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Since the mid 1940's the United States of America has provided over \$215 billion dollars to 53 African nations and three regions in foreign aid. Aid is provided to individual African nations to improve stability, quality of life, and to enhance national security of the United States. War, poverty, disease, and human suffering are common throughout Africa and this paper correlates foreign aid and conditions to recipient nations. The concept provided in this paper changes the historical norms of providing foreign aid to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) building regional infrastructure projects that benefit African nations and provide a common goal.

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Preface

Analysis of the African continent with respect to future threats and operating environments, employment of unmanned aviation assets, pre-staging logistics on Ascension Island, sub-surface logistics capability, and United States foreign aid are the topics of four Marine Officers and one United States Army Officer in Advanced Studies Program (ASP) group 1, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Each topic was researched with the theme of “Places Without Bases” and investigated the probability, methods, and future threats United States Military forces could find on the African continent. The study of United States foreign aid and the long-term effects on recipient African nations is the focal point of this research.

I would like to thank my fellow ASP students for their research and concepts on the African continent; Major Tim Barcus USA, Major Jason Laird USMC, Major Ashley Lish USMC, and Major Jane Oren USMC. Their research provided insight into the access limitations and future threat capabilities from Chinese investment in Africa. Mr. Lawrence Freeman, economist and Executive Intelligence Review writer, provided detailed information to support the regional infrastructure concept of this paper. Mr. Freeman’s knowledge of African economies and published articles on the Transaqua were vital to my research. My concept attempts to change the method and purpose of United States foreign aid to a regionally focused, mutually beneficial, and economic based approach for improving Africa.

Executive Summary


Title: A New Approach in Africa: Analyzing the Effectiveness of United States Foreign Aid on the African Continent and a New Concept for Infrastructure

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Thesis: As the United States increases foreign aid the recipient African nation leaders are incentivized to not improve their countries and corruption increases, human development decreases, economic complexity decreases, levels of political violence increase, and nation state stability decreases.

Discussion: Since the mid 1940's to present day the United States of America has provided over \$215 billion dollars (USD) to 53 African nations and three regions in economic and military aid. Aid has varied in value, type, and purpose and is given mostly to individual African nations to improve stability, quality of life, and to enhance national security of the United States. Governments of African nations are very similar in structure and leadership style of the European colonial powers that ruled until the 20th century, and the foreign aid provided has not produced the results desired by the United States and the international community. War, poverty, disease, underdevelopment, and human suffering are common throughout Africa and this paper correlates relationships to United States foreign aid and resulting conditions to recipient nations. The African nations of Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan provide countries in different geographic regions, economies, and histories. The concept provided in this paper changes the historical norms of providing foreign aid to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) specifically tailored to building regional infrastructure projects that benefit multiple African nations and provide a common goal on the continent. The Transaqua project demonstrates how redirecting fresh water from the Congo River can have lasting effects for millions of Africans in the Lake Chad Basin and provide power, access, and economic benefit to multiple African nations.


Conclusion: The comparison of United States foreign aid to Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan shows increasing quality of life and human development, decreasing economic complexity, increasing levels of perceived corruption, no improvement to state fragility, and a corresponding relationship to the levels of political violence.



Introduction and Methodology

The continent of Africa, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, suffers from Joseph Conrad's description as the "heart of darkness" and leads to an overexaggerated image of Human

Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV / AIDS), war, economic strife and poorly run countries by social elites.¹ Social, economic, and political issues in Africa have led the United States of America to provide economic and military assistance to



struggling nations in an attempt to stabilize the continent. The amount of foreign aid, both military and economic, varies in monetary value, scope, purpose, and outcome to both the supported nation, the continent, and the United States. Figure 1 shows the distribution of United States foreign aid throughout the continent of Africa.² With increasing assistance from external countries such as the United States, foreign aid has become a staple of budgets accounting for more than half of gross domestic investment in many African nations.³ The supply of foreign money has produced dire consequences on its effect in subsidizing African nations by incentivizing nation governments to remain the same. This enduring practice facilitates outcomes not intended by the donor country.

The current and historical method for improving conditions on the African continent is dominated by large amounts of foreign aid from international countries, particularly the United States, to improve the quality of life of the African people, regional security, and governance capability. Figures 2 and 3 show that foreign aid is not completely focused on specific nations but to African regions, and that the United States has given over \$19.6 billion United States

Dollars (USD) in non-specific aid.⁴ The concern rests with the actual effects of foreign aid provided African nations in that the conditions have not improved, often stagnate, and even decline as aid levels increase. This research paper examines five African nations; Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan to compare human development, corruption perception, economic complexity, commodity prices, and state fragility to foreign aid provided by the United States. The financial data provided by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) compiles total financial aid in current USD for both military and economic assistance.

The monetary totals are from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants notebook and was prepared by the USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on January 10, 2017.⁵ The economic aid is a collection of loans and grants to African nations from multiple United States Government agencies including, but not limited to, the Department of Agriculture, USAID, the Department of Defense (DoD), African Development Foundation, the Peace Corps, and the Department of State.⁶ Every African nation, with the exception of Egypt, selected in the data base is totaled per year and compared with USD totals in both economic and military assistance. The yearly totals of Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan are compared to indexes measuring various country performance.

The data for country performance is sourced from four indexes: 1. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International; 2. The Fragile State Index (FSI) from the Fund For Peace; 3. Human Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations Development Program; 4. The Economic Complexity Index from The Observatory of Economic Complexity. The final data comparison measures United States foreign aid, the country performance metrics described above, and the levels of political violence in the selected countries from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Region 1946-2015 database authored by

Monty G. Marshall from the Center for Systemic Peace. Historical commodity prices are also included to show trends in value of each nation's top export. The CPI of Transparency International is the first measure of each country's perceived corruption levels.

