

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE***Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188*

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

**PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b>		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b>		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b>					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b>					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b>

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

**TITLE:** THE AFRICAN FUTURE ENVIRONMENT: FACING CHINESE INFLUENCES  
ACROSS THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:** Major Jane R. Oren, USMC

AY 16-17

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

*Anna Louise Antonoff*  
*Anna Louise Antonoff*  
*10 May 17*

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

*CDR Russell Evans USN*  
*Russell Evans*  
*10 MAY 17*

## Executive Summary

**Title:** THE AFRICAN FUTURE ENVIRONMENT: FACING CHINESE INFLUENCE ACROSS THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

**Author:** Major Jane R. Oren, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** China's diplomatic, economic, military, and informational influences in Africa create points of friction in Chinese-African relations that the United States and its allies and partners can exploit to deter the development of an anti-access/area denial future operating environment.

**Discussion:** The future operating environment of Africa covers a spectrum – from austere and resource scarce to urbanized and technologically advanced. Adapting to this range of circumstances presents a challenge to United States military planners. External influencers to the African continent contribute to the challenge. In the past two decades, China's diplomatic, economic, informational, and military influence created a mutually beneficial relationship with African states that promotes the Chinese model of government and economic development as a viable option and alternative to Western models. China's influence in Africa may potentially curtail access opportunities for the United States. The ability to forecast the potential development of an adversarial anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability within Africa requires analysis of China's influence across all aspects of national power and the identification of the indicators which could disrupt the current trend.

**Conclusion:** Understanding China's activities and influence in Africa provides the United States with a means of identifying pressure points which affect China's sources of income and resources from outside its historical sphere of influence in mainland China and the South China Sea. Additionally, actions in Africa may prove less prone to escalation to combat operations than would actions in the South China Sea to curtail Chinese influence.

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

*Table of Contents*

Page

EXECUTIVE  
SUMMARY .....  
i

DISCLAIMER .....  
ii

INTRODUCTION .....  
1

AFRICAN CURRENT  
STATE .....  
4

DRIVERS OF FUTURE  
WORLDS .....  
5

CURRENT CHINESE-INFLUENCED  
AFRICA .....  
9

CHINESE ECONOMIC  
INFLUENCE .....  
12

CHINESE DIPLOMATIC  
INFLUENCE .....  
17

CHINESE MILITARY

INFLUENCE .....

22

CHINESE INFORMATION

INFLUENCE .....

24

THE CHANGING SYSTEM AND PROSPECTIVE  
WORLD .....

26

CONCLUSION.....

28

APPENDIX

A.....

30

ENDNOTES .....

33

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....

38

## Introduction

Military planners assessing what the future environment will look like focus on the military aspects with the ultimate problem set of an adversary that creates an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment for the United States and allies. When considering an A2/AD environment, the eastern region of China, particularly in vicinity of the Taiwan Strait and the capital city of Beijing presents the most formidable vision of this type of environment.

Characterized as highly urbanized, densely populated, and economically diverse, the eastern coast of mainland China also epitomizes the strength and heart of a complex military defense.

Over the past decade, China extended its presence and influence in the South China Sea through land reclamation efforts and subsequent infrastructure construction on the newly expanded Paracel and Spratly Islands thereby creating a “buffer” to the heart of the military A2/AD environment on mainland China. The islands further China’s territorial claims in the region and allow China to normalize its security influence in the area through maritime patrols. President Xi Jinping envisions China’s South China Sea endeavors as a means of protecting China’s territorial and maritime rights, serving as a stabilizing power to crisis and conflict, preserving the maritime environment, and continuing development in the region.<sup>1</sup>

Accomplishment of these aims would place China as the leading major power in the region, and the United States could anticipate decreased credibility as an effective security ally. Mira Rapp-Hopper, formerly the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, stated China’s South China Sea efforts served more to “fortify its territorial claims than to help it extract natural resources” despite fisheries and potential oil and gas deposits in the region.”<sup>2</sup> China developed its influence in the South China Sea over time through carefully planned initiatives and sensitizing regional actors to Chinese foreign policy. With China seeking opportunities and

markets to feed its mainland economy to support a growing population, China looks to Africa as a solution for sustainment of its economy and continued growth.

Africa is a continent of 54 nations (including islands) composed of over 1.1 billion people, more than 3,000 tribes, and with over 2,000 languages spoken. The future operating environment of Africa presents multiple environments – from austere and resource scarce to urbanized and technologically advanced. External influences, such as foreign states and transnational threats, to the African continent add another layer of complexity to an already challenging environment. China’s economic and diplomatic activities in Africa contribute to an environment which possesses the potential to present access challenges for the United States well beyond just the military aspects of access. The ability to forecast the development of a future A2/AD relies on an analysis across all aspects of national power, and in the case of China, specifically remaining cognizant of diplomatic and economic objectives.

### **Concept**

This paper aims to identify seams in Chinese influence in Africa which planners can exploit to gain or retain access to areas of potential future interest, whether as a source of critical resources for the United States or a means of applying pressure on China itself. Access refers to the ability to influence passively and actively in the physical, cognitive, and informational domains. China’s use of “soft power” characterizes passive access denial. A matrix scenario analysis, based on the intersection of two major drivers of uncertainty, creates the basis for alternative future “worlds” that set the global opportunities and constraints for developments in any region. Within these alternative “futures,” one can begin to identify and explore specifically

African future operating environments, starting with the status quo today and then considering which trends are likely to continue and what may change.

The Fragile State Index provides general characteristics of the current state of the African continent as the baseline for the building of the future operating environment assessment. A secondary layer to developing the current state includes identifying Chinese activities and influences across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic areas (DIME) elements of national power.

- Diplomatic considerations consist of identifying China's foreign policy and desired objectives. This primarily translates to understanding the "One Belt, One Road" policy and the "One China" policy which in turn influence economic, military, and information activities.
- Information objectives include promoting among African states the Chinese alternative to Western and European forms of government and business.
- Military aspects of the environment include weapons sales, training, and use.
- Economic factors include several types of investments (foreign direct investment, aid, and loans/grants), whether developmental or commercial.

Analyzing investment in such a way helps in determining those geographic areas where China may take action to maintain or increase influence via any or all elements of national power. The timeframe of any potential action remains vague; within most published analyses, Chinese objectives in Africa are defined in terms of a general end state, without a designated timeframe. Such open-endedness, however, aids in identifying those current trends or characteristics with a high likelihood of continuing to influence the future operating environment.

China's diplomatic, economic, military, and informational influences in Africa create points of friction in Chinese-African relations that the United States and its allies and partners can exploit to deter the development of an anti-access/area denial future operating environment.

## **Current African State**

The current state of the African continent presents a conflicting narrative. Forty-four African states fall within the top 100 countries on the Fragile State Index.<sup>3</sup> Of those states categorized in the “Alert” category which indicates the highest range of scores in terms of vulnerability to collapse or conflict, six African states make up the eight states on the list: Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Looking at the trends in development in Africa over the past two decades, there has been a dramatic shift in the outlook of Africa’s future. Around the turn of the century, Africa was considered a continent in crisis. In 1997, sub-Saharan Africa alone owed the West approximately \$US219 billion, and there were over 12 million refugees and displaced persons due to armed conflict.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, the following 10 to 15 years were reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the best years ever for sub-Saharan African economic growth with regions reporting over 5% growth annually.<sup>5</sup> By 2013, a number of African states reported increases in per-capita Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), diminishing poverty, and increased foreign and internal trade.<sup>6</sup> Many of the positive economic trends in sub-Saharan Africa stem from a drive by African states to open their economies to international trade. For the past three years, China has been sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trade partner. Comparing the United States and China in 2015, the United States reported \$18.9 billion in goods imported while China – which decreased its imports by 40% from 2014 – reported \$63.9 billion.<sup>7 8</sup> The trend of Chinese investment and aid to the African continent only looks to increase in the next 15 to 20 years. A prospective look at how China’s influence may affect the African environment is therefore in order.

## Drivers of the Future Worlds of Africa

A number of drivers exist which can determine Africa's future state and influence a future Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operating environment, but the two primary drivers of uncertainty regarding Chinese activities on the continent are economic state and level of order. Putting both of these drivers on opposing axes, as depicted in Figure 1, provides four potential worlds for Africa. These worlds represent potential operating environments and circumstances which the United States and its allies and partners will need to negotiate. The term "order" refers to the stable, peaceful interaction of governments, populaces, businesses, and cultures within African states. "Disintegration" denotes the collapse of world and regional structures within the current international system, from the United Nations to the Organization for African Union (OAU). On the other axis, the economic state ranges from depression to prosperity among African economies.




