


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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Places without Bases

*“The Past as Prologue, the Future in Forecasting:
Preparing the US Military for Conflict in 2030”*



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Past as Prologue, the Future in Forecasting:
Preparing the US Military for Conflict in 2030

Author: Major Adam Stenberg, US Army

Thesis: Current forecasts of future conflict focus on only a portion of the character of potential wars, avoiding likely locations. This project expands on these forecasts and paints a more complete picture by creating a model that helps predict the places for and players involved in future conflict so that military planners can better prepare.

Discussion: If war never changed, strategic planners would be unemployed. However, Carl von Clausewitz asserts that the nature of war is enduring but the character changes. War will continue, but how is uncertain. While difficult, the military professional must plan and prepare for future conflict in order to win and maintain the standard of living. Adequately planning for military success requires planning five, ten, even fifteen years or more in advance. Current forecasts well describe how future war may transpire in that time period based on trends and drivers but hardly address where it may occur. A critical aspect is whether the US will fight in “places without bases” without sufficient logistical support for typical military operations. This will also drive training, manning, and equipping the force. Current forecasts are also more art than science, so if conditions change, different results are difficult to ascertain.

While current military and civilian forecasts are incomplete, they do provide a reliable foundation upon which to build. In this paper, I review three prominent forecasts: *Global Trends 2030*, *Global Risks 2035*, and the *Joint Operating Environment 2030*. I then identify the common and strongest trends and drivers and separate them into two key categories, economics and governance, in order to allow for scenario analysis. By combining this result with the Fragile States Index method for graphing countries, I can then create a graphic depiction of areas that represent the greatest risk of conflict between 2030 and 2035.

Attempting to create one static forecast of future conflict, however, is a fool’s errand. Utilizing the scenario analysis, I then develop two projections for comparison: one with *economics* as the key driver and the other with a *governance* emphasis. The real benefit comes from comparing the results from these two projections and from countries within each. Finding similarities and differences can show the military planner where to prudently focus resources.

Conclusion: While this project assists military planners with graphical depictions of likely locations of potential future conflict, a benefit is the dynamic nature of the methodology that allows for adjusting data as primary drivers shift. The real advantage then comes from being able to compare various scenarios. From this effort, it is evident that conflict will likely occur in “places without bases,” and the military planner can best prepare by either expanding foreign agreements for US military activity or lessening the force’s reliance on logistical support as researched by other papers in this program.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Introduction and Problem Statement

Forecasting is a critical tool in planning to win wars. Nearly two hundred years ago, the esteemed Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, divided war activities into two classes: preparations for war and the actual conduct of war.¹ The latter includes tactics, strategy, and the employment of armed forces during combat. The former covers “the creation, discipline, and maintenance of all the military forces”² before combat and is the subject of this paper. The tactics and strategy of war are fundamental but are uniquely dependent on the preparation of military forces before combat begins. Just after the commencement of combat in Iraq in 2003, the American press roundly criticized the Department of Defense (DOD) for not employing adequate equipment. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld famously stated that “you go to war with the Army you have.” His assertion highlights the importance of intelligently manning, training, and equipping troops between wars in order to be ready to win the next war.

To accomplish this, experts must project troop strength, organize the forces, evaluate weapons and equipment, modify training, evaluate the threats, and most importantly, forecast potential conflict in order to integrate all of the above. Each year, intelligence professionals, federal budget analysts, and civilian think tanks assemble products that analyze the threats and potential crises that confront US interests around the world. The problem is that most simply identify general trends and drivers of instability. This paper will evaluate the effectiveness of these forecasts in order to project potential threats fifteen years from now so decision-makers can consider necessary adjustments.

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, trans. Colonel J.J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1908), 93.

² *Ibid.*

As the lone remaining superpower for the past twenty years, the United States has developed an effective defense network throughout the globe to protect its people and interests and even to maintain a stable, predictable world order that benefits all people. The US cannot cover all areas, however, so the remaining challenge is to predict and detect the location of these threats before they arise. While some are “Black Swans” in that they are highly improbable but have an enduring impact, as evidenced by the events of 9/11 that took all Western democracies by surprise, planners can anticipate many scenarios with prudent analysis of global trends and drivers of instability. This paper will first review some of the more prominent forecasting products and methods of today. It will then evaluate their effectiveness by considering a case study. Finally, it will build upon them in order to create an actual map of projected conflict in 2030 that is more applicable to military planners and can be used to make adequate preparations.

This project is undertaken particularly in light of the fact that the location of future engagements may likely occur in “places without bases,” that is, crises may break out in places where the US hasn’t recently fought conventional wars and won’t have the usual logistical support. The analysis is based on two fundamental assumptions. First, it only applies to larger-scale operations. Frequently, the US sends out teams or sections of twenty or less service members (SMs) that are mostly self-sufficient, even in foreign territory. This need for this paper is only for those situations where much larger units of 100 to 1,000 or more SMs will need to operate. Second, forecasting will be based on the current world order of states and their boundaries. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, states and their recognized governments have defined foreign relations. This paper accepts such limitations and incorporates them into the findings.

The goal of this paper is not to propose diplomatic or political changes to avoid conflict but rather to consider the signs suggesting areas of potential conflict so the US military can prepare for success in those scenarios. This is not to suggest that efforts to improve foreign relations and the global order are not beneficial. They are indeed necessary, and most forecasting is limited to this. The military must go beyond this to prepare for the inevitable conflicts and crises because they will happen and the US must be prepared to act. Besides 9/11, Western powers were not adequately prepared for the Arab Spring, Russia annexing Crimea, or China re-asserting herself in southeast Asia, among others. In some instances, inaction or insufficient action made conditions worse. The product of this paper will provide insight on how to better organize forces, wisely spend limited funds, and prioritize limited military training opportunities by analyzing the trends, measuring veracity of predictions, and projecting potential locations of future conflict.

The Current State of Forecasting

Governments and businesses spend billions of dollars each year to forecast future markets and scenarios. The global trends and drivers of instability in these forecasts allow institutions to plan and prepare for multiple scenarios. Trillions of public and private dollars are at stake. With this information they can not only plan on how to spend limited money now, but they can also incorporate the potential positive and negative effects on future revenue streams. This paper will consider those forecasts most closely related to international conflict. The most prominent today are the National Intelligence Council's (NICs) *Global Trends 2030*, The Atlantic Council's *Global Risks 2035*, and DOD's *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2030*. Each service has its own version of the latter, but JOE 2030 provides a good overarching summary of them.

NIC published *Global Trends 2030* in December of 2012. This is the fifth installment which NIC circulates every five years. The next version is due later this year. The ostensible goal of this forecast is to “provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.”³ It identifies four “megatrends” that will affect every international organization: an acceleration of individual empowerment, a diffusion of power, growing demand for resources as the global population increases, and changing demographic patterns resulting from urbanization, migration, and the average age of a country’s population. It also describes in detail six potential game-changers and eight possible Black Swans for planners to consider. Most importantly, it outlines four “alternative worlds” which could result from the forces mentioned above.

Two variables largely define the projections: economics and the progress of globalization. The perception of economic inequality frequently incites unrest between groups of people. Globalization is the measure of economic dependency between organizations in countries throughout the world. Both variables are integral to most forecasts. Figure 1 briefly describes the four scenarios in *Global Trends 2030*.

Figure 1: The Four Scenarios from *Global Trends 2030*

1. “Stalled Engines” - globalization stalls as the US and Europe turn inward
2. “Fusion” - the US and China cooperate leading to worldwide cooperation
3. “Gini-Out-of-the-Bottle” - a world dominated by economic inequalities
4. “Nonstate World” - non-state actors take a leading role around the world


Source: *Global Trends 2030*, page 113.

Each scenario also explains potential conflict that could result but only in generic terms of regions and people-groups, which is only minimally helpful to military planners.

³ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (Washington DC: December 2012), i.

Global Trends 2030 measures the outcome of each scenario in the projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each country. It compares the US share to the rest of the world and breaks down the other countries by region. It describes a range of potential GDPs, depicted by “the Futures Cone” model in figure 2. Since nobody can precisely predict future numbers, experts define ranges in which future values will probably lie.

Figure 2: The Futures Cone



source: <https://geopoliticatus.wordpress.com/tag/joseph-voros/a>

Once again, this would be helpful for government and business leaders making budget plans but not useful in identifying locations for future conflict.

Global Risks 2035 builds on this forecast and adds some specifics, particularly in relation to areas of potential conflict around the world. The author, Mat Burroughs, is now director of the Atlantic Council’s “Strategic Foresight Initiative” after retiring from twenty-eight years with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of State. He was also the lead author of NIC’s *Global Trends 2030*. He has added the impact of growing resentment by Russia and China to Western dominance as well as the impact of regionalized conflict in places like the Middle East, which has been exporting terrorism to the West. He expands this potential to Asia and Africa with growing religious tensions.

Global Risks 2035 also incorporates the drawbacks to globalization and technology advances. Once the harbinger of economic equality, both are now creating losers in the near term, not just winners. For a time, all peoples benefitted from the economic benefits of lower costs that came from globalization and advances in technology. Now they are increasing the needs for higher education, leading to the same historical disparity between upper and lower classes. Western democracies are not realizing a drop in spending on social welfare programs, particularly when combined with aging populations. This is in contrast to many developing countries, which are experiencing an increase in youth population leading to unrest, as seen in the Arab Spring. Internal economic and social pressures in the West are leading to a reluctance to get involved in such unrest throughout the world, particularly with the Russian and Chinese resentment mentioned on the last page.

Burroughs outlines five potential “alternative worlds,” each briefly described in figure 3.

Figure 3: The Five Alternative Worlds from *Global Risks 2035*

1. “Fragmented World” - increasing isolationism and protectionism in both the US and Europe with lower long-term economic growth, and China and Russia becoming regionally dominant
2. “New Cold War” - China experiences economic decline leading to deeper separation between East and West and ultimately larger-scale conflict
3. “Ageless World” - economic stress worldwide from the costs of aging populations and lack of opportunities for younger workers as life expectancy rises
4. “Strange Bedfellows” - among other alliances, China and the US unite to combat the threat of increased terrorism, leading to renewed importance of states
5. “Urban Oasis” - cities become more important than and dominant over central governments that cannot provide adequate services for growing populations

Source: *Global Risks 2035*, page vii.

Once again, these scenarios fall in a broad cone of future possibilities that could call for a wide variety of military action. It doesn't narrow down options for military planners.

Fortunately, *JOE 2035* was designed to fill this gap. The stated purpose of this report is to describe “the future security environment” so that the Joint Force “can anticipate and prepare for potential conflicts.”⁴ Unfortunately, it limits the scope to describing the circumstances of the future security environment and avoids specific locations and events. Even though this will not help answer the question of whether the US will fight in “places without bases,” it makes a significant contribution towards determining the context of future conflict that could provide guidance pertaining to how DOD should train, man, and equip the force for conflict in 2030 and beyond.

Like *Global Risks 2035*, *JOE 2035* also builds off NIC’s *Global Trends* project. Both are regularly published reports designed to address the future operational challenges of the US government -- one politically, the other militarily. *JOE 2035* further utilizes other DOD assessments and collaborates with the individual services and their War Colleges as well as US allies in order to identify emerging security challenges. The Joint Concepts Division under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is responsible for writing the document.

The paper is divided into three sections describing the future security environment, six potential contexts for future conflict, and implications for the Joint Force. All three elements provide the US military with the best planning criteria of all the forecasts currently out there. It can help answer some of the questions as to how to train, man, and equip the force for combat in 2035. Even so, it also avoids the particular locations, which commanders need in order to prepare their service members.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington DC: July 14, 2016), 1.

Case Study

At the beginning of every year, prognosticators come out with predictions as to what will happen in the next twelve months. Some are as generic and obvious as a tornado in Kansas; others are as remote as an insurgency in the US. They garner headlines and generate public discussions as to what the year may hold. Not only are they typically unhelpful for planners in business or government, but most are not analyzed at the end of the year for accuracy. The same goes for many current forecasting products. While some will review previous trends and drivers, few forecasts and methodologies are truly measured to determine how accurate they were in the past. That is a likely result from many either being inaccurate or missing critical events, Black Swans notwithstanding. Yet to determine which type of forecasting to use for effective planning military, one must make an attempt to measure how effective such forecasts have been at predicting future global conflict. This section addresses that challenge.

The one modern forecast which actually went back and assessed its previous product was NIC's *Global Trends 2015*. Published in December of 2000, *Global Trends 2015* includes a section that revisits its previous forecast, which was the first in the series. It is still the best evaluation of a past forecast. The authors used the four years in between forecasts to test the methods and judgements used in that first edition. As a result, the authors stated that they "expanded our treatment of drivers, altered some projections we made in 1997, and matured our thinking overall."⁵ It caused them to alter six of the trends and drivers and five of the projections they made in the new edition.

⁵ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts* (Washington DC: December 2000), 6.

The most significant impact came from missing the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. The troubles centered in East Asia but had economic and political reverberations around the world. The currencies of multiple countries in this one region were devalued, governments were unable to make required payments, and political leaders were ousted in response to internal conflict. The crisis had the potential for severe economic contraction. Fortunately, multiple intergovernmental agencies (IGOs) such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund assisted in softening the long-term impact, engineering a relatively quick turnaround, and avoiding international conflict. Nonetheless, the situation highlighted the importance of overcoming obstacles to economic development and the struggles that can erupt from such difficulties.

This also served to emphasize the increasing importance of globalization. The authors subsequently employed globalization as a more powerful driver in the next edition. IGOs centered on economic relationships like the World Trade Organization (WTO) became more prominent. Closely related to this was the spread of cheaper technology, particularly related to science and information technology. The authors identified technology as a more important tool in growing economies and maintaining stable governments and put much more weight on it in their methodology.

Two final resulting changes came from the availability of natural resources and the role of leading countries and regions. It particularly mentions the impact of water scarcity on potential conflict. It also outlines the importance of the US as a world leader, the effect of declining power in Russia, the growing power and importance of China as it copes with these trends, and the negative outlook in Middle Eastern countries.

The result of such analysis shows that *Global Trends* is truly an effective forecasting tool that one can use for aspects of future planning. While nobody can accurately predict all future events or even all of the trends, comprehensive forecasts can be helpful as long as researchers adapt the methodologies in response to previous results. *Global Trends* has done this and continues to do so. It has provided a good basis for other forecasts like *Global Risks* and *JOE 2035* and contains relevant trends and drivers that this project will use for developing military planning applications.