A non-profit non-governmental organization, Transparency International began identifying corruption in various countries in the 1990s and has continued to produce a yearly CPI since.⁷ Unlike the other three metrics chosen, the CPI is computed based on societal perceptions of corruption by public sector institutions on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) of 176 countries in 2016.⁸ Compiled and analyzed through 12 primary sources including the African Bank Governance ratings to the World Justice Project Rule of Law index, each nation is given and overall world ranking and a CPI score.⁹ Each index is computed and displayed differently and the CPI values are formatted to better display trends over time due to computation changes by Transparency International. Similar adjustments were made to displayed HDI variables and are labeled accordingly. CPI values before 2012 were displayed as single digits and scores since are double digit numbers, and all values have been adjusted to double digits to better display trend analysis. Similar to the CPI is the FSI produced by the Fund For Peace.

The Fund For Peace utilizes a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) computing algorithms based on twelve social, economic, and political factors that are further subdivided into 14 sub-indicators.¹⁰ Each FSI ranking is based on the cumulative value of the 12 factors and the lower the ranking and higher the FSI total score the more fragile the state.¹¹ The FSI values are compared to CPI data to display the relationship to state fragility and perceived government corruption. This comparison links foreign aid to corruption and the state officials lacking ability to govern. FSI and CPI measure the capability of the state and to analyze the populace, HDI is

incorporated to display the changes in life expectancy, expected education and Gross National Income (GNI).

The HDI is produced by the United Nations Development Program and ranks and compares the overall value of the life expectancy, expected years of education, GNI levels, and providing a HDI value for each country.¹² Although the HDI does not take into account income inequality, poverty, human security, and empowerment it does analyze gross per capita income, education through people 25 years and younger, and the life expectancy at birth which assists in filling gaps in other indexes.¹³ HDI data inputs of GNI and the HDI value itself were adjusted in number format to better display quantitative values across all metrics. Specifically, the GNI is displayed in tenths of the original thousands of USD per source documents and the HDI value is measured in double digits instead of its original percentage format. The last index, the ECI, measures a country's productive output.

Produced by the Observatory for Economic Complexity, the ECI is a numeric composition of a nation's economic complexity that is specific to the ability for productive output and reflects the structures that emerge to hold and combine knowledge of the people and organizations within a state's economy.¹⁴ The statistical analyses of imports and exports incorporates the Balassa index for Revealed Comparative Advantage or RCA. Dr. Bela Balassa, Hungarian economist and former Johns Hopkins professor, says that a country has Revealed Comparative Advantage in a product if it exports more than its "fair" share, that is, a share that is equal to the share of total world trade that the product represents.¹⁵ The ECI provides a comparison of the economies of the selected African nations to the United States to demonstrate the significant difference in economic development and complexity. The indexes work in conjunction with each other and assist to fill gaps that each index may not display.

The HDI does not specifically factor income inequality and poverty but the FSI fills this shortfall as it measures poverty, uneven development, and human rights as part of the twelve categories used to compute the FSI rating.¹⁶ The CPI accounts only for the perceptions of the people toward corruption within the public sector and the FSI validates these perceptions by factoring the legitimacy of the state, public services, state security apparatus, and fractionalized elites which is specific to those holding government office.¹⁷ The CPI, HDI, and FSI do not measure the economic productivity and complexity of the state economies, but the ECI provides this specific data set. The CPI, FSI, HDI, and ECI measure the capabilities of each nation, its people, perceptions, and economic complexity but all fail in quantifying historic political violence.

The MEPV provides a database of political violence that has been coded, quantified, and defined as the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of a specific episode.¹⁸ The MEPV comprises 327 episodes of armed conflict (including 30 ongoing cases) that constitute a comprehensive accounting of all forms of major armed conflicts in the world over from 1946-2012.¹⁹ Major episodes of political violence require a minimum of 500 related fatalities and include; inter-state, intra-state, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare.²⁰ To quantify the effects of episodes of political violence, the MEPV include fatalities and casualties, resource depletion, destruction of infrastructure, and population dislocations, among other things such as the psychological trauma to individuals and adverse changes to the social psychology and political culture of affected social identity groups.²¹ Episodes of all political violence are measured for Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Sudan, to compare levels of conflict with foreign aid received from the United States. The

data chosen for this research directly relates to the United States in providing both economic and military assistance throughout the African continent.

Problem Statement

The United States continues to provide foreign aid to nations within the African continent but economic and social conditions are declining and levels of violence are increasing. The strategic objective of the United States relates to stability of the African continent, but the foreign aid provided is not achieving this goal and lacks a common end state to synchronize assistance efforts. The desired results of improving economic opportunity, social conditions, and reducing violence through providing foreign aid are often not the outcome as nation leaders use the funds to secure lucrative commercial contracts with multinational corporations to gain international loans.²² The traditional approach of providing foreign aid fails due to a lack of fulfilling long term improvements of African nation states. Further dependence on international support leads to economic stagnation, decreased human development, decreased nation stability and increased corruption. With corruption playing a significant role in Africa governments the continuous supply of foreign aid further adds to a seemingly endless cycle of the stagnation of progress on the African continent. The variables determining whether foreign aid is to be given to any African nation should tie to the strategic objectives of the United States, mutual economic benefit, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for infrastructure development, and be evaluated using metrics measuring human development, corruption levels, economic complexity, violence levels, and state governance capability. Testing data to correlate issues related to corruption, human development, state fragility, economic complexity, and violence levels is the focus of the thesis.

