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The term civil-military relations refers to the interaction between the military, the government, and society. This paper focuses specifically on the relationship between civilian authorities and senior military leaders. Several theorists explored the relationship in attempts to provide a usable framework for better understanding the dynamics at work. Five factors increase the tension between government officials and senior military leaders. This tension manifest itself in a number of ways. Members of the military can address current sentiments of distrust within civil-military relations in three ways.

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Walking the Tight-Rope: An Evaluation of Civil-Military Relations Today

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Walking the Tight-Rope: An Evaluation of Civil-Military Relations Today

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Thesis: Tension in the civil-military relationship is not a new phenomenon; however, the relationship is aggravated further by five factors. These five factors include: a blurring of the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches in exercising civilian control, a distancing of senior military officials from the seat of power, a rise of the American military in the shaping of foreign policy, increasing public confidence in the military, and use of the media to sway public opinion. Members of the military can address the current sentiments of distrust within civil-military relations by embracing its complex symbiotic nature, making small reforms to professional military education, and improving accountability within the ranks.

Discussion: The term civil-military relations refers to the dynamic interaction between the military, the government, and society. This paper focuses specifically on the relationship between civilian authorities and senior military leaders, an association laden with distrust dating back to the days of the Continental Army. Since the end of World War II, several civil-military theorists have explored the relationship in an attempt to provide a usable framework for better understanding the dynamics at work. Although an appreciation of all the theories is important, ultimately Schiff's concordance theory captures the ideal civil-military relationship. To further complicate the civil-military relations environment, five factors increase the tension between government officials and senior military leaders. They include: confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of government in exercising civilian control, the increasing distance of senior military leaders from the seat of power, the rise of the military in shaping foreign policy, increasing public confidence in the military, and the lasting and immediate impact of the media to sway public opinion—all of which exacerbate that distrust. Tension between military leaders and civilian authorities manifests itself in a number of ways. The most obvious examples are the disagreements over policies in Afghanistan and Iraq; however, disputes over the attempted retirement of the A-10 Warthog and gender integration occurred most recently. These contemporary examples of friction in the civil-military relationship illuminate future issues such as defense acquisitions and military led efforts to reduce base infrastructure.

Conclusion: Members of the military can address current sentiments of distrust within civil-military relations in three ways. First, they must embrace the symbiotic nature of the relationship. Second, reforms to professional military education will bridge the language barrier between government officials and senior military leaders. Finally, by holding members of the profession of arms accountable for their behavior, the military will foster a culture where leaders display both moderation and an appreciation for dissent.

<u>DISCLAIMER</u>

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

I first had the idea for this paper last summer as the primary season for the presidential election culminated with party conventions. At both the Democratic and Republican Conventions, retired general officers stood on stage and publically endorsed candidates not as private citizens, but as former generals. A subsequent editorial response in the *Washington Post* criticizing the public endorsement reminded me of a lesson I had learned very early on. As a young cadet in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at the College of William and Mary, my instructors taught me one of the bedrocks of the profession of arms is the subordinate nature of the United States Military to civilian authorities. In my mind, a critical component of this civil-military relationship is the perceived "apolitical" nature of the military. Watching and reading the debate over the actions at the conventions sparked a number of questions. Was it appropriate for retired general officers to use their rank to publically support political candidates? Does the public endorsement of a candidate by a retired general officer undermine the concept of an apolitical foundation? How is a military officer expected to balance their personal beliefs with the responsibilities that come with wearing the uniform?

In my mind the easy answer was to look towards George Washington and George Marshall as the standard military professionals should strive for. In their own ways, I felt each served as the embodiment of both an apolitical military leader and a critical node in an effective civil-military relationship. However, the more I read, the less comfortable I was with that idea. Although I frequently look to both as the example to emulate, in reality each of them faced their own challenges within the civil-military relationship. I quickly found myself looking less at trying to identify who was the best example of balanced civil-military relations, and focused instead on trying to better understand civil-military relationships in general. I gained a better appreciation for where the civil-military relationship has been in the past and where it is going in the future. I believe studying both will be beneficial as I continue my military career.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the many individuals who helped me complete this paper. First, I would like to thank my faculty mentor, Dr. Wineman, not only for his guidance throughout the process, but also for his patience. I am sure I was a constant source of frustration with my scatter-brained ideas and general procrastination. Next, I want to thank Dr. DiDesidero for her assistance and help in structuring and editing the paper. Last, but not least, I want to thank my wife, Jennifer Lucas, for all of the time she invested in keeping me focused on the task at hand and in reviewing the multiple drafts I sent her way.

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Introduction

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz was one of the first to identify that war is not "the exclusive province of soldiers."[1] He recognized that the rise of ideologically driven mass armies during the French Revolution fundamentally changed how governments fought wars. War was no longer just "a matter for the army and the army alone" because governments "now had to appeal to the citizenry."[2] This shift in the conduct of war also reverberated through civil-military relationships, coupling the military objectives of a conflict with a larger political purpose. For Clausewitz, war was an extension of politics through other means; the political goals determined "both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."[3] Clausewitz highlights the natural tension at play between the soldier and the statesman. The statesman determines the political objective of the war; the soldier determines if the political objective is consistent with the use of military force. The soldier establishes the military objective and military means to execute the conflict; both the soldier and the statesman ensure the military strategy achieves the political purpose. Feedback from the strategy helps reframe the political objective, ultimately leaving the statesman to decide when to end the conflict.[4]

This tension remains a critical component of civil-military relationships in the United States today. Members of the military hold the subordinate nature of their institution to civilian authorities as a core principle of their profession. Deference to civilian officials legitimizes military efforts to protect the interests of the United States domestically and internationally. Civilian control of the military provides government representatives with a powerful bargaining chip during negotiations. Unfortunately, the relationship between senior military officials and civilian authorities is not always amenable. President Harry S. Truman relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur after MacArthur challenged the policies of his administration in Korea. General Stanley McChrystal resigned after making controversial comments on the

policies of President Barack Obama's administration in Afghanistan. More recently, remarks to the national media from retired military officers during the presidential election re-ignited a conversation on the status of civil-military relationships in the United States. This new dialogue accentuates the idea that understanding the complex dynamics at play is an obligation for every military officer.

The tension between government authorities and senior military leaders that exists today is not new. However, not understanding or acknowledging this tension poses a problem for modern civil-military relations. The concerned parties fail to appreciate the dynamics of the relationship and the prevailing sense of distrust between the parties that has existed since the Continental Army. Even though the civil-military divide is not new, the relationship is aggravated by five factors: a blurring of the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches in exercising civilian control, a distancing of senior military officials from the seat of power, a rise of the American military in the shaping of foreign policy, increasing public confidence in the military, and use of the media to sway public opinion. Members of the military can address the current sentiments of distrust within civil-military relations by embracing its complex symbiotic nature, reforming professional military education, and improving accountability for behavior within the ranks.