Concept

These forecasts provide the foundation for the fundamental purpose of this project: constructing a tool that can help predict locations of potential future conflict fifteen to twenty years from now. To accomplish this, the model requires two more components. The first is a method for applying the trends and drivers to each of the countries throughout the world and creating a measurable scale by which to compare them to each other. Second is a way to visually map them.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) can serve as a starting point for the first task. The Fund For Peace (FFP) has published this report annually for the past eleven years. It has created a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) that incorporates the trends and drivers mentioned thus far, along with a number of other variables. CAST produces scores for all of the countries that are members of the United Nations. The latest report from 2016 is based on data collected during the 2015 calendar year. Adjusting this data with information from the forecasts highlighted in this paper will produce the ranking system needed to measure countries for likelihood of future conflict.

The only drawback to the FSI for purposes of this project is that it is based on current information and not necessarily looking forward to fifteen to twenty years from now. It is possible, however, to go back and compare how the most vulnerable countries ranked in the past. Since this is the twelfth edition, one can go back eleven years. Of the sixteen countries that are in the FSI's "Very High Alert" or "High Alert" categories for 2016, ten were in the same position in the very first publication in 2005 (Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Chad, Congo (D.R.), Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Guinea, and Zimbabwe). One, Sudan, even had a civil war and split into two countries during that time. Countries do not move a lot over the years, so the model can effectively use the FSI methodology and rankings as leading indicators.

While conducting research for this project, I interviewed Mat Burroughs, author of *Global Risks 2035* and lead writer for *Global Trends 2030*. He stated that the two most important factors contributing to conflict around the world were youth bulges and water availability. Both are mentioned as drivers in all of the forecasts, and he recommended weighting them more heavily. Among all of the indicators in the forecasts, youth bulges are the top indicator for future conflict. There is a "high correlation between youth bulges and the propensity for conflict, either inside or between countries."⁶ Regarding water as the second key indicator, it is the primary of all resources needed by everyone. Water scarcity becomes even more significant as population increases and average age decreases. Combine that with the fact that both indicators are at high risk in the same regions, and it is evident that "water scarcities are a growing threat."⁷

⁶ Mat Burroughs, *Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal* (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, 2016), 18.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Given median age and water scarcity, I then took the twelve indicators in the FSI and narrowed them down to the eight that best fit the megatrends and game-changers from *Global Trends 2030*. Details about selecting these eight will be covered in the next section. Each indicator is published on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being the lowest threat and 10 being the highest threat. With ten categories, each country will then have a simple score between 1 and 100 that can be mapped and measured against each other.

To compile numbers for the two new categories, I researched the recent data from respected organizations. For age figures, I utilized median age statistics published by the CIA in the World Factbook, aspects of which are updated monthly but were last officially copyrighted in 2013. To scale these median ages from 1 to 10, I created categories that each covered three ages, except for the first one which covered the remaining ten ages. The 1 category included ages 42-53, and 10 covered ages 15-17.

Much data was available regarding water. Including the most suitable figures required further examination. Some organizations measured how much fresh water was available in each country for drinking and farming. Others measured how well each country was able to replenish the water used by all aspects of its economy. Most countries also rely on water for industries that are vital to their economies. All these factors are important to incorporate. For that reason, I selected data from the World Resource Institute. It published a report in 2015 that not only weighed the ability of a country to replenish what it used but also categorized it on a percentage basis that could be easily scaled from 1 to 10, with 1 being easy and 10 being difficult to replace. With these figures in place, I compiled all of them into one spreadsheet.

The final challenge was graphing this data on a map. With technology today, there are many expensive options available to accomplish this. Fortunately, there were a number of free options available on the internet that used Office 2010. Most are only two color, but I found one by Robert Mundigl out of Germany that was a full-color map of the world in Excel. The only drawback to this method was that they are based on a world map from 2010. While it was a limitation that I had to accept, the differences did not significantly impact the results. For example, even though Sudan and South Sudan are now separate countries, their values were not very different so the final map was basically the same as if they were listed separately.

Trends and Drivers

With all the data set, the last step is determining which ten indicators to include in the final index. The first two will, of course, be the new age and water data to be weighted more heavily in the new forecast. FSI then has twelve indicators, which must be narrowed down to eight. All twelve are listed in Appendix 4. Some of them overlap with the new age and water data, which makes the part of the selection process easier, but a sound process is needed for making the final choices.

The final eight selected must best represent the remaining trends and drivers denoted in the featured forecasts, particularly *Global Trends 2030*, in order to create a more accurate index. The FSI provides sub-indicators for each of the twelve, each with more detailed information that can help determine which particular drivers and trends are included within each indicator. To make the final selections, I turned to “Scenario Analysis” for help in constructing a final product that is uniquely valuable.

Producing one simple forecast may not be best since it is nearly impossible to accurately forecast a single outcome. It would be static and, if inaccurate, particularly unhelpful in preparing for future conflict. On the other hand, creating a broad range of future possibilities, as with the Futures Cone, is no different than many other forecasts and still not helpful to military planners. I instead aim to create a product that not only provides a fixed forecast for planners to visualize but one that can also be modified for revised data. As values change, or if changes to variables are anticipated, the formula can be recalculated and a new map created to reflect these changes.

Doing so would also allow for parallel forecasts of the same time period in the future, given particular adjustments to certain variables that can be controlled by the user. To some extent, this is what the highlighted forecasts do: provide “alternative worlds.” They are more art than science, however. In contrast, assembling this data and putting it into a mathematical formula will enable the functionality described above in a way more easily understood by users. It will allow planners to conduct Scenario Analysis on the parallel forecasts. Comparing two (or more) forecasts for the same period will then allow planners to see how similar or how different the outcomes are based on specific variables.


Scenario Analysis relies on categorizing the various drivers into two groups. In this case, two categories best summarize the trends and drivers, as depicted in figure 4.

Figure 4: Two Primary Categories for Trends and Drivers

1. Effective Governance - ranging from ineffective to very effective
2. Economic Growth - ranging from negative to positive growth

The governance category includes all aspects of government from political to military. It covers how well governments provide for their people and how they interact with other countries. The economic category covers all things financial from budgets to currency. Both are influenced by multiple aspects of the same drivers including technology, infrastructure, aging and growth of population, access to natural resources, and so on.

By applying these categories to a two-dimensional graph, one can better visualize and describe four potential scenarios. The “Potential Worlds” in *Global Trends 2030* plot nicely into the resulting graph depicted in figure 5. (See figure 1 for descriptions).



Interestingly, one could also plot each country on such a graph. For purposes of this paper, however, it is more important to understand the overall order resulting from the two variables. *Global Trends'* four “Potential Worlds” matching with the four quadrants in the preceding graph corroborates the process outlined thus far. Not only does this new scheme coincide with other proven methods, but it is also complimentary to the forecasts that have been proven to be a good foundation upon which to build.

From these two categories, depicted as the two axes in Figure 5, I can now build two unique projections: one emphasizing economics and the other emphasizing governance. For the final eight indicators in the economic projection, I utilized both of FSI's economic indicators, two of their four social indicators, and four of their six political and military indicators. Details for each of these can be found in Appendix 5. For the governance projection, I included one of their economic indicators, the same two social indicators, and five of their six political and military indicators. Appendix 6 contains the details for this projection.

Both appendices also include details on the youth bulges and water scarcity indicators, as well as the scoring methodology. The two social indicators selected for both projections were an easy choice since the other two contained data from data sets for youth bulges and water scarcity. Selecting different indicators from the economic and the political and military indicators provides the unique weighting for economic versus governance projections. Appendices 1 and 2 contain the end results for each of these projections, including the final map and all related data for each. The next section will now analyze and compare them.

Analysis

The data, formulae, and mapping are now in place. The final step is comparing the two maps and data sets. Comparing these two projections constructed from an economic emphasis and governance emphasis allows military planners to visualize the difference between the alternative worlds. This is the true benefit from this project, comparing one to another, to the current world order, or to another "alternative world."

Below are the two maps for purposes of comparison in this paper. Figure 6 depicts the economic emphasis and figure 7 the governance emphasis. Military planners can now plan for each scenario and then see how different those plans would be.

Figure 6: Conflict Risk World Map 2030 (*Economic Emphasis*) see Appendix 1 for details





Figure 7: Conflict Risk World Map 2030 (*Governance Emphasis*) see Appendix 2 for details



At first glance, some commonalities are visible. Overall risk for conflict is obviously greatest in Africa and the Middle East in both scenarios. This corresponds with where conflict continues to develop today. Close behind is the risk in Korea, southern Asia, and the islands to the south. This all coincides with findings in *Global Risks 2035*.

“Conflict Risk Increasing” is the title of Chapter Five. “During the next twenty years, a number of limited interstate conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Central and South Asia could develop over access to raw materials.”⁸ *Global Trends 2030* adds that “the Middle East and South Asia are the two regions most likely to trigger broader instability.”⁹ Both forecasts further confirm the methodology used to derive the projections in here. This is evident in the results from both projections. The lesson from this for military planners is to be prepared for conflict in hotter, drier, and desert-like conditions.

Another large land mass that is hard to miss on both maps is Russia. It is ranked 90 among the 189 countries for risk of conflict in the economic projection but 55 in the governance projection. FSI ranks it 65. By score, it moves from 6.0 to 6.8, still in the same “warning” grouping but at a much higher risk for conflict. Of interest, this implies that struggles in and with Russia will not necessarily be over resources but over effective governance, both internally and externally. The same shift occurs in its neighbors, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, each of which move into the “warning” group under the governance projection. While the greatest takeaway from this may be for diplomats, it warns the military planner of the possibility for larger-scale conflict.

⁸ Mat Burroughs, *Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal* (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, 2016), 37.

⁹ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (Washington DC: December 2012), viii.

A similar situation occurs to the south where China also moves up into the “warning” group, from a 5.6 to a 6.3 score, if the main driver is governance over economics. This suggests that China may be able to adequately manage its quest for resources for the near future and that governance poses a greater risk. This confirms the previous warning to military planners that larger-scale conflict may pose a greater risk than in the past three decades. This, too, coincides with the featured forecasts. Chapter Five of *Global Risks 2035* goes on to explain that both China and Russia are more apt to object to Western leadership and principles of governance today than over the past twenty-five years. If this holds true, diplomats and service members may be busier dealing with these two large countries over the next fifteen to twenty years, both of which possess greater economic and military threats than the US has faced for decades.

Regarding large, populous countries, India cannot be overlooked. It ranks relatively high in both projections. It is in the “warning” category for both with relatively high scores of 6.8 for economics and 6.6 for governance. *Global Trends 2030* cites India, along with Russia and China, as a key player that could increase the risk of interstate conflict as it contends for resources (page viii). *Global Risks 2035* includes a chart on page 65 that not only projects China will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2030 but India will move up into third place. What requires attention is that not only does India share a border with China but other neighbors rank much higher for risk of future conflict. Countries include Pakistan (8.6/8.7), Afghanistan (8.9/8.9), Iran (7.2/8.0), Nepal (7.4/7.4), Myanmar (7.2/7.4), and Sri Lanka (6.9/7.4). This is another vital aspect of comparison for military planners. When a key player like India is surrounded by countries at greater risk of conflict, it holds more influence for peace or war.

The regions and countries outlined thus far represent the most significant findings from this project. Of course with 189 countries in this index, there is still room for further analysis. However, additional situations are either at lower risk or do not represent a large change from the current scenario. For example, the Korean Peninsula is an area that already receives much attention and will likely not change unless something significant occurs, such as unification, which could result from positive or negative activity in the coming years. Likewise, planners could conduct much more analysis on southern Asia with its numerous countries, islands, sea lanes, and growing religious tensions leading to terrorist attacks. Mexico, Central America, and the northern half of South America, notably Brazil, also pose unique challenges with growing economies and noteworthy populations. Currently, such conclusions are more pertinent to diplomats and statecraft than to military services.

Furthermore, additional comparisons could be made with respect to the current world order, other forecasts like the FSI, and even new forecasts created from this methodology created from updated data, different emphases, or other new assessments. This undertaking, however, is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of each country throughout the world, although it does allow for that should planners desire to conduct a more in-depth look at a particular region. Indeed, such analysis could be useful as militaries prepare for upcoming engagements to see how involvement might impact one country as well as those around it. Rather, this project is intended as an advance toward quantifying such comparison and analysis so that researchers can use more science than art in exploring further scenarios. Analysis could be accomplished by changing data instead of changing models.

Conclusions

The benefit of this methodology is threefold. First, it graphically depicts how the trends and drivers impact various countries and regions on a tangible scale. Second, it provides the ability to change the emphasis on certain variables in order to compare the changing outcomes. Finally, the first two combine to create the third benefit: being able to see the difference between alternative futures and between countries in various regions. The key to utilization is in the comparisons outlined in the previous Analysis section.

Such analysis should continue as the variables change. For example, game-changers like nuclear capabilities could have significant impact, particularly if new countries already at high risk of conflict obtain them. Also, aging populations and the impact on burdensome government expenses could limit some countries ability to engage in conflict. Lastly, should non-state actors be able take control of multiple states, scenarios will change. Even so, all of these factors could be incorporated into new projections and provide the ability to compare changing projections.

One static projection of the future would be very nice but isn't possible. Yet, without a system like this, leading countries would face two undesirable situations. They would either have to prepare for multiple scenarios with huge expenses they could not afford or they would prepare for limited scenarios and run the risk of being wrong and thus unprepared for what may be the actual scenario. Analysis must indeed continue as such factors change.


Interestingly, the overall risk of conflict for all countries ranks 5.7 on the scale of 1 to 10 in both the economic and governance projections. The difference is in which countries are at higher risk in each projection. Economics are more important in Africa and the Middle East. Governance is more important in Asia. Such results allow planners to change priorities as such drivers are identified as more important.

It is evident from this endeavor that future conflict is indeed likely to occur in “places without bases,” locations where the US has little of the typical support structure required for military engagements. Such regions include Africa, parts of the Middle East, and southern Asia. Specific countries include Russia, China, and possibly India, although the location of potential conflict is uncertain. Engagements could be in proximity to these key players or could take on the character of proxy wars as countries vie for limited resources around the world with growing populations and economies. The maps provide insight as to where such struggles will likely take place.