Figure 1. Future World Drivers

The two drivers create four worlds: 1) economic growth and order/globalization, 2) economic growth and anarchy, 3) economic depression and order/globalization, and 4) economic

depression and anarchy. Of these four worlds, the most likely and most dangerous in terms of the prospect of A2/AD capabilities in the future operating environment are worlds 2 and 4, respectively. The following sections describe these four worlds and characterize the situation in how the A2/AD environments evolve.

Economic Growth and Order/Globalization. The first future world, also termed “Utopia”, is the world the United States finds most desirable on the African continent. Economic growth proliferates across the continent either through foreign investment or internal regional development. The economic growth on the continent arises from globalization, which promotes openness within Africa to both “Western” and “Eastern” influences that advance living situations. Order exists in that African states conduct good governance and support an international rules-based system. Additionally, states resolve disputes without the use of violence. The populace holds confidence in the government’s abilities to provide essential services. Non-African nations invest economically in Africa for the gain of raw resources and technology development opportunities. African nations explore economic partnering with African and non-African states, which generates healthy economic competition between neighboring African states and furthers technological development. Due to the potential for continued economic growth among African countries and foreign investors alike, external interests on the continent increase. Availability of exploitable natural and manmade resources and the prospect of creating economic stability or even growth drive the activities of external actors in Africa. This activity, however, does not guarantee stability within Africa itself. Competition among outside actors for African resources, together with competition among African states for foreign direct investment, will tend to increase friction within areas being exploited, between states with the exploitable resources, and possibly between the external actors

desiring the resources. External actors will leverage economic incentives such as weapons sales in exchange for access to resources.

Economic Growth and Anarchy. The second world, characterized as “King Midas,” presents an A2/AD development. The abundance of resources on the continent garners external interest. Foreign investment in Africa increases, which generates economic growth. Without improvement in local governance, the economic growth creates instability in individual societies as the minority elites retain the wealth of the country and the disparity in wealth generates unrest amongst disenfranchised local populace groups. The revenue from natural resources is not seen by the majority of the local populace and poverty increases in those areas which do not possess a competitive economic resource. The disparity between economic and social classes drives conflict, as much as minority exclusion by elites causes uprisings. Opposition towards the government increases due to the government’s failure to invest in programs and institutions to provide for non-elites. Dissident groups with ties to Islamist insurgencies or violent extremist groups recruit from the disenfranchised populace to challenge state sovereignty. Weapons proliferation among disenfranchised groups originates from external threats to support local efforts to destabilize the government. The state commits to military spending with the purpose of developing a force capable of promoting stability for the existing government. The potential for human rights violations increases as governments take stronger actions to quell civilian unrest.

Economic Depression and Order/Globalization. The third world, defined as “Grapes of Wrath”, is an unstable, transient world. The economic crisis puts a severe strain on the international institutions of order, both internally as donor and member countries face more difficulty in sustaining levels of support, and externally as the economic crisis in the “periphery” creates strife. Internal and external trade is essentially nonexistent or does not favorably

contribute to the African nations' GDP. Economic depression leads to popular discontent with the leadership's inability to address local grievances for essential services and causes migrations of African to Europe seeking improved living conditions. African leadership in countries experiencing high levels of economic depression face increased internal popular unrest. Internal and transnational threat groups capitalize on local grievances to gain support and momentum for their cause/objectives. This world can quickly devolve into the fourth world if the first world cannot pull itself together to save international order.

Economic Depression and Anarchy. The fourth world, "Dystopia", is the most undesirable of the worlds. This does not necessarily lead to a military A2/AD environment since the economic depression limits African nations' ability to create a military strong and capable enough to counter a modernized force. Political access to the continent may be limited and dependent on the type of government in place. Economic depression leads to increased unrest amongst the populace as the governments lack the funds and capabilities to provide essential services. Security decreases as national security apparatuses prove unable to quell local unrest. Infrastructure deteriorates due to a lack of financial support. Human rights violations increase as strained governments attempt to quell protests and popular unrest. Governments also attribute the negative aspects of the environment to the presence and activities of foreign actors.

Transnational and intrastate threat groups take advantage of the unstable government and lack of effective security to recruit from among the disenfranchised populace. As in world 2, weapons proliferation among disenfranchised groups originates from external threats. As the threat groups expand in size and territory, a domino effect takes place across the continent. Due to the increase in violence from threat groups, the number of displaced persons incurs increased aid, and subsequently increased Non-Governmental Organization activities and requirements.

### **Current Chinese-Influenced Africa**

According to Meine Pieter van Dijk, the Chinese influence in Africa can be measured in five ways: 1) number of Chinese living and/or working in Africa, 2) goods and services rendered to Africa, 3) Chinese aid to African countries, 4) Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa, and 5) other financial flows between China and Africa.<sup>9</sup> Of these five categories, the first four have the most substantive data with which to hypothesize how Chinese influence will impede United States access to operating in Africa.

The data sets for Chinese people living and working in Africa varies and is difficult to determine definitively. As one scholar notes, “A former official of the African Development Bank believed that more Chinese had come to Africa in the past decade ‘than Europeans in the past 400’”<sup>10</sup> In 2009, analysts estimated the Chinese population in Africa at between 750,000 to 929,000.<sup>11</sup> By 2013, the estimated Chinese population that settled in jobs in Africa exceeded one million.<sup>12</sup> Today, that number continues to exceed one million, but is difficult to calculate due to geographical challenges of the continent such as porous borders, lax immigration and border control, and corruption in African government agencies.<sup>13</sup>

While no consolidated lists of numbers exist from substantiated data sources, a look at numbers compiled on Wikipedia provide at least a general view of the trend of Chinese migration by country. Figure 2 depicts general Chinese migration numbers by the top ten African states with Chinese populations greater than 5,000 people. Of the ten countries listed in the migration chart, only two of them rank within the top ten of the Fragile State Index: Republic of

Congo (among the top ten on the FSI since 2006) and Sudan (among the top five on the FSI since 2006).<sup>14</sup> The reasons for migration to these two countries despite the vulnerability to failure and instability likely pertains to the raw




Figure 2. Chinese Population by Country

resources. Chinese companies maintain a 40 percent stake in the largest oil fields in South Sudan, but Sudan to the north controls the pipelines to export the oil.<sup>15</sup> Chinese migration continues to Sudan to ensure access and control of the South Sudanese oil flow, which at one point accounted for 5% of China’s oil imports.<sup>16</sup> The Democratic Republic of Congo accounts for more than half of the world’s supply of cobalt, and China owns 90% of the mines in Katanga province in southern D.R. Congo which accounts for a third of the province’s cobalt reserves.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, China signed a \$US9 billion “minerals-for-infrastructure deal” with D.R. Congo in 2007 and later “scaled back” to \$US6 billion in 2009.<sup>18</sup>

With the growing numbers of Chinese emigrants and migrants to Africa, competing perspectives are developing in Africa: appreciation for the Chinese efforts in stimulating African economies and development, and resentment at the fact that the Chinese are consuming the small business market and underbidding even the African local sellers. Despite such resentment, in a poll of thirty-six African countries conducted in 2016 by a Pan-African research network, Afrobarometer, 63% of the African states on average viewed Chinese economic and political

influence as positive.<sup>19</sup> The countries registering the highest percentages of positive views of Chinese influence included Mali, Niger, Cameroon, and Liberia (Figure 3).<sup>20</sup>




Figure 3. Perceptions of China in Africa

A growing positive perception of Chinese activities in Africa by African populations has the potential to hinder Western and European influence on the continent. A number of cultural points of tension with China may alleviate those fears of the West and provide seams the United States and allies can exploit. The reverse perception of how Chinese in Africa view Africans is in stark contrast to the African perception. Chinese perceive the Africans to be lazy and below the Chinese. This could be used to undermine Chinese influence in the region via information operations. Additionally, reports on Chinese business practices and labor conditions have garnered negative African attention. Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), a British NGO based in Oxford, surveyed Chinese-run enterprises in Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo and reported numerous reasons for negative perceptions of the Chinese: no regard for Congolese laws, no concern to protect the environment, not transparent,

no compensation for injured workers, unpaid sick leave, disregard for safety, abusive employers, demand long hours for low pay, rely almost exclusively on illegally-sourced minerals (reference to child labor), and have no commitment to social development.<sup>21</sup> Katanga represents a relatively small region, but nonadherence to international labor laws does not promote the globally responsible state image China desires.

