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The past fifteen years have seen a drastic increase in the utilization of the US Army's Reserve Component (RC) in support of contingency operations. However, the vast majority of RC forces are not specifically designed to meet the demand of contingency operations. Designing Army RC force structure to combat a near-peer adversary has worked in the past, but it may not be the optimal way to design forces going forward. This paper analyzes Army National Guard (ARNG) Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Engineer unit mobilization data as one way to examine if the Army designed its RC forces the most optimal way to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy over the past fifteen years.

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Army National Guard (ARNG); United States Army Reserve (USAR); Brigade Combat Team (BCT); Army Engineer units; Army force structure development process; Readiness levels of each Army component; Policies governing the mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) units.

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Did they Fight as Designed?
The Mobilization of the United States Army National Guard Post 9/11

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Preface

Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) is more important today than ever before. The past fifteen years have seen a drastic increase in the utilization of the US Army's Reserve Component (RC) in support of contingency operations. However, the vast majority of RC forces are not specifically designed to meet the demand of contingency operations. Designing Army RC force structure to combat a near-peer adversary has worked in the past, but it may not be the optimal way to design forces going forward. The gap between the missions the Army designed its RC forces to conduct and the missions its RC forces conducted over the past fifteen years suggests this is a subject worth studying further. This paper explains the Army's force structure development process, the history behind why the Army has employed the RC the way it has, and how the Army should consider designing its forces in the future.

This paper analyzes Army National Guard (ARNG) Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Engineer unit mobilization data as one way to examine if the Army designed its RC forces the most optimal way to meet the demands of the *National Military Strategy* over the past fifteen years. Army National Guard BCT mobilization data is used to represent combat force structure in the RC and ARNG Engineer unit mobilization data is used to represent combat support-type force structure in the RC.

This paper will benefit three main audiences (in addition to commanders):

Army Force Managers

Soldiers and leaders in BCTs and Engineer Units

Soldiers and leaders in the US ARNG

Executive Summary

Title: Did they Fight as Designed? The Mobilization of the United States Army National Guard Post 9/11.

Author: Major Keith V. Moran, ARNG

Thesis: A gap exists between the missions Army National Guard (ARNG) Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and Engineer units were designed to conduct and the actual mission requirements over the past fifteen years. This trend is the reality of a US Army Reserve Component (RC) that was built as a strategic reserve, but due to operational demand over the past fifteen years, was employed in support of contingency operations.

Discussion: This paper will examine the role each of the following factors had in shaping the design and employment of the Army's RC: (1) the Army force structure development process, (2) the mission and readiness levels of each Army component, (3) the policies governing the mobilization of RC units, and (4) the competition for resources between the Active Component (AC) and RC of the Army.

Conclusion: The mobilization and deployment of the Army's RC over the past fifteen years is the result of increased operational stress on the Army writ large. Although, the Army successfully managed its responsibility to support the *National Military Strategy* over the past fifteen years, it could optimize the utilization of its forces, both AC and RC, and decrease inefficiency going forward if it implemented either one of the two recommendations in this paper: (1) move force structure amongst its components, or (2) redesign a portion of its forces to meet demands of contingency operations. Moving and/or redesigning Army force structure are extremely sensitive issues for all Army stakeholders. However, the Army should continue to examine how to optimize the utilization of its forces in support of the *National Military Strategy*. The Army cannot afford to allow parochialism to stand in the way of innovation. If the Army is to optimize its ability to support the *National Military Strategy*, it must consider changing its force structure to meet the demands of the future, whether contingency or major theater war.

INTRODUCTION

Post 9/11 the United States' Global War on Terror and its invasion of Iraq increased the demand on the US Army resulting in significant operational stress. During this time, the Army depended heavily on the mobilization of its Reserve Component (RC): The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR). Analysis of ARNG Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Engineer unit mobilization data from the past fifteen years of combat operations proves that the ARNG generated trained and ready combat and combat support-type forces in support of the *National Military Strategy*. In doing so, both ARNG BCTs and Engineer units were employed, at varying rates, in support of missions they were not designed to execute. This indicates that a gap exists between the missions these forces were designed to conduct and the actual mission requirements over the past fifteen years.

This trend is the reality of a Army RC that was built as a strategic reserve, designed to conduct a major theater war against a near-peer adversary. However, due to operational demand over the past fifteen years, RC forces were employed in support of contingency operations. This thesis is intended to determine if the design methodology and employment practices of Army RC forces over the past fifteen years were optimal. This paper will examine the role each of the following factors had in shaping the employment of the Army's RC: (1) the Army force structure development process, (2) the mission and readiness levels of each Army component, (3) the policies governing the mobilization of RC units, and (4) the competition for resources between the Active Component (AC) and RC of the Army.

US ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The Army develops its force structure based on the likelihood of conducting future threat-based scenarios. The forces it can develop and maintain are limited in size and type by funding constraints imposed on it by the US Congress. Subsequently, the Army cannot design forces for every possible contingency.[1] As a result, most Army forces, especially those forces in the RC, are built to support a near-peer adversary in a major theater war. A preponderance of the mission requirements over the past fifteen years have been contingency operations requiring Army forces to fight adversaries they were not designed to combat. To meet this demand, the Army trained its forces, including the RC, to fight non-conventional contingency operations. However, at no point during the last fifteen years did the Army cease designing its force structure to combat a near-peer adversary in a major theater war.

The Army employs a systems approach known as the force development process to design and update its force structure and determine what kind of units are fielded amongst its three components. Force structure is defined as the number and types of combat units, as well as the personnel and equipment, that the Department of Defense (DOD) can generate, sustain, and support.[2] Force structure is designed to meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy, *National Military Strategy*, and other strategic national-level guidance. The Army's force development process consists of five phases: (1) develop capabilities, (2) design organizations, (3) develop organizational models, (4) determine organizational authorizations, and (5) document organizational authorizations.[3]

In phase one, the Army develops the need for operational capabilities based on national level guidance using the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The JCIDS analyzes capability concepts and mission requirements to identify and prioritize

capability gaps or shortcomings in the current force.[4] In phase two, the Army develops the proposed organization, designs, missions, and functions to fulfill the required operational capabilities. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), specifically the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), proponent centers, and schools, develop and analyze the proposed designs to meet operational capabilities.[5] In phase three the Army Force Management Support Agency (USFMSA) develops organizational models referred to as Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). A TOE prescribes the doctrinal wartime mission, organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements for a military organization and is the model for authorization documents.[6] It also depicts minimum mission essential wartime requirements for sustained combat operations, including the organizational source of capabilities which the organization needs to sustain itself but cannot provide.[7]

