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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Understanding Taiwan and How It Can Improve International Recognition to Achieve
True Sovereignty**

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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Understanding Taiwan and How It Can Improve International Recognition to Achieve True Sovereignty

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Thesis: Taiwan underlies a complicated sovereignty issue with the People's Republic of China (PRC), with reconciliation not a feasible consideration; there are still possible opportunities to achieve progress towards a peaceful sovereignty resolution.

Discussion: Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 the ROC lost great credibility in its international influence due to the debate of the legitimate representation of China within the UN. After years of separation the possibility of reconciliation is still unfeasible, with the majority of the population still in support of independent status within the international community seeking methods to achieve that long term goal is discussed by providing recommendations to the ROC government, seeking to solve this long lasting issue in a peaceful matter by utilizing instruments of national power, and bringing harmony to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This can be done by implementing three main focuses: 1. a robust and motivated military to provide effective deterrence. 2. Increased economic interaction to enmesh Taiwan and the PRC. 3. Utilizing the One China Policy to the Republic of China's advantage and diplomatic policy.

Conclusion: The status quo of Taiwan currently is considered peaceful and sustainable, but far from ideal for the people of Taiwan, for the nation not recognized in the global community is an embarrassment to the people. The sovereignty issue of Taiwan will not be a quick solution, but it is possible to achieve a peaceful resolution across the strait by building a strong foundation of support that will support Taiwan's legitimacy in the international community.

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Introduction

The Republic of China (ROC), also more commonly known as Taiwan, underlies a complicated sovereignty issue with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This dispute began at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 with the ROC basing its government in Taiwan losing great credibility in its international influence and the PRC announcing its independence. Facing the newly established PRC, the debate of the legitimate representation of China within the UN began.

The Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation conducted a survey in September 2016, showing 69.7% of the people support independence or remain with the status quo, 17.8% think of uniting with the PRC, and the rest with no opinion.¹ The survey also shows that 68.4% distrust communist China, this shows that reconciliation with the PRC is not feasible. The separation of basically the same ethnic group is mainly due to lack of freedom and democracy that the Taiwanese people have become so accustomed to in the last century. Also issues of suppressing Taiwan's diplomacy, general mistrust, controlled information, rudeness, and human rights violations discourage the majority of the population from reconciliation.

From a strategic point of view, Taiwan supports the idea of preventing the expansion of communism and the influence it will bring to everyday life. This can be supported by assessing the *Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China* signed in 1954,² although terminated due new diplomatic ties with the PRC, it was replaced with the *Taiwan Relations Act* to continue the mutual relationship between the US and Taiwan. In a legal perspective, the democratic

constitution and laws contradicts communist practices, for instance, 1997 Hong Kong was returned to communist China and the Central Communist Party agreed to a one country two systems policy, but over the years the relationship has become complex, contradictory, and thought provoking.³ In 2015 four booksellers were detained by Chinese officials for selling books that are not permitted for reading in mainland China violating Hong Kong's Basic Law of freedom of speech and publication,⁴ which also generates large trust issues to consider. And last is the lack of incentives that the PRC can provide towards Taiwan to negotiate a peaceful reconciliation, until now there is nothing the PRC can provide Taiwan that can persuade the nation to forfeit the current status quo.

So still after more than 70 years, issues between Taiwan and the PRC are still unsettled, with changing perceptions now putting Taiwan in a highly vulnerable status to remain sovereign. This paper provides some background on what caused this situation, critical decisions made in the past, and actions the PRC are taking to restrict Taiwan. This will be followed with future recommendations to the ROC government seeking to solve this long lasting issue in a peaceful matter by utilizing instruments of national power, and bringing harmony to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

In sequence this article seeks to describe Taiwan's historical background, diplomatic situations, policy and challenges, and suggestions of improvement. Taiwan is an independent state and has all the attributes to support the claim, but what defines sovereignty in this matter? Woodrow Wilson explains that "Sovereignty is the daily operative power of framing and giving efficacy to the laws."⁵ Léon Duguit defines it "the

common power of the state, it is the will of the nation organized in the state, it is right to give unconditional orders to all individuals in the territory of state.”⁶ So why is Taiwan still battling over the issue of sovereignty? This is due to the lack of international recognition, mainly from diplomatic and economic pressure generated from the PRC, forming a perception that Taiwan is a breakaway state.

