the discourse surrounding the publication of MCDP-1 in the *Marine Corps Gazette* only saw a brief increase and then quickly declined. While, some discussion continued, such as the debate surrounding the use of synchronization in maneuver warfare, however, the same institutional vigor that surrounded the publication of FMFM-1 was missing.⁹¹ Four of the twenty-one articles containing at least minor substance were merely announcements of the release of the MCDP series publications. As the substantive discussion became one way articles, mere mentions of maneuver warfare tied to functional areas and the introduction of physical maneuver concepts began to dominate the pages of the *Gazette*. Maneuver warfare became little more than a superficial branding of existing programs and spatially oriented doctrine such as Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM).

The 2001 publication of the *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* (EMW) concept, which included physical maneuver concepts such as OMFTS and STOM, further clouded the Marine Corps's understanding of maneuver warfare and the supporting discourse in the *Marine Corps Gazette*. While EMW does acknowledge maneuver warfare philosophy as a core foundational competency in its initial pages, its design as a capstone concept that informs how the Marine Corps will train, equip, and fight necessarily focuses on the specific application of Marine Corps assets and doctrine.⁹² Although the concept itself refers to maneuver warfare, its explanation

implies a more physical/spatial focus that bastardizes the explanation in MCDP-1 and the original essence of maneuver warfare. In its section on maneuver warfare, EMW states:

Maneuver warfare stresses proactive thought and action, elevating beyond the crude simplicity of attrition. It combines high tempo operations with a bias for action to achieve advantage—physical, temporal, or conditional—relative to an adversary. The aim is to shatter an adversary’s cohesion, succeed in other operations by rapid action to mitigate damage, or resolve a crisis on favorable terms.⁹³

While the quote begins by referring to proactive thought, it concludes by focusing mainly on physical action. This approach resembles the explanation of maneuver in FMFM-1 that forgoes the psychological domain. Though MCDP-1 explicitly referenced the psychological domain, among others, in a deliberate revision to clarify misunderstandings, this refinement was apparently underappreciated.

The release of this physically-focused concept generated confusion and dominated the pages of the *Gazette*. As seen in Figure 3, coinciding with the release of EMW the number of mere mentions of maneuver warfare in relation to substantive discussion skyrockets. Most of the articles lacking substance over the next seven years specifically focus on the EMW concept. Some even go so far as to refer to EMW as the Corps’s “capstone doctrine,” conflating the capstone concept with the Corps’s guiding doctrine, MCDP-1. This confusion may preclude the deeper thought encouraged by the philosophical doctrine, instead favoring reference to the action oriented concept of EMW, and thus creating a deeper rift between the existing doctrine and its theoretical foundations on one hand, and the Corps’s emerging capstone concept on the other. The physical/spatial maneuver focus that was the subject of earlier discourse and major focus of the doctrinal revision of *Warfighting*, began to permeate discussion again and enable the spread of the misunderstanding.

The “attritionist letters,” a series of articles published in 2010, intended to regenerate the maneuver warfare discourse in the *Gazette*.⁹⁴ The appearance of these articles demonstrates that a group of Marines who understood maneuver warfare and sought to correct misunderstandings existed. In these articles, a group of anonymous maneuverist officers cleverly wrote about their perceived struggle in the Marine Corps to advance the practice of maneuver warfare despite the attritionist attitudes of uncritical Marine Corps leaders. In the genre of C.S. Lewis’ *The Screwtape Letters*, the authors introduced misunderstandings through an imagined conversation between an attritionist general and a maneuverist captain. Throughout the series of articles published over the following year, General Screwtape attempts to refute maneuverist ideas and explain to young Captain Wormwood why they will not work. However, as seen in Figure 3, the maneuverists met limited success in the pages of the *Gazette*, sparking only a short-lived increase in discourse.

Recent articles in the *Gazette* generally fall into one of three categories. They either challenge the Marine Corps’s understanding of maneuver warfare, demonstrate their own misunderstandings, or display a combination of the two preceding categories. Undoubtedly, individuals and small groups who understand maneuver warfare exist in today’s Marine Corps. Claims of shortfalls in the Marine Corps’s understanding and implementation of maneuver warfare go unchallenged, while the apparent misunderstandings stand uncorrected. This pattern has two possible implications. First, those reading the *Gazette*, either agree with the allegations or do not care enough to respond. Second, those reading the *Gazette* do not notice the misunderstandings, which confirms the misunderstanding in and of itself. Finally, many articles only refer to MCDP-1, *Warfighting*, equating maneuver warfare solely with the publication, and

excluding the essence of the concept from its theoretical foundations. Both are equally troublesome and undoubtedly contribute to the current misunderstanding among Marines.

As seen in Figure 4, the CSC curriculum over the same period had very little time scheduled for grappling with maneuver warfare concepts. Maneuver warfare education at the school surrounding the adoption of Boyd's ideas as doctrine in 1989 was deliberate and robust. Following the release of MCDP-1, the school did not place the same emphasis on maneuver warfare education—either in the theoretical underpinnings of the concept or the doctrinal publication itself. Curriculum guidance in the course syllabi merely refer to viewing all education through the lens of MCDP-1. In the 1999-2000 Command and Staff College course syllabus, maneuver warfare was no longer even listed as a recurring theme; rather, it states, “Within the context of MCDP-1, *Warfighting*, these themes should enable the student to better face the challenges within the academic and operational worlds.”⁹⁵ A schedule from the same year includes only an hour and fifteen-minute lecture on Marine Corps doctrine.⁹⁶ In AY 02-03, more time was dedicated to the concept of EMW than maneuver warfare, though by only thirty-minutes.⁹⁷ By 2008, maneuver warfare was relegated to a one hour seminar that discussed the characteristics of war, such as uncertainty, friction, fluidity, and disorder—similar topics discussed with newly commissioned second lieutenants at The Basic School during their first week of training.⁹⁸ Subjects related to maneuver warfare, such as critical thinking, mission orders, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu were introduced throughout the curriculum over the years, but they lacked the explicit thread of maneuver warfare to weave them together. The degree to which these subjects were tied to the Corps's doctrinal philosophy was heavily reliant on individual instructors. This method was predicated on the assumption that prior experience and schooling cultivated a solid foundation in maneuver warfare in the students and instructors alike,

which according to discourse and trends in educational efforts was flawed. Like the majority of the articles in the *Gazette* at the time, the Marine Corps professional military education system reflects an inconsistent approach lacking depth and, which further solidified the institution's misunderstanding.

While MCDP-1 closely captures the essence of maneuver warfare as described in *Patterns of Conflict*, the lack of consistent formal education built around its concepts and theoretical underpinnings coupled with diminished intellectual discourse about the Marine Corps's philosophical doctrine left a gap in Marines' understanding. Further, the doctrine has not been updated for nearly twenty years, counter to the charge of the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps in the foreword to MCDP-1, which states:

That said, I believe *Warfighting can and should be* improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.⁹⁹

The only Commandant to order a revision of MCDP-1 was the last, which suggests that the Marine Corps is overconfident in its familiarity with the concept of maneuver warfare and equates it solely with the doctrinal publication. Without supporting education or discourse and with a stagnate doctrine, Marines generationally removed from the adoption and theoretical underpinnings of the concept turn to MCDP-1 as *the* answer, as opposed to incorporating the original theories it interprets. Quotes from the publication are now cherry picked and the manual has become a reference, rather than the intended portal to a deeper understanding of the theory contained within. As a result, the Marine Corps has lost touch with the original essence of the concept and currently views maneuver in its physical/spatial context.

Conclusions and Implications

The Commandant is right. Maneuver warfare has lost vigor and primacy in the Marine Corps.¹⁰⁰ Without the discourse in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and a professional military education that centers on maneuver warfare, Marines have lost touch with the theoretical underpinnings of their doctrine. This intellectual shortfall plays a major role in the institutional misperceptions of maneuver warfare as a largely physical way of fighting that only now has implications for maneuvering in the cognitive domain. Intellectual vigor surrounded the adoption of maneuver warfare with the publication of FMFM-1 in 1989, facilitating its initial success. FMFM-1, written as the Marine Corps's philosophy for thinking about, preparing for, and conducting maneuver warfare was intentionally more descriptive than prescriptive, and this new approach to doctrine provoked vigorous debate over the validity and true meaning of the doctrine in subsequent years, as well as the revision of the doctrine itself. Following the publication of MCDP-1, however, the debate lost vigor and grew increasingly one-sided. Simultaneously, the concept of maneuver warfare quickly lost its central role in the professional education of Marines. Exacerbated by the loss of vigorous debate and the failure to place maneuver warfare at the center of the Marine Corps's professional military education continuum, the fundamental misunderstanding of maneuver warfare as a physical/spatial concept permeated the Marine Corps writ large.

While FRAGO 01/16 and the MOC indicate the Marine Corps's current misconception of maneuver as a physical/spatial concept, they also represent the Commandant's call to identify shortfalls and make corrections. Although the Marine Corps as an institution misunderstands maneuver warfare, the concept is still applicable and, as Grazier and Lind suggest, "islands" of understanding exist. Armed with knowledge of its misunderstanding and how it evolved, the

Corps can capitalize on these “islands” of understanding and lessons of the past to make necessary corrections to its doctrine, ensure the centrality of maneuver warfare in its professional educational system, and reinvigorate the discourse surrounding the concept. Twenty years following its publication, it is time to reevaluate MCDP-1. While MCDP-1 improved on FMFM-1, twenty years of additional experience, technological advances, and perpetuated misunderstandings have passed, and contrary to both General Gray and General Krulak’s intent the doctrine has stagnated. Much as MCDP-1 aimed to correct misunderstandings of FMFM-1, a review and subsequent improvement may do the same today. However, just as the previous versions avoided the traditional staffing process, any revision to improve on the current publication must follow suit. The text must capture the coherent thought of a strong mind, not the cobbled fragments of a corporate body. Review and revision must reflect the Commander’s intent, not the pressures of consensus-building and compromise. The authors who review and make any subsequent improvements must come from the group of Marines who truly understand the concept and they must work directly for the Commandant.

As MCDP-1 demonstrated, however, revision of the doctrine alone will not correct the existing misunderstanding. The Marine Corps must reestablish the centrality of maneuver warfare in its schools, both officer and enlisted. Maneuver warfare must be the *Schwerpunkt* of the Marine Corps educational system. The theories underlying the doctrine must be included. The schools’ curriculums must be linked vertically in a progressive continuum that starts with entry-level education. They must also be linked horizontally, ensuring officer and enlisted education mirror each other at the appropriate levels. Finally, instructors at all schools, much as General Gray stressed, must be selected and better prepared for their roles in the education of the Corps. The Corps must make deliberate efforts to “educate the educators,” institution-wide.

A reenergized doctrine, re-prioritized educational system, and deliberate effort to invigorate discourse in the *Gazette*, can capitalize on the recent resurgence of maneuver warfare articles. The *Gazette*, for example, could run features on the above recommended changes, deliberately soliciting opinions and facilitating the next renaissance. Further, an annual writing contest centered on the theoretical concepts behind maneuver warfare and current implications would encourage new ideas on the subject and spark additional discussion. A maneuver warfare special edition featuring articles central to the original discourse, with a charge from the Commandant that it be read by all Marines, could also serve to rekindle the discourse.

Additional areas such as training and manpower management also require reforms, but the preceding three areas will lay the foundation for broader changes. With a renewed doctrine, a forum for debate, and better educational foundation, Marines will undoubtedly find new and creative solutions to fix training problems and manpower issues. By better educating Marines, they will more deeply understand their doctrine, which empowers them to develop and conduct maneuver warfare training. These improvements will undoubtedly lead to newly identified problems and associated solutions that fall outside the scope of this paper, which will only further the requirement for forward progress and begin the entire process anew. It is time to move out on General Neller's guidance and reinvigorate and reaffirm the primacy of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps.

Endnotes

- ¹ John F. Schmitt. "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine." *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 no. 8, (November 1990): 99.
- ² Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). *Advance to Contact*. FRAGO 01/2016, (19 January 2016): 3, 8.
- ³ Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*. Concept, (September 2016): 4, 8.
- ⁴ Grant T Hammond. *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2004): 102.
- ⁵ Fideleon Damian. "The Road to FMFM 1: The United States Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, 1979-1989" Master's Thesis, Kansas State University, (2008): 27-29.
- ⁶ Robert Coram. *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*. (New York, New York: Bay Back Books/Little, Brown and Company, 2002) 4-7; James Fallows. "A priceless original." *U.S. News & World Report* 122, no. 11, (March 24, 1997): 9; Hammond. *The Mind of War*, 1-4. The Coram and Hammond works on Boyd offer a more complete treatment on the life and work of Boyd.
- ⁷ Anthony John Piscitelli. "The United States Marine Corps Way of War." PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, (2014): 44-46; William S. Lind. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985): Acknowledgments, 1-3.
- ⁸ Lind. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. 4-8.
- ⁹ Damian. "The Road to FMFM 1." 27-30, 42-43.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, 30.
- ¹¹ Ibid. 6.
- ¹² Ibid. 6, 95.
- ¹³ Dan Grazier, "The Creation of *Warfighting*, with John Schmitt," *Pentagon Labyrinth*, Straus Military Reform Project, Project on Government Oversight, podcast audio, November 28, 2016. <http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/military-people-and-ideas/2016/podcast-the-creation-of.html>; General Alfred M. Gray, Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, and John Schmitt. "Warfighting Panel," YouTube video, March 26, 2015, 1:23:29, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RL4_NVYByw.
- ¹⁴ Terry C. Pierce. *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation*. (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004): 95.
- ¹⁵ Frans P. B. Osinga. *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. London; (New York: Routledge, 2007): 131.
- ¹⁶ John R. Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." Unpublished briefing, (last modified in 1986): 111. Retrieved from <http://www.dnipo.org/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf>. Emphasis from original briefing slide.
- ¹⁷ Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 139.
- ¹⁸ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 12.
- ¹⁹ Coram. *Boyd*. 329.
- ²⁰ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 7.
- ²¹ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 7.; Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 141.
- ²² Ibid. 115.
- ²³ As mentioned in Boyd's purpose for *Patterns of Conflict*, he studied conflict writ large, thus the use of the term maneuver conflict. The study of conflict implies a larger scope than the study of war or warfare. The "maneuverists" introduced the term maneuver warfare for use in the Marine Corps, an organization focused specifically on war. For the same reason, Boyd uses the term adversary vice enemy. For the purposes of this study, adversary is used in the section on Boyd's ideas to remain consistent with his thought process. Enemy is used throughout the remainder of the paper, consistent with the Marine Corps's focus on warfare.
- ²⁴ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 114-117.; Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 166-169.
- ²⁵ "John Boyd Patterns of Conflict Part 11," YouTube video, February 2, 2015, 27:32, Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTu3kl-hZnw>.
- ²⁶ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 12. Emphasis from original briefing slide.; Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 142.
- ²⁷ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 174-175.
- ²⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, ed. and trans. (New York: Oxford University, 1963): 91.
- ²⁹ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 14.
- ³⁰ Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds. *On the German Art of War: Truppenführung*. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001): 3-5. The editors point out that the concept is not referred to by name in *Truppenführung* it is

clearly present. Boyd's explanation of the concept is consistent with the editors and as seen throughout their translation of *Truppenführung*.

³¹ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 74.; Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 156-157.

³² *Nebenpunkte* is the plural form of *Nebenpunkt*

³³ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 70-78.; Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 156-159.

³⁴ Boyd. "Patterns of Conflict." 175.

³⁵ Osinga, *Science, Strategy, and War*, 229. As noted by Osinga, Boyd's only graphical representation of the OODA loop did not appear until 1995 in Boyd's final contribution to *A Discourse, The Essence of Winning and Losing*.

³⁶ Lind. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. 5-7.

³⁷ The OODA loop itself is often oversimplified, which further complicates these issues. This study does not have the ability to address the specific current misunderstanding of Boyd's OODA Loop. For a detailed analysis of this issue see USMC Major Paul Tremblay's unpublished master's thesis, "Shaping and Adapting: Unlocking the Power of Colonel John Boyd's OODA Loop," at <http://www.pogoarchives.org/straus/shaping-and-adapting-boyd-20150422.pdf>.

³⁸ Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept*. 8.

³⁹ Ibid. MAGTF acronym utilized in MOC stands for Marine Air Ground Task Force.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 10.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Boyd. *Patterns of Conflict*. 115.

⁴³ Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. FMFM 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, (March 6, 1989):75.; Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. MCDP 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, (June 20, 1997): 94.

⁴⁴ The Ellis Group. "21st Century Maneuver Warfare: Absorbing the Lessons." *Marine Corps Gazette* 100, no. 11, (November 2016): 36-37.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 37, 39.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 39-40.

⁴⁷ The Ellis Group. "21st Century Maneuver: Mastering the Maneuver Spaces." *Marine Corps Gazette* 101, no. 2, (February 2017): 73.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 73.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 74-75.

⁵⁰ HQMC. *Warfighting*, MCDP-1. 72. Of note, this expanded definition of

⁵¹ Gregory A. Thiele. "The Warfighting Skills Program: An Opportunity—Take Advantage of It." *Marine Corps Gazette* 100, no. 8, (August 2016): 53.

⁵² Daniel A. O'Hara. "The Re(al) Awakening" Thoughts on the Direction of the Postwar Marine Corps." *Marine Corps Gazette* 98, no. 5, (May 2014): 47.

⁵³ Daniel R. Grazier and William S. Lind. "Maneuver Warfare: Making it real in the Marine Corps." *Marine Corps Gazette* 99, no. 4, (April 2015): 24.