A Review of Civil-Military Relations

Before proceeding to the analysis of modern civil-military relations, it is important to provide context on four things. The four areas are: a definition of civil-military relations; an identification of the parties involved in the relationship; a brief historical review of the tension between civilian authorities and senior military leaders inherent in the relationship; and an appreciation for the evolving roles and responsibilities for the parties in the civil-military relationship.

In a lecture at the United States Air Force Academy in 2013, Dr. Mackubin T. Owens defined civil-military relations as the interaction between the institution of the military, the government, and "the other sectors of the society in which the armed force is embedded."[5] Central to this relationship is an understanding between the citizens, their representatives of government, and the military on the apportionment of roles and responsibilities in defense of the interests of the United States. Dr. Owens compares civil-military relationships to two hands wielding a sword. One hand, the representatives of government, are responsible for determining when and why to pull the sword from its scabbard. The other hand, the military, maintains the blade and applies it to achieve the objectives identified by the government.[6] The term "gap" frequently refers to the distance between a society and the military charged to protect it. Although that link is critical, that discussion is reserved for another time. For the sake of brevity, this paper focuses solely on the relationship between representatives of government and senior military leaders. The terms "divide" or "tension" are used interchangeably to discuss that relationship.

The delicate balance, or tension, that defines the civil-military relationship has always existed. In the twilight of the American Revolution, as the threat from Great Britain dissipated, feelings of malcontent amongst the soldiers of the Continental Army reached a tipping point. Facing limited supplies, no pay, and frozen promotions, factions of the army called for a more aggressive approach to the Continental Congress.[7] General of the Armies George Washington successfully quelled the revolt, asking the angry parties to place "the army's confidence in the Congress and the commander in chief."[8] During the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George McClellan disagreed on an appropriate strategy to conduct the war. Lincoln felt McClellan moved too slowly; conversely, McClellan felt he lacked

sufficient forces to achieve Lincoln's objectives. Unable to come to an agreement, Lincoln replaced McClellan with Major General Ambrose E. Burnside in November 1862. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General of the Army George C. Marshall clashed over the lend-lease program with Great Britain, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and the timing of the invasion of Western Europe.[9] Despite their differences in opinion on these issues, Roosevelt and Marshall upheld an "image of civil-military comity" throughout World War II.[10] In all three examples, civilian control of the military reigned supreme.

The balance of roles and responsibilities between participating parties in the civil-military relationship evolved over time as well. Prior to World War II, the military was "too peripheral to policymaking and society" to assume a strong position in the relationship.[11] Dr. Owens identifies four redistributions of power since the end of World War II. The first one occurred coming out of the war, as the United States military moved from the periphery into the limelight as a central government organization. During the Cold War, the strategy of deterrence "marginalized the military's contribution to strategy making."[12] The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War marked a third renegotiation of the roles and responsibilities as politicians and military leaders attempted to map a course through uncharted waters. Finally, Dr. Owens suggests the state of continuous conflict over the last fifteen years has potentially brought civil-military relations to a point where the United States military exercises excessive sway over the government.[13]

Civil-Military Relationship Theories

Clausewitz's identification of the tension between military leaders and civilian authorities and his theory on civil-military relations is only a starting point. Scholars criticize him for oversimplifying the relationship and failing to "understand the dynamics of civilian interactions with the military."[14] Since the end of World War II, five more recent civil-military theorists have

explored these dynamics in greater detail. Early theorists like Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz provide a foundation for the study of civil-military relations. More contemporary theorists like Eliot A. Cohen, Peter D. Feaver, and Rebecca L. Schiff expand the research in the field. Although understanding all of the theories is important to appreciate that contribute to the tension between government authorities and senior military leaders, ultimately Schiff's theory is the best representation of the ideal civil-military relationship.

Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist, first started to explore civil-military relations in the early years of the Cold War as the United States flexed its global military power. In his book *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington lays out what many consider the foundation of modern civil-military theory. He argues the military, specifically officers, comprise a profession. A profession is "a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics," including expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.[15] The officer corps of the military meets Huntington's general characteristics of a profession in three ways. First, members of the officer corps are experts in the application of violence, developed through specialized training and consisting of its own occupational language. As experts in the use of force, members of the officer corps are responsible to society for only using that skill in appropriate situations. Finally, the ability to exercise this skill is limited to a small number, who are "publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank," as members of the military bureaucracy.[16] For Huntington, it is important to differentiate between the terms "professional soldier," or "professional army," and military profession. The first two terms describe individuals who work for pay, while the latter refers to those pursuing something greater than themselves "in the service of society."[17] Admittedly, historians criticize Huntington for resting his theory on the rise of the military profession on limited sources about the United States Army during the 19th century. In an article

from 1991, Edward M. Coffman said, "We now know that the isolated situation of the officer corps which Huntington considered so important in the molding of the professional ethic did not exist for many."[18] However, Huntington remains a good starting point for exploring the civil-military relationship.

Huntington believes in the subordinate nature of the military to civilian authorities, claiming obedience is "the supreme military virtue."[19] He envisions two approaches to the civilian control of the military: subjective control and objective control. High levels of political and social involvement and low levels of military professionalism characterize subjective civilian control. Government officials utilize strict control measures to minimize conflict and maintain power over the military. For Huntington, "the denial of an independent military sphere," is at the heart of subjective control.[20] Conversely, low levels of political and social involvement and high levels of military professionalism mark objective civilian control. Senior politicians leave military matters to military professionals, and senior military leaders leave political matters to politicians. There is a distinct distribution of power between the military and civilians leading to "the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior," in the officer corps.[21] For these reasons, Huntington firmly believed objective civilian control was the ideal method of civil-military relations. Increased autonomy contributed to a higher sense of professionalism, resulting in an apolitical military securely under civilian control.

Another contemporary civil-military theorist writing at roughly the same time as Huntington was sociologist Morris Janowitz. He did not share Huntington's faith in the two distinct institutions of military leaders and civilian authorities. Instead, Janowitz argues that evolving responsibilities of the military gradually distort the lines between the two domains. In order to accomplish their new missions, professional officers need "skills and orientations common to

civilian administrators and civilian leaders."[22] He envisioned the military transitioning to what he calls the "constabulary concept." Under this new organizational design, the military no longer differentiates between "peacetime" and "wartime," remaining "continuously prepared to act" across the range of military operations.[23] To achieve this constabulary concept, Janowitz saw a convergence of the civilian and military sectors. The civilian elites would work to evolve the military profession. In return, the military elites would remain "amenable to civilian political control," because they recognized that the civilian authorities respected "the tasks of the constabulary force."[24] Although Janowitz disagreed with Huntington on the force structure and utilization of military, both theorists appreciated the value of an apolitical military service.