The results outline here will challenge military planners and operators to adapt in one of two ways: either establish basing agreements or Status of Forces Agreements with countries in the regions noted that could support US military operations or adapt training, manning, and equipping of the force so it can operate in “places without bases.” Such adaptations could include streamlined force structure, lighter equipment, or technology advances that could make forces less reliant on long-distance logistical support. While this project may not provide the ultimate tool in preparing for future conflict, hopefully it is one more enhancement in modernizing military planning.

Appendix 1

World Conflict Index Map 2030
Economic Emphasis



Appendix 1

1e			World Conflict Index 2030 Economic Emphasis	Average	Gov Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Public Services	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Gov	Econ														
4	1	1	Yemen	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.5	8.4	9.4	9.3	10	9.5	10	9	9.8	94.5
6	2	2	Syria	9.0	9.3	10	10	7.4	7.8	8.9	10	9.9	10	7	8.7	89.7
9	5	3	Afghanistan	8.9	8.9	9.5	8.6	7.5	8.5	9.6	10	8.6	9.9	9	8.1	89.3
11	3	4	Iraq	8.9	9.2	9.4	9.8	7.5	6.8	7.8	10	9.6	9.7	9	9.0	88.6
1	4	5	Somalia	8.9	9.0	9.7	9.4	9.3	9.0	9.0	9.7	10	9.5	10	3.3	88.9
3	7	6	Central African Rep	8.6	8.7	10	9.3	9.9	8.6	10	9.2	10	9.5	9	0.0	85.5
14	8	7	Pakistan	8.6	8.7	8.9	9.7	7.0	7.4	8.2	9.3	8.9	9.6	8	8.8	85.8
4	6	8	Sudan	8.6	8.8	10	9.8	7.6	8.7	9.1	9.2	10	9.9	9	2.9	86.2
7	12	9	Chad	8.4	8.4	9.8	8.5	9.3	8.0	9.8	9.1	9.8	8.5	10	0.8	83.6
8	9	10	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	8.4	8.5	9.7	9.7	8.9	8.1	9.7	9.2	9.8	9.7	9	0.0	83.8
21	10	11	Cote d'Ivoire	8.4	8.5	8.0	8.3	8.2	6.8	8.7	7.7	9.4	9.4	9		75.5
10	13	12	Haiti	8.4	8.2	7.9	6.7	9.5	8.9	9.4	7.9	9.6	9.9	8	5.7	83.5
25	11	13	Libya	8.1	8.5	8.0	8.3	5.8	8.0	7.2	9.6	9.4	9.7	6	9.5	81.5
18	15	14	Eritrea	7.9	8.1	8.5	6.6	7.5	8.3	8.6	7.4	8.1	7.9	9	7.0	78.9
12	19	15	Guinea	7.9	7.8	8.4	8.8	7.4	9.4	9.2	9.0	9.9	7.6	9	0.0	78.7
40	14	16	Lebanon	7.9	8.2	9.5	8.7	5.8	6.1	5.9	8.9	9.3	9.3	6	9.8	79.3
13	17	17	Nigeria	7.9	8.0	7.7	9.4	8.8	7.7	9.4	9.7	9.9	6.5	9	1.3	79.4
19	27	18	Niger	7.8	7.5	8.0	7.7	8.2	8.0	9.2	8.9	8.9	8.3	10	0.4	77.6
15	18	19	Burundi	7.7	7.8	9.1	8.1	7.4	8.2	8.2	9.0	8.5	8.7	10	0.0	77.2
20	25	20	Kenya	7.7	7.6	8.0	9.1	8.0	7.4	8.2	8.5	8.9	8.3	9	1.1	76.5
35	36	21	Timor-Leste	7.7	7.3	6.5	6.7	7.0	8.1	8.7	7.4	8.3	9.0	9	6.1	76.8
16	20	22	Zimbabwe	7.7	7.8	8.7	7.5	8.2	8.3	8.5	7.8	9.8	7.7	9	1.9	77.4
24	21	23	Ethiopia	7.6	7.7	9.5	8.6	6.7	6.7	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.2	10	1.3	75.7
17	29	24	Guinea Bissau	7.6	7.4	7.5	5.4	8.7	8.5	9.5	9.1	9.6	8.5	9	0.0	75.8
27	43	25	Liberia	7.5	7.1	8.9	6.0	8.6	8.3	9.5	6.6	8.3	9.5	9	0.0	74.7
29	38	26	Mali	7.5	7.2	8.1	7.9	7.6	7.9	9.0	9.2	5.2	9.6	10	0.7	75.2
23	26	27	Uganda	7.5	7.6	9.1	9.0	7.6	6.7	8.5	7.3	8.9	8.0	10	0.0	75.1
22	23	28	Cameroon	7.4	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.1	6.3	8.9	8.1	9.4	8.0	9	0.0	74.3
28	35	29	Mauritania	7.4	7.3	8.2	7.2	7.0	7.9	9.2	7.1	8.8	8.2	9	1.5	74.1
33	31	30	Nepal	7.4	7.4	8.0	9.5	7.2	7.0	7.4	6.7	8.3	7.1	8	4.4	73.6
52	47	31	Solomon Islands	7.3	7.0	4.6	6.5	9.2	7.3	7.9	6.1	8.2	8.3	8		66.1
26	28	32	Burma (Myanmar)	7.2	7.4	8.3	9.9	7.9	6.4	8.7	8.4	8.6	7.5	6	0.3	72.0
57	54	33	Comoros	7.2	6.8	4.7	5.0	7.2	8.2	8.4	6.9	7.5	7.5	9		64.4
38	24	34	Egypt	7.2	7.6	7.0	9.0	6.2	8.4	5.1	8.3	8.8	8.1	8	3.0	71.9
47	16	35	Iran	7.2	8.0	6.7	8.8	5.8	6.6	4.7	7.7	9.6	6.7	6	9.7	72.3
69	22	36	Israel (West Bank)	7.2	7.7	7.5	9.8	7.0	4.0	5.0	7.1	8.1	7.7	6	10	72.2
77	30	37	Jordan	7.1	7.4	9.3	7.7	5.6	6.6	4.4	5.2	6.9	7.3	8	9.7	70.7
64	34	38	Kyrgyzstan	7.1	7.3	5.5	8.6	6.1	7.2	5.3	6.5	8.0	6.6	7	9.8	70.6

Appendix 1

2e			World Conflict Index 2030 Economic Emphasis	Average	Gov Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Public Services	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Gov	Econ														
54	39	39	Philippines	7.1	7.2	7.1	8.1	5.9	5.7	6.9	9.4	8.0	6.6	8	5.6	71.3
37	41	40	Angola	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.7	9.6	6.1	9.2	6.2	7.2	5.6	9	1.8	69.7
32	44	41	Rwanda	7.0	7.1	8.0	9.1	8.5	6.2	7.6	5.9	8.3	7.7	9	0.0	70.3
34	75	42	Sierra Leone	7.0	6.4	7.9	5.9	8.5	8.8	9.0	4.5	7.8	8.1	9	0.0	69.5
41	53	43	Burkina Faso	6.9	6.8	6.8	4.7	8.4	6.5	8.9	8.1	8.1	7.7	10	0.2	69.4
31	45	44	Congo (Republic of)	6.9	7.0	7.9	6.9	8.3	6.7	9.2	6.7	6.7	7.3	9	0.0	68.7
39	51	45	Djibouti	6.9	6.9	7.5	6.7	8.1	7.1	8.1	6.6	7.3	8.9	8	0.5	68.8
30	42	46	Korea, North	6.9	7.1	4.6	6.0	7.7	8.9	8.8	8.5	8.5	9.3	4	3.1	69.4
42	68	47	Mozambique	6.9	6.5	5.5	5.6	8.9	7.7	9.2	6.7	6.9	7.6	10	1.2	69.3
43	32	48	Sri Lanka	6.9	7.4	7.9	9.2	7.3	5.6	5.3	7.6	8.8	6.5	5	6.0	69.2
70	61	49	India	6.8	6.6	5.5	8.5	7.2	5.3	7.6	7.6	7.3	5.6	6	7.3	67.9
79	40	50	Turkey	6.8	7.2	8.8	9.5	5.9	4.8	4.6	7.8	7.6	5.6	5	8.2	67.8
36	50	51	Bangladesh	6.7	6.9	6.3	8.9	6.9	6.3	7.8	7.8	9.6	6.0	7	0.6	67.2
56	79	52	Madagascar	6.7	6.3	3.6	4.3	8.8	7.8	9.3	7.3	7.8	7.0	9	1.9	66.8
44	73	53	Malawi	6.7	6.4	6.3	5.1	8.5	8.6	8.1	4.5	7.7	8.4	10	0.0	67.2
59	81	54	Senegal	6.7	6.3	7.5	6.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	5.9	6.6	6.8	9	1.5	66.7
44	58	55	Swaziland	6.7	6.7	4.8	3.4	8.4	9.4	7.8	6.0	6.8	7.3	8	5.0	66.9
60	33	56	Uzbekistan	6.7	7.4	5.7	7.3	7.1	6.5	5.1	7.3	8.8	4.8	6	8.2	66.8
76	49	57	Algeria	6.6	6.9	6.5	7.9	6.3	6.8	5.5	7.7	7.1	5.1	6	7.5	66.4
57	48	58	Tajikistan	6.6	7.0	4.5	7.6	5.3	7.5	5.8	6.9	8.4	6.1	7	6.8	65.9
61	66	59	Guatemala	6.5	6.5	5.8	8.2	8.3	5.7	7.7	7.3	6.8	5.4	8	1.6	64.8
50	74	60	Papua New Guinea	6.5	6.4	4.7	6.5	9.3	5.8	9.2	7.2	7.1	7.0	8	0.2	65.0
62	88	61	Tanzania	6.5	6.2	6.9	5.4	7.3	6.4	8.8	5.2	6.0	7.4	10	1.9	65.3
51	69	62	Togo	6.5	6.5	6.8	4.8	8.4	6.5	8.3	6.7	7.6	6.2	9	0.2	64.5
49	83	63	Zambia	6.5	6.3	6.6	5.4	8.9	8.1	8.1	4.7	5.7	6.9	10	0.2	64.6
81	37	64	Azerbaijan	6.4	7.2	7.9	6.7	5.6	3.8	5.1	6.4	7.9	6.6	5	8.7	63.7
46	60	65	Cambodia	6.4	6.6	5.9	7.1	6.8	5.9	8.0	6.4	8.3	7.6	7	0.8	63.8
66	97	66	Lesotho	6.4	5.9	4.8	4.1	7.6	8.2	8.3	5.9	7.3	8.0	7	3.0	64.2
80	100	67	Micronesia	6.4	5.8	3.6	4.0	8.5	9.0	6.2	4.8	5.6	9.2	7		57.9
63	59	68	Venezuela	6.4	6.7	4.8	7.4	6.9	7.0	7.2	6.8	8.2	5.6	6	3.9	63.8
48	72	69	Gambia	6.3	6.4	6.5	3.4	6.9	8.1	8.0	6.0	6.8	7.2	9	0.9	62.8
72	57	70	Georgia	6.3	6.7	7.7	8.1	5.7	5.6	4.5	7.0	9.1	7.6	3	4.9	63.2
68	78	71	Honduras	6.3	6.3	4.0	6.1	7.9	6.6	7.0	7.0	6.8	7.7	8	1.4	62.5
103	107	72	Namibia	6.3	5.6	5.2	6.0	8.4	7.0	7.6	5.2	3.5	6.6	8	5.2	62.7
88	70	73	Tunisia	6.3	6.5	4.2	7.9	5.1	6.9	4.6	7.9	7.8	6.6	5	7.5	63.5
84	84	74	Ecuador	6.2	6.2	5.4	7.5	6.9	5.5	6.0	6.5	8.2	5.8	6	3.8	61.6
53	56	75	Equatorial Guinea	6.2	6.7	3.6	6.3	8.9	6.2	7.4	6.7	8.2	5.2	9	0.0	61.5

Appendix 1

82	65	76	Fiji	6.2	6.5	3.3	7.1	6.5	6.7	4.5	6.8	7.9	7.4	6		56.2
3e			World Conflict Index 2030 Economic Emphasis	Average	Gov Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Public Services	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Gov	Econ														
89	62	77	Morocco	6.2	6.6	5.6	7.4	6.4	5.0	5.4	5.4	6.6	5.7	6	9.0	62.5
97	46	78	Saudi Arabia	6.2	7.0	4.9	7.5	5.5	4.7	4.0	6.5	8.2	4.9	6	10	62.2
72	101	79	Benin	6.1	5.7	5.7	3.6	7.8	6.3	8.9	5.9	7.0	6.8	9	0.0	61.0
86	85	80	Indonesia	6.1	6.2	5.6	7.3	6.0	5.5	6.1	5.9	7.0	5.4	6	5.9	60.7
11			Macedonia	6.1	6.0	7.0	7.1	5.4	6.0	4.1	5.7	7.3	6.2	3	8.7	60.5
1	93	81														
10			South Africa	6.1	5.7	5.6	6.3	7.7	6.6	7.2	5.8	5.6	3.2	7	6.1	61.1
8	105	82														
83	52	83	Turkmenistan	6.1	6.9	3.7	6.8	6.9	5.1	5.8	6.5	7.8	4.3	6	8.5	61.4
75	89	84	Bolivia	6.0	6.1	4.1	6.2	8.8	5.1	7.0	6.7	8.3	6.0	7	1.1	60.3
67	71	85	Colombia	6.0	6.4	7.9	7.0	7.8	3.9	6.1	7.0	7.6	6.2	6	0.6	60.1
55	67	86	Laos	6.0	6.5	5.3	6.6	7.1	5.4	7.2	5.7	8.3	6.3	8	0.1	60.0
10			Mexico	6.0	6.1	4.1	6.7	6.3	4.4	6.5	8.0	5.1	5.2	6	7.7	60.0
7	91	87														
71	94	88	Nicaragua	6.0	6.0	4.2	6.7	8.2	5.9	6.9	5.7	7.1	7.5	7	0.8	60.0
98	87	89	Peru	6.0	6.2	4.5	7.6	7.6	3.4	6.9	7.3	6.9	3.7	6	6.3	60.2
65	55	90	Russia	6.0	6.8	6.0	9.0	6.4	5.4	4.4	9.2	8.1	5.9	2	3.4	59.8
10			Armenia	5.9	6.3	6.7	5.6	4.7	6.5	3.8	5.0	7.0	6.9	4	8.7	58.9
9	76	91														
78	95	92	Bhutan	5.9	5.9	7.2	7.6	6.6	5.2	6.3	4.7	7.5	8.2	6	0.0	59.3
10			Cape Verde	5.9	5.7	4.4	4.1	7.3	5.7	6.2	5.4	5.5	7.8	7		53.4
1	102	93														
74	63	94	Thailand	5.9	6.6	6.1	9.0	5.5	3.8	4.6	9.2	9.7	4.0	3	3.8	58.7
85	82	95	Ukraine	5.9	6.3	4.3	6.9	4.4	7.0	3.9	7.8	8.0	8.8	2	6.2	59.3
10			Dominican Republic	5.8	5.8	3.5	6.0	6.0	5.2	6.8	5.5	6.2	5.6	6	7.6	58.4
5	99	96														
91	80	97	Maldives	5.8	6.3	4.4	4.8	3.8	6.1	5.8	6.6	8.0	6.7	6		52.2
93	98	98	Moldova	5.8	5.9	4.1	7.0	5.0	6.6	5.1	6.3	8.3	7.6	3	5.5	58.5
11			Cyprus	5.7	5.6	5.0	6.5	6.1	6.4	2.7	4.1	7.9	9.2	3		50.9
9	106	99														
11			Kazakhstan	5.7	6.2	3.2	7.3	4.4	6.6	4.2	5.4	7.6	4.4	5	9.3	57.4
3	86	100														
88	96	101	Bosnia	5.6	5.9	7.8	7.0	5.3	5.7	3.8	5.9	8.7	8.4	2	0.9	55.5
86	77	102	China	5.6	6.3	5.1	8.1	7.5	4.1	5.9	5.6	7.2	2.9	3	6.6	56.0
11			Samoa	5.6	5.4	2.4	4.5	5.1	6.5	5.1	4.9	5.1	8.9	8		50.5
0	112	103														
12			Botswana	5.5	5.0	4.7	5.1	8.0	6.0	7.0	3.8	3.3	4.3	8	4.8	55.0
0	122	104														
96	109	105	El Salvador	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.2	6.6	5.6	6.6	7.0	4.3	5.6	7	1.5	55.4
10			Ghana	5.5	5.1	5.2	4.6	6.8	6.6	7.4	3.8	4.9	6.9	8	0.9	55.1
2	118	106														