In phase four the Army determines organizational authorities. This phase is composed of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process where force structure is ultimately allocated amongst the Army's three components. Total Army Analysis assesses modeling efforts conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) employing DOD-approved scenarios to determine the demand for operational forces.[8] The TAA process uses the demand analysis results to determine how much of that force the Army can afford to develop and sustain, and serves to establish the force mix within the three Army components. Historically, most of the forces the Army requires to combat the most likely future threat-based scenarios reside in the AC. For example, most combat units (Armor, Infantry, Artillery, etc.) that are programmed to support little to no-notice DOD-approved scenarios reside in the AC. In contrast, nearly 80% of the Army's support-type units (Engineer, Military Police, Transportation, Quartermaster, etc.), typically referred to as follow-on forces, reside in the USAR and ARNG.[9]

During phase four the Army modifies the TOE based on resource availability and establishes a Modified Table of Distribution and Equipment (MTOE) for the proposed force structure. For example, a TOE might call for *x* number of tanks and personnel for an armored unit, but the DOD only has enough funding to field *y* (a lesser amount). An MTOE represents the *y*. An MTOE doesn't change the TOE mission statement or purpose of the unit; rather it represents a calculated risk the Army accepted in the design of the TOE to build its larger force structure to accomplish the totality of the Army's missions. All Army components have an opportunity to provide input as to the distribution and allocation of force structure. However, the final decision as to the allocation of force structure is a compromise amongst stakeholders to work within constrained manpower, equipping and funding thresholds to execute the *National Military Strategy,* and defense planning guidance tasks.[10] After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, organizational authorities are documented in the final phase of the force development process.

In summary, every unit in the Army inventory exists to conduct a specific wartime mission. In the case of the RC, most of its units are designed to combat a near-peer adversary in a major theater war because the Army prioritizes building forces to combat a major theater war over contingency operations. One reason the Army prioritizes major theater wars over contingencies may be that contingencies are difficult to predict and some do not have a high probability of occurring. Another reason may be that Army force developers see the task of combating a near-peer adversary as more complex than contingency operations and wrongfully assume that any unit capable of combating a near-peer adversary should be able to combat an adversary in contingency operations. As the ARNG BCT and Engineer unit mobilization data will demonstrate, when the operational demand increased for contingencies over the past fifteen

years of combat operations the Army chose to employ its RC units to fill the mission requirement gaps. In doing so, the Army may have underutilized its ARNG BCTs and Engineer units and perhaps could have optimized its total force by redesigning a portion of its forces to meet the demands of contingency operations. For example, the Army could have taken a portion of ARNG BCT force structure and redesigned the units to conduct contingency operations like Security Force (SECFOR) and training team missions. If the ARNG had a unit designed for SECFOR missions over the past fifteen years, it would have been valuable because it would have reduced the requirement for other units to respond to SECFOR missions and increased the number of units available to combat a near-peer adversary.

US ARMY MISSION AND READINESS

The mission of each Army component drives the expected readiness levels of the units in that component. The Army's AC is on duty twenty-four hours, seven days a week, 365 days a year, and its units are expected, and funded, to achieve higher readiness levels than its RC counterparts, who only train part-time. Since its inception, the Congress has favored a small standing army. With the advent of Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) in the 1970's, the Congress viewed the AC/RC balance as one way to keep the costs of the nation's defense down while still maintaining the capability to respond in times of war or national emergency. The Army is composed of three components: the AC, the USAR, and the ARNG.

The AC mission is to fight and win the Nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders. The Army executes Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code (USC) directives, to include organizing, equipping, and training forces for the conduct of prompt and

sustained combat operations on land.[11] The Army is responsible to conduct missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders.[12]

The USAR mission is to be the federal reserve of the AC. It does this by providing trained; equipped; and ready Soldiers, leaders, and units to meet America's requirements at home and abroad.[13] The USAR primarily carries out its mission under Title 10 USC directives.

The ARNG has a dual mission: 1) a federal mission to provide trained units available for active duty in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security may require; and 2) a state mission to provide military support to civil authorities, to respond to state emergencies, and to provide support to counter-narcotics operations.[14] The ARNG primarily carries out its state mission under Title 32 and is considered federally mobilized when acting under Title 10 authority.

There are several differences between the Army's three components. Most of those differences stem from the level of readiness and responsiveness the Congress expects of each. Congress measures the readiness of all Army units monthly through the Unit Status Report (USR), which measures the manning, training, and equipping levels for every reportable unit. Most Army units adhere to a readiness cycle which establishes a timeline to achieve collective training proficiency. In general, collective training proficiency certifies that a unit can conduct its core mission, or the mission it was designed to execute, and is available for mobilization.

Most AC units adhere to a twenty-four-month training-readiness cycle to reach collective unit proficiency. In comparison, most RC units adhere to a sixty-month training-readiness cycle to achieve a similar level of readiness. There are some exceptions to these general rules. For example, some AC and RC units are funded to always maintain collective proficiency or move faster through the training-readiness cycle. However, in general, the RC takes longer to build

collective unit proficiency because of limited training days. Post 9/11, the Army's readiness cycle was named the Army's Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Today, it is called the Sustainable Readiness (SR). Despite the name change, the basic premise and for both AC and RC units to achieve collective unit proficiency remains the same, meaning the AC moves faster than the RC through the training-readiness cycle.

Due to its twenty-four-month readiness cycle, the AC is available for deployment more frequently than the RC. Furthermore, its forces are more accessible than the RC in that they are on duty year-round. As the AC's mission statement says, it is responsible to provide "prompt" combat operations on land. Prompt means capable of responding to national command authority directed Title 10 USC missions with little to no notice. Amongst the three Army components the AC is commonly referred to as the "fight tonight" force.

In contrast, most of the USAR and the ARNG are only on duty for thirty-nine days a year, which traditionally breaks down to one weekend a month and two weeks a year. There are some exceptions to this general rule. For example, some ARNG BCTs train up to sixty days per year as they progress through the training-readiness cycle.[15] However, even RC units that train more days per year are not expected, or required, to respond to no notice Title 10 USC mobilizations at the same speed as the AC or without additional training days prior to deployment.

