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
THE CHILEAN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE:
A TOOL TO SUPPORT CHILEAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Executive Summary

Title: The Chilean Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade: A Tool to Support the Chilean Foreign Policy.

Author: Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Aguilera, Chilean Navy (Marine Corps)

Thesis: The creation of the Chilean Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (AEB) is the result of the evolution of Chilean foreign policy, an evolution which implies new roles and missions for the Chilean Marine Corps related with international cooperation. Those roles and missions require expeditionary capabilities and the ability of conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) overseas. The Chilean Marine Corps thus has to identify what kind of MOOTW it can execute, including the particular characteristics of these operations, and the required capabilities. That definition will allow the development of a doctrine and the consolidation of the process of change.

Discussion: Chile has dramatically changed its foreign policy since its return to democracy after eighteen years of military government (1973-1990). Those changes have affected the way Chile uses its Armed Forces and have created new roles and missions, especially related to participating in international cooperation tasks. The involvement in those tasks of international cooperation requires the Chilean Marine Corps to acquire expeditionary capabilities, a clear definition of what kind of operations the Corps can conduct, and organizational changes to be adapt to these new capabilities. For those reasons, the Chilean Marine Corps has created the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade in late 2012 and published its new doctrine in 2017. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the new organization, capabilities, and doctrine of the Chilean Marine Corps, to determine what kind of operations it can conduct to support Chilean foreign policy.

Conclusion: The Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade has expeditionary capabilities but, at the same time and mainly due to the lack of air support, the organization has limitations to conduct operations that require use of force. The new doctrine needs to embrace concepts and principles of the Military Operations Other Than War and define the type of operations the Brigade aim to conduct. Finally, the Chilean Marine Corps needs the development of a training and education curriculum that guarantees the understanding of the range of military operations.

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Introduction.

Notwithstanding Inchon and the Korean War, U.S. amphibious forces since 1945 have maintained presence abroad, quelled unrest, evacuated noncombatants, provided disaster relief, and paved the way for additional forces. The United States did not use amphibious forces to conquer territory or win wars. Committing them to humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations short of war, the United States used amphibious forces more often in support of foreign policy (the State Department) than national security (the Defense Department).

Capt Keith F. Kopets, "Omar Bradley Was Right...", *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2003.

The Chilean Marine Corps is in a process of change. This process was triggered by the evolution of Chilean foreign policy and it involves the organization, doctrine, and capabilities of the Chilean Marine Corps. Although the main purpose of the Chilean Marine Corps (CMC) is the protection of the country, recent changes indicate the CMC is searching for new roles and missions to acquire expeditionary capabilities and the ability of conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) overseas in order to align with the evolution of Chilean foreign policy and the national interests.

The way Chile relates to the international community, and especially to its neighbors, has evolved dramatically since the return to democracy after eighteen years of military government between September 1973 and March 1990. Redemocratization has had a broad impact on the roles and missions assigned to the armed forces.

Chile developed its Armed Forces and set up its capabilities, organization, and location based on its relationships with its neighbors, and on different theories of conflicts developed for the territorial protection of the country, but without a national security strategy. Thus, the

Chilean Navy developed a Marine Corps capable of facing the possibility of conflicts. This Corps had amphibious capabilities but based on independent battalions distributed through the country and oriented to specific threats like Peru and Bolivia in the north and Argentina in the south. Currently and due to economic and military integration with Argentina, Chile dismissed the theory of conflict with that country. Peru maintains aspirations to recover territories lost during the Pacific War (1879-1883). In 2014, Peru managed to change the maritime border by filing a lawsuit against Chile in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Likewise, Bolivia has the aspiration to recover coastal territories taken by Chile during the Pacific War (1879-1883), resorting to the ICJ in 2013 with the intention to force Chile to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean; a case that is pending in the ICJ.

The changes in the foreign policy and the insertion of Chile in the international community facilitated its economic integration with the other Latin American countries and throughout the globe. That economic integration forced Chile to define which and where are its national interests and how to protect them, developing its national security strategy and including international cooperation operations as a new role for its armed forces. For those reasons, the Chilean Marine Corps created the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (AEB) in 2012.

The creation of the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (AEB) is the result of the evolution of Chilean foreign policy and the development of the National Security and Defense Strategy, an evolution which implies new roles and missions for the Chilean Marine Corps related with international cooperation. Those roles and missions require expeditionary capabilities and the ability of conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) overseas. The Chilean Marine Corps thus has to identify what kind of MOOTW it can execute,

the particular characteristics of these operations, and the required capabilities. That definition will allow the development of a doctrine and the consolidation of the process of change.

This study analyzes the Chilean foreign policy since the military government of General Pinochet (1973-1990), its insertion into the international community, and the evolution of the civil-military relations and defense policy. Additionally, the study frames the MOOTW and the principles that a military organization must include to conduct this kind of missions and operations. Finally, the paper analyses the new doctrine of Chilean Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade and its mission, organization, and capabilities, comparing them with a US Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The objective of this analysis is to establish which kind of MOOTW the Chilean Brigade can accomplish.