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104	115	107	Guyana	5.5	5.2	3.8	6.4	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.1	5.1	7.0	7	1.3	55.1
9812	113	108	Serbia	5.5	5.4	8.6	7.8	5.0	6.6	4.4	5.7	8.0	6.4	1	1.7	55.2
121	64	109	Bahrain	5.4	6.5	2.5	7.9	4.8	3.5	2.0	6.4	7.1	5.0	5	10	54.2
9811	103	110	Gabon	5.4	5.7	4.7	4.0	6.7	5.0	6.9	4.7	7.1	5.4	9	0.0	53.5
118	119	111	Jamaica	5.4	5.1	3.1	3.6	5.6	7.1	6.1	6.6	3.7	6.0	7		48.8
9592	110	112	Paraguay	5.4	5.5	2.8	6.0	8.1	5.2	6.4	6.8	7.8	4.5	6	0.0	53.6
9211	92	113	Belarus	5.3	6.0	3.8	7.1	4.9	6.2	4.4	6.3	8.3	7.5	2	2.7	53.2
116	121	114	Belize	5.3	5.0	3.8	4.1	5.9	6.4	6.1	6.1	4.3	7.2	8	0.8	52.7
4e			World Conflict Index 2030 Economic Emphasis	Average	Gov Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Public Services	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Gov	Econ														
128	120	115	Mongolia	5.3	5.1	2.7	4.0	6.1	5.0	5.6	3.7	5.5	6.8	6	7.5	52.9
122	124	116	Grenada	5.1	4.9	3.2	3.8	5.0	6.2	4.0	5.9	5.6	6.8	5		45.5
126	90	117	Kuwait	5.1	6.1	3.7	5.2	4.4	2.7	2.8	4.2	7.5	4.5	6	10	51.0
112	126	118	Suriname	5.1	4.9	3.0	5.8	6.3	6.8	5.8	5.1	5.8	6.1	6	0.5	51.2
106	108	119	Vietnam	5.0	5.6	4.4	6.2	5.2	5.3	4.9	4.8	6.9	5.4	5	2.0	50.1
124	117	120	Albania	4.9	5.1	3.3	4.7	3.8	5.5	4.2	4.4	6.2	6.4	5	5.9	49.4
115	104	121	Malaysia	4.9	5.7	3.9	6.7	5.2	3.3	4.4	6.5	6.8	4.0	6	2.6	49.4
125	116	122	Seychelles	4.9	5.2	2.9	4.5	5.7	4.3	2.9	6.3	6.0	7.2	4		43.8
117	123	123	Brazil	4.8	5.0	2.9	5.7	8.0	4.5	6.0	6.4	4.9	3.0	5	1.7	48.1
114	111	124	Cuba	4.8	5.4	4.2	4.2	5.6	4.2	4.3	5.4	7.0	5.3	2	5.7	47.9
130	128	125	Greece	4.8	4.7	5.0	5.1	3.9	7.0	4.0	4.2	3.8	6.1	1	8.2	48.3
137	114	126	Oman	4.7	5.3	2.2	3.1	4.3	4.2	3.7	4.4	6.6	2.0	7	9.9	47.4
127	130	127	Trinidad	4.5	4.5	2.8	4.4	5.1	4.6	4.5	6.0	5.6	3.3	4		40.3
129	129	128	Antigua & Barbuda	4.4	4.6	2.8	3.9	4.7	4.7	4.0	5.4	3.7	5.5	5		39.7
131	131	129	Montenegro	4.4	4.4	4.8	7.6	2.6	4.9	3.3	3.7	6.5	6.2	2	2.1	43.7
140	132	130	Argentina	4.3	4.3	2.5	4.7	5.1	5.5	4.0	4.0	2.8	4.3	5	5.4	43.3
1313	136	131	Bahamas	4.2	4.0	2.7	4.1	4.7	4.5	4.8	4.3	4.5	3.4	5		38.0

Appendix 1

7															
13	140	132	Barbados	4.2	3.8	2.6	4.1	4.8	6.0	2.7	4.4	4.2	5.7	3	37.5
9															
13	137	133	Bulgaria	4.2	4.0	4.0	5.3	4.6	5.9	3.9	3.8	5.3	4.5	1	41.9
2															
14	139	134	Italy	4.1	3.9	5.0	5.0	3.1	5.5	2.3	4.2	4.9	2.5	1	40.7
8															
13	134	135	Panama	4.1	4.1	3.2	5.3	7.6	3.1	5.3	5.4	2.5	2.9	6	41.3
3															
13	135	136	Romania	4.1	4.1	3.0	7.0	4.4	4.9	4.0	3.2	5.4	3.8	2	40.6
4															
14	145	137	Costa Rica	4.0	3.6	3.6	4.4	5.5	4.2	4.1	3.3	3.8	4.3	5	40.1
2															
13	138	138	Croatia	4.0	3.9	7.5	6.0	3.5	5.5	2.6	3.7	4.4	4.8	1	40.0
6															
14	142	139	Estonia	4.0	3.8	2.6	6.8	3.4	3.7	3.1	2.9	5.5	4.0	1	39.9
6															
13	133	140	Hungary	4.0	4.2	6.7	5.0	4.0	5.6	3.4	2.4	5.3	4.1	2	40.0
5															
14	125	141	Qatar	4.0	4.9	2.0	4.6	4.9	2.3	1.5	2.3	5.0	2.9	4	39.5
2															
15	144	142	Spain	3.9	3.7	2.0	5.9	3.7	5.2	2.4	3.0	6.3	2.0	1	39.4
3															
14	127	143	United Arab Emir.	3.9	4.8	2.2	3.6	3.9	2.6	2.4	2.8	3.6	2.6	5	38.7
5															
15	141	144	Chile	3.8	3.8	2.2	3.8	5.4	3.3	4.2	2.9	2.2	2.3	4	38.5
0															
14	146	145	Latvia	3.6	3.6	3.0	7.7	4.3	3.7	3.1	3.2	4.3	4.1	1	36.0
1															
14	148	146	Mauritius	3.6	3.5	2.4	3.8	4.0	4.2	3.5	2.5	3.2	4.9	4	32.5
7															
15	147	147	Czechia	3.5	3.5	4.0	5.0	2.9	4.3	2.8	2.3	5.0	2.9	2	34.8
1															
14	153	148	Lithuania	3.5	3.2	2.4	4.6	4.7	4.7	3.7	3.1	3.0	3.5	1	35.0
9															
14	149	149	Slovakia	3.5	3.5	4.0	6.5	3.7	4.8	2.6	2.0	4.2	3.5	2	35.2
4															
15	150	150	United States	3.4	3.5	2.1	5.1	4.5	2.5	1.8	2.9	4.3	0.9	3	33.6
9															
15	151	151	Poland	3.3	3.3	3.8	4.9	3.2	3.8	2.5	2.0	3.8	3.1	2	33.1
2															
16	143	152	Singapore	3.3	3.8	1.4	2.8	4.0	2.2	1.5	1.7	4.0	1.4	4	33.0
1															

5e			World Conflict Index 2030 Economic Emphasis	Average	Gov Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Public Services	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Gov	Econ														
164	157	153	Belgium	3.2	2.8	2.1	4.4	2.9	4.4	1.8	1.9	3.9	1.2	2	7.3	31.9
158	155	154	France	3.2	3.0	2.7	7.0	3.4	4.5	1.3	3.0	1.9	2.0	2	4.3	32.1
154	154	155	Malta	3.1	3.2	4.1	3.9	2.8	4.2	2.2	3.3	2.0	3.5	2		28.0

Appendix 1


162	156	156	United Kingdom	3.1	2.9	2.2	5.9	3.8	3.8	1.8	2.4	3.5	1.0	2	5.0	31.4
156	152	157	Korea, South	3.0	3.2	1.7	3.1	3.2	2.1	2.1	1.8	3.8	5.1	2	5.2	30.1
163	161	158	Portugal	3.0	2.6	1.9	2.7	2.7	5.0	2.4	1.5	2.5	2.5	2	6.6	29.8
155	159	159	Uruguay	3.0	2.7	2.2	2.7	4.3	3.3	3.1	3.5	2.7	2.7	4	1.2	29.7
157	158	160	Japan	2.9	2.7	3.4	3.9	1.8	4.3	1.8	1.3	2.6	4.0	1	4.6	28.7
165	162	161	Germany	2.7	2.5	5.7	4.8	3.0	2.4	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1	3.5	26.8
172	160	162	Australia	2.6	2.6	2.0	4.1	2.4	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.0	3	6.8	26.3
168	163	163	Luxembourg	2.6	2.5	3.7	3.1	1.7	1.2	2.3	1.9	3.4	1.3	2	5.5	26.1
166	164	164	Netherlands	2.6	2.5	4.0	4.4	2.4	2.9	1.2	1.7	3.1	0.9	1	4.5	26.1
160	165	165	Slovenia	2.6	2.5	4.5	4.2	3.6	4.0	1.7	1.8	1.7	2.5	1	1.2	26.2
167	166	166	Austria	2.4	2.3	6.1	4.0	3.1	1.9	1.3	1.2	2.7	1.4	1	1.0	23.7
172	169	167	Ireland	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.6	2.4	3.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.6	3	3.5	22.3
171	167	168	Sweden	2.2	2.1	5.5	1.7	1.5	2.0	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.3	2	3.2	22.1
169	168	169	Canada	2.1	1.9	2.0	3.6	2.7	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.5	1.0	1	2.3	20.6
176	173	170	New Zealand	2.1	1.7	1.5	3.8	2.5	3.8	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.9	3	1.2	20.8
170	172	171	Iceland	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.3	3.5	1.4	1.2	1.8	4.3	3	0.0	19.5
177	170	172	Norway	1.9	1.8	3.0	3.8	1.7	1.7	1.1	2.2	1.1	1.5	2	1.1	19.2
174	171	173	Switzerland	1.9	1.8	2.2	3.8	2.4	2.5	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.0	1	2.4	18.7
178	175	174	Finland	1.8	1.5	2.5	2.0	1.2	3.7	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.0	1	3.4	18.3
175	174	175	Denmark	1.7	1.6	1.8	4.6	1.8	2.2	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.1	1	1.1	17.5
	176	176	Andorra											1	6.9	
	176	176	Dominica											4		
	176	176	Kiribati											7		
	176	176	Liechtenstein											1	1.1	
	176	176	Marshall Is.											8		
	176	176	Monaco											1	7.0	
	176	176	Nauru											7		
	176	176	Palau											4		
	176	176	Saint Lucia											4		
	176	176	Taiwan											2	3.1	
	176	176	Tonga											8		
	176	176	Tuvalu											7		
	176	176	Vanuatu											8		
	176	176	West. Sahara											8		

No New Data

123		Brunei	4.8		2.4	5.9	7.8	3.0	2.0	5.3	7.4	3.8	6		43.6
		Sao Tome	6.4		4.4	4.5	6.2	8.7	6.1	5.2	6.3	7.6	9		58.0
2		South Sudan	9.8		10	9.9	9.0	9.3	10	10	9.7	10	10		87.9