⁵⁴ Daniel R. Grazier. "A Manœuvre Renaissance" Overcoming the Attritionist Tendency." *Marine Corps Gazette* 99, no. 6, (June 2015): 57.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 58.

⁵⁶ Ian Brown. "Letters: Maneuver Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* 99 no. 8, (August 2015): 6.

⁵⁷ HQMC. *Warfighting*, FMFM-1. Foreword.

⁵⁸ Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online. "philosophy," accessed January 8, 2017. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/philosophy>.

⁵⁹ HQMC. *Warfighting*, FMFM-1. Foreword.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 59.

⁶¹ Ibid. 58.

⁶² Dan Grazier, "The Creation of *Warfighting*, with John Schmitt," *Pentagon Labyrinth*, Straus Military Reform Project, Project on Government Oversight, podcast audio, November 28, 2016.

<http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/military-people-and-ideas/2016/podcast-the-creation-of.html>.

⁶³ Coram. Boyd. 388.

⁶⁴ The author conducted the search in the *Marine Corps Gazette* digital archives at https://www.mca-marines.org/magazine-archive-search?search_api_views_fulltext=%22Maneuver+Warfare%22. Articles were not analyzed for their understanding of maneuver warfare, only the amount of substance surrounding the term's use.

⁶⁵ William S. Lind. "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* 72 no. 1, (January 1988): 16-17.

- ⁶⁶ Kevin R. Clover. "Maneuver Warfare: Where are We Now." *Marine Corps Gazette* 72 no. 2, (February 1988): 54-59; Michael D. Wyly. "Ideas for Changing Doctrine." *Marine Corps Gazette* 72 no. 8, (August 1988): 41-43; Michael D. Wyly. "Operational Handbook 6-1, *Ground Combat Operations*." *Marine Corps Gazette* 72 no. 7, (July 1988): 30-31.
- ⁶⁷ John F. Schmitt. "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine." *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 no. 11, (November 1990): 90-100.
- ⁶⁸ Andrew D. Walker. "An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* 75 no. 11, (November 1991): 48-51.
- ⁶⁹ David C. Andersen. "Misnamed Doctrine Misleading." *Marine Corps Gazette* 75 no. 6, (June 1991): 26.
- ⁷⁰ General Alfred M. Gray to Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Undated, General Alfred M. Gray Papers, Archives and Special Collections Branch. Library of the Marine Corps, Box 6, Folder Alfred M. Gray P.C. 2580 CMC Guidance on Improved Training and Education Jul 1989, Coll. 2580. A comment in paragraph two references recent HASC testimony on 12 July 1988, which indicates that the letter is likely from late 1988. It also provides a suspense date of 1 April 1989 (less than a year away).
- ⁷¹ Ibid. 1.
- ⁷² Ibid. 2.
- ⁷³ Ibid. 3.
- ⁷⁴ Director, Command and Staff College to Distribution List, Report of Course Content Review Board (CCRB) and Action Required for AY 1988-1989, 16 May 1988, Command and Staff College, Administration 1988-1989, Box 1, Folder: Course Content Review Board, 8-9.
- ⁷⁵ Director Amphibious Warfare School to AWS Faculty and Staff, Amphibious Warfare School Box 57, Course Content Review Board 1987-1989, Folder CCRB AY-90, 1.
- ⁷⁶ Dan Grazier, "The Creation of *Warfighting*, with John Schmitt," *Pentagon Labyrinth*, Straus Military Reform Project, Project on Government Oversight, podcast audio, November 28, 2016. <http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/military-people-and-ideas/2016/podcast-the-creation-of.html>; General Alfred M. Gray, Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, and John Schmitt. "Warfighting Panel," YouTube video, March 26, 2015, 1:23:29, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RL4_NVYByw.
- ⁷⁷ Dan Grazier, "The Creation of *Warfighting*, with John Schmitt," *Pentagon Labyrinth*, Straus Military Reform Project, Project on Government Oversight, podcast audio, November 28, 2016. <http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/military-people-and-ideas/2016/podcast-the-creation-of.html>.
- ⁷⁸ Director, Command and Staff College to Distribution List, Report of Course Content Review Board (CCRB) and Action Required for AY 1988-1989, 16 May 1988, Command and Staff College, Administration 1988-1989, Box 1, Folder: Course Content Review Board, 8-9; Syllabus, Theory and Nature of War, Class Title: USMC History and Doctrine, 30 August 1994, Command and Staff College, Syllabi 1994-1995, Box 3, Folder: 3100 Theory and Nature of War (Original) 1994, 60-61; Weekly Schedule, Command Staff College (Week 22), Command and Staff College, Administration and Miscellaneous 1997-1998, Box 1, Folder: Schedules; Weekly Schedule, Command and Staff College (Week 18), 2 Dec 99, Command and Staff College, Administration 1999-2000, Box 1, Folder: Schedules; Warfighting...From The Sea Warfighting Course Card, 4 Aug 08, Command and Staff College, Administration 08-09, Box 9, Folder: Warfighting Lessons 1201-1205 Syllabus AY 08-09: AY 16-17 Course Card, Lesson Title: WS 3210, Modern Theorists: Boyd, Maneuver Warfare and MCDP-1, 14 Oct 16.
- ⁷⁹ Command and Staff College is used as a main example because it was collocated with the newly established Marine Corps University and the availability of archival material.
- ⁸⁰ Command and Staff Planning Calendar AY 89-90, Week 5, Command and Staff College, Administration 1989-1990, Box 1, Folder: Planning Calendar.
- ⁸¹ Syllabus, Theory and Nature of War 23 August- 15 September 1989, Command and Staff College 1989-1990 Administration, Box 2, Folder: Command and Staff Writing Program/Syllabi/Lesson Plans, 22-26.
- ⁸² Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Va, Theory and Nature of War (Syllabus), Academic Year 1990-1991, Command and Staff College, Syllabi 90-91, Box 3, Folder C(C)3100 Syllabus: Theory and Nature of War, 35-36, 311-317.
- ⁸³ Theory and Nature of War Course Card, Command and Staff College, Syllabi 1991-992, Box 2, Folder: C(C)3100 Syllabus Theory and Nature of War.
- ⁸⁴ Weekly Schedule, Command Staff College (Week 22), Command and Staff College, Administration and Miscellaneous 1997-1998, Box 1, Folder: Schedules.
- ⁸⁵ HQMC. *Warfighting*, MCDP-1. Foreword.

⁸⁶ Dan Grazier, "The Creation of *Warfighting*, with John Schmitt," *Pentagon Labyrinth*, Straus Military Reform Project, Project on Government Oversight, podcast audio, November 28, 2016.

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⁸⁷ HQMC. *Warfighting*, MCDP-1. 72.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 73.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Foreword.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Foreword, Preface.

⁹¹ John F. Schmitt. "If Not Synchronization, What?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 1, (January 1997): 54-60;

Irvin E. Evans III. Untitled Letter, *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 1, (January 1997): 10.

⁹² J.L. Jones. "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare." *Marines* 33, no. 1 (January 2004): 1. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 27, 2016).

⁹³ Ibid. 4.

⁹⁴ Colonel John Kennan, USMC (Ret), "Editorial: Don't Ask Don't Tell." *Marine Corps Gazette* 94, no. 5, (May 2010): 3.

⁹⁵ Course Syllabi, Chapter 2 Command and Staff College, Command and Staff College, Administration 1999-2000, Box 1, Folder: Syllabi of Instruction, 18.

⁹⁶ Weekly Schedule, Command and Staff College (Week 18), 2 Dec 99, Command and Staff College, Administration 1999-2000, Box 1, Folder: Schedules.

⁹⁷ Weekly Schedule, Command and Staff College (Week 23), 19 Dec 02, Command and Staff College, Administration 2002-2003, Box 1, Folder: Schedules.

⁹⁸ *Warfighting*. . . From The Sea *Warfighting* Course Card, 4 Aug 08, Command and Staff College, Administration 08-09, Box 9, Folder: *Warfighting* Lessons 1201-1205 Syllabus AY 08-09. The author taught the *Warfighting* Discussion group during his time as an instructor at The Basic School from 2013-2016.

⁹⁹ HQMC. *Warfighting*, MCDP-1. Foreword.

¹⁰⁰ In this study, primacy is interpreted to coincide with the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Primacy is defined as "the state of being first (as in importance, order, or rank)." *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* Online. "primacy," accessed January 29, 2017.

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Year	Month	Title	Author	Comments
1979	Dec	Winning Through Maneuver Conclusion-Countering the Defense	Capt S.W. Miller	Mentions Maneuver Warfare by name at the end of the article. Majority of article is focused on physical/spatial maneuver.
	Oct	Letter- Only a Beginning	William S. Lind	Discusses recently completed much training. Talks about maneuver warfare specifically and addresses some of the topics in his handbook
1980	Mar	Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps	William S. Lind	Explanation of Maneuver Warfare. Mentions the mental component. Focuses on physical maneuver to achieve cognitive effects. Additional topics maneuver vs attrition. Simplified OODA.
	Jun	Letter- Maneuver Warfare Well Done	Col J.C. Studt	Reply to Lind's defining MW article. Call for Marine Corps to rise to the challenge.
	Jul	More Mobility for Today's Threat	Larry R. Williams	Mentions Maneuver warfare. Appears to be largely focused on positional/spatial maneuver through mechanization.
	Aug	Sen Gary Hart is High on the Harrier	Anonymous	Brief mention of Marine Corps commitment to maneuver warfare
	Sep	Some Lessons from Israelis	William C. Fite	Discusses maneuver warfare and uses examples from the Israelis.
	Nov	Letter- Curriculum Clarified	LtCol Michael D. Wyly	Response to Sept Fite article demonstrating positives of the current AWS curriculum.
1981	Mar	Tally Ho-Pounce or Heads Up	Bruce G Brown	Several References to Maneuver Warfare--Physical Spatial Focus
	Apr	The 'Maneuver Warfare' Concept	Wilson, Wyly, Lind, Trainor	Defining and clarifying the concept
	Jun	Letters- Replies to Col Brown Article	Maj K.L. Thompson	Reply to Brown's article. References Maneuver Warfare twice...also seems physical focused
	Jun	Thinking Beyond the Cockpit	William S. Lind	Mentions maneuver warfare 2 times...no explanation, more commentary on professionalism difference between ground and aviation officers
	Aug	Letter-Maneuver Warfare	G. I. Wilson	Reply and Challenge to some of Gen Trainor's Comments
	Sep	Tactics in Maneuver Warfare	William S. Lind	Defining and demonstrating tactics in maneuver warfare. MW is not a new formula, but a replacement for formulas. Defines tactics as a process of combining two elements, techniques and education, through three mental "filter" or reference points, mission-type orders, the search for enemy surfaces and gaps, and the focus of our own main effort, with the object of producing a unique approach for the specific enemy, time and place. Discusses maneuver warfare as not a way of moving but a way of thinking.
	Sep	Book Review- The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S> Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf	David A. Quinlan	Mentions book authors call to adopt a maneuver warfare doctrine
	Oct	Maneuver Warfare Board at Lejeune	Anonymous	News type article confirming the establishment of the maneuver warfare board at Camp Lejeune. Lists suggested Articles to read
	Nov	Maneuver Warfare Training	Anonymous	News type informational coverage of a 2 MarDiv MW training exercise
	Nov	The Merits of Military History	Terrence P. Murray	Discusses examples of maneuver warfare in history. Doesn't counter the subject, but suggests it is not as novel as its proponents seem to think
	Dec	A Critique of ECP 9-5, 1981 Edition	William S. Lind	Uses the critique of the publication to identify concepts of maneuver warfare.
	Dec	LAV Quo Vadis?	Kenneth W. Estes	Improper Development of LAV--potential correct use--several references to maneuver warfare
	Dec	The 'tacwar' Wargame	C A Leader	Wargames to improve decision making...mentions Boyd Theory
	Dec	LCAC and the Lift Dilemma: Sandbags. Rice Bowls. And Pandora's Box	John G. Miller	Article about LCAC...references Maneuver Warfare once
	Dec	Letters-MCCRES	Capt P.R. Pucket	Reviews MCCRES mentions the continual discussion of maneuver warfare
	Dec	The Concept of Strategy	Mark F. Cancian	Mentions Maneuver Warfare once...initial context seems physical/spatial
1982	Jan	Food Service and Maneuver Warfare	PJ Klepper II	Restructuring Food service to support Maneuver Warfare--physical/mobility focus
	Jan	Maneuver/Fluid Warfare: A Review of the Concepts	GI Wilson	Defines, Explains, and Defends
	Jan	Letter- Intelligence and Maneuver warfare/Maneuver Warfare	Robinson/Greg or	For/against--more against Lind than the Concept
	Jan	Engineer Support: The Key to Successful Mechanization	Skipper	As title suggests. Brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Feb	Current Training and Maneuver Warfare	Bryan N Lavender	Argues for changes to training to support maneuver warfare
	Feb	Letters-Guerrilla Warfare	Leader	Why no talk of Guerilla warfare? "inexpensive maneuver warfare"
	Mar	Comments on Maneuver Warfare	R.H. Voight	Counterpoint on maneuver warfare--partial validity
	Mar	TWSEAS and Maneuver Warfare	G.R. Wright	challenge maneuver warfare to TWSEAS
	Mar	2d MARDIV Maneuver Warfare Study	Anonymous	News type release discussing Boyd delivering Patterns of Conflict to 2dMARDIV...brief summary, mentions OODA loop
	Mar	Letters Readings on Maneuver Warfare	Cunningham	Response to Readings on Maneuver Warfare to get more book titles
	Apr	Maneuver Warfare Roadmap	Bruce G Brown	Potential Changes required to develop and adopt Maneuver Warfare

	Apr	Reexamining Maneuver Warfare	Gordon Batchellar	Counterpoint on maneuver warfare
	Apr	Letters/2 letters	Phaneuf/Glasgow	For--applauds look into logistical considerations/against
	May	Maneuver Warfare Roadmap	Bruce G Brown	Part 2 to article of same name
	May	Editors and Authors		Mentions Browns Maneuver Warfare Roadmap at bottom
	May	Letters- In Defense of Mr. Lind	Brown	Defends Lind and his contributions to the discussion
	Jun	Why the German Example	William S. Lind	Explaining relationship of maneuver warfare to Germans
	Jun	Rommel's Maxims Revisited	Lavender	Uses Rommel's 'maxims' as a point of departure to understanding MW concepts
	Jun	Letters	Stokes/Robeson/Wyly	3 separate letters--For?
	Jul	Letters-More Readings on Maneuver Warfare	Col Collins	As title suggests...
	Jul	How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare	FD Dunn	Book Review
	Jul	A Perspective: 'On Infantry'		Book Review--calls a requisite for understanding MW
	Aug	Defending Maneuver Concepts	GI Wilson, WA Woods	Counter to LtCol Batchellor's Apr Article
	Aug	Phantoms, Intruders, and Marines	LG Karch	Importance of Aviation in MW
	Aug	Letters-Maneuver Warfare	Wilson	Reply to Col Browns Maneuver Warfare roadmap
	Aug	On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kipper War	Hart	Book Review--references coordination to support maneuver warfare present in the text
	Aug	Mechanization: United or Divided	Carter	Physical/mechanization focus
	Sep	Maneuver Warfare and the MAGTF	JD Burke	As title suggests, defines and compares to attrition/suggests improving firepower and attrition
	Sep	Seven Principles of Soviet Tactical Doctrine	Belilacqua	Soviet Form of maneuver warfare
	Sep	Letters - Lets Learn From Everybody	Slipetsky	Talk about the when, why how of MW, not origin--in response to Lind's "Why the German Example"
	Sep	Global Flexibility	Sheridan	Focus on Amphibious Ops..brief mention of MW
	Oct	Are we Training to Bn First-String Players or Cheerleaders	Twomey	Mentions maneuver warfare at the end--thinks Marine Corps has lost its way in training
	Oct	Can Marines Fight	Hansen	Focus on close combat training, mentions age of MW
	Nov	Combined Arms Properly Understood	MC Chisum	Importance of Aviation in MW, thinks Lind devalues its use
	Nov	Extending the Battlefield	Murray	extending the battlefield due to technological challenge...Brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Nov	Letters-Defending the LAVs	Ronald Brown	LAVs use for maneuver warfare
	Dec	The Mission and 'the offensive spirit'	Robeson, Karch, Moore, Wyly, Burke	Response to Maj Brukes Sep Article and his rebuttal
	Dec	Comments on the 'relamenting'	Estes	AAV officers ...Maneuver warfare to bn level
	Dec	The AAV Maintenance Shuffle	Karl's	Importance and recommendations for AAV maintenance ISO MW
	Dec	The Lament Substantiated	Roby	AAV uses....some mention of MW
	Dec	Logistic Support for Mechanized Units	Saunders	As title suggests...brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Dec	Amphibious Operation at Vihn	Besch	Proposed mission at Vihn in Vietnam. Mentions Amphibious Maneuver warfare potential still exists
	Dec	The Evolving Role of Attack Helicopters	Quinter	Mentions MW up front and then makes suggestions as to how attack helicopters should be used
1983	Jan	Beyond the Beachhead	Wyly	Reply to Burke-Examples of maneuver in amphibious operations
	Jan	Editors and Authors		Overview of articles in this issue
	Jan	Letters- No Maneuver MAGTF??	Estes	Response to Burke's Sep 82 Article
	Jan	Future Conflict and the Lessons of Vietnam	Cancian	Brief mention of maneuver warfare as one possible strategic solution
	Feb	Major General Edward A. Wilcox for Professional Writing 1982	Anonymous	Announces writing award at least 4 of the 9 articles mentioned discussed maneuver warfare including the top runner up
	Feb	Soviet Defense Against an Amphibious Assault	Baxter	only reference to another article at the end (from editors)
	Mar	War without Firepower	Wyly	Discusses the debate...talks both sides (attrition and maneuver) advocates a firepower in maneuver
	Mar	Its Time for Realistic Engineer Training	Skipper	Training engineers in support of maneuver warfare--mentions frequency of topic in the Gazette
	Mar	Maneuver Tactics and the Art of War	Leader	Looking at Maneuver and Attrition, discusses how we educate officers to think about warfare...confusion in the name maneuver warfare
	Mar	Better Logistics Training	Lyng	Mentions Current training and maneuver warfare article in last sentence of the article
	Apr	MAGTFs and the Tactical Defense	Robeson	Uses math to refute maneuver warfare--"danger is becoming enamored with maneuver warfare"--reply to Burke and Wyly
	Apr	Letters-2 Separate letters	Scharfen, MA Woods	Replies applauding Wyly's beyond the beach head
	May	MEWSG and Operation Employment	Whitfield	Aircraft and Aircraft support ISO MW