In order to transform this *de facto* state to a *de jure* state over time, understanding the background and implementing recommendations implied within this study can achieve progress towards a peaceful sovereignty resolution. Three main focuses will be addressed within the passage: 1. a robust and motivated military to provide effective deterrence. 2. Increased economic interaction to enmesh Taiwan and the PRC. 3. Utilizing the One China Policy to the Republic of China’s advantage and diplomatic policy.

Historical Background

This article begins explaining the historical background from 1949, not to neglect other important issues of the road map building towards the current Taiwan sovereignty situation, but to focus on more relevant information where the diplomatic conflict began. The legitimate representation of China was fought since 1949 without reaching any type of solution, only buying time with the intervention of the Korean War. On August 2, 1961, despite a number of advisors who would suggest that the United States should rethink its China policy, President John F. Kennedy reaffirmed the United States' support for the ROC representation in the United Nations. Considering the PRC a threat to international stability, President Kennedy secretly informed the ROC that the US would veto any efforts taken into account to seat the PRC in the United Nations Security Council at the expense of Taiwan⁷; this veto promise remained American policy through the end of Kennedy's administration.

In the early 1960s, the PRC's international status elevated and more nations changed diplomatic recognition to Beijing, forcing Kennedy to conceive a different strategy to safeguard the ROC seat. The ROC continued to use the "important question" method to hold its status as China's representation in the UN. This criterion proposed by the US was passed by the UN General Assembly.⁸ This temporary resolution was in accordance with Article 18 of the UN Charter that stated "decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."⁹ But actions from Beijing continued to change the support and considerations from various nations. In January 1964, the French showed the intention of recognizing the PRC. The US understood that this would set off rippling effects, and

attempted to facilitate a resolution but was unsuccessful. This led the ROC to break relations with France in early February, becoming one of the first major allies to change recognition.¹⁰

Between 1964 and late 1966, the administration of President Lyndon Johnson debated constantly about the American stance on Chinese representation. Especially after October 15, 1964, when the PRC successfully conducted a nuclear test, attaining nuclear status and a shift of international power the debate of representation grew even more intense. On November 14, 1964, the Canadian ambassador indicated to Washington that his government was considering supporting PRC admission to the United Nations at the 1965 General Assembly. Despite the loss of support, President Johnson believed that giving in to communist China would be “the greatest setback to US interests on the world scene in many years.”¹¹

Soon after President Richard Nixon took office in 1969 the policies changed towards rapprochement with communist China. Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing to meet with Premier Zhou En-lai, Zhou argued the US must recognize Beijing's claim of Taiwan “unreservedly” and recognize the PRC as the “sole legitimate government of China.” Kissinger recognized that the US future political evolution was likely to be in the PRC’s direction.¹² July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing and expected to visit himself the following year. This drastically changed the atmosphere for the China policy and devastated the trust towards the US from the people of Taiwan. This led to Resolution 2758 in the UN with the PRC recognized as the sole legal authority of China¹³ and began the global isolation of the ROC.

Diplomatic Situation

Understanding history provides a brief roadmap to the complexity between Taiwan and China. Just as important is the mindset of Taiwan leadership during the time, shaping the fate of the island without much consideration of alternative options provided. Due to the superior guidance of ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, it is “an impossible coexistence between the people and thieves.” (漢賊不兩立) This saying can be described as the people of the ROC will never recognize the communist China, leaving options such as dual representation in the UN nonnegotiable.

Nonetheless, after the PRC’s victory in the UN, the position that Taiwan is a province of China continues to spread across the world for the last 45 years, utilizing all types of methods through official and unofficial channels to deny Taiwan any type of international recognition. Here are a few situations that Taiwan has encountered due to the pressure given by the PRC: The international civil aviation organization (ICAO) shut out Taiwan, Taiwan was denied access to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the UN refused Taiwan citizens entry for tourism, and Taiwan faced discrimination while attending the annual World Health Assembly.