Appendix 2

World Conflict Index Map 2030
Government Emphasis



Appendix 2

1g			World Conflict Index 2030 Government Emphasis	Average	Econ Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Legitimacy of the State	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Econ	Gov														
4	1	1	Yemen	9.5	9.4	9.6	9.5	8.4	9.4	9.4	10	9.5	10	9	9.8	94.6
6	2	2	Syria	9.3	9.0	10	10	7.4	10	9.8	10	9.9	10	7	8.7	92.8
11	4	3	Iraq	9.2	8.9	9.4	9.8	7.5	9.2	8.9	10	9.6	9.7	9	9.0	92.1
1	5	4	Somalia	9.0	8.9	9.7	9.4	9.3	9.5	9.7	9.7	10	9.5	10	3.3	90.1
9	3	5	Afghanistan	8.9	8.9	9.5	8.6	7.5	9.1	8.7	10	8.6	9.9	9	8.1	89.0
4	8	6	Sudan	8.8	8.6	10	9.8	7.6	9.8	9.3	9.2	10	9.9	9	2.9	87.5
3	6	7	Cent. African Rep.	8.7	8.6	10	9.3	9.9	9.8	9.9	9.2	10	9.5	9	0.0	86.6
14	7	8	Pakistan	8.7	8.6	8.9	9.7	7.0	8.3	8.2	9.3	8.9	9.6	8	8.8	86.7
8	10	9	Congo (Dem Rep)	8.5	8.4	9.7	9.7	8.9	9.3	10	9.2	9.8	9.7	9	0.0	85.3
21	11	10	Cote d'Ivoire	8.5	8.4	8.0	8.3	8.2	8.1	8.1	7.7	9.4	9.4	9		76.2
25	13	11	Libya	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.3	5.8	9.5	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.7	6	9.5	85.1
7	9	12	Chad	8.4	8.4	9.8	8.5	9.3	9.2	9.3	9.1	9.8	8.5	10	0.8	84.3
10	12	13	Haiti	8.2	8.4	7.9	6.7	9.5	9.4	7.7	7.9	9.6	9.9	8	5.7	82.3
40	16	14	Lebanon	8.2	7.9	9.5	8.7	5.8	7.8	7.4	8.9	9.3	9.3	6	9.8	82.5
18	14	15	Eritrea	8.1	7.9	8.5	6.6	7.5	9.5	9.1	7.4	8.1	7.9	9	7.0	80.6
47	35	16	Iran	8.0	7.2	6.7	8.8	5.8	9.2	9.5	7.7	9.6	6.7	6	9.7	79.7
13	17	17	Nigeria	8.0	7.9	7.7	9.4	8.8	8.8	9.1	9.7	9.9	6.5	9	1.3	80.2
15	19	18	Burundi	7.8	7.7	9.1	8.1	7.4	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.5	8.7	10	0.0	78.3
12	15	19	Guinea	7.8	7.9	8.4	8.8	7.4	9.8	7.9	9.0	9.9	7.6	9	0.0	77.8
16	22	20	Zimbabwe	7.8	7.7	8.7	7.5	8.2	8.9	8.4	7.8	9.8	7.7	9	1.9	77.9
24	23	21	Ethiopia	7.7	7.6	9.5	8.6	6.7	7.7	8.5	8.1	8.3	8.2	10	1.3	76.9
69	36	22	Israel (West Bank)	7.7	7.2	7.5	9.8	7.0	6.6	7.7	7.1	8.1	7.7	6	10	77.5
22	28	23	Cameroon	7.6	7.4	8.0	8.5	8.1	8.7	7.7	8.1	9.4	8.0	9	0.0	75.5
38	34	24	Egypt	7.6	7.2	7.0	9.0	6.2	8.4	9.7	8.3	8.8	8.1	8	3.0	76.5
20	20	25	Kenya	7.6	7.7	8.0	9.1	8.0	7.8	7.2	8.5	8.9	8.3	9	1.1	75.9
23	27	26	Uganda	7.6	7.5	9.1	9.0	7.6	8.3	8.0	7.3	8.9	8.0	10	0.0	76.2
19	18	27	Niger	7.5	7.8	8.0	7.7	8.2	7.8	6.7	8.9	8.9	8.3	10	0.4	74.9
26	32	28	Burma (Myanmar)	7.4	7.2	8.3	9.9	7.9	8.7	8.6	8.4	8.6	7.5	6	0.3	74.2
17	24	29	Guinea Bissau	7.4	7.6	7.5	5.4	8.7	8.9	7.5	9.1	9.6	8.5	9	0.0	74.2
77	37	30	Jordan	7.4	7.1	9.3	7.7	5.6	6.4	8.0	5.2	6.9	7.3	8	9.7	74.1
33	30	31	Nepal	7.4	7.4	8.0	9.5	7.2	7.1	7.4	6.7	8.3	7.1	8	4.4	73.7
43	48	32	Sri Lanka	7.4	6.9	7.9	9.2	7.3	7.4	8.5	7.6	8.8	6.5	5	6.0	74.2
60	56	33	Uzbekistan	7.4	6.7	5.7	7.3	7.1	9.7	9.4	7.3	8.8	4.8	6	8.2	74.3
64	38	34	Kyrgyzstan	7.3	7.1	5.5	8.6	6.1	7.9	7.0	6.5	8.0	6.6	7	9.8	73.0
28	29	35	Mauritania	7.3	7.4	8.2	7.2	7.0	8.2	8.1	7.1	8.8	8.2	9	1.5	73.3
35	21	36	Timor-Leste	7.3	7.7	6.5	6.7	7.0	7.1	5.5	7.4	8.3	9.0	9	6.1	72.6
81	64	37	Azerbaijan	7.2	6.4	7.9	6.7	5.6	8.9	8.6	6.4	7.9	6.6	5	8.7	72.3
29	26	38	Mali	7.2	7.5	8.1	7.9	7.6	6.3	7.0	9.2	5.2	9.6	10	0.7	71.6

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2g			World Conflict Index 2030 Government Emphasis	Average	Econ Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Legitimacy of the State	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Econ	Gov														
54	39	39	Philippines	7.2	7.1	7.1	8.1	5.9	7.2	5.6	9.4	8.0	6.6	8	5.6	71.5
79	50	40	Turkey	7.2	6.8	8.8	9.5	5.9	6.6	7.4	7.8	7.6	5.6	5	8.2	72.4
37	40	41	Angola	7.1	7.0	7.3	7.7	9.6	8.8	7.5	6.2	7.2	5.6	9	1.8	70.7
30	46	42	Korea, North	7.1	6.9	4.6	6.0	7.7	10	9.6	8.5	8.5	9.3	4	3.1	71.3
27	25	43	Liberia	7.1	7.5	8.9	6.0	8.6	7.0	6.7	6.6	8.3	9.5	9	0.0	70.6
32	41	44	Rwanda	7.1	7.0	8.0	9.1	8.5	6.8	7.4	5.9	8.3	7.7	9	0.0	70.7
31	44	45	Congo (Republic)	7.0	6.9	7.9	6.9	8.3	9.1	8.2	6.7	6.7	7.3	9	0.0	70.1
97	78	46	Saudi Arabia	7.0	6.2	4.9	7.5	5.5	8.1	8.9	6.5	8.2	4.9	6	10	70.5
52	31	47	Solomon Islands	7.0	7.3	4.6	6.5	9.2	7.0	5.4	6.1	8.2	8.3	8		63.3
57	58	48	Tajikistan	7.0	6.6	4.5	7.6	5.3	9.3	7.9	6.9	8.4	6.1	7	6.8	69.8
76	57	49	Algeria	6.9	6.6	6.5	7.9	6.3	7.8	6.8	7.7	7.1	5.1	6	7.5	68.7
36	51	50	Bangladesh	6.9	6.7	6.3	8.9	6.9	8.0	7.6	7.8	9.6	6.0	7	0.6	68.7
39	45	51	Djibouti	6.9	6.9	7.5	6.7	8.1	7.9	7.5	6.6	7.3	8.9	8	0.5	69.0
83	83	52	Turkmenistan	6.9	6.1	3.7	6.8	6.9	9.8	8.9	6.5	7.8	4.3	6	8.5	69.2
41	43	53	Burkina Faso	6.8	6.9	6.8	4.7	8.4	7.3	6.3	8.1	8.1	7.7	10	0.2	67.6
57	33	54	Comoros	6.8	7.2	4.7	5.0	7.2	6.8	6.5	6.9	7.5	7.5	9		61.1
65	90	55	Russia	6.8	6.0	6.0	9.0	6.4	8.2	9.4	9.2	8.1	5.9	2	3.4	67.6
53	75	56	Equatorial Guinea	6.7	6.2	3.6	6.3	8.9	9.9	9.4	6.7	8.2	5.2	9	0.0	67.2
72	70	57	Georgia	6.7	6.3	7.7	8.1	5.7	8.5	5.8	7.0	9.1	7.6	3	4.9	67.4
44	55	58	Swaziland	6.7	6.7	4.8	3.4	8.4	8.8	8.8	6.0	6.8	7.3	8	5.0	67.3
63	68	59	Venezuela	6.7	6.4	4.8	7.4	6.9	8.7	8.6	6.8	8.2	5.6	6	3.9	66.9
46	65	60	Cambodia	6.6	6.4	5.9	7.1	6.8	8.5	7.9	6.4	8.3	7.6	7	0.8	66.3
70	49	61	India	6.6	6.8	5.5	8.5	7.2	4.9	6.2	7.6	7.3	5.6	6	7.3	66.1
89	77	62	Morocco	6.6	6.2	5.6	7.4	6.4	6.8	7.0	5.4	6.6	5.7	6	9.0	65.9
74	94	63	Thailand	6.6	5.9	6.1	9.0	5.5	7.7	8.2	9.2	9.7	4.0	3	3.8	66.2
121	109	64	Bahrain	6.5	5.4	2.5	7.9	4.8	8.4	8.3	6.4	7.1	5.0	5	10	65.4
82	76	65	Fiji	6.5	6.2	3.3	7.1	6.5	7.1	6.6	6.8	7.9	7.4	6		58.7
61	59	66	Guatemala	6.5	6.5	5.8	8.2	8.3	6.7	6.9	7.3	6.8	5.4	8	1.6	65.0
55	86	67	Laos	6.5	6.0	5.3	6.6	7.1	9.3	8.1	5.7	8.3	6.3	8	0.1	64.8
42	47	68	Mozambique	6.5	6.9	5.5	5.6	8.9	6.7	5.8	6.7	6.9	7.6	10	1.2	64.9
51	62	69	Togo	6.5	6.5	6.8	4.8	8.4	8.0	6.9	6.7	7.6	6.2	9	0.2	64.6
88	73	70	Tunisia	6.5	6.3	4.2	7.9	5.1	6.7	6.7	7.9	7.8	6.6	5	7.5	65.4
67	85	71	Colombia	6.4	6.0	7.9	7.0	7.8	6.5	7.2	7.0	7.6	6.2	6	0.6	63.8
48	69	72	Gambia	6.4	6.3	6.5	3.4	6.9	8.1	8.9	6.0	6.8	7.2	9	0.9	63.7
44	53	73	Malawi	6.4	6.7	6.3	5.1	8.5	6.6	6.4	4.5	7.7	8.4	10	0.0	63.5
50	60	74	Papua New Guinea	6.4	6.5	4.7	6.5	9.3	7.0	7.1	7.2	7.1	7.0	8	0.2	64.1
34	42	75	Sierra Leone	6.4	7.0	7.9	5.9	8.5	7.1	5.5	4.5	7.8	8.1	9	0.0	64.3
109	91	76	Armenia	6.3	5.9	6.7	5.6	4.7	7.2	7.0	5.0	7.0	6.9	4	8.7	62.8

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3g			World Conflict Index 2030 Government Emphasis	Average	Econ Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Legitimacy of the State	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Econ	Gov														
86	102	77	China	6.3	5.6	5.1	8.1	7.5	8.3	8.7	5.6	7.2	2.9	3	6.6	63.0
68	71	78	Honduras	6.3	6.3	4.0	6.1	7.9	7.0	6.6	7.0	6.8	7.7	8	1.4	62.5
56	52	79	Madagascar	6.3	6.7	3.6	4.3	8.8	7.3	5.8	7.3	7.8	7.0	9	1.9	62.8
91	97	80	Maldives	6.3	5.8	4.4	4.8	3.8	8.7	7.7	6.6	8.0	6.7	6		56.7
59	54	81	Senegal	6.3	6.7	7.5	6.6	7.6	5.2	6.2	5.9	6.6	6.8	9	1.5	62.9
85	95	82	Ukraine	6.3	5.9	4.3	6.9	4.4	8.4	6.2	7.8	8.0	8.8	2	6.2	63.0
49	63	83	Zambia	6.3	6.5	6.6	5.4	8.9	7.2	7.1	4.7	5.7	6.9	10	0.2	62.7
84	74	84	Ecuador	6.2	6.2	5.4	7.5	6.9	6.7	5.2	6.5	8.2	5.8	6	3.8	62.0
86	80	85	Indonesia	6.2	6.1	5.6	7.3	6.0	5.3	7.4	5.9	7.0	5.4	6	5.9	61.8
113	100	86	Kazakhstan	6.2	5.7	3.2	7.3	4.4	8.0	7.4	5.4	7.6	4.4	5	9.3	62.0
98	89	87	Peru	6.2	6.0	4.5	7.6	7.6	7.4	4.5	7.3	6.9	3.7	6	6.3	61.8
62	61	88	Tanzania	6.2	6.5	6.9	5.4	7.3	6.1	6.1	5.2	6.0	7.4	10	1.9	62.3
75	84	89	Bolivia	6.1	6.0	4.1	6.2	8.8	7.0	6.2	6.7	8.3	6.0	7	1.1	61.4
126	117	90	Kuwait	6.1	5.1	3.7	5.2	4.4	7.4	7.6	4.2	7.5	4.5	6	10	60.5
107	87	91	Mexico	6.1	6.0	4.1	6.7	6.3	6.2	6.2	8.0	5.1	5.2	6	7.7	61.5
92	113	92	Belarus	6.0	5.3	3.8	7.1	4.9	8.9	8.1	6.3	8.3	7.5	2	2.7	59.6
111	81	93	Macedonia	6.0	6.1	7.0	7.1	5.4	6.0	4.0	5.7	7.3	6.2	3	8.7	60.4
71	88	94	Nicaragua	6.0	6.0	4.2	6.7	8.2	7.6	5.4	5.7	7.1	7.5	7	0.8	60.2
78	92	95	Bhutan	5.9	5.9	7.2	7.6	6.6	4.5	6.3	4.7	7.5	8.2	6	0.0	58.6
88	101	96	Bosnia	5.9	5.6	7.8	7.0	5.3	6.7	6.1	5.9	8.7	8.4	2	0.9	58.8
66	66	97	Lesotho	5.9	6.4	4.8	4.1	7.6	6.1	4.7	5.9	7.3	8.0	7	3.0	58.5
93	98	98	Moldova	5.9	5.8	4.1	7.0	5.0	6.8	5.1	6.3	8.3	7.6	3	5.5	58.7
105	96	99	Dominican Republic	5.8	5.8	3.5	6.0	6.0	5.7	6.0	5.5	6.2	5.6	6	7.6	58.1
80	67	100	Micronesia	5.8	6.4	3.6	4.0	8.5	5.7	3.4	4.8	5.6	9.2	7		51.8
72	79	101	Benin	5.7	6.1	5.7	3.6	7.8	5.9	5.4	5.9	7.0	6.8	9	0.0	57.1
101	93	102	Cape Verde	5.7	5.9	4.4	4.1	7.3	5.5	4.2	5.4	5.5	7.8	7		51.2
98	110	103	Gabon	5.7	5.4	4.7	4.0	6.7	7.7	7.2	4.7	7.1	5.4	9	0.0	56.5
115	121	104	Malaysia	5.7	4.9	3.9	6.7	5.2	7.4	7.7	6.5	6.8	4.0	6	2.6	56.8
108	82	105	South Africa	5.7	6.1	5.6	6.3	7.7	5.0	4.4	5.8	5.6	3.2	7	6.1	56.7
119	99	106	Cyprus	5.6	5.7	5.0	6.5	6.1	5.0	3.2	4.1	7.9	9.2	3		50.0
103	72	107	Namibia	5.6	6.3	5.2	6.0	8.4	3.5	4.0	5.2	3.5	6.6	8	5.2	55.6