Despite the best attempts of Huntington and Janowitz to explain the ideal civil-military relationship, theories continued to evolve. In his attempt to understand the complexities of civil-military relations, Eliot A. Cohen proposes the idea of the unequal dialogue. Cohen, a political scientist, recognizes the foundation Huntington's objective control model provides, but believes it fails to deliver "a description of either what does occur, or what should," in civ-mil relations especially in times of war.[25] He critiques Huntington's idea that military officers are truly experts in the application of violence, arguing many spend entire careers without partaking in a conflict. Because "war is too varied an activity for a single set of professional norms," senior military leaders find themselves advising on issues for which they have no frame of reference.[26] This does not detract from the quality of their advice, but demonstrates that their counsel is not infallible. In Cohen's unequal dialogue, government officials and senior military leaders repeatedly express "their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively."[27] However, in the end the authority of the civilian leader reigns supreme.

The next civil-military theorist, Peter D. Feaver, attempts to clarify civ-mil relations using the business concept of agency theory. For Feaver, the "relations between civilians and military are … a strategic interaction carried out within a hierarchical setting."[28] Civil-military relations are strategic because the decisions either side makes depend on what they believe the other is likely to do. The relations occur within a hierarchical setting because "civilians have legitimate control over the military."[29] According to agency theory, government authorities, or principals, enter into a contract with the military institution, or agent, to build a force capable of defending the principal's interests. Once both sides agree to the contract, the principal ensures the agent adheres to it by establishing appropriate mechanisms to minimize the risks associated with the delegation of power. Feaver argues the ideal blend of "monitoring mechanisms" minimizes the chance for the military to ignore the wishes of the government, "at the least cost to the principal and while preserving the efficiencies of specialization that come with delegation."[30] Inherent in this explanation of civil-military relations is the idea that at times, the military has the ability and motivation to avoid doing what civilian authorities want. The military will violate the contract if there is a negative perception of what the civilians are asking for, and it is unlikely the principal will punish them for the violation.[31] The areas of agreement and disagreement between the principal and agent will shift over time. For Feaver, civilians can "shape military behavior," by promoting military leaders "who hold preferences more similar to those of civilian principals."[32] Unfortunately, even that action is of limited utility because the unique nature of military culture lends itself to the development of diverging viewpoints.

The final contemporary civil-military relations theory worth mentioning is political scientist Rebecca L. Schiff's concept of concordance theory. Writing after the end of the Cold War, Schiff challenged the standing belief that civil-military relations consist of a "dichotomous power

relationship between [the] civil and military spheres."[33] Schiff's concordance theory contains strong undertones of both Plato's three parts of the polis and Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity."[34] She identifies three partners within civil-military relationships: the military, the political elites, and the citizenry. Concordance theory's three partners try to achieve concordance, or agreement, on four indicators: the composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. Unlike other civil-military theories that stress the separation of military and civil institutions, concordance theory "highlights dialogue, accommodation," and similarities between the concerned parties.[35] Concordance theory is not a dualistic ordered approach to civ-mil relations. Instead, the military, the political elites, and society should aim for a cooperative relationship. This relationship "may or may not involve separation, but does not require it."[36] Using the countries of Israel and India as case studies, Schiff argues that concordance theory achieves two conditions that previous civil-military relations theories do not. First, it identifies the organizational and societal conditions that encourage or disrupt domestic military intervention. The theory also forecasts domestic military intervention is unlikely if the partners reach an agreement.[37]

Since the end of World War II, civil-military theorists have repeatedly tried to capture the complex nature of the civil-military relationship. In their theories, Huntington and Janowitz articulate a very linear approach to the relationship, ultimately with the military subservient to civilian authority. Huntington's foundational concept of objective control is the theory perhaps most preferred by members of the military. More recent theorists like Feaver, Cohen, and Schiff adopt a non-linear description by accounting for the variables that can enhance or degrade the overall quality of the relationship. Although it is important to recognize the contributions of all

the theorists to the study of civil-military relations, Schiff's concordance theory captures the ideal civil-military relationship.

Factors Contributing to Civil-Military Tensions

Five factors further aggravate the relationship and contribute to increasing the civil-military divide. First, there are questions about the roles or responsibilities the President and Congress have in exercising civilian control over the military. Next, the continued growth in size of the National Security Council distances senior military leaders from the seats of power. Third, because the Department of Defense is the largest institution in the federal government, civilian leadership over utilizes the military in support of the foreign policy of the United States. Fourth, despite a downward trend following the Vietnam War, societal trust in the military is extremely high, while trust in government officials is at an all-time low. Finally, both senior government officials and military leaders are able to wage anonymous wars through the media. Ultimately, no single party is to blame for the growing divide in the civil-military relationship; instead it results from the complex combination of all of these factors. By understanding the variables contributing to the tension, concerned parties can better navigate the choppy waters of civil-military relations.

The Founding Fathers established dual civilian control of the military in the Constitution of the United States. Article I grants Congress the authority "to declare war," and provide funds for the support of the armed forces.[38] Article II outlines the President's role as commander-in-chief of the military.[39] Scholars recognize that effective civilian control is "enhanced by maintenance of two controls – both presidential and congressional – in their respective fields."[40] Unfortunately, since the end of World War II, the dynamics of this dual control have been in flux. Coming out of the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Act of 1973 in an attempt to further clarify the roles of the executive and legislative branches of government. This

joint resolution was largely in response to President Lyndon B. Johnson's gradual build-up of men and equipment in Vietnam without a formal declaration of War from Congress. It limited the President's ability to commit military force to up to ninety days without a declaration of war, or specific authorization from Congress.[41] However, instead of limiting the President's authority, the War Powers Act of 1973 had the opposite effect. It increased the President's control over the military, allowing the commitment of military forces in situations that represent "unavoidable military necessity."[42] The President effectively took the power to go to war, leaving Congress with the power of the purse. At times, this dynamic places military officials in a difficult position. The military culture of the services recognizes the significance of the President's role as commander-in-chief. Yet Congress controls the flow of critical funds necessary to keep the military running. When the executive and legislative branches of government disagree on the direction of the country, senior military leaders remain stuck in the middle.

