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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**BUILDING CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP FOR STABILITY
AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS:
THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN POLICY AND FUNDING**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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14. ABSTRACT Due to the complex nature of Stability and Reconstruction operations civilian leadership is preferential to the military. Since the late 1990s successive administrations have attempted to build civilian organizations to lead these operations, but all attempts have been unsuccessful. Ultimately, these attempts have failed because the Congress cannot reconcile the benefits with the startup costs and consequently prioritized appropriations in favor of the military, further starving and crippling civilian capability.					
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Executive Summary

Title: Building Civilian Leadership for Stability and Reconstruction Operations: The Disconnect Between Policy and Funding

Author: LCDR Nicholas W. Wagner, United States Navy

Thesis: Civilian leadership in Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) missions ultimately failed because Congress could not reconcile its intangible benefits with its startup costs and consequently prioritized appropriations in favor of the military, further starving and crippling civilian capability.

Discussion: Due to the complex nature of S&R missions, more specialized expertise is required to solve the diverse problems than typical military members possess. While the military does not possess the specialized skills needed for S&R, they do possess an abundance of capacity to respond to S&R missions due to built in excess capacity when not engaged in large-scale combat operations. To make civilian leadership more central, President Clinton and subsequent administrations have attempted to build effective civilian capability and capacity to lead whole of government responses to S&R problems. However, no attempt to build civilian S&R capacity has met the expectation of its proponents.

Civilian led S&R leadership has failed primarily due to a lack of funding. From FY2004 to FY2015, successive administrations requested a total of \$993.7 million to build civilian capability and capacity, but Congress only appropriated \$409.9 million, or 41.2 percent of what was thought necessary. In comparison, over \$1 billion was spent for military S&R missions in FY2010 alone during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lack of funding can be explained by factors internal to both the DOS and Congress and by the nature of S&R missions. Poor mission prioritization and year-to-year budgeting of the DOS make it difficult for Congress to make a proper cost benefit analysis. The lack of short-duration, high-impact S&R projects make growing S&R capability a difficult sell to Congress. Additionally, overseas S&R projects are difficult for Congress members to support because there is no tangible utility for their districts in sending money overseas.

Conclusion: The disparity between DOS and DOD funding and the disconnect between policy and funding show that building civilian S&R capability and capacity has never truly been a priority of Congress. Doctrine should be changed to reflect the reality of military primacy in S&R operations, or Congress should reprioritize funding and accept that building civilian capability and capacity will not be popular, quick, or painless.

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Preface

Many thanks to my mentor on this project, Dr. Ed Erickson, without his guidance this project could not have been a successful. Thank you to my civilian faculty members, Dr. Lynn Tesser and Dr. Bradford Wineman who facilitate a captivating learning environment. LtCol Mike McMellon, my military faculty member deserves great recognition for his help, advice, and common sense approach to leading and teaching. Most of all I want to thank my editor-in-chief, Karen, whose understanding and assistance have been critical to all my endeavors.

INTRODUCTION

By early 2004, US military victories on the ground had successfully disrupted the Taliban in Afghanistan and disassembled Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. It quickly became apparent that the newly empowered replacement governments could not effectively administer their respective fragmented societies. While the American military was arguably the most effective nation building organization in the world, difficulties in assisting the fledgling governments to build stability led some lawmakers to believe it was time to bring in strong civilian leadership.¹ In an article in *Washington Quarterly*, John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan commented that the U.S. Government "can no longer afford to face every task with nothing but a hammer at its disposal."²

Attempting to bolster nation building efforts in the Middle East, the Bush Administration proposed a "whole of government" approach to address the shortfalls plaguing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts. To lead this new approach, the Department of State (DOS) was assigned responsibility to "coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."³ As the President's lead department in diplomacy and foreign policy, the DOS was a natural fit to direct the government's efforts to provide economic reform, strengthen the weak justice systems, and develop the institutions needed to enable legitimate governance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite its mandate, the DOS was not manned, funded, or equipped to take the lead role in nation building. To take on this role it needed to build an organic capability with the right experience and expertise across a multitude of diverse lines of effort. In mid 2004, the DOS took the first step to build the required capability with the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for

Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS). At the time this move was widely lauded throughout the halls of government and international aid community and even championed by military leadership, who foresaw a return their primary focus to war fighting vice nation building.

Over the next decade and a half the S/CRS and its antecedents, suffering from constant change and resource starvation, struggled to build effective capability. Successive initiatives and administrations attempted to shape and strengthen civilian capability, but were continuously unappreciated and underfunded. Without being able to point at direct, tangible benefits of growing S&R capability to their constituents, Congress appropriated a total of \$409.9 million from 2004 to 2015. This was only 41 percent of the \$993.7 million requested by the DOS to build this capability. At the same time the DOD received unprecedented levels of funding for its efforts to shape operations in the Middle East. Consequently, the DOS never attained the required capabilities and were never able to meet the expectations of the policy's proponent eventually losing momentum as the major S&R operations in the Middle East came to an end shifting focus to conflict prevention.