Chilean Foreign Policy Evolution and International Cooperation as a New Role.

The Chilean foreign policy has evolved throughout its modern history according to several factors including political isolation of the military government of General Pinochet, bitter relationships with its neighbors, and the return to democracy, which was prompted by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization. Those factors and changes have influenced the way Chile uses its armed forces, generating new roles for them.

From 1973 to 1990, during the military government of General Pinochet, Chilean foreign policy was profoundly marked by the Cold War and the relationships with neighbors. During that period the country was politically isolated because of the negative image of the regime.¹ Chile

¹ Mariana Perry Faure, *Las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile y su Proceso de Integración a las Operaciones de Paz*, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Católica de Chile. 110.

moved away from international organizations, especially from United Nations (UN), and the Organization of American States (OAS), breaking its long tradition of multilateralism.

During that period, Chile developed its defense policy as well as the doctrine and capabilities of the Armed Forces based on the often contentious relationships with its neighbors. With Peru, the relations were tense since 1973 due to territorial aspirations. There was a serious crisis with Argentina in 1978, which brought both countries to the brink of war, solved only after a Vatican mediation.² The situation was the same with Bolivia, despite Pinochet's efforts to strengthen bilateral ties which included a proposal to grant landlocked Bolivia an exit to the Pacific Ocean. Since this effort did not succeed, Bolivia broke diplomatic relations with Chile in 1978. For those reasons, Chile developed, organized, and located its military forces based on theories of conflicts with its neighbors, focused on the territorial defense of the country. Moreover, Chile displayed a negative image about the employment of the Armed Forces in other tasks related to global security and stability. For instance, in Article 90 of the Political Constitution of 1980 the military government defined that "the Armed Forces exist for the defense of the homeland, they are essential for national security, and guarantee the institutional order of the Republic"³. Thus, the constitution established that the Armed Forces were only for territorial defense.

After the military regime in the early 1990s, the new democratic government faced two main challenges to improve the international image of the country. The first one was its reinsertion into the international community by re-embracing its tradition of multilateralism. The

² Paulina Le Dantec Valenzuela, *Chile y las Operaciones de Paz, Estudio comparado de la Política Exterior de los tres Gobiernos Concertacionistas*, Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos Chile, Nov. 2006, 53.

³ Chilean Government, Political Constitution, Santiago October 21, 1980. 54.

second one was to normalize the civil-military relations, an essential prerogative to commit forces in MOOTW.

The insertion of the country into the international community occurred in three phases. The first phase had the goal of portraying Chile as a democratic country and respectful of human rights. For that purpose, high importance was given to the UN, recognizing its role in preventing and resolving international conflicts, and seeking to reinforce Chilean participation in multilateral organizations. The second phase was focused on economic integration, aiming to open the Chilean economy. Thus, the country signed fourteen free trade agreements and built alliances to promote the Chilean economic growth. And finally, the third phase has been marked by the efforts to participate in the international community, being willing to engage military forces in global security and stability tasks. Consequently, in October 1999, the Ministry of Defense issued the Supreme Decree No. 68 defining the National Policy to Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations. However, the Decree had no impact since most of the military leaders and academics still were firmly against it.⁴ On the other hand, in June 1999, the theory of conflict with Argentina was dismissed with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, settling twenty-three of twenty-four territorial disputes with that country. And finally, in 2000, the administration of President Ricardo Lagos defined that the contribution to the international peace and security would be the central objective of the Chilean foreign policy deploying, for the first time in its history, a Chilean Joint Battalion (Army and Marines) to the UN mission in Haiti.⁵ That experience was relevant to evaluate new roles for the armed forces, update its capabilities, and normalize civil-military relations.

⁴ Ibid, 64.

⁵ Claudio Fuentes, *La Apuesta por "El Poder Blando": Política Exterior de la Concertación 2000-2006*, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago 2006. 7-8.

That engagement of military forces in peacekeeping operations changed the mindset of many that the Armed Forces exists only for territorial defense. Accordingly, the democratic governments published three Books of Defense since 1997 and finally, the first National Security Strategy in 2012. Those facts consolidated the transition of the Chilean defense to assume international cooperation as a new role, together with the protection of sovereignty.

The first Book of Defense of 1997 defined a defense policy and the national interests.⁶ In this book, the government identified nine national objectives, but none related to international cooperation. The only objective defined in that regard was maintenance of good international relations.⁷ The second Book of Defense in 2002 set ten national goals and established that international projection is a permanent national objective for Chilean defense.⁸ The third Book of Defense, published in 2010, has a whole chapter about the international framework of the defense. Furthermore, it establishes the political will to engage military forces to cooperate with the world's security and stability as well as the following permanent objectives: (1) the support of the international projection of Chile, and (2) the contribution to international peace and security to protect national interests.⁹

As a result of the insertion of the country within the international community and the evolution of its defense policy, on June 28, 2012 the government published the first Chilean National Security and Defense Strategy, which establishes a shared vision for the state's organisms, and the strategic capabilities of the Armed Forces. In this National Strategy, Chile

⁶ Chilean government, *Libro de Defensa Nacional 1997*, 10-11.