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106	119	108	Vietnam	5.6	5.0	4.4	6.2	5.2	8.4	7.5	4.8	6.9	5.4	5	2.0	55.8
96	105	109	El Salvador	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.2	6.6	5.0	6.5	7.0	4.3	5.6	7	1.5	54.7
95	112	110	Paraguay	5.5	5.4	2.8	6.0	8.1	7.2	6.1	6.8	7.8	4.5	6	0.0	55.3
114	124	111	Cuba	5.4	4.8	4.2	4.2	5.6	7.3	7.7	5.4	7.0	5.3	2	5.7	54.4
110	103	112	Samoa	5.4	5.6	2.4	4.5	5.1	5.7	4.3	4.9	5.1	8.9	8		48.9
98	108	113	Serbia	5.4	5.5	8.6	7.8	5.0	5.4	4.6	5.7	8.0	6.4	1	1.7	54.2
137	126	114	Oman	5.3	4.7	2.2	3.1	4.3	6.5	7.4	4.4	6.6	2.0	7	9.9	53.4
4g			World Conflict Index 2030 Government Emphasis	Average	Econ Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Legitimacy of the State	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Econ	Gov														
104	107	115	Guyana	5.2	5.5	3.8	6.4	5.9	5.6	3.6	6.1	5.1	7.0	7	1.3	51.8
125	122	116	Seychelles	5.2	4.9	2.9	4.5	5.7	5.7	4.3	6.3	6.0	7.2	4		46.6
124	120	117	Albania	5.1	4.9	3.3	4.7	3.8	5.9	5.0	4.4	6.2	6.4	5	5.9	50.6
102	106	118	Ghana	5.1	5.5	5.2	4.6	6.8	4.7	5.3	3.8	4.9	6.9	8	0.9	51.1
118	111	119	Jamaica	5.1	5.4	3.1	3.6	5.6	5.0	5.2	6.6	3.7	6.0	7		45.8
128	115	120	Mongolia	5.1	5.3	2.7	4.0	6.1	4.2	4.7	3.7	5.5	6.8	6	7.5	51.2
116	114	121	Belize	5.0	5.3	3.8	4.1	5.9	5.4	4.4	6.1	4.3	7.2	8	0.8	50.0
120	104	122	Botswana	5.0	5.5	4.7	5.1	8.0	3.5	4.7	3.8	3.3	4.3	8	4.8	50.2
117	123	123	Brazil	5.0	4.8	2.9	5.7	8.0	5.9	6.1	6.4	4.9	3.0	5	1.7	49.6
122	116	124	Grenada	4.9	5.1	3.2	3.8	5.0	5.6	3.4	5.9	5.6	6.8	5		44.3
142	141	125	Qatar	4.9	4.0	2.0	4.6	4.9	6.3	6.5	2.3	5.0	2.9	4	10	48.5
112	118	126	Suriname	4.9	5.1	3.0	5.8	6.3	5.2	4.8	5.1	5.8	6.1	6	0.5	48.6
145	143	127	United Arab Emir.	4.8	3.9	2.2	3.6	3.9	6.9	7.5	2.8	3.6	2.6	5	10	48.1
130	125	128	Greece	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.1	3.9	6.2	3.2	4.2	3.8	6.1	1	8.2	46.7
129	128	129	Antigua & Barbuda	4.6	4.4	2.8	3.9	4.7	5.6	4.6	5.4	3.7	5.5	5		41.2
127	127	130	Trinidad	4.5	4.5	2.8	4.4	5.1	4.7	4.3	6.0	5.6	3.3	4		40.2
131	129	131	Montenegro	4.4	4.4	4.8	7.6	2.6	4.8	4.1	3.7	6.5	6.2	2	2.1	44.4


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140	130	132	Argentina	4.3	4.3	2.5	4.7	5.1	5.0	3.8	4.0	2.8	4.3	5	5.4	42.6
135	140	133	Hungary	4.2	4.0	6.7	5.0	4.0	6.3	4.9	2.4	5.3	4.1	2	1.5	42.2
133	135	134	Panama	4.1	4.1	3.2	5.3	7.6	3.7	4.5	5.4	2.5	2.9	6	0.0	41.1
134	136	135	Romania	4.1	4.1	3.0	7.0	4.4	5.7	3.9	3.2	5.4	3.8	2	2.9	41.3
137	131	136	Bahamas	4.0	4.2	2.7	4.1	4.7	4.0	3.3	4.3	4.5	3.4	5		36.0
132	133	137	Bulgaria	4.0	4.2	4.0	5.3	4.6	4.7	3.5	3.8	5.3	4.5	1	3.6	40.3
136	138	138	Croatia	3.9	4.0	7.5	6.0	3.5	3.1	3.8	3.7	4.4	4.8	1	1.0	38.8
148	134	139	Italy	3.9	4.1	5.0	5.0	3.1	3.9	2.2	4.2	4.9	2.5	1	7.2	39.0
139	132	140	Barbados	3.8	4.2	2.6	4.1	4.8	2.7	2.6	4.4	4.2	5.7	3		34.1
150	144	141	Chile	3.8	3.8	2.2	3.8	5.4	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.2	2.3	4	8.2	37.7
146	139	142	Estonia	3.8	4.0	2.6	6.8	3.4	2.9	1.8	2.9	5.5	4.0	1	6.9	37.8
161	152	143	Singapore	3.8	3.3	1.4	2.8	4.0	3.9	4.3	1.7	4.0	1.4	4	10	37.5
153	142	144	Spain	3.7	3.9	2.0	5.9	3.7	3.0	2.0	3.0	6.3	2.0	1	7.9	36.8
142	137	145	Costa Rica	3.6	4.0	3.6	4.4	5.5	2.6	1.7	3.3	3.8	4.3	5	1.9	36.1
141	145	146	Latvia	3.6	3.6	3.0	7.7	4.3	3.6	2.8	3.2	4.3	4.1	1	1.6	35.6
151	147	147	Czechia	3.5	3.5	4.0	5.0	2.9	4.9	2.6	2.3	5.0	2.9	2	3.6	35.2
147	146	148	Mauritius	3.5	3.6	2.4	3.8	4.0	3.2	3.6	2.5	3.2	4.9	4		31.6
144	149	149	Slovakia	3.5	3.5	4.0	6.5	3.7	4.5	2.7	2.0	4.2	3.5	2	1.9	35.0
159	150	150	United States	3.5	3.4	2.1	5.1	4.5	2.1	3.4	2.9	4.3	0.9	3	6.5	34.8
152	151	151	Poland	3.3	3.3	3.8	4.9	3.2	3.5	2.9	2.0	3.8	3.1	2	4.0	33.2
156	157	152	Korea, South	3.2	3.0	1.7	3.1	3.2	3.4	2.9	1.8	3.8	5.1	2	5.2	32.2
5g			World Conflict Index 2030 Government Emphasis	Average	Econ Avg	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Uneven Development	Legitimacy of the State	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Youth Bulges	Water Scarcity	Total
FSI	Econ	Gov														
149	148	153	Lithuania	3.2	3.5	2.4	4.6	4.7	2.9	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.5	1	4.3	32.2
154	155	154	Malta	3.2	3.1	4.1	3.9	2.8	3.8	3.2	3.3	2.0	3.5	2		28.6
158	154	155	France	3.0	3.2	2.7	7.0	3.4	1.5	2.3	3.0	1.9	2.0	2	4.3	30.1

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162	156	156	United Kingdom	2.9	3.1	2.2	5.9	3.8	1.7	1.9	2.4	3.5	1.0	2	5.0	29.4
164	153	157	Belgium	2.8	3.2	2.1	4.4	2.9	1.6	1.0	1.9	3.9	1.2	2	7.3	28.3
157	160	158	Japan	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.9	1.8	1.4	3.2	1.3	2.6	4.0	1	4.6	27.2
155	159	159	Uruguay	2.7	3.0	2.2	2.7	4.3	1.1	2.5	3.5	2.7	2.7	4	1.2	26.9
172	162	160	Australia	2.6	2.6	2.0	4.1	2.4	1.0	2.5	1.8	1.7	1.0	3	6.8	26.3
163	158	161	Portugal	2.6	3.0	1.9	2.7	2.7	1.8	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.5	2	6.6	26.2
165	161	162	Germany	2.5	2.7	5.7	4.8	3.0	1.0	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1	3.5	25.4
168	163	163	Luxembourg	2.5	2.6	3.7	3.1	1.7	1.0	1.0	1.9	3.4	1.3	2	5.5	24.6
166	164	164	Netherlands	2.5	2.6	4.0	4.4	2.4	1.5	1.1	1.7	3.1	0.9	1	4.5	24.6
160	165	165	Slovenia	2.5	2.6	4.5	4.2	3.6	2.9	1.7	1.8	1.7	2.5	1	1.2	25.1
167	166	166	Austria	2.3	2.4	6.1	4.0	3.1	1.1	1.4	1.2	2.7	1.4	1	1.0	23.0
171	168	167	Sweden	2.1	2.2	5.5	1.7	1.5	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.3	2	3.2	21.1
169	169	168	Canada	1.9	2.1	2.0	3.6	2.7	1.0	1.5	1.9	2.5	1.0	1	2.3	19.5
172	167	169	Ireland	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.6	2.4	1.2	1.1	1.8	1.5	1.6	3	3.5	19.4
177	172	170	Norway	1.8	1.9	3.0	3.8	1.7	0.5	1.6	2.2	1.1	1.5	2	1.1	18.5
174	173	171	Switzerland	1.8	1.9	2.2	3.8	2.4	1.0	2.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	1	2.4	18.1
170	171	172	Iceland	1.7	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.8	4.3	3	0.0	16.6
176	170	173	New Zealand	1.7	2.1	1.5	3.8	2.5	0.6	0.7	1.4	1.1	0.9	3	1.2	16.7
175	175	174	Denmark	1.6	1.7	1.8	4.6	1.8	0.6	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.1	1	1.1	16.5
178	174	175	Finland	1.5	1.8	2.5	2.0	1.2	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.0	1	3.4	15.2
	176	176	Andorra											1	6.9	7.9
	176	176	Dominica											4		4.0
	176	176	Kiribati											7		7.0
	176	176	Liechtenstein											1	1.1	2.1
	176	176	Marshall Is.											8		8.0
	176	176	Monaco											1	7.0	8.0
	176	176	Nauru											7		7.0
	176	176	Palau											4		4.0
	176	176	Saint Lucia											4		4.0
	176	176	Taiwan											2	3.1	5.1
	176	176	Tonga											8		8.0
	176	176	Tuvalu											7		7.0
	176	176	Vanuatu											8		8.0
	176	176	West. Sahara											8		8.0
No New Data																
123			Brunei	5.5		2.4	5.9	7.8	8.3	7.9	5.3	7.4	3.8	6		54.8
94			Sao Tome	5.8		4.4	4.5	6.2	5.8	3.5	5.2	6.3	7.6	9		52.5
2			South Sudan	8.8		10	9.9	9.0	9.7	9.7	10	9.7	10	10		88.0