### **China's Economic Influence**

Chinese economic policy is significantly influenced by the guidelines for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries put forth in 1964 by then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The Premier Enlai's eight principles aimed to help developing countries build a sustainable economy and included: 1) mutual benefit for both China and the recipient country; 2) no conditions attached; 3) the no-interest or low-interest loans would not create a debt burden for the recipient country; 4) to help the recipient nation develop its economy but not become dependent on China; 5) to help the recipient country with projects that need less capital and provide quick returns; 6) the aid must be of high quality at the world market price; 7) to ensure locals could learn and master the technology; and 8) the Chinese experts and technicians working for the aid recipient country are treated equally as the local ones with no extra benefits for them.<sup>22</sup>

China has increased economic ventures in Africa within the last decade, and the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) economic policy currently under enactment highlights the movement of resources and goods across and from the African continent. The Mercatur Institute for China Studies (MERICS) published a graphical depiction of China's OBOR policy (Figure 4) which reflect updates for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>23</sup> In addition to the overland economic corridors across

mainland China to western Europe, maritime corridors have expanded beyond the eastern coast of India in the Bay of Bengal to ports along eastern Africa and through the Suez Canal. In Africa, current and future planned overland routes via railroad connect the east and west coast of sub-Saharan, as well as create intra-continental trade routes. The notable updates in MERICS’ graphic include thirteen ports “planned or under construction”. These ports reflect China’s desire to include import raw materials from the continent as well as exploit a new market for finished goods.




Figure 4. MERICS China Mapping: One Belt, One Road

Since 2003, China has invested more than \$75 billion in economic and development ventures in Africa.<sup>24</sup> In 2009, China became Africa’s leading trading partner, surpassing the European Union (EU) and the United States (US).<sup>25</sup> “Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development prospects almost entirely depend on continued Chinese demand.”<sup>26</sup> China matches the demands for raw resources such as petroleum, natural gas, precious metals, rare timber, mineral-rich reserves, suitable farmland with the “...willingness to sell very inexpensive

consumer goods”, provide “concessionary loans” to countries, and make considerable infrastructure contributions to the sub-Saharan countries.<sup>27</sup> This makes the Chinese-African relationship mutually beneficial.<sup>28</sup>

From 2000 to 2011, Chinese trade with the sub-continental region of Africa increased from \$10 billion to \$120 billion.<sup>29</sup> This closely compares to total US trade with the entire African continent at \$126 billion.<sup>30</sup> Figure 5 presents Chinese imports from and exports to Africa from 2002 to 2015, and highlights the increase in Chinese-African within the last decade; markedly surpassing U.S.-African trade in 2012.<sup>31</sup>

Current economic investments include China’s promise of more than \$120 billion since May 2017 to Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, including a \$40-billion New Silk Road fund and a \$50-billion Beijing-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.<sup>32</sup> Despite a slowdown from President Xi Jiangping’s stated goal of 10% annual export growth, China’s economic investments in Africa will likely continue in the long term as China’s mainland economies require Africa’s raw resources to maintain production.




Figure 5. Africa and Chinese Trade

While China’s economic activities in Africa have been characterized by the West as colonial in the extraction of raw materials, a substantial amount of China’s activities relate to

infrastructure development. An estimated three quarters of total Chinese investment in Africa applies to infrastructural development activities.<sup>33</sup> It should be noted that a number of the infrastructure development projects undertaken by the Chinese do have direct ties with the business investments. The roads and railway projects typically link key nodes in the movement of goods from the point of extraction/processing to the point of embark to export to mainland China. Developmental projects announced in 2013 included the opening of a new \$US27 million project financed by China to construct a 100 kilometer highway between Ethiopia and Sudan.<sup>34</sup> The highway connects the Ethiopian town of Asossa with the Sudanese town of Kumruk.<sup>35</sup> While the benefits to the two African nations include increased opportunities for interstate trade, the Chinese also benefit significantly as China has invested billions in the oil industry in South Sudan and the Sudan and a highway provides a means to move product.

China's economic activities are directly supported by the government controlled banks responsible for export credit. The Chinese central government charters four banking policy institutions – Sinosure, China Eximbank, China Development Bank, and Agricultural Development Bank of China.<sup>36</sup> These banks serve the state strategy and play more important policy roles in supporting China's foreign trade development with the strategy of 'go-abroad', safeguarding the security of national economy, and promoting economic growth, employment, and equilibrium in the international balance of payment.<sup>37</sup> The latter refers to China not maintaining a prolonged deficit or surplus on the balance of payment on current account. Specific data regarding the banks' lending and credit amounts are not made public which presents difficulty in determining the full extent of Chinese foreign investment and to determine what potential challenges may arise as a result of Chinese banking policies. A 2013 study of China's export credit activities, reported no evidence of debt sustainability considerations of

financial assistance recipients or environmental considerations by the Chinese banking institutions.<sup>38</sup> While this does not conform to U.S. standards for loan consideration, the lack of evidence of China assessing loans by these criteria fall in line with its foreign policy of non-interference.

While Chinese activities receive critical reviews from the West, in research conducted using multiple indices found that a correlation to U.S. aid and violence levels in five African states proved true.<sup>39</sup> China's policy of providing aid through economic ventures, providing training in technical skill sets, and reducing dependency on China theoretically could provide long-term sustainable solutions to developing countries, but correlations between Chinese aid and long-term economic improvement and sustainability prove difficult to determine. cursory looks comparing data compiled through the AidData research program conducted by William and Mary provides a sampling of data to gain an idea of China's financial investments in the region and the type of projects China supported. In the last ten years, this compilation of open source data indicates China provided or promised over \$US105.4 billion in grants and loans, \$US 2.2 billion in foreign direct investment, and \$US 2.8 in export credits to Africa.<sup>40</sup> This money supported projects for transportation and storage, agriculture/forestry/fishing, education, banking/financial support, communications, emergency response, energy generation and supply, general environmental protection, health, industry/mining/construction, social infrastructure and services, support to Non-governmental Organizations/governmental organizations, trade and tourism, water supply and sanitation, and developmental food aid/security assistance.<sup>41</sup>

Continued Chinese investment in Africa proves to be a mutually beneficial arrangement which does not demonstrate signs of changing in the next fifteen to twenty years. Chinese big industry and private businesses look to Africa as a new market, and African states see Chinese

investments as a means of improving infrastructural, governmental, and economic areas. As Western and European nations continue to require African states to meet certain political and social conditions in order to receive aid, African states facing severe economic depression will likely look to China or other aid sources which do not have the same constraints. As such, the ability to dissuade Chinese economic influence rests in exploiting potential seams. Anti-Chinese sentiment exists across sub-Saharan Africa by business owners and local populace due to the perceived unequal trade imbalance, the Chinese control of African industries, and the growing sentiment of China exploiting the region's resources.<sup>42</sup> U.S. and allies may need to look at other means of influencing political and social change than limiting aid. China's infrastructure and developmental approach appears successful in garnering African government's favor.

### **China's Diplomatic Influence**

The objectives of China's foreign relations policy are two-fold: increase influence to support the economy in mainland China, and promote the "One China" policy, also known as the "1992 consensus." Since the Chinese civil war in 1949, when the CCP established the People's Republic of China and the Nationalists opposed to the CCP established themselves on Taiwan, the People's Republic of China has continued to assert its sovereignty over Taiwan.<sup>43</sup> Looking at how China has changed African relations and support for Taiwan provides a perspective on how China can use economic investment to influence diplomatic ties. Since the Chinese civil war in 1949, mainland China continues to pursue support for the One China policy which entails ensuring that other states do not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation. Prior to 2007, as many as 30 African nations had ties with Taiwan.<sup>44</sup> By 2007, only five African nations attended the first annual Taiwan-Africa Head of State Summit and supported Taiwan's bid to the United

Nations: Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Malawi and The Gambia.<sup>45</sup> The number decreased further in November 2013, when The Gambia cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan.<sup>46</sup> Then in March 2017, The Gambia reestablished formal diplomatic ties with China; The Gambia previously held ties with China from 1971 to 1995.<sup>47 48</sup>

Different theories exist regarding this reestablished political relationship: 1) The Gambia seeks additional sources of aid due to the loss of aid as a result of human rights violations by the government as perceived by the West and Europe, and 2) China seeks access to a naval port which provides access to the Atlantic and inland Africa.<sup>49 50</sup> Both hypotheses hold merit particularly since The Gambia does not possess extensive natural resources from which China's economy would benefit.<sup>51</sup> A deep seaport on the western coast of Africa; however, provides valuable access to spreading influence from a maritime aspect into the Atlantic, which China currently does not possess.