Every president handles the military in slightly different ways. For example, President Franklin Roosevelt valued personal relationships over structured organization to help him run the country. This provided service chiefs with a direct line to the president.[43] The close proximity to the president had other benefits. Inter-service rivalries took a back seat, allowing national interests to take priority.[44] The passing of the National Security Act of 1947 started the process of distancing senior military leaders from the president. Intended to aid the president in making decisions on foreign policy strategy, it reorganized the services, unifying them under a single Secretary of Defense. It also established a small council consisting of seven permanent members and chaired by the president.[45] The size of the council has ebbed and flowed over time. President Harry S. Truman's council was relatively small, while President Dwight D. Eisenhower had a larger council because of his "predilection for the military staff system."[46] Under Presidents John

F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the size of the National Security Council shrank as both individuals relied more heavily on a close group of advisors. Although an exact number is unknown, the current National Security Council consists of approximately four hundred people.[47] In principle, the idea was sound; consolidate key foreign policy advisors from across the government in one location to streamline the flow of information to the executive branch. What the concept failed to take into consideration was the different levels of comfort each president would have with the organization. No matter the size or structure of the National Security Council, it contributed to the slow movement of the service chiefs "to a peripheral position in the policy-making process."[48] The current distance from the seat of power decreases trust between the executive branch and the military, fuels inter-service rivalries, and contributes to the current civil-military divide.

United States military involvement around the world has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. In his book *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, Andrew J. Bacevich identifies only six "large-scale U.S. military actions abroad," for the entire Cold War.[49] From 1989 until the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the United States participated in as many as nine military actions, not including a number of small-scale events. The American people have grown accustomed to seeing "the latest reports of U.S. soldiers responding to some crisis."[50] This rise in "American militarism," is an unforeseen byproduct of institutional reforms the services went through following the Vietnam War. Disillusioned with their experiences in Vietnam, the officer corps looked for ways to rebuild. With the implementation of General Creighton Abram's "Total Force Policy," and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's "Weinberger Doctrine," the services took steps to ensure "another Vietnam-like disaster" would never happen again.[51] The success of the military in the Persian

Gulf War validated most, if not all, of the institutional reforms made after Vietnam. However, despite the best efforts of senior military leaders to tie the hands of civilian leaders to conflicts where overwhelming force could ensure a decisive victory and quick exit, something else happened. Built to defeat the forces of the Warsaw Pact, the Persian Gulf War proved the military had "a capacity for global power projection."[52] Following shortly after the end of the Gulf War, Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated something else to civilian leaders. Not only could the United States deploy forces overseas, it could also deploy to "sensitive areas on or near former Eastern Bloc territory."[53] These lessons contributed to an increase in policy-makers putting a military face on problems. With politicians from both parties "nourishing an increasingly hearty appetite for intervention,"[54] senior military leaders acquiesced to demands to utilize the American military in situations other than "large-scale conventional wars."[55] Failing to do so would have equated to acknowledging the military's inability to handle the post-Cold War security environment. Unfortunately, this mentality shift also marked a blending of the political and military spheres General Abrams and others had worked so hard to avoid.[56] Bacevich uses the analogy of driving a bus. As the bus driver, senior military leaders may want a larger role in determining the commitment and use of military forces. Tension arises when civilian authorities choose the destination and identify the route.[57]

The rise in American militarism coincided with increased levels of societal trust and confidence in the American military. At the end of the Vietnam War this faith between the people and the armed forces was precariously low. Society viewed the military as "a duplicitous, ineffective, and inefficient organization," plagued by widespread racial and drug problems.[58] Only thirty-two percent of participants in a National Opinion Research Center survey from 1973 expressed faith in senior military leaders.[59] Thanks in part to a series of internal service reforms,

including the transition to the all-volunteer force and the structural reorganization under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the public's perception of military professionalism slowly improved. Coupled with successful operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, public confidence in the military increased to almost ninety percent.[60] Although incidents like the Tailhook scandal and the misconduct of service members at the Aberdeen Proving Ground adversely affected public perception of the military during the mid-90s, in general, society appreciated the dedication of the military to "addressing issues of drug abuse, race, and gender integration."[61] Despite fifteen years of conflict, in a Gallup survey from 2016, approximately seventy-three percent of respondents expressed "a great deal" of confidence in the military. From the same survey, only thirty-six percent of respondents expressed confidence in the President, and nine percent expressed confidence in Congress.[62] With a favored position in the minds of the American people, the military is postured to utilize its status with the people to attempt to influence civilian authorities.

Senior military officials talking to members of the media is not a new phenomenon. The media historically served as a venue for civilian officials and military leaders to battle for the approval of the people. Lieutenant General George S. Patton upset members of Congress in April 1944 after comments he made about the postwar world at a ceremony in Knutsford, England, circulated through the press.[63] When McArthur placed himself "into an all-or-nothing position against his superiors in Washington," Truman was forced to relieve him.[64] With the rise of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, it is possible to over emphasize the civil-military divide. Not only do news agencies rush to break stories first, but once a story is published, it has a more immediate and lasting impact. During his time as Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates observed public statements by senior officers to members of the media "added to the inherent

tension with both Bush and Obama."[65] Gates attributes the rise of unwarranted comments to the media in part to the increasing belief amongst senior military officials of their responsibility to message. These "strategic communicators" looked at opportunities to engage with the media in all forums as a responsibility of command.[66] Unfortunately, these interactions with the media, and indirectly with the public, have consequences. First, Gates points to the emerging use of social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) by senior officers as something that erodes "their aura of rank and authority."[67] Perhaps the greatest impact is the negative one on the foreign policy of the United States. By speaking out of place, senior military officials generate "unwanted (and sometimes unnecessary) political problems at home," limit options overseas, and limit the president's freedom of action.[68] Civilian authorities can and do use the media to direct the actions of the military. In 2006 when Gates took over from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the services resisted purchasing the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. The primary concern was the cost for the vehicles would come out of already existing programs. Gates publically "asserted it was a national priority to buy the ballistic steel used in making MRAPs," and ordered the Pentagon to start purchasing the steel.[69] As long as there is a media outlet for senior government and military officials to vent, it will contribute to the rift between civilian and military leaders.

As easy as it would be to point to one institution or the other as the primary source of conflict, the reality is no one entity is to blame. In a complex relationship where tension exists at the very core, five factors continue to exacerbate the situation. Confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the President and Congress in exercising civilian control of the military, the growth of the National Security Council, the increased militarism of the United States, high levels of societal trust in the military, and the immediate and lasting impact of the media

continue to place a strain on the relationship. Strategic miscalculations by both parties continue to erode the professional trust that should exist between civilian authorities and a subordinate military. This loss of trust manifests itself in different ways. The loss of trust by the military in civilian leadership looks like a number of army generals suddenly retiring, "speaking out against the secretary of defense," and "calling for a Democratic takeover of Congress."[70] The lack of trust from civilian leaders in military officials is evident when former Vice-President Joe Biden counsels then President Barrack Obama that the military "will screw you every time."[71] Appreciating the variables contributing to the tension between senior military leaders and government officials helps place examples of the divide into perspective.

