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United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Filling the Knowledge Gap for Joint Operational Logistics in
Expeditionary Deployments

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

LCDR Franz J. Yu, SC, USN

AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Craig A. Swanson, PhD
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 10 May 2007

Oral Defense Committee Member: Michal Byrnie LTJG USMC
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 20 May 2007

Executive Summary

Title: Filling in the Knowledge Gap for Joint Operational Logistics in Expeditionary Deployments

Author: LCDR Franz J. Yu, SC, USN

Thesis: The JLSO's knowledge gap in expeditionary deployments that are constrained by tribal knowledge reliance that sets up the J4 Staff's (Logistics Directorate's) logistics and sustainment efforts for failure. The Joint Staff for Logistics must implement a suitable education and training program within the JLSO's career path and pre-deployment preparation to familiarize him or her with joint logistics core competencies and address the complex expeditionary deployment in order to meet the demands of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the full spectrum of military operations.

Discussion: Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) expect Joint Logistics Staff Officers (JLSOs) to be flexible and adaptable to the operational environment in expeditionary deployments, which is also known as "boots on ground" or ground forces. A reliance on tribal knowledge during the RIPTOA process constrains the success of JLSOs. Education and training deficiency of JLSOs leads to inefficient and restricted productivity of the J4 Staff (Logistics Directorate) serving in military campaigns. The information for Joint Operational Logistics delivered in *Joint Publication 4-0* is useful, but it is not sufficient to aid JLSOs in expeditionary deployments. This paper will address the critical need to implement a strong education and training program that will address joint logistics core competencies and the logistical challenges in expeditionary deployments based on the Geographical Combatant Commander's (GCC's) requirement. The JLSO education and training program must address Host Nation (HN) support, Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), and military occupation in expeditionary deployments to meet the demands of the JFC.

Conclusion: With an established doctrine and training program, JLSOs will have the required skill set to build strategic relationships with key stakeholders and strategic partners in order to establish the key factors to successful joint logistics operations and tackle challenges ahead in expeditionary deployments. This implementation will enable JLSOs to determine the planning and execution variables, capitalize on the logistics and sustainment partnerships, and identify key factors to support the warfighter in the area of operations, which will deliver success in Joint Operational Logistics in any expeditionary deployments. The Joint Staff must request for a modification of the Joint Officer Management the under the Goldwater-Nichols Act to include the JLSO's education and training pipeline across all service branches. This course of action must involve the Senate Armed Services Committee because it requires an internal policy change and may require added funding to meet the JLSO's required joint warfighting skill set in expeditionary deployments.

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Introduction

The joint logistics and sustainment operations in expeditionary deployments, also known as "boots on ground" or ground forces, are critical to support the warfighting efforts in the battlefield of the Geographical Component Command (GCC), Joint Task Force (JTF), Joint Forces Component Command (JFCC), and subordinate units. Commanders in military campaigns expect Joint Logistics Staff Officers (JLSOs) to be flexible and adaptable to the operational environment in expeditionary deployments. The success of JLSOs is constrained by the reliance on tribal knowledge during the turnover or Relief in Place / Transfer of Authority (RIPTOA) process. Tribal knowledge in a joint military campaign is the staff officers' undocumented information and common knowledge within an organization, such as a JTF. The JLSO's knowledge gap in expeditionary deployments that are constrained by tribal knowledge reliance sets up the J4 Staff's (Logistics Directorate's) logistics and sustainment efforts for failure. To fill this knowledge deficiency, the Joint Staff for Logistics must implement a suitable pre-deployment education and training program within the JLSO's career path and pre-deployment preparation to familiarize him or her with joint logistics core competencies and address the complex expeditionary deployment variables in order to meet the demands of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the full spectrum of military operations.

In a fast paced and complex environment at the operational level coupled with short deployment cycles, joint staff officers focus on meeting the JFC's requirements without documenting what they have done to achieve the mission successfully. There are instances when the incoming JLSO may have less than three days to perform a proper turnover due to various external factors. In this scenario, the incoming JLSO will only get a small piece of knowledge

and experience from his or her predecessor. This ongoing issue causes a steep learning curve and hinders the J4 Staff's daily operations. The failure to document effective models and practices also affected the US Army's wargaming process during World War II. The limitations of relying on tribal knowledge during World War II caused the Army a considerable amount of redundancy and wasteful staff hours in developing successful wargaming models.¹ The reliance on tribal knowledge continues and plagues today's military campaigns.



Figure 1. Geographical Combatant Commands' Area of Responsibility.

Note: From the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Website, “*Unified Command, CENTCOM & Component*,” last accessed May 1, 2017. <http://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMPONENT-COMMANDS/>

Staff officers typically deploy on a short cycle of six to nine months downrange. The outgoing JLSO conducts a “turnover” process with their counterpart in established military

¹ Alfred W. DuQuoy, “Operational War Gaming.” *Armor*, Vol LXXII, (Sep-Oct. 1963), 33-40.

campaigns. This turnover of military duties and responsibilities in Joint Operational Logistics may be challenging because of various unwritten factors that affect the operational environment. Depending on the turnover or relief in place process and the exposure to joint military campaigns in a JLSO's career, he or she may or may not be effective in meeting the JFC's requirement. Deployed joint staff officers find themselves to be at their optimal point of effectiveness in joint operations nearing their six-month mark of their deployment. If the US Armed Forces replace tribal knowledge with proper education and training, the J4 Staff will be able to maximize its staff officers' capability and improve their interaction with key stakeholders and strategic partners to support the warfighters on the battlefield.

In addition to the lack of education and training to support the current military campaigns, JLSOs do not have sufficient joint awareness training during their career path in joint operational logistics to meet the Joint Force Commander's requirements. This oversight leads to inefficiency and restricted productivity within the J4 Staff's operation. The most current Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction in Officer Professional Military Education Policy states that the primary education of pay grade O-3 officers "should foster an understanding of joint warfighting necessary for success." Additionally, the policy maintained the requirement for Joint Awareness incorporates joint warfare/cross domain fundamentals and joint campaigning for O-1 to O-3 officers.² The most recent addition to the policy is the company grade officers' "operational adaptability" in joint awareness.³ Commanders expect JLSOs are to be familiar with operating in various types of military campaigns at a junior level by this given policy.

² Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1800.01E, 2015, A-A-3.

³ *Ibid*, Annex A.

Aside from the ongoing JLSOs issue with unwritten relief in place documents and lack of training in their primary education, the joint publication for logistics, which is *Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics (JP 4-0)*, does not give sufficient details to aid JLSOs in expeditionary deployments. *JP 4-0* is the first step to get familiar in joint logistics doctrine. The imperatives of *JP 4-0* are universally applicable; however, JLSOs that are involved in military campaigns will need detailed information in Joint Operational Logistics that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. *JP 4-0* is not sufficient to provide the JLSO's requirement downrange. Since every expeditionary deployment is different, JLSOs will need to rely on the most current operational requirements that come from the GCC.