The remaining African countries supporting Taiwan by the end of 2013 included Swaziland, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, and Burkina Faso.<sup>52</sup> The most recent change to African support to Taiwan occurred in December 2016, when Sao Tomé and China declared re-established diplomatic and economic relations after almost 20 years of the former siding with Taiwan since 1997.<sup>53</sup> In exchange for the re-established relations, China indicated hopes for Chinese investments in Sao Tomé's media and tourism areas. Within the last decade, China's influence in Africa decreased African support of Taiwan from five to two countries (Figure 6). As of April 2017, only Burkina Faso and Swaziland continue to support Taiwan.<sup>54</sup>




Figure 6. African Nations in Support of Taiwan 2007 - 2017

Alliances can change over time, so the importance of monitoring diplomatic relationships will aid in determining diplomatic access in an A2/AD environment. As a case in point, Sao Tomé has switched alliances between Taiwan and China three times since 1960, and in the next 15 to 20 years its cooperative relationship with Taiwan may be renewed. The strength of the diplomatic relationships may very likely possess ties to a country’s economy, especially for African states, so diplomatic relationships will develop or break based on the most generous and amenable provider. In the case of The Gambia, the consequence of enforcing a condition on the African state’s government to address rights infractions resulted in China’s increased influence politically as the sole major power willing to aid a country in which the rest of the international community either significantly reduced or stopped aid.

Additionally, China has made a marked transition in its foreign policy dealings within the region. In November 2014, Chinese President Xi stated China would take a less aggressive approach to security, and would take a more diplomatic and cooperative approach.<sup>55</sup> This statement was an attempt to ease fears that China’s economic growth would result in a more muscular military and diplomatic approach in foreign policy. In fact, however, the new policy

precipitated the land reclamation activities in the South China Sea in which China's activities caused concern among other Southeast Asian countries regarding sovereignty violations.<sup>56</sup> President Xi indicated at the time that despite the drive for better efforts to “increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's message to the world,” that China would also resolutely protect territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interest and national unity.<sup>57</sup> At the time, the Chinese president's comments easily related to the South China Sea; however, the same could be related to China's activities and interests in Africa. With China's significant investments in Africa, China may be inclined to take similar foreign policy tactics to apply diplomatic and military approaches to protect Chinese interests in Africa – the raw resources which support the mainland economy.

Previous foreign policy was marked with a “non-interference” theme, but the deployment of a Chinese battalion of 700 military troops to South Sudan in December 2014 as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force marked a significant change.<sup>58</sup> This served as the first time China provided combat forces to a U.N. mission. The protection of Chinese investments, specifically in this case billions of dollars in the oil industry in South Sudan, prompted Chinese military involvement.<sup>59</sup> Likewise, the terrorist attack by a Uighers group on a Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan in August 2016 prompted a first for Chinese response.<sup>60</sup> Following the attack, Ms. Hua Chunying, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, stated, “We will firmly strike against them [Uighers] and safeguard the safety of the Chinese people in foreign countries.” The protection of Chinese nationals in foreign countries also applies to African states. It can be reasonably assumed that as China's investments in Africa increase, China's military may be more involved in security activities aboard the continent. The likelihood of China's involvement in future U.N. peacekeeping missions increased significantly in September 2015 as President Xi

Jinping announced the contribution of “8,000 troops for a United Nations peacekeeping standby force.”<sup>61</sup> China’s decision to provide combat troops in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions does provide three advantages for China: 1) reduces the spread of conflict and helps to protect Chinese interests, people, and businesses, 2) allows troops to gain experience, and 3) strengthens China’s status and reputation as a cooperative participant in global affairs.<sup>62</sup>

With the current stated Chinese political intentions to protect interests, and the trending instability in a number of African states, China may reassess its stance on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles: 1) states hold the primary responsibility of protection, 2) the international community should assist states in meeting their protection responsibilities, and 3) allows for the use of force by the international community via the U.N. Security Council if peaceful means fail.<sup>63</sup> Per an article supporting the April 2017 USIP conference, China historically opposed R2P from 2000 to 2005, tolerated R2P from 2005 to 2008, and adapted R2P to suit its foreign policy from 2009 to present.<sup>64</sup> While China’s reluctance to invoke the third R2P pillar stems from their non-interference foreign policy, a shift occurred over the past 17 years which may indicate China’s bending towards recognizing the international rules-based system in its pursuit to increase its reputation as a responsible global player.

With China’s continued economic investments in Africa, modernization and growth of its military over the past two decades, and continued growth as a global political power, China will likely reinforce diplomatic influence with the other elements of national power. China’s “Say/Do” gap in foreign policy continues to detract from China’s desired global reputation. A policy of non-interference stands to be questioned when China sells weapons to countries in which China heavily invests. Additionally, China’s reluctance to invoke the third pillar of R2P principles attracts negative international attention, and criticism of China’s defense spending.

Furthermore, under the historical trend that African alliances with China change with time, and are heavily influenced by who provides the most, China's African alliances can be exploited. Forecasts indicate China's GDP annual growth rate will steadily decrease to below 6% by 2020.<sup>65</sup> As GDP growth rates slow, China's investments in Africa will likely decrease, or the situation develops that non-Chinese businesses or governments will be able to undercut Chinese offers thereby opening the potential for United States and its allies and partners to work with African states.

### **Chinese Military Influence**

In stark contrast to the physical presence of Chinese combat troops, Chinese arms sales in the African continent increased in the last decade. According to a report by Andrew Hull and David Markov, researchers for the Institute for Defensive Analyses, the three factors on which China bases its weapons sales to Africa consist of non-interference, price structure, and financing options.<sup>66</sup> China's non-interference policy allows for the selling of weapons to a state regardless of the current security or intended use of the weapons. Peter Brooks, a Senior Fellow of National Security Affairs for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, observed "African dictatorships are regular buyers of Chinese weapons and military equipment, which they often use to oppress minority populations, quash political opposition, harass neighboring countries, and extinguish any glimmers of democratization."<sup>67</sup> In 2004, despite the U.S. and European Union arms embargo against Zimbabwe, China sold Zimbabwe fighter aircraft and military vehicles for \$US200 million.<sup>68</sup> In addition to adhering to a non-interference policy, Chinese weapons sales appeal more to African states than Western and European because China

undercuts other sellers' pricing on weapons sales, offers financing options such as soft loans, and accepts "bartering" options such as access to raw materials in exchange for weapons.<sup>69</sup>

China places importance on Africa as a market for weapons, since it uses weapons sales as a point of leverage to access minerals and resources. Since 2010, China's presence at arms shows possessing large African in world arms shows. At the 2010 Africa Aerospace and Defence (ADD) show – ADD bills itself as the largest exhibition in Africa - China had the largest contingent of foreign exhibitors. Likewise, in 2011 at the 10<sup>th</sup> International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) – considered "one of the preeminent shows for marketing to African countries" - held in the United Arab Emirates, China again possessed a large presence.<sup>70</sup> The equipment featured at these arms exhibitions included surface-to-air missile systems (HQ-9), tactical air defense weapons (QW-2 and QW-18), anti-ship cruise missiles (C-704, C-705, and C-802 AKG), tactical fighter aircraft (FC-1 and JF-17), anti-tank guided missiles (Red Arrow-8), and command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment.<sup>71</sup> In combination, all or even select purchases in any of the categories would present a more challenging operating environment for a foreign military.

Military exports to the continent are likely the easiest way to measure the advancement or development of a military policy denying competitors any significant access to or engagement with countries on the African continent. China retains a less-than-accurate reputation of providing weapons sales data to the United Nations Arms Registry of Weapon Transfers; however, the data that is reported from 1992-2011 reflects weapons transfers to twelve African states consisting of armored personnel carriers, warplanes, helicopters, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces.<sup>72</sup> The military equipment at arms exhibitions and in the UN Arms Registry of Weapon Transfers present a picture of robust military sales, at least to specific countries.

Nevertheless, the proliferation of actual A2/AD weapons remains to be seen across the continent. According to data on military equipment transfers from 2005-2016 provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it is true that China conducted numerous weapons transfers with 27 of 55 African states; however, the sales do not consist of extensive A2/AD weapons systems such as anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, ballistic missiles, fighter/armed aircraft, and surface-to-surface missile systems.<sup>73</sup> Analysis of Chinese weapon sales of this type shows they have been minimal in numbers, with proliferation limited to Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Sudan.<sup>74</sup> (See Appendix A.)