This paper seeks to explain the disconnect between policy and funding in S&R operations since the late 1990s by examining the iterative legislative and budgeting processes that highlighted attempts to build DOS S&R capability. A further comparison of DOS and DOD appropriations shows that the funding disparity for S&R operations is on an order of magnitudes. In doing so, this paper will answer the question of the motivation behind why the DOD is disproportionately funded over DOS for S&R operations. Ultimately, civilian leadership in S&R missions failed because the Congress could not reconcile its intangible benefits with its startup costs and consequently prioritized appropriations in favor of the military, further starving and crippling civilian capability.

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

By examining theoretical models and doctrine, this section defines S&R operations and seeks to explain why nation building efforts are an important phase in the spectrum of war fighting. Furthermore, it addresses why civilian expertise is necessary in solving the complex problems involved with S&R missions while acknowledging the advantages of excess military capacity during Phase IV operations. Finally, this section posits that civilian leadership must concede that the military holds and will continue to hold necessary S&R roles throughout the spectrum of armed conflict.

Stability and Reconstruction Defined

Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, offers a strong definition for S&R operations as “the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.”⁴ These types of operations have long had a place in American operational lexicon, but became important drivers of U.S. overseas interventions in the post 9/11 fight against the spread of global terrorism. The thought held that ungoverned or failing territories would become safe havens to be used as bases from which terrorist organizations and international crime syndicates could organize, train and operate.

The goal of S&R operations is to build resilient, indigenous institutions and capability in post-conflict areas legitimizing local governments and preventing them from returning to the conditions leading to instability and war. Synonymous with state building, nation building, and transition operations, S&R missions share many of the same aspects of pre-conflict stability operations, but they are made more difficult due to the non-permissive environment associated

with the cessation conflict. This difficulty is exacerbated if the United States was an active participant in the conflict and not a participating solely as a peacekeeping force.⁵

According to JP 3-07 *Stability*, S&R operations focus on five “stability sectors.” The five stability sectors emphasized are (1) security, (2) justice and reconciliation, (3) humanitarian assistance and social well being, (4) governance and participation, and (5) economic stabilization and infrastructure.⁶ Each sector is meant to build trust, credibility, and legitimacy between host nation governments and their citizens. The ultimate goal is to transition responsibility and authority for post-conflict governance back to autonomous, capable, legitimate local agencies.

The stability sectors comprise a vast litany of complex issues and disciplines, requiring specific expertise to address. Expert responders and developers from medical fields, law enforcement specialties, legal backgrounds, and energy and finance sectors are all highly sought. These experts are sourced from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the international community at large. Since no single organization has expertise in all these areas, a whole of government approach is required.

Military Leadership versus Civilian Leadership

Immediately following combat operations, heavy military presence is required to ensure the security and safety in the region. As seen in the Ideal Model in Figure 1 shows, the military presence quickly wanes following combat operations as civilian and indigenous organizations become more capable, taking up functions previously provided by the military.⁷ In the end, local civil organizations assume total control as military and international aid organizations depart.

Figure 2 shows how recent efforts have actually unfolded.⁸ In this model, military presence slowly decreases as international civilian presence gradually increases. Driven by

resource disparity and lack of organizational capability, international civilian capacity is slow to respond and never reaches the level of military capacity.




Figure 1. Ideal Vision of Transition

Source: Conrad Crane, “Phase IV Operations, Where Wars are Really Won,” *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 18.




Figure 2. Realistic Vision of Transition

Source: Conrad Crane, “Phase IV Operations, Where Wars are Really Won,” *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 18.

Because military capacity is based on large-scale combat operations, excess military manpower and equipment levels are built into the organization when it is not engaged in large-scale combat operations.⁹ This differs from the DOS, which does not build in excess capacity. The DOS is manned for diplomatic work where every civil servant and Foreign Service Officer is engaged in ongoing DOS functions. Since there is no “surge” capacity built into the DOS it

can take months to mobilize adequate response in post-conflict zones. Due to this difference in capacity, military units are routinely tasked with S&R missions.

Why is there an effort to build civilian capacity in S&R mission while it is clear the military has superior resources? The argument can be summed up along two lines, expertise and message. The depth and breadth of the five stability sectors requires skills and tools that average soldiers do not possess. While the military is comprised of capable, flexible service members ready to assist across a range of problems, the transition from combat to nation building requires an altogether different skill set. Flexible service members adapt as best they can to provide their best efforts, but fall short of the required expertise. The complex issues require people with special training, who can devote time and attention to the demands of the missions. Law enforcement trainers, conflict law experts, economists, and agriculture specialists all have years of training and experience in their particular fields. While good intentioned, most soldiers do not possess these skills, which are found in NGOs, the international aid community, and across the whole of government.

Perhaps the most important aspect of using civilian responders over the military is the message. Using heavily armed military members to provide S&R aid in a country ravaged by war, in which the United States may have been a participant, is not the most effective way to build trust and confidence in indigenous populations. Civilian experts trained for S&R programs are less likely to provoke hostile feelings with those they are trying to help and therefore may be more effective at providing the assistance needed.

Concessions to the Military

Acknowledging the prominence of civilian leadership and expertise in the S&R missions, it is important to understand that resources and sentiment cannot shift so far as to the exclude the

military from these operations. Civilian leadership must concede a permanent place to the military in nation building enterprises. “Boots on the ground” are best equipped and positioned to provide secure and permissive environments in which civilian experts can apply their skills. Excess military capacity and equipment will continue to enable civilian leadership to execute robust programs.