In addition to the implemented policy on Joint Awareness from the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, the need for JLSOs to understand the GCC's area of operations is critical for success. The expeditionary environment that the J4 Staff will encounter is complex in nature because many variables affect the JFC's ability to sustain the line of efforts in the battlefield; therefore, JLSOs must consider the planning and execution variables (PEVs) in their assigned GCC. These PEVs in Joint Operational Logistics will greatly vary in each geographical area. The GCC can leverage its capabilities by orienting the JLSOs through its current and specified PEVs in theater.

Tribal knowledge in joint military campaigns coupled with the lack of joint awareness training and short deployment cycles prolongs the JLSO's learning curve in a fast paced and complex operational environment. An established dynamic training curriculum on joint awareness, a well-documented joint operational logistics doctrine, and familiarization of the GCC's current operational requirements are required to optimize the Joint Logistics Staff Officers' capabilities to support the JFC's requirements in the deployed environment. The JLSO's

training requirement must encompass Host Nation (HN) support, Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), and military occupation in order to fulfill the full spectrum of logistics and sustainment support for the warfighter.

The goal of the content in this paper is an establishment of the proposed JLSO education and training for expeditionary deployments. The Joint Staff and GCC should use the given content to effectively bring an optimized knowledge management in Theater Joint Operational Logistics for expeditionary deployments. The phased approach and PEVs in this proposal is a framework that the Joint Staff and GCC can capitalize on by transforming critical Joint Operational Logistics information into doctrine in order to meet the Commander's intent. The given examples in this section are from past expeditionary deployment experiences to emphasize the importance of the PEVs mentioned for the JLSO's education and training implementation. The next section of this paper discusses the needed approach to implementing the proposed solution to the JLSO's knowledge gap.

JLSO Education and Training Implementation Plan

The goal of implementing the JLSO's education and training plan is to bridge the "knowledge gap" and shorten the learning curve of the oncoming J4 Staff before assuming command in a JTF or supported command during expeditionary deployments. The Joint Staff in the strategic, operational, and tactical level will greatly benefit from knowledge management optimization in theater joint operational logistics. As seen in Figure 2, implemented fundamental theater logistics PEVs during the JLSO Education and Training (Phase I) will smoothly transition to detailed GCC operational requirements (Phase II) in a well-developed training

platform. Both Phase I and II will ease the JLSO's transition into the JTF RIP/TOA process (Phase III). This developed proposal will optimize the knowledge management in logistics operations for JLSOs in expeditionary deployments.




Figure 2. Phased Approach to Proposed Education and Training for JLSOs.

Phase One is the JLSO education and training foundation from O-1 to O-3 officers. In this phase, JLSOs will learn the core foundation in joint operations. JLSOs will have the knowledge in joint warfare/cross domain fundamentals, joint campaigning, and operational adaptability.⁴ This training is a capstone course that expands to the familiarization of logistics planning and

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1800.01E, 2015, Annex A

execution variations, which is discussed in the fifth section of this proposal under “Planning and Execution Variations (PEVs).” The success of Phase One will rest on the Joint Staff’s education and training implementation to the US service branches. These PEVs must be updated as the operational environment shifts to meet the GCC’s requirements in theater. These fundamental logistics PEVs should include the JLSO’s familiarization and address the action needed in HN support, JFEO, and military occupation scenarios.

Phase Two is the GCC's current operational requirements. In this phase, the training course intends to bring the JLSO up to speed with the GCC's specific logistics planning and execution variables. These variables are built and tailored from the foundational logistics planning and execution factors in Phase One. The GCC's training course must include the familiarization in theater support capabilities from the State Department, other interagency entities, combat support service areas (CSSAs), and CSAs, such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and Army Materiel Command (AMC). This given training course is introduced to JLSOs sixty to ninety days prior to arriving to the GCC's area of operation. In this training, JLSOs will know their primary and alternate points of contact with the theater key stakeholders. This training will improve the JTF's interaction with key stakeholders and strategic partners in theater. The GCC must maintain the training curriculum of Phase II and make the necessary revision to its education and training requirements in order to meet the JFC's mission in the area of operation.

Phase Three is the standard RIP/TOA process that commands or individual augmentees conduct in theater. The JTF manages the RIP/TOA process to ensure a smooth transition. The

incoming group must carry out a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), review Lessons Learned and After Action Reports (AARs), and review specific JFC requirements prior to arriving in theater. In a typical unit RIP/TOA process, the oncoming group will send the "torch party," which consists of key players that will set the conditions for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in theater. The ADVON, or advanced group, follows to get familiar with the operational environment and conduct the turnover of responsibilities, which is also considered the "left seat-right seat" process before the scheduled Transfer of Authority of the oncoming command. The main body, which consists of the entire unit or command, follows through and performs the turnover with their counterparts in operations.

The advantages of implementing the goal of this plan for the JLSO's education and training is elaborated in Figure 3. Once the JLSO's education and training cycle plan is established, the US service branch should introduce the PEVs to bring in improved communication throughout the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). This improved communication and interaction within the JLEnt will standardize the logistics and sustainment support in all three scenarios of expeditionary deployments, which are HN support, JFEO, and occupation: "The JLEnt is connected by a web of relationships among global logistics providers, supporting and supported organizations and units, and other entities. The key DOD organizations in the JLEnt include the Services, combatant commands, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the Joint Staff J-3 Operations Directorate, and the Joint Staff J-4 Logistics Directorate."⁵ The objective of the JLEnt is to integrate the

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, JP 4-0, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. 2013, I-4.

Department of Defense capabilities with interagency, multinational, non-governmental office, and commercial industries; and meet the needs of the troops downrange.⁶ Capitalizing on logistics and sustainment partnership in today’s military operation ties in the unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response through the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt).




Figure 3. Proposed Education and Training for JLSOs (with detailed PEVs).

The ultimate beneficiary of the JLSO education and training implementation plan is the JFC. The J4 Staff will have JLSOs with proper skill sets to meet the demands of the JFC. The

⁶ Mike Vincent, “The Joint Logistics Enterprise: Inverting the Traditional Support Model – Again,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 95, no 10 (October 2011): 71. <http://search.proquest.com>.

proposed JLSO education and training program will improve the logistics interaction with the major stakeholders, increase the JTF's combat readiness, and enhance the logistics and sustainment performance in the JFC's area of responsibility.