In summary, over the past fifteen years of combat operations the readiness and responsiveness of the Army's AC ensured its forces deployed prior to the RC. The Congress funds the AC to maintain a higher level of readiness. It realizes a return on that investment when the AC promptly deploys its units to execute the most demanding missions. Contingency operations, like SECFOR missions over the past fifteen years, consume readiness because it is an

ad hoc assigned mission that deteriorates a unit's proficiency in the mission it was designed to execute. When considering which units to employ in support of contingency operations, like SECFOR missions over the past fifteen years, it 'costs' less in unit readiness to employ the RC because, in general, RC units are at lower levels of readiness. For example, ARNG BCTs very seldom train to conduct complex brigade level maneuvers due to the dispersion of its units, the availability of maneuver space, the restrictions on training time available, and the costs of such training events. In comparison, AC BCTs regularly train to conduct complex brigade level maneuvers and to deploy an AC BCT against a contingency operation that does not require brigade level maneuvers is a waste of readiness.

As the ARNG BCT and Engineer mobilization data will demonstrate, the missions that were assigned to the RC over the past fifteen years of combat operations were a result of increased demand on the Army to conduct contingency operations, like SECFOR missions. In being a reserve force to the AC, the RC is responsible to support ad hoc and unanticipated missions when operational demand increases because it is less costly to AC unit readiness and less risky in support of the *National Military Strategy*. However, the Army could have better optimized the Congress' investment in the total readiness of the force if it had designed a portion of its forces to support the demands of contingency operations, like SECFOR missions, at some point during the past fifteen years and placed those units in the RC.

POLICIES GOVERNING THE MOBILIZATION OF RC UNITS

The policies governing the mobilization of RC units are largely a result of the Army's experiences in combat throughout the 20th century. During this time, the United States transitioned from a nation, which depended on conscription, to surge its forces during wartime, to an all-volunteer force. In the eyes of the Congress and Army leadership the advent of an all-

volunteer force meant the Army would be more dependent on its RC during future combat operations. One question that remained to be answered was to what extent the Army AC would depend on its RC. The Congress answered this question by limiting the amount of funding it would invest in the Army's AC, compelling its remaining force structure into the RC.

The amount of funding Congress allocates the DOD and the Army impacts force structure decisions and the DOD's strategy to defend the nation. This is one of the reasons the DOD and the Army developed a plan to effectively employ all its force structure, regardless of component, known within the DOD as total force policy and within the Army as ATFP. Department of Defense total force policy has its roots in the 1970 US President Richard Nixon administration. In response to the unpopular draft, President Nixon appointed a commission to determine the most practical means for abolishing it while ensuring the US could still meet its defense commitments.[16] The commission recommended an all-volunteer force to meet the manning requirements of the military. In response, the Nixon Administration's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, directed the services via memorandum to achieve "economies" by employing a "total force" concept in "all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing National Guard and Reserve Forces."[17] Secretary Laird realized that an all-volunteer force would require the services' active components to rely on their respective reserve in future wars and gave birth to the total force concept.

While the DOD was mulling over the specifics of how to employ the total force concept, each service was working its own plan. When General Creighton Abrams became Army Chief of Staff on October 16, 1972, plans were already underway to reduce the post-Vietnam AC Army to 825,000 and thirteen divisions.[18] General Abrams concluded this number to be inadequate to provide a sufficient AC Army to promptly meet the Soviet threat. Secretary of

Defense, James R. Schlesinger, agreed to allow Abrams to increase the size of the Army to sixteen AC divisions, the number the service had before the Vietnam buildup in 1964, if Abrams did not require additional manpower or resources.[19] Abrams achieved his goal of sixteen AC divisions by reducing the number of AC brigades and sustainment force structure, and placing it in the RC. Abrams went as far as aligning specific RC force structure with AC divisions creating what was commonly referred to as "round-out" brigades.[20] Abrams accomplished his goal, but also acted in the spirit of the total force concept by developing round-out brigades.

The next significant change in the Defense Department's adoption of the total force concept occurred in 1973, when Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger codified the concept into an official administration policy. The Schlesinger Memorandum stated "total force policy is no longer a concept…and as emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the AC forces."[21] Despite the strong language of Secretary Schlesinger's memo, the shrinking defense budget in the 1970's hampered the policy from achieving its full potential. When the defense budget grew in the 1980's funding was directed to the Army's AC first. In fact, in 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger codified this policy stating that, henceforth, "units that fight first [would] be equipped first regardless of component."[22] However, seeing that most war plans at the time overwhelmingly committed AC forces ahead of RC units, the policy ensured that the lion's share of resources would go to the AC.[23]

The result of Secretary Weinberger's directive was that the Army's RC was deprived of resources in comparison to the AC. This reinforced the role of the Army's RC as a strategic reserve, only relevant insofar as their role in a major theater war. Even then, the Army's RC

would require significant training and investment to conduct its wartime mission. The 1990 Persian Gulf War was the first mass mobilization of the Army's strategic reserve post ATFP. In total, the Army mobilized 148,000 RC personnel with mixed results.[24] In general, the Army support-type units efficiently mobilized and successfully executed its wartime missions; however, the ARNG round-out brigades (combat maneuver units) were less successful. After the Persian Gulf War a Congressional Research Service report cited the following reasons for mobilization issues with ARNG round-out brigades: (1) poor readiness; (2) Army AC inattention to the actual readiness of round-out brigades; and (3) excessive optimism on behalf of the Army AC that round-out brigades would be able to respond to no-notice crisis, despite this never having been the expectation via policy, funding, or otherwise.[25]

The lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War led the Congress to address readiness shortcomings of the ARNG through the passage of the 1993 ARNG Readiness Reform Act.[26] In summary, this Act reformed the readiness reporting requirements for RC units, it provided more funding to support the training and readiness requirements for early deploying RC units, and it required the Secretary of the Army to ensure its RC units were accurately reporting its readiness levels through regular inspections. The intent was two-fold: (1) for the Army to accurately assess its ability to support DOD-approved scenarios in support of the *National Military Strategy*; and (2) to better fund and therefore, man, train, and equip RC units. In part, due to the changes made in the 1993 Readiness Reform Act, the Army began to employ its RC units in low-intensity conflicts in the mid to late 1990s. For example, RC units mobilized and deployed to Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999).[27] This marked the beginning of a shift in mindset of the Army RC from a strategic reserve to more of an operational force. When mission requirements increased after 9/11 this trend grew drastically.

After 9/11, deployment of the Army's RC increased drastically in support of both low-intensity conflicts and high-intensity combat operations. Twenty-seven percent of the Army's RC performed active duty between 2001 and 2003.[28] After 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the percentage of the Army's RC being deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) rose to thirty-two percent. The reliance of the Army on its RC to conduct two combat operations at the same time forced the DOD to re-consider the status and funding of total force policy. With pressure from the Congress, the DOD issued Directive 1200.17 on October, 29, 2008 titled, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." The directive established an overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the manning, training, and equipping of the RC as an operational force. It directed the services to ensure that its total force policies encouraged optimal integration to ensure its reserves are ready for operations. Thus, the transition from a strategic Army reserve to an operational reserve was codified in policy.