September 27, 2016: The international civil aviation organization (ICAO) shuts out Taiwan, going against international principles and interests of aviation safety. Taoyuan airport is the fifth busiest international cargo airport, and 11th for international passenger traffic according to Aviation Council International rankings.¹⁴ With 23 million Taiwanese nationals, tourists and international business traveling in and out of the 23rd

largest economy, even with an ethically or influential standpoint Taiwan should not be excluded from the ICAO conference.¹⁵

April 19, 2016: Taiwan was denied access to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) hosted in Belgium. The Taiwanese delegation was requested to leave the conference due to the protest from China, stating the Taiwan delegation did not send adequate ranking officials to the meeting. A statement which was far from the truth, since Taiwan sent a five-person delegation led by Shen Wei-cheng (沈維正), director-general of the Industrial Development Bureau's Metal and Mechanical Industries Division. Taiwan is not a member of the OECD but has been granted observer status in its competition committee, steel committee, and fisheries committee in 2002, 2005 and 2006, later changing its status to participant in 2013.

Taiwan citizens have also been refused entry to UN facilities for tourism if they present identification issued by the Taiwanese government like their passport or national ID card, but if they have a different type of identification such as a US driver's license or student ID they would be able to enter.¹⁶ This type of childish play that is normally heard of in playgrounds is actually enforced by the UN, an organization that claims "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" within the second paragraph of its own charter is somewhat ridiculous.

May 6, 2016, Taiwan received an invitation to attend the annual World Health Assembly in Geneva as an observer. This sounds like great news, but there were a few strings attached with the invitation. A few things will need to be explained before discussing the invitation. Since 2009, Taiwan has attended this event as an observer using the title of “Chinese Taipei.” This was an agreement between the Taiwan government led by former President Ma Ying-jeou, the government in Beijing, and the World Health Organization (WHO). This arrangement expecting Taiwan incrementally engage in the important network of WHO committees that fights against worldwide diseases.

Now, after almost eight years Taiwan is still turned down from most of the international health framework, and for those that Taiwan is allowed to attend often face great discrimination. A few years ago, WHO general secretary Margaret Chan even instructed her staff and member organizations to refer to Taiwan as “Province of China.”¹⁷ Also with the new Taiwan government administration of President Tsai Ing-wen taking office, Beijing definitely did not welcome the Taiwanese to the WHO. Luckily both the United States government and the European Union members states insisted Taiwan attend the meeting as an observer.

There are several other scenarios that Beijing is manipulating to affect Taiwan’s influence in the international community, such as protesting against Taiwan in the Olympics¹⁸, beauty pageants¹⁹ or many other international competitions to only use the title of “Chinese Taipei” rather than The Republic of China or Taiwan. The goal of the PRC is to disrupt Taiwan from achieving possible engagement opportunities with other nations through ASEAN, international summits, or attending functions such as the

Committee for Rare Diseases and international gatherings they can influence. China understands it cannot risk the chance of Taiwan gaining public recognition, a childish mindset possibly due to the restricted information precautions they use upon their own people of communist China.

Policy and Challenges

With China constantly creating resistances against Taiwan, the Taiwan government must continue to seek opportunities to influence the perspective of other nations, in order to retain a legitimate present in an international community. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Taiwan according to the ROC Constitution states that “the foreign policy of the Republic of China shall, in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, cultivate good-neighborliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the Charter of the United Nations, in order to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace.”²⁰

With that said, Taiwan has analyzed its own strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats, with strengths and opportunities including the persistence of freedom, democracy, and human rights, upholding the common values between the people of Taiwan and countries with corresponding virtues. The Taiwanese have similar virtues and beliefs when related with nation states including the United States, Japan, and Europe thus maintaining a positive relationship. Furthermore, due to the effects of globalization, the opportunities of environmental protection, medical assistance, disease prevention,

international crime cooperation, and disaster prevention have become issues that Taiwan can cooperate and contribute to.