Planning and Execution Variations (PEVs)

*A sound logistic plan is a foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.*⁷

- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN (Ret)

In order to have successful joint logistics in a deployed environment, logistics staff officers must determine the planning and execution variations (PEVs) in the area of operations and utilize successful tools and methods to overcome the challenges ahead. Each deployment will bring in various levels of complexities in logistical and sustainment support. The deployment challenges may be present in both peacetime and wartime operations. Logistics planners must familiarize themselves with the aerial and sea ports, support facilities, and road networks that will support the major sources of supplies.⁸ The *Army Doctrinal Publication 1* states that "the land domain is the most complex of the domains because it addresses humanity - its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics."⁹ Preparing the logistics in a deployed environment involves the careful analysis and planning for utilizing the logistics infrastructure, and layout of logistics assets is the core foundation of logistics flexibility and success.

⁷ Carter, Wormall R. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II.* (1998), VII.

⁸ James A. Brabham, "Operational Logistics: Defining the Art of the Possible." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 78 (1994), 29.

⁹ Department of the Army Headquarters (HQDA), *The Army*, ADP 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, September 2012, 1.

In areas such as the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East and Southwest Asia, rapid change is very prevalent.¹⁰ JLSOs must clearly understand the dynamic changes in the area of operations. The collaboration of supplies delivery to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) within a sovereign nation, solving the delays in the transpiration of food provisions or fuel, and managing the workforce with a limited manning capacity within a combat sustainment unit are some challenges that the J4 Staff may face.

There are numerous PEVs in logistics support that leaders on the battlefield must consider in a combined and joint environment. The six notable challenges in today's Joint Operational Logistics that the Joint Staff must implement in the Joint Publication for Logistics are (1) involving resource management in planning, (2) being ready for a sudden shift in the commander's priorities, (3) being aware of the enemy's adaptation to US and coalition forces' efforts, (4) interacting with the State Department, (5) identifying the task organization challenges, and (6) knowing the Operational Contracting Support's role in requirements building. These identified challenges, also known as the PEVs in logistics, are crucial in setting up the stage for success within the J4 Staff. The GCC must also capitalize on this effort by establishing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that will address specific theater planning and execution considerations under these six factors.

The three parts of PEVs in this section are broken down to (1) the content needed in fundamental logistics planning/execution variations, and (2) the required actions needed to streamline the logistics and sustainment effort to support host nation support, joint forcible entry operations, and occupation, as applicable. The planning and execution variations (PEVs)

¹⁰ James L. Terry, "Curtain's always Rising for Theater Army," *Army*, (Feb 1, 2016), 49.

addressed below will give the JLSOs a better understanding of the complexity that they may face in expeditionary deployments.

Involving Resource Management

*Money is my most important ammunition in this war.*¹¹

- General David H. Petraeus, USA (Ret)

The first fundamental logistics PEV must include the importance of resource management, the expected interaction with the Resource Manager (RM), the lead time to get a requirements package, and specific guidelines to follow to meet the requirements for the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB), which is also called the Contracting Requirements Review Board (CRRB), in order to fulfill the Commander's Intent. The RM in a JTF "is the principal financial management advisor to the commander" and "is singularly responsible for financial management and provides all theater accounting support."¹² The RMs are responsible for communicating and accounting for the JTF's requirements to the command cognizant to meet the congressional mandate financial requirements.¹³ The RM's involvement is critical to the JFC's requirement in all logistics and sustainment efforts. Funding availability and approval will dictate the logistical and sustainment operations in theater. The JLSO's communication with the Resource Manager is vital to stay ahead of the current and future theater requirements. It is vital to relay the importance of funding a requirement to the supported command. The *Money as a*

¹¹ Department of the Army Headquarters (HQDA), *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, No. 09-27. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2009, 1.

¹² Department of the Army Headquarters(HQDA), *Financial Management Operations*, FM 1-06, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, April 2014, 1-13.

¹³ *Ibid*, 5-7.

Weapon System Handbook lays out seven steps for funding the warfighter with the acronym,

WEAPONS:

- **W**ork to identify the requirement and appropriate funding authority.
- **E**stimate the cost and ensure funding is available.
- **A**ttain required approval(s).
- **P**urchase the goods or services.
- **O**versee the requirement to receipt or completion.
- **N**otify the appropriate authorized U.S. government (USG) disbursement agency when the goods/services are received or project is complete.
- **S**ecure the appropriate documentation.¹⁴

Although the process seems to be simple and very easy to follow, JLSOs must familiarize themselves with requirements for validation and funding authorization on the operational and tactical level. Information requirements sharing between the logistics staff and resource management is critical in delivering the current and future requirements to the warfighter. This process goes along with requirements in supplies procured through common user logistics and supplies and services acquired. Relaying the supported commands' future requirements over six to nine months will help secure the appropriate funds when the need is initiated. Validation of funding requirements may require a JRRB (Joint Requirements Review Board) or CRRB (Contract Requirements Review Board). The JRRB/CRRB is composed of key players from a JTF. These key players are representatives from all the joint staff directorates. Depending on the

¹⁴ Department of the Army Headquarters (HQDA), *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, No. 09-27. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2009, 3.

geographical area of operations, the JRBB may be chaired by the Deputy Commanding General - Sustainment (DCG-S), J3 Directorate, or the most senior official leading the sustainment efforts in the battlefield. According to the *Operational Contracting Support, JP 4-10*, the JRRB “is a mechanism to review, validate, prioritize and approve selective Service component contract support requirements.”¹⁵ The JRRB/CRRB is an operationally focused board that enforces standards of support, other joint operations area/theater restrictions, and command and control cost measures.¹⁶ Operation Contracting Support-Integration Cells (OCS-ICs) manages the implemented JRRBs/CRRBs on the tactical, operational, and strategic level. For instance, in CJTF-OIR, JRRBs/CRRBs are respectively performed at the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) at the tactical level, CJTF at the operational level, and Army Central Command (ARCENT) at the theater level. In this case, the levels of approval will depend on the supporting command. ARCENT sets the permission levels for requirements validation for CJTF-OIR, and CJTF-OIR does the same for its CFLCC. The approval requirements in a JRRB/CRRB will vary on the command's monetary approval threshold authority. The Resource Manager (J8) will need to validate the funds before the Commander at each level approves the requirement. Synching and forecasting the supported commands' requirements between the J4 and the Resource Manager will eliminate delays in procurement. Figure 4 shows an established the Requirements Process Flowchart from the 101st Airborne Division as CJFLCC-OIR (Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve) in 2015.

¹⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Operational Contract Support, JP 4-10*, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, III-20.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, F-1.



Standard Operational Contracting Support (OCS) Requirements Process




Figure 4. CJFLCC-OIR J4, OCS-IC Requirements Process Flow Chart.