While the A2/AD weapons systems are not currently prevalent in Africa, this does not mean they could not arrive in the next 10 to 20 years, building on a pattern of influence. As of a news report in March 2016, two-thirds of African countries use Chinese weapons.<sup>75</sup> African states facing challenges to sovereignty may seek Chinese arms deals in exchange for access to raw resources. The continued introduction of Chinese weapons systems in Africa will lead to deadlier encounters.

### **Chinese Information Influence**

China's use of information influence extends beyond the traditional sense of the term – strategic communication and putting forth one's intent. The advances in technology allow the information environment to serve as a way to promote national security objectives.<sup>76</sup> The use of the Internet, radio waves, satellite communications, and wireless networks comprises an information environment, but Africa's information environment still requires significant efforts in development in order to be used effectively by African governments as an element of national power. China has begun investing in the development of the African information environment,

which has the subsequent advantage in promoting the Chinese system of economic development as an alternative to the more liberal West. As a result, China's initiative of developing Africa's communications architecture proves an effective use of "soft power." To protect the billions of dollars of economic investments, China requires a level of stability in African governments that is possible through African communications development ventures.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China has played a decisive role in building the telecommunications infrastructure that brought internet access and its attendant challenges to large parts of Africa.<sup>77</sup> In December 2004, China provided Nigeria with an "orbiting two-way satellite capable of improving existing methods of accessing Internet broadband and all manner of mobile telephone technology."<sup>78 79</sup> In 2015, China also launched a communications satellite for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CongoSat-01, which reportedly also covers the whole of Southern and Central Africa.<sup>80</sup> While the introduction and propagation of internet access in Africa presents advantages in sharing knowledge and ideas across the continent and globally, for African governing institutions, the Internet presents challenges to sovereignty.

The primary challenge the internet poses for African governments is the increased tensions the open communication creates between the government and its people. In attempts to prevent or counter government opposition and protests, the governments of a number of African states, particularly during elections, rely on internet and mobile network blackouts or service interruptions.<sup>81</sup> To date, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, and Cameroon reportedly used internet and/or mobile service shutdowns. All but Zimbabwe and Ethiopia used these practices during election periods.<sup>82</sup> While internet and mobile service shutdowns provide immediate censorship, these actions put a significant strain on already

constrained African economies which rely on internet and mobile service. To mitigate the significant impacts shutdowns have on economies, China provides an alternative solution of internet filtering in the form of a deep packet inspection technology which China uses for its own monitoring and filtering of internet traffic.<sup>83</sup> While China's government-controlled and regulated cyber policy runs counter to the United States' policy of openness in the cyber domain, African states look at China's policy as a viable model for their own survival as governing institutions.

In a future world for Africa, the acceptance of the Chinese cyber model will impede United States access and influence via the cyber domain. From an Africa government's perspective, the United States' policy of openness leads to organized unrest from the populace. The United States needs to prepare itself to either operate in an environment where the free flow of ideas is tightly regulated or non-existent, or offer a competitive option for a communications architecture. Information operations will need to address challenges of getting the United States' message to the intended audiences in a constrained environment. Additionally, a potential seam to exploit exists between the African governing institutions and the populace. A populace desiring openness in the information and cyber environments can be rallied to invoke change in a perceived repressive government. Lastly, United States active participation in developing the international laws for the cyber domain will help influence access in the African future environment.

### **The Changing System and Prospective World**

Revisiting the driver analysis presented at the beginning of this paper, the different worlds indicate the conditions within Africa in terms of toleration of the very real irritants in Chinese economic and foreign policies. The current state of Africa shares characteristics with the

fourth world – economic depression and anarchy, but on the shallow end of the anarchy scale. A level of order exists to the extent that African states are not at war with each other, nor does China’s influence cause violent conflict among states. China’s activities, however, are increasing tensions between African states, between African states and international organizations, between external actors, and between China and African states.

Africa is a system in flux, however, and will change over time. Chinese influence may cause change to happen sooner that changes the trajectory of current trends to other worlds. The human element, combined with the enduring memory of Africa’s colonial history, will create reactions to changes in Chinese influence.

A number of triggers will change the current trend of African-Chinese relations. Increased Chinese military presence on the continent for security and policing activities to ensure stability would undermine China’s noninterference foreign policy. The noninterference policy served as the attraction for African governments of Chinese influence across all elements of national power. Africans would view the larger Chinese military presence as a return to colonialism and a threat to sovereignty. It may fuel African efforts to expel Chinese from the continent. This would move the world towards disintegration of order and economic depression as African economies would suffer from the lack of infusion of Chinese investment.

Similarly, increased transparency in China’s economic business practices and political dealings may provoke a backlash from sub-state groups who perceive their nations sovereignty has been compromised into serving China’s interests. Sub-state groups challenging state authority would indicate movement towards global disintegration/anarchy and economic depression until another external actor fills the economic investor gap left by China.

While development projects improve African local infrastructure, the economic concessions African states make in terms of access to raw resources to “fund” the developmental projects undermine local businesses and introduces more “foreigners,” who do not fall under local law, into the region. This could cause African indigenous movements seeking to eject Chinese and other multinational corporations from controlling African resources.

An alternative to this is Africa playing off of China’s need for resources for infrastructure development. Once the roads are built, the harbors are deepened, the train tracks are laid, China has a sunk cost and the advantage tilts toward the Africans in any such strife. They have no further need of China, except for money; and they can seek other external actors, such as the United States, at that point against the Chinese.

### **Conclusion**

In predicting Africa’s future environment, one thing is certain – it will not be the one we see today. Challenges to access apply to all elements of national power, not just the military – though focusing on weapons proliferation and capabilities is the tendency of military planners. In regard to Africa, the economic and diplomatic access have a higher likelihood of presenting challenges for the United States and its allies and partners in the next ten years. Assuming current trends continue, the picture of the African future operating environment by 2025 and beyond looks to be one with significant Chinese influence. China would possess 100% support in Africa for its “One China” policy. With continued significant economic investments, infrastructure development projects, and aid, China’s flooding of African markets with Chinese goods to include weapons could contribute to a military A2/AD. Points of friction that could alter a heavy Chinese influence is China’s methods of ensuring stability. The use of “hard power”, i.e.

heavy military and diplomacy, could create anti-colonialism sentiment among Africans regarding Chinese activities and presence. Continued use of “soft power” which takes time and money could offset China’s international balance of payment and lead to financial and economic failure for China.

Understanding China’s activities and influence in Africa provides the United States with a means of identifying pressure points which affect China’s sources of income and resources from outside its historical sphere of influence in mainland China and the South China Sea. Additionally, actions in Africa may prove less prone to escalation to combat operations than would actions in the South China Sea to curtail Chinese influence.

## APPENDIX A

### Transfers of Chinese Major Conventional Weapons to African States

#### Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2005 to 2016

**Note:** The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <[http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at\\_data.html](http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html)>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

**Source:** SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

**Information generated:** 26 April 2017

Recipient/ supplier (S) or licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
<b>Algeria</b>							
S: China	1	Daxin	Training ship	(2004)	2006	1	Algerian designation <u>Soummam</u>
(18)WA-021/Type-88	155mm	Towed gun	(2007)	2010	(18)		
3	C-28A	Frigate	(2012)	2015-2016		3	C-28A version
(50)	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	(2012)	2015-2016		(50)	For C-28A frigates
(50)	FM-90	SAM	(2012)	2015-2016		(50)	For C-28A frigates
(50)	PLZ-45 155mm	Self-propelled gun	(2013)	2014	(50)		
<b>Angola</b>							
S: China	(45)	BF6	Diesel engine	2013	2015	(45)	For 45 <u>Casspir</u> APC from South Africa; designation uncertain (reported as 'Chinese' engine)
<b>Burundi</b>							
S: China	(15)	WZ-551	APC	(2012)	2012	15	
<b>Cameroon</b>							
S: China	2	MA60	Transport aircraft	2011	2013	(2)	
(50)	FN-6	Portable SAM	2012	2013	(50)	FN-16 version	
(12)	GDF 35mm	AA gun	2012	2013	(12)	Type-90 (PG-99) version	
(5)	Type-07	APC	(2012)	2013	(5)		
(6)	Type-07P/VN-1	IFV	(2012)	2013	(6)		
(15)	Type-825	Fire control radar	2012	2013	(15)	For use with GDF anti-aircraft guns	
(12)WMA-301	Assaulter	AFSV	(2012)	2014	(12)		
2	P-108	Patrol craft	2013	2014	2		
(50)	Red Arrow-8	Anti-tank missile	(2013)	2014	(50)	For Z-9 combat helicopters	
4	Z-9WZ	Combat helicopter	(2013)	2014	4	Z-9WE version	
<b>Chad</b>							
S: China	(6)	Type-81 122mm	Self-propelled MRL	(2006)	2007	(6)	
10	ZFB-05	APC	(2006)	2007	10		
(12)WMA-301	Assaulter	AFSV	(2007)	2010	(12)		
(10)	WZ-523	APC	(2007)	2008	(10)		
(30)WMA-301	Assaulter	AFSV	(2012)	2013	30	Designation uncertain (reported as 'battle tank')	
<b>Congo</b>							
S: China	(5)	ZFB-05	APC	(2005)	2006-2007	(5)	
9	ZFB-05	APC	2009	2009	9	Designation uncertain	
<b>Djibouti</b>							
S: China	1	MA60	Transport aircraft	2013	2014	1	Incl for support of Djibouti peacekeeping troops in Somalia and VIP transport
(1)	WMA-301	Assaulter	AFSV	(2014)	2015	(1)	
2	Y-12	Light transport ac	2015	2016	2	Y-12E version	
<b>Egypt</b>							
L: China	80	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	1999	2001-2005	(80)	\$345 m deal; K-8E version; 70 assembled from kits in Egypt
18	ASN-209	UAV	(2010)	2012-2014		(18)	