Thesis

As the United States increases foreign aid the recipient African nation leaders are incentivized to not improve their countries and corruption increases, human development decreases, economic complexity decreases, levels of political violence increase, and nation state stability decreases. The United States should change its approach of providing foreign aid by focusing on FDI designed to develop regional infrastructure that promote future economic growth and stability throughout the continent. Data analysis shows the result of subsidizing African nations with economic and military assistance, and if the United States continues its current approach to providing foreign aid the conditions within the continent will not improve and the United States military will most likely operate from installations with inadequate infrastructure. The null hypothesis of the research is that the approach to providing foreign aid is immaterial to African nation state recipients and has no effect on economic complexity, corruption levels, human development, levels of political violence, state stability and that the United States military will operate from adequate installations to conduct operations on the African continent.

The data and results are incorporated into a literature review on the topic of foreign aid to African nation states. The processes of providing both economic aid and military assistance is challenging as there are no common metrics utilized to determine the effectiveness of aid provided. The lack of infrastructure on the African continent provides insight into operational environments the United States military could operate in the future with the inability to rely on developed installations that source reliable power, clean water, and infrastructure to support the employment of people and equipment.

Literature Review and Data Comparison

The relationship between African nation states and the international community are the centerpiece of Doctors David Leonard and Scott Straus in their book *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*.²³ Africa is characterized through widespread cases of poverty, autocracy, disease, and conflict which have always existed but are further enhanced through the relationship between African nation states and the international community.²⁴ The international community, in a quest to better improve the quality of life for African people, economic opportunities, and governance have further solidified such behavior throughout the continent. The technical, trade, and development assistance provided in the continent results in poor development, continuing humanitarian efforts, military interventions, and African governments with organizational capacity deficiencies that fail to achieve the human rights and peace the foreign aid was originally intended for.²⁵ To better understand present day African governments and relationship to foreign aid, the historical context of the evolution of colonial states to independent nations is necessary.

The centralized government structure of the colonial states provided the framework for independent African nations to have large bureaucracies that were coercive but not strong.²⁶ The large bureaucratic governments did not adjust from previous European colonial architecture and instead of collecting revenue for the European power the focus turned to sustaining the state itself through exports.²⁷ To secure the survival of the state, African nations increasingly relied upon extracting raw minerals, petroleum, and large farms for food production producing enclave economies and dysfunction with governments increasingly reliant on exports.²⁸ These government leaders of enclave economies become dependent on exports, drawing attention from other needs of the country by becoming externally focused to secure aid and international loans

rather than pending domestic issues.²⁹ With a focus on exports to secure the state, a trend of a personal rule paradigm became prevalent in African politics.

The personal rule paradigm of government rulers in Africa, coined by scholars Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg in the 1980s, became prevalent after independence from colonial powers and is characterized by heads of states using rule for personal gain.³⁰ Loyalty to a ruler or regime, informal agreements, and the inability for a government to operate effectively are characteristics of a nation under the personal rule paradigm.³¹ Public office is utilized for personal gain and patronage with loyalty to the ruler as the most important factor to gain access.³² The character of African governments are also described through the term patrimonialism, coined by Max Weber, that links the executive, administrative, and military forces being personal agencies retained by the head of state.³³ The characteristics of personal rule are very similar, but describe political appointments depending on loyalty and not performance, personalized transitions of office, and that private interests outweigh those of the public.³⁴ With ineffective governments focusing on revenues through exports and rule for personal gain, the use of military force for tax collection and state demands originated during colonial rule.

The reliance on commodity exports began with the slave trade and the use of human capital by African nations and tribes to support new territories, specifically North America. Although the slave trade on the African continent existed before European interest, the magnitude of the transcontinental slave trade had qualitatively different effects and the emerging states became dependent on the export rather than the use of labor.³⁵ This impact on African economies was further engrained during European colonial powers using military force to secure taxes. The African colonies became expensive, and reliant on European financing leading to the collection of harsh taxes through coercion using colonial military forces.³⁶ This use of colonial military


force to secure revenue and meet demands of the colonial state influenced the use of security forces long after African states achieved independence.³⁷ The European colonial exit from the African continent left newly independent African nations with weak governments reliant on foreign aid, loyal state agencies, and export revenues for survival.

The countries of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo are two examples of states with enclave economies still struggling since independence. The United States has provided Nigeria over \$8.2 billion USD in economic and military aid since 1952 and still struggles to govern effectively.³⁸ Mobutu Sese Siko's Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), then Zaire, is a prime example of a nation leader securing large wealth for himself during 32 years of rule. Securing his rule through exports including diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, and foreign aid, Mobutu built personal wealth and those of his loyal followers.³⁹ The large oil production of Nigeria and the mineral wealth of the DRC build evidence that ineffective governance, durable authoritarian regimes, corruption, and violent conflict relate to the "political resource curse."

Dr. Michael Ross, political science professor at the University of California Los Angeles, analyzes the relationship between petroleum producing countries and the "political resource curse" in his essay titled "*What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?*".⁴⁰ Dr. Ross defines the political resource curse as the adverse effect of a country's natural resource wealth on its economic, social, and political well-being.⁴¹ Countries that are strongly reliant on petroleum production tend to have negative outcomes of production whereas countries predominantly reliant on agricultural exports do not.⁴² Senegal is an African nation that does not meet the characterization of an enclave economy because the primary exports of cotton and groundnuts require large farms for production including larger amounts of the population.⁴³ Countries where primary exports require production and not extraction, such as Senegal, do not fall under the

classification for suffering a resource curse.⁴⁴ Dr. Ross hypothesizes that less oil wealth should result in politically troubled countries thus reinforcing the idea that the resource curse is directly related to petroleum.⁴⁵ Whether specifically tied to petroleum production or not, a strong link exists between exports and conflict.