	May	Letters- Lamenting an Arty Lament	Steitz	Criticizing authors who argue against maneuver warfare because it may affect their MOS
	Jun	A Second Mission for the Corps	Robeson	Suggests mountain warfare as secondary mission...mentions maneuver warfare in relation to it
	Jul	Remembering Another Kind of War	Palladino	Draws on Lessons of Vietnam...mentions MW up front...seems to equate with mechanization, discusses debate
	Jul	Letters_ Capabilities and Missions	Wyly	Response to Robeson's Response to his article
	Jul	Toward a New Amphibious Tactical Concept	Rothwell	brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Aug	Recon: A Neglected Supporting Arm	Parker	As title suggests, ties importance of reconnaissance to MW
	Aug	Wheels for Reconnaissance	Waddill	Motorized Reconnaissance ISO MW
	Sep	Those Confusing M's	Wyly	Discussion of the misuse of maneuver, movement, mechanization and motorization--counters theme from last year that MW=mechanization
	Sep	Views from PP&O: An Interview with LtGen Benard E. Trainor	Scharfen	As title suggests...3 questions in relation to maneuver warfare
	Sep	Letters-Stay Light to Maneuver	Walker (USAF)	Challenges thought of maneuver warfare and professionalism of Marines
	Oct	Preparing for the Press In Combat	Gigure	brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Oct	The Defensive Naval Campaign an Appropriate Mission	Stein	Focus on naval campaign--maneuver warfare is not the solution
	Oct	LAV and the Amphibious Assault	Hamilton	As title suggests, brief reference to high ammo consumption in high speed maneuver warfare
	Oct	Letters-The Priority Problem	Batchellor	Critique of a bunch of different things...to say policy makers need to prioritize
	Oct	German Training and Tactics: An Interview with Col Pestke	Anonymous	Although it only mentions maneuver warfare once, the article address questions that develop an understanding..."Col Pestke's comments are of particular interest because much has been written in military journals over the last few years about German tactics and maneuver warfare. His answers to questions validated many of the things that have been said. He also gave us a more complete understanding of the German model and its similarities and differences compared to U.S. Services. Most important, Col Pestke provided some professional notes from which all Marines may profit."
	Nov	Letters-Tactical Deception	Raub	Deception in Maneuver Warfare in response to Aug 83 article by Baxter
	Dec	Countering the EW threat	Dean	brief mention of maneuver warfare
1984	Feb	The Hammer	Dunjev	Counter to articles calling soviet high mobility war maneuver warfare
	Feb	Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union	Owens	Book Review-mentions Maneuver warfare
	Mar	Battlefield Mobility and Survivability of the MAGTF	Marapoti	As title suggests...largely physical/spatial focus
	May	The Legacy of J.C. Breckenridge	Moore	References Maneuver warfare and spike in education
	Jun	Preparing for Maneuver Warfare	William S. Lind	How the Marine Corps can prepare as an institution to adopt maneuver warfare
	Jun	A Traveling Command Post	Berger	Command Post Ideas in support of MW
	Jun	Command, Control, and communications Countermeasures	Raub	Subject to support/compliment maneuver warfare
	Jun	Specializing the logistics field	Armstrong	"This subject certainly won't get the attention that marathon-training techniques and an improved fitness report system receive, and it will never rival maneuver warfare versus firepower/ attrition for column inches in the GAZETTE, but it deserves a little attention now and then."
	Jun	Editors and Authors		Intro to articles in this edition
	Jul	Maneuver Warfare at Tinian-1944	Brown	Case to display maneuver warfare...although initial sentence references principles of war
	Aug	Letters- Educational Philosophy	Ing	Mentions Moore's article, says maneuver warfare is nothing new
	Sep	Commentary "Preparing for Maneuver Warfare	Multiple	Series of mixed replies on Lind's article
	Sep	Anzio-A Sedentary Affair	Tharp	Discusses Anzio-then discusses maneuver warfare as potential response to lessons learned
	Sep	Force in Readiness Revived	Russell	Mentions maneuver warfare in relation to vehicles at the expo
	Sep	AWS- A Graduates Perspective	Ryan	No direct mention to Maneuver warfare, but discusses the good things the school is doing in relation to these concepts (search hit was from a dagger reference at the bottom of the article)....can be used in education discussion of paper
	Oct	The Defense Reform Debate	Wyly	Book Review--mention of maneuver warfare
	Nov	Letters-Wrong on PUC	Kendell	Response to Tinian article, subject as title suggests
1985	Jan	Setting Up Training Library	Hammes	One of the lists is for maneuver warfare related books
	Jan	History of Blitzkrieg	Stewart	Book-Review- single reference at the end suggesting adherents of MW read the book
	Jan	Letters-Mobile Logistics	Wilson	Reply to Lt Tharp's article--discusses logistics ISO MW
	Jan	Rear Area Security: The Threat Pt 1	Lavender	brief mention of MW at the end. Saying we don't focus on rear area security and soviets attack it
	Feb	The LAV: Marshalling its Capabilities	Ealum	only reference to another article at the end (from editors)

	Mar	Law Enforcement/Security Problems	Atkinson	Mentions lack of attention for subject in comparison to MW among other things
	Mar	Flawed Strategic Thinking, Too Singular a Focus	Owens	Mention MW, brief intro to concept and relation to strategy
	May	Questions for Marine Aviation	Lind, Etter	References ground interest in maneuver warfare and study to denounce aviators ³
	Jun	Questions for Marine Aviation	Lind, Etter	Aviation tactics--ISO maneuver warfare, pt 2 of previous article
	Jun	Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Big Horn	Millet	Book review single reference to MW at the end
	Jul	Combat Intelligence in a maneuver environment	Bevilacqua	As title suggests...appears to equate MW with positional maneuver and potentially an over reliance on intelligence
	Jul	Letters-The Next War	Decker	Reply to The Soviet Myopia...mentions MW "not an attack on MW"
	Sep	Maneuver, Attrition of the Tactics of Mistake	Anderson	Maneuver as a mental aspect--explains and advocates tactics of mistake--appears to be a mix of the 2...implies he thinks they are mutually exclusive
	Oct	Protecting Reconnaissance Assets	Rosenau	Alternative approach to RFA around Recon assets to aid ISO MW
	Oct	Air Delivery: A Forgotten Friend	Adams	Logistics/Air delivery--mentions benefit in MW environment
	Dec	Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare	Trimble	Book review...relates it to MW
	Dec	The Destruction of the Soviet Air Defense System	Caldwell	Mentions implications in maneuver warfare
1986	Jan	Maneuver Warfare Handbook	Sanford	Book Review- negative assessment
	Jan	Comm Jamming: What it Means	Lewis	Singular mention of maneuver warfare with no follow discussion--focused on Soviet Capabilities
	Feb	Osprey: Force Multiplier	Hanifen	Mentions Maneuver Warfare, Boyd, Lind and talks about how the Osprey can be a force multiplier
	Apr	Special Trust and Confidence 1986	Duke	single mention of maneuver warfare debate
	Apr	The Mechanized Battlefield: A Tactical Analysis	Trimble	Book Review--Discusses portion of the book by maneuver/mobility "disciple"--mobility focuses
	Jul	Lt Ski- A Man for all Seasons	Haley	Only mentioned in a dagger by editors
	Aug	Forrest War: Putting the Fight Back...	Robeson	War is more complex than maneuver or firepower-attrition models suggest
	Aug	Military Reform and Military History	Davis	Discusses MW and subject items--against MW..calls it over sold
	Aug	America Can Win	Funk	Book Review- Author Discusses the Military Reform Movement and his experience in 2dMARDIV with MW
	Sep	The Lessons of the Recent Wars in the Third World Vol 1	Trainor	Book Review-single reference to maneuver warfare
	Nov	Letters-Maneuver (2)	Decker/batchell or	Reply to Robeson and Davis Articles...bridges gap for those who think maneuverist exclude all firepower. Both discrediting MW
	Dec	Money	Loschiavo	Singular mention of maneuver warfare with no follow discussion
	Dec	So, You're Going Back to the FMF	Beeler	Brief Mention of Maneuver warfare and associated concepts
1987	Jan	Sorting out Maneuver and Attrition	Batchellor	Book Review- Relevant to the Discussion
	Feb	Generals Speak Up, or do they	Etter	Calls out Generals for not participating in the MW debate
	Feb	Cold Weather CSS	Hulbert II, Lloyd	single mention of fast moving maneuver warfare tactics
	Mar	World Wide Mechanization Surveyed	Besch	Book Review- Singular reference to MW, mobility/movement focused
	May	The Education of a Naval Aviator	Lapiska	Why he volunteered to be an air officer? He wanted to learn MW and big picture of the Marine Corps
	May	Letters-Understanding Combined Arms	Edson	Mention of MW Handbook and its definition of combined arms
	Jul	Reflex Sights and Night Sights	Sparks	Singular mention in the intro--article on night optics
	Nov	Another Assessment of the M1A1	Neller	As title suggests, mere mention of MW
	Nov	Thinking About Warfare	Shutler	Rethinking warfare-technological changes
	Dec	Critiquing the Critic-Edward L Luttwak	Owens	single mention of maneuver warfare as a panacea
1988	Jan	Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare	William S. Lind	Counters as title suggests
	Jan	Tactical Mobility and Minefield Breaching	Marapoti	hit on search because of quote from MW Handbook
	Feb	Countering the Rear Area Threat	Sayen	Mention of need to focus on rear areas because of maneuver warfare
	Feb	Maneuver Warfare: Where are we Now?	Clover	As title suggests
	Mar	Observations on Decision Making in Battle	Schmitt	As title suggests
	Apr	Fundamentals of Maneuver	Anonymous	Examples from OH 6-1
	Apr	The Operational Art	William S. Lind	Operational Art, Operational Level of war and relationship to MW
	Apr	The Asymmetrical Ace	Edson	Response to Shutler Article. "But it can provide those who stick with it new insight into maneuver warfare, operational art, and general military theory. I hope it gets wide attention." A couple of direct references but relevant discussion
	Apr	Letters-2 letters	Davis, Studt	Two letters in response to Lind's misconceptions
	Apr	Adding Perspective to the Light Armor Debate	Besch	As title suggests, references Jan Articles
	May	Meeting the RAS Threat	Heidman	Brief mention of MW at the end...CSS will need to defend rear areas in MW
	May	Training TACC Marines	Jonas	Mention of Implications in relation to MW in final paragraph
	Jun	The Next Agenda: Military Reform	Lind	Challenges to the Marine Corps, including MW

	Jul	Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground Combat Operations	Wyly	Review of the handbook, presence of MW and obviousness of completion by committee
	Jul	The Next Agenda: Military Reform	Lind	Part 2 to article of same name
	Aug	Ideas for Changing Doctrine	Wyly	As title suggests, how to create a series of doctrine that accepts maneuver warfare ***suggests name MW is not important***
	Aug	A Window on the Future of Amphibious Warfare Kernel Blitz 88-1	Rothwell	Review of training exercise--free play to test MW in amphibious settings
	Sep	Why Some Win and others Lose	Wyly	Book Review--Detailed and integrates maneuver warfare
	Oct	A Useful Case Study	Greenwood	Book Review-singular mention of MW
	Oct	Clausewitz or Jomini	Aucoin	"William S. Lind, in a recent Gazette article, acknowledges the misconception that maneuver warfare is just a formula for flank attacks. He argues, as I'm sure Gen Jomini would, that maneuver warfare is not a formula for anything. "It is a way of thinking . . . that recognizes that each combat situation is different and, therefore, requires a unique approach." (See MCG, Jan88.)"May
	Oct	Mental Wanderings Military Brilliance	Schmitt	Book Review--Compares Marine Corps Efforts at reform with Marine Corps Current debate
	Oct	Letters-Intelligence-the Achilles Heel	Marx	As title suggests-no context reference
	Nov	But, Can they Fight	Ettore	singular mention of maneuver warfare with no context
	Dec	New Tanks for the Old: How Marines Should Think About Armored Vehicles	Gudmundsson	Brief mention of MW
1989	Jan	Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Company and Battalion Size Units	Karch, McGrath	Small Section on MW
	Feb	Letters-	Kiley	Reference to MW
	Mar	Jacks of All Trades-Masters of One: Its time to change the MOS Assignment System	Ryan	Avoid overspecialization--Non Combat arms lack understanding of foundational doctrine
	Mar	TWSEAS: A Practical Training System for the FMF	Martello	Section on use with MW
	Mar	Letters- 2 letters	Weinmann/Kolber	References MW mission type orders and LCpl Rother, and a response to Gudmundsson article about M1A1
	Mar	TBS: The Genesis of Marine Professional Military Education	Anonymous	As Title Suggests--mentions MW is several parts
	Apr	When Maneuver Fails	Anderson	Not completely against, but again advocates it is a subcomponent
	Apr	Editors and Authors		Intro to articles, but actually discusses the debate
	Apr	The Art of MAGTF Warfare	Moore	Discussion about maneuver warfare and the MAGTF, suggests part of the problem has been the maneuverers poor job of explaining their theory
	Apr	Combined Arms Warfare	Draude Krulak, Appleton, Hegna, Lind	Cursory mention to evaluators at CAX understanding MW
	Apr	Some Facts on the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle	Zeitfuss	Mention at end of article
	May	Marine Air: Look to the Battlefield then Practice it in Peace	Etter	Section on Aviation in MW
	May	Letters-Strengths of the Corps	Klimp	Well-Done to AWS in prep of Cpts
	May	Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation	Lind	As Title Suggests
	May	Editors and Authors		Intro to articles in this edition
	Jun	The M1A1- Too Much of a Good Thing	Gunzelman	Tank integration into the Marine Corps. "The Marine Corps must either change its equipment and organization to effectively employ its tank assets, or it must change its concept of operation."
	Jun	Enemy-Oriented Operations, What Makes them Hard?	Anderson	as title suggests. Further explanation on his point of view
	Jun	Letters- 2 Letters	Borror/Henders on	MW and CAX/Against the OODA loop and oriented toward MW
	Jun	Observations on Fire Support and Maneuver	Pitts	Need Fire Support techniques to standardize fire support with new MW doctrine
	Jul	Marine Marksmanship Have we Lost it	Tillotson	One reason marksmanship suffering because of maneuver emphasis on suppression
	Jul	CAX-Beating the Strongpoint	Walker	Mentions MW at the end
	Aug	The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare	Saxman	Counter Argument to Lind's Article--advocates aviation as a maneuver unit
	Aug	Airpower on the Maneuver Battlefield	Menton	As title suggests
	Aug	Implementing Enemy Oriented Operations	Anderson	Continuation of the Author's Argument
	Aug	Understanding Survivability	Ponnwitz	Multiple Reviews/Criticisms of Lind's MW/Aviation article
	Sep	A Marine For All Seasons Maneuver Warfare Vs Low-intensity Conflict	Hayden	MW not totally applicable in low-intensity conflict
	Sep	PME Workshop Held	Anonymous	Announcement of PM workshop at TBS (130 instructors)
	Sep	Letters- 2 Letters	Copeland/Hobbs	References to Maneuver Warfare
	Sep	C^Sup 3^Cm...A warfighting Strategy Whose Time Has Arrived	Cubillo, Watters	As title suggests
	Oct	A Primer on Maneuver Warfare	Brickhouse	As title Suggests