Other strengths include competitive international industries, human resources, and a geographical advantage that assists in the development of international relationships. Industries such as semiconductors, machinery, computers, communication, biomedical, and agricultural science, have proved Taiwan's importance in the world. Also due to its geographic location, it offers the opportunity to expand business and international commerce within the Asia Pacific with active cooperation throughout the region.²¹

The people of Taiwan are also very active in participating in humanitarian assistance and non-government organizations (NGOs), contributing to the international society and providing a positive image for the nation. One of the most recent events providing humanitarian assistance would be the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. Taiwan organized several charities and NGOs to form a "Taiwan International Health Action team." According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Taiwan was the 6th largest assistance provider during the incident²², proving the capabilities Taiwan has to offer in the field of diplomacy.

Nonetheless, Taiwan also has weaknesses and threats it faces on a daily basis. First, it has limited resources to support diplomacy. This is caused by several factors, including financial difficulties the nation faces and the lack of consensus between political parties. Second is the fact that the PRC continues to restrict Taiwan's involvement in international activities. This would be the most challenging factor the

government faces in diplomatic engagements, for the PRC has robust economic and military advantages compared to Taiwan, aggressively promoting the “One China Policy” at every opportunity, restraining Taiwan’s capability to participate in international platforms. And the last difficulty is that nations operate mostly based on realism to enforce their national interests. This often creates a one-sided decision between the benefits of Taiwan and the PRC, and the PRC has a much greater economy, a larger military with nuclear capabilities, human resources, and a vast range of natural resources.

Although Taiwan is capable of providing limited financial assistance to allies and has done so in the past. A recent example of providing financial assistance would be efforts in Paraguay, distributing US\$ 71 million to improve local infrastructure in 2016. But clearly utilizing long term checkbook diplomacy it is not the preferred method for Taiwan to compete against the world’s second largest economy “that has trillions of dollars to do it.”²³

Maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship other than financial support type diplomacy is crucial, creating tailored cooperation plans for the benefit and growth of participating nations. In the Taiwan perspective with its limited economic resources, this would be more effective in sustaining these relationships. Between 2000 and 2013, China provided approximately \$31.5 billion of aid to Africa (\$2.25 billion per year)²⁴ and has pledged another \$60 billion in 2016 during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Within this \$60 billion announcement, \$5 billion is provided as grants and interest-free loans, \$5 billion for the Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs, \$5 billion for the China-Africa Development Fund, \$10 billion will create and offer the initial

capital for the China-Africa production capacity cooperation fund, and the rest include \$35 billion in preferential loans, export credits, and concessional loans.²⁵ With mainland China's foreign assistance highly active, results would not favor Taiwan if it was to implement the same strategy. Taiwan continues to focus on trust building and creating a symbiotic relationship with nation states. Activities including high-level engagements, technical exchange, political and economic pluralism²⁶ have been successful. The most recent high-level engagement would be January 2017, where President Tsai Ing-wen departed on a nine-day trip, visiting four diplomatic allies of Taiwan in Central America symbolizing the importance of solidifying these alliances.

The second continuous effort would be deepening and expanding the relationship with nation states that uphold similar virtues and beliefs, especially focusing on the US, Japan, and Singapore. Not to neglect the importance of relationship building among other nations, but to focus the utilization of limited resources. It is difficult to achieve formal diplomatic relations with these nations, but the unofficial bonds and relationships still contribute a great deal to the status of Taiwan, even to the extent that these unofficial bonds exceed the importance of current official diplomatic relations. Not that Taiwan refuses to seek official diplomatic ties, but due to current situations under the PRC's "One China Policy" this is difficult to achieve. This creates an environment which the number of diplomatic allies Taiwan has is less importance, and the "unofficial relations with more powerful countries endure," says Timothy Rich of the University of Western Kentucky. Rich continues to describe this situation "To be blunt, formal relations with a microstate may be consistent with Taiwan's claims of sovereignty, but it does little to prevent conflict with China in the future. Unofficial support from countries like the U.S.

provides such assurance.”²⁷ The US is undoubtedly the most valuable unofficial partner to the Taiwan, tied together by the Taiwan Relations Act that was initiated in 1979, and the Six Assurances from 1982.