In a host nation support mission, the JTF may leverage the State Department through the embassy's country team or the host nation's contracting capabilities by using the Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) for obligating the required funds in order to fulfill the JTF's logistical requirement. There may be instances where the State Department, through the US Embassy country team, or host nation have established the vehicle for sourcing the JTF's requirement. In this case, it may be best for the J4 Staff to capitalize on the State Department or

the host nations' ability to procure the required supplies or services. One thing I would read for in the rest of the draft is missing words at the sentence level—this seems to be a recurring issue that can impact clarity for readers.

In a JFEO and occupation scenarios, the J4 Staff will primarily source its requirements through the Combat Service Agencies (CSAs). Although the funding source of most common user logistics requirements is tied into the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt), there may be instances that the JTF must utilize MIPRs to obligate the funds to the CSAs, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, to procure in bulk supplies into theater. Aside from depending on processing the requirements from CSAs, JLSOs must utilize the logistics staff estimates to determine the existing assets of JTF subordinate units. Using the Department of State (DoS) or HN may be limited, although some requirements that will need contracting support may require coordination with DoS for allied nations to support this operation.

Sudden Shift in Priorities

Victory is won or lost in battle, but all military history shows that adequate logistic support is essential to the winning of battles.¹⁷

- Dan A. Kimball, former Secretary of the Navy

When the supported commands clearly communicate their financial requirements to the J4 and J-8 (Resource Management), the JTF should support the second PEV, which is the Sudden Shift in Priorities, if the requirement is valid. In sudden shift in priorities, the JLSOs can capitalize their theater resources through key strategic partners, maintain direct communication

¹⁷ Wormall R. Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II*, (1998), foreword.

with logistics liaison officers from CSAs and other supporting entities, and utilize JLEnt in order to streamline the logistics support in the area of operations. The JFC expects logisticians in the operational and tactical levels to maintain a fully integrated logistics/supply system that supports the ground forces' requirements at all times. Demands may change and priorities may shift; JLSOs will need to closely communicate all critical requirements before the issue becomes an impediment to the mission.

All operations and campaigns in expeditionary deployments will have unique priorities and demands. JLSOs at the operational and tactical level may experience a paradigm shift in the area of operations, which will depend on various internal and external factors within the complex expeditionary environment. US forces experienced a change in priorities during Operation Iraqi Freedom from conducting kinetic operations focusing on counterinsurgency operations, to non-kinetic operations focusing on nation building and transitioning the responsibilities back to the Iraqi government.¹⁸

The proposed education and training plan for JLSOs needs to express the relationship between operations and logistics and how both elements respond to a change in priorities. Both operators and sustainers aim to fulfill the Commander's Intent; however, both are still fundamentally separated. For instance, the operators will focus on conducting Advise and Assist missions or training Iraqi troops in the area of operation. Sustainers, on the other hand, will focus on continuous movement for food provisions, POLs (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), ammunition, and repair parts. Both operators and sustainers diverge to conduct specific tasks and

¹⁸ Millicen A. Dill, "The Corps Logistics Planning and Decision Cycle," *Army Sustainment*, (July 1, 2010), 16. <http://search.proquest.com>.

converge to meet the same objectives.¹⁹ Operators will not care how the task will be achieved but will only worry about completing the mission.²⁰ What matters to the operator is the bottom line: "When will we get the parts?" "From flash to bang, when should these items arrive upon my request?", or "I'll need these fifty cement bunkers for the firebase upon the artillery team's arrival in Iraq. Can you make this happen?" These are some questions that logistics staff officers must prepare to answer.

According to Admiral Raymond Spruance, "the logistic planning has to fit into and accompany the operational planning. The two must be carefully coordinated, and the planners for each must look as far into the future as they can in order to anticipate and prepare for what lay ahead."²¹ Priorities may gradually or suddenly shift in a high tempo deployment. Logistics staff officers must plan ahead and take several steps ahead to meet the needs of the warfighter by being adaptive and flexible to support any unexpected or sudden shift in requirements. The need to build up the CJOA's (Combined Joint Operational Area) requirements may not have been communicated well, or maybe the source supplier is not able to provide the demands in theater.

The J4 Staff must continue to look for solutions and mitigate any issues that impede the logistical support to the JFC such as using the J2 (Intelligence) Staff support to ensure that forward logistics movement can be successful.²² The J4 Staff must remain focused on meeting the operational commander's requirements by not restricting options and responding to any

¹⁹ Millicen A. Dill, "The Corps Logistics Planning and Decision Cycle," *Army Sustainment*, (July 1,2010), 16. <http://search.proquest.com>. 18.

²⁰ Ibid, 21.

²¹ Wormall R. Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II*. (1998), VII.

²² James A. Brabham, "Operational Logistics: Defining the Art of the Possible." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 78 (1994): 29.

uncertainty in situations downrange. Having logistical flexibility means that forward movement of materiel and organizations must take place whether the JTF is performing HN support, JFEO, or occupation.

Enemy's Adaptation to US and Coalition Efforts

The JTF's sudden shift in priorities may also be the effect of the enemy's adaptation to the US and coalition's military campaign. The fundamental and GCC specific logistics PEVs must take into account the enemy's ability to adapt and disrupt the lines of communications in theater. Keeping the line of communications free from the enemy's disruption is key in sustaining vital life support supplies and services downrange. In Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operations Enduring Freedom, the enemy focused on asymmetrical attacks in the battlefield such as ambush attacks of numerous supply convoys to sustain forward operating bases. The means of winning using basic soldiering skills such as rifle marksmanship, vigilance, intelligence, and persistence were factors in defeating the enemy in critical situations. Conducting AARs on every enemy contact gave joint forces the leverage in gaining invaluable information and understanding how to counter asymmetric attacks.²³

As the JTF adapts its counterinsurgency tactics in its area of responsibility to prevent casualties and gain the upper hand against the enemy, the enemy, in turn, adapts, and changes their tactics overtime. It is a cycle that will never cease.²⁴ The Center of Naval Analyses research

²³ Morris K. Estep, "Destroying the Enemy Ambush in Iraq." *Armor*, (Nov 1, 2006), 15.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 15.

study shows that a terrorist group such as ISIL or Daesh is an “adaptive and innovative organization whose tactics do not place it clearly within the definition of any single type of armed group.” Daesh proved to be tactically adaptive by changing to coalition air campaigns and internet-based activities to disrupt coalition efforts. Daesh is tactically innovative; the group improved its tactics from Taliban and Al-Qaida by utilizing better IEDs, integrating new technologies, escalating barbarity, and elevating propaganda.²⁵

JTF operations are constantly adapting and responding to the enemy's strategy and tactics. JLSOs must be very familiar with the JLEnt in order to capitalize on the established logistical network to find other alternatives in order to sustain the efforts in the area of operations. JLSOs must be flexible, agile, and adaptable to unforeseen challenges ahead in providing the logistics and sustainment efforts to maintain continuous support to the forces downrange. In host nation support, JFEO, and occupation, the J4 Staff must stay on top of all current and anticipated requirements and have a contingency plan to implement alternative routes to sustain operations in Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) downrange. This effort involves constant communication to key CSAs, the lead S4 (Logistics) Officers in FOBs, the host nation, and the State Department, as applicable. JLSOs in the planning section must engage with the J2 Staff (Intelligence) regarding any activities that may disrupt military or contractor based supply ground lines of communication in order to sustain the logistics efforts in the CJOA.