It is also important to recognize that S&R operations do not take place at a discrete time during a conflict. Despite the martial order implied by “Phases,” there are no concrete demarcations between phases. As can be seen in the excerpt in Figure 3, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, acknowledges how phase elements can overlap.¹⁰ This overlap is especially evident between Domination, Phase III, and S&R, Phase IV. For example, to prevent insurgents from finding aid and succor in a recently cleared village, it is more effective to create an environment where locals police themselves or support American policies and troops through legitimate governance. Just the same, decisive combat may be required in response to a resurgence in violence in a previously pacified area. Planning and operations must proceed with the end in mind and S&R must be taken into account throughout every operation.

The military’s inextricable connection with S&R Operations is codified in its own doctrine. DOD Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, provides forces with guidance on conducting S&R operations. DOD Instruction 3000.05 was originally released in 2005 as DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, making stability operations a “core function” of the DOD on the same level as combat operations.¹¹ These documents conclude that even though civilians should take the lead to in S&R operations soldiers must be prepared to lead or assist in those types of mission at any time.

POLICY AND STATE DEPARTMENT EVOLUTION

As established in the previous section, civilian responders have the unique expertise and provide a non-threatening message that gives them the necessary abilities to lead S&R operations. This section diverges from the theoretical mandate and illustrates actual governmental efforts to build civilian leadership and response capability in the DOS since the mid 1990s. Illustrated by Executive Orders, Congressional Research Service reports, and Inspectors General reports, it details the rocky, and ultimately unsuccessful, evolution of civilian stabilization organizations within the DOS. All the while this section highlights the policy efforts that placed, or misplaced, priority on developing specialization within the DOS to lead a “whole of government” approach to S&R efforts and respond to crises.

Evolution of the Policy

Faced with crises in Bosnia, Iraq, central Africa, and Bangladesh the need for strengthening interagency capability was apparent to the Clinton administration in 1997. To better manage “complex contingency operations,” President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, in May 1997. This PDD directed the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee to establish an Executive Committee (ExCom) composed of leaders from all relevant departments and agencies to orchestrate whole of government solutions for complex crises as they occurred. Plans were to include comprehensive situation assessments, mission statements, agency objectives, and desired end states consistent with legal and fiscal constraints.¹² Despite the directive’s proactive intent, PDD 56 lapsed due to lack of compelling exigencies and political ambivalence at the time.¹³

The attacks on September 11, 2001 led to a resurgence of focus on interagency cooperation and S&R missions. Military objectives in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were

quickly achieved, leading to the largest nation building programs since the Marshall Plan.¹⁴ However, pervasive instability and lawlessness within those states continued to threaten global security. In an attempt to increase security and stability in those regions, the Bush administration decided to bolster S&R efforts. By reorganizing and strengthening its civilian institutions to take the leadership responsibility for critical peace building tasks.

In February 2004, Senators Richard Lugar and Joe Biden, chairman and ranking Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) respectively, introduced legislation to create and fund a State Department Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction. However, this bill never gained wide support of the congressional leadership. Lawmakers in the Senate never considered the bill or its companion bill in the House introduced by Representative Adam Schiff. In July, not waiting for the Congress to act, Secretary of State Colin Powell used his prerogative to create the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) directly under the Office of the Secretary of State. Endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Speaker of the House, and Senate Majority Leader this move was seen as an important step to achieving an integrated national approach to S&R.¹⁵ Having no statutory authority nor individual funding, the office got off to a slow start with only 37 individuals from across the government including personnel from USAID, DOD, Department of Commerce, and Department of the Treasury.¹⁶ Statutory authority was granted to the S/CRS later that year on December 8, 2004, when Section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 was signed into law; however, the mandate was still absent of funding.¹⁷

S/CRS was given six responsibilities per the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriation Act. These responsibilities appeared comprehensive, but conscientiously avoided interfering with military efforts. The responsibilities included: (1) catalogue and monitor the non-military crisis

response resources of Executive agencies, state and local governments as well as private and non-profit sectors; (2) monitor worldwide political and economic instability to anticipate need; (3) assess ongoing crises and determine appropriate non-military responses; (4) plan for contingencies in paragraph (3); (5) coordinate plans of relevant Executive agencies; and (6) coordinate training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities.¹⁸

To further strengthen the S/CRS coordination role, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, on December 7, 2005. This directive superseded President Clinton's PDD-56 and firmly established the DOS as the lead integration agency for all U.S. government S&R efforts.¹⁹ It went so far as to establish a coordinating relationship between the DOS and DOD to harmonize efforts with ongoing military operations across the spectrum of conflict, but did not go so far as to assign DOS with specific command authority. NSPD-44 created the position of, "Coordinator," and assigned roles of planning and leading whole of government efforts to prevent and mitigate the effects of conflict.