The generality of Directive 1200.17 left a lot up to the Army and other service secretaries. For example, the directive calls for the operational employment of the Army RC, but leaves it up to the Army to determine what type of units will deploy, against which mission sets and how often. However, both the President and the Congress have some ability to impact this. For example, the Obama administration's FY 2015 budget proposed that RC forces should make up fifty-four percent of the Army by 2017, in comparison to fifty-three percent just prior to 9/11 and forty-nine percent when the Army was at its peak during OIF and OEF.[29] The concept here is two-fold. First, by moving more Army force structure into the RC the cost of AC units decreases because there are less Soldiers on active duty year-round. Second, it reinforces

Directive 1200.17, requiring the Army to regularly employ the RC as mission requirements increase.

In summary, ATFP is the result of constrained resources on an all-volunteer force. As demonstrated leading up to and during the Persian Gulf War, Army AC leadership paid little attention to the readiness of its RC. Over the same course of time, the Congress underfunded the Army RC as it related to ATFP. The 1993 ARNG Readiness Reform Act helped to bring ATFP closer to reality. However, it was not until operational demand and employment of the RC increased drastically after 9/11 that the Congress pressured the DOD to better implement ATFP in support of the *National Military Strategy*. Despite this, Directive 1200.17 gave the service secretaries the responsibility to determine AC/RC core competencies and how frequently those forces would deploy.

The Army's leadership viewed, and still views, the AC's core competency as conducting combat operations vis-a-vi the employment of its BCTs and the RC's core competency as conducting combat support-type operations. There is nothing wrong or even inaccurate with the sentiment that the AC's core competency is combat operations and the RC's is combat support-type operations. However, if this is the reality then it is inefficient for the Army to keep relatively large numbers of BCTs (27) in the ARNG. In the spirit of ATFP the Army should consider moving BCTs out of the ARNG or redesigning ARNG BCTs to meet the demands of contingency operations.

Army National Guard Engineer unit mobilization data from the past fifteen years of combat operations demonstrates that ATFP resulted in RC support-type units, such as ARNG Engineer units, mobilizing more frequently in support of missions they were designed to execute. It will also demonstrate that over the same timeframe, ARNG BCTs mobilized less frequently in

support of missions they were designed to execute. Army Total Force Policy complements the missions of each Army component, and the preponderance of the forces within the component. To maximize the utility of ATFP and the operationalization of RC units the Army should consider designing forces to support contingency operations, like SECFOR missions over the past 15 years, and place them in the RC in lieu of ARNG BCTs.

AC/RC COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES

Since the advent of the all-volunteer force and the creation of ATFP in 1973 there has always been a competition for resources within the Army's components. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's 1982 policy, which funded Army units that deployed first ahead of those that did not deploy as promptly, started much of the parochialism that exists today. Seeing that most future threat-based scenarios employed AC units ahead of RC units this policy meant the RC was under-resourced and irrelevant short of a major theater war. Active Component leadership understood this and continued to build AC units as the primary deploying units in support of contingency plans and major theater wars. RC leadership and units were under-resourced, ill-equipped, and extremely marginalized by their AC brethren. The Army AC had long enjoyed the upper hand in this inter-component competition for resources. However, after fifteen years of demonstrated capability to mobilize and deploy in support of combat operations the RC caught the attention of the Congress as a cost effective, combat capable, force that should be resourced in proportion to the degree its forces are regularly mobilizing and deploying.

Directive 1200.17 combined with the constraints of the 2011 Budget Control Act, the end of OIF, and the reduction of Army forces in Afghanistan brought to the forefront a long-standing, and mostly behind closed doors, debate between Army AC and RC leadership regarding RC capability and interchangeability with AC units. Up for discussion in the Congress

was funding and end strength for each component within the Army. Specifically, the Congress was interested in the costs of mobilizing RC units and potential costs savings of RC force structure in comparison to AC force structure. The debate regarding cost efficiency of RC units has long favored the movement of more Army force structure into the RC.

However, Army AC leaders sought to change the nature of the conversation from cost efficiency to unit effectiveness. For example, at the National Press Club on January 7, 2014 Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, fired the proverbial first shot in this debate when he made his case that the ARNG was not "interchangeable" with the AC because they "only train 39 days a year."[30] While General Odierno's comments regarding Army RC training less days per year than their AC counterparts is accurate, his assertion that AC and RC units are not interchangeable contradicted the fundamental design of Army force structure. For example, Army BCTs are designed to execute the same mission, with the same number of personnel and equipment, regardless of which component they are assigned to. This is also true for Army support-type units. Furthermore, the *National Military Strategy* requires all Army units, regardless of component, to be capable of "conduct[ing] operations of sufficient scale and duration to accomplish their missions."[31] By saying that ARNG units are not interchangeable with AC units the Army Chief of Staff was essentially saying the Army was not capable of supporting the *National Military Strategy*.

Other Army AC senior leaders participated in the debate and questioned RC capabilities. For example, the late AC Major General promotable (P) John Rossi, Commanding General of the Army Fires Center of Excellence, stated in a 2014 interview with Breaking Defense reporter Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. that when ARNG BCTs were employed as full brigades they were typically given missions "requiring less complex brigade-level coordination and planning."[32]

Major General Rossi (P) went on to say that the complexity of combined arms maneuver is difficult for an ARNG BCT to achieve at the same level of proficiency as their AC counterparts due to a limited number of training days executed by ARNG BCTs.[33] Again, to call into question the effectiveness and interchangeability of RC units is to call into question the Army's force generation process (ARFORGEN) and the Army's ability to support the *National Military Strategy* as designed in defense of the nation.

The Army's RC also voiced its opinion in the debate over its capabilities. For example, former Director of the National Guard Bureau, retired Lieutenant General Steven Blum, said that ARNG BCTs are in fact interchangeable with AC BCTs as the Army designed them to be.[34] In response to Major General Rossi's comments regarding ARNG BCTs being assigned less complex missions, Lieutenant General Blum pointed out that the ARNG does not choose which missions its units conduct when mobilized.[35] The AC leadership is responsible for determining what components are assigned missions to mobilize. For example, Army Forces Command receives requirements from Combatant Commanders or the National Command Authority and determines if an AC or RC unit will be assigned that mission. Army National Guard leadership also saw the debate over their interchangeability with AC forces as a debate over the relevance of the RC going forward. In other words, the ARNG was concerned it would be forced back into the role of a strategic reserve rendering its force irrelevant by reducing its level of funding and impacting its ability to man, train, and equip its force.