²⁵ Julia McQuaid et al, “Adaptive and Innovative: An Analysis of ISIL's Tactics in Iraq and Syria,” CNA Publication, December, 2015: iii-v.

Interaction with the State Department

*The future of national and international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, international partners and non-governmental organizations.*²⁶

—Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chief of Naval Operations (Ret)

Although it is valuable for the JLSO to know how to utilize the JTF's key strategic partners to counter the enemy's adaptability, it is critical for the JLSO to be aware of the importance of the JTF's interaction with the State Department. The fundamental and GCC specific logistics PEVs interacting with the State Department must emphasize the challenges that a JTF may face, such as limitations on the number of personnel in Iraq, not having the ability to operate from Forward Operating Bases, challenges in moving personnel in and out of Iraq, and limited modes of transportation. These issues are constraints that the US and coalition forces faced downrange.²⁷ In most recent military campaigns such as CJTF-OIR, there were three critical issues that the J4 Staff encountered in delivering the logistical and sustainment efforts to Iraq: the Force Management Level (FML), the contractors' visa processing, and the cargo movement diplomatic clearance process.²⁸ All these three were constraints that limited military operations against the fight with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh.

Force Management Level (FML) Constraints. The first critical issue that needed the State Department's intervention is the US military's FML constraints to the area of operation. To

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Guidance for 2007-2008*, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2007, 2.

²⁷ Curtis A. Buzzard, et al, "An Exercise in Mission Command: The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve," *Infantry* 105, (2016), 34.

²⁸ Third Army Corps, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, CJ4 Staff, *CJTF-OIR After Action Review (AAR): Aug 2015-Aug 2016*, Staff Study, 2016, 15, 33-34, & 39.

keep focused-mission deployments and maintain a small tactical footprint, Secretary of Defense, under the US President's direction, limited the number and type of US military forces authorized in Iraq during CJTF-OIR operations through the Force Management Level constraints.²⁹ This manning restriction became ARCENT's challenge in Iraq, and it also became III Corps' (Third Army Corps') challenge when they assumed command as CJTF-OIR in 2015.³⁰ FML constraints created operational restrictions in Iraq. Combat logistics and supply functions in Iraq were affected to sustain the needs of the forces in the area of operations. Ground forces experienced limitations in various operations.

Slow Contractors' Visa Process. The State Department needs to intervene with the second critical issue with the host nation, which is the resolving the slow and cumbersome contractors' visa process. Iraq's visa processing and approval process to bring the US and third country nationals as contractors in Iraq became challenging. III Corps experienced delays for more than thirty days in visa approval for essential personnel going to Iraq for various requirements. Because of this the slow process in processing the contractors' visa, CJTF-OIR's logistics and sustainment operations experienced some degradation due to the lack of the needed manpower in sustainment operations. Additionally, Field Service Representatives were not able to be in theater in a timely manner which affected engineering and information technology support. There was no mechanism to properly track the status of visa applications, assist in processing, or prioritize essential personnel. The command resolved this issue by having CJ1

²⁹ Brandon L. Van Orden and Robert S. Coon. "Tailoring Existing Capability in DCGS-A to Meet Emerging Demands." *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 42 (4) 2016: 6.

³⁰ United States Army Central. *16-10 ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve: Initial Impressions*, Staff Study, 2016, 19, <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/16-10>.

Staff (Personnel and Manpower) serve as an entry point while the CJ4 Staff works the priority order of personnel going to Iraq.³¹

Cargo Movement Operations Restrictive Process. The third critical issue that the Department of State can assist is the cargo movement operations into the host nation. III Corps experienced challenges in moving cargo operations into Iraq because the system is poorly established. All cargo movement into Iraq needs the diplomatic clearance approval from Prime Minister's National Operations Center (PMNOC). Air cargo movements require requests submitted ninety-six hours before the mission. The approval from PMNOC is only valid for twenty hours. Ground cargo movements require requests submitted fourteen days in advance; the approval is only valid for four days. If these missions were delayed or canceled for any reason, the cargo movement request would need to get restarted. PMNOC's cargo movement approval percentage was just above fifty. The CJFLCC-OIR Key Leader Engagement (KLE) staff needed to establish good relations with PMNOC and address this movement constraints in identifying reasons for disapproval including required movement extensions to prevent restarting the cargo movement request³².

In HN support, these challenges that a JTF will significantly vary from the GCC's area of responsibility. The GCC must coordinate with its service component commands and the JTF in order to address the complexity and challenges that the warfighter may face in assuming an operational or tactical level command in theater. Full engagement and interaction with the lead agency, the State Department, is critical for success to meet the JFC's requirements.

³¹ Third Army Corps, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, CJ4 Staff, *CJTF-OIR After Action Review (AAR): Aug 2015-Aug 2016*, Staff Study, 2016, 39

³² *Ibid*, 33-34.

In JFEO and occupation, the JTF may not have full interaction with the State Department but will need to be ready to engage with Key Leaders to prepare the transition from JFEO, occupation, and HN support. The Department of State will may some oversight on this part with this gradual transition. Logistics efforts in JFEO and occupation will heavily rely on CSAs. DLA and USTRANSCOM are important players that the J4 Staff will have to depend on providing the common user logistics and critical components in order to sustain JFEO and occupation operations.

Task Organization and Manpower Challenges

The foundation of success of a JTF comes from a well-built task organization that is properly manned with personnel holding the appropriate skill set. Fundamental logistics PEV with task organization and manpower challenges must include identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the current or proposed administration within the organization, implementing an effective “standard template” in task organization, and identifying key positions for Joint Manning Document implementation in order to streamline the operations in a joint operating environment. It is critical for JLSOs to be aware of task organization and manning challenges. A successful deployment can be defined by properly establishing the task organization and manning document of a multinational force or joint task force. When a Combatant Command assumes command of a multinational force, the established upper, lower, or parallel task organization may or may not be suitable to fulfill JTF’s logistical requirements. III Corps experienced this challenge when it assumed as CJTF-OIR in September 2015 from ARCENT.