Economist Paul Collier contends that intrastate conflict is more prevalent between rebel groups and military forces in nations where dependency on the production of exports is primary.⁴⁶ Collier also suggests that the primacy of export production provides further incentive




for rebellion.⁴⁷ Collier does not link a specific export to the relationship between rebellion and military forces, but James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin of Stanford University do find evidence that countries who primarily produce petroleum are more susceptible to conflict.⁴⁸ Although Fearon, Laitin, and Ross do link the production of petroleum to conflict, there appears to be a link between intrastate conflict and enclave production.⁴⁹ Evidence also supports that conflict does occur in African states that do not fit the enclave definition and that ethnic tensions are not always better in agriculturally dependent nations.


The countries of Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi rely on the exports of coffee, tea, and cocoa through peasant labor on large farms.⁵⁰ Even though ethnic tensions rise and fall and

grievances are ever present, the countries have not seen major conflict.⁵¹ The country of Uganda's wealth, before the ruthless dictator Idi Amin, was coffee and cotton but the country saw years of war under his brutal rein showcasing a non-enclave economy with conflict.⁵² The presence of conflict is not completely dependent on the primary commodity of African nations but some are more susceptible than others. The five African nations of this essay differ in the commodities they export.

Ethiopia primarily exports Arabic coffee, Kenya exports tea, Morocco exports phosphates, and Nigeria and Sudan export oil. Each nation represents a different geographic area of Africa, economic base, and have received high levels of foreign aid from the United States. Figure 4 shows the total aid in both economic and military aid provided by the United States. The United States has given far more in economic than military aid to all five nations with Sudan receiving the most economic and Morocco the most military aid.⁵³ The totals for all five countries are \$64.7 billion USD in both economic and military assistance accounting for 29 and 45 percent of all aid given to African nations by the United States respectively.⁵⁴ Figure 5 displays the entire aid given by the United States to African nations, \$215.2 billion USD, and includes both specific and non-specific aid given to support regional development. The data does not include debt relief provided to African nations and includes only United States government agencies with recorded aid. For totals of United States foreign aid provided to specific African nations see Appendixes 1 and 2. The first country to test the hypothesis of this research paper is Ethiopia.



The country of Ethiopia is marked by historic war with two colonial powers, Great Britain and Italy having its first major levels of intrastate violence starting in 1973 under Marxist dictator Haile




Mengitsu's "Red Terror" campaign.⁵⁵ Border wars with Somalia in 1977, large famine in 1985, and interstate conflict with Eritrea show a violent and troubled past for the African nation and provide context to the corresponding levels of political violence.⁵⁶ The main export is Arabic coffee and the country is not considered an enclave economy as the agricultural exports are a staple of the economy and do not require extraction to produce. Even with the levels of intra and interstate violence, human development shows improvement.

Figure 6 displays the HDI data results for Ethiopia from 2000 to 2015. Ethiopia showed a significant increase in GNI from 2003 to 2015, a slight rise in life expectancy, expected years in

education and the overall HDI score.⁵⁷ The trends during this time-period show that although the income earned in Ethiopia has improved, the overall quality of life of the populace remained relatively stagnant. The CPI and FSI comparisons in Figure 7 show that corruption perception steadily increased from 2002, peaking at 2005, and varying until 2016. The CPI and FSI scores remained relatively constant showing that Ethiopia has digressed and not improving. The rise in GNI does not correlate to the spike in the CPI ranking and is associated with the inclusion of Ethiopia into the CPI in 2002. The HDI, CPI, and FSI data show a slight improvement in the income of Ethiopians but no decrease in corruption perception and improvement in the strength of the nation. Comparing the effects of commodity pricing and economic complexity show the volatility of the coffee market and agricultural base for Ethiopia.

The comparison of historical Arabic coffee prices and the ECI of Ethiopia, in figures 8 and 9, show large variations in commodity pricing. The price of Arabic coffee declined significantly from 1997 to 2002 with a rebound in value peaking at 2011. The variation in pricing since 2011 shows declines in 2013 and 2015 but not to the levels experienced in the early 2000s. The steadily



increasing prices of coffee from 2002 to 2011 could explain the increase in GNI for the Ethiopian people but there is no corresponding variation in GNI from the HDI data after 2011. The ECI for Ethiopia varies but remains in negative numbers and compared to the more diverse economic ability of the United States shows the vast difference between the two nations. With the economy of Ethiopia primarily reliant on the exports of agricultural products, the ECI rating is not expected to improve or reach the level of the United States. United States foreign aid has varied in quantity and purpose, but from 1946 to 2015 over \$15 billion USD has been given to Ethiopia.

Figure's 10 and 11 display the total aid provided to Ethiopia from the United States with significant variations in military aid. Military aid peaked during the Cold War with over \$120 million USD given in 1972 alone with a sharp decline to \$0 USD from 1979 to 1994. Military aid saw an increase in the mid-1990s but has not reached pre-1979 levels. Economic aid has a similar variation until 1979 with a decline until 1987 with a steady increase peaking at over \$900 million USD in 2009. The increasing economic aid in 2002 to 2003 does correspond to the increase in corruption perception in figure 7 and the increase in GNI in figure 6. The military and economic aid have not effected the fragility of Ethiopia and have not made significant improvements in the HDI or FSI data. The relationships between foreign aid, HDI, CPI, and FSI are slight and the most apparent relationship is between economic and military assistance and levels of conflict.