⁷ *Ibid*, 22-23.

⁸ Chilean government, *Libro de la Defensa Nacional 2002*, 23.

⁹ Chilean government, *Libro de Defensa Nacional 2010*, 186-187.

defines five criteria for its defense, and reaffirms that international cooperation is imperative.¹⁰ Furthermore, it sets twelve national interests, framed in sovereignty, prosperity, and security. Among them include: the exercise of sovereignty, jurisdiction and control in Chilean land, sea, and air, in accordance with international law; the protection of the people against transnational threats, catastrophes, and pandemics; protection of the country's territory and resources, with emphasis on strategic areas; and the strengthening of the international cooperation in support of peace, security and multilateralism, deepening regional integration.¹¹ Thus, this strategy gives great importance to both international cooperation, and sovereignty and territorial protection. For the former, Chile indicates that it will participate in international forums, combined exercises, and international cooperation operations.¹² Regarding the latter, the assessment of the neighboring countries as a threat is low, even with some pending issues, taking into account the consolidation of democratic governments in South America, the respect for international law, and economic integration.¹³

Consequently, the National Strategy defines the means that will allow the country to reach its goals. Thus, for the naval forces, it determines the requirement of one fleet of auxiliary ships for strategic projection, with helicopters for personnel and material transport; and one amphibious force, partially mechanized, capable of conducting international cooperation operations.¹⁴

¹⁰ Chilean government, *National Security and Defense Strategy 2012-2024*, Santiago June 28, 2012. Pg. 3-5.

¹¹ Ibid, 13-17.

¹² Ibid, 26-30.

¹³ Ibid, 19.

¹⁴ Ibid, 65.

The Chilean National Security and Defense Strategy 2012-2024 is the final result of a long process of changes, the insertion of the country into the international community, and normalization of the civil-military relations. It consolidates that Chile is willing to use its military capabilities to cooperate with international peace and security, mitigate the effects of disasters, and fight against transnational threats,¹⁵ tasks which involve the ability to conduct MOOTW.

International Cooperation and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

With the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a new global order, the type of conflicts have changed, while interstate conflicts have decreased, intrastate struggles and transnational threats have been increasing (See figure 1). This trend has fostered conditions that required the involvement of the armed forces in activities different from war, where its capabilities allow them to deter conflicts, promote peace, and bring humanitarian assistance far away from its bases in places plagued by suffering.




Figure 1: Trends in Armed Conflict Type.

Source: Benjamin Jensen, Explaining the Character of Contemporary Intrastate Conflicts. (Marine Corps University, CSC, Quantico, VA, February 14, 2018) PowerPoint Presentation.

¹⁵ Ibid, 52.

Chile's National Security Strategy recognizes that trend and acknowledges the importance of the contribution that military forces can make by defining the term *international cooperation operations* as "the employment of military means to face breaches of the peace, threats to the global stability, humanitarian crisis, and the effects of disasters, whether natural or man-made."¹⁶ This definition covers a broad array of military operations, including MOOTW, which are complex and dissimilar from the war.

During the 1990's, the US Joint Chief of Staff defined that the purpose of MOOTW is to avoid interstate and intrastate conflicts, to support to civil authorities, and to promote peace. Some characteristics of these operations are political restrictions and include the parameters of the participation of both governmental and non-governmental organizations.¹⁷ That definition implied commitment to the international community, well-defined national interests, and clear political goals in every military action. For that reason, the conduct of such operations is a way to support the foreign policy of the country, committing military forces in the backing of international organizations, other states, or civilian authorities.

Although the US doctrine does not use the term MOOTW in the JP 03-0 *Joint Operations* and JP 03-07 *Stability*, it will be used in this paper considering that this term is still part of the Chilean military doctrine. Currently, US Joint Doctrine defines that the operations that compose the range of MOOTW are stability operations, and that they occur in the frame of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; as well as in crisis response and in limited contingency operations. In those operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) supports other

¹⁶ Chilean government, *National Security and Defense Strategy 2012-2024*, Santiago June 28, 2012. 28.

¹⁷ US Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operation Other Than War*, JP 3-07. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, June 16, 1995), I-1.

instruments of national power, international organizations, or other countries.¹⁸ In the case of military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence, the goals are to build relationships, acquire the cultural knowledge for future operations, and avoid conflict. In situations that require crisis response and limited contingency operations, the goals are to protect national interests and avoid escalation (See figure 2). These can vary in size and intensity, from small-scale non-combat operations to major non-combat and combat operations.¹⁹




Figure 2: The Conflict Continuum.

Source: Joint Chief of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations* (Washington DC, January 17, 2017) VI-2. Since 1995, the US Joint Chief of Staff has identified the following operations that

compose the broad range of MOOTW:²⁰

- a. Arms Control: Seek to control the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems maintained by some armed group.

¹⁸ Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, January 17, 2017), VI-1.