The United States, being the largest economy and most powerful military by far in the world, definitely plays an important role towards the international recognition of Taiwan. Actions taken by the US government serve as guidelines or references for other nations. The current Taiwan government expects to continue this special relationship and build a stronger foundation of bilateral trust through pluralism of effort. Recent activities that continue to build this relationship would be events similar to the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meeting, held in Washington D.C. October 4, 2016, and the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) on March 2, 2016. These events not only strengthen the ties, but also seek to build upon the foundation of shared values, values of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights.

Another recent sign of improvement is the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017*, which now allows Taiwan and the US to participate in greater levels of military engagement, including the opportunity to observe the largest international maritime military exercise the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, and military exchanges between senior officers that were restricted in the past. This is a huge milestone since after the US recognized the one China policy in 1971, the formal interaction of senior officers or officials were extremely difficult to conduct.

Japan and Singapore, with similar beliefs and virtues as Taiwan, have also improved diplomatic relations in the past few years. Since the two serve as neighboring countries with active interaction in several areas (trade, tourism, culture, education etc.), the relationship provides great credibility to Taiwan's identity. Recent events that helped improve the relationship would be Japan's decision to add the word Taiwan to the name of its de facto embassy in Taipei. Starting January 2017, it will become the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association. Although only a small act of recognition, the significance has already made an impact on the hearts of the Taiwan people.²⁸

Additionally, signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement in 2013, has settled years of controversy to share fishery resources that have arisen from overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs).²⁹ Beyond signing documents, an unexpected act of diplomacy sparked friendly relations among the two nations. In March 2011, the people of Taiwan generated the largest combined donation to assist the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami.³⁰ This act of generosity gained respect and thanks from the citizens of Japan boosting the relationship greatly.

Singapore has had close relationships with Taiwan since the 1970s, led by the former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. According to the Taiwan Customs Administration, in July 2013, a Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA) between the Taiwan Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Program and Singapore Secure Trade Partnership Program was signed, from which traders are eligible to enjoy benefits provided by Taiwan Customs and Singapore Customs under this MRA.³¹

In November 2013, Singapore and Taiwan also signed an Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP), basically a free trade agreement with the desire of not antagonizing China by directly using Taiwan or The Republic of China in the paperwork. The implementation of these agreements will effectively enhance trade security and facilitation for both sides and tie the bond between the two nations even closer.³² Building relationships and connections continues to maintain Taiwan's presence in the international community, but it also draws attention to Beijing and puts difficulties on the interaction and cooperation options Taiwan can build with other nations.

Seeking other ways of raising the international influence of Taiwan, while minimizing the opportunity of Beijing intervening, Taiwan has also looked towards the involvement in international organizations and NGOs that promote issues of public policy, academics, culture, commerce, health, agriculture, environmental protection, humanitarian aid, sports, and more. Some organizations mentioned earlier like WHO, ICAO, or OECD, although still facing much resistance in Beijing have a harder time of finding leverage to decline interaction, due to the overall contributions Taiwan can provide to the international community. Organizations that Taiwan actively participates in include the Red Cross, World Vision International Criminal Police Organization, International Human and Privacy Rights Protection Association, World Federation of Teachers Union, World Federation of Exchanges, and Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation just to name a few.³³

The dispute across the Taiwan Strait should be resolved primarily between Beijing and Taipei. Other nations can influence and provide suggestions to the Taiwanese government, but the ultimate decision lies in the hands of the people and leadership of the island state itself. Taiwan's different political parties and leadership also have caused diversity of effort, resulting inconsistency in strategic direction and have led the situation back and forth with little progress if any. During 2008-2016, former President Ma took a closer relationship with Beijing to increase trade and tourism. Although this method looks like siding towards China, it opens a great opportunity for Taiwan to reach out and connect to other nation states, international organizations, and events, with minimal intervention. This opportunity of minimal intervention helped to promote Taiwan and gain ground within the international realm, incrementing towards a stronger recognition and peaceful resolution. On November 6, 2015 both leaders of China and Taiwan held their first meeting since the end of the Chinese civil war, stating to work and resolve their differences peacefully.³⁴ In 2016, former President Ma addressed that "Cross-strait relations have improved more in the past eight years than during any period since 1949."³⁵ These are signs that indicate the improvement of bilateral relationships between Taipei and Beijing.