III Corps learned that the established task organization from ARCENT presented some challenges in streamlining the tasking required with logistical support in Iraq. The 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1TSC) managed US Central Command's (CENTCOM's) sustainment efforts in the area of operations, to include CJTF-OIR's combined joint operational area in Iraq. The task organization that was poorly established supported CJTF-OIR's effort in executing time sensitive requirements to its subordinate units in Iraq. CJTF-OIR may not task the TSC's subordinate units because it falls under ARCENT's task organization. CJTF-OIR had to request for assistance to get support for logistical operations in the CJOA. Movement, priorities, and information of supplies and equipment were misaligned in various occasions. It was easier to coordinate strategic support with combat support agencies such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and Air Mobility Command (AMC).³³

According to Akin and Topic, former J9/US Joint Forces Command and J4 Joint Staff directors, respectively, “we focus on the operational level because we believe this is where enhancements to joint logistics offer the greatest opportunity for the JFC; choosing the best management structure for a given mission is a critical component of the overall logistics effort.”³⁴ It is best to have a supporting sustainment command under CJTF-OIR. It will eliminate the need to request for assistance and will provide a seamless flow in sustaining the logistical efforts of critical locations in the battlefield. Restructuring a separate Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) to solely support CJTF-OIR or embedding an ESC Liason Officer within the CJ4 to sustain operations in supporting the CFLCC are other alternatives to building an efficient

³³ Third Army Corps, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, CJ4 Staff, *CJTF-OIR After Action Review (AAR): Aug 2015-Aug 2016*, Staff Study, 2016,15.

³⁴ Akin, Mark K. and George L. Topic, “Transforming Joint Operational-level Logistics,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (4th Quarter 2007), 88.

task organization for the JTF.³⁵ Identifying an issue within an established process flow will enable the JTF to support the needs of the CFLCC and its subordinates effectively. Logistics staff officers must quickly address these issues to their chain of command in order and work with the TSC and ESC for a better course of action. III Corps' experience with task organizational challenges shows the importance of addressing this issue through the fundamental and GCC specific logistics execution and planning variations during the Phase I and II of the proposed JLSO doctrine and training proposal.

With regards to HN support and JFEO, the US military has been proactive in conducting combined and joint exercises that encompass these scenarios. An established JTF will have issues within the given "standard" task organizational template as III Corps had experienced when it assumed command of CJTF-OIR. The GCC must tailor and implement the proper standardized task organizational template for HN support, JFEO, and occupation scenarios in order to minimize management issues within the organization. With the continuous feedback from the JFC, the GCC may improve and revise the standard template for task organization to streamline the operations downrange.

Operational Contracting Support's Role on the Battlefield

The fundamental logistics planning and execution variations with Operational Contracting Support's role in the battlefield must provide how the supported commands can capitalize their resources through the Operational Contracting Support-Integration Cell for

³⁵ III Third Army Corps, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, CJ4 Staff, *CJTF-OIR After Action Review (AAR): Aug 2015-Aug 2016*, Staff Study, 2016, 15.

construction, supplies, and services in expeditionary deployments. Operational Contracting Support plays a vital role in supporting both long term and short term needs of the warfighter downrange. Units in the battlefield rely on the established sustainment support from their combat sustainment support services for provisions, clothing and equipment, POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), construction materials, ammunition, medical material, and repair parts. When it comes to acquiring vital services and supplies, military common user logistics cannot bring such as vehicle leasing services, base life support services, security services, and heavy equipment service operations. Operational Contracting Support covers the needed requirements that the normal supply system cannot provide. *JP 4-10* states that "OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations."³⁶ OCS provides the CCDR a variety of supplies and services vital to operations in the AOR such as base operational support, transportation, and security.³⁷ The main purpose of OCS is to ensure that requirements to support and sustain the warfighter efforts are properly validated, authorized, and funded. The three elements that *JP 4-10* described are contract support integration, which is performed by the requiring activity or supported command; contracting support, which is conducted by the contracting office; and contractor management, which is carried out by both parties.³⁸

After OCS completes this process, it is then passed to the contracting office for solicitation to local vendors, technical evaluations of the offer or proposals, selection of the offer,

³⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, JP 4-10, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, I-2.

³⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, JP 4-0, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. 2013, II-9, 10.

³⁸ Timothy G. Godwin, "Partnering Up," *Army AL & T*, (2016): 82.

and procurement of the supplies or services needed. Figure 4 serves as an example from CJFLCC-OIR's OCS-IC in 2016 that shows the level of detail in submitting and validating a requirement before it gets submitted to the Regional Contracting Command for acquisition.

OCS is a critical function in the battlefield because it manages all active contracts in the CDR's area of operations. Most of the services provided in the battlefield require contractor support in order to sustain operations. Base life support services, vehicle leasing services, line haul transportation services, heavy equipment leasing, and local construction materials procurement are some of the requirements that will need contractor support.

Although it is the requiring activity's responsibility to track and manage their contracts, OCS oversees this function to ensure that there is no "break-in-service" for valid requirements that is needed in the battlefield. It is vital to ensure that subordinate units clearly communicate their logistical and sustainment requirements to the J4/OCS Staff. The requiring activity must be prepared to initiate a contract several months in advance before the required delivery date of the supplies or services. The requiring activity must also prepare to renew existing requirements for contract services or supplies to prevent a break in service. A break in service will cause detrimental effects on the readiness of ground forces. Although it is the requiring activity's responsibility to keep close track of their contracting requirements, staff logistics officers in the operational level must be aware that requirements for contracting services or supplies will need timely preparation to generate for review and approval by the Commander.

During Operation Inherent Resolve in 2015, the 900th Contracting Battalion and the 82nd Airborne Division, as the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command – Iraq, formed an elite team in the OCS-IC and carefully coordinated with the supporting command. Their

combined efforts and close engagement with the supported command provided contracting solutions to operational problems and satisfied the warfighter requirements, procurement cost, quality, and timeliness.³⁹ Ground forces under the CFLCC must continue to communicate their need to their higher chain of command and initiate their request for supplies or services in a timely fashion. The OCS-IC must be viewed as the liaison between the units (customers) and the regional contracting command. The OCS-IC, the contracting office, and supported command are three major stakeholders in a successful contracting procurement. The Operational Contracting Support Integrated Cell and the supported command's ability to lean forward and communicate the ground forces' existing requirement will ensure that the needed service or supply contracts are not gapped. Weekly or semi-weekly communication is needed to ensure that the units' requirements are being initiated and processed for validity. The J4/OCS Staff must educate their customers regarding the initiation, process, and validation of requirements to maintain logistics and sustainment support to the warfighter.

In HN support, contingency contracting support may be available through the Department of State, Host Nation, and the US Military. Normally, tactical units that are under a JTF will have to go through utilize its proper chain of command in initiating a contract through the JTF's OCS-IC. However, there are exceptional circumstances when the JTF's OCS-IC cell must leverage the Department of State or Host Nation's resources through their contract management office. For instance, if the State Department or Host Nation has an established line haul service in the required location, the supported command or requiring activity may leverage these line haul services to expedite service delivery and eliminate the pre-award contract action period.