¹⁹ Ibid, V-5.

²⁰ Ibid, III-1 to III-15.

- b. Combatting Terrorism: Include defensive activities known as antiterrorism, and offensive measures known as counterterrorism.
- c. Support to Counterdrug Operation: Support foreign state or agencies to prevent the illegal traffic of drugs.
- d. Enforcement of Sanction / Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO): Employment of military force to avoid the freedom of movement of specific items.
- e. Enforcing Exclusion Zone: Seek to forbid some activities in a specific area, whether air, sea, or land. Restrictions usually are imposed by the UN or another international organism.
- f. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight: Seek to protect the right of navigation by vessels or aircraft, established by international law.
- g. Humanitarian Assistance (HA): Seek to alleviate human suffering caused by pain, disease, hunger, or privation of essential services. Disaster relief is part of HA operations, usually, these operations are limited in scope and duration.
- h. Military Support to Civil Authorities: Those operations are conducted inside the country for a defined time of duration to support civil authorities when certain situations exceed their capabilities, such as a relief in natural disaster or instability caused by riots.
- i. Nation Assistance / Support to Counterinsurgency: Seek to build a host nation military capability to face and control security or instability situations. Foreign Internal Defense is part of those kinds of operations.
- j. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): Seek to relocate threatened or vulnerable population from a hostile foreign country to a secure environment.
- k. Peace Operations: It includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to restore peace within a region in conflict.

- l. Protection of Shipping: Operations related to ensuring freedom of navigation, those operations seek to protect vessels against threats.
- m. Recovery Operations: Conducted to search and rescue personnel, sensitive equipment, or critical items. A military unit can conduct this kind of operations in friendly or denied areas.
- n. Show of Force Operations: Seek to avoid the occurrence of a conflict by the demonstration of the will to use a credible military force in a specific area.
- o. Strikes and Raids: Short-term operations in order to destroy a military objective for political purpose. It involves a planned withdrawal.
- p. Support to Insurgency: Seek to overthrow a regime which threatens national interests.
- q. Security Force Assistance (SFA): Development of foreign country military capabilities, according to national interests.
- r. Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Support to a foreign government to carry out program to protect its population from some threats.

Furthermore, MOOTW shares some characteristics with warfare operations and therefore it utilizes the same traditional principles of war: objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.²¹ However, the unique conditions of MOOTW have led to adding three more principles. The first one is restraint, referring to the proper application of force avoiding unnecessary use at all levels since it can affect the political goals and the legitimacy of the mission. The second one is perseverance, related to keeping focused on national objectives which could involve protracted operations. The third principle is

²¹ Joint Chief of Staff, *Stability*, JP 3-07. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, August 3, 2016), I-13.

legitimacy, associated with the legal and moral authority to conduct military operations in a foreign country. Legitimacy encompasses the perception that different actors have about military intervention such as the international community, and the population of both, its own country and the host nation.²²

The Chilean Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (AEB), Doctrine, Organization, and Capabilities Analysis.

On December 14, 2012,²³ the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy approved the reorganization of the Marine Corps with the creation of the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (AEB) as the only Marine unit for naval projection. This organizational shift was a reactive measure triggered by the 2004 deployment of Chilean Marine units to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). There, the Marines have conducted peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, but with a doctrine, organization, and capabilities developed for territorial protection and focused upon warfighting. Thus, the AEB seeks to acquire expeditionary capabilities as well as build a multitask force capable of conducting MOOTW overseas, and therefore, to be able to support Chilean foreign policy.

Consequently, the Chilean Marine Corps published the Doctrine of the AEB in 2017, based on the Joint and Chilean Maritime doctrines. The purpose of that publication is to define principles, to be a guide for thought and action, and to be the basis for the development of the employment concepts as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures.²⁴ This doctrine defines that

²² Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, January 17, 2017), A-1 to A-4.

²³ Chilean Navy, CON Classified Resolution No 6013/5765 Vrs. Dec. 14, 2012.

²⁴ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 4.

the primary function of the AEB is the projection of naval power being the landing force and expeditionary unit of the Chilean navy, capable of operating in joint and combined forces.

Likewise, the doctrine defines the tasks of the AEB for both peace and wartime. Within the peacetime tasks, it establishes the participation in MOOTW, within and outside the country, setting up Marine Task Organizations.²⁵

The Chilean Approach to Expeditionary Operations.

Except for military support to civil authorities, most of MOOTW operations occur out of the border of a given country. For that reason, the first condition to be able to conduct that kind of operations is to achieve expeditionary capabilities. In the case of the AEB, the achievement of these capabilities is through integration with naval forces, particularly the Naval Amphibious Transport Command, and by the implementation of the new doctrine.

USMC MCDP-3 is the publication that defines expeditionary operations as “a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.”²⁶ Hence, expeditionary operations involves the deployment of a force overseas with proper support by the establishment of forward or sea bases. Likewise, expeditionary operations imply limited duration and the intention to withdraw, as well as austere conditions and support.²⁷ Therefore, being an Expeditionary Force involves having special capabilities.