				"On 1 September Gen AM. Gray addressed a conference attended by some 70 senior logistics officers from commands throughout the Corps. The following points, which identify some of the logistics challenges facing Marines in the years ahead, were highlighted in his remarks."
	Oct	Comments on Logistics	Gray	
	Oct	Letters-Stick With Maneuver	Hoffman	Reply to Anderson's Enemy-Oriented Ops
	Oct	LAI: Light Armored Cavalry	de Camp	LAI use in MW
	Oct	Marine Corps University Established at Quantico	Wyly	As title suggests
	Nov	The Great FMFM-1 Debate: Is there anything New Here	Schmitt	As title suggests
	Nov	Our Warfighting Philosophy	Lloyd	As suggested, explanation of the warfighting philosophy
	Nov	Critique of FMFM-1 Warfighting	Robeson	As title suggests--thinks the manual pretty much got it right
	Nov	Letters- ACE and Maneuver Warfare	Treichler	Response to Previous articles about ACE in MW
	Dec	The Force	Hoffman	Mention of MW, reference to Army article
1990	Jan	A Case for the Corps	Peterson	Book Review, Single Mention No MW Substance
	Jan	A Case Study of Tactical Evolution	Jackson	Book Review, Single Mention No MW Substance
	Jan	The Constants of War	Delaney	Book Review, minor substance
	Jan	Multiple Launch Rocket System- A Look at the Future	Williams	Single Mention No MW Substance
	Jan	Sea based Logistics: Viable or Not	Labreque	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Jan	Combat Service Support at the High End of the Spectrum	McGovern	Single Mention No MW Substance
	Feb	Critical Parts for Maneuver Warfare	Violette	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Feb	Dunkirk: The Amphibious Antithesis	Bushnell	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Feb	Recruit Training: The Need For Harmony Between Goals and Methods	Garvey	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Mar	Communications and Maneuver Warfare	Moore	As title suggests
	Mar	Civil War Warriors	Zackary	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Mar	F/A-18D and the Armed Reconnaissance Mission	Macak	Single Mention No MW Substance
	Apr	MajGen Edward A. Wilcox Award for Professional Writing, 1989	Anonymous	Two references, no substance
	Apr	TDG #90-1	Schmitt	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Focusing on the Process: Closing of the Military Design	Wehrle	Book Review--Single Reference, no MW substance
	Apr	State of the Union: The Navy-Marine Corps Team	Murray	Two references, no substance
	Apr	The Flash of the Kingfisher	McKenzie	Single reference, no substance
	May	Discussion Groups Alive and Well	Anonymous	Single reference, no MW substance....does indicate outside professional discussion
	May	Heinl and Geiger Awards Announced	Anonymous	Single reference, no substance
	May	Aviation Posture Statement	Pitman	Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Editors and Authors	Greenwood	Two references, no substance
	Jun	Sword/Shield Antitank Employment	Gould	Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Light Infantry Tactics	Lind	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Jun	Light Infantry and Vietnam: Why Generals Need to Study Tactics	Wyly	Single Reference, No MW Substance
	Jun	Dismantling the Pipeline an Introduction to Light Infantry Logistics	Kuntz	Single Reference, No MW Substance
	Jun	Letters	Kroelinger	Single Reference, No MW Substance
	Jul	Artillery in Maneuver Warfare	Steen	As Title Suggests
	Jul	Maneuver Warfare in Commercial Board Wargames	Walters	As Title Suggests
	Jul	Silencing their Guns	Mazzara	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Aug	Understanding Maneuver as a Basis for Doctrine	Schmitt	As Title Suggests
	Aug	Letters	Taylor	Maneuver Warfare
	Aug	Recon Pull: A Marriage of 2S and 3S	Moore	Recon Pull and MW
	Aug	Improving Combat Control	Work	Single Reference, No MW Substance
	Sep	Letters	Russell	Two mentions, No MW Substance
	Sep	Comments on TDG #90-1	Anonymous	Single mention, No MW Substance
	Sep	Maritime Special Operations	Magee, Wilson	Single mention, No MW Substance
	Oct	Close Air Support Revisited: Doctrine, Tactics, and Technology	Davis	CAS and MW
	Nov	Prowler: Best for the Future?	Watson	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Nov	Basic Electronic Warrior Training	Bowen	Single mention, No MW Substance
	Nov	Letters	Sullivan	Response to Schmitt's Maneuver as a Basis of Doctrine Article
	Dec	Keeping Up with Navy Doctrine	Gregson	Two References, No MW substance
1991	Jan	A History Lesson from Gen Grant	Burger	Book Review--Two References, minor substance
	Jan	Iraq's Defense of Kuwait and the Battle of Kursk	Szelowski	Single Reference, very minor substance
	Jan	Commentary on Desert Shield	Huddleston	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jan	Putting the "Combat" Back into Combat Engineers: Lessons from Team Spirit-89	Howard, Anderson	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Feb	Amtrack or Assault	Gudmundsson	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Feb	Iwo Jima	Johnson	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Feb	A Leadership Challenge-Pursuing Success and Accepting Failure	Admire	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Feb	Developing a Continuous Operations Capability	McMenamin	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Feb	Solutions to TDG #90-9	Wyly, Hammes	Single Reference, No MW substance

	Mar	Teaching Light Infantry Tactics	Kelley, Smith	As title suggests, MW and Light Infantry
	Mar	Finding the Gaps: Intelligence and MAGTF Warfare	Moore	Single Reference, Minor Substance
	Mar	Editors and Authors	Greenwood	Multiple References, very minor substance in editorial, other references are from articles in the issue
	Mar	MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest Winners	Anonymous	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Mar	AirLand Battle Future	Steen	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Mar	Letters	Gallagher	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Apr	The Future of Forcible Entry	Hoffman	Multiple References, Minor substance
	Apr	Letters--	Bollinger	Letter in Response to Ma Szelowski's Article
	May	Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?	O'Neill, Driscoll	As title suggests
	May	Friedrich Von Bernhardi: Clausewitz Disciple and Prussian Militarist	Baker	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jun	The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare and the Operational Art	Wilson	As title suggests
	Jun	Misnamed Doctrine Misleading	Anderson	As title suggests
	Jun	A Perspective on Desert Storm	Edson	Firepower and MW
	Jun	Real Time Staff Planning Exercises	Lederer	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jun	Military Reform-Where Now?	Jordan	Book Review-- Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Letters	Sullivan	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective	Pierce	Combined Navy Composite Warfare and Marine Amphibious Doctrine and affects on MW
	Jul	Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operations	Bierly, Seal	OTH and MW
	Jul	Operational Art and Amphibious Warfare	Pugh	Multiple References--Appears to be woven throughout
	Jul	Message from the President of the Marine Corps Association	Dailey	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	The Role of Intelligence in the Oriental Concept of Command	Chipman	Single Reference, minor substance
	Aug	MLRS and Maneuver Warfare	Morris	As Title Suggests
	Aug	CH 53Es in the Desert	Montemayor, LeBlanc	Two References, very minor substance
	Aug	Letters	Huffman, Sampson	Multiple References in two articles
	Aug	Perspective on the Corps	Mundy	Multiple References, minor substance
	Aug	LAI in the MEU(SOC)	Cooling	Two references, no substance
	Aug	Why Reinvent the Wheel	Hoffman	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	Letters	Thompson, Batcheller	Multiple References in two articles
	Sep	But What if We'd Had the Osprey	Crouch	Two references, no substance
	Sep	Reflections on the Military Budget	Keiser	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	The 3d Marines in Desert Storm	Admire	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Oct	The Marine Side of the Story	Neven	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Oct	A Conversation with LtGen Royan N. Moore Jr	Ewers	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Nov	An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare	Walker	As Title Suggests
	Dec	Task-Specific Physical Training for Marines: Restoring the 'Grunt' to the Grunts	Henrie	Two references, no substance
	Dec	Our Marksmanship Roots	Stanford	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Dec	OTHAC2 Combines Best Features of GPS and PLRS	Harley	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Dec	Marine Corps Historical Notes from the Gulf War	Caporale	Single Reference, No MW substance
1992	Jan	New Motorcycle Buy Underway	Anonymous	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jan	Priorities in Fire Support	Starnes	Multiple References, minor substance
	Jan	Letters	Coffman, Wilson	Coffman's article letter has little to no substance, Wilson's is refuting Thompsons Sep 91 article and is substantive
	Feb	The ACE is Not a Maneuver Element--Yet!	Dixon	Multiple References, minor substance
	Feb	Letters	Quentin, McGohey, Wilson	3 Separate Letters responding to Maj Walker's Alternative to MW article (Nov 91)
	Feb	Air as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?	Hammes	As title suggests, Multiple References, minor substance
	Feb	Soviet Lessons Learned: Operation DESERT STORM	Dilegge	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Mar	Editorial	Greenwood	Single Reference, Minor Substance
	Apr	1991 Mahor General Edward A. Wilcox Award For Professional Writing	Anonymous	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Apr	Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces- An Introduction	Herrly	Single Reference, Minor Substance
	Apr	Letters	Hildebrand	Single Reference, No MW substance--Response to letters criticizing a TDG Scenario
	May	Force Planning For the MACCS	Bozelli	Multiple References, minor substance
	May	Air Support: From the Beginning	Etter	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	May	FastFACs in the KTO: The First Combat Test of the F/A 18-D	Robertson	Multiple References, minor substance
	May	Deception: The Missing Tool	Parker	Single Reference, No MW substance

	Jun	Beyond Mahan: Naval Doctrine in the Post-Cold War World	Anderson	Multiple References, minor substance
	Jun	Who Fights the MAGTF?	Munson, Lyons	Two References, minor substance
	Jun	Rethinking The MAGTF	Moore	Multiple References, minor substance
	Jun	New Concepts and New Doctrine	Donovan	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	MAGTF (SOC): Time to Make it Happen	Lance	Two References, minor substance
	Jul	Marine Corps MILCON Programs: A Look Back	Neven	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Aug	Amphibious Warfare: A Round Table Discussion	Kelly, LePlante, Jenkins	Multiple References, minor substance
	Aug	The Legacy and Lessons of Operation WATCHTOWER	Hoffman	Two References, very minor substance
	Aug	Are We Really Light Infantry	Vangeison	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	Friendly Fire: Time for Action	Washabaugh	Multiple References, minor substance
	Sep	Ethics and the Moral Element of War	Sampson	Two References, minor substance
	Sep	A Challenge of Command	Brunn	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Oct	Employing the Defense in Maneuver Warfare	Medina	As title Suggests
	Oct	Maneuvering Blind	Brunn	Multiple References--Improvement to ACE and Sensors for MW
	Oct	Battle Simulation, Army Style	Ballentine	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Nov	If Not Tarawa, What	Batcheller	Multiple Reference, no MW substance
	Nov	...From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services	O'Keefe, Kelso, Mundy	Two References, very minor substance
	Dec	The Legacy and Lesson of Operation TORCH	Hoffman	Two References, minor substance
1993	Jan	The Legacy and Lessons of the 2d Matanikau	Hoffman	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Jan	Ask 'How'	Walker	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jan	T-AVB Ships: Vital Ingredients for MAGTF Sustainment	Henderson	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jan	What's Happening to Our Doctrine?	Watson	Single Reference, Minor Substance throughout discussion
	Feb	The Amphibious Dilemma	Hoffman	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Feb	Austerlitz: The Consummate Defensive Battle	Delaney	Single Reference, minor substance
	Feb	Letters	Hoffman	Hoffman's letter addresses Amphib Ops and MW
	Mar	1992 Boldness and Daring Awards	Anonymous	Single Reference, very minor substance
	Mar	Solutions to TDG #1-93	Gudmundsson, Boroughs	Single Reference, minor substance
	Mar	Letters	McQuown	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Apr	The NCO and Maneuver Warfare	Weber, Furness	As title suggests
	Apr	Commanders Intent Defined	Ettore	As title suggests
	Apr	The Decline of the Mission/The Rise of the Intent	Downes	As title suggests
	Apr	Examining our Warfighting Doctrine	Hoggatt	Book Review
	Apr	The Theory of Maneuver in USMC Doctrine and Force Structure	Lauer	As title suggests
	Apr	Letters	Anonymous	Three separate letters reference MW
	May	The Combined Arms Exercise, Train Like We Fight?	Schreck	Two mentions, minor MW substance
	Jun	Editorial: On Changing Direction	Greenwood	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jun	MEU (SOC) Embarkation in the 1990s	Germain	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare	McKenzie	As title Suggests
	Jul	Leadership for a More Educated Corps	Halliwell	Leadership and MW
	Jul	The Light Attack Helicopter Squadron and the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion	Schreck	As title suggests
	Jul	Wargames of the Gulf War: The Tactical Level	Walkers	Book review--minor substance
	Jul	Rifle Squad in the Attack	Barron	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	Letters	Ramos	Written in Reply to Lauer Article
	Jul	State of the Art: Not So Fast	Johnson	Single Reference, minor substance
	Jul	Maneuver from the Sea and Post-Industrial Warfare	Anderson	Single Reference, minor substance
	Jul	Specific Suggestions to Improve USMC Rifle Marksmanship Training	Stanford	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	Do We Still Need In-Extremis Hostage Rescue	Pratt, Cash	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Aug	The Last 300 Yards	O'Donohue	As title Suggests
	Aug	The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China	Robinson	Book Review--very minor substance
	Aug	Maintaining the Character of the Corps	Hickey	Character, Discipline and MW
	Aug	Medical Support and the Gulf War	Koella	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	The Legacy and Lessons of the New Guinea Campaign	Hoffman	Multiple References, minor substance
	Sep	Combat Medevac: The Mission for the Reservist	Selleck	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown-Water Operations	Murphy	Multiple References, minor substance
	Oct	Doctrinal Change: The Move to Maneuver Theory	Wyly	Origins of MW
	Oct	New Doctrine or Slipping into the Past	Wilson	As title suggests
	Oct	Operational Maneuver From the Sea...Making It Work	Pierce	OMFTS, MW, and ME
	Oct	LTH Update		Single Reference, No MW substance
	Oct	Employ Attack Helicopters as an Independent Maneuver Element	Stinger	Multiple References, minor substance
	Oct	Revise FMFM-1 Warfighting	Knobel	As title suggests

	Oct	Dysfunctional Doctrine: The Marine Corps and FMFM 1, Warfighting	Trout	As title suggests
	Nov	Studying Squad Tactics	Wyly	MW and squad tactics
	Nov	The Legacy and Lessons of Tarawa	Hoffman	Single Reference, minor substance
	Dec	TDG #93-12	Schmitt	Quote from O'Donohue at the End
	Dec	Microterrain- A Small Unit Leaders Ally	Dearth	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Dec	A Charge to a New Generation of Marine Leaders	Punaro	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Dec	Commentary on Marksmanship	Lutz	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Dec	Strategic Concepts and Marine Corps Force Structure in the 21st Century	Hoffman	Single Reference, No MW substance
1994	Jan	The E(3) Control Program: The Electromagnetic Environment and the Corps	Harrell	Two references, no substance
	Jan	Dr. Deming and the Recruiting Service	Gregory	Single reference, no substance
	Jan	The Legacy and Lessons of the Campaign in Italy	Hoffman	Three mentions, no substance
	Jan	At The Forefront of Tactical Thought	Wyly	Single Mention, Discussion of FMFM-1 and revising Doctrine
	Mar	Fighting in the Real World	McKenzie	Synchronization and MW
	Apr	Keeping Up with Maneuver Theory--Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology Edited By Richard D. Hooker Jr.	McKenzie	Book Review--Significant Discussion
	Apr	Getting the Most out of Weapons Company	Anil, Ogle	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Redesigning Recon	Kelly	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Department of the Navy 1994 Posture Statement	Dalton, Kelso, Mundy	Single reference, no substance
	May	Fratricide: The Underlying Causes	Greenwood	Single Reference, very minor substance
	May	Accurate All-Weather Close Air Support	Deeb	Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Guderian and Synchronization	Jesson, Whittle, Orr, DeCamp	Response to MacKenzie's article Fighting in the Real World
	Jun	Stalking the Gagne: What are the Fundamentals?	Wyly, Clay	Two mentions, minor substance
	Jun	Observations on Four Years of TDGs	Schmitt	As Title Suggests
	Jun	Fighting the Bureaucrats-- The Pentagon Wars	Wilson	Book Review-- Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Cherish the Mavericks	Downes	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Jul	Rationalizing Army and Marine Corps Roles and Missions Through Operational Art	Lind	Three mentions--MW, Amphibious Landings and Echelonning
	Jul	Company Command Screening: Sending an Elitist Signal	Bergmeister	Single mention, minor discussion
	Aug	Out of Synch with Maneuver Warfare	Schmitt	Synchronization and MW
	Aug	Guderian: The Master Synchronizer	McKenzie	Multiple mentions, minor MW substance
	Aug	Synchronization: The U.S. Inheritance of Soviet Military Doctrine	Walters	Synchronization and MW
	Aug	They Shoot Synchronizers, Don't They?	McKenzie	Synchronization and MW
	Aug	Amphibious Operations in the Gulf War	Trainor	Single mention, very minor discussion
	Aug	Reestablishing What?!	Wyly	Single mention, very minor discussion
	Sep	The Missing Link: Company Fire Support Coordinator	Sullivan	As title suggests, MW and fire support
	Sep	The Legacy and Lessons of Peleliu	Hoffman	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Sep	The Transition to Fourth Epoch War	Bunker	Single mention, minor discussion
	Nov	Synchronization and the Corps	Johnson	Synchronization and MW
	Nov	Leadership Principles for Warfighters	Camden	Leadership and MW
	Nov	Misunderstanding Synchronization: An Army Perspective	Lemelin	Synchronization and MW
	Nov	Editorial: Learning from Other Services	Greenwood	Single mention, very minor discussion
	Nov	MAC II: The Improved Weapons Company	Kennedy, Wallace	Single mention, minor discussion
	Dec	Lessons on Maneuver Warfare and Fighting Smart	Karch	As Title Suggests
	Dec	The Cybernetic Design: Maneuver Warfare Organization for the Information Age	Gregory	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Dec	Comments on a TDG Situation	Schmitt, Lind	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Dec	Close Air Support and Beyond: Marine Corps Tactical Aviation in Joint Warfare	Deeb	Single Reference, No MW substance
	Dec	Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look	Lind, Schmitt, Wilson	Single Reference, No MW substance
1995	Jan	Aviation's Role, Properly Understood--Air Power and Maneuver Warfare By Martin Van Creveld with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower	Lind	Book Review
	Jan	Less SigInt, More EW	Dearth	EW's use, discusses implications on MW
	Jan	Editorial: Modus Operandi	Greenwood	Single reference, no substance
	Feb	The Legacy and Lessons of Iwo Jim	Hoffman	Two references, minor substance in Lessons Learned
	Feb	Humanity on Humanitarian Operations: How Much Violence is Enough	Allen	Single reference, no substance
	Mar	Composite Maneuver Warfare Commander	Cayce	Single Reference, Minor indirect substance
	Mar	Fourth Generation Warfare?	Bean	Multiple Mentions, minor substance
	Mar	Editorial: The Road to Tactical Expertise	Greenwood	Single reference, no substance
	Mar	An Era of Expeditionary Warfare	Gerard	Single Reference, Minor indirect substance
	Mar	Fourth Generation Warfare: What Does it Mean to Every Marine	Wyly, Celeste	Single Reference, very minor substance