S: China	40	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	2004	2007-2010	(40)	K-8E version; assembled from kits in Egypt
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>							
S: China	1	Salamandra -	Landing ship	(2008)	2009	1	Equatorial Guinean designation Qs; probably sold via Ukraine and possibly designed in Ukraine and produced in China; armament and radars fitted in Ukraine
<b>Ethiopia</b>							
S: China	(10)	Type-89/ZSD-89	APC	(2011)	2013	(10)	
(20)	WZ-551	APC	(2011)	2012-2014	(20)		
(1)	HQ-64	SAM system	(2012)	2013	(1)		
(75)	PL-11/FD-60	BVRAAM	(2012)	2013	(75)For HQ-64 SAM system		
<b>Gabon</b>							
S: China	(3)	WZ-523	APC	(2005)	2006	(3)	
(3)	ZFB-05	APC	(2005)	2006	(3)		
<b>Ghana</b>							
S: China	4	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	2006	2007	(4)	Partly paid with 1 second-hand Gulfstream-3 transport aircraft
4	Type-062-1G/Lushun	Patrol craft	2009	2011	4Designation uncertain		
(58)	WZ-523	APC	(2009)	2009-2010	58		Possibly incl other armoured vehicles
(4)	WZ-523	APC	(2012)	2013	(4)Ambulance version		
(24)	WZ-523/Type-05	IFV	(2012)	2013	(24)		
4	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	2014	2015	4	Z-9 version	
<b>Kenya</b>							
S: China	32	WZ-551	APC	(2006)	2007	32	
(4)AS365/AS565 Panther		Helicopter	2009	2010	(4)Z-9WA armed version		
5	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	2012	2014-2015	5	Z-9WA armed version	
30	VN-4	APV/APC	2015	2016	30	For police	
25	CS/VP3	APC	(2016)	2016	25For police; delivery 2017		
<b>Mauritania</b>							
S: China	2	Huangpu	Patrol craft	(2014)	2016	2	
<b>Morocco</b>							
S: China	(12)	AR-2/PHL-03 300mm	Self-propelled MRL	(2009)	2010	12	
(54)Type-90-2/MBT-2000		Tank	(2009)	2010	54		
(75)	PL-9	SRAAM	(2010)	2011-2012	(75)	For Sky Shield air defence systems	
(50)	Red Arrow-8	Anti-tank missile	2010	2010	(50)		
(6)	Sky Shield	AD system	(2010)	2011-2012	(6)		
<b>Namibia</b>							
S: China	(12)	F-7MG	Fighter aircraft	(2005)	2006-2008	(12)	F-7NM version; incl FT-7NM version
(21)	WZ-523	APC	(2008)	2009	21For Namibian UN peacekeeping units		
2	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	2009	2012	2 H-425 (Z-9) version		
1	Elephant	OPV	2010	2012	1		
(10)	WZ-523/Type-05	IFV	(2012)	2013	(10)		
<b>Niger</b>							
S: China	(5)	ZFB-05	APC	(2007)	2009	(5)	
(2)	WZ-523	APC	(2008)	2009	(2)		
<b>Nigeria</b>							
S: China	15	F-7M Airguard	Fighter aircraft	2005	2010	(15)	\$251 m deal; F-7NI version; incl 3 FT-7NI version
(20)	PL-9	SRAAM	2005	2010	(20)\$20 m deal (part of \$32 m deal incl other armament); PL-9C version; for F-7NI combat aircraft		
2	P18N	OPV	2012	2014-2016	2	NGN6.8 m (\$42 m deal)	
(120)	CS/VP3	APC	(2013)	2014-2015	(120)		
(30)	AR-1	ASM	(2014)	2014	(30)		
(5)	CH-3	UAV/UCAV	(2014)	2014	(5)Armed (UCAV) version		
1	Type-62	Patrol craft	2014	2015	1	Aid	
<b>Rwanda</b>							
S: China	6	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	(2006)	2007	6	Designation uncertain (reported as artillery)
20	ZFB-05	APC	(2008)	2008	20Designation uncertain		
<b>Senegal</b>							
S: China	(12)	WMA-301 Assaulter	AFSV	2015	2016	12	
(1)	WZ-551	APC	(2015)	2016	(1)Command post version		

<b>Sierra Leone</b>							
S: China	1	Type-062/Shanghai	Patrol craft	(2005)	2006	1	Possibly Second-hand; aid; Shanghai-3 version
6	Type-83 122mm	Towed gun	2010	2011	6	Possibly second-hand; aid; Type-96 version	
<b>South Sudan</b>							
S: China	1200	Red Arrow-73	Anti-tank missile	(2013)	2014	1200	Red Arrow-73D version; deal incl also 100 launchers
<b>Sudan</b>							
L: China	(460)	Type-63 107mm	Towed MRL	(2000)	2001-2014	(460)	Incl production in Sudan as TAKA-1
S: China	(25)	Type-85-IIM	Tank	(2001)	2002-2006	(25)	Possibly assembled in Sudan; Sudanese designation Al-Bashier
(50)	WZ-551/Type-92	IFV	(2003)	2006-2015	(50)	Assembled of produced in Sudan as Shateef-2	
(9)	BT-6/PT-6	Trainer aircraft	(2004)	2005	(9)	BT-6A version	
(12)	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	(2004)	2005-2008	(12)	Incl for combat role	
(50)	FN-6	Portable SAM	(2005)	2006	(50)		
(50)	Type-59D	Tank	(2008)	2010-2015	(50)	Sudanese Type-59 rebuilt to Type-59D; assembled in Sudan	
(450)	Red Arrow-8	Anti-tank missile	(2009)	2009-2012	(450)		
6	WS-1 302mm	Self-propelled MRL	(2009)	2014	(6)		
(2)	FB-6	Mobile SAM system	(2015)	2016	(2)		
(100)	FN-6	Portable SAM	(2015)	2016	(100)		
6	FTC-2000	Trainer/combat ac	(2015)				
<b>Tanzania</b>							
S: China	(4)	ZFB-05	APC	(2005)	2006-2007	(4)	
(30)	Type-59G	Tank	(2007)	2011-2013	(30)	Tanzanian Type-59 rebuilt to Type-59G	
(14)	F-7MG	Fighter aircraft	(2008)	2009-2012	(14)	F-7TN version; incl 2 FI-7TN version	
(6)	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	(2010)	2011-2012	(6)		
(10)	WZ-551	APC	(2010)	2011-2012	(10)		
(12)	A-100 300mm	Self-propelled MRL	(2012)	2013	(12)		
(1)	FB-6	Mobile SAM system	(2012)	2013	(1)		
(50)	FN-6	Portable SAM	(2012)	2013	(50)	For FB-6 SAM system	
(1)	YLC-18	Air search radar	(2012)	2013	(1)	Designation uncertain	
(10)	PLL-05 120mm	Self-propelled mortar	(2013)	2014	(10)		
(10)	Type-63A	Light tank	(2013)	2014	(10)		
(5)	Type-84	ABL	(2013)	2014	(5)	Type-84A version	
2	Type-037-1/Haiqing	Patrol craft	2014	2015	2	Probably second-hand	
<b>Uganda</b>							
S: China	2	Y-12	Light transport ac	(2007)	2008	2	Y-12-IV version
<b>Zambia</b>							
S: China	(2)	MA60	Transport aircraft	(2005)	2006	(2)	
5	Y-12	Light transport ac	2006	2006-2007	5	Y-12-IV version	
(5)	WZ-551	APC	(2007)	2008	(5)	WZ-551B version	
8	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	(2010)	2012	8		
7	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	(2011)	2012	(7)	\$105 m deal	
6	L-15	Trainer/combat ac	(2014)	2016	3L-15AFT version; delivery 2016-2017		
(50)	LS-6-500	Guided bomb	(2014)	2016	(25)	For L-15 combat/trainer aircraft	
		PL-5E	SRAAM	(2014)	2016	(20)	
(50)	YJ-9E	ASM	(2014)	2016	(25)	For L-15 combat/trainer aircraft	
<b>Zimbabwe</b>							
S: China	6	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	2005	2005	6	Bought after UK refused to sell spare parts for Hawk trainer/combat aircraft in service in Zimbabwe
6	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	2006	2006	6		