President Tsai, after taking office in May 2016, has taken a different approach towards solving the cross strait dispute, sending a stronger message of sovereignty to Beijing. Clear about her intentions, China has started to heavily intervene with Taiwan's international engagements, putting pressure among nations and organizations that intend to favor Taiwan, reiterating the one China policy. Meanwhile, by limiting the number of tourists that can visit Taiwan, the PRC reduces economic support towards the island.

Since President Tsai's inauguration, mainland tourist numbers have gone down by more than 30 percent.³⁶

Recommendations

The ultimate utopia for the government and people of Taiwan would be a peaceful resolution across the strait, with the Republic of China formally recognized within the international community as an independent and sovereign state. With that, there is still much to strive towards. Nonetheless, using methods that have been implemented since the beginning of the One China conflict has not seemed to make significant progress to improve the current status of sovereignty. Have in mind that since 1971 thoughts and relationships have changed across the world, the following section will provide recommendations Taiwan must consider to open the stage entering a blue ocean strategy.³⁷ There are four suggestions that focus on weak points or unnoticed areas within the strategy of gaining greater international support and also gain leverage. The four suggestions are as follows: introducing an incremental strategy to build relationships; information operations to promote Taiwan and discredit the PRC; military deterrent by hard and soft power; and strengthening economic ties. These suggestions will be addressed in sequence and further detailed in the next few paragraphs.

First, slow is fast, implementing an incremental strategy to achieve the desired goal. How President Ma and President Tsai used different approaches to resolve Taiwan's sovereignty issue was briefly described in previous paragraphs. President Ma taking a much more reliant strategy towards gaining international support, by slowly rebuilding relationships with countries that normally would retract under Beijing's

pressure. Although this approach has cost Ma to take blame selling out Taiwan in favor of China, the stability of the country upon the issue was rather steady. President Tsai taking a direct and straightforward approach makes her position and desired outcome vary clear. But it irritates Beijing greatly; the nation faces much more resistance and pushback from other countries and international organizations.

Stephen Covey wrote, “With people, if you want to save time, don’t be efficient. Slow is fast and fast is slow.”³⁸ And international relations is a people’s game, being too eager to achieve a tactical victory might lead to a strategic failure, by blocking all the possibilities that have not had the chance to mature. A slow but steady pace, achieving small victories one at a time, will incrementally gain Taiwan a stronger position with more friends and resources to confront the adversary when necessary. Showing your hand of cards too early most often leads to failure due to clear counter measures your opponent can place upon you. This strategy should benefit Taiwan in the long run, as long as Taiwan prevents from provoking Beijing, it eases the tension and the PRC can focus on the other internal and external disputes.

Taiwan can also use the One China Policy to its advantage in this type of environment, understanding Taiwan and the PRC agree upon the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan should leverage this to undermine the One China Policy, this can be done by gaining representation in more international events to build recognition. This should be conducted into three conditions based phases: 1. Gaining international representation phase. 2. Undermining the One China Policy phase. 3. Legitimate recognition phase.

In the first phase, the main objective is to gain opportunities to attend multiple international events and organizations. This can be done by using titles the PRC accepts, this action will definitely undermining the ROC public, but to achieve international influence the importance is to address the representation to the international community of the greater good that the Taiwan representation provides, such as improving public health issues in the WHO or improving aviation safety in the ICAO. The ability to have a seat at the table and present to the global community what Taiwan has to contribute and not abide by a meaningless naming game is critical in the initial phase.

After achieving a certain degree of international publicity and building strong relationships with several nation states, the second phase of undermining the One China Policy can begin to take action. This should start with describing the 1992 Consensus that the PRC agrees with, describing to the public that China means the ROC and not the PRC. If this strategy is played carefully, it is possible that the One China Policy can completely backfire against communist China disrupting decades of effort they put in to delegitimize Taiwan's credibility.