As coordinator for interagency operations S/CRS had marginal success, but fell dramatically short of expectations. From FY2006 through FY2009, S/CRS assisted 14 countries from Southeast Asia to Trans-Sahara Africa in prevention or response to conflict.²⁰ In 2007, S/CRS introduced the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization. As approved by the NSC Deputies Council, the IMS was the fruit of 16 cooperating agencies and was a guide to interagency coordination during highly complex S&R crises.²¹ In conjunction with USAID, S/CRS released the Interagency Conflict Assessments Framework (ICAF) in 2008 to provide a framework to identify "at risk" areas.²² Despite these successes, an early strategic decision hobbled the S/CRS. Its leadership decided that the wars in

Iraq and Afghanistan were outliers in the spectrum of the conflicts to which they were to respond.²³ These conflicts were just too big for S/CRS to be effective. Instead of dedicating resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, S/CRS decided to focus on capacity and capability building for the next crisis.²⁴ Subsequently, a State Department Inspector General Report blasted the S/CRS with, “not play[ing] the role its proponents hope[d] it would.”²⁵ At the same time, the report praised the organization for their high morale.²⁶

In an effort to reform and expand civilian S&R capability, further legislation was passed in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. This law provided for specific functions and requirements for the S/CRS and formally established the Response Readiness Corps (RRC) and Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) in U.S. Code. The RRC and CRC were part of President Bush’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) and were intended to be the civilian workforce component to the S/CRS for expanded S&R missions.²⁷ Under the Bush administration, the RRC consisted of personnel from State, USAID, and other agencies organized between Active Response Corp (ARC) and Standby Response Corps (SRC) components answerable to the DOS and deployable to afflicted areas within 48 hours and 30 days, respectively.²⁸ Similar to the ARC and SRC, the CRC was intended as a deployable force of experts in reserve, whose ranks were filled from the private sector vice the government. The CRC was to be answerable to the DOS and deployable to crises within 45-60 days. While the Bush administration requested 250 personnel for ARC, 2000 personnel for SRC, and 2000 personnel for CRC, no final strength was dictated in the 2009 NDAA.²⁹

This general framework was maintained by the Obama administration with some rebranding when he took office. Under Obama, the CSI was unified under a single Civilian Response Corps (CRC). Obama’s CRC was arranged along the lines of an active component

(CRC-A), standby component (CRC-S), and reserve component (CRC-R), without substantive change to function.

Throughout 2010 S/CRS led CRC-A and CRC-S personnel during S&R missions to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Sudan. In December 2011 it had 68 personnel from DOS, USAID, Agriculture, Commerce, and Justice in 11 different countries.³⁰ By early 2012 the CRC-A roster boasted 131 members from seven departments and agencies, and CRC-S had a total of 1,374 members.³¹ While the active and standby components slowly grew, the reserve component was tabled in favor of a more cost conscious roster of technical experts, or the “Expert Roster.” Participants of the Expert Roster were essentially volunteers willing, but not obligated, to deploy.³²

The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) provided a major step forward in advancing civilian capability and capacity. The 2010 QDDR was the first holistic policy statement by the State Department. Among other far-reaching goals, it announced the elevation of the S&R mission to a “core function” of the DOS.³³ To manage this core function the DOS created a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) placed under the direction of an Assistant Secretary.³⁴ The QDDR promised that the CSO would be staffed and managed by experts with hands on experience in, “containing violence, reducing communal tensions, and preventing contested political power arrangements.”³⁵

The 2010 QDDR assigned the CSO responsibility to rapidly deploy civilian responders as crises occurred and work closely with other agencies, especially USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).³⁶ Its five functions were: (1) build capabilities of the CRC and other response teams, (2) provide expertise and guidance for policy building, (3) provide specialist liaisons to regional bureaus, (4)

institutionalize an operational framework, and (5) coordinate efforts to build civilian capacity in international partners and emerging nations.³⁷

Following formal establishment in November 2011, the CSO was active in several countries through FY2012-2013 as U.S. focus shifted away from Iraq and Afghanistan. Missions to Burma focused on landmine removal. In Kenya, the CSO deployed to prevent violence surrounding the March 2013 elections.³⁸ The deployment to Honduras was the most ambitious undertaking, attempting to prevent violent crime and enhance civilian security by working with prosecutors and investigators.³⁹ Other deployments to Syria, Senegal, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador worked on a variety of stability enhancing projects.⁴⁰

Amidst the numerous small-scale stability operations, the CSO came under much scrutiny. A DOS Inspector General Report released on March of 2014 said of the CSO, “it has diminished, rather than enhanced, a whole-of-government approach... it has not engaged in recognized high-priority conflicts of national security interest.”⁴¹ Furthermore, it noted the poor morale of the bureau resulting from lack of direction and large personnel turnover. By January 2012, the CRC-A was at about half of the designed end strength, 131 personnel, and CRC-S was reduced to about a quarter of the original intended end strength, 590 personnel, with no plan to increase numbers.⁴² CRC was even rebranded as the Civilian Response Network (CRN).⁴³ Overall the CSO fell far short of the NSPD-44 mandate to be the lead coordinating agency of S&R efforts.

Overall, executive branch efforts to build State Department S&R capacity over the past two decades have failed to provide any lasting results. Without compelling exigencies President Clinton’s early attempt to grow capacity through PDD-56 never gained support. A more fertile

environment allowed President Bush some marginal success. Under Bush's NSPD-44 the S/CRS was created, but never reached operational relevance. Continued conflict during President Obama's early years allowed him to grow the CRC and transform the S/CRS into a full bureau under the CSO. However, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan waned and attention shifted from building large-scale civilian capability and capacity to responding to much smaller development needs.