	Mar	The Navy-Marine Corps Team	Boorda	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Is Mission Control The Weakness of Maneuver Warfare?	Walters	As Title Suggests
	Apr	Warfighting: A Leap of Faith	Lauer	Argument against MW that claims MW rejects Combined Arms and Past lessons
	Apr	Implementing OMFTS: Infestation and Infestation	Anderson	Two references, minor substance
	Apr	A Corps of Professionals	Moore	Single reference, no substance
	May	Editorial: Challenges Facing Marine Aviation	Greenwood	Single reference, no substance
	May	Do You Really Need a Forward Air Controller for a Cobra Attack?	Delatte	Two references, no substance
	May	1995 Aviation Posture Statement	Blot	Two references, no substance
	May	V-22 Osprey: There is No Alternative	Hanifen	Single reference, no substance
	Jun	Forward...From the Sea: Health Service Support	Anonymous	Single reference, no substance
	Jun	When Dialing 9-1-1 Just Won't Work	Smith, Foggo	Single reference, no substance
	Jul	Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense: Cornerstone for 21st Century Joint Operations	Hood	Multiple Mentions, no substance
	Jul	Review the Ingredients: Commander's Insights from CAP-Haitien	Jones	Two References, minor Substance
	Jul	Forward...From the Sea: The Mine Warfare Implications	Wilhelm	Two References, minor Substance
	Jul	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense: The Enabler for Operational Maneuver From the Sea for the 21st Century	Jenkins	Single Reference, minor substance
	Aug	Another Look at Helicopter Lift	Kane	Single reference, no substance
	Aug	Marine Aviation...The Rest of the Story	Musella	Single reference, no substance
	Aug	Commandant's Planning Guidance	Krulak	Single reference, no substance
	Sep	Understanding CAX	Miller, Ray	Two References, minor Substance
	Oct	Editorial: Aviation and Maneuver Warfare	Greenwood	As Title Suggests
	Oct	FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action: A prescription for Failure	Cancian	Multiple References, minor substance
	Oct	Information Enhancement on Today's Battlefield	Walsh	Information and MW
	Oct	A Replacement for Towed Artillery	Etoile	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Oct	An Interactive Tactical Decisionmaking Game-- Infantry Combat: The Firlle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small Unit Tactics and Leadership By John Antal	Newman	Single reference, no substance
	Oct	Command and Control at the Crossroads	Czerwinski	Single reference, no substance
	Dec	The Marine Commander	Krulak	Single Reference, minor substance
	Dec	Fighting Smarter: A Naval Tradition	Boorda	Single reference, no substance
	Dec	Thoughts in Doctrine Development	Walter	Single reference, no substance
	Dec	Planning the Battalion Attack: A New Paradigm for an Old Process	Hand, Amyx, Jones, Martin	Single Reference, but entire article is based on planning for an attack in MW
1996	Jan	AN/KSQ-q Enhances C3 in Operational Maneuver From the Sea	DeSantis, Floore	Two Mentions, no MW substance
	Jan	New Aviation Systems: Adding Mass and Depth to Combined Arms	Mykleby	Single mention, very minor substance (single quote from FMFM-1)
	Jan	Seamless Integration at Work	Richard	Single mention, no MW substance
	Feb	Making the Joint Readiness Training Center a Real Training Exercise	Hittinger	Three mentions, very minor substance
	Feb	Endless Change	Daugherty	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Mar	Solutions to TDG # 96-1	Turner, Schmitt, Banks	Single Mention, minor substance
	Mar	Wolfpack Beacon: An Observer's Report	Gattusao	Two mentions, minor discussion
	Apr	Intuitive Combat Decision Making	Tritten	Two mentions, minor discussion
	May	Jaeger Squadron (X)	Anonymous	4 mentions, minor substance
	May	The Multipurpose Mission	Ashby	Two mentions, minor discussion
	May	The Ground Commander's Hip Pocket Air Force	Hewlett	Three mentions, minor discussion
	May	Marine F/A-18s: Redundant or Synergistic	Robinson	Single mention, no MW substance
	May	How Long Must We wait for Osprey?	Grathwol	Single mention, no MW substance
	Jun	The Packaged Maneuver Trilogy	Bredheft	Book Review--Book and review that covers warfighting
	Jun	OMFTS and the Single Battle Concept	Gresham	4 mentions, minor substance
	Jun	MEU (JOC) and Operational Maneuver	Yunker	Three mentions, very minor substance
	Jun	A Review of Jaeger Air	Gardner, Robertson	Three mentions, no MW substance
	Jun	Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore	Anonymous	Multiple mentions, very little substance
	Jun	Stroking the Dragon's Fire	Hoffman	Two Mentions, no MW substance
	Jun	Solutions to TDG #96-4	Schmitt, DeGuman, Richmond	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jul	Operation Tiger: Amphibious Operations in the Northern Persian Gulf Revisited	Ritter	Minor Substance
	Jul	Tearing Down the Stovepipes in Marine Corps Fire Support	Soderberg	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Aug	The Sword and the Shield: Electronic Warfare and the Marine Corps of 2015	Sullivan	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Aug	Electronic Warfare: The Critical Vulnerability of OMFTS	Close	Single mention, minor substance

	Aug	Time for an Old Idea	Hammes	Single mention, no MW substance
	Sep	Let's Put Jaeger to the Test	Ross	Jaeger Tactics and MW
	Sep	A New Dimension in Amphibious Warfare	Verzera	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Sep	MEU (JOC) Stage II: Growing an Operational Capability	Yunker, Feldmeier	Single mention, no MW substance
	Sep	The V-22 Procurement Rate Problem	Rhodes	Single mention, no MW substance
	Oct	How TQL Should Have Been Introduced to the Marine Corps	Galbraith	Comparing the Introduction of TQL to MW
	Oct	Editorial: Evaluating Peacetime Processes	Greenwood	MW shift far from complete...Intro of an Article.
	Oct	Salute to John F. Schmitt MCG Distinguished Author	Anonymous	As Title Suggests
	Oct	A Reemphasis on Infantry	Kinner	3 Mentions, minor discussion
	Oct	TQL? You Mean That's still Around?	Humpert	Two mentions, no substance
	Oct	Letters--Stereotyped Maneuver Warfare	Inman	Single mention, no MW substance
	Nov	TDG #96-8 Revisited	Kies	Mentions difficulties in MW with aviation
	Dec	MAGTF Aviation and Maneuver Warfare: Lip Service or Lethal Punch?	Rayfield	As Title Suggests
	Dec	Editorial: Aviation's Maneuver Doctrine	Greenwood	Discussion based on Rayfield's article.
	Dec	An Operational Maneuver MAGTF from the Sea	Yunker, Feldmeier	Three mentions, no substance
	Dec	Innovation, The Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine	Krulak	Single Mention, No MW substance
1997	Jan	If Not Synchronization, What?	Schmitt	Synchronization vs. MW
	Jan	Do We Need an Information Warrior	Kish	Single mention, 1 section devoted minor substance
	Feb	Infestation Teams: A Good Answer	Hoffman	3 Mentions, minor discussion
	Apr	MCDP-4 Approved	Anonymous	Announcement of MCDP-4
	Apr	Revitalizing Career Level School to Build Better Leaders	Nichols	2 Mentions, minor substance
	Apr	The Marine Corps and Information Warfare		3 Mentions, minor discussion
	Apr	Department of the Navy 1997 Posture Statement	Dalton, Johnson, Krulak	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Letters--	Evans	Response to Schmitt's Synchronization article. Single mention, direct counterarguments, albeit a bit flawed
	Apr	Information Warfare: Nothing New Under the Sun	Rodgers	Single mention, no substance
	May	You Say You Want a Revolution?	Jansen	CAS, Combined Arms and MW
	May	A Response to TDG #96-12	Bean	Single Mention, extremely minor substance
	May	Solutions to TDG #97-3	Schmitt, Bean, Tallen	Single Mention, minor substance
	May	The 'Hub' Revisited: Is the TAOC Relevant	Weiss	Single mention, no substance
	May	Does Organizational Culture Affect Doctrine	Darrah	Single mention, no substance
	Jun	The Traders' Games	West	Single mention, no substance
	Jun	Informational Superiority	Van Riper	Single mention by name, significant discussion
	Aug	MCDP-1 Approved	Anonymous	Single mention, relevant discussion
	Aug	MCDP-2	Anonymous	Announcement of MCDP-2, relation to other doctrine
	Aug	OMFTS: A Perspective	Mason, Phillips	Multiple Mentions, Minor discussion
	Aug	Comparative Warfare	Gudmundsson	Book Review--Single Mention, no MW substance
	Aug	Progressive Systematic Simulation	Smith	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Sep	MCDPs 1-2,1-3, and 5 Approved	Anonymous	Single Mention, Minor Substance
	Sep	Preparing the Marine Corps for War	Krulak	Two mentions, minor MW substance
	Sep	Infestation Tactics and Operational Maneuver from the Sea; Where Do We Go From Here?	Anderson	Single mention, no MW substance
	Oct	Future Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain	Anonymous	Single mention, no MW substance
	Oct	Unified Effort in Support of Dominant Maneuver on the Joint Battlefield	Clauer	Two mentions, substantive follow on discussions (2 sections of the article)
	Nov	New Look at 'Vintage' Pacific Landings	Nihart	Book Review--Two Mentions, no MW substance
	Nov	An Implementing Concept for Operational Maneuver from the Sea	Anonymous	OMFTS and Maneuver Warfare
	Nov	Letters--OMFTS	Goulding	Reply to OMFTS A Perspective
	Dec	OMFTS: Innovation, Deep Maneuver, and Aviation	Wilson, Yunker, Spinner	OMFTS and Maneuver Warfare
	Dec	Mobility Requirements and the 21st Century MAGTF	Yunker	OMFTS and Maneuver Warfare
	Dec	Letters--Critical Battle Ignored	Poole	Two mentions very minor substance
	Dec	The Transition from Hunter to Urban Warrior	Schenkel	Single mention, no MW substance
	Dec	Outsourced Logistics: Maximizing External Support	Ormerod	Single mention, no MW substance
1998	Jan	Every Marine an Innovator	Rhodes	No MW substance, all references to tenets in conjunction with operational concepts
	Feb	Operational Art and the Influence of Will	Liddell	Single mention, minor MW substance
	Feb	MPF 2010 and Beyond	Anonymous	Single Mention
	Mar	The Marie NCO: Winning the Three-Block War	Black	Multiple mentions, Educating NCOs to understand and apply MW concepts
	Mar	Sir Julian Corbett on Amphibious Operations	Gibson	Three mentions, no substance

	Mar	In Defense of the 'Joint Vision'	Clauer	Two mentions, minor MW substance
	Mar	Achieving Ship-to-Object Maneuver Before the 21st Century	Woulfe	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Mar	Letters--Claymores	Brookman	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Apr	Building Decisionmakers	Glasgow	NCOS, MW and decisionmaking
	Apr	Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support	Anonymous	Single mention, minor MW substance
	Apr	Letters--	Williams	Single Mention, no MW substance
	May	Light Armored Vehicles and Attack Helicopters	Barge	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jun	Precision Logistics	Stewart	Multiple mentions, minor discussion
	Jun	A Critique of the Hunter Warrior Concept	Schmitt	MW vs. the Hunter Warrior Concept
	Jun	Editorial: Coping with Urban Crises	Greenwood	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jun	The Commentary on Developing NCOs Continues...	Karam, Murphy, Ford, Poole, et al	Poole's sub commentary on the maneuver NCO contains substance
	Jun	Incentive PT is Not the Answer	Meagher	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jul	The Foundation for Urban Warrior	Gangle	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Jul	Beyond C2: A Concept for Comprehensive Command and Coordination of the Marine Air Ground Task Force	Anonymous	Multiple mentions, C2 and MW, appears to address many concepts in MCDP-1
	Jul	Marine Field Artillery: Doctrine to Procurement Mismatch	Strahan	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Aug	A Concept for Information Operations	Rhodes	Multiple mentions, minor substance
	Sep	Dispersed Strike Operations Now	West	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Oct	Comments on Maneuver	Myatt	3 Mentions...Discussion centers on MW and misuse of term maneuver
	Oct	In Defense of Company 60's	Watson	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Oct	The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore	Krulak	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Nov	A Concept for Sea based Logistics	Anonymous	No MW substance
	Nov	Letters--Live Fire and Maneuver or Miles	Poole	Poole's letter discusses MW and force on force training
	Dec	The MCDPs	Anonymous	Description of the MCDP Series
	Dec	Getting the Hunt into Hunter Warrior	Hoffman	Counter to Schmitt's article on Hunter Warrior
	Dec	Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications: Timely, Relevant, and Compelling	Williams	Single Mention, Minor MW substance---article relevant to process for institutionalizing Doctrine
	Dec	Mine Countermeasures	Anonymous	Multiple mentions, minor substance
1999	Jan	Framing OMFTS: An Evolution to a Revolution	Zak, Gentry, Jozwrak, Fischel, et al	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Jan	Future Technology Solutions for Today's Sea-Based Power Projection Problems	Lasswell	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Jan	Letters	Freer	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Feb	MAGTF Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the Sea	Anonymous	ACE, OMFTS and Maneuver Warfare. Discussion about actual MW is spread throughout.
	Feb	Editorial: OMFTS--For Tomorrow's Marines	Greenwood	" Similarly, the maneuver warfare concepts that began emerging in 1979 were not formally approved as Marine Corps doctrine until 1989, and many believe that their "institutionalization," even today, is far from complete. "
	Feb	Combat Decision Range Training	Sullo	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Feb	Death By Formalization	Culbertson	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Mar	Concept Versus Capability	Beckman	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Apr	Urban Warrior-- A View from North Vietnam	Lamont	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Apr	Time To Get Serious About Urban Warfare Training	Hammes	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Apr	The Urban Defender Has the Edge	Poole	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Apr	Solutions to TDG #99-2	Barrick	Single Mention, no MW substance
	May	Building Marine Aviation for the 21st Century	McCorkle	Single Mention, no MW substance
	May	Marine Expeditionary Air Operations: A Case for V/STOL Aviation	Herman	Single Mention, no MW substance
	May	Cultivating Intuitive Decision Making	Krulak	Single Mention but theme woven throughout
	May	First to Fight, but Not Fighting Smart: a Skeptical Assessment of Marine Corps Effectiveness in the 21st Century	Steele	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jun	Lessons from Afghanistan	Fulford	Book Review-no MW substance
	Jun	Why the Marine Corps Needs the NTC	N Van Taylor	Two mentions, no MW substance. Advocates free play training
	Jun	OMFTS: Forging a Path to the Future of Amphibious Warfare	Howard, Blasiol	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Jun	Ship-To-Objective Combat Service Support	Reynolds	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jun	Where is OMFTS Going?	Cancian	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jul	Squat Tactics for Small Unit Leaders	Bennett	Book Review-no MW substance
	Jul	Applying Lessons of the Past	Lind	Book Review-no MW substance
	Jul	Surface to Surface Fire Support, May it Rest in Peace	Grice	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Jul	MEB-Be We Should Reconsider	McDivitt	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Jul	The M777: Marine Artillery's Jackpot	Crane	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Jul	The 32nd Commandant's Senate Confirmation Hearing	Anonymous	Brief explanation of MW in Question 83.
	Jul	The Expanding Bureaucracy of War	Cancian	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Jul	Unit Cohesion: The Army's Effort	Vandergriff	Two mentions, no MW substance