The MEPV data, figure 12, shows corresponding increases in intrastate conflict and total violence to increasing military assistance provided in the mid-1970s, 1999, and 2012. Economic aid does not have the same relationship as military aid in the 1970s, but is similar in 2006 and 2009 with corresponding increases in aid and violence. There is a corresponding link with rises in coffee prices and drops in violence levels in 1997 and 2011 supporting the violence in non-enclave economies based on agriculture. The results for Ethiopia, per the data tested, result in increases in

United States foreign aid have a positive impact on HDI, no impact on ECI, an increase in political violence, and no effect on the FSI rating. The next country, Kenya, is like Ethiopia with its economy based on agricultural exports with tea being primary.




Map 2

The nation of Kenya earned independence from Great Britain in 1963 with Omani Arabs, the Portuguese, and British colonizing the country since the 1830s.⁵⁸ Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya did not experience large ethnic violence after independence but political assassinations, military coups, and ethnic unrest have been present in the nation.⁵⁹ Interstate conflict with Somalia starting in 2011 and intrastate conflict with the terrorist organization Al-Shabab starting in 2012 have brought recent increases in political violence in the country.⁶⁰ The non-enclave economy of Kenya shows improvement in quality of life of the people but the nation is still plagued by corruption and a weak government.

Kenya's HDI results, Figure 13, show an increasing trend in quality of life and human development for the nation. Life expectancy, GNI, and the HDI score have shown steady

improvement with expected education levels stagnating. The GNI increase is not as profound as Ethiopia but the gradual improvements show progress for the quality of life for Kenyans. The CPI and FSI data show similar trends with increases in corruption perception in the early 2000s with slight variations but no significant improvement to 2016. The country shows a decreasing trend for state fragility in 2006 with stagnation through 2016. The lack of improvement in state fragility and increase in corruption perception are similar trends from Ethiopia and no apparent relationship




between HDI, CPI, and FSI is present. Figure 15 displays a volatile tea market with prices varying over \$100 USD per year. The tea prices do not correspond to the CPI ranking in figure 14 nor the GNI increase in figure 13. The ECI, figure 16, for Kenya against the United States is similar to Ethiopia but has shown relative improvement since 2000. Foreign aid amounts from the United States show similar trends to Ethiopia.

Figure 17 shows economic aid to Kenya peaking at just over \$200 million USD in 1984 followed by a slight decline until 1996. Economic aid has an increasing pattern since 1996 bringing the total to \$11.6 billion USD from 1954 to 2015.⁶¹ Military aid, Figure 18, shows a large increase in 1974 at under \$160 million USD declining significantly in the 1990's. There is a slight increase in 2002 with steadily increasing levels starting in 2012 totaling military aid to Kenya just over \$834 million USD.⁶² In relation to corruption perception there is correlation between the levels of perceived corruption and an increase in economic aid starting in 1998. The violence levels in Figure 19 show different political violence in Kenya than in Ethiopia with much more prolonged political violence. The rise and fall of political violence from 1974 to 1980 corresponds with levels of military aid provided. This trend is not apparent with increases of military aid in 2002 and 2011 through 2012. Levels of economic aid to follow political violence trend lines within Kenya

specifically from 1976 to 1996 and 2004 through 2012. The effects of United States foreign aid are different from Ethiopia.

The data shows different trends for Kenya in that as foreign aid increases the HDI and quality of life increases, the ECI improved slightly but remains stagnant, levels of political violence




increase, and the fragility of the state increases. Both Kenya and Ethiopia are not categorized as enclave economies as their primary exports are agricultural products but both display slightly different reactions to receiving foreign aid from the United States and the possibility for political violence. The north African country of Morocco is our next test country with its primary export being phosphates.

Morocco




The country of Morocco had colonial influence from the Spanish and mostly France with a French protectorate lasting in the country until 1956.⁶³ Morocco has remained relatively stable since independence with interstate conflict with Algeria starting with the 1973 Polisario movement for the settlement of Spanish Sahara with a ceasefire agreement reached in 1991.⁶⁴ Relations with the Spanish government have varied since independence and Morocco has experienced an increase in civil unrest with the “Arab Spring” starting in 2011.⁶⁵ Even with the border clashes with Algeria, disagreements with Spain, and civil unrest Morocco has experienced less political violence than



Ethiopia and Kenya and the quality of life for the people of Morocco continues to improve.

Morocco's HDI results, Figure 20, shows vast improvements in life expectancy, GNI, and HDI scores. The improvements in Morocco exceed those in Ethiopia and Kenya but like the two nations the expected education levels remain stagnant. Corruption perception and state fragility show similar trends with Ethiopia and Kenya. The CPI score and ranking improved slightly between 1999 and 2000 but declined with variations since. The fragility of Morocco has remained relatively constant with variations in world ranking since 2006. Phosphate prices, Figure 22, show steady pricing levels until a significant increase in 2007, a decline in 2008, with variations through 2016. The spike in 2008 phosphate prices does not correspond to variations in either HDI, CPI, or FSI. Foreign aid levels are provided in Figures 23 and 24.



United States economic aid to Morocco was most prevalent between 1956 and 1994 with a peak in 1961 at \$600 million USD and in 2008 at just under \$800 million USD bringing the total since 1952 over \$9.6 billion USD.⁶⁶ Military aid was most prevalent between 1952 and 1994 with

the peak in 1983 with \$160 million USD bringing the total to \$2.6 billion USD to Morocco since 1952.⁶⁷ The levels on political violence, Figure 25, show high violence levels towards civilians from 1974 to 1989 and 1991 to 2005. Unlike Kenya where both economic and military aid showed relationships to political violence, only military aid displays this relationship in Morocco. The levels of military aid display a relationship to the levels of political violence up until 2011. The results for Morocco are like Kenya and Ethiopia but are not as apparent. As United States, foreign aid increased quality of life and the HDI score improved, the economic complexity remains steady, violence levels increased, and state fragility was not affected. The next test nation of Nigeria is an enclave economy dependent on the production and export of petroleum.