Bookended by the 2015 QDDR, attempts by the DOS to build additional S&R capacity have all but ceased. While the 2010 QDDR designated post-conflict S&R as a "core function," the 2015 QDDR focused on conflict prevention. Acknowledging that the CSO fell short of expectations, the 2015 QDDR placed central emphasis on the USAID's DCHA.⁴⁴ This shift was the subject of a recent white paper authored by representative from the DOD, the DOS, and USAID.⁴⁵ With no major conflict on the horizon and little push from the top, the CSO will not likely see better days.

APPROPRIATIONS

While there was seemingly substantial effort to grow the DOS S&R capacity, the actual appropriations paint a different picture. In this case, successive administrations and lawmakers identified the DOS S&R growth as a key policy priority. The concept even made its way into military and civilian doctrine as well as national strategy documents. However, was building this capacity building ever really a priority? The appropriations to make strong civilian leadership a reality never accompanied the authorization legislation. This section examines the budgeting process and the actual DOS appropriations made by the Congress. A further comparison of DOS appropriations with DOD wartime spending shows that a disproportionate amount of treasure was allocated to the military vice building civilian capacity. The truest indication of where priorities lay is how money is spent; DOS capacity building was never a real priority.

The Budget Process

Prior to looking at the relevant appropriations, it is important to understand how government budgets are created. The path to receiving appropriations via the federal government is anything but simple. In general, the budget process starts with the President who is legally obligated to submit his budget request to Congress by the first week in February. Not generated in a vacuum, the President's budget submission is informed by and negotiated with applicable agencies and departments through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Once complete, the President's budget is sent to Congress where the House and Senate will send bills to applicable authorization and appropriation sub-committees for the DOS. The House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees determine which DOS programs receive congressional authority to operate; this process is known as "authorization." While this process is typical of

other portions of the budget, Congress had not passed nor did the President sign into law a State Department Authorization bill between 2002 and 2016.⁴⁶

The House and Senate Committees on State, Foreign Affairs, and Related Programs provide the other half of the equation by controlling appropriations. Appropriations determine how much funding is applied to programs and are typically applicable for only one year, but can be used for longer periods as specified in the bill. For the most part authorizations and appropriations are coordinated, but programs can and have been authorized without a funding. Once authorizations and appropriations get through the various sub-committees they go to the floor of the Senate or House for a full vote. Individual bills approved by the House and Senate are consolidated and coordinated in conference committees then sent to the President for his consideration. The president will veto or sign the bill into law. All told, government budgeting is a deliberately cumbersome process designed to elicit discussion and debate, ensuring national resources are expended with due consideration.

Appropriation Methods

While authorizations and appropriations are passed through the legislature the same way, appropriations can take on several different forms to include annual, supplemental, and overseas contingency. Annual, Base, or Enduring are all synonyms for the annual appropriation that an agency or department will receive to conduct normal operations, acquisitions, and investments throughout the year. These are for the basic level of government function. If a shortfall due to an unplanned crisis or contingency arises that requires additional appropriation authority, Congress will pass a supplemental measure in much the same way it passes the annual appropriation to provide for that contingency. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was initially implemented to offset the mounting costs of combat operations in the Middle East.

While the application of OCO funds has expanded into other areas over the recent years, the general principal remains the same.

If Congress and the President cannot agree upon a budget by the beginning of a fiscal year, the government may shut down to essential functions or a Continuing Resolution (CR) can be passed. A CR will hold government spending at the same or a fraction of the prior year's spending and no new programs can be started while the CR is in place. The CR is a stopgap measure that allows Congress and the President more time to compromise on an annual budget.

From 2005 to 2010 Congress authorized transfer authority from the DOD to fund DOS S&R operations from DOD funds. This funding in, Section 1207, of the Defense Appropriations bills was temporary in nature and was only available for operations while DOS built capability and capacity.

Funding Civilian Capacity

The creation of the S/CRS by Secretary Colin Powell in 2004 without a mandate from Congress started the trend that would leave the DOS with an ineffective structure. Between FY2004 and FY2007 S/CRS grew from 12 personnel to well over a 100 individuals sourced from all over the government as well as contracted from outside the government.⁴⁷ Despite receiving statutory authority in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2005, S/CRS lacked its own appropriation and was reliant on the State Department's Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) budget for funding.⁴⁸ During this time, S/CRS received \$14 million to develop and build what would become a "core function" of the State Department.⁴⁹

Corresponding to the surge in Iraq, S/CRS received its first significant funding in FY2008. Through the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (PL 110-252) S/CRS and USAID received \$65 million for S&R activities.⁵⁰ Of that amount \$30 million went directly to the

D&CP budget “to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity.”⁵¹ USAID received \$25 million to build S&R capability within their organization. The remaining \$10 million was part of a lump sum bridge fund provided to D&CP to be spent in FY2009.⁵² The combination of the supplemental and annual appropriation made available through D&CP provided S/CRS with \$35.8 million to start hiring employees for the active and standby components of President Bush’s RRC.