Contemporary and Future Examples of the Civil-Military Divide

Disagreements between government and military officials come in a variety of forms. Perhaps the largest two examples of the civil-military divide are the disagreements over policies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, arguments over the Air Force's attempts to retire the A-10 Warthog and gender integration within the services highlight the breadth of issues senior military leaders and civilian authorities find themselves at odds over. These contemporary examples of friction in the civil-military relationship illuminate future issues of conflict like defense acquisitions and military led efforts to reduce base infrastructure.

With the war in Afghanistan, it is easy to see where the trouble began. Despite initial early success during the invasion in the fall of 2001, setbacks in December 2001 and March 2002 made American strategy in Afghanistan appear disjointed. Despite the efforts of senior leaders to attempt to understand the dynamics at play in Afghanistan, by August 2002, the central focus of the Joint Staff "was on planning for potential operations" in Iraq.[72] For the next several years the conflict in Afghanistan took the back seat to the conflict in Iraq. While both government and military officials applauded hollow victories, the media started referring to Afghanistan as "the

forgotten war."[73] By 2008, even the false narrative spun by senior officials could not mask reality. Military and civilian casualties were a daily occurrence, and the Taliban "had regained control over key provinces."[74] The commander of the International Security Assistance Force at the time, General David McKiernan, acknowledged the bleak prediction but remained confident additional troops would bolster his counterinsurgency strategy. Contributing to his positive outlook was his belief that Barack Obama would win the election for president. Obama had already taken steps to build a relationship with McKiernan, and following a visit to Kabul publically announced his intent to deliver the necessary troops.[75]

The disconnect between civilian officials and military leaders on Afghanistan continued after President Obama took office. The administration asked McKiernan to submit a recommendation for a new ambassador to replace William Wood; he advised against the administration's preferred candidate, Karl W. Eikenberry. Shortly after submitting his opinion, McKiernan realized he had lost favor. The administration leaked Eikenberry's name to the *New York Times* as the new ambassador to Afghanistan. They also started an Afghan policy review with Obama only consulting McKiernan twice; by May of 2009 McKiernan was fired.[76] Members of the military criticized Gates and the administration for not showing McKiernan the proper respect. Additionally, some senior military officials believed Gates orchestrated the whole situation to enable the Pentagon to request additional troops on top of those already requested by McKiernan. McKiernan had been fired to allow the Pentagon "a chance to reset" under new military leadership.[77]

General Stanley McChrystal replaced McKiernan in Afghanistan. Within five months of taking command, cracks in McChrystal's relationship with the administration started to appear. In late September 2009, the *Washington Post* published a copy of McChrystal's confidential

assessment on the war. Although the source of the leak was unknown, tensions between McChrystal and the administration started to increase. After the leak, McChrystal attempted to apply pressure on the president through the media, asserting in an interview with *60 Minutes* that President Obama had only spoken with him once in five months. Following the *60 Minutes* interview McChrystal publicly disagreed with Vice-President Biden while giving a talk to a group from the Institute for Strategic Studies.[78] Biden advocated for a policy "to draw down U.S. troops," in Afghanistan while McChrystal wanted to surge.[79] By late fall 2009 there were effectively two policy camps for Afghanistan: Team Biden and Team Pentagon.[80] Leaks to the media continued to plague the relationship between the administration and McChrystal. In November 2009, a series of telegrams sent by Ambassador Eikenberry expressing concerns about the way ahead in Afghanistan appeared in the *New York Times*. Despite the release of the telegrams, President Obama informed McChrystal in late November he had elected to surge thirty thousand troops to Afghanistan. This decision was effectively a compromise between the two camps, as the surge forces were on a timeline to withdraw by July 2011.[81] The frictions between the Obama administration and McChrystal came to a head with the release of an article in *Rolling Stone Magazine* in June 2010. The article included quotes from McChrystal and members of his staff that were openly critical of the administration.[82] President Obama had no choice but to accept McChrystal's resignation.

The divide between civilian and military leaders over the war in Iraq was evident from the very beginning. A number of senior military officials expressed concerns that an invasion of Iraq would detract vital resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There was also the belief that war in Iraq would mire the United States military in a resource intensive occupation.[83] Another major point of contention during the early stages of planning for the Iraq

invasion was the number of troops the government would authorize to support the invasion. Both sides framed the problem differently. Civilian officials such as then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld valued minimizing the number of ground forces while maximizing the use of precision-guided munitions. Conversely, military planners abided by the "maxim of fighting as you train, especially fighting alongside those with whom you train."[84] The military's concern stemmed from the "force cap" imposed on the invasion of Afghanistan, which some felt contributed to initial setbacks. Yet despite anxieties about the pending invasion of Iraq, senior military leaders initially avoided opposition with the civilian leaders.[85]

Two factors influenced the initial lack of formal confrontation between civilian and military leaders over Iraq. First was the manner in which members of President Bush's administration handled disagreement. When questioned about rumors of discourse within the walls of the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attributed it to "the result of ignorance."[86] Rumsfeld essentially wrote off those who disagreed. This approach continued to plague the Bush administration. Even after the invasion, government officials chalked criticism of administration policies up to "Monday morning quarterbacks."[87] The second factor was the general unwillingness of senior military officials to challenge civilian leaders resulting from a failure to accurately read the situation. The Bush administration ran on a national security platform counter to that of President Bill Clinton. Instead of an indiscriminate commitment of forces, Bush "vowed to use the military more wisely."[88] The incoming administration would be a friend to the armed forces. Unlike the Clinton administration, which cut capabilities, the new administration "would restore military trust in political leaders."[89] This did not necessarily prove to be the case. The "new crowd wielded sharper elbows" than senior military officials had experienced during the Clinton administration and pushed through any obstacles in their way.[90] For example,

Rumsfeld killed the Crusader program, not telling the Army until it was too late to mount serious opposition to the decision.[91] Under the Bush Administration, decisions were final.[92]

Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki was the first senior military leader to publically disagree with the Iraq war plan. His breaking from the ranks was in part the byproduct of an ongoing feud with Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary for Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who leaked the name of his replacement fifteen months ahead of schedule. This unorthodox approach made Shinseki "a lame duck" and "undercut his ambitious transformation agenda" for the Army.[93] Addressing members of Congress on February 25, 2003, Shinseki conceded that the Army required several thousand soldiers to successfully occupy Iraq. Although he didn't know it at the time, his comments that day are "the most remembered public moment" of his time as Chief of Staff.[94] Wolfowitz immediately went on the counteroffensive, calling into question Shinseki's statements. Nonetheless, Shinseki stood by his remarks, repeating them to members of Congress roughly a month later.[95] The strife between Shinseki and the civilian leaders of the Pentagon continued through his retirement ceremony in the summer of 2003; neither Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz attended.[96]