Nigeria



Map 4


The history of Nigeria is ripe with colonial powers specifically Germany, Portugal, Great Britain, and Arab rulers in 1809.⁶⁸ A large source for human capital to support the development of the America's, Nigeria was a bedrock of the slave trade from the 16th to the 18th centuries.⁶⁹ Securing independence in 1960 Nigeria has a long history of political instability, weak governance, ethnic unrest, and intrastate conflict. Ethnic violence between Islamic and Christian Nigerians saw high levels in 2002 predominantly around the Gulf of Guinea and led to the uprising of the terrorist

organization Boko Haram in 2009.⁷⁰ Nigeria's government is highly corrupt and like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Morocco the quality of life has shown improvement.



Nigeria's HDI data in Figure 27 shows a growing life expectancy, increasing GNI, expected years of education capped at 10 years, and an increasing HDI score between 2000 and 2015.⁷¹ The corruption perception and state fragility data show a large increase in corruption from 1996 until 2007 with fragility remaining constant since 2006. Crude oil prices in Figure 29 show a steady price increase in 2001 peaking just over \$200 USD per barrel in 2008 and losing over 50% value by 2009. Prices recovery started in 2009 and mild fluctuations in price, comparable to the peak level in 2008, occurred until 2014 when oil prices started falling again. Economic complexity for Nigeria, Figure 30, improved to its highest levels in 2014 but remains negative

compared to the United States. Corruption levels do show a relationship to the price of oil specifically in 2000 and 2008 but the GNI remains ascending.




Figure's 31 and 32 show spikes in aid provided to Nigeria at differing times. Economic aid was a major focus from 1961 to 1976 peaking in 1969 almost reaching \$600 million USD in a single year. Military aid remained minimal until the late 1990s with a large spike over \$20 million USD in 2001, a significant decrease in 2003, and levels steadily rising since. The total economic and military aid to Nigeria totals \$8.5 billion USD and \$114.6 million USD respectively.⁷² The levels of corruption in Figure 28 correspond to United States economic aid in years 2000 and 2006 but do not in 2008. The levels of political violence, Figure 33, show direct relationships to economic and military aid from 1964 to 1971, 2000 to 2003, and 2008 to 2011. Nigeria's results show an increase in quality of life and HDI, a slight increase in economic complexity, and increase in political violence, and state fragility remaining the same as United States foreign aid increases.

The last country, Sudan, is like Nigeria in that it is characterized as an enclave economy reliant on oil production and export.




Map 5

Governed through joint ventures by the Ottoman Empire and Egyptians until 1881 and then the British and Egyptians starting in 1899, Sudan earned independence in 1960 and has a troubled history of civil war and interstate conflict.⁷³ With oil discovered in Benitu 1978, now in the Republic of South Sudan, intrastate conflict between the Islamic dominant north and Christian south lasts to present day.⁷⁴ The Republic of South Sudan earned independence in July 2011 from Sudan but conflict over the oil fields remains as both countries are reliant on the extraction, production, and export of petroleum making Sudan an enclave economy. Quality of life and human development are showing slight improvements but the nation is ripe with corruption and an ineffective government.



Sudan, in Figure 34, shows progression in life expectancy, GNI, and HDI with expected years of education remaining below 10. Corruption perception increased significantly starting in 2003 and Sudan is consistently one of the most corrupt and most fragile nations in the world. Its CPI score improved slightly in 2013 but it did not impact its overall CPI world ranking. Crude oil prices, Figure 36, is the same data utilized for Nigeria and shows a corresponding increase in corruption perception as oil prices rise but not an inverse relationship as oil prices decline. Sudan's economic complexity has decreased since 1985 with fluctuations through 2015. This score is not surprising as the primary industry for Sudan is crude oil extraction, production, and exports. The levels foreign aid and political violence, Figures 38 through 40, show corresponding relationships.



Total economic and military aid to Sudan totals \$14.3 and \$1.5 billion USD respectively and show near identical increases and decreases.⁷⁵ Economic aid, beginning in 1952, shows three major periods of 1959 to 1968, 1977 to 1989, and 2004 to 2011. Military aid has two major periods of 1978 to 1983 and 2004 to 2011. The levels of political violence, Figure 40, show trends from 1959 to 1972, 1973 to 1980, 1982, to 1993, 1995 to 2001, and an increase starting in 2005. Both economic and military aid show relationships to political violence levels during these periods. Increasing economic aid also corresponds with increasing corruption perception starting in 2003. The results for Sudan show an increase in quality of life and HDI scores, a decrease in economic complexity, and increase in political violence, and no improvement to state fragility. Data comparisons on Sudan show different relationships with United States foreign aid but all countries analyzed show common trends.

The hypothesis of this research paper is that as the United States increases foreign aid and military assistance the recipient African nation leaders are incentivized to not improve their countries and corruption increases, human development decreases, economic complexity decreases, levels of political violence increase, and nation state stability decreases. The results of analyses show that the hypothesis is validated with increases in foreign aid and increasing levels of political violence and decreasing economic complexity, but does not show the same relationship with human development and state fragility. Increases in human development are common with Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sudan and there is no improvement to the state fragility score of any country. The hypothesis is disproven when factoring all aspects, but shows correlation with levels of political violence and economic complexity. What is demonstrated, is that each of these countries receives billions of USD in foreign aid and all have not improved significantly in state fragility and levels of political violence. If the United States continues foreign aid programs to African nations with no long-term purpose the state leaders will only be incentivized to remain the same. If this were not true then each nation analyzed should have a decrease in the FSI scores and rankings, decreases in political violence, and larger improvements in HDI values. A new concept of FDI to support regional infrastructure projects differs from the traditional use of foreign aid targeted at specific countries in Africa.