The Army debate regarding its force structure and a host of other topics led the Congress to sanction a National Commission on the future of the Army in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1703(c). The Commission was charged with returning a report to Congress by February 2016 with recommendations on contentious issues that had come

to a head after the passage of the Budget Control Act. The National Commission on the Future of the Army returned sixty-three recommendations to the Congress, most which were extremely favorable to the Army RC. For example, most Commission recommendations center on the Army's absolute requirement to fully implement ATFP and to capitalize on the RC to provide the operational capabilities and strategic depth required for future campaigns.[36] The Commission also thought it was important to address the relationship between the components of the Army stating, "it was disheartening to hear elements of discord from within the Army's ranks…pitting the ARNG against the AC. This is unacceptable behavior, especially from some senior uniformed and civilian officials. Such parochialism undermines the Army's values, does disservice to soldiers and veterans, and adversely impacts the Army's mission."[37]

In summary, the parochialism which transpired between 2014 and 2016 highlights a missed opportunity for the Army. Instead of discussing a much more relevant issue, such as the design of its force structure, it was consumed by in-fighting. As former CSA Odierno and other prominent AC general officers have illustrated, the AC views its forces as the tip of the spear when it comes to BCTs conducting combat operations. While this is likely a valid assumption, it does nothing to further the conversation on the ability of the Army to support the *National Military Strategy* and project future mission requirements. The Army was required to adapt its forces over the past fifteen years to conduct missions its units were not designed to execute. After such an experience, one would think the Army would be searching for answers on how to change its force structure development process to more accurately project the correct force mixture, not fight amongst itself for resources. In fairness to former CSA Odierno and retired LTG Blum, their component's force managers could have been studying such an initiative, but their public commentary did not indicate so.

CURRENT ATFP TRENDS

The current Army Chief of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, has made great strides to eradicate the ugliness of the rift between the Army components and has embraced ATFP and many of the recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of the Army. First, in June of 2016 General Milley issued HQDA Executive Order (EXORD) 205-16, implementing an associated unit pilot program where AC and RC units would train together to increase collective unit readiness and interoperability between the components of the Army. In total fourteen relationships were established between AC and RC battalions, brigades, and divisions creating fourteen multi-component units. This concept is different from previous such efforts, like the round-out brigade concept in the 1990's for several reasons. First, the Army is funding associated units, regardless of component at 100% of the man, train, and equip requirement. Second, the associated unit pilot places AC and ARNG units on the same readiness cycle enabling the multi-component unit to achieve collective unit proficiency within the same timeframe and therefore should enable them to deploy at the same time and rate. Finally, the associated unit pilot program includes an AC and RC personnel exchange program which should help break down barriers between AC and RC personnel and build a shared understanding of the unique challenges of each component.

Another effort that General Milley has taken to fully embrace ATFP and operationalize the Army's RC is his decision to increase the readiness posture of ARNG Armored BCTs (ABCTs) and Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) from a sixty-month readiness cycle to a forty-eight-month cycle. The concept is to ensure that at least one ARNG ABCT or SBCT will be mobilized and deployed annually. The EXORD documenting this decision is still in draft. However, Army officers from HQDA and the ARNG have confirmed this concept has been approved and

implementation guidance is forthcoming. To some degree this policy is representative of the increased demand in the world today for ABCTs, but it is worth noting because the Army has currently chosen to go in the direction of utilizing its RC, as opposed to moving more ABCTs from the ARNG to the AC.

MOBILIZATION DATA ANALYSIS

The following case study utilized the Mobilization and Deployment Information System (MDIS) and previously published reports as sources to collect data on the mobilization of ARNG BCTs and Engineer units. Mobilization and Deployment Information System is a database owned by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to manage historical Title 10 USC mobilization of its forces, both AC and RC. Other parameters that were considered when collecting data on the mobilization of ARNG BCTs and Engineer units were as follows: (1) mobilization authority, (2) mobilization deployment scenarios, and (3) mobilization size. First, Army units can be mobilized under Title 32 USC or Title 10 USC. For the purposes of this analysis, only federal mobilizations under Title 10 USC were considered.

Second, the Army categorizes mobilizations into three basic unit deployment scenarios: total deployment, full deployment, and partial deployment. A Army unit is only considered to be mobilized in a total deployment scenario if the parent unit (AA–Level Unit Identification Code) deploys with all its assets (personnel and equipment), without exception.[38] Post 9/11, such total deployments were rare. Subsequently, the Army predominantly mobilized its units, regardless of component, in full and partial deployment scenarios. Both full and partial deployment scenarios indicate that the unit has been tailored in some way from its original MTOE or parent unit to accomplish a specific mission.

One strict interpretation of units mobilized under full and partial deployment scenarios is that the unit was not deployed as the Army designed it to be and therefore did not execute its wartime mission. While this may be true in the strictest sense of the definition, it is misleading. For example, consider an Engineer Bridging Company that mobilized to construct bridges in Iraq. If this unit took most of its assets (personnel and equipment), to include company leadership and the unit commander, but did not mobilize its mess section because the mission did not require it, it would not have been categorized as a total deployment but rather as a full deployment. For the purposes of this analysis, if the Engineer Bridging Company conducted its bridging mission as the Army had intended, minus the mess section, the unit is considered having executed its wartime mission. Finally, what the unit did while mobilized was compared to the TOE narrative, which contains a mission statement for the unit, to arrive at a conclusion regarding if the unit conducted its wartime mission.

Third, the Army categorized the mobilization of individual Soldiers serving as mobilization augmentees to other AC or RC units as partial deployments. This often resulted in multiple partial unit deployments for the same mission. For example, if Soldier *x* was filling a vacancy for unit *y*, but Soldier *x* was from a different unit and could not transfer directly into unit *y* then a separate and distinct deployment would be created for Soldier *x*, even though he or she was mobilizing as part of unit *y*. To mitigate the possibility of double-counting partial unit deployments in the data query any mobilization that was less than a platoon echelon (approximately 20 Soldiers) was not considered. Finally, ARNG Engineer unit mobilizations include company to brigade headquarter deployments and ARNG BCT deployments include mobilizations where most of the brigade was deployed or where the parent unit (brigade FF) was deployed.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

The research hypothesis is if force use matched force design than the Army force structure development process resulted in the correct RC force structure to meet mission requirements over the past fifteen years of combat. To measure this hypothesis mobilization data will be examined for both ARNG BCTs and Engineer units. Army National Guard BCT mobilization data is used to represent combat force structure in the RC and ARNG Engineer unit mobilization data is used to represent combat support-type force structure in the RC. For this hypothesis to be true, one would expect most mobilizations of ARNG BCTs and Engineer units over the past fifteen years of combat operations to be in support of the MTOE mission each force-type was designed to execute. The term 'most,' for the purposes of proving this hypothesis true, is defined by any value greater than or equal to seventy-five percent (where mobilization data has been aggregated by force-type over the past fifteen years). Any mobilization of ARNG BCTs and Engineer units in support of MTOE missions less than seventy-five percent will disprove this hypothesis.