FY2009 was the first year in which Congress provided the CSI with a specific annual appropriation separate from D&CP. In the midst of the surge in Iraq, the Bush administration requested \$246.8 million to “organize, train, equip and employ” the planned cadre of 250 active, 2000 standby, and 2000 reserve civilian responders.⁵³ Ultimately Congress appropriated only \$75 million to standup the active and standby components of the CSI; the reserve component was tabled for future consideration. Of the appropriated funds, \$45 million went directly to the DOS for the S/CRC and the CRC while \$30 million went to USAID for coordination with DOS.⁵⁴ This appropriation represented only 30.2 percent of that requested by the administration. This shortfall severely undercut the ability to build capacity for response and develop expertise in all necessary skill sets.⁵⁵

President Obama’s FY2010 budget request increased President Bush’s FY2009 request by 331 percent to a total of \$323 million; all of it programmed for the DOS.⁵⁶ This request included \$63.6 million earmarked for the establishment of the reserve corps, which was left unfunded the previous year.⁵⁷ Passed on December 16, 2009, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 provided only \$120 million to DOS and \$30 million to USAID. \$10 million of the DOS appropriation was withheld from State with the sole provision that a memorandum of understanding be signed with the DOD for strategic airlift capability.⁵⁸ Again, the CRC-R was

left without funding. In August of 2010, Congress made matters more difficult for the DOS when it rescinded authority for State and USAID to spend unobligated funds resulting in further shortfalls; \$40 million and \$30 million, respectively.⁵⁹ With this rescission, total obligated funds for FY2010 amounted to only \$80 million, well short of the requested \$323 million.

The beginning of FY2011 was plagued with a series of Continuing Resolutions that lasted well into March. During this time, the CSI programs continued to receive full FY2010 funding levels based on the original annual appropriation. When finally passed, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Appropriations Act, 2011, appropriated \$35 million to DOS and \$5 million to USAID for growth and operations.⁶⁰ While the President's budget requested \$184 million, the Senate had overriding concerns about DOS' ability to deploy the requisite number of personnel.⁶¹ Again, undercut by 78 percent of what the president thought was necessary, the CSI programs were resource limited.

Called Conflict Stabilization Operations in the FY2012 budget, the President requested \$92.2 million for continued operations and support of the new bureau.⁶² This request represented a growth from the previous year, but a reduction from the 2010 levels, presumably based on the transition of the reserve corps to the "Expert Roster" as part of the 2010 QDDR realignment. Instead of providing the entire requested amount, The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 granted transfer authority up to \$35 million from D&CP funds.⁶³ This approach was a return to pre-2008 funding method when there was no individual line item available for S&R. In addition to the transfer authority, the bill appropriated \$8.5 million to CSO as OCO funds.⁶⁴ Despite the common usage to fund military operations for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this was the first time OCO had provided funding for CSO. It is important to note that FY2012 represented the

final year of significant military operations in Iraq. As U.S. forces withdrew, the DOS planned for their operations to shift from “transition” to “normal” diplomatic operations.⁶⁵

FY2013 was the first budget year to incorporate the QDDR’s new Bureau of Conflict Stabilization. The Obama Administration’s request of \$56.5 million for CSO promised to increase flexibility and expeditionary capability with a reduced staff.⁶⁶ While the Senate recommended passage of the full requested amount under D&CP funding, the House recommended maintaining funding at the same level as the previous year.⁶⁷ From the available documentation it is unclear as to which version was passed in conference, but likely the House’s bill stood without the accompanying OCO addition. What is clear is that the funding was subject to sequestration, which resulted in CSO receiving only around \$8.1 million for the entire year.⁶⁸

FY2014 and FY2015 continued to see declines in CSO appropriations. Requests of \$45.2 million and \$43.9 million dollars for FY2014 and FY2015, respectively, were met with \$21.8 million (plus \$8.5 million in OCO) and \$38.5 million.⁶⁹ By percentage these funding levels were higher than ever before (67.0 percent and 87.7 percent), but the ambition of the program shrunk faster than ever. The perception of failure permeated so much that in FY2016 the House recommended withholding funds altogether until mission overlaps, bureau shortfalls, and staff size issues were resolved.⁷⁰ There were no specific budget requests in FY2016 or FY2017.

Lawmakers made a paltry effort from FY2004 through FY2015, despite the preponderance of legislators who supported building a strong civilian force to lead S&R. As seen in Table 1, only about 41 percent of requested funding was ever appropriated during this period. DOS requests totaled less than one billion dollars, \$993.7 million. Between FY2004 and FY2008 funding for S/CRS was handled directly through D&CP funds. Documentation of individual requests was not available. Total appropriations for DOS/USAID civilian

stabilization capacity building and operations, with regard to the rescission in FY2010 and sequestration in FY2013, in this same period were \$409.9 million, or 41.2 percent.

It is important to note that 41.2 percent over the entire timespan is an inflated figure. The early years prior to FY2009 with no direct requests and the late years following FY2013 bias this percentage. For the critical growth years between FY2009 and FY2011, \$755.9 million was requested while appropriations totaled only \$194.8 million. This appropriation represented only 25.8 percent of total requested funds.