³⁹ Timothy G. Godwin, "Partnering Up," *Army AL & T*, (2016): 85.

JLSOs need to be familiar on how to capitalize on existing contracts in the area of operation in order to efficiently process the supported command's requirements. Contractor support for base life support with combat support agency such as Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) may be available depending on the GCC's theater capability.⁴⁰ JLSOs may expect Field Service Representatives (FSRs) in theater to support the JTF in particular requirements when critical skill sets from the Armed Forces are not available.

In JFEO, the reliance on OCS-IC and the regional contracting command will be very limited. The JTF will be dependent on Combat Support Service Areas (CSSAs) and pre-positioned assets in theater. The J4 Staff will need to closely align the JFC's requirements with critical CSAs, such as USTRANSCOM to streamline the sea lines of communication and equipment movement into the battlefield, and DLA for Class I (food provisions), Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and Class IX (repair parts) support.

In a military occupation, expect the supported command or requiring activity to rely on OCS-IC and Regional Contracting Command for its critical supplies and services requirements. The J4 Staff must plan a phased transition to support its sustainment operations through US contractors from JFEO to military occupation. The area of operations may have limited Interagency support; however, the GCC may have US contractors support the sustainment efforts the battlefield with CSAs such as LOGCAP. JLSO should expect FSRs in theater to support the mission requirements.

⁴⁰ According to *Army Regulation 700-137*, 1-1, LOGCAP is a Department of the Army (DA) Regulatory Program that augments the force by providing a service capability to meet externally driven operational requirements for rapid contingency augmentation support.

Conclusion and Recommendation

No two deployments are alike. Aside from following the established Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs), checklists, and assessments for deployment preparation, JLSOs must understand the dynamic changes that will affect their area of operations, utilize successful tools and methods, and capitalize on their current logistics and sustainment partners to overcome the unexpected challenges ahead.

Solely relying on the "standard" pre-deployment checklist may guide JLSOs to the right path; however, it may not sufficiently prepare the JTF for the sudden shift in the Commander's priorities or a change in situation. This practice may lead to failure in supporting the operations. Although a command may have done all the essential work for pre-deployment, JLSOs must not neglect the deployment planning and execution variables that may dramatically affect the JTF's logistical operations. The Honorable James Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, noted in The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE) that "it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take. Nevertheless, it is vital to try to frame the strategic and operational contexts of the future in order to glimpse the possible environments."⁴¹ Therefore, an established JLSO education and training plan that is Joint Staff and GCC enforced and frequently updated is more effective than following a "cookie cutter" approach from previous deployment models.

In combined and joint military campaigns, the JFC will need a well knowledgeable staff for the right job. In this case, the JLSOs level of proficiency in serving at the operational level in expeditionary deployments such as a JTF is critical in bringing success in joint operational

⁴¹ Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE), foreword.

logistics in the area of operation. JLSOs that are well versed in joint logistics operations in military campaigns are needed to meet the JFC's operational and logistics requirements. Without a solid education and training in joint awareness, joint staff officers cannot be expected to be operationally adaptable because of the learning curve that JLSOs must go through before they get familiar with the operational environment. The JLSO education and training implementation phased proposal will align the knowledge gap and deliver efficiency within the J4 Staff.

The phased approach of the proposed education and training plan for JLSOs is critical in optimizing a knowledge-based program in theater joint operational logistics. Primary drivers for this implementation are the Joint Staff for Phase One, the GCC for Phase Two, and the JTF for Phase Three. The Joint Staff's guidance, implementation, and assessment are needed to establish this proposal. Although this framework is tailored to satisfy the J4 Staff's capability, this model is a template that can be suitable to meet other JTF staff directorates' manning requirements. The Joint Staff and GCC must conduct any updates or revision to the established fundamental and specific PEVs in Phase One and Two in order to keep up with the JFC's critical requirements in the area of operations.

JLSOs are the bridge to bring the required supplies and services to the operators in the JTF's area of operations. With an implemented education and training program, JLSOs will be familiar with the task organization structure, relationships, and the roles of each entity prior to arrival in the GCC's area of operations. Through this knowledge management approach, JLSOs will be able to quickly capitalize on the established relationships within the task organization, combatant commands, State Department, host nation, and combat support agencies in delivering the required supplies and services to the JFC. With this implemented education and training plan,

JLSOs will have a shorter learning curve of the JTF's operations and will have the knowledge to support the forces in the area of operations effectively.

The recommended course of action to resolve the knowledge gap with JLSOs and other designators in expeditionary campaigns is for the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) to present this challenge and the joint staff officer's education and training plan to the Senate Armed Service Committee. The CJCS must request for modification of the Joint Officer Management under the Goldwater-Nichols Act to include the JLSO's education and training pipeline across all service branches. This course of action has to involve the Senate Armed Services Committee because it requires an internal policy change and may require added funding to meet the JLSO's required joint warfighting skill set in expeditionary deployments.

The synchronization of this implementation plan will involve the service branches to educate and train the joint fundamentals and logistics core competencies to their logistics and supply officers in Phase One, which is geared towards O-1 to O-3 officers. The National Defense University must take the lead in course development for Phase One because of the institution's direct focus on joint operations in military campaigns. The GCC must champion the efforts in Phase Two, training the GCC's specific planning and execution variations because the focused course is geared towards their theater requirements. In this phase, the GCC must use training detachments with its tailored course to reach out to deploying commands that are involved at the operational and tactical level. The Joint Task Force and the incoming command are responsible for a seamless RIP/TOA process in Phase Three.

JLSOs assigned in the operational and tactical level may not have all the answers that the JFC need; however, with an established doctrine and training program, JLSOs will have the

needed skill set to build strategic relationships with key stakeholders and strategic partners in order to establish the key factors to successful joint logistics operations and tackle challenges ahead in expeditionary deployments. Determining the PEVs, capitalizing on the logistics and sustainment partnerships, and identifying key factors in meeting the JFC's demands will deliver success in Joint Operational Logistics in any expeditionary deployments.

Appendix A: MMS Presentation



MMS Oral Defense

Master's Thesis

Filling the Knowledge Gap for Joint Operational Logistics in Expeditionary Deployments

Author:
LCDR Franz J. Yu, SC, USN
AY 16-17



Problem Statement

- Joint Logistics Staff Officers (JLSOs) are not well equipped with the proper education and training when augmented to expeditionary deployments.
- JLSOs heavily rely on tribal knowledge during their “turnover” process with their predecessor.
- JLSOs do not have sufficient joint awareness training during their career path in joint operational logistics that is tailored to meet the Joint Force Commander’s requirements. T
- This leads to inefficiency and restricted productivity within the J4 Staff’s operation.