## Endnotes

- 
- <sup>1</sup> Shinji Yamaguchi, “Creating Facts on the Sea: China’s Plan to Establish Sansha City,” AMTI.csis.org, April 17, 2017, <https://amti.csis.org/chinas-plan-establish-sansha-city/>.
- <sup>2</sup> Derek Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,” *nytimes.com*, October 27, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html>.
- <sup>3</sup> J.J. Messner, ed., “Fragile State Index 2016,” (Washington, D.C.: Fund For Peace, 2016) 7, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>.
- <sup>4</sup> Tunde Zack-Williams, Diane Frost, and Alex Thomson, ed., *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 15.
- <sup>5</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 17.
- <sup>6</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 16-18.
- <sup>7</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Africa,”: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa>.
- <sup>8</sup> AFP - <https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinas-imports-africa-plummet-2015-officials-062813826--finance.html>
- <sup>9</sup> Meine Pieter van Dijk, ed., *The New Presence of China in Africa* (Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 13.
- <sup>10</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 153.
- <sup>11</sup> Meine Pieter van Dijk, ed., *The New Presence of China in Africa* (Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 13.
- <sup>12</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 153.
- <sup>13</sup> Yoon Park, “Living Between: The Chinese in South Africa,” *Migration Policy Institute* (January 4, 2012): <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/living-between-chinese-south-africa>.
- <sup>14</sup> “Fragile States Index,” *Fund For Peace*, accessed May 8, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html>.
- <sup>15</sup> The Editors, “South Sudan’s Famine Is China’s Chance to Lead,” *Bloomberg.com*, February 27, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-27/south-sudan-s-famine-is-china-s-chance-to-lead>.
- <sup>16</sup> The Editors, “South Sudan’s Famine Is China’s Chance to Lead,” *Bloomberg.com*, February 27, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-27/south-sudan-s-famine-is-china-s-chance-to-lead>.
- <sup>17</sup> Simon Clark, Michael Smith, and Franz Wild, “China Lets Child Workers Die Digging in Congo Mines for Copper,” *Bloomberg.com*, July 23, 2008, <http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8724>.
- <sup>18</sup> Tom Wilson, Kinshasa, Chinese partners near deal for \$660 million power plant: DR Congo rising?,” *Mail & Guardian Africa*, October 15, 2015, <http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-10-15-dr-congo-chinese-partners-near-deal-for-660-million-power-plant>.
- <sup>19</sup> Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, updated April 17, 2017: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557>.
- <sup>20</sup> Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, updated April 17, 2017: <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557>.

- 
- <sup>21</sup> Rights & Accountability in Development, “Survey Confirms Widespread Abuses By Chinese Mining Companies in Congo – Risk of Backlash Warns, NGO,” press release, September 29, 2009, <http://www.raid-uk.org/sites/default/files/pr-drc-china-report.pdf>.
- <sup>22</sup> Jiang Shixue, “China’s principles in foreign aid,” *China.org.cn*, November 29, 2011, [http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-11/29/content\\_24030234.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-11/29/content_24030234.htm).
- <sup>23</sup> Mercator Institute for China Studies, “One Belt, One Road: With the Silk Road Initiative, China Aims to Build a Global Network Infrastructure,” [http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/pic/China-Mapping/ChinaMapping\\_Silk\\_Road\\_SiKo\\_Final\\_122015.pdf](http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pic/China-Mapping/ChinaMapping_Silk_Road_SiKo_Final_122015.pdf)
- <sup>24</sup> Claire Provost, and Rich Harris, “China in Africa: soft power, hard cash,” *Theguardian.com*, April 29, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/2013/apr/29/china-commits-billions-aid-africa-interactive>.
- <sup>25</sup> Meine Pieter van Dijk, ed., *The New Presence of China in Africa* (Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 9.
- <sup>26</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 151.
- <sup>27</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 152.
- <sup>28</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 151.
- <sup>29</sup> Yoon Park, “Living Between: The Chinese in South Africa,” *Migration Policy Institute* (January 4, 2012): <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/living-between-chinese-south-africa>.
- <sup>30</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 156.
- <sup>31</sup> *United Nations Comtrade Database*, accessed May 2, 2017, <https://comtrade.un.org/data/>.
- <sup>32</sup> Huang Hongxiang, Zander Rounds, Xianshuang Zhang, “China’s Africa Dream Isn’t Dead,” *Foreign Policy*, February 18, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/18/africa-kenya-tanzania-china-business-economy-gdp-slowing-investment-chinese/>.
- <sup>33</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 155.
- <sup>34</sup> Aid Data, Tracking Chinese Development Finance – BETA, <http://china.aiddata.org/downloads>.
- <sup>35</sup> Aid Data, Tracking Chinese Development Finance – BETA, <http://china.aiddata.org/downloads>.
- <sup>36</sup> Lennart Skarp, “*Chinese Export Credit Policies and Programmes*,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 16, 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG%282015%293&doclanguage=en>.
- <sup>37</sup> Lennart Skarp, “*Chinese Export Credit Policies and Programmes*,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 16, 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG%282015%293&doclanguage=en>.
- <sup>38</sup> Lennart Skarp, “*Chinese Export Credit Policies and Programmes*,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 16, 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG%282015%293&doclanguage=en>.
- <sup>39</sup> William Oren, “A New Approach in Africa: Analyzing the Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Aid and Military Assistance on the African Continent and a New Concept For Infrastructure,” (unpublished manuscript, May 7, 2017, Microsoft Word file).
- <sup>40</sup> Aid Data, Tracking Chinese Development Finance – BETA, <http://china.aiddata.org/downloads>.

- 
- <sup>41</sup> Aid Data, Tracking Chinese Development Finance – BETA, <http://china.aiddata.org/downloads>.
- <sup>42</sup> Justin McDonnell, “The New Scramble,” *The European Magazine*, September 12, 2013, <http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/justin-mcdonnell/7726-chinese-influence-in-africa>.
- <sup>43</sup> Albert Feuerwerker, et al., *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, s.v. “China and war between the Nationalists and Communists,” April 28, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/War-between-Nationalists-and-communists>.
- <sup>44</sup> Sella Oneko, Philipp Sandner, “Africa: diplomatic battleground for China and Taiwan,” DW.com, April 15, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/africa-diplomatic-battleground-for-china-and-taiwan/a-19192069>.
- <sup>45</sup> The China Post news staff, “Five African allies support Taiwan's United Nations bid,” *Chinapost.com*, September 10, 2007, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/News/2007/09/10/121869/Five-African.htm>.
- <sup>46</sup> BBC, “Gambia severs diplomatic ties with Taiwan,” *BBC.com*, November 15, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24951115>.
- <sup>47</sup> Yoon Park, “Living Between: The Chinese in South Africa,” *Migration Policy Institute* (January 4, 2012): <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/living-between-chinese-south-africa>.
- <sup>48</sup> Austin Ramzy, “China Resumes Diplomatic Relations With Gambia, Shutting Out Taiwan,” *nytimes.com*, March 18, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/asia/china-gambia-taiwan-diplomatic-relations.html>.
- <sup>49</sup> Ben Blanchard, and J.R. Wu, “With Gambia move, China ends diplomatic truce with Taiwan,” *Reuters.com*, March 17, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-gambia-idUSKCN0WJ1DT>.
- <sup>50</sup> Sam Phatey, “Gambia sends proposal to China to reestablish shipping lines,” *Gambia.smbcgo.com*, September 30, 2016, <https://gambia.smbcgo.com/2016/09/30/gambia-sends-proposal-china-reestablish-shipping-lines/>.
- <sup>51</sup> Sam Phatey, “Gambia sends proposal to China to reestablish shipping lines,” *Gambia.smbcgo.com*, September 30, 2016, <https://gambia.smbcgo.com/2016/09/30/gambia-sends-proposal-china-reestablish-shipping-lines/>.
- <sup>52</sup> BBC, “Gambia severs diplomatic ties with Taiwan,” *BBC.com*, November 15, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24951115>.
- <sup>53</sup> Yoon Park, “Living Between: The Chinese in South Africa,” *Migration Policy Institute* (January 4, 2012): <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/living-between-chinese-south-africa>.
- <sup>54</sup> Justin McDonnell, “The New Scramble,” *Theeuropean-magazine.com*, September 12, 2013, <http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/justin-mcdonnell/7726-chinese-influence-in-africa>.
- <sup>55</sup> Matthew Miller, “China's Xi strikes conciliatory note, broadens diplomatic focus,” *Reuters.com*, November 30, 2014: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea-idUSKCN0JE04J20141130>.
- <sup>56</sup> Matthew Miller, “China's Xi strikes conciliatory note, broadens diplomatic focus,” *Reuters.com*, November 30, 2014: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea-idUSKCN0JE04J20141130>.
- <sup>57</sup> Matthew Miller, “China's Xi strikes conciliatory note, broadens diplomatic focus,” *Reuters.com*, November 30, 2014: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea-idUSKCN0JE04J20141130>.
- <sup>58</sup> Bree Feng, “China to Send Its First Infantry Troops to U.N. Mission in South Sudan,” *Sinosphere Dispatches From China (Blog)*, December 23, 2014:

---

[https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/china-to-send-its-first-infantry-troops-to-u-n-mission-in-south-sudan/?\\_r=0](https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/china-to-send-its-first-infantry-troops-to-u-n-mission-in-south-sudan/?_r=0).

<sup>59</sup> Bree Feng, "China to Send Its First Infantry Troops to U.N. Mission in South Sudan," *Sinosphere Dispatches From China (Blog)*, December 23, 2014:

[https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/china-to-send-its-first-infantry-troops-to-u-n-mission-in-south-sudan/?\\_r=0](https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/china-to-send-its-first-infantry-troops-to-u-n-mission-in-south-sudan/?_r=0).

<sup>60</sup> Josh Rudolph, "Beijing Vows to Strike Back After Kyrgyzstan Attack," *Chinadigitaltimes.net*, September 7, 2016, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/09/beijing-vows-strike-back-kyrgyzstan-embassy-attack/>

<sup>61</sup> Michael Martina, and David Brunnstrom, "China's XI says to commit 8,000 troops for U.N. peacekeeping force," *Reuters.com*, September 28, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-china-idUSKCNORS1Z120150929>.

<sup>62</sup> Courtney J. Fung, "China's Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping," *Peace Brief 212*, (July 26, 2016), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping>.

<sup>63</sup> Courtney J. Fung, "China and the Responsibility to Protect," *Peace Brief 205*, (June 8, 2016), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>.

<sup>64</sup> Courtney J. Fung, "China and the Responsibility to Protect," *Peace Brief 205*, (June 8, 2016), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>.

<sup>65</sup> Trading Economics, "China GDP Annual Growth Rate Forecast 2016-2020," accessed May 10, 2017, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual/forecast>.

<sup>66</sup> Andrew Hull, and David Markov, "Chinese Arms Sales to Africa," *Institute for Defense Analyses Research Notes*, (Summer 2012): 28, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Images/Publications/2012researchnotessummer.ashx>. <https://www.ida.org/~media/Corporate/Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2012/2012%20Chinese%20Arms%20Sales%20To%20Africa.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Brookes, and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States," *Backgrounder*, no. 1916 (February 22, 2006): 4, <http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-influence-africa-implications-the-united-states>.

<sup>68</sup> Editor, "China sells 12 fighter jets to Zimbabwe: opposition," *Defencetalk.com*, June 14, 2004, <http://www.defencetalk.com/china-sells-12-fighter-jets-to-zimbabwe-opposition-2733/>.

<sup>69</sup> Andrew Hull, and David Markov, "Chinese Arms Sales to Africa," *Institute for Defense Analyses Research Notes*, (Summer 2012): 28, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Images/Publications/2012researchnotessummer.ashx>. <https://www.ida.org/~media/Corporate/Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2012/2012%20Chinese%20Arms%20Sales%20To%20Africa.pdf>.

<sup>70</sup> Andrew Hull, and David Markov, "Chinese Arms Sales to Africa," *Institute for Defense Analyses Research Notes*, (Summer 2012): 26, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Images/Publications/2012researchnotessummer.ashx>. <https://www.ida.org/~media/Corporate/Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2012/2012%20Chinese%20Arms%20Sales%20To%20Africa.pdf>.

<sup>71</sup> Andrew Hull, and David Markov, "Chinese Arms Sales to Africa," *Institute for Defense Analyses Research Notes*, (Summer 2012): 27, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Images/Publications/2012researchnotessummer.ashx>.

---

<https://www.ida.org/~media/Corporate/Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2012/2012%20Chinese%20Arms%20Sales%20To%20Africa.pdf>.

<sup>72</sup> Andrew Hull, and David Markov, “Chinese Arms Sales to Africa,” *Institute for Defense Analyses Research Notes*, (Summer 2012): 30,

<https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Images/Publications/2012researchnotessummer.ashx>.

<https://www.ida.org/~media/Corporate/Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2012/2012%20Chinese%20Arms%20Sales%20To%20Africa.pdf>.

<sup>73</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed May 11, 2017, <https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

<sup>74</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed May 11, 2017, <https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

<sup>75</sup> Ashley Cowburn, “Two-thirds of African countries now using Chinese military equipment, report reveals,” *Independent.co.uk*, March 1, 2016,

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/two-thirds-of-african-countries-now-using-chinese-military-equipment-a6905286.html>.

<sup>76</sup> Robert Kozloski, “The Information Domain as an Element of National Power,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, accessed May 10, 2017, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=232244>.

<sup>77</sup> Harriet Ellis, “Freedom or firewalls: shaping Africa’s internet,” *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, February 27, 2017, <http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/february-b85c/freedom-or-firewalls-c6ea>.

<sup>78</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *Africa Emerges* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 152.

<sup>79</sup> Melissa M. Chan, “China to Launch Second African Satellite,” *Chinadigitaltimes.net*, November 18, 2012, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/11/china-to-launch-second-african-satellite/>.

<sup>80</sup> Melissa M. Chan, “China to Launch Second African Satellite,” *Chinadigitaltimes.net*, November 18, 2012, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/11/china-to-launch-second-african-satellite/>.

<sup>81</sup> Dionne Searcey, Francois Essomba, “African Nations Increasingly Silence Internet to Stem Protests,” *Nytimes.com*, February 10, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?\\_r=1](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?_r=1).

<sup>82</sup> Dionne Searcey, Francois Essomba, “African Nations Increasingly Silence Internet to Stem Protests,” *Nytimes.com*, February 10, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?\\_r=1](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?_r=1).

<sup>83</sup> Dionne Searcey, Francois Essomba, “African Nations Increasingly Silence Internet to Stem Protests,” *Nytimes.com*, February 10, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?\\_r=1](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/africa/african-nations-increasingly-silence-internet-to-stem-protests.html?_r=1).

## Bibliography

- 
- Messner, J.J., ed. "Fragile State Index 2016." Washington, D.C.: Fund For Peace, 2016, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>.
- Zack-Williams, Tunde, Diane Frost, and Alex Thomson, ed. *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
- Rotberg, Robert I. *Africa Emerges*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
- Pieter Van Dijk, Meine, ed. *The New Presence of China in Africa*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009,
- Oren, William. "A New Approach in Africa: Analyzing the Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Aid and Military Assistance on the African Continent and a New Concept For Infrastructure." Unpublished manuscript, last modified May 7, 2017. Microsoft Word file.
- McDonnell, Justin. "The New Scramble." *The European Magazine*, September 12, 2013. <http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/justin-mcdonnell/7726-chinese-influence-in-africa>.
- Feuerwerker, Albert. *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, s.v. "China and war between the Nationalists and Communists," April 28, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/War-between-Nationalists-and-communists>.
- Fung, Courtney J. "China's Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping." *Peace Brief* 212, (July 26, 2016). <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping>.
- Fung, Courtney J. "China and the Responsibility to Protect." *Peace Brief* 205, (June 8, 2016). <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>.
- Brookes, Peter, and Ji Hye Shin. "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States." *Backgrounder*, no. 1916 (February 22, 2006).