Concept of Regional Infrastructure Development

The United States should investigate a regional approach to building stability and improving countries in Africa for strategic interests and for better access to the continent. Instead of providing aid to specific African nations a regional approach is recommended with a focus on long term infrastructure projects designed to improve access, source reliable power, and target poor economic conditions that plague African nations which drive recruitment for terrorist and criminal organizations. Increasing the numbers of United States military personal to assist in solving security issues may be ineffective due to the historical application of military force throughout the continent. Instead, African nations should continue regional partnerships that benefit multiple partners and encourage FDI to support infrastructure projects. One such project, the Transaqua, attempts to refill Lake Chad, provide power, access, and economic opportunity to multiple African nations.





Figure 41

Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, and Cameroon have been effected by the decreasing size of Lake Chad. The decreasing size of Lake Chad combined with encroachment of the Sahara Desert southward, known as desertification, has had a large impact on the quality of life, economics, and future for the people living in the Lake Chad Basin. Terrorist and criminal organizations, such as Boko Haram, thrive in the Lake Chad Basin and with vast unemployment and poverty, the governments of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon face an endless pursuit of improving the conditions of their people. Although a feasibility study has not been completed and a cost estimate for the construction of the Transaqua is not yet determined, a shift to a concept based on regional infrastructure is recommended. My concept uses the situation in the Lake Chad Basin to demonstrate that encouraging FDI in the construction of the Transaqua could increase the size of lake and providing economic opportunity to the region.

To measure the effectiveness of regional infrastructure projects, like the Transaqua, the United States could utilize corruption perception, economic complexity, human development, and state fragility as demonstrated in this research paper. The Transaqua is a comprehensive infrastructure project that redirects water from the Congo River to fill Lake Chad and provide hydroelectric power.⁷⁶ In shrinking to a tenth of its original size, Lake Chad would receive 100,000 billion cubic meters of fresh water per year accounting for 5% of the total fresh water in the Congo River Basin.⁷⁷ The Congo River ends in the Atlantic Ocean and redirecting water to Lake Chad would require over 2,800 kilometers of canals that are 25 meters deep and 100 meters wide.⁷⁸ The total distance of the canals is equivalent to the distance between Paris and Moscow and would provide the opportunity for hydroelectric powerplants that could produce 4 gigawatts of power.⁷⁹ The benefits of the Transaqua proposal effect not only the people of the Lake Chad Basin but all of the countries along the entire canal.

As depicted in Figure 41 the project spans from central Africa to the Lake Chad Basin, provides navigable canals for shipping, and includes a fresh water port in the Central African Republic. The plan for the Transaqua was drafted in the 1970s by Italian Engineer Dr. Marcello Vichi and with Lawrence Freeman, expert on African economics and Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) contributor, assert that the Transaqua program not only will improve the lives of the 40 million Africans in the Lake Chad Basin but is essential in stopping the Sahara Desert's southern encroachment.⁸⁰ The Lake Chad Basin, including its tributaries, is 967,000 square kilometers long and is larger than the states of Virginia, Texas and New York combined ranking it as the fourth largest lake in Africa.⁸¹ As the remnant of an ancient inland sea 13,000 years ago, Lake Chad has varied in size from 1 million square kilometers in 6500 BC to 25,000 square kilometers in 1963 and 4,500 square kilometers in 2014.⁸² The shrinking of Lake Chad is not a new phenomenon and in the 16th century the lake dried up completely but the Quaternary,



Pliocene, Continental Terminal, and Cretaceous aquifers eventually refilled it.⁸³ Figure 42 shows the changing size of Lake Chad from 1973 to 2001.⁸⁴ The geologic factors in the survival of the lake are not fully understood but the benefit of refilling the lake is.

In a speech to the Lake Chad Basin Committee (LCBC) on

November 17, 2014 Mr. Freeman presented five major benefits of the Transaqua program that highlight a changing trend of international assistance from traditional aid to a new focus of infrastructure development.⁸⁵ The first major benefit comes from a changing interest by international investors in the African continent. Railways, energy projects, and water management are major undertakings by international investors, led mostly by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), that focus on long term economic growth through infrastructure developments.⁸⁶ The second benefit relates to saving lives and reversing the effects of desertification. The two largest bodies of water in the Sahel are Lake Chad and the In-Land Mali Delta that could provide a stable area for food production for over 25 million Africans, reverse the expansion of the Sahara Desert, and support a future African population of over 2.4 billion people.⁸⁷ The infrastructure focus has not included the United States and European nations and African nations have sought PRC to invest in infrastructure. At the 2014 U.S. Africa summit then U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Linda Thomas Greenfield stated that “We don’t do infrastructure” further distancing the United States from the Transaqua project.⁸⁸ A regionally focused infrastructure concept is a departure from this position and encourages the United States to assist organizations such as the LCBC in future development.

Though completion of the Transaqua increases in agricultural productivity, industrial capacity, and power production it could affect 12 African nations and could help reduce the root causes for terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram.⁸⁹ With a large complex infrastructure such as the Transaqua, the United States would benefit far greater than providing economic aid and military assistance programs to numerous African nations year after year. The Transaqua program is an example of a regional infrastructure project that would mutually benefit the African nations it is built for and the United States government. The African nations of Central

African Republic, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon Democratic Republic of Congo, and others would reap the benefits of consistent electrical power supporting a growing industrial capability. With a consistent power supply the African continent would be better postured for further economic growth and development that is beneficial to the United States.