The Air Force's battle to retire the A-10 Warthog is one more contemporary example of the tension between government and military officials. Referred to as "the darling of the first Gulf War," the A-10 is a favorite of combat units in Afghanistan.[97] Looking to replace the A-10 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in 2013, the Air Force first announced a plan to deactivate five Warthog squadrons. Concerned with the long-term survivability of the airframe and its compatibility with emerging technologies, the Air Force argued that trimming the program "would save $3.5 billion over five years."[98] Almost immediately, advocates of the airframe both in and out of Congress pushed back on the Air Force's plan. Citing the A-10's success in combat

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, proponents of the platform voiced concern about the F-35's ability to assume a similar role.[99] Still, senior leaders within the Air Force continued to try to cut the program from the service's budget, finally conceding the issue with the fiscal year '17 budget.[100]

Another more contemporary example of the civil-military divide is the issue of gender integration of combat units. This is an especially contentious matter for the Marine Corps, a ninety-three percent male-dominated service.[101] Facing a deadline from the Obama administration to open all combat jobs to women by 2016 or ask for exemptions, senior Marine Corps leaders and civilian officials squared off "in an unusually public dispute over whether integrating women" would undermine unit effectiveness.[102] In September of 2015 the Marine Corps released results of a thirty-six million dollar study demonstrating integrated units were less effective. As a result, the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., requested an exemption to policy "for some front-line combat units."[103] Then Secretary of the Navy Raymond E. Mabus Jr., disagreed with the published results. He repeatedly claimed in public statements "the summary findings were … biased toward keeping women out of combat roles."[104] Despite the request of General Dunford, Secretary Mabus proceeded with a recommendation to integrate all formations. Mabus argued that concerns over the effectiveness of combat units were the same excuse used to defend segregation and the ban on homosexuality in the services.[105]

The defense budget is one area where a civil-military divide may occur in the future, particularly as it relates to the acquisition of new systems and base closures. The Army is already the first service to come forward and request greater autonomy in the acquisitions process. Specifically, the service wants the ability "to develop and build weapons without detailed

oversight from the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)."[106] Senior Army leaders believe the service is more than capable of developing and testing weapons systems. Lieutenant General Michael Williamson, the current Principle Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, contends the Army deserves the chance. In an interview from March 2016, he said the Army has never "put a system or a capability in a soldier's hand" without doing its due diligence.[107] The impetus for the request is the Army's most recent attempts to field an acceptable replacement for the standard issue 9MM pistol. Under the current acquisitions process, criticized for being inefficient and ineffective, the last major ends items fielded by the Army were the "Big 5" in the 1980s.[108] This issue represents a potential source of conflict because the oversight of the services by the OSD and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is congressionally mandated. Civilian leaders did not have faith that "the military did a good enough job at testing."[109]

The issue of closing bases is another area that will strain future civil-military relations. The Pentagon currently believes it has far more infrastructure than it needs. By going through another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, military officials believe they can eliminate excess structure, save money, "and put about $2 billion back into the operating force by 2025."[110] Senior military leaders claim the need for a BRAC round is critical and threatened to "explore any and all authorities that Congress has provided to eliminate wasteful infrastructure."[111] The last round of BRAC occurred in 2005; however, members of Congress criticized the results, claiming the process delivered "lower savings and higher costs than advertised."[112] The real reason members of Congress do not want to approve a new round of BRAC is the second and third order effects it has on their constituents. What congressional leaders fail to recognize is that "inaction and uncertainty is actually worse than the potential for

bad news" in most communities.[113] In an attempt to force Congress' hand, military leaders want to tie budgetary shortfalls to BRAC. In other words, if a funding concern arises over weapons, maintenance, or personnel actions, military officials can look at Congress for failing to cut costs where possible.[114]

From battles over policy in the execution of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, to disagreements over retiring equipment and gender integration the civil-military divide manifests itself in a number of ways. In the future, efforts by the services to modernize equipment and reduce the increasing cost of infrastructure will continue to place a strain on the relationship. At the end of his book *The New American Militarism*, Andrew Bacevich says, "There can be no recovery without first acknowledging the disease … denial merely postpones the inevitable day of reckoning."[115] In order to move forward, certain changes must be made.

Recommendations

History demonstrates there is rarely one way to resolve complex problems, and civil-military relations are infinitely complicated. Scholars have studied the relationship between government officials and senior military leaders for years with varying thoughts on how to modify or adjust the relationship. The system in which civil-military relations exists is not set up for an equitable distribution of power. Ultimately, civil-military relations will be messy; the complexity exists because of the checks and balances the Founding Fathers built. As Eliot Cohen identified in an article from 1997, any "remedies will take time to have effect."[116] Concerned parties cannot expect significant change to take place overnight; however, incremental change is possible. Simply having a conversation or studying the issue helps provide clarity and prevents the relationship from deteriorating to an unrecoverable level. The proposed recommendations in this paper focus specifically on actions the military can take to gradually improve the sentiments of distrust within current civil-military relationships.

Developing a better understanding of civil-military relations continues to remain relevant for field grade officers across the services. The two potential areas identified for the civil-military divide to occur in the future are defense acquisitions and BRAC, indicating the relationship transcends many different levels of command. A field grade officer may find himself or herself on a staff responsible for writing a point paper to shape how the commander justifies an equipment purchase to Congress. That same officer may serve on a staff responsible for assisting a local community in dealing with the positive or negative ramifications of a base realignment. Field grade officers at all echelons must demonstrate high levels of awareness of the civil-military relationship because it is their responsibility to explain the "why" to subordinates. A field grade must understand the subtleties of the relationship that impact national security strategy and policy making. Perhaps most importantly, field grade officers should appreciate the dynamics of the civil-military relationship because one day they may find themselves in a position to provide advice to civilian officials.

The first recommendation for bridging the civil-military divide is perhaps the most tangential: members of the military should embrace the complex symbiotic nature of the relationship. This is not to say an appreciation for the intricacy of the relationship does not already exist, but rather that service members should accept the complexity and move past it. If Clausewitz's idea of warfare being an extension of politics is correct, then it is abundantly clear that civilian authorities and military leaders must work together. There are two steps to embracing the reciprocal nature of civ-mil relationships. First, the services need to stop pointing to civilian authorities as the root cause of the problem and accept their own culpability in creating distrust between the parties. A large part of this step is developing a better understanding of the various civil-military relationship theories and ultimately adhering to one.

Next, the services need to appreciate the distinct culture of the other side, but value the similarities that do exist.