Discussion

- The CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Education Policy* addresses the importance of joint operability throughout an Officer's career path that emphasizes on joint operability and adaptability.
- US service branch does not have a consistent program that aid service members prior to deploying to JTF in support of a GCC.
- The current RIPTOA processes is insufficient to bring the oncoming JLISO up to speed with the JTF's operational pace.

CJCSI 1800.01E
29 May 2015

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE A OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CONTINUUM

EDUCATION	CADET/MIDSHIPMAN PRECOMMISSIONING	O-1/O-2/O-3 PRIMARY	O-4 INTERMEDIATE	O-5/O-6 SENIOR	O-7/O-8/O-9 GENERAL/FLAG
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, PROGRAMS AND COURSES	SERVICE ACADEMIES ROTC OCS/OTS/DC	• BRANCH WARFARE OR STAFF SPECIALTY SCHOOLS • PRIMARY-LEVEL PME COURSES	• Air Cmd and Staff College • Army Cmd and Gen'l Staff College • College of Naval Cmd and Staff • Marine Corps Cmd and Staff College • JFSC: Jt & Combined Warfighting School, AJPME • National Intelligence Univ	• Air War College • Army War College • College of Naval Warfare • Marine Corps War College • Eisenhower School • National War College • JFSC: Jt & Combined Warfighting School, AJPME • JFSC: Jt Advanced Warfighting	• CAPSTONE • Jt Functional Component Cmdr Courses • SJOCAC • JFOWC • COEC • PINNACLE
LEVEL OF WAR EMPHASIZED	Conceptual Awareness of all Levels	TACTICAL	OPERATIONAL		
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION	• Intro to Service Missions • U.S. Constitution • U.S. Gov't	• Assigned Branch of Staff Speciality • Domain Knowledge (Land, air, sea, space & cyber)	• Warfighting w/in context of Op Art • Intro to Theater Strategy, Plans, NMS, NSS • Op Art in All Domains • Joint leader development	• Svc Schools: Strategic Leadership, Leader Development NMS, Theater Strategy • NWC: NSS • Eisenhower: NSS w/emphasis on resource components • All: Theater Strategy & campaigning, planning processes and systems, JIM capability & Int.	• Jt Matters & Nat'l Security • Interagency Process • Multinat'l Ops
CAREER LONG DEVELOPMENT	LIFE-LONG LEARNING SKILLS/SELF-DEVELOPMENT/ADVANCED EDUCATION				
JOINT EMPHASIS	CULTURAL EDUCATION: FROM AWARENESS TO COMPETENCE				
	<u>Joint Introduction</u> • Nat'l Military Capabilities (in all domains) & Organization • Foundations of Joint Warfare	<u>Joint Awareness</u> • Joint Warfare/Cross Domain Fundamentals • Joint Campaigning • Operational Adaptability	<u>JPME Ph I</u> • Nat'l Mil Capabilities Cmd Structure & Strategic Guidance • Jt Doctrine & Concepts • Jt & Multinat'l Forces at Operational Level of War • Jt Planning and Execution Process • Jt C2 • Operational Adaptability • Desired Leader Attributes AJPME	<u>JPME Ph II</u> • NSS & NMS • Jt Warfare, Theater Strategy & Campaigning in Jt, IA, Intergov't & Multi-Nat'l Envirns • Nat'l & Jt Planning Systems and Processes across all domains. • Integration of Jt, IA, Intergov't & Multinat'l Capabilities • Desired leader Attributes • Strategic Adaptability AJPME	<u>CAPSTONE</u> • NSS • Jt Op Art • Jt Func Component CC courses & JFOWC • NSS • Nat'l Planning Systems & Org • Theater Strategy, campaigning and mil ops in Jt, IA, Intergov't & Multinat'l Environments • IO PINNACLE
DESIRED LEADER ATTRIBUTES	1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY				
	2. ANTICIPATING AND RESPONDING TO SURPRISE AND UNCERTAINTY				
	3. ANTICIPATING AND RECOGNIZING CHANGE AND LEADING TRANSITIONS				
	4. OPERATING IN INTENT THROUGH TRUST, EMPOWERMENT, AND UNDERSTANDING				
	5. MAKING ETHICAL DECISIONS BASED ON THE PROFESSION OF ARMS				
	6. THINKING CRITICALLY/STRATEGICALLY AND APPLYING JOINT WARFIGHTING PRINCIPLES AT ALL LEVELS OF WARFARE				



Recommended Course of Action

- The Joint Staff, J4, must implement an education and training program that addresses the knowledge gap of JLSOs in expeditionary deployments.

Phase	Content	Implemented and Administered by
I	Core foundation and PEVs	US Service Branch
II	Specific PEVs tailored to the GCC's requirements	GCC
III	Standard RIP/TOA Process	JTF

- The Joint Staff must be ultimately responsible for the implementation and program success.



Recommended Course of Action


- The Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) to must present this challenge and the joint staff officer's education and training plan to the Senate Armed Service Committee.
- The CJCS must request for modification of the Joint Officer Management under the Goldwater-Nichols Act to include the JLSO's education and training pipeline across all service branches.
- This course of action has to involve the Senate Armed Services Committee because it requires an internal policy change and may require added funding to meet the JLSO's required joint warfighting skill set in expeditionary deployments.



Synchronization the JLSO's Education and Training Plan

- Phase 1 - Service branches to educate and train the joint fundamentals and logistics core competencies to their logistics and supply officers, which is geared towards O-1 to O-3 officers. The National Defense University must take the lead in course development for Phase One because of the institution's direct focus on joint operations in military campaigns.
- Phase 2 - The GCC must champion the efforts in this phase. The training of GCC's specific planning and execution variations must be the focused towards their theater requirements. In this phase, the GCC must use training detachments with its tailored course to reach out to deploying commands that are involved at the operational and tactical level.
- Phase 3 - The Joint Task Force and the incoming command are responsible for a seamless RIP/TOA process in Phase Three.

Proposed Education and Training for Joint Logistics Staff Officers (JLSOs)




*CJCSI 1800.01E, Annex A.
Published by author



Planning and Execution Variables

- Involving Resource Management
- Sudden Shift in Logistical Priorities
- Enemy's Adaptation to US and Coalition Efforts
- Interaction with the State Department
- Task Organization Challenges
- Operational Contracting Support's Role on the Battlefield





Conclusion

- The JLSO education and training plan will bring in joint operational adaptability to support the logistical requirements of the JFC.
 - Increase the JLSO's level of proficiency in joint operational logistics.
 - Build strategic relationships with key stakeholders and strategic partners.
 - Determine the planning and execution variables in the complex environment.

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