Appendix 3



Appendix 3

1	Fragile States Index 2016	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
1	Somalia	114.0	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.5	9.3	9.0	9.5	9.0	9.7	9.7	10.0	9.5
2	South Sudan	113.8	9.9	10.0	9.9	6.6	9.0	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.7	10.0
3	Central African Rep.	112.1	8.7	10.0	9.3	7.2	9.9	8.6	9.8	10.0	9.9	9.2	10.0	9.5
4	Sudan	111.5	9.0	10.0	9.8	9.1	7.6	8.7	9.8	9.1	9.3	9.2	10.0	9.9
4	Yemen	111.5	9.5	9.6	9.5	7.5	8.4	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.4	10.0	9.5	10.0
6	Syria	110.8	8.4	10.0	10.0	8.6	7.4	7.8	10.0	8.9	9.8	10.0	9.9	10.0
7	Chad	110.1	9.9	9.8	8.5	8.9	9.3	8.0	9.2	9.8	9.3	9.1	9.8	8.5
8	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	110.0	9.1	9.7	9.7	6.8	8.9	8.1	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.2	9.8	9.7
9	Afghanistan	107.9	9.5	9.5	8.6	8.4	7.5	8.5	9.1	9.6	8.7	10.0	8.6	9.9
10	Haiti	105.1	9.2	7.9	6.7	9.0	9.5	8.9	9.4	9.4	7.7	7.9	9.6	9.9
11	Iraq	104.7	8.1	9.4	9.8	7.9	7.5	6.8	9.2	7.8	8.9	10.0	9.6	9.7
12	Guinea	103.8	8.9	8.4	8.8	7.5	7.4	9.4	9.8	9.2	7.9	9.0	9.9	7.6
13	Nigeria	103.5	9.1	7.7	9.4	7.4	8.8	7.7	8.8	9.4	9.1	9.7	9.9	6.5
14	Pakistan	101.7	8.9	8.9	9.7	7.3	7.0	7.4	8.3	8.2	8.2	9.3	8.9	9.6
15	Burundi	100.7	9.5	9.1	8.1	6.5	7.4	8.2	9.0	8.2	8.5	9.0	8.5	8.7
16	Zimbabwe	100.5	8.6	8.7	7.5	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.9	8.5	8.4	7.8	9.8	7.7
17	Guinea Bissau	99.8	8.3	7.5	5.4	8.3	8.7	8.5	8.9	9.5	7.5	9.1	9.6	8.5
18	Eritrea	98.6	9.1	8.5	6.6	8.0	7.5	8.3	9.5	8.6	9.1	7.4	8.1	7.9
19	Niger	98.4	9.5	8.0	7.7	7.2	8.2	8.0	7.8	9.2	6.7	8.9	8.9	8.3
20	Kenya	98.3	9.1	8.0	9.1	7.8	8.0	7.4	7.8	8.2	7.2	8.5	8.9	8.3
21	Cote d'Ivoire	97.9	8.2	8.0	8.3	7.0	8.2	6.8	8.1	8.7	8.1	7.7	9.4	9.4
22	Cameroon	97.8	8.3	8.0	8.5	7.8	8.1	6.3	8.7	8.9	7.7	8.1	9.4	8.0
23	Uganda	97.7	8.7	9.1	9.0	7.6	7.6	6.7	8.3	8.5	8.0	7.3	8.9	8.0
24	Ethiopia	97.2	9.3	9.5	8.6	7.3	6.7	6.7	7.7	8.3	8.5	8.1	8.3	8.2
25	Libya	96.4	5.1	8.0	8.3	6.5	5.8	8.0	9.5	7.2	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.7
26	Myanmar	96.3	7.3	8.3	9.9	6.0	7.9	6.4	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.4	8.6	7.5
27	Liberia	95.5	9.2	8.9	6.0	6.9	8.6	8.3	7.0	9.5	6.7	6.6	8.3	9.5
28	Mauritania	95.4	8.9	8.2	7.2	6.6	7.0	7.9	8.2	9.2	8.1	7.1	8.8	8.2
29	Mali	95.2	8.7	8.1	7.9	8.7	7.6	7.9	6.3	9.0	7.0	9.2	5.2	9.6
30	North Korea	93.9	7.9	4.6	6.0	4.1	7.7	8.9	10.0	8.8	9.6	8.5	8.5	9.3
31	Congo (Republic)	92.2	8.1	7.9	6.9	7.1	8.3	6.7	9.1	9.2	8.2	6.7	6.7	7.3
32	Rwanda	91.3	8.2	8.0	9.1	7.6	8.5	6.2	6.8	7.6	7.4	5.9	8.3	7.7
33	Nepal	91.2	8.8	8.0	9.5	6.7	7.2	7.0	7.1	7.4	7.4	6.7	8.3	7.1
34	Sierra Leone	91.0	9.2	7.9	5.9	8.7	8.5	8.8	7.1	9.0	5.5	4.5	7.8	8.1
35	Timor-Leste	90.8	9.2	6.5	6.7	7.3	7.0	8.1	7.1	8.7	5.5	7.4	8.3	9.0
36	Bangladesh	90.7	8.0	6.3	8.9	7.5	6.9	6.3	8.0	7.8	7.6	7.8	9.6	6.0

Appendix 3

2	Fragile States Index 2016	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
37	Angola	90.5	9.0	7.3	7.7	6.3	9.6	6.1	8.8	9.2	7.5	6.2	7.2	5.6
38	Egypt	90.2	6.8	7.0	9.0	4.4	6.2	8.4	8.4	5.1	9.7	8.3	8.8	8.1
39	Djibouti	89.7	8.5	7.5	6.7	5.5	8.1	7.1	7.9	8.1	7.5	6.6	7.3	8.9
40	Lebanon	89.6	5.8	9.5	8.7	5.1	5.8	6.1	7.8	5.9	7.4	8.9	9.3	9.3
41	Burkina Faso	89.4	9.4	6.8	4.7	7.2	8.4	6.5	7.3	8.9	6.3	8.1	8.1	7.7
42	Mozambique	87.8	9.5	5.5	5.6	7.7	8.9	7.7	6.7	9.2	5.8	6.7	6.9	7.6
43	Sri Lanka	87.7	5.7	7.9	9.2	7.9	7.3	5.6	7.4	5.3	8.5	7.6	8.8	6.5
44	Malawi	87.6	9.3	6.3	5.1	8.1	8.5	8.6	6.6	8.1	6.4	4.5	7.7	8.4
44	Swaziland	87.6	8.9	4.8	3.4	7.2	8.4	9.4	8.8	7.8	8.8	6.0	6.8	7.3
46	Cambodia	87.4	7.2	5.9	7.1	7.8	6.8	5.9	8.5	8.0	7.9	6.4	8.3	7.6
47	Iran	86.9	5.1	6.7	8.8	6.5	5.8	6.6	9.2	4.7	9.5	7.7	9.6	6.7
48	Gambia	86.8	8.5	6.5	3.4	8.4	6.9	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.9	6.0	6.8	7.2
49	Zambia	86.3	9.5	6.6	5.4	8.1	8.9	8.1	7.2	8.1	7.1	4.7	5.7	6.9
50	Papua New Guinea	86.2	7.9	4.7	6.5	7.4	9.3	5.8	7.0	9.2	7.1	7.2	7.1	7.0
51	Togo	85.8	8.0	6.8	4.8	7.6	8.4	6.5	8.0	8.3	6.9	6.7	7.6	6.2
52	Solomon Islands	85.3	8.2	4.6	6.5	6.6	9.2	7.3	7.0	7.9	5.4	6.1	8.2	8.3
53	Equatorial Guinea	85.2	7.7	3.6	6.3	5.7	8.9	6.2	9.9	7.4	9.4	6.7	8.2	5.2
54	Philippines	84.7	7.7	7.1	8.1	6.5	5.9	5.7	7.2	6.9	5.6	9.4	8.0	6.6
55	Laos	84.4	7.4	5.3	6.6	7.7	7.1	5.4	9.3	7.2	8.1	5.7	8.3	6.3
56	Madagascar	84.2	8.8	3.6	4.3	6.4	8.8	7.8	7.3	9.3	5.8	7.3	7.8	7.0
57	Comoros	83.8	7.5	4.7	5.0	7.6	7.2	8.2	6.8	8.4	6.5	6.9	7.5	7.5
57	Tajikistan	83.8	8.1	4.5	7.6	6.4	5.3	7.5	9.3	5.8	7.9	6.9	8.4	6.1
59	Senegal	83.6	8.3	7.5	6.6	7.7	7.6	7.6	5.2	7.6	6.2	5.9	6.6	6.8
60	Uzbekistan	83.5	5.8	5.7	7.3	6.0	7.1	6.5	9.7	5.1	9.4	7.3	8.8	4.8
61	Guatemala	83.2	7.4	5.8	8.2	7.0	8.3	5.7	6.7	7.7	6.9	7.3	6.8	5.4
62	Tanzania	81.8	8.9	6.9	5.4	7.3	7.3	6.4	6.1	8.8	6.1	5.2	6.0	7.4
63	Venezuela	81.6	5.2	4.8	7.4	5.2	6.9	7.0	8.7	7.2	8.6	6.8	8.2	5.6
64	Kyrgyzstan	81.1	5.7	5.5	8.6	6.7	6.1	7.2	7.9	5.3	7.0	6.5	8.0	6.6
65	Russia	81.0	4.8	6.0	9.0	4.2	6.4	5.4	8.2	4.4	9.4	9.2	8.1	5.9
66	Lesotho	80.9	8.2	4.8	4.1	7.7	7.6	8.2	6.1	8.3	4.7	5.9	7.3	8.0
67	Colombia	80.2	6.7	7.9	7.0	6.3	7.8	3.9	6.5	6.1	7.2	7.0	7.6	6.2
68	Honduras	79.8	6.5	4.0	6.1	6.6	7.9	6.6	7.0	7.0	6.6	7.0	6.8	7.7
69	Israel (West Bank)	79.7	5.7	7.5	9.8	3.5	7.0	4.0	6.6	5.0	7.7	7.1	8.1	7.7
70	India	79.6	8.1	5.5	8.5	5.8	7.2	5.3	4.9	7.6	6.2	7.6	7.3	5.6
71	Nicaragua	79.0	5.5	4.2	6.7	8.3	8.2	5.9	7.6	6.9	5.4	5.7	7.1	7.5
72	Benin	78.9	8.5	5.7	3.6	7.1	7.8	6.3	5.9	8.9	5.4	5.9	7.0	6.8

Appendix 3

3	Fragile States Index 2016	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
73	Georgia	78.9	4.2	7.7	8.1	5.1	5.7	5.6	8.5	4.5	5.8	7.0	9.1	7.6
74	Thailand	78.8	6.6	6.1	9.0	4.4	5.5	3.8	7.7	4.6	8.2	9.2	9.7	4.0
75	Bolivia	78.5	6.4	4.1	6.2	6.7	8.8	5.1	7.0	7.0	6.2	6.7	8.3	6.0
76	Algeria	78.3	5.4	6.5	7.9	5.4	6.3	6.8	7.8	5.5	6.8	7.7	7.1	5.1
77	Jordan	78.0	6.7	9.3	7.7	3.9	5.6	6.6	6.4	4.4	8.0	5.2	6.9	7.3
78	Bhutan	77.6	6.3	7.2	7.6	7.2	6.6	5.2	4.5	6.3	6.3	4.7	7.5	8.2
79	Turkey	77.3	5.1	8.8	9.5	3.6	5.9	4.8	6.6	4.6	7.4	7.8	7.6	5.6
80	Micronesia	77.1	7.6	3.6	4.0	9.5	8.5	9.0	5.7	6.2	3.4	4.8	5.6	9.2
81	Azerbaijan	76.3	4.8	7.9	6.7	4.0	5.6	3.8	8.9	5.1	8.6	6.4	7.9	6.6
82	Fiji	76.2	4.4	3.3	7.1	7.9	6.5	6.7	7.1	4.5	6.6	6.8	7.9	7.4
83	Turkmenistan	76.0	5.6	3.7	6.8	4.8	6.9	5.1	9.8	5.8	8.9	6.5	7.8	4.3
84	Ecuador	75.6	6.0	5.4	7.5	5.9	6.9	5.5	6.7	6.0	5.2	6.5	8.2	5.8
85	Ukraine	75.5	4.4	4.3	6.9	5.4	4.4	7.0	8.4	3.9	6.2	7.8	8.0	8.8
86	China	74.9	6.9	5.1	8.1	4.6	7.5	4.1	8.3	5.9	8.7	5.6	7.2	2.9
86	Indonesia	74.9	6.8	5.6	7.3	6.6	6.0	5.5	5.3	6.1	7.4	5.9	7.0	5.4
88	Bosnia	74.6	4.0	7.8	7.0	5.2	5.3	5.7	6.7	3.8	6.1	5.9	8.7	8.4
88	Tunisia	74.6	4.4	4.2	7.9	5.8	5.1	6.9	6.7	4.6	6.7	7.9	7.8	6.6
89	Morocco	74.2	5.0	5.6	7.4	7.9	6.4	5.0	6.8	5.4	7.0	5.4	6.6	5.7
91	Maldives	74.0	5.5	4.4	4.8	5.9	3.8	6.1	8.7	5.8	7.7	6.6	8.0	6.7
92	Belarus	73.9	5.3	3.8	7.1	3.1	4.9	6.2	8.9	4.4	8.1	6.3	8.3	7.5
93	Moldova	73.2	5.0	4.1	7.0	6.3	5.0	6.6	6.8	5.1	5.1	6.3	8.3	7.6
94	Sao Tome	72.9	6.4	4.4	4.5	8.2	6.2	8.7	5.8	6.1	3.5	5.2	6.3	7.6
95	Paraguay	72.6	6.2	2.8	6.0	5.5	8.1	5.2	7.2	6.4	6.1	6.8	7.8	4.5
96	El Salvador	72.5	6.6	5.0	6.2	7.5	6.6	5.6	5.0	6.6	6.5	7.0	4.3	5.6
97	Saudi Arabia	72.2	5.5	4.9	7.5	3.5	5.5	4.7	8.1	4.0	8.9	6.5	8.2	4.9
98	Gabon	72.0	6.8	4.7	4.0	5.8	6.7	5.0	7.7	6.9	7.2	4.7	7.1	5.4
98	Peru	72.0	5.2	4.5	7.6	7.0	7.6	3.4	7.4	6.9	4.5	7.3	6.9	3.7
98	Serbia	72.0	4.5	8.6	7.8	5.0	5.0	6.6	5.4	4.4	4.6	5.7	8.0	6.4
101	Cape Verde	71.5	7.2	4.4	4.1	8.2	7.3	5.7	5.5	6.2	4.2	5.4	5.5	7.8
102	Ghana	71.2	7.1	5.2	4.6	7.9	6.8	6.6	4.7	7.4	5.3	3.8	4.9	6.9
103	Namibia	71.1	7.3	5.2	6.0	6.8	8.4	7.0	3.5	7.6	4.0	5.2	3.5	6.6
104	Guyana	70.9	5.5	3.8	6.4	9.4	5.9	6.1	5.6	6.4	3.6	6.1	5.1	7.0
105	Dominican Rep.	70.8	7.0	3.5	6.0	7.3	6.0	5.2	5.7	6.8	6.0	5.5	6.2	5.6
106	Vietnam	70.7	5.8	4.4	6.2	5.9	5.2	5.3	8.4	4.9	7.5	4.8	6.9	5.4
107	Mexico	70.4	6.2	4.1	6.7	5.5	6.3	4.4	6.2	6.5	6.2	8.0	5.1	5.2
108	South Africa	69.9	7.3	5.6	6.3	5.2	7.7	6.6	5.0	7.2	4.4	5.8	5.6	3.2