Based on the breakdown of combat and combat support-type units in the AC versus the RC, and the high demand for contingency operations over the past fifteen years, one would expect ARNG mobilization data to show its BCTs did not mobilize as designed and that its Engineer units did. If this expectation is determined to be accurate than it suggests the mobilization of ARNG BCTs was not optimal over the past fifteen years. This may indicate that the Army force structure development process should explore redesigning ARNG BCTs in support of both contingency operations and near-peer adversaries. Also, if determined accurate, then it suggests the mobilization of ARNG Engineer units was optimal over the past fifteen years

of combat operations. This may indicate that the Army force structure development process accurately designed its combat support-type forces, but inaccurately designed its combat forces.

ARNG BCT DATA

The mobilization data for ARNG BCTs shown in Tables A-1 through A-3 includes previously published data on ARNG BCT mobilizations by mission type from 2004 through 2013, updated to also include 2014 and 2015.[1] In total, there were 51 ARNG BCT mobilizations, supporting three different mission types: (1) SECFOR, (2) Counterinsurgency (COIN) Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), and (3) Task Force Phoenix (TF Phoenix).

Table A-1:



Table A-2:



- Represents all ARNG BCTs that mobilized from 2004 through 2015
- 51 total BCT deployments based on mobilization of Brigade FF: 26 SECFOR; 18 COIN(FSO); and 7 TF Phoenix

[1] Data available in a March 2014 Breaking Defense article titled *National Guard Commanders Rise in Revolt Against Active Army*, by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. The article contained an ARNG slide showing ARNG BCT mobilizations by mission type from 2004 through 2013.

Table A-3:



- 51 total BCT deployments: 39 IBCT; 11 ABCT; and 1 SBCT

Security Force missions became a catch-all phrase for missions that required Soldiers to do a variety of tasks both in the continental United States (CONUS) or Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) post 9/11. The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) categorized four types of SECFOR missions in its 2006 release of the SECFOR Handbook: (1) convoy security; (2) personal security detachment; (3) site security; and (4) other security missions such as training security forces and conducting detainee operations.[39] When a BCT mobilized in support of SECFOR missions it usually conducted all four types of SECFOR missions in addition to a host of other tasks due to its size and capabilities. Other SECFOR tasks could include port security operations, convoy security and escort, provincial reconstruction team security, base camp force protection and command and control, combat patrols, quick reaction force (QRF), area reaction force (ARF), and training of host nation military forces.

Over the past fifteen years of combat operations there was no unit in the Army inventory that was doctrinally designed to conduct SECFOR missions. This is likely because the Army force structure development process was focused on building forces to combat a near-peer adversary in a major theater war. Subsequently, the Army was forced to adapt its forces to meet the demands of SECFOR missions. Often this was done with BCTs, but other Army units were

also employed in support of SECFOR missions, as the ARNG Engineer unit mobilization data will show.

Recently, the Army force structure development process has seemingly acknowledged the increased demand for SECFOR missions. In February 2017, the Army announced that it will stand-up six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). The SFABs are designed to conduct SECFOR missions and contain only Non-Commissioned Officers at the rank of E-6 and above and Officers at the rank of Captain and above. The AC is slated to begin training the first SFAB in fiscal year 2018 and the remaining five are not yet funded and therefore have not been designated to a specific Army component. Although this is a step in the right direction, it took the Army over fifteen years to recognize, validate, and incorporate this structure into its forces.

United States Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, published in December 2006, defined COIN operations as offensive, defensive, and stability operations to defeat insurgency and achieve a stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development.[40] United States Army FM 3-0, published in February 2011, defined FSO as Army forces combining offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. The COIN FSO mission is the product of the operational environment in both OEF and OIF and was considered the most dynamic and complex mission a BCT could conduct.

The TF Phoenix mission-set is like a SECFOR mission, but is a unique Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) that was specific to operations in Afghanistan during OEF. The TF Phoenix mission was to train and mentor newly created Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to establish and maintain law and order throughout

Afghanistan using Embedded Training Teams (ETT).[41] In addition the BCTs conducting the TF Phoenix mission set were responsible to maintain twenty-four-hour operations at Camp Phoenix including camp force protection, command and control, and QRF.[42] The TF Phoenix mission started in 2003 and was phased out in 2010 as evident in Table A-1. Considering the similarities between the SECFOR and TF Phoenix mission a big-picture view of the 51 ARNG BCT mobilizations shows that ARNG BCTs were deployed thirty-five percent of the time as designed, in support of their MTOE mission. That means that ARNG BCTs did not manage brigade-level combined arms operations in offense, defense, and stability operations during sixty-five percent of their mobilizations since 9/11. As expected, these percentages disprove the hypothesis that the Army force structure development process resulted in the correct type of RC combat force structure to meet the mission requirements over the past fifteen years of combat operations.

The preponderance of ARNG BCT deployments were Infantry BCTs (IBCTs). This makes sense given that over the past fifteen years the ARNG has had approximately twenty IBCTs, compared to seven ABCTs and one SBCT. This number is an approximation because the ARNG converted its BCT force structure to match the AC's modular design over the past fifteen years and it required some BCTs to be phased out. As depicted in Table A-2 and A-3, ARNG IBCTs did most of the SECFOR, COIN, and TF Phoenix missions, in that order. However, when ARNG ABCT and SBCTs were mobilized they conducted the mission they were designed to execute more often than IBCTs.

It is difficult to definitively determine if ARNG IBCTs were mobilized more frequently in support of non-MTOE missions due to the high quantity of IBCTs or if the Army viewed IBCTs as more adaptable to other mission sets. However, consider the former reason was in fact the reality. If IBCTs are the preferred RC force structure to be employed against missions they

were not designed to conduct, the Army may want to consider moving more light infantry BCTs into its RC. This would have major implications on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) of both the AC and the RC. For example, securing schools for RC Soldiers to train on light infantry tactics and growing RC leaders capable of employing light infantry tactics would be cumbersome and take time.