The capabilities defined in the doctrine of the AEB, which seek to grant the status of Expeditionary to the Brigade are:

²⁵ Ibid, 5.

²⁶ USMC, *MCDP-3 Expeditionary Operations*, 31.

²⁷ Ibid, 33-35.

- Political flexibility: The Brigade is a tool to be employed by the government on cooperation, coercion, or pressure. Its presence represents a message related to national interests, its willingness to protect them, or commitment to international stability.
- Operational flexibility: It is a versatile force, capable of moving from one task to another, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. Its high level of mobility allows the country to respond beyond its borders.
- Logistic flexibility: Its integrated logistic combat element and support of the Naval Amphibious Transport Command, grants the AEB the capability to conduct operation far away from its base.
- Ready to operate on arrival: It can operate upon arrival on friendly, unfriendly, or denied areas.²⁸

The characteristics previously defined must be acquired by the full integration of the AEB with the fleet, particularly with the Naval Amphibious Transport Command, which needs to be able to train and live onboard. Furthermore, the acquisition of expeditionary capabilities imply not only the development of proper doctrine but the way to put it into practice.

The US Marine Corps has broad experience in expeditionary operations, and in the MCDP-3 *Expeditionary Operations*, the Marine Corps defines the characteristics of the expeditionary units. Aspects that the Chilean Marine Corps has to consider in order to build an expeditionary unit include:

- Expeditionary mindset. It is a critical element of expeditionary units. It is related to the willingness of its members to be deployed anywhere and anytime. The AEB develops this

²⁸ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 13-15.

mindset through the execution of amphibious exercises every year. These exercises are carried out in different training fields, located between five hundred to one thousand and six hundred nautical miles from its base, taking advantages of the extensive Chilean coastline.

- Naval character. The AEB is part of the Chilean Navy and is one of the naval forces which make up the Naval Operation Command. The AEB was designed to operate with, and to be transported by, the Amphibious Transport Command, and it is considered the primary means of naval projection for the Chilean Navy.²⁹
- Strategic mobility. It is the ability of a force to move from theater to theater and sustain credible military power. This characteristic is defined in the Chilean National Security and Defense Strategy as “the attitude to deploy forces in international long and short-term operations.”³⁰ For this, the AEB relies on the navy. Chile does not have forward deployed forces or prepositioned equipment. Therefore, the only way to get strategic mobility is being ready to be deployed from its base.
- Operational mobility: It is the ability of a force to move within a theater in the context of the campaign. As the same way as strategic mobility, the AEB fulfills this requirement with the support of the Navy and its amphibious capacity, since it has limited capacity to move the whole brigade overland at great distances.
- Operational and tactical competence. It is the ability to fulfill the assigned tasks efficiently. To achieve this capability, the AEB seeks to acquire a high standard of readiness, conducting compound training exercises in different environments along the country. Additionally, the AEB gained experience on peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations during

²⁹ Ibid, 13.

³⁰ Chilean government, *National Security and Defense Strategy 2012-2024*, Santiago June 28, 2012. Pg. 55.

its deployment to Haiti. The AEB also provided military support to civil authorities during the natural disasters that happened in Chile between 2010 and 2014. These experiences have allowed for the development of new capabilities in the Chilean Marine Corps and are essential to be able of conducting MOOTW.

- Sustainability. It is the ability to maintain the level of activity to achieve the military objectives. Sustainability is one of the principles of war defined in the doctrine of the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade. The AEB obtains sustainability from the naval and joint commands through its Logistic Support Battalion.
- Adaptability. It is the capacity to change. For the AEB this characteristic is defined in its doctrine as “operational flexibility.” The AEB is a versatile multitask force, capable of conducting operation from the humanitarian assistance to combat and to adapt itself swiftly to a new scenario.
- Reconstitution. It is the ability to regenerate, reorganize, replenish and reorient itself, without the necessity to return to the base. This characteristic, even when it is related to adaptability, is not considered in the AEB’s doctrine, nor in the Chilean National Security and Defense Strategy or in any other document. Neither is there any experience, regarding forward operating bases (FOB), considering the fact that Chile has none. Nevertheless, FOB capabilities must be analyzed and considered in the core attributes of the Brigade to acquire expeditionary capabilities.

In addition, as already noted, MOOTW incorporates the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy in the traditional principles of war, even as they vary from one country to another, and sometimes from one military service to another. The AEB’s doctrine

considered the seven principles of war defined by the Chilean Navy: objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, security, mass, and mobility. Moreover, according to the Chilean Maritime Doctrine, the AEB considered the principles of NATO for international operations: unity of command, cooperation, sustainability, initiative, flexibility, morale, and simplicity.³¹ Hence, AEB's doctrine does not consider the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy needed to conduct MOOTW. Nevertheless, those tenets should be understood and included in the doctrine since they are permanent basics of the MOOTW, and moreover because its correct understanding create favorable conditions for success.