The civil-military relationship theory that permeates the earlier examples of the civil-military divide is Feaver's agency theory. Feaver recognizes it is in the best interest of the civilian authorities to place in positions of responsibility military leaders who share similar ideals. However, his model also accepts that military leaders will attempt to avoid doing everything they are told; they will "shirk" their responsibilities. Ultimately, the behaviors condoned by Feaver's agency theory when the military does not get what it wants are detrimental to fostering trust with civilian authorities. To truly take accountability for their role in fostering distrust within the civil-military relationship, military leaders should reject agency theory.

Huntington's model of objective control is frequently trumpeted as the preferred framework for civil-military relations because he establishes two separate spheres: one for politics and one for military action. Both politicians and senior military officials retain authority in their respective area of expertise. What gets overlooked, or conveniently forgotten, is that even in Huntington's model the military remains subordinate to civilian authorities. Military leaders can disagree with civilian officials, but in the end must execute the orders they receive. Huntington would argue it is contrary to the idea of the military professional for senior military leaders to remain bitter over a decision they disagree with. Huntington's emphasis on the military professional make his model important for military leaders to know and learn, but other theories better capture the dynamics of the civil-military relationship.

Cohen's idea of an unequal dialogue is, in essence, just an expansion of Huntington's ideas. Military leaders remain obligated to provide candid advice to government officials on the use of military force, but the notion of civilian authority is reinforced. Disagreement occurs before the

decision is made. After the decision is made public, dissent is then considered disobedience, which would undermine the trust. The difference between Cohen and Huntington lies in how they each handle the inherent friction of civil-military relations. Where Huntington passively dismisses it, Cohen implies the friction is ok.

The ideal model for civil-military relations is Schiff's concordance theory. She recognizes that the most functional relationship is achieved when all three concerned parties come to the table and work together. External variables that undermine the civil-military relationship are negated by the identification of similarities between participating parties. The concept of principled negotiations is one technique military leaders can use to exercise Schiff's model. First postulated by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton in their book *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, principled negotiations are an alternative to the more traditional positional approach. Principled negotiation is a strategy where the goal is to decide issues on "their merit rather than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won't do."[117] The trouble with competitive win-lose positional bargains is they are inefficient and typically do more harm to the relationship between involved parties. Schiff's concordance theory, executed through principled negotiations, enable military leaders to build trust with civilian officials by finding common ground and appreciating the position of the other side.

Finally, part of embracing the complexity and symbiotic nature of the relationship is appreciating the distinct culture of the other side, but also valuing similarities where they exist. The most obvious similarity between civilian officials and senior military leaders is the oath each takes before entering office. Both parties swear to "protect and defend the constitution of the

United States."[118] Although a simplistic example, it demonstrates an existing foundation from which to build trust.

The second recommendation to address the civil-military divide is a reform of professional military education. These reforms should be approached under the guise of improving military members' ability to speak a similar "language" to their civilian authorities. These efforts include adjustments to traditional blocks of military education and increased opportunities to participate in inter-government exchange programs or fellowships and the pursuit of advanced degrees from leading *civilian* institutions.

In an essay published in 1948, Paul H. Appleby argues, "there is a general shortage of persons even fairly well qualified to administer organizations so large, complicated, and socially significant as our military establishment," and that the "whole educational effort is designed to produce specialists and individualists rather than to produce generalists who understand and can act and support action in intricate organized efforts."[119] Sixty-nine years later, formal professional military education still focuses on producing leaders comfortable and capable of performing at the operational and tactical levels of conflict, but less comfortable communicating with civilian authorities. When two parties involved in the inevitable negotiations of civ-mil relationships do not understand one another, it is very easy to cultivate distrust. One way to tackle this issue is to add additional blocks of instruction on "the legislative and philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. military establishment," specifically as they relate to civ-mil relations.[120] This recommendation is not intended to downplay the value in service members' study of military history, tactics, or strategy. Rather, it is an argument that a more refined understanding of civil-military relations improves an individual's ability to communicate his knowledge from the other areas to government officials. As Williamson Murray argues "officers

who know only the tactical and operational framework … might offer faulty advice."[121] Over time, the increased emphasis on civil-military relations creates an officer corps with a greater appreciation of the military's role in the relationship and the prerequisite skills to successfully navigate it.

Educational reforms should also include an increase in opportunities for military officers to participate in exchange programs with other federal agencies. In their article "Young Person's Game: Connecting with Millennials," Matthew Colford and Alec J. Sugarman propose allowing "a select group of newly commissioned officers from each military academy to fulfill a portion of their initial service obligation through a rotation at a civilian institution."[122] The premise of this idea has merit, although newly commissioned officers are, perhaps, the wrong audience. Because junior company grade officers are still refining an understanding of the foundations of their profession, a better target audience is captains and majors who have completed their key developmental (KD) billets. Currently, the Army already offers select majors and lieutenant colonels an opportunity to participate in the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Interagency Fellowship. The program is designed to expose participants to a federal department or agency and help them "develop a more thorough understanding of the agency's mission, culture, capabilities, and procedures … while developing comprehensive solutions for our nation's most difficult national security challenges."[123] Unfortunately, the program is only for one year; the officer has a very limited time in the position before they return to military service. It is also a very selective and small program, providing an opportunity to only a few officers. By opening up the opportunity to captains, increasing the time spent working for the agency, and opening up more slots for the program, the Army would prepare more officers to effectively interact with government officials later in their careers.

The Army also offers officers with future service potential the opportunity to compete for three other government fellowships: the Congressional Fellowship; the Joint Chiefs Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense/Army Staff (JCS/OSD/ARSTAF) Internship; and the White House Fellowship. Although tremendous opportunities, similar to the CGSC Interagency Fellowship, the programs are limited either by time in position or available slots. Currently a White House Fellow is in position for one year, a JCS/OSD/ARSTAF for two years, and a Congressional Fellow for forty-four months.[124] Similar to the CGSC Interagency Fellowship, additional slots make these programs more effective in the scope of their reach into the Army and how its senior leaders communicate with civilian officials.

The military has made significant strides in recent years in providing opportunities for service members to pursue advanced civil schooling. In the Army alone, approximately 1,400 students participate annually in the Advanced Education Program (AEP), pursuing advanced degrees at institutions across the United States.[125] However, there is room for improvement. Initiatives like the Mellon Project on Civilian-Military Educational Cooperation are another way to expose service members to civilian institutions. Initially started with a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the program is “designed to assist thirteen of the U.S.’s leading civilian and military education institutions in the development of new forms of academic and social interaction.”[126] Although the target audience is undergraduate institutions, graduate level institutions like the Naval War College participate as well. The primary goal of the project is to bridge the civil-military divide “by providing academic and social opportunities for positive interaction between communities.”[127] The Army attempted to start a similar program with the Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Strategic Broadening Seminars. Available to officers, warrant officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and Department of the Army

civilians, the courses average about a month long, and "are designed to prepare soldiers and civilians for future leadership roles with Army, joint, interagency, and multinational task forces and teams."[128] Programs like the strategic broadening seminar and the Mellon Project are beneficial because they expose more service members to the language and communication skills needed to be successful in future civil-military relations.