	Jul	Commandant's Guidance	Jones	Two mentions, no MW substance
	Jul	The Mv-22 Osprey, Part Iii: Warfighting and Related Acquisition Challenges	Hanifen	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Aug	The Small Unit Warfighting Team	Nugent	Two mentions, very minor substance
	Sep	OMFTS Impact	Sayers	Multiple mentions, No MW substance
	Sep	The Combat Service Support Debate, Part II	Reynolds	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Sep	Understanding German Operations in WWII	Daugherty	Book Review-no MW substance
	Oct	CAX: A Primer for Maneuverists and Over the Horizon Guys	Prowse, Sullivan	CAX and MW
	Oct	Nothing Wrong with 'Our System'	Hoffman	Reply to Lind's Book Review
	Oct	Applying Lessons of the Past	Hammond	Reply to Lind's Book Review--single reference to MW with no substance
	Oct	Editorial: Focusing on the 'Basics'	Greenwood	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Oct	Intelligence and Operational Maneuver From the Sea: Organizing for the Future	Davis, Buikema	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Nov	Company I	Davis	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Nov	More Commentary of TBS (appears to be letters)	Anonymous--Specific Letter is Anderson	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Dec	Editorial: Core Competencies	Greenwood	Single Mention, no MW substance
	Dec	Information Programs in Peace Operations	Hoffman	Book Review-no MW substance
	Dec	The Future of Marine Corps Mechanized Warfare	McLean	Single mention, minor MW substance
2000	Jan	The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Martin	Book Review--Single Mention
	Feb	Boyd Conference Conducted	Anonymous	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Feb	The Strategic Corporal in Kosovo	Merida	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Feb	They Returned	Wonson	Book-Review Single Mention, No MW substance
	Feb	In the Mud and the Blood with the Bugs and the Bytes	Walters	Book Review--Some supporting discussion
	Mar	Rethinking Close Air Support Terminal Control Procedures	Franzak	Multiple Mentions---Minor discussion
	Mar	The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus: a Forerunner of OMFTS	Burke	Two references, no MW substance
	Mar	Fire Force: Vertical Envelopment During the Rhodesian War	Custis	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Apr	Ph.D. S	Batchellor	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Apr	Marine Corps Signal Intelligence	Braden	Single Mention, No MW substance
	May	Transforming Marine Aviation	McCorkle	Two references, no MW substance
	May	Enhanced Combat Communications for the Marine Aircraft Wing	Olszowy, Voneida	Single Mention, No MW substance
	May	The Themes of Airpower Theory, Joint Vision 2010, and Some Comparison Implications for Marine Aviation	Hanifen	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jun	Genocide Intervention: Send in the Marines?	Thieme	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jun	Trouble in the Breach	Howard	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jul	One Less Book to Read	Pierce	Book Review--minor discussion
	Jul	US Army Doctrine in the Interwar Years	Gudmundsson	Book Review--two mentions, no MW substance
	Jul	Blindness to the Lessons of History	Lind	Book Review--two mentions, no MW substance
	Jul	The First Provisional Marine Brigade in Korea Pt 1	Manza	MW in the case of the subject--1 section
	Jul	A Case for 21st Century MOUT Facilities	Reynolds	Two references, no MW substance
	Jul	A Guide to the Commandant's Reading List for Majors	Rogers	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Aug	A Cultural Dilemma	Nemeth	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Sep	The Blinding Sand of Macarthur's Hourglass: The Race to Seoul	Smith	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Sep	Assistant Commandant Bids Farewell	Dake	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Sep	Seaward Maneuver in Quantico: Mine Countermeasures in Support of STOM	Yunker, Scott	Two mentions, Very Minor MW Substance***MAY NEED TO READ***
	Sep	Operational Maneuver From the Sea: realizing a Concept	Oliver	Two references, no MW substance
	Sep	Project Metropolis: Exploiting the Lessons of Urban Warrior	Anderson	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Oct	Missing the Boat: a Response to Generals Knutson, Hailston, and Bedard	Lind	Multiple Mentions---
	Nov	Some Thoughts on Assessing Military Operations	Beydler	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Nov	Letters-Night Fighting	Mayer	"A night attack is maneuver warfare"
2001	Jan	MAGTF Lessons Learned	Anonymous	Two mentions, No MW Substance
	Jan	Getting Serious About NCO Leadership	Martin	Single Reference to MW Handbook
	Jan	Ship-to-Urban Objective Maneuver: A Communications Nightmare	Phillips	Single reference, no substance
	Jan	The Intelligence Plan: An Update	Liebl	Two References ISO EMW
	Jan	Letters--Reserves in the MEF	Knutson	Single Reference to MW Handbook
	Feb	Mobility: A Forgotten Component of Marine Corps PT	McGuire	PT and MW
	Feb	Commander's Intent: Easy to Understand, Tough to Articulate	Anonymous	MW..mere mention, but discussion based on the mention
	Feb	The Demise of the Tank	Estes	Book Review- Single Mention
	Mar	Letters--Reply to Lind's Oct 2000 Article	Donnell	Critique of Lind's Article
	Mar	Amphibious Shipbuilding Paradigms	Germain	Single mention of EMW (Currently under development)

	Mar	Fires In Support of Amphibious Operations--A Status Report	Schwalm	Single reference, no substance
	Apr	Leading the Corps, Meeting the Challenges	Williams	Mentions the development of EMW twice
	Apr	Letters--On NCO Leadership		References "The NCO and Maneuver Warfare" from 90s in reply to Martin Article
	Apr	Army Warfighter Observations	Marletto, Mundy, Smith, Khan, et Al	Single reference, no substance
	May	CMC Introduces Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	Anonymous	As Title Suggests
	May	Are you Using the Best Tools for Close Air Support?	Arnold	Quote from MCDP-1
	May	MV-22 Capabilities, Employment, And Escort Tactics	George	References MW and EMW, no substance
	May	Planning Guidance	Anonymous	Mentioned in Intro
	May	Tiltrotor Advantages to Assault Support	George	Mentions EMW in concl
	May	Unleashing the MACG Det	Bufkin	Single Mention, No MW substance
	May	Marine Air Maintains Legacy	McCorkle	Single mention of EMW
	May	Desert Shield/Desert Storm--Ten Years Later	Hammes	Single mention of EMW
	Jun	innovations in Command and Control For Tactical Logistics Units	Gerlson	Two mentions of EMW
	Jun	Integrated Logistics Capability: An Imperative for Change	Love, Collenborne	EMW as the imperative for the stated change
	Jun	The Common Operational Picture	Ennis	The words "common operational picture" or the acronym "COP" figure prominently in today's military lexicon. As a matter of fact, in the Marine Corps' doctrinal bible, Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century, almost every chapter ("Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare-21," "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," "Ship-to Objective Maneuvers," "Sustained Operations Ashore," etc.) reinforces the need to establish and maintain the COP.
	Jun	The Marine Corps Has too Much Stuff	Dickerson, Karafa	Single mention of EMW
	Jul	Future Military Operations on Urban Terrain	Neil	MW and MOUT
	Jul	Assemble the Fleet	Jenkins	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jul	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	Anonymous	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Jul	Are We Operationally Ready to Win a Street Fight	Cooling	Single Mention, No MW substance
	Aug	The Marine Air Command and Control System and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare--Part Two: Maccs Employment Options	McCorkle, Knutson	EMW mention
	Aug	Fighting the Single Battle	Anonymous	Two mentions, Very Minor MW Substance***MAY NEED TO READ***
	Aug	The Information Revolution at the Squad Level: Extending the Littoral Battlespace Actd	Anonymous	Single mention of EMW
	Sep	Let's Set the Record Straight with Regard to NSFS	Kearns	Two mentions of EMW
	Sep	Marines and Joint Experimentations	Goulding Jr	Two mentions of EMW
	Sep	Information Operations Planning: a Model for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force	McGinley	Quote from MCPP about Top down planning....derived from MW
	Sep	Letters-Career Level Schools	Walters	Reply Capt Grissom "Career Level Schools" Fundamental or Fundamentally Flawed"...very minor MW substance
	Nov	Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look	Lind, Schmitt, Wilson	Single Reference, No MW substance***NEED TO READ***
	Nov	On the Horns of our Own Dilemma	Hoffman	Two References. Minimal to substantial discussion
	Dec	Main and Supporting Efforts	Anonymous	Single Reference, but entire article is applicable
	Dec	Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative: A Catalyst for Change	Balash	References MW and EMW, no substance
	Dec	Training For Combat: The Role of an NCO	Emmel	Two references, no MW substance
	Dec	A CAX History Primer	Swift	Two References, some supporting discussion
2002	Jan	What if?...The Essence of the COA Wargame	Anonymous	MW and the COA Wargame
	Jan	Editorial A Moment in Time	Glasgow	About Gen Gray, mentions MW once
	Jan	Technologies in Power Production	Perkins	Single Reference (EMW)
	Feb	Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	Jones	Our new capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), moves us down the path outlined in Marine Corps Strategy 21, and provides the foundation for the way the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex environment of this new century. EMW is the union of our core competencies; maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary heritage; and the concepts by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. It emphasizes the unique capabilities the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander JFC) and the synergy created when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies. ...EXPLANATION OF EMW FROM THE CMDNT (3 months following the release of the concept)
	Feb	Training and Education: Combined Arms Applied to Marine Scout/Snipers	Ukeiley	MW in the SS school, very minor discussion

	Feb	Low-Altitude Air Defense Employment at Combined Arms Exercises	Ellis	Single Reference
	Feb	Letters		Single mention
	Mar	how Do we Fight	Ballard	Book Review- very minor discussion
	Mar	Transporting America's Expeditionary Forces in the 21st Century	Snyder	Mentions MW and EMW, no substance
	Mar	Burnishing the Jewel in the Crown	Goulding Jr	Mentions MW and EMW, no substance
	Apr	Artillery Support in EMW	Palm	MW, EMW and Artillery. Not a lot of substance about MW itself
	Apr	Terminology and Graphics	Anonymous	MW, mission orders and importance of understanding meaning of tasks
	Apr	Editorial: From the Oblique	Glasgow	Single Reference (EMW)
	Apr	GCE Advocacy, Speaking with one Voice	Bedard	Single Reference (EMW)
	Apr	Letters-Editorial Thoughts	More	Single Reference
	Apr	What Are We Afraid of	Cancian	Single Reference, expanding discussion on MCDP-1 and Free play exercises
	May	The Future of Heavy Lift in Support of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	Dowling	References to EMW not substance
	May	Project Metropolis	Gangle	MW in MOUT, very minor discussion
	May	Urban Logistics	Doty	Single reference, no substance
	May	Tank-Infantry Team in the Urban Environment	Storer	Single reference, no substance
	May	Letters-Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	Meyer	Two references to EMW...sealift shortages
	May	State of Marine Aviation	Nyland	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jun	Integrated Logistics Concept: Unharnessed Power on the Battlefield	Lott, Davis	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jun	Combat Service Support in Transition	Burrell	Current CSS changes that are contrary to MW
	Jul	Expeditionary Warfare School: the Schoolhouse for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	Keenan, Thompson	Mentions EMW and describes POI
	Jul	The Evolution of Enlisted Professional Military Education	St Amour	Mentions MW and EMW, no substance
	Jul	Where are We Now on Fire Support	Gobar	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jul	Naval Surface Fires-For Want of a Nail	Hammond	Single Reference
	Jul	Letters--x2	Hammond/Wes t	EMW Fires/MW, careerism, risk aversion
	Jul	Educating for the World Of Uncertainty	Hendrickson	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Maybe its Time to Reconsider Maneuver Warfare	Chmielewski	As title suggests. Appears to intend to start a conversation
	Aug	Command and Control in 2015	Anonymous	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Marine Corps C2 Capability Shortfalls in 2010	Dobson	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Introducing the Joint tactical Radio	Wilson, Alexander	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Transforming Marine Corps C4	Thomas	Single Reference (EMW)..continued discussion of EMW
	Aug	Decisive Engagement in Scout Vs. Sniper...Finally	Ukeiley	Single Reference
	Aug	Letters	Dees	Single Reference (EMW)
	Sep	Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Looks at Seabasing	Goulding Jr	3 References to EMW
	Sep	Editorial: Thoughts on Individual Responsibility	Glasgow	Single Reference (EMW)
	Sep	Commandant's Guidance Update: Expeditionary by Culture--Transformational by Design	Jones	"The ongoing process of conceptual change is embodied in the recent publication of our overarching concept paper, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (MCG, Feb02). It is our foundation for conducting operations in the 21st century. Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the union of our core competencies, maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. It emphasizes the unique and proven capabilities the Marine Corps provides JFCs and the synergy created when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies."
	Sep	The Creation of the Seabase	Burke	Single Reference (EMW)
	Sep	EMW in the 21st Century: How do we get there	Richardson	Single Reference (EMW)
	Oct	A Message from the Commandant of the Marine Corps	Jones	Single Reference (EMW)
	Oct	Lets Organize and Train as We Would Fight	Khan, West, Brown	Mentions MW and EMW, no substance. We are not training to these
	Nov	Off We Go"	Yunker	Book Review--References MW 2 times (Boyd by Coram)
	Nov	Transforming for the Chaordic Age	Hoffman	minor discussion of MW
	Dec	Marine Corps METOC	Williams	Single Reference (EMW)
2003	Jan	A Concept for Marine Corps Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition	Hirsch	Bounces back and Forth btw EMW and MW, minor MW explicit conversation
	Jan	Millennium Dragon 02: A Step Towards Marine Corps Transformation	Barr	Two References (EMW)
	Jan	Letters-Maneuver Warfare Revisited	Engelbrecht	Reply to Maybe its Time to Reconsider MW (Aug 02)...In favor of MW
	Jan	Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System: The Future of Mobile NBC Reconnaissance	Olszyk, Bryce, Leitner	Single Reference
	Jan	Unit-Level Ammunition Status (Or No More Meatballs, Please)	Zarnesky	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jan	The Reserve Unit Anti-Terrorism Officer	Mosher	Single Reference

	Feb	Artillery Dilemma: The Requirements Acquisition Disconnect	Palm	Fires ISO EMW
	Feb	Editorial: Bridging the Gap	Glasgow	2 references to EMW
	Feb	The Islandian Marine Corps: A Model	Lind	2 References to MW
	Mar	The Future Family of U.S. Naval Ships	Lundquist	Single Reference
	Mar	Migrating to Joint Tactical Radios	Wilson, Breitingner	2 references to 1 to MW, 1 to EMW
	Mar	Maritime Prepositioning Force—Optimize the Capability	Carothers	Single Reference (EMW)
	Mar	M203 or Rifle Grenade	Eby	Single Reference
	Apr	Restructuring II MEF for Enhanced Warfighting Capability	West, David	Single Reference
	May	State of Marine Aviation	Hough	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	Fourth Generation Warfare Minus Five	Szelowski	Two references to MW/3GW
	May	The CH-53E SLEP: Too Little, Too Late, Too Expensive! The Case for New Heavy Lift Production	Kane	References MW, no substance
	May	Seabasing Aviation and Ground CSS: The T-AGL Logistics Ship	Dunne	2 references to 1 to MW, 1 to EMW
	May	Beyond Visual Range Engagements and Claws	Rutter	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	Who will be the first to Fight	West, David	Single Reference
	May	Letters-The Artillery Dilemma	Hanlon	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	Naval TacAir Integration: Capabilities-Based Relevance	Walsh	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	Some Aspects of the Historiography of British and U.S. Doctrines of Amphibious Operations in the 20th Century	Gibson	"In the meantime, the U.S. Marine Corps adopted the concept of maneuver warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine in 1989. In 1992, in recognition of the shift in threat from global total war to regional threats, The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps jointly published a paper entitled From the Sea that was the first effort (they maintained) to extend maneuver warfare to the sea and combine it with amphibious warfare. (See MCG, Nov92, p. 18.) This was refined by a further joint paper entitled Forward . . . From the Sea (See MCG, Oct94, p. 32), and the "new" doctrine was entitled Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). (See MCG, Jun96, insert.) The intention was to boost the element of surprise by sea maneuver and, because of the substantial self-sustainment capabilities, the lack of which had hitherto restricted the ability of heavy landing forces:"
	Jun	Digital Command and Control: Cyber Leash or Maneuver Warfare Facilitator	Skaggs	As title suggests. Advocates the latter if used correctly
	Jun	Expeditionary Fires for the 21st Century	Fallon	Two References (EMW)
	Jun	Expeditionary Fire Support, What is it?	Lindsey	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jun	Definitions for the 'New Reality'	Riddenhof	Two References. Minor discussion
	July	Navy SeaBees: The MAGTF 'Sting' The Marine Corps Needs	Johnson	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jul	Solutions to TDG 3-05	Ukeiley, Russell	Single Reference
	Jul	Letters- Requirement vs. Acquisition	Feist	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jul	Fix recon, USSOCOM, and the Future of the Corps: Food For thought	Kyser	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Future Magtf Logistics and Support from the Sea (2010+)	Linkowitz	multiple references, minor discussion about logistics ISO MW
	Aug	L-E-A-D-E-R-S-H-I-P Challenge	Lehmann	Single Reference
	Aug	Excellence in Warfighting Through Logistics Education	Montemayor, Stauffer	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Mlc: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield	Lehnert, Wissler	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	Omar Bradley Was Right	Kopets	Single Reference (EMW)
	Sep	Proportionality in the Law of War	Gillette	MW and the Law of War
	Sep	Basra to Baghdad': the 1914-18 British Campaign for Mesopotamia	Howard	Single Reference
	Oct	The Family of Concepts	Corbett	EMW and related concepts (OMFTS, STOM, SB)
	Oct	What is an EMW Capability List	Rogers, Villalva	As title suggests
	Oct	Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations	Bass	MCDP Series and MCDP 1-0 relation
	Oct	A History and Future of Continued Success	Hanlon	Single Reference (EMW)
	Oct	The Expeditionary Force Development System: a New Combat Development Tool for the 21st Century	Kratzer	Single Reference (EMW)
	Oct	Growing Expeditionary Legs in the Pacific Theater: Iii Me Demonstrates Organic Mobility for Operations in Southeast Asia	Wenger	Single Reference (EMW) and Single Reference MW
	Nov	Implications from Operation Iraqi Freedom for the Marine Corps	West, Smith	MW Worked
	Dec	No FARP Too Far	Anonymous	MWSS MW
2004	Jan	Letters-The Past as a Prologue	Keller	Single Reference (EMW)