In accordance with the above, most of the characteristics of the expeditionary units are considered in the AEB's doctrine, or in the National Security and Defense Strategy. Nevertheless, the AEB must conduct an analysis on how to achieve the concept of reconstruction and the limitations that its absence implies. Furthermore, the AEB must add the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy in its doctrine in order to conduct MOOTW.

Comparison of the Mission, Organization, and Capabilities of the AEB with the MEU.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a proven pre-deployed, multi-mission unit that has the characteristics and capabilities of any expeditionary organization. It provides to the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) a credible military force capable of conducting a whole range of military operations, with a particular focus on crisis response and limited

³¹ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 6-9.

contingency operations.³² For that reason, the MEU will be the point of comparison to assess the AEB mission, organization, and capabilities.

Table 1: Comparison of permanent mission statements

AEB's mission	MEU's mission
<p>In order to contribute to the naval projection, protect sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to promote and defend the national interest overseas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Organize, equip, and lead the subordinated units or Marine task units ordered by a higher command. ● In the frame of warfighting operations, conduct military projection operations from the sea, and combat operation on land, according to the planning of the CNO or Joint Commands. ● In the framework of military operation other than war (MOOTW), conduct humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster 	<p>Provide a forward deployed, flexible sea-based MAGTF capable of conducting amphibious operations, crisis response, and limited contingency operations, in order to support the theater requirements of GCCs.³⁴</p>

³² Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps), 3.

³⁴ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps), 4.

relief (DR), military support to civil authorities, stabilization, and international cooperation operations, according to the planning of the CNO or Joint Commands. ³³	
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This comparison leads to the following conclusions: the MEU is designed to be a forward deployed MAGTF, while the AEB is not a forward deployed unit. The AEB operates from its base to protect Chilean sovereignty or national interests overseas through its mobility and amphibious capabilities. The MEU is a multitask MAGTF capable of conducting amphibious operations, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. In similar manner, the AEB is a multitask unit with capabilities for amphibious operations and ground combat within the framework of war. Nevertheless, the AEB includes a broad and unclear array of operations in the framework of MOOTW, even when HA/DR, and military support to civil authorities are specific operations. The use of the terms such as *stabilization and international cooperation operations* embrace the wide array of MOOTW, and make it unclear in what kind of MOOTW the AEB must operate. Finally, the MEU is designed to support the requirements of GCCs, participating in joint or combined operations. Likewise, the AEB has to be able to participate in naval, joint or combined operations, within the frame of international cooperation conducting MOOTW. Therefore, both units have amphibious capabilities and are multitask organizations; however, the MEU can be forward deployed in contrast, while the AEB must operate from its base.

³³ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 4.

Comparison and analysis of organizations:

The AEB is the landing force of the Chilean Navy, and it is composed of a Command Element, two Infantry Battalions, and one Fire Support Battalion as a Ground Combat Element, and one Logistic Support Battalion as a Logistic Combat Element.³⁵




Figure 3: Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade Organization.

Source: Chilean Marine Corps HQ, Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade Doctrine (Concon 2017). 15

On the other hand, the MEU has the MAGTF organization composed by a Command Element; a Ground Combat Element (Battalion Landing Team); an Air Combat Element (Composite Squadron); and a Logistic Combat Element (Combat Logistics Battalion)³⁶

³⁵ Headquarters of the Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade Doctrine*, Concon 2013. 15-16.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 6-15.




Figure 4: MEU Task Organization.

Source: USMC HQ, Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview (Washington DC), 3.

The differences between both organizations suggest that: the Chilean Brigade lacks an Air Support Element, which is a weakness, especially when conducting MOOTW that requires the use of force like strikes, rides, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, some FID, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, and NEO in denied areas. Therefore, the AEB has a limitation to conduct these operations since it must rely upon the support of the Amphibious Transport Command for air transportation, and on the air force or allied forces for close air support. Furthermore, having no organic air assets hinders training capabilities resulting in less experience in air assaults and in close air support. Furthermore it is important to consider that modern amphibious operations rely on and get essential advantages using air assets.

On the other hand, the MEU's GCE has under its command all ground combat units, in contrast, in the AEB the GCE is conceptual, it has no single command element. Instead, it is composed of two infantry battalions and one fire support battalion under the direct command of the CE. Having two infantry battalions bring more flexibility to the Commandant, although this requires more coordination measures and greater logistic effort.

Comparison and analysis of capabilities.

Table 2: Command Element Capabilities.

Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade³⁷	MEU³⁸
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Command and Control (C2) ● Enable Joint Task Force operations ● Reconnaissance and Surveillance ● Human intelligence collection ● Integrate and synchronize ground artillery and naval fires 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Rapid and deliberate planning ● Command and Control (C2) ● Enable Joint Task Force (JTF) and maritime prepositioning force operations ● Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) ● Human intelligence collection ● Signals intelligence collection ● Geospatial intelligence/analysis ● Imagery intelligence collection ● Ground sensor employment ● MIO/VBSS ● Integrate and synchronize MEU, naval, joint, and combined fires ● Military information support operations ● Civil Affairs Team

³⁷ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 17.