The long-term goal of the reforms to the current system of professional military education is to create three and four star general officers who are more capable of interacting with government officials. With the increasing trend of political leaders with little to no military experience, it is imperative that senior officers "are deeply educated in the issues surrounding the use of military force."[129] In order to achieve the appropriate blend of intelligence, critical thinking, and tactical and technical competency necessary to provide sound counsel at higher ranks, the services must invest in their subordinate leaders. Increasing fellowship and advanced civil schooling opportunities for captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels complete with their key developmental assignments achieves three effects. Initially, it enables those officers to fully develop the necessary skill sets to serve at higher ranks. Next, it increases the pool of qualified candidates for O-6 level command opportunities, the final gateway to selection as a general officer. Finally, it creates a bench stock of officers capable of serving in influential positions on senior military staffs even if not selected to command at the O-6 level.

Currently there are at least two barriers to implementing these educational reforms. To start, a military culture exists that values the completion of certain assignments over others. An unorthodox career path often goes unrewarded, providing little incentive for individuals to stray far from the established path. The second barrier is the invasive idea that units cannot afford to give up the most qualified individuals to pursue unique educational opportunities outside

traditionally accepted intuitional military venues. In an article from 2009, Williamson Murray argues even institutional professional military education is barely tolerated by the services despite its utility as "a portion of a larger framework" for preparing officers for future challenges.[130]

Overcoming these barriers requires a cultural shift within the Department of Defense. The military services will need to recalibrate what they look for in their senior officers. The criteria should be individuals who are both tactically proficient and equally mindful of the civil-military relationship. The impetus for this shift is found in the ideas of Huntington, who believed "serious education and intellectual preparation must lie at the heart" of the military professional.[131] A simple change like tying promotion and eventual selection for O-6 level command opportunities would go a long way to achieving the desired objective of general officers fully prepared to walk the tightrope of civil-military relations.

The final recommendation is to re-instill a culture of accountability into the military. This recommendation is less about holding senior officers liable for below average or poor performance, and more about acknowledging the responsibility service members have to police their own for poor behavior. The underlying goal in the proposed idea is making senior military leaders as worthy of equality in the already unequal dialogue. If the goal is to limit distrust between government officials and military leaders, behavioral accountability is a critical step towards developing "energetic, determined, cooperative, and trustworthy" military leaders.[132]

There are other tangible benefits to instilling an ethos of behavioral accountability. It provides the military an opportunity to identify, build on, and then reward certain characteristics vital to improving civil-military relationships. The first is moderation. While describing the qualities of former great statesmen, Cohen emphasizes moderation, or a leader's ability "to

discipline his passions, and an understanding of when and how to counteract a trend."[133] Cohen offers Lincoln as one example of a statesman displaying moderation. His core principles drove him to fight a war to restore the Union, yet he demonstrated "flexibility and self-restraint in the pursuit of [the] ultimate objectives."[134] Despite criticism from northern politicians, he willingly extended more agreeable terms to the South to achieve that restoration.[135] The nation needs military leaders driven by the core principle of providing the highest quality military advice to civilian authorities, but who can discern when advocating too strongly for a course of action would be detrimental to the achievement of the long-term objective.

The other important quality a culture of accountability creates is an appreciation for the difference between dissent and disobedience. As a member of a profession, the military leader can disagree with a policy decision of a civilian leader. However, that "dissent should take place during the debate leading up to the final decision."[136] After the decision is made, the professional is obligated to carry it out. Anything less is an act of disobedience, and undermines the "trust relationship between civilians and the uniformed military."[137]

Developing a culture of accountability within the military is not an easy task. Services will inevitably point to their values and ethos as examples of how they already hold themselves accountable. While those foundations are valuable, Drs. Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras started a debate about their effectiveness in preventing a say-do gap amongst members of the military. In their article "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession," they demonstrate how the professional values of honesty and integrity have not necessarily stopped dishonest action, especially with regards to certain reporting requirements.[138] Instead of dwelling on the negative, military members should view the creation of a culture of accountability as the driving force behind innovation, an especially important characteristic in dynamic times. If

members of the military truly want to call themselves "professionals," the military needs to do a better job of policing its own ranks.

Conclusion

Washington called a meeting of the Newburgh conspirators on March 15, 1783, in a building appropriately nicknamed the Temple of Virtue. Although he approved the meeting, those in attendance did not expect him to show; Washington did not make a practice of openly confronting his own officers. When he slipped into the building visibly agitated, the atmosphere in the room changed. Moving to the front of the room, Washington addressed the assembled officers, chastising them "for improper conduct in calling an irregular meeting," and disputing Congress's indifference to their situation.[139] Almost as soon as the reprimand started, Washington's tone changed. He fluidly transitioned from admonishing the actions of the officers standing in front of him to appealing to their sense of patriotism. With his words, Washington "lifted them to a higher plane, re-awakening a sense of their exalted role in the Revolution and reminding them that illegal action would tarnish that grand legacy."[140] Finishing his prepared address, and hoping to further reassure the officers of Congress's good will, he pulled out a letter from a member of the Continental Congress. Stumbling over the first few words, he paused and pulled out glasses. Starting over, he excused himself and said, "I have grown gray in your service and now find myself growing blind."[141] The uncharacteristic gesture of vulnerability forced those in the room to reflect on Washington's lasting sacrifice for the new country, effectively subduing any remaining resistance in the room. More importantly, Washington's words and behaviors that day laid the groundwork for civil-military relations in the United States, a foundation that still exists 234 years later.

The tension in civil-military relations is not new; it is the embodiment of a complex relationship, laden with distrust since the days of the Continental Army. Confusion over the roles

and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of government in exercising civilian control, the growing distance of senior military leaders from those civilian leaders they advise, the rise of the military in shaping foreign policy, increasing public confidence in the military, and the lasting and immediate impact of the media to sway public opinion all exacerbate that distrust. Members of the military can address the current sentiments of distress within civil-military relations in three ways. First, they must embrace the symbiotic nature of the relationship, recognizing that Schiff's concordance theory provides the most effective framework. Second, reforms to professional military education will bridge the language barrier between government officials and senior military leaders. Finally, by holding members of the profession of arms accountable for their behavior, the military will foster a culture where leaders display both moderation and an appreciation for dissent. In the end, as Washington identified at Newburgh, for both civilian leaders and military professionals, service to the nation should be the primary focus, not the concerns of the individual.

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[1] Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005), 3.
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[31] *Ibid.,* 57-58.
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