	Jan	Marine Corps Science and Technology: Meeting the Needs of the Future Warfighter	Lemmeyer, Duggan, Haig	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jan	Sea Viking: Expeditionary Tactical Communications System	Cusak	Single Reference (EMW)
	Feb	Combined Arms: Losing the Effects	Quigley	MW and Combined arms, small discussion at the beginning
	Mar	Movement and Maneuver of MAGTFs in Mine Environments: Gordian Knot or Not	Mariota	References EMW
	Mar	Big Deck' Amphibious Force Transformation: LHD 8 Will Roll Out of the Yard Ready for The Marines of Tomorrow	Hooper	Single Reference to EMW
	Mar	Then: Naval Trends and Developments	Metcalf	Single Reference to EMW
	Apr	Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation Building and Stability Operations	Rohr	Related to Capstone Concept of EMW
	Apr	The School of MAGTF Logistics: For this Fight and the Next	Reynolds	Single Reference
	Apr	Memories of Dai So	Weise	Single Reference to EMW
	Apr	Part III: Tikrit, South to Babylon	Kelly	"In reality, however, we do have a doctrine and a warfighting philosophy that opens the mind to problem-solving and avoids the set piece. The debate about maneuver warfare is thankfully over. I would be lying to you, and kidding myself, if I said everyone was an avid practitioner, and I do not know if the schools have it right even now. I do know it very much depends on the person, his or her traits, and life's experiences. What we do have, I can assure you, are sufficient leaders at every level who run through the loop very fast-and act without hesitation. These are individuals who will employ a 2,000 pound joint direct attack munition or pass out water to anti-coalition protesters, situation depending. I think for much of this we can thank Cols John Boyd, USAF(Ret) and Mike Wyly, USMC(Ret), and certainly my friend, William Lind, from Ohio, all men I have known and worked with in the past."
	May	Keyhole CAS for Modern Warriors	Frey	Two references, no MW substance
	May	Transforming Marine Aviation Training Through an Aircrew Training Systems Approach	Horton	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	Preparation for Transformation: Driving the Dialogue in the Marine Air Command and Control System Evolution	Forrester, MCCommick	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	The Transformation of Marine Aviation Logistics	Garant	Single Reference (EMW)
	May	State of Marine Aviation	Hough	Single Reference (EMW)
	Jun	Transition, Transformation, and the Week after Next	Lindsey	Multiple references to MW and EMW, no substance
	Jul	Distributed Operations: The Time is Now	Hanlon	Single Reference
	Jul	Distributed Operations: From the Sea	Schmittle	Two references, very minor discussions
	Aug	Lead from the Front	Gardner	Book Review- multiple mentions, only quote shows misunderstanding
	Aug	Logistics Modernization: A Marine Corps Warfighting Imperative	Kelly	Two References (EMW)
	Aug	An Imperative for Change: The Case for Logistics Modernization	Neal, Knutson, Ayers, McKissok	Two References (1x MW/1xEMW)
	Aug	The Logistics Architecture: Our Sand table for Logistics Modernization	Rineaman, Ruark	Single Reference (EMW)
	Aug	The Courage to Change	Chandler	Single Reference (EMW)
	Sep	The Sea Viking Experimentation Campaign	Berry Jr	Expeditionary MW
	Oct.	The distributed Operations Hurdles	Dobson	Multiple references, minor discussion about MW debate
	Oct	Future Combat Systems and the MEFFV	Anonymous	Single Reference (EMW)
	Oct	Overmatching the Enemy	Seder, Steiner	Single Reference (EMW)
	Nov	Barracks-Ball Nov 2003	Foley	Single Reference
	Dec	Combined TACAIR Integration: Strategic Enabler for the 21st Century	Gackle	Two References (EMW)
2005	Jan	Marine Corps Science and Technology	Lasswell	Single Mention (EMW)
	Feb	Marine Corps Business Transference	Matthewson	Single mention (second in citation)
	Mar	Predators in the Mounts	Warfield	Two mentions...very minor physically/spatially focused supporting discussion
	Mar	A Winning Combination	Leader	Book Review-Single Reference
	Mar	Letters--x2		Single mention in each article, no MW substance
	Mar	Toward a Common Navy Planning Process	Drake	Single Mention (EMW)
	Apr	A Recipe for Change	Anderson	Book Review-Two reference, minor following discussion
	Apr	Distributed Operations	Goulding Jr	Single Mention
	May	Digital Targeting in the MAGTF	McPhillips, Boorstein	Single Reference in article, 1 in pic caption, 1 in notes
	May	Expeditionary or Expedient	Dalkiewicz	Single Mention (EMW)
	May	Aviation Logistics Initiatives	Anonymous	Single Mention (EMW)
	May	To Improve Aviation Safety, Improve Aviation Organization	Ford	Single Reference

	May	State of Marine Aviation	Hough	Single Mention (EMW)
	Jun	Creating Stability in an Unstable World	Anonymous	Single Mention (EMW), mention of DO as an extension of MW
	Jun	Shoot, Move, and Communicate or Get out of the Way	Coulter	Single Reference
	Jun	Letters- On Navy Planning	King	Single Reference
	Jun	Combining the Assault Amphibian Battalions for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM	Abbott	Single Mention (EMW)
	Jun	Enhanced Target Acquisition Platoon Concept	Avenetti	Single Reference
	Jul	More on Distributed Operations	MacIntyre	Single Reference
	Jul	The Intelligence Rifleman	David, Collings	Single Mention (EMW)
	Aug	MCDP-1 Warfighting Revisited	Strickland	Continued Relevance of MW in current times, MW=MCDP-1
	Aug	General Loius H. Wilson	Hagee	Single Reference
	Aug	Letters	Mykleby	Two references, reply to May Aviation Issues, minor discussion
	Aug	Redefining MAGTF Logistics	Gackle	Single Mention (EMW)
	Aug	Amphibious Operations During the Second Indochina War: 1965-1973	Hayden	Single Mention in reference to Operation STARLITE
	Aug	Louis H. Wilson 1920-2005	White	Single Reference
	Sep	Its Time for the Exoskeleton	Edy	Single Reference
	Nov	Operation Reach	Thieme	Single Reference in article, 2 in a single note
	Nov	Blackjack's Super Squad	Matthews	Single Reference
	Dec	Leveraging Actionable Intelligence	Shelton	Very minor discussion of intel supporting MW/DO
	Dec	Intelligence Support to Distributed Operations	Reynolds	Two references, no MW substance
2006	Jan	Letters-x 2	Pastenbaugh/C hristie	Ref to EMW (Calls it doctrine)/mere mention
	Jan	Achieving Future Capabilities	Lasswell	Single Mention (EMW)
	Jan	Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program	Stocks	Single Mention (EMW)
	Feb	Reorganization of Marine Infantry	Strickland	Single Mention
	Feb	Culture Shock: Overhauling the Mentality of the Military	Higgins	Single Mention
	Mar	NSFS Shortfalls	Hammond	NSFS ISO MW
	Mar	Fires	Dobson	Single Mention
	Mar	Preparing for Africa	Thompson	Two references, no MW substance
	Mar	The Naval Services: At Risk of Irrelevance	Berry Jr	Single Mention (EMW)
	Apr	Marine Corps Joint Terminal Attack Controllers	Grice	Single Mention
	May	Operating Concepts	Hollis	Two references, no MW substance
	May	2015 Marine Aviation Command and Control	Anonymous	Two references, no MW substance
	May	Aviation Logistics	Anonymous	Single Mention (EMW)
	May	Letters	Mortenson	Single Mention, No MW substance
	May	Wisdom Beyond Their Experience	Hetherington	Single Mention. Minor Discussion
	May	State of Marine Aviation	Castellaw	Single Mention (EMW)
	Jun	Mine Countermeasures	Gard	Two References (EMW)
	Jun	Engineers at the Crossroads	Ottingnon	Two References (EMW)
	Jun	Sustaining Amphibious Attack	Griffin	Two References (EMW)
	Jun	Embedded Training Teams	Cuomo	Single Mention
	Jul	Marine Corps Artillery in Transition	McCaskill	Single Mention
	Jul	Twenty-Eight Articles	Kilcullen	Single mention. Minor following discussion
	Aug	Leadership and Judgment	Glasgow	Book Review-Single Reference
	Aug	Commanding General's Command and Control (C2) Intent	Mattis	Single Mention
	Aug	No Time Like the Present	McGinley	Single Mention
	Sep	Millennials Merging: leading a New Generation in War	Sinclair	Maneuver Warfare and the Millennial Generation
	Sep	Letters-Response to Mine Coutner Measures	Marapoti	Single Mention (EMW)
	Oct	Back to the Future	McDaniel	Two mentions, No MW Substance
	Nov	Letters- x 2	Harris/Davis	Single Mention in reference to "Relearning Stormtroop tactics article"/Rebuttal to LtCol Sinclair article
	Nov	Where's Pete Ellis?	Armstrong	3 references, very minor discussion
2007	Feb	Improving the MAGTF COC Now	Mades	2x EMW, 1x MW, no expanding context
	Feb	Distributed Operations	Goulding Jr	"DO is MW"
	Feb	An Operating Approach	Lewis	Single Mention
	Feb	In Search of the Single Battle	Sinclair	Two mentions no substance
	Feb	The Ethical Warrior of the 21st Century	Shusko	Single Mention
	Mar	Letters-PME Rebuttal	Thompson	Two Mention of Expeditionary MW
	Mar	Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments	Amos	Single Mention
	Apr	On the Conduct of War	Mujica	"In order to be successful in Iraq and in future operations, maneuver warfare must not only be emphasized in theoretical discussions and the classroom, but it must be ingrained into the way we conduct our operations."
	Apr	For What are we Ready	Birdzell	Two mentions in relation to 3GW
	May	under the Umbrella	Pena	Single Mention
	May	Tempo, Technology, and Hubris	Martin	Single Mention--MAY NEED TO RELOOK IN DETAIL MAY HAVE MORE APPLICABILITY
	Jun	Fear of Flying	Grice	Single Mention
	Jul	Rethinking the 'Rifle' Company	Spincin	As title suggests

	Jul	Will We be Prepared for What's Next	Cuomo	Changes for IW
	Aug	Overcoming Enemy Counters to Combined Arms	Birdzell	Two Mentions
	Aug	The Command Element for the Long War	Grice	Single Mention
	Aug	Risk Curves	Miller	Single Mention
	Sep	Task Organizing for Distributed Operations	Little	Single Mention
	Sep	Integrating Apaches	Jansen	Single Mention
	Oct	Significance in Semantics	Leva	Single Mention
	Oct	Twenty-Eight Articles	Kilcullen	Single mention. Minor following discussion
	Nov	The Future of Medium Lift	Crouch	3GW, 4GW, DO and MW
	Nov	The Message is Insurgency	Hammes	Two Mentions
2008	Feb	MAGTF Fires	Hawkins	Single Reference
	Feb	Is Warfighting Enough?	Richards, Vandergriff	Boyd and MW
	Feb	One Single Nail	McLean	Single Mention of Expeditionary MW
	Feb	Over the Next Hill	Isherwood, Garrison	Single Mention of Expeditionary MW
	Apr	Maneuver Warfare, Open Source Intelligence, and Military Reform	Mogilner	Open Source Intel, Boyd's OODA and Maneuver Warfare
	Apr	MAGTF Planning	Dunne	Mention of MW from quote in MCWP 5-1
	Apr	Its Time to Woop-Ass	Gurfein	Single Mention of MW as the Corps Combat Doctrine
	Jul	Are you Sure?	Schaefer	3 mentions, not sustenance
	Jul	Aviation and Ground Logistics	Miller	Single Mention of Expeditionary MW
	Aug	Teamwork in Counterinsurgency	Falk	Two mentions no substance (physical misunderstanding)
	Aug	A Long View of the Long War	Griffin	Small Discussion on MW and intelligence
	Aug	Enhanced Company Operation	Goulding Jr	Single Mention
	Sep	Gaps in the Digital Perimeter	Bacharach, Hyla	MW and cyber attack
	Oct	Do Fire Support	Hays	Distributed Ops, MW, and ANGLICO
	Oct	Resuscitating the King	Grice	Fires..2 mentions of MW
	Oct	Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 Executive Summary	Anonymous	Single Mention
	Nov	The Engineer Center of Excellence	Prickett	Two Mention of Expeditionary MW
	Nov	Belleau Wood	Morrow, Starace, von Hassell	Single Mention--German Perspective on Belleau Wood
	Dec	A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations	Conway	Single Mention
2009	Jan	Fifth Generation War	Coerr	Mentions MW in context of 3GW and Boyd
	Mar	MCLB Barstow A Case for Change	Enzor	Mentions Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
	Apr	COIN Perspectives	Hanson	Mentions MW in Context of small fireteam elements in Counterinsurgency
	May	Good Decisionmakers are not enough	Van Echo	As title suggests with interests towards MW requirements
	Jun	Fitness Reports: Where's Your Gap?	Walsh	Signal Reference
	Jun	Unmanned UF35-B Lightning II	Roberts	As title suggests, ISO Maneuver Warfare
	Jul	Put CI Back Into Tactical CI/HumInt	Duckworth	Signal Reference
	Aug	Combined Arms in Afghanistan	Meyer	Single Reference
	Aug	Enhanced MAGTF Operations	Goulding Jr	Single Reference
	Sep	A New View of C2 Systems	Larsen	C2 leading to overly centralized control--counter to MW
	Sep	Organic Mobility	Gourgoumis	Single Reference
	Nov	Irregular Amphibious War	Crabb	Single Reference
	Dec	The General and his Watch	Bourne, O'Donogue	Single Reference
	Dec	Where is Our Kilcullen?	Grice	Single Reference
2010	Feb	Embrace Maneuver Warfare: The DS Section	Graham	Marine Aviation and MW
	Mar	Maneuver Warfare in the Cognitive Domain	Anonymous	As title suggests...Strategic Communication
	Apr	Strategic Communication, Intel, and a Remembrance	Keenan	References a title of an Article
	Apr	Maneuver and the Information Battlespace	Morgan, Fugler, Batson	Single Reference in Conclusion
	May	Some thoughts on TDG Utilization	Hammes	As title suggests--in relation to MW
	May	Editorial--Don't Ask Don't Tell	Keenan	Mentions Attritionist letters and intent for debate
	May	Air Combat, the Mesh, and the Cloud	Coerr	Mentions MW and recon pull
	May	The Attritionist Letters # 1	Anonymous	1 reference to MW in specific, but greater discussion of MCDP 1
	May	Aviation Logistics Transformation	Yasaki	Single Reference
	Jun	Embrace Maneuver Warfare: A Rebuttal	Heuer	As Title Suggests
	Jun	Editorial--Too Much Command in Command and Control	Keenan	Mentions Attritionist letters, some expanding thought
	Jun	The Combat Operations Center	Beutel	Single Reference
	Jul	The Attritionist Letters #3	Anonymous	"Triad of MW
	Aug	The Road to Hell	Thiele	Maneuver Warfare and PTP
	Aug	The Feeling of Power	Steinfels	Singular Reference
	Aug	Letters Rebutting the Rebuttal	Graham	AS title suggests, rebutting Heuer's rebuttal of his Feb Article
	Aug	Justice and the Art of Military Leadership	Saucedo	Single reference in article, second in notes.
	Sep	The Attritionist Letters# 5	Anonymous	Attrition is easier to understand than maneuver
	Oct	The Attritionist Letters #6	Anonymous	Eliminate MW Concepts