³⁸ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps), 9.

The main weakness in C2 of the AEB pertains to the conduct of MOOTW because it does not have a civil affairs team. Having a civil affairs team would bring an essential capability in this kind of operations since it is the way to building a bridge between the local population and the military unit. Moreover, when military units conduct MOOTW in a foreign country, understanding the locals' needs and mindset is crucial to success and to create a positive perception of the unit actions, strengthening the legitimacy of the mission.

On the other hand, for signal, geospatial, and imagery intelligence collection, the AEB has to rely on the navy and on the joint forces. Furthermore, it has no capability to integrate and synchronize joint and combined fires which is a critical capability to be able to interoperate with these forces. Moreover, Chile's National Security Strategy defines that the main way to participate in MOOTW is through making up coalitions, whether under UN mandates or other types of forces.

Additionally, the CE of the AEB does not have the capability to conduct maritime interdiction operations (MIO/VBSS). Although the Navy considered MIO/VBSS as a relevant task,³⁹ since Chile is a maritime country with more than six thousand kilometers of coastline and a maritime area of responsibility five times greater than its land area.

Table 3: Ground Combat Element Capabilities.

Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade ⁴⁰	MEU ⁴¹
● Amphibious assault	● Amphibious assaults

³⁹ Headquarters Chilean Navy, *Maritime Doctrine: The National Naval Power*, (Valparaiso, Headquarters Chilean Navy, June 05, 2009). 98-99.

⁴⁰ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 17-18.

⁴¹ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps), 10.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Amphibious raids ● Offensive operations ● Defensive operations ● Stability operations ● Non-combatant evacuation (NEO) ● Reconnaissance and Surveillance ● Humanitarian Assistance (HA) ● Disaster Relief (DR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Amphibious raids ● Airfield seizure ● Offensive operations ● Defensive operations ● Stability operations ● NEO ● MIO/VBSS ● HA ● TRAP ● R&S
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As listed on the table above, on both AEB and MEU, GCE’s capabilities are similar. However, as already exposed above, without ACE, the AEB has limited capacity to conduct amphibious assault and raids; NEOs; offensive and defensive operations; and some of the activities included under the umbrella of stability operations, like peace enforcement.

Likewise, the GCE does not consider MIO/VBSS within the array of missions it can accomplish. That is a critical disadvantage for an amphibious unit that is part of the Chilean naval forces.

Finally, stability operations involve a wide range of MOOTW, and are the military contribution to promote peace, avoid conflict, and provide relief for catastrophes and human suffering,⁴² so that the AEB can support that stability operations, but not conduct it by itself.

⁴² Joint Chief of Staff, *Stability*, JP 3-07. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, August 3, 2016), I-1.

Table 4: Logistics Combat Element Capabilities

Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade⁴³.	MEU⁴⁴.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Five days organic sustainment and fifteen days supported by ATF. ● Ground supply operations. ● Ground equipment maintenance second level (Intermediate). ● Transportation operations. ● Health services first level. ● General engineering operations. ● Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). ● Humanitarian assistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fifteen days organic sustainment. ● Ground supply operations. ● Ground equipment maintenance – intermediate level. ● Transportation operations. ● General engineering operations. ● Health services. ● Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). ● General services (postal, ammo). ● Humanitarian assistance. ● Evacuation control center operations. ● Law enforcement operations.

The capabilities that the Logistics Combat Element provide are essential for an expeditionary unit. In that regard, the AEB has limited sustainment, with the ability to extend it by external support from the ATF, joint, or combined forces. Additionally, the AEB does not have the capability to conduct law enforcement operations. Furthermore, despite GCE’s NEO

⁴³ Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, *Amphibious Marine Brigade Doctrine*, (Concon, Headquarters Chilean Marine Corps, 2017), 17.

⁴⁴ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps), 14.

operation capabilities, the LCE has no evacuation control center, which directly affect the capacity of the Brigade in this type of operations.

The analysis of the mission, organization, and capabilities demonstrates that AEB seeks to be a multi-task unit but is not clear which kind of MOOTW is intended to cover. However, this analysis shows what types of MOOTW the AEB can and cannot execute:

- MOOTW that the EAB can accomplish: support to counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, non-combatant evacuations, recovery operations, peacekeeping operations, arms control, security force assistance, and show of force.
- MOOTW that the EAB can accomplish with limitations or support: strikes and raids, MIO/VBSS, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, non-combatant evacuation and recovery operations in a denied area, and counterterrorism.
- MOOTW that the EAB cannot accomplish: enforcing exclusion zone, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, protection of shipping, foreign internal defense, and support to insurgency.

In sum, the MOOTW which the AEB can conduct or support according to the conflict continuum (see figure No. 2) are:

Table 5: MOOTW that the AEB can conduct.