The third phase is to achieve legitimate recognition, this phase Taiwan will need to have achieved support from the majority of the international community in order to become effective. With international support in place, taking legal actions of representation through the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Arbitration for long concerning issues such as the East and South China Sea disputes. Where Taiwan has strong evidence to claim these areas compared to the PRC and Japan, but currently lacks global support of a voice to present it.³⁹

The Second recommendation is the use of modern information operations, utilizing social media and mainstream websites to influence the international public. Today's social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram have become the mainstream source of information for the public, which can make a great impact at an affordable cost. With mainland China and its population of nearly 1.4 billion people in 2017⁴⁰, its influence of the One China policy propaganda is much more widespread and effective than Taiwan's population of 23 million advertising their sovereignty.

With China and its information restrictions among the World Wide Web, this information restriction they have imposed on themselves would be an excellent opportunity to exploit and conduct information operations to influence the world about facts and occurring situations, not to focus on certain individuals but the general public to gain support that drives the political decision. There are two focus points that Taiwan should allude to, the first would be to clearly depict that Taiwan is not a province of mainland China or the PRC, and to emphasize that China does not possess any direct influence towards the Taiwan government in any form. Also to condemn actions of political violence the PRC's conducts against Taiwan, seeking to marginalize Taiwan's international influence. The objective of this strategy is to let the world face the fact that there is a People's Republic of China and a Republic of China, revealing the One China Policy as a childish joke, and would make China stuck in a difficult situation to persuade to others the One China Policy when no one really cares anymore.

Third, shape a robust and motivated military to provide effective deterrence through hard and soft power, building a military that is prepared for the worst. In the past

few years, Taiwan's senior military leaders have shown a lack of faith in the military capabilities of defending the island. On January 18, 2017, former Deputy Minister of Defense Chung-bing Lin (林中斌) stated that the Taiwan military could possibly only hold the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from invading up to 48 to 72 hours. September 22, 2016, the current Minister of Defense Shih-kuan Feng (馮世寬) stated during a legislators inquiry, that "Taiwan would certainly last more than a week." This type of response is ridiculous if you want someone to respect the capabilities of your military, leave alone your adversary laughing. Although Minister Feng later clarified that the Armed Forces will fight as long as they can, and not to be bonded to a certain timeframe this type of mindset is corrosive, lowering the will of the military to defend, not only depleting the faith of the people towards the military, but also the honor and respect the military strives on. Still there are many other Defense Ministers that provide different opinions on how long Taiwan can hold off an attack from the PRC, such as former Minister Yen Ming (嚴明) saying that he can guarantee that Taiwan can fight longer than one month, and former Minister Kao Hwa-chu (高華柱) stating "it will never be less than a week."⁴¹ If the Nation does not take military matters seriously, no one else will. "God helps those who help themselves" said Ben Franklin. Understanding that Taiwan will need great amounts of military assistance from other nations, it is important to show self-determination towards the defense of the nation. If not, why would anyone else want to sacrifice their lives for a battle they can choose not to? For instance in Afghanistan, Afghan soldiers continue to surrender their posts to the Taliban with little resistance; this act of selfishness declines the willingness of coalition forces to continue supporting

them.⁴²

Recommendations for the military consist of two areas, the soft and hard powers of the military. The soft power would be to implement an optimistic mindset of winning wars, and the hard power is to increase physical strength of deterrence. First the Taiwan military need to create an optimistic mindset that believes Taiwan can and will defend its sovereignty from enemies. It is understandable that facing mainland China the largest military in the world, with a force of 2.2 million active military members and an annual defense budget of \$140 billion dollars is very intimidating, especially when Taiwan only has 210,000 active duty service members with a much smaller budget. With that understood, the goal is not to defeat the PLA with Taiwan forces alone, but to set the necessary circumstances to deter the enemy, increase the willingness of allies to provide military, and attract international attention.

Still, just looking at the facts, Taiwan has prepared itself to resist invasion for the past 70 years, building a very robust network of defense and communication; they also understand the terrain and restrictions it has, thus limiting aggression to anticipated areas. Not to mention Taiwan has a reserved force of approximately 3.5 million that can be mobilized when necessary, facing the opposition that is more than likely not to engage 100 percent of its forces towards the island of Taiwan, also the capability and limitations of the PLA to deploy their forces, and the plausible international influence opposing the act of aggression.