	Oct	Listening to History	Lawton-King	Single Reference
	Oct	Distance Education and Blended Learning Seminars	Haskin, Griffin	Single Reference
	Oct	Irregular Threats and Challenges	Cole	Single Reference
	Nov	The Attritionist Letters #7	Anonymous	MW and trust
	Nov	Post-Afghanistan Marine Corps	Work	Single reference in article, second in notes. Some discussion
	Nov	The MV-22 in the Objective	Forsling	Single Reference in the final paragraph, some explanation
	Nov	Enhancing Rifle Company Operations	Goulding Jr	Single Reference
	Dec	Sea based Supporting Fires	Branstetter	Two references in article 1 in notes
2011	Jan	The Marine Corps of the Future	Thiele	4GW and Maneuver Warfare
	Jan	Why a Marine Corps	Wilson, Hayden	Single reference at the end of the article
	Jan	The Attritionist Letters # 9	Anonymous	Single Reference- Logistically Focused
	Feb	Maneuver Warfare in the 21st Century	Harkin	As title suggests
	Mar	The Marine Corps and Energy	Chipman, Thompson	Single Reference
	Apr	Tactical Mobility and Maneuver in Mine and IED Environments: The MAGTF across the Range of Military Operations. Postured for the Future?	Marapoti	Two References, some expanding discussion
	Apr	An Ethical Officer Corps	Brown	Single Reference
	May	Onboard Vehicle Power	Hammack, Mimmagh	Two References to Expeditionary MW
	Jun	Attritionist Letter 10: A Response	Mullen	Single Reference
	Jun	Letters- A Blunt Rebuttal	Neller	Single Reference, some expanding discussion
	Jul	Warden's Theory in COIN	McShane	Single Reference
	Aug	Editorial: The Opposing Ideas	Keenan	Two references, discussing debate arising from the Attritionist Letters- Discusses other letters that were not returned on the search
	Sep	Parting Reflections	Brendal	Single Reference, but expanding discussion
	Sep	Offensive Cyber Warfare	Mirenda	Single Reference, but some expanding discussion
	Oct	Walking Down a Dangerous Path	Fischer	Single Reference, but some expanding discussion
	Oct	The Decisionmaking Quandry: Analytical Decisionmaking at the Small Unit Level	Quist	As title suggests
	Oct	The Joint Logistics Enterprise	Vincent	Single Reference
	Nov	Letters- Maneuver Warfare	Lind	Single reference and short point
	Nov	The Marine Corps and the Coming Fiscal Reality	Dobson	Single Reference, but some expanding discussion
	Dec	21st Century Amphibious Capability	Hoffman	Single Reference, but some expanding discussion
	Dec	Marine Aviation Centennial	Allison, Baughn	Single Reference
2012	Jan	The Discussion Continues	Grice	Two References, supporting discussion expands on references
	Jan	The Cargo UAS	Sharp	Two References, no MW substance
	Jan	The Marine 'Mask of War'	Hoffman	Single Reference
	Jan	Marine Aviation Centennial	Allison	Single Reference
	Jan	The Basic School 2011 POI: The Impetus for Change	TBS Staff	Single Reference
	Mar	The Dynamics of Adaptation	Hoffman	Book Review-single reference
	Mar	Tasking Success: Defining Mission Accomplishment Through Task Analysis	Sinclair	Single Reference
	Apr	Editorial: Technology and Innovation	Kennan	Single Reference
	Apr	Machinegunnery	Del Gaudio	Single Reference
	Apr	Military Ethos and Culture: You can't Always Do what you Want	Kuntz	Single Reference
	Apr	An Intelligence Transformation	Patterson	Single Reference
	May	An Amphibious Resurrection	Davies	Case Study on Operation CHROMITE discussing MW
	May	Benefits from the MQ-9 Reaper	Walters	Mentioned twice, no MW substance
	May	Enabling the MAGTF ACE	Anonymous	Mentioned twice, no MW substance
	May	Air Ground Integration and Distributed Operations	Freshour, Ryan	Single Reference
	May	Rotary Wing and Tiltrotor Aviation	Anonymous	Single Reference
	Jun	Scout/Sniper Leader's Training Continuum	Rozic	Single Reference
	Jul	Free Play Training: A Recipe for Combat Success	Brusch, Hotvet	As Title Suggests
	Aug	Letters- What the Young Turks Mean	Munson	Single Reference, some discussion
	Aug	A Letter to Our Young Combat Leaders	Owen	Single Reference
	Oct	The Three Block Fellowship	Newell	Two References, some expanding discussion
	Nov	A Study of Military Theory	Blashek, Galloup	As title suggests
	Nov	Biography of an Icon	Anderson	Two references, no significant discussion
	Nov	Amphibious Warfare Conference, Department of State	Kelley	Three references, no significant discussion (from 1976)
	Nov	Reorienting on the Pacific	Mannion	Single Reference
	Dec	More Biographies	Hopgood	Single Reference
2013	Jan	Demystifying Attack the Network	Kinner, Osman	Singular Reference
	Mar	Letters-Combat Fitness	Thompson	Two References, no MW substance
	Mar	Force Reconnaissance	Carr	Single Reference,

				Single Reference "The tenets of the MCPP - top-down planning, Single-Battle Concept, and integrated planning - derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations. The tenets are directly influenced by the warfighting functions and the synchronization of the principal staff."2"
	Mar	The Seventh Warfighting Function	Hoffman	
	Apr	A Modern-Day Time Machine	Burgess	Two References, no MW substance
	Apr	Transforming for the Chaordic Age	Hoffman	Minor discussion of MW
	May	The State of Marine Corps Aviation		Single Reference
	May	Next Gen Warfare	Johnston	Single Reference
	Jun	Fourth Generation Warfare	Thiele	Single Reference
	Jun	The Marine Expeditionary Unit	Handy	Two References, no MW substance
	Jun	China's New Regime	Grant	Single Reference
	Jul	True Light Infantry	Thiele	Lack of adherence to our MW doctrine
	Jul	Clausewitz: His Influence on Current Marine Corps Doctrine	Boothroyd	No Specific Reference to Maneuver warfare, but does discuss Clausewitz's influence on MCDP-1
	Aug	In the Wake of Pete Ellis	Hoffman	Reference to MW in 1 of four Main Challenges facing the Marine Corps
	Sep	The Enlightened Marine	Covey	Single Reference
	Sep	Air Cooperation and the Marine Corps	Thiele, Rubinstein	Two References, supporting discussion on how the concept supports MW
	Sep	Employing the UAS	George	Single Reference in Conclusion
	Oct	Shock Trauma Platoon	Smith, Angell	Two References, no MW substance
	Nov	Close to the Fight at Chu Lai	Braudt	Single Reference
	Dec	Sexual Harassment: A Rat in Wolfe's Clothing	Friday	Single Reference
2014	Jan	Aviation and Fire Support: Part I: Obstacles to Overcome for the Corps to achieve the Goal of True Distributed Operations	McBride	Distributed Ops and maneuver warfare "[DO] constitutes a form of maneuver warfare. Small, highly capable units spread across a large area of operations [. . .] will provide the spatial advantage commonly sought in maneuver warfare, in that they will be able to sense an expanded battlespace, and can use close combat or supporting arms, including Joint fires, to disrupt the enemy's access to key terrain and avenues of approach.2"
	Jan	Institutional Innovation: An Organic Design	Freidman	Singular Reference
	Jan	Read-Think-Win: A Directed Focus to Exercise and Develop the Mind	McMillen	Lists MW as a book to read
	Jan	Swarming to Defeat A2AD Systems: Bees and Sharks at the Beach	Christ	Singular reference in the guise of 3GW
	Feb	A Counter to 'Air Cooperation': Chase Prize Essay Winner Misses the Mark	Dean	Advocating the Doctrine of MW in response to a Theile and Rubinstein Article about Air Cooperation
	Feb	Cyber Warfare: Supporting MEU Operations	Mitchell	Single Reference at the end to changing MW to include cyber operations
	Mar	The Basic School: Developing today's Leaders through a Common Background of Training, Friendship, and Mutual Purpose	Desgrosseilliers, Hoffman	mentioned twice, very minor discussion
	Apr	Operate to Know: A Proposed Operating Concept for Intelligence and Operations to Enhance Combat Effectiveness	Cukor, Poggemeyer, Jones, Kratzer	mentioned twice
	Apr	Small Unit Combat: Principles of Field Grade Officer Leadership	Targos	Singular mention, very minor discussion following
	Apr	Wanted Critical Thinkers: A Critical Approach to Recruiting Critical Thinkers	Jordan	Singular mention of MW, but MCDP-1 mentioned throughout
	Apr	Tactical Tweets, Bolds, Smartphones, and Drones (Oh My!) Social Media as a Force Multiplier	Mistein	Singular mention of MW
	May	The Re(al) Awakening: Thoughts on the Direction of the Postwar Marine Corps	O'Hara	Use of MW mindset to correct Marine Corps Problems--our current distancing from these tenets
	Jun	Battles Alone Do Not Bring Success	Reist	Book Review-mentions maneuver warfare at the end
	Jul	Flushing the MCPP: Changing the Marine Corps' Planning Paradigm	Cook	Minor discussion at the Beginning of the Article about adoption of Maneuver warfare to set up introduction of design
	Jul	Ship-To-Objective Maneuver: In the Modern A2/Ad Environment, Over the Horizon is not over the Hill	Farrar	Singular mention but small discussion surrounding
	Jul	The LAWS Virtues: Rebuilding our Scholarly Culture	Dixon	Singular mention
	Jul	Expeditionary Armor: What are the Operational Demands and Total Capability Required	Lamont	Singular mention
	Aug	Operational Art: The Complexity of the Modern Battlefield	Cubas	Two mentions of maneuver warfare
	Sep	Multilater Assessments and the Marine Corps: Looking at Options to Improve our Evaluation System	Niedziucha	Singular Mention
	Sep	Traditional Amphibious Warfare: Wrong For Decades, Wrong for the Future	Howell	Singular mention
	Oct	Equipping the Force: Ten guidelines	Jankowski	Discusses MW as a broader concept...relates to ACV and supporting establishment
	Oct	Sustaining the Expeditionary Forces: Tailoring Concepts to Support Dispersed Marine Units	Thomas	Singular Mention

	Nov	Aviation Target Identification: Technology as an Enabling Capability for Cross-Domain Operations	Lamont	Singular Mention
	Nov	Thinking About Future Conflict: Preparing for the Full Spectrum	Anderson	Singular Mention
	Dec	Maneuver Warfare: A Defense	Friedman	As Title Suggests
	Dec	Air Cooperation Revisited	Thiele, Rubinstein	Reply to Dean's Article...Countering with a discussion of MW
2015	Jan	Education for the Uncertain Environment	O'Connell, Fallon	Education and MW
	Jan	The Basic School: Developing today's Leaders through a Common Background of Training, Friendship, and Mutual Purpose	Desgrosseilliers, Hoffman	mentioned twice, very minor discussion
	Feb	The Future Threat is Insurgency: The Most Likely Conflicts	Stephenson	"This article argues first that insurgencies are inevitable. Second, it argues that bottom-up counterinsurgency (COIN) is how to conduct maneuver warfare in the COIN environment. Third is that the Marine Corps must implement a new retention and recruiting plan that will elevate the Corps to a level to be able to thrive in the COIN environment. Fourth is how this force can operate as the "silver bullet" solution to insurgency by generating bottom-up COIN."
	Feb	Digital Link-16 Interoperability : A dramatic Paradigm Shift for the Marine Corps	Murray	mentions MW mindset twice
	Feb	A Combat Arms Regimental System: A True Band of Brothers	Barndollar	As title suggests
	Feb	An Officers Oath-Supporting and Defending the Constitution	Walker	mentions MW once
	Apr	Maneuver Warfare: Making it Real in the Marine Corps	Grazier, Lind	Suggestion (quick for implementation of Maneuver Warfare
	Apr	The Company Landing Team: The Backbone of the Special Purpose MAGTF	Williams, Kay	As title suggests
	Apr	A Different MAGTF for an Austere Age: The Method is not the Mission	Forsling	Singular reference in conclusion
	Apr	MEU ACE	Welborn	single reference with minor following discussion
	Jun	Opening the Loop: A Look Inside the Mind of John Boyd	Brown	As the title suggests
	Jun	A Manoever Renaissance: Overcoming the Attritionist Tendency	Grazier	Single mention, but much broader discussion, differentiating maneuver from maneuver
	Jun	PME in Today's "Interwar Period" Global Uncertainty Demands High-Quality, Educated Marines	Hatton, Peterson, Kiihne, Ableson, Fowler	single mention, with minor surrounding discussion. Tied to PME
	Jun	The Operational Warfighter Initiative: Building Better Commanders and Staff Officers one exercise at a Time	Rohr	mentions FMFM-1 at the end
	Jun	The Essential EWS: Preparing for the Future	Faculty of EWS	Single Reference in Learning Obj
	Jul	Intrusive Leadership	Forsling	Singular reference
	Jul	SIGINT Can Regain the Initiative: Preventing Cold Starts to Crisis Reponses	Hart	Single mention, but broader discussion in context of recon pull
	Jul	The Art of Leading Up: The Critical Function of "Feedback"	Salene	Mentions MW, but discussion expands upon it
	Jul	Paddles Out: Returning the Infantry Small Boat Company to Every MEU	Spillane	As title suggests
	Aug	Intelligence for Intuitive Command: Investigating Forms and Functions	Rau	mentions MW twice. MW premium on speedy decisions--talks about intuitive decision making
	Aug	Cyber Electronic Warfare: Closing the Operational Seems	Poole, Schuette	Mentions MW once
	Sep	Exercises Doomed to Succeed: We Must be Ready to Fail	Dunbar	Only mention of MW is a reference from the MW handbook footnote
	Sep	Reducing Dependence on Energy: Adopting Individual Energy Efficient Behaviors Will make the Corps More Lethal and Agile	MCICOM Staff	"The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan introduced considerable challenges to the Marine Corps' tenets of maneuver warfare: travel light, travel fast, and bring only what you need to the fight. " Only mention
	Sep	Combat Readiness Through Cyber Resilience: Asserting Our Presence	Shockey	single reference
	Oct	The Performance Evaluation System: Multisource Feedback and the Marine Corps	Adams	As title suggests
	Nov	Marine Corps Innovation: The need for a Reawakening	Wood	Mentions MW as a Marine Innovation s few times
	Nov	bright	St. Pierre	Mentions MW once
	Nov	Counterinsurgency Considerations for the Information Age: Do We Have to Have One	Kallas	Single mention of MW in relation to 3GW
	Nov	Words have Meaning: Understanding What We Say and Write	Vohr	Confusion based on the term of maneuver warfare

	Dec	Three Rules of a Marine Rifleman	Lesnowicz	"The three rules of a Marine Rifleman are a tool to achieve command and control concepts in maneuver warfare. They provide the framework for the "implicit communication" and "harmonious initiative" that Marine Corps doctrine charges Marines to achieve."
2016	Jan	Operational Maneuver From the Sea Revisited: A Wargame Still Relevant	Lamont	mentions the "tenets of maneuver warfare" twice
	Feb/Apr	Sprinting to Fight the Last War: A Response to "Evolving the Marine Corps for Irregular Warfare"	Brown	singular mention of maneuver warfare
	Feb	21st Century Urban Operations: Infrastructure Impact on Military Operations	Ellis Group	Quotes from MCDP1 and MCDP-6
	Feb	Complex Military Environment: A Checklist Mentality in a Maneuver Warfare Environment	Foster	"There is dissonance between Marine Corps theory of maneuver warfare versus the linearity of our institution's centralized systems approach to training. The Marine Corps identifies maneuver warfare as the keystone philosophy for defeating our enemies. However, a top-down systems approach to training and education curbs the flexibility of critical thought required of every Marine in the development of their decision-making abilities, which is inherently required for the application of maneuver warfare. The solution requires more focus on improving the decision-making capabilities of the individual Marine rather than checklist-style evaluation of proficiency."
	Feb	The Defense Innovation Initiative: America's Third Offset and its impacts to the USMC Officer PME Continuum	Gutierrez	Brief mention of maneuver warfare
	Feb	The "Grand Ideal" John Boyd and America's Strategic Vision	Brown	maneuver warfare, Boyd and Moral Warfare
	Feb	The Crossroads of Adaptation: Characterizing Innovation in Today's Marine Corps	Wood	Characteristics of Adaptive Organizations, mentions maneuver warfare in defining adaptation
	Mar	Implications from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM for the Marine Corps	West, Smith	Originally Printed in Nov 2003. Maneuver warfare was successful in OIF...proved the concept
	Mar	The United States Marine Corps: Our Nation's Force- in-Readiness for the 21st Century	Krulak	Originally published in Apr 1998- singular mention of MW
	Apr	The Art of Communications Planning	Newell	singular mention of the tenants of maneuver warfare
	Jun	Evaluating Units	Devlin-Foltz, Bosnick	singular mention of the principles of maneuver warfare
	Jun	Improve Training: Free Play Exercises: Importance, Design, and Execution	Devlin-Foltz, Bosnick	only reference to maneuver warfare is MW handbook citation
	Jun	MCMAP: Execute the Leadership Technique: Be an Ethical Warrior	Gerlach	mentions maneuver warfare, reference Capt O'Hara Article
	Jun	Leadership Competency: Intellectual Deficiencies in the Officer Corps	Guthrie	Mentions MW as driver for needed intelligent officer corps
	Jul	Finding Water in the Desert: Challenges for Mid-Level Leaders in fiscally lean years	Tlapa	singular reference to maneuver warfare mindset
	Aug	C2 in the 21st Century	Friedman	singular reference to maneuver warfare
	Aug	Military Ethics: How Maneuver Warfare Demands Adherence to our values	Katolin	As title suggests
	Aug	Warfighting 3.0	Brown	Changes to MCDP-1 and move to "moral warfare"
	Aug	The Warfighting Skills Program	Thiele	Encourages readers to review the warfighting skills program. References the website, the maneuverist.org
	Sep	C2 for Idiots: Leadership in the Post-Privacy Age	Gerbracht	mentions maneuver warfare in the conclusion
	Sep	Breaking out of Iron Cages	Hoffman	Book Review-mentions maneuver warfare
	Sep	The Will to Communicate! Retaining Freedom of Action in a Denied/Degraded Environment	Stokes	Breifmention of maneuver warfare (says it was adopted in 1991)
	Sep	Adding Information-Related Capabilities: Increasing Force Capability to Shatter the Enemy's Cohesion	Fitts	Using Information in pursuit of MW
	Sep	Russian Reflections and Military Renaissance	Del Gaudio	Discusses maneuver warfare as a result of the second military renaissance
	Oct	For Further Reading	Bowers	Book Review-mentions maneuver warfare
	Oct	The Logistic Combat Team	Warfield	As title suggests--mentions maneuver warfare once
	Oct	Trash! A Critical look at the Assault Pack and its Deficiencies	Kittle	References the definition of MW in MCDP-1 to bring out the point of rapid...as a point of argument against the assault pack
	Nov	Editorial: Happy 241st Birthday marines	Woodbridge	Mentions Ellis Group Article and the questions it will address
	Nov	21st Century Maneuver Warfare	The Ellis Group	Maneuver warfare as it applies to the 21st century
	Dec	Editorial: Have a Great Holiday Season	Woodbridge	Mentions Ellis Group Article
	Dec	21st Century Combined Arms	Ellis Group	As title suggests
	Dec	Ambrosia: Chapter 6	Ruble	"In maneuver warfare, timing and phasing are absolutely critical. The most critical. Things have to happen exactly when they are supposed to happen or else you end up conducting fire-and-movement or, worse, movement under fire. But the enemy always gets a vote, so you have to make things event driven rather than time driven in an oversimplified sense."