Appendix 3

4	Fragile States Index 2016	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
109	Armenia	69.6	3.3	6.7	5.6	5.9	4.7	6.5	7.2	3.8	7.0	5.0	7.0	6.9
110	Samoa	67.6	5.9	2.4	4.5	9.2	5.1	6.5	5.7	5.1	4.3	4.9	5.1	8.9
111	Macedonia	67.0	3.0	7.0	7.1	5.2	5.4	6.0	6.0	4.1	4.0	5.7	7.3	6.2
112	Suriname	66.7	5.0	3.0	5.8	7.0	6.3	6.8	5.2	5.8	4.8	5.1	5.8	6.1
113	Kazakhstan	66.5	4.7	3.2	7.3	3.3	4.4	6.6	8.0	4.2	7.4	5.4	7.6	4.4
114	Cuba	66.3	5.7	4.2	4.2	5.4	5.6	4.2	7.3	4.3	7.7	5.4	7.0	5.3
115	Malaysia	66.1	5.5	3.9	6.7	4.7	5.2	3.3	7.4	4.4	7.7	6.5	6.8	4.0
116	Belize	66.0	5.6	3.8	4.1	6.7	5.9	6.4	5.4	6.1	4.4	6.1	4.3	7.2
117	Brazil	65.3	7.6	2.9	5.7	4.3	8.0	4.5	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.4	4.9	3.0
118	Jamaica	65.0	4.9	3.1	3.6	8.1	5.6	7.1	5.0	6.1	5.2	6.6	3.7	6.0
119	Cyprus	64.0	3.7	5.0	6.5	4.2	6.1	6.4	5.0	2.7	3.2	4.1	7.9	9.2
120	Botswana	63.5	7.9	4.7	5.1	5.2	8.0	6.0	3.5	7.0	4.7	3.8	3.3	4.3
121	Bahrain	63.4	4.3	2.5	7.9	3.2	4.8	3.5	8.4	2.0	8.3	6.4	7.1	5.0
122	Grenada	63.0	4.9	3.2	3.8	8.6	5.0	6.2	5.6	4.0	3.4	5.9	5.6	6.8
123	Brunei	62.0	3.9	2.4	5.9	4.3	7.8	3.0	8.3	2.0	7.9	5.3	7.4	3.8
124	Albania	61.2	4.2	3.3	4.7	7.6	3.8	5.5	5.9	4.2	5.0	4.4	6.2	6.4
125	Seychelles	60.2	4.8	2.9	4.5	5.6	5.7	4.3	5.7	2.9	4.3	6.3	6.0	7.2
126	Kuwait	58.5	5.2	3.7	5.2	3.3	4.4	2.7	7.4	2.8	7.6	4.2	7.5	4.5
127	Trinidad	57.8	4.7	2.8	4.4	7.8	5.1	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.3	6.0	5.6	3.3
128	Mongolia	56.6	5.3	2.7	4.0	3.0	6.1	5.0	4.2	5.6	4.7	3.7	5.5	6.8
129	Antigua & Barbuda	56.2	4.3	2.8	3.9	7.0	4.7	4.7	5.6	4.0	4.6	5.4	3.7	5.5
130	Greece	55.9	3.9	5.0	5.1	3.5	3.9	7.0	6.2	4.0	3.2	4.2	3.8	6.1
131	Montenegro	55.2	3.0	4.8	7.6	3.7	2.6	4.9	4.8	3.3	4.1	3.7	6.5	6.2
132	Bulgaria	53.7	3.9	4.0	5.3	4.3	4.6	5.9	4.7	3.9	3.5	3.8	5.3	4.5
133	Panama	53.2	5.4	3.2	5.3	4.3	7.6	3.1	3.7	5.3	4.5	5.4	2.5	2.9
134	Romania	52.9	3.4	3.0	7.0	4.2	4.4	4.9	5.7	4.0	3.9	3.2	5.4	3.8
135	Hungary	52.7	2.0	6.7	5.0	3.0	4.0	5.6	6.3	3.4	4.9	2.4	5.3	4.1
136	Croatia	52.4	3.3	7.5	6.0	4.2	3.5	5.5	3.1	2.6	3.8	3.7	4.4	4.8
137	Oman	51.6	5.0	2.2	3.1	2.2	4.3	4.2	6.5	3.7	7.4	4.4	6.6	2.0
137	Bahamas	51.6	6.6	2.7	4.1	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.0	4.8	3.3	4.3	4.5	3.4
139	Barbados	49.0	4.1	2.6	4.1	5.1	4.8	6.0	2.7	2.7	2.6	4.4	4.2	5.7
140	Argentina	48.4	4.0	2.5	4.7	2.7	5.1	5.5	5.0	4.0	3.8	4.0	2.8	4.3
141	Latvia	47.4	3.1	3.0	7.7	4.5	4.3	3.7	3.6	3.1	2.8	3.2	4.3	4.1
142	Costa Rica	45.1	3.8	3.6	4.4	3.8	5.5	4.2	2.6	4.1	1.7	3.3	3.8	4.3
142	Qatar	45.1	4.0	2.0	4.6	2.8	4.9	2.3	6.3	1.5	6.5	2.3	5.0	2.9
144	Slovakia	44.9	2.5	4.0	6.5	3.9	3.7	4.8	4.5	2.6	2.7	2.0	4.2	3.5

Appendix 3

5	Fragile States Index 2016	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
145	United Arab Emir.	44.5	4.2	2.2	3.6	2.2	3.9	2.6	6.9	2.4	7.5	2.8	3.6	2.6
146	Estonia	43.4	3.0	2.6	6.8	3.7	3.4	3.7	2.9	3.1	1.8	2.9	5.5	4.0
147	Mauritius	43.2	3.8	2.4	3.8	4.1	4.0	4.2	3.2	3.5	3.6	2.5	3.2	4.9
148	Italy	43.1	2.8	5.0	5.0	1.7	3.1	5.5	3.9	2.3	2.2	4.2	4.9	2.5
149	Lithuania	42.4	3.0	2.4	4.6	4.1	4.7	4.7	2.9	3.7	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.5
150	Chile	41.9	5.4	2.2	3.8	3.5	5.4	3.3	3.5	4.2	3.2	2.9	2.2	2.3
151	Czechia	40.8	1.6	4.0	5.0	2.5	2.9	4.3	4.9	2.8	2.6	2.3	5.0	2.9
152	Poland	40.7	3.0	3.8	4.9	4.2	3.2	3.8	3.5	2.5	2.9	2.0	3.8	3.1
153	Spain	39.8	2.2	2.0	5.9	2.1	3.7	5.2	3.0	2.4	2.0	3.0	6.3	2.0
154	Malta	39.6	2.7	4.1	3.9	3.9	2.8	4.2	3.8	2.2	3.2	3.3	2.0	3.5
155	Uruguay	36.2	4.0	2.2	2.7	4.1	4.3	3.3	1.1	3.1	2.5	3.5	2.7	2.7
156	South Korea	36.1	3.3	1.7	3.1	3.6	3.2	2.1	3.4	2.1	2.9	1.8	3.8	5.1
157	Japan	35.1	4.5	3.4	3.9	2.9	1.8	4.3	1.4	1.8	3.2	1.3	2.6	4.0
158	France	34.5	3.0	2.7	7.0	1.9	3.4	4.5	1.5	1.3	2.3	3.0	1.9	2.0
159	United States	34.0	3.0	2.1	5.1	1.4	4.5	2.5	2.1	1.8	3.4	2.9	4.3	0.9
160	Slovenia	33.9	2.5	4.5	4.2	2.8	3.6	4.0	2.9	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	2.5
161	Singapore	32.9	2.7	1.4	2.8	3.0	4.0	2.2	3.9	1.5	4.3	1.7	4.0	1.4
162	United Kingdom	32.4	2.6	2.2	5.9	1.8	3.8	3.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.4	3.5	1.0
163	Portugal	29.2	2.3	1.9	2.7	1.9	2.7	5.0	1.8	2.4	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.5
164	Belgium	29.0	2.2	2.1	4.4	1.6	2.9	4.4	1.6	1.8	1.0	1.9	3.9	1.2
165	Germany	28.6	2.2	5.7	4.8	1.8	3.0	2.4	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.0
166	Netherlands	28.2	2.7	4.0	4.4	2.3	2.4	2.9	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.7	3.1	0.9
167	Austria	27.5	2.1	6.1	4.0	1.2	3.1	1.9	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.2	2.7	1.4
168	Luxembourg	24.1	1.7	3.7	3.1	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.0	2.3	1.0	1.9	3.4	1.3
169	Canada	23.8	2.1	2.0	3.6	1.9	2.7	1.9	1.0	1.7	1.5	1.9	2.5	1.0
170	Iceland	22.8	1.8	1.7	1.3	2.5	1.3	3.5	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.2	1.8	4.3
171	Sweden	22.6	2.2	5.5	1.7	1.2	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.3
172	Ireland	22.5	1.9	1.7	1.6	2.5	2.4	3.6	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.8	1.5	1.6
172	Australia	22.5	1.5	2.0	4.1	1.0	2.4	1.8	1.0	1.7	2.5	1.8	1.7	1.0
174	Switzerland	21.8	1.7	2.2	3.8	1.8	2.4	2.5	1.0	1.1	2.0	1.3	1.0	1.0
175	Denmark	21.5	2.2	1.8	4.6	1.6	1.8	2.2	0.6	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.1
176	New Zealand	21.3	1.6	1.5	3.8	1.8	2.5	3.8	0.6	1.6	0.7	1.4	1.1	0.9
177	Norway	21.2	1.7	3.0	3.8	1.3	1.7	1.7	0.5	1.1	1.6	2.2	1.1	1.5
178	Finland	18.8	1.3	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.2	3.7	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.0

Appendix 4

FSI 2016 Indicators

POLITICAL and MILITARY

 **State Legitimacy** SL

Corruption and a lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Corruption
- Government Effectiveness
- Political Participation
- Electoral Process
- Level of Democracy
- Illicit Economy
- Drug Trade
- Protests and Demonstrations
- Power Struggles

 **Public Services** PS

The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Policing
- Criminality
- Education Provision
- Literacy
- Water & Sanitation
- Infrastructure
- Quality Healthcare
- Telephony
- Internet Access
- Energy Reliability
- Roads

 **Human Rights and Rule of Law** HR

When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Press Freedom
- Civil Liberties
- Political Freedoms
- Human Trafficking
- Political Prisoners
- Incarceration
- Religious Persecution
- Torture
- Executions

 **Security Apparatus** SEC

The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Internal Conflict
- Small Arms Proliferation
- Riots and Protests
- Fatalities from Conflict
- Military Coups
- Rebel Activity
- Militancy
- Bombings
- Political Prisoners

 **Factionalized Elites** FE

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Power Struggles
- Defectors
- Flawed Elections
- Political Competition

 **External Intervention** EXT

When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Foreign Assistance
- Presence of Peacekeepers
- Presence of UN Missions
- Foreign Military Intervention
- Sanctions
- Credit Rating

ECONOMIC

 **Uneven Economic Development** UED

When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- GINI Coefficient
- Income Share of Highest 10%
- Income Share of Lowest 10%
- Urban-Rural Service Distribution
- Access to Improved Services
- Slum Population

 **Poverty and Economic Decline** ECO

Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between the "haves" and the "have nots". Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Economic Deficit
- Government Debt
- Unemployment
- Youth Employment
- Purchasing Power
- GDP per capita
- GDP Growth
- Inflation

SOCIAL

 **Demographic Pressures** DP

Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Natural Disasters
- Disease
- Environment
- Pollution
- Food Scarcity
- Malnutrition
- Water Scarcity
- Population Growth
- Youth Bulge
- Mortality

 **Group Grievance** GG

When tension and violence exists between groups, the state's ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Discrimination
- Powerlessness
- Ethnic Violence
- Communal Violence
- Sectarian Violence
- Religious Violence

 **Refugees and IDPs** REF

Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Displacement
- Refugee Camps
- IDP Camps
- Disease related to Displacement
- Refugees per capita
- IDPs per capita
- Absorption capacity

 **Human Flight and Brain Drain** HF

When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Migration per capita
- Human Capital
- Emigration of Educated Population

Appendix 5

Indicators for Economic Emphasis Scenario

YOUTH BULGES

Base data is the published median age by country in the CIA World Factbook 2013. Median ages ranged from 15 to 52 years old. Three ages were put into each category, starting with the young ages 15-17, with the last group of older ages covering 42-53. These categories were then assigned a number from 1 to 10 which was used in the calculation of the index. Countries were only included by UN membership.

Age Range	Score	Totals
15-17	10	14
18-20	9	31
21-23	8	22
24-26	7	18
27-29	6	30
30-32	5	23
33-35	4	18
36-38	3	17
39-41	2	26
42-53	1	30
Total Countries		229

WATER SCARCITY

The Aqueduct Report by the World Resources Institute provided data for water stress. Figures were projected for 2030 under "Business as Usual" (BAU), assuming no changes. *Water Stress* measures total annual water withdrawals expressed as a percentage of the total annual available blue water. The Score was multiplied by two for inclusion in the index in order to obtain a standardized value between 1 and 10.

Score	Value for Water Stress
[0-1]	Low (<10%)
[1-2]	Low to medium (10-20%)
[2-3]	Medium to high (20-40%)
[3-4]	High (40-80%)
[4-5]	Extremely high (>80%)

POLITICAL and MILITARY

Public Services PS

The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Policing
- Criminality
- Education Provision
- Literacy
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- Infrastructure
- Quality Healthcare
- Telephony
- Internet Access
- Energy Reliability
- Roads

Security Apparatus SEC

The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Internal Conflict
- Small Arms Proliferation
- Riots and Protests
- Fatalities from Conflict
- Military Coups
- Rebel Activity
- Militancy
- Bombings
- Political Prisoners

Factionalized Elites FE

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Power Struggles
- Defectors
- Flawed Elections
- Political Competition

External Intervention EXT

When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Foreign Assistance
- Presence of Peacekeepers
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- Credit Rating

SOCIAL

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Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat. Includes pressures and measures related to:

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- IDP Camps
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- IDPs per capita
- Absorption capacity

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- Powerlessness
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- Communal Violence
- Sectarian Violence
- Religious Violence

ECONOMIC

Uneven Economic Development UED

When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- GINI Coefficient
- Income Share of Highest 10%
- Income Share of Lowest 10%
- Urban-Rural Service Distribution
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Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between the "haves" and the "have nots". Includes pressures and measures related to:

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- Youth Employment
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Appendix 6

Indicators for Government Emphasis Scenario

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- Protests and Demonstrations
- Power Struggles


Human Rights and Rule of Law
HR

When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Press Freedom
- Civil Liberties
- Political Freedoms
- Human Trafficking
- Political Prisoners
- Incarceration
- Religious Persecution
- Torture
- Executions


Factionalized Elites
FE

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

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- Rebel Activity
- Militancy
- Bombings
- Political Prisoners


External Intervention
EXT

When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Foreign Assistance
- Presence of Peacekeepers
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- Credit Rating

SOCIAL


Refugees and IDPs
REF

Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat. Includes pressures and measures related to:

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- Access to Improved Services
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