Military engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence	Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Arms control ● MIO/VBSS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Non-combatant Evacuation (NEO) ● Peace Operation (PO)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Combating terrorism ● Support to Counterdrug operations ● Security Force Assistance (SFA) ● Humanitarian Assistance (HA) ● Show of Force ● Counterinsurgency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recovery operations ● Strikes and Rides ● Military support to civil authority
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Hence, the AEB can conduct or support the five typical operations of crisis response and limited contingency.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, it can conduct or support eight of the thirteen typical operations of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.⁴⁶ Thus, the AEB is a

⁴⁵ Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0. (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, January 17, 2017), VII-2 to VII-6.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, VI-5 to VI-12.

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unit designed to execute crisis response and limited contingency operations with capabilities to carry out some military tasks related to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

Recommendations.

The organizational change and the creation of the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade brings several challenges for the Chilean Marine Corps. The fact that it was a reactive measure instead of a proactive one has implied resistance within the organization, mostly caused by misunderstandings in relation to the process. The further development of the doctrine is a crucial step to resolve those misunderstandings and to fulfill the gaps that currently exist between the intention to be an expeditionary multitask unit and the actual acquisition of capabilities to be one.

Therefore, to acquire the needed capabilities to conduct MOOTW abroad, the Chilean Marine Corps needs:

1. The development of a training cycle that allows full integration between the AEB and the Naval Amphibious Transport Command which is the amphibious force of the Chilean Navy and the strengthening of its capabilities by procuring new ships and helicopters. Such an integration must involve living and working together executing all the phases of deployment from the planning to the withdrawal; updating the current amphibious doctrine and aiming to execute expeditionary operations. Despite the fact that Chile does not have predeployed forces, its geography and extensive coastline are conducive for the development of training

Robledo, Marcos P., *Democratization, economic interdependence, and Security Cooperation Between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile*, Naval Postgraduate Archive, 2001.

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exercises that could be designed to build the expeditionary capability of the AEB to conduct exercises far away from its base and in austere conditions.

2. To seek to obtain experience and familiarity with the use of the naval transport helicopters squadron, by developing the procedures and techniques to conduct air assaults during an amphibious operation as well as obtaining experience in close air support.
3. Based on the concept that MOOTW have particular characteristics, the AEB must develop these capabilities and include in its training cycle preparation for the following types of operations: support to counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, non-combatant evacuation, recovery operations, peacekeeping operations, arms control, protection of shipping, security force assistance, show of force, amphibious assault and raids, MIO/VBSS, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, and counterterrorism. Likewise, It has to include the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy in its doctrine, oriented to MOOTW.
4. To build a Civil Affairs Team in its CE, developing the tasks, procedures, and skills to be an effective member of the organization. In order to understand the challenges of conducting military operations in foreign countries where military activities are affected by the population and vice versa; being able to oversee complicated situations and to minimize its adverse effects for both, the AEB and the local population.
5. To acquire the capability to synchronize joint and combined fire, to be interoperable with other forces or coalitions; strengthening capabilities, and revising the procedures of the fire support coordination center. (FSCC)
6. To review and update the educational curriculums in the naval academy, Marines lieutenant's course, naval CSC, and specialty course for enlisted; including in them the expeditionary

concepts, the implications and procedures to conduct MOOTW, and the new organization and doctrine. Thus, providing to the AEB, young Marines who understand and have the ability to execute the new tasks.

Conclusions.

The evolution of the Chilean foreign policy, the development of the National Security Strategy, and the definition of the national interests have increased Chile's international commitments. These changes have brought new opportunities for the Marine Corps. In particular, the emphasis given to international cooperation has allowed to the Chilean Marine Corps to evolve, to take on new roles, and to create the Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade.

The increase of intrastate conflicts and the emergence of transnational threats, have allowed for the rise of MOOTW. This kind of operations have particular characteristics and capabilities requirements, and are usually conducted in foreign countries, to restore and promote peace, to avoid conflict, and to mitigate human suffering.

The Chilean Marine Corps created the AEB in order to acquire expeditionary capabilities and to be capable of conducting MOOTW supporting Chile's foreign policy. The AEB's doctrine establishes that its primary focus is to acquire capabilities to win the country's wars. Capabilities that create a base to execute other missions related to international cooperation. That definition must be reviewed regarding the particular characteristics of MOOTW as well as the identification of what kind of MOOTW the AEB can conduct allows to the AEB to define the capabilities that it needs to do so.

The current organization, capabilities, and doctrine of the AEB allow it to conduct MOOTW that require limited use of force. The lack of Air Combat Element (ACE) is the main weakness of the AEB and because of that, it has limitations, or needs external air support to conduct MOOTW that require the use of force. Additionally, because of its nature or due to observance of political restraint, the AEB cannot conduct the enforcement of exclusion zone, or ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, and support to insurgency.

The creation of the AEB and the development of the doctrine is therefore only the beginning of the process for the AEB to acquire expeditionary capabilities and for it be able of conducting MOOTW. The naval character and amphibious nature of the Chilean Marine Corps is an advantage. It is important to continue to utilize the experiences that the Marine Corps already has gained in the mission of stabilization in Haiti and in the military support to civil authorities, by serving as the basis to further develop the necessary training and procedures to conduct MOOTW.

Endnotes