Following the same logic, the Army may want to consider moving more ABCTs into its AC. This force structure change would have large monetary and DOTMLPF-P implications too. Armored BCTs cost more in equipment, maintenance, and training ammunition than light infantry BCTs and any force structure change would have to be done with the approval of the Congress. Also, the facilities to store, maintain, and train ABCTs are very difficult to come by due to the large amount of land required to operate and fire armored weapon systems and the environmental impacts of said activities. In conclusion, even if such a force structure change occurred it would do nothing to further the accuracy of the Army's ability to project the optimal forces required because IBCTs would still be designed to combat near-peer adversaries.

ARNG ENGINEER UNIT DATA

The mobilization data for ARNG Engineer units shown in Tables B-1 through B-3 includes a combination of unclassified data available in MDIS and querying representatives from each mobilized ARNG Engineer unit.[2] Most of the ARNG Engineer units mobilized federally under Title 10 USC since 9/11 were employed as they were designed by the Army. Per Table B-1, seventy-nine percent of ARNG Engineer units executed their wartime mission. For example,

[2] The data in MDIS does not indicate what mission the units conducted while deployed. Thus, a representative from each unit mobilized was contacted to confirm the unit's mission while deployed. In total, data was collected for 229 ARNG Engineer units mobilized from 2001 through 2015.

an Engineer Horizontal Construction Company, conducted horizontal construction. The high percentage of Engineer units that executed its wartime mission is likely because the AC has reduced its combat support-type units in favor of maintaining larger quantities of combat units. Thus, the AC does not have enough support-type units required to sustain its combat formations during deployments. Therefore, over the last fifteen years of conflict it is reasonable to expect that the Army employed its RC combat support-type formations more frequently as they were designed. The percentage of ARNG Engineer units mobilized and deployed as designed exceeds the seventy-five percent threshold and therefore proves the hypothesis that the Army force structure development process resulted in the correct RC combat support-type force structure to meet mission requirements over the past fifteen years of combat. This was expected for combat support-type units, like ARNG Engineer units, because the AC has a relative low number of combat support-type force structure. The results further suggest that the Army force structure development process accurately designed its combat support-type forces, but inaccurately designed its combat forces.

Table B-1:



- Sampling of 229 ARNG Engineer units deployed from 2002 through 2016
- Includes Engineer company to brigade headquarter deployments
- 7% margin of error

Table B-2:



Table B-3:



- 229 total ARNG Engineer unit mobilizations from 2002 through 2016
- 49 ARNG units mobilized for non-MTOE missions

Table B-3 provides a closer look at the twenty-one percent of ARNG Engineer units mobilized federally under Title 10 USC since 9/11 for non-MTOE missions. These mobilizations occurred for a variety of reasons and in virtually every major operation since 9/11. When considering all the non-MTOE missions that Engineers were employed for since 9/11, SECFOR missions were the majority at twenty-seven total mobilizations. One factor that likely had an impact on ARNG Engineer units being mobilized for SECFOR missions is the domestic security environment post 9/11. The advent of the Homeland Security Advisory System in 2002 and its often-elevated threat alerts increased the demand for armed Soldiers to protect critical civilian and military infrastructure such as airports, train stations, power plants, and military

installations. This would explain why half of the Engineer mobilizations in support of SECFOR missions occurred in CONUS during fiscal years 2003-2004. As for the other half of the Engineer units tasked with conducting SECFOR missions, those missions occurred across a range of military operations including Kosovo Force (KFOR), OEF, and OIF. This was likely the result of the increased demand placed on the Army during this timeframe. The highest number of ARNG Engineer units being mobilized for SECFOR missions occurred between fiscal year 2003 and 2006 when the Army was attempting to sustain combat operations in both OEF and OIF.

The second largest quantity of ARNG Engineer units being mobilized for non-MTOE missions were in support of route clearance missions during twelve deployments. The Army's CALL Route Clearance Handbook, released November 2003, defined route clearance as maintaining clear Lines of Communication (LOC) through deliberate and hasty sweeps for obstacles during an operation.[43] While obstacle clearance is fundamentally an engineer task that falls under the larger umbrella of mobility and survivability, not every engineer unit is equipped and trained to conduct this task, as was the case with these ten units. For example, these ten mobilizations were composed of Horizontal Construction Companies, Vertical Construction Companies, or Engineer Support Companies. The only engineer formations specifically designed to perform route clearance are Route Clearance Companies and Sapper Companies.

The third largest quantity of ARNG Engineer units being mobilized for non-MTOE missions were in support of Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) missions at four mobilizations. Explosive Ordinance Disposal is inherently a Army Ordinance Corps mission to safely dispose of explosive devices. However, much like the route clearance mission, neutralizing explosive hazards is also an engineer task that falls under the larger umbrella of

mobility and survivability. Also, like the route clearance mission, not every engineer unit is equipped and trained to conduct this task. Only one of the four ARNG Engineer units deployed in support of EOD missions was a Horizontal Company and therefore was not designed to or trained to conduct explosive obstacle clearing. The other three were all Sapper units, capable of clearing explosive obstacles; however, they were not employed in that manner. Instead, all three Sapper Companies report that they were employed as motorized infantry assisting EOD teams maneuver to explosive device locations and establishing area security.

The number of EOD units in the Army inventory is small with two EOD Groups, eight EOD Battalions, and fifty-two EOD Companies programmed in fiscal year (FY) 2016 per USFMSA. Manning EOD units is incredibly challenging due to the length and rigor of the training. It is highly likely that the employment of ARNG Engineer units in this capacity was a direct result of the undersized and understaffed EOD units. This too is an area that the Army may want to study further to determine if it has the correct size inventory spread across all three components to better prepare for the next war.

The remaining non-MTOE ARNG Engineer deployments are split between Mobile Transition Team (MTT) missions (3 mobilizations), motorized infantry missions (2 mobilizations), and civil reconstruction oversight (1 mobilization). Mobile Transition Teams, or advise and assist teams, are groups of senior ranking officers and non-commissioned officers that mobilize as a unit to coach, teach and mentor foreign military units so that they can carry out independent operations without coalition force support in the future. These missions were usually battalion headquarters missions and personnel were usually cobbled together to have the correct skill and experience set to be successful. This is outside the scope of an Engineer battalion headquarters' wartime mission. Due to the rank requirements of training team

mobilizations, often leadership from several companies would be absorbed into the battalion leaving the lower echelon units without key leaders. This has been a problem for the Army writ large over the past fifteen years. However, the Army seems to have a potential solution with the advent of the SFAB, which will also support MTT missions, and are scheduled to begin training in fiscal year 2018.