Table 1. FY2004-FY2015 Department of State Requests and Appropriations

	FY04-07 ^a	FY08 ^b	FY09 ^c	FY10 ^d		FY11 ^e	FY12 ^f	FY13 ^g		FY14 ^h	FY15 ^h	Total
Requested	*	*	248.6	323.3		184.0	92.2	56.5		45.2	43.9	993.7
Appropriated												
State	14.0	5.8	45.0	120.0	80.0	34.9	35.0	21.6	8.1	34.0	22.7	279.5
Supplemental		30.0										30.0
OCO							8.5	8.1	8.5	8.5	15.0	40.5
USAID		25.0	30.0	30.0		4.9						59.9
Subtotal	14.0	60.8	75.0	150.0	80.0	39.8	43.5	29.7	16.6	42.5	37.7	409.9
Percentage of Request			30.2%	46.4%	24.7%	21.6%	47.2%	52.6%	29.3%	94.0%	85.9%	41.2%

Dollar amounts are in Then Year, million dollar increments

Shaded areas reflect annual appropriations, which were subject to rescission in FY2010 and sequestration in FY2013, these amounts are not reflected in the total.

* Date not available

Source: Author's table compiled from source material. ^aSerafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, 9. ^bSerafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*; 15. ^cPL 111-08. ^dEpstein, Nakmura, and Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations*, 10 and PL 111-226. ^ePL 112-10 and Serafino, Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, 19. ^fPL 112-74 and Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, 20. ^gEpstein, Tiersky, and Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2014 Budget and Appropriations*, 6, 15. ^hEpstein, Tiersky, and Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2014 Budget and Appropriations*, 15.

DOS versus DOD

While one cannot make a direct comparison of the above appropriations to the appropriations going to the military at the same time, a conclusion can be drawn from the difference in orders of magnitude of the accounts. From FY2001 to FY2016 the DOD appropriated \$1,618.2 billion for war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷¹ In FY2010 alone over \$1 billion was appropriated to the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) out of the military's Operations and Maintenance budget for various S&R missions.⁷² During the same span of years Congress appropriated only \$123.2 billion to DOS in OCO funds for all diplomatic operations and foreign aid programs.⁷³ As seen in Table 1 above, DOS S&R capacity and capability efforts received less than \$500 million during roughly that same time. While it is near impossible to divest exactly how much of DOD's funding went to war fighting versus state building, it is evident that the balance of funding favored DOD over DOS by several orders of magnitude.

POLICY/FUNDING DISCONNECT

Given the long expressed need to build civilian S&R capacity, how can the lack of congressional funding be explained? There are several factors, internal to both the DOS and Congress that act as disincentives, which make justifying large appropriations for growing S&R capability difficult. Improperly focused planning and inefficiencies in budgeting by the DOS did not clearly demonstrate a concerted plan for capability development to Congress. As for Congress, the ambiguous nature of S&R programs make them easy to support in theory, but difficult to support in practice. S&R missions rarely have clearly measurable metrics with which to judge success or failure; lawmakers easily see the costs but cannot quantify the benefits of such programs. The multiyear commitments to S&R, which can be on the scale of two to four years, do not fit into the two-year election cycle of the House of Representatives. Additionally the outward focus of S&R programs make them hard to connect to the domestic constituency who maintain lawmakers in power. Lastly, overlapping mandates between agencies and departments make Congress reticent to fund new expenditures.

Internal consistencies within the DOS hamper its ability to project a concerted plan that meets its tasking. In 2004, NSPD-44 charged DOS with being the government's lead on S&R operations. The largest needs and opportunities of that time were the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of directing effort in those engagements, S/CRS leaders decided to focus on other areas. S/CRS sought gain to experience and grow capacity in less challenging environments prior to circling back to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Despite the 2010 QDDR's declaration that Iraq and Afghanistan were not the primary models for building civilian capacity, failure to commit to these pressing conflicts surely devalued the office and dissuaded Congress from providing further appropriations.⁷⁵

S/CRS' strategy to circle back to Iraq and Afghanistan may have been more successful if the DOS' budget planning process presented a plan with a longer time horizon to Congress. Unlike the DOD, which presents a budget to Congress for the next year plus the next four out years, the DOS works only on an annual, or year-to-year basis.⁷⁶ Even though only a single year is approved at a time, planning for the out years demonstrates a longer commitment and a more cohesive and ultimately achievable plan. With assurance that programmed funds will be used responsibly, Congress will be more apt to risk funding uncertain projects. Unfortunately, the DOS lacks the staff, resources, and expertise to perform this type of long range budgeting.

While the DOS has its problems with prioritization and planning, the dynamics of Congress and S&R programs pose their own challenges. One such challenge is the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of S&R programs. Because these programs deal with complex, multifaceted issues discrete measurements of success is difficult to achieve. It is easy to count the number of crisis responders made available as a measure of effectiveness for a hiring program, but this does not give a good indication of the true capacity and capability developed. How can the number of wells drilled and roads laid be directly correlated to the number of terrorist attacks avoided? The results of any program in stability and relationship building are usually intangible and take years to develop.⁷⁷ Lacking discrete, effective measures of success makes it difficult for Representatives to champion. Elected for short, two-year terms, the Representatives demand high impact, short-term projects they can tout as major successes to their domestic constituency.