But numbers are not the dominant factor of war; it is the determination of the

people and military that decides final results. As General Alexander A. Vandegrift stated “Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.”⁴³ Looking back in history, this has occurred over and over again. In 1939 The Winter War was fought between Finland and the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union total force estimated at 1,800,000 men (deploying approximately 600,000), against Finland with approximately 180,000 troops in the initial standing. The Finns were greatly outnumbered by the Soviets also in armor (6,541 to 30) and aircraft (3,800 to 130), but their determination carried them through, inflicting mass casualties on the Soviets, ending with signing the Moscow Peace Treaty.⁴⁴ Other examples include the Vietnam War and Afghanistan, where the US, a far more superior force, fought a comparable ill-prepared force but was unable to achieve a quick and clear victory. These examples show how human determination plays an important role towards the success of achieving victory in conflict.

Critics may argue that Mainland China does not have the restrictions that the US was tied to during those engagements, but in the end, the war would still end longer than a week. Some of the shortest wars in history like the Falklands War was 77 days,⁴⁵ the Polish-Lithuanian War 139 days,⁴⁶ Second Balkan War 94 days,⁴⁷ Sino-Vietnamese War 27 days, and the Indo-Pakistani War was 13 days. These do not even include the buildup preparations time, which already gives a signature of launching an attack. Of course there is also the 6 Day War that was fought between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq that lasted 6 days. But the countries involved did not have an 180-kilometer strait to cross, which will need days of shaping operations to set landing conditions and

eventually conduct a large-scale conventional amphibious assault to take over a country, disregarding any restrictions from international organizations.

The importance of creating an optimistic mindset within the military is to solidify the determination of defending the country against aggression; this would not only increase combat power unquantified by numbers but also creates a strong deterrence towards a forceful resolution of Taiwan. This strategy also will increase the respect of other nations, affecting how they view and are willing to support Taiwan in the future.

The second part of the military aspect recommendation is to increase the military defense budget to 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or at least attempt to narrow the gap. This is mainly due to increase military defense capabilities to contend the PLA's rising military power. But there are also other important reasons to this action; first it will send a direct message to Beijing, stating that Taiwan is preparing for the worst sending another message of deterrence. Second, it will also meet the expectations of the US government and provide greater opportunities for cooperation and military engagements. Although Taiwan and the US have the Taiwan Relations Act as a defense cornerstone, fighting another country's war is not the highest of interest of any nation, and showing measurable commitment towards national defense is always a confidence builder to those that are willing to support the security within the region.

The last recommendation is generating strong economic ties with all countries possible; this would be the unofficial coalition among the international community.

Attracting foreign investment and development within Taiwan not only helps the economy but also creates a bond of national interests between different countries, for governments have the obligation to provide security to the investments of their citizens. The US for instance, to ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment)⁴⁸ is listed a vital interest of the nation. Other countries also have similar obligations to ensure the prosperity of the nation, and if there is enough at stake, they will definitely need to express their considerations to prevent losses. This strategy would also work with creating strong economic ties with the PRC, by creating a tight economic relationship with the PRC will generate several new considerations the communist party will have face. Economy would act as a double edged sword if they attempt to conduct aggressions against Taiwan, they would also damage the income of their own.

Conclusion

The status quo of Taiwan currently is considered peaceful and sustainable, but far from ideal for the people of Taiwan, with resistance from Beijing in trade and international cooperation, this alone will cause tension of inequality, with citizens of Taiwan not recognized in the global community is an embarrassment to the people. So it is difficult to understand how the status quo will actually benefit the complicated situation.

The sovereignty issue of Taiwan will not be solved overnight, but it is possible to achieve a peaceful resolution across the strait that can eventually relieve Taiwan from the nonsense of trying to justify its own existence. Efforts through an indirect shaping phase will build a strong foundation that will support Taiwan's legitimacy in the international community. Gradually with the support built over the years, the PRC will not be able to promote the One China Policy with rational justification and will seem only like a childish action.

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