The two ARNG Engineer units that were mobilized and employed as motorized infantry were both Sapper units deployed to Iraq. Both Sapper units reported that they were assigned a sector and worked COIN operations. There are similarities between these two mobilizations and the three Sapper units mobilized in support of EOD missions in that they were all employed as mobilized infantry while in Iraq over the same two-year timeframe (from 2004 to 2005). This likely indicates that the need for motorized infantry units was far greater than the available supply at the time which forced the Army to cast a wider net for acceptable units with similar capabilities and resulted in the mobilization of Sapper units.

The last non-MTOE mobilization was for an ARNG Engineer Brigade Headquarters in support of Civil Reconstruction. The mission of an Engineer Brigade Headquarters per USFMSA is to plan, integrate, and direct the execution of engineer missions conducted by 3-5 mission tailored engineer battalions. This ARNG Engineer Brigade found itself managing the planning and oversight of contracts awarded to civilian Iraqi firms to rebuild critical infrastructure damaged during combat operations. The additional training and certifications that are required for Contracting Officers (KO) and Contracting Officers Representatives (COR) are not branch specific in the Army. Any officer can attend the course and become a KO or a COR. However, due to the abundance of civil reconstruction of critical infrastructure, engineer force structure was leveraged heavily in support of this mission set. In response to the growing

demand for contracting teams OCONUS, the Army created the Army Contracting Command (ACC) in October of 2008.

In summary, the results of the data analysis in regards to the research hypothesis were mixed. The hypothesis was disproved for ARNG BCTs and proved for ARNG Engineer units. This indicates that the Army force structure development process inaccurately designed its RC combat forces, but accurately designed its RC combat support-type forces. The results also suggest that the Army may benefit from redesigning a portion of its RC combat force structure, like BCTs, to meet the demand of contingency operations, like SECFOR missions. The advent of the SFABs indicates that the Army may be adopting such an approach to force design. However, with only one SFAB unit funded to stand-up in 2018 in the AC and no timeline to fund and stand-up the remaining five SFABs, it is difficult to say the Army has definitively made such a transition.

Conclusion:

This paper discussed multiple factors which impacted the mobilization and deployment of ARNG BCTs and Engineer units over the past fifteen years of combat operations. It compared the missions ARNG BCTs and Engineer units, and by extension RC combat and combat support-type forces, were deployed to support over the past fifteen years to the missions those forces were designed to conduct. The results of the comparison are mixed. In regards to RC combat forces, it demonstrated that the Army did not employ ARNG BCTs as designed most of the time and therefore did not optimize the utilization of RC combat forces. In regards to RC combat support-type forces, it demonstrated that the Army did employ ARNG Engineer units as designed most of the time and therefore did optimize the utilization of RC combat support-type forces. The mixed results of RC combat and combat support-type mobilization data suggests the

Army has room to improve its design versus employment gap. One way to close this gap and improve the Army's ability to support the *National Military Strategy* is to redesign a portion of RC combat forces to meet the demands of contingency operations. Another way to optimize Army force structure is to move combat and combat support-type forces amongst its components; however, this option will do little to close the design versus employment gap.

If the Army force structure development process adopts a hybrid approach to its threat-based force design, accounting for near-peer adversaries and potential contingencies, then redesigning a portion of its forces would optimize the utilization of the total Army in support of the *National Military Strategy*. Considering the mobilization data for ARNG BCTs over the past fifteen years of combat operations, only thirty-five percent were deployed as designed. The remaining sixty-five percent of ARNG BCT deployments were for ad hoc assigned missions. If the Army was to redesign this same portion of ARNG BCTs to be SFABs than the Army may optimize its ability to leverage its RC in support of contingency operations and ultimately increase the readiness of the total Army to combat a major theater war. The intent is that SFAB force structure in the RC would absorb contingency requirements which would allow for the remaining RC combat and combat support-type forces to focus on combating a near-peer adversary.

If the Army force structure development process continues to prioritize designing its forces to combat a near-peer adversary over contingency operations, then moving select force structure from the RC to the AC may optimize the readiness of the Army to win a major-theater war. For example, moving ABCTs from the ARNG to the AC and IBCTs from the AC to ARNG may be one way of achieving this optimization. ARNG BCT mobilization data over the past fifteen years indicates that IBCTs mobilized more in support of contingency operations, like

SECFOR missions, than ARNG ABCTs. This suggests that IBCTs were the Army's force of choice for ad hoc missions. If this trend is in fact reality, then the Army can build strategic depth in support of a major theater war by placing more IBCTs in the ARNG, while still having the responsiveness to adjust in support of contingency operations. The intent is with more IBCT force structure in the ARNG to absorb contingency requirements, the necessity for other RC combat and combat support-type forces to do the same will decrease. However, moving IBCTs and ABCTs amongst Army components will not improve the optimization of force structure design versus force structure employment because BCTs will still be designed to combat a near-peer adversary and mobilize to support contingency operations.

Moving and/or redesigning Army force structure are extremely sensitive issues for all Army stakeholders. The National Commission on the Future of the Army has made its recommendations regarding how best to leverage the total Army going forward. However, the Army should continue to examine how to optimize the utilization of its forces in support of the *National Military Strategy*. The Army cannot afford to allow parochialism to stand in the way of innovation. If the Army is to continue its success it must consider changing its force structure to meet the demands of the future, whether contingency or major theater war.

[1] The US spends more on defense than any other country in the world, $596 Billion in 2015, and outspends the next

seven largest defense spending countries combined.
[2] John D. Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, "Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force" (Master's thesis, US Army War College, 2014), 13.
[3] Headquarters Department of the Army, Force Development and Documentation, AR 71-31 (Washington, DC: July 1, 2013), 18.
[4] *Ibid*, 19.
[5] *Ibid*.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] *Ibid*.
[8] National Commission on the Future of the Army, "Total Army Analysis," (Washington, DC: April 10, 2015), 1, http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/readingMaterial_8.pdf.
[9] Lt. Gen. Stephen M. Twitty, "Enhancing Reserve Component Readiness," *Army.mil*, last modified September 8, 2016, 3, https://www.army.mil/article/174783.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] United States Army, "Organization: Who We Are," *Army.mil*, October 21, 2016, 1, https://www.army.mil/info/organization/.
[12] *Ibid.*
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