Reliable energy and improved economic conditions on the African continent benefits the United States by reducing poverty and starvation which drive recruitment for criminal and terrorist organizations. A regional focused infrastructure project promotes long term growth and stability for the African continent providing an opportunity for the United States to have better access if contingency operations require it. Developments that benefit multiple countries and large groups of people are far more effective in the long term than military assistance that combats a seemingly endless line of criminal and terrorist organizations. The example of the Transaqua changes the premise of developing “real wealth” and not “fictitious money” as Mr. Freeman described in his LCBC speech in 2014.⁹⁰ Utilizing this concept with the Transaqua program would ensure that that the African continent is developed to support a growing population rather than managing territory for a continent falsely characterized as over populated.⁹¹ With a concept focusing on economic development the aspect of military assistance could be tailored to regional forces instead of individual nations.

The size, scope, and regional influence of the Transaqua requires African nations to have the same security interests for its construction, maintenance, and safe keeping from criminal and terrorist organizations. With such a lasting impact on African people, better economic conditions for an entire region, and reliable power the security interests of affected nations are shared. This would allow United States military assistance to be focused on regions of the country and be linked to infrastructure essential for economic growth and betterment of the nations involved.

Utilizing the CPI, HDI, SFI, and ECI the United States could measure the progress of its investment in infrastructure and encourage United States companies to provide FDI. Providing the funding and support for such a large infrastructure endeavor would also give the United States a favorable position with African nations leading to access agreements if the deployment of United States military forces is required for a contingency.

The Transaqua provides water and power to multiple African nations but other FDI projects that involve railroads, roads, and power plants could benefit the United States military in conducting operations within the continent. If foreign aid remains the same the improvements in the African continent will be mainly through Chinese efforts in their quest to source minerals, food, and petroleum to support their economy. The stagnant nature and negative consequences of continuing aid not linked to long term infrastructure cement current water and power capabilities throughout the African continent. Large scale poverty, unemployment, corruption, stagnating human development, enclave economies and African nations subsidized by the United States and other foreign aid donors prolong underdevelopment.

Conclusion

The United States must take a different approach to economic and military assistance to nations within the African continent. Continuing historical patterns in foreign aid only encourages conditions to stay the same and the United States to be involved in monetary and military action for years to come. Notions of providing billions of USD in foreign aid for international admiration as argued by George Friedman, Chief Executive Officer of Stratfor and intelligence expert, are merely repeats of past actions that have not produced the desired results for the United States.⁹² The historical amounts of United States foreign aid have increased quality of life and human development slightly but have increased corruption and levels of

political violence. Economic complexity shows decreasing trends due to reliance on exports and state fragility is stagnating as African nation leaders are incentivized to not improve their governance. Without a shift to FDI the United States may find a future African continent that restricts our capabilities due to underdeveloped infrastructure prohibiting military operations within the continent. A change in direction for United States foreign aid would provide better access, mutually beneficial economic benefits, and target conditions inherent to poverty, disease, and political violence. The United States has already spent \$215 billion USD on aid in Africa, the total is increasing, and it is never too late to change our direction and purpose.

Notes:

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- ¹ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures* (Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003), ix.
- ² USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services (Washington, DC: USAID, January 10, 2017) <https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html>
- ³ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*, 11.
- ⁴ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁵ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁶ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁷ Transparency International, *FAQs on Transparency International*. 2016. http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_transparency_international/9/.
- ⁸ Transparency International: the global coalition against corruption. *Global Corruption Perception Index*
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Fund For Peace. *The Methodology Behind The Index*. 2016. <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/methodology>.
- ¹¹ Fund For Peace. *The Methodology Behind The Index*. 2016.
- ¹² United Nations Development Program, Human Development Reports Data, *Human Development Index*. 2016. United Nations. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.
- ¹³ United Nations Development Program, Human Development Reports Data, *Human Development Index*
- ¹⁴ AJG Simoes, CA Hidalgo, *The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development*, Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011 <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/resources/permissions/>
- ¹⁵ AJG Simoes, CA Hidalgo, *The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development*
- ¹⁶ Fund For Peace. *The Methodology Behind The Index*. 2016.
- ¹⁷ Fund For Peace. *The Methodology Behind The Index*. 2016.
- ¹⁸ Monty G. Marshall, *Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions, 1946-2012*, Center for Systemic Peace, (Washington, DC, May 2016). www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm
- ¹⁹ Monty G. Marshall, *Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions, 1946-2012*
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures* (Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003), 11.
- ²³ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures* (Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003), ix.
- ²⁴ Ibid, ix.
- ²⁵ Ibid, x.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid, 11.
- ²⁸ Ibid.

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- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Ibid, 2.
- ³¹ Ibid, 4.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Ibid, 2.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 9.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid, 10.
- ³⁸ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ³⁹ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*, 13.
- ⁴⁰ Michael L. Ross, "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18, UCLA (Los Angeles, CA: May 21, 2015), 240.
- ⁴¹ Michael L. Ross, "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?", 240.
- ⁴² Ibid, 241.
- ⁴³ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*, 13.
- ⁴⁴ Michael L. Ross, "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?", 241.
- ⁴⁵ Michael L. Ross, "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?", 243.
- ⁴⁶ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*, 14.
- ⁴⁷ David Leonard, Scott Strauss, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures*, 14.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid, 14.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, 72.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Ibid, 73.
- ⁵³ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁵⁴ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁵⁵ BBC, "Ethiopia Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13351397>
- ⁵⁶ BBC, "Ethiopia Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13351397>
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- ⁶⁰ BBC, "Kenya Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176>
- ⁶¹ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁶² USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*
- ⁶³ BBC, "Morocco Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260>
- ⁶⁴ BBC, "Morocco Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260>
- ⁶⁵ BBC, "Morocco Country Profile", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260>
- ⁶⁶ USAID, *U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946-2015*

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