The focus of S&R missions on the development of foreign institutions is yet another challenge which makes S&R capability a hard sell to domestic constituents. The average American can easily equate DOD spending with safety and security. Beyond the peace of mind

obtained through national security funding, DOD spending had additional benefit as it filters to the local constituency through local military bases and industry, providing economic stability to many communities around the nation.⁷⁸ It is harder to demonstrate to Congress, let alone the average American, how foreign aid and S&R spending benefits Americans when voters do not see a tangible return on their investments.

The competition for appropriations across many organizations with similar missions further complicates the appropriations process. More than two dozen organizations have a hand in S&R missions to include DOS, USAID, and DOD.⁷⁹ Competition for appropriations between these organizations is fierce. USAID alone has two offices, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (CMM), which have capabilities similar to what was envisioned for the original S/CRS.⁸⁰ This competition makes it difficult for lawmakers to pick a winner and invest a preponderance of resources in any single organization. Some proponents suggest that a unified national security budget, organized across mission area or function vice department, would allow for a better allocation of resources by allowing “cross-cutting” agencies to closely collaborate; however, this practice has not been adopted as yet.⁸¹

As evidenced by the lack of conflict stabilization as a core function in the 2015 QDDR, executive level attention has shifted away from conflict stabilization to conflict prevention. Growth of civilian S&R capacity is unlikely under the new president’s administration as there are currently no major conflicts sending a demand signal for enhanced interagency cooperation. Additionally, the new President’s inwardly focused “America First” policy is counter to increased S&R capability and capacity at first glance.⁸² Despite the sizeable effort to build capacity over the last decade and a half, inherent challenges have prevented that growth. Identified inconsistencies with the internal DOS prioritization and their reliance on annual

budgeting process, exacerbated by the lack of obvious benefits for domestic constituencies, contributed to Congress' apparent disinterest in funding civilian S&R programs and prevented the building of effective civilian capability and capacity.

CONCLUSION

Despite numerous executive orders and attempts at legislation that build civilian capacity and capability, Congress has never appropriated sufficient resources to the Department of State to allow it to fulfill its mandate. Since FY2004, only \$409.9 million, or 41.2 percent of that requested, has been appropriated to build response capacity and develop civilian leadership expertise in the State Department. Contrasted with the Department of Defense, which received almost \$1 billion in a single year to conduct S&R operations, this was a paltry amount. While S&R operations remain a necessary priority for lasting conflict termination, the disparity in funding between State and Defense demonstrates that building civilian capacity has not been a real priority to lawmakers.

The disconnect between declared policy and real priority is explained by a combination of factors internal to both the DOS and Congress which are centered on the nature S&R missions. Poor mission prioritization and year-to-year budgeting of the DOS make it difficult for Congress to make a proper cost benefit analysis, resulting in the defunding of programs that appear to fail before have an opportunity to begin. The natural lack of short-duration, high-impact S&R projects make growing additional capability a difficult sell to Congress members who must regularly seek reelection. Additionally, overseas S&R projects are difficult for Congress members to support, because there is no tangible utility for their districts in sending money overseas. Ultimately, either doctrine should be changed to reflect the reality of S&R operations or Congress must reprioritize funding and accept that building civilian capability and capacity will not be a popular, quick, or painless process.

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⁷¹ Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams, *Overseas Contingency Operation Funding: Background and Status*, CRS Report for Congress R44519 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2016), 12, <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.

⁷² Miles, *Political Science Quarterly*, 496.

⁷³ Epstein and Williams, 12.

⁷⁴ Miles, *Political Science Quarterly*, 41.

⁷⁵ US Department of State. *2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 125.

⁷⁶ Miles, *Political Science Quarterly*, 503.

⁷⁷ Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, *Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, August 2015), 23.

⁷⁸ Miles, *Political Science Quarterly*, 511.

⁷⁹ Miles, *PRISM*, 42.

⁸⁰ Miles, *Political Science Quarterly*, 498.

⁸¹ Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, *A Unified National Security Budget? Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress R42997 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2013), 1, <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.

⁸² Donald Trump “Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, DC, January 2017), White House <https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address>.

GLOSSARY

ARC – Active Response Corps
CERP – Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CMM – Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management
CR – Continuing Resolution
CRC – Civilian Reserve Corps, under the Bush administration
CRC – Civilian Response Corps, under the Obama administration; Active (CRC-A), Standby (CRC-S), Reserve (CRC-R)
CRN – Civilian Response Network
CSI – Civilian Stabilization Initiative
CSO – Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations
D&CP – Diplomatic and Consular Programs
DCHA – USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
DOD – Department of Defense
DOS – Department of State
ExCom – Executive Committee
FY – Fiscal Year
IMS – Interagency Management System
NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act
NSC – National Security Council
NSPD – National Security Presidential Directive
OCO – Overseas Contingency Operations
OMB – Office of Management and Budget
OTI – Office of Transition Initiatives
PDD- Presidential Decision Directive
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
QDDR – Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
R&S – Reconstruction and Stabilization
RRC – Response Readiness Corps
S/CRS – Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SFRC – Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SRC – Standby Response Corps
USAID – United States Agency for International Development

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