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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: Does the Corps have a "Ready Bench?"
An analysis of the disparity between supply and operational demand.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY
STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Does the Corps have a “Ready Bench?” An analysis of the disparity between supply and operational demand.

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Thesis: Without a holistic appreciation of the impacts weighing on personnel readiness, the Marine Corps is unable to properly balance force readiness against operational demand to meet its current and future strategic goals.

Discussion: The Marine Corps provides a responsive “medium-weight” force capability that can be task-organized and deployed to any point of friction at the right time and place. With this desirable advantage, the operational demand on the Marine Corps across the continuum of military operations will not see any respite in the near future. Specifically, the service must concurrently balance capabilities in support of global force operations, sustaining residual readiness for major combat operations, and modernizing the force of tomorrow. However, manpower resources are finite and the negative impacts of spreading the force too thin across competing priorities have produced more risks than current manpower readiness assessments reveal. Under current manpower readiness reporting, accurately measuring force readiness and specifically personnel readiness is a challenge and prone to subjectivity. This generates a false sense of readiness, despite an obvious gap in manpower capacity to support operational demand and core mission requirements. In essence, the Marine Corps is not ready “to fight tonight” without accepting significant risk to other competing missions and the force.

Recommended Solutions:

- All operational requirements must be accounted for to accurately understand the demand on the service. This enables the Marine Corps to prioritize and maximize resources within acceptable risk to force and risk to mission.
- The service must select a deputy commandant to lead and synchronize all facets of manpower readiness and facilitate unity of effort to account for, validate and prioritize all manpower demand across the service.
- The service must develop a campaign plan that standardizes the tasking process, prioritizes manpower requirements, and synchronizes service and operational manpower initiatives to optimize resources and facilitate information sharing.
- The service must develop a manpower system that automates and synthesizes manpower data, integrates manpower information to accurately assess trends and ready capabilities, and support manpower sourcing and decision-making.

Conclusion: Manpower is the single most important resource that allows the Marine Corps to “fight tonight” at the right time and place. The sustainable apportionment of limited manpower supply to operational requirements must be approached and balanced through a responsible agent and a continuous, accurate, and standardized assessment process that enables risk-based decision making. To do otherwise, exposes the service to manpower demands that are unsustainable, weakens combat readiness, and potentially delays the fight to tomorrow.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

“We have to continue to adapt, innovate, and change to meet future threats. We must always challenge the status quo and ask ourselves: Are we doing the right thing? Are we doing them in the right way? What do we need to do things differently?...we must all resolve to improve readiness because we need more Marines and equipment ready to fight *now*.”

General Robert Neller, CMC Guidance, 2017

I am a manpower officer in the United State Marine Corps. Throughout my career, I’ve had the fortune to serve in commands that developed my understanding of the different levels of manpower and the value that knowledge could bring to a commander. During a tour in the G-1 at 1st Marine Division, I learned to operationalize manpower information, trends, and assessments and apply that knowledge to maximize the human capital element of combat readiness. Because operational demand currently exceeds available manpower inventory, the ability to forecast manpower risk and mitigate its impacts through planning is an essential skill for all decision-makers. Senior leadership will be more prepared to make informed risk-based decisions when armed with a keen understanding of the processes that influence the planning, execution, and consumption of manpower. In the absence of time, manpower officers like myself should facilitate that education. Through the Marine Corps’ investment in my professional growth at resident Command and Staff College, I firmly believe that the research contained within this thesis on service-level manpower readiness is something tangible that will support further discussions, planning, and process improvements.

I would like to thank Dr. John Gordon, Lieutenant Colonel Owen Nucci and Lieutenant Colonel Bradford Tippet for their guidance and assistance in writing this paper. Additionally, I would like to thank 1st Marine Division leadership and Marine Forces Command G1 Staff for granting access to relevant information and providing guidance and mentorship to develop a broader understanding of my occupation and role as an officer.

Introduction

The Marine Corps provides a responsive “medium-weight” force that can be task-organized and deployed to any point of friction at the right time and place. With this desirable advantage, the operational demand on the Marine Corps across the continuum of military operations will not see any respite in the near future. Specifically, the service must concurrently balance capabilities in support of global force operations, sustaining residual readiness for major combat operations (MCO), and modernizing the force of tomorrow. Those objectives come with heavy manpower requirements that ultimately compete for the same finite resources. Overtime, the negative impacts of spreading a force too thin across competing priorities have produced more risks than current manpower readiness assessments reveal.¹ Without a holistic appreciation of those impacts weighing on personnel readiness, the Marine Corps is unable to properly balance force readiness against operational demand to meet its current and future strategic goals.

Organization and Methods of Analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to capture a well-rounded understanding of the manpower readiness problem. This study used the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE) design framework to "achieve a greater understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate conceptual solution."² The analysis began by assessing the current environment and all the factors that influence or affect personnel readiness.³ The first step in this analysis was to study the service-level processes that govern force development, force structure, manpower management, and force management as they are designed in comparison to how they are executed. Once the enterprise level processes were understood, their relationships and impacts were applied to a case study of the 1st Marine Division. This case study explored personnel readiness assessments and impacts at the service, organizational and

occupational levels of analysis.⁴ This case study formed a more complete appreciation of the problem as the attributes of the problem, its root causes, and potential solutions were revealed. 1st Marine Division is the “fighting division” of the service, contains the greatest amount of combat power, and is staffed according to this priority.⁵ It was assumed and later confirmed during the study that any strain on personnel readiness in this division is comparable in degree and magnitude to the same personnel readiness strain on any major subordinate command in the operating forces. This is relevant because the most viable solution is one that is universal and can be applied broadly across the force.

One challenge to writing about manpower and personnel readiness is the existence of broad misinterpretations of common manpower terms, definitions, and processes which undermines and distracts from root cause analysis. To eliminate confusion, Annex A contains terms and definitions of the language used throughout this document. Further, the results of this case study have wide implications beyond the 1st Marine Division. Annex B contains a list of service-level stakeholders across the enterprise that are relevant to this paper. In Annex C, the results of the case study are coalesced into a strategic plan of action that shapes and supports future force development. Furthermore, there are graphic representations provided throughout the thesis that visualize the complex concepts, processes, and systems to simplify the logic, and hopefully improve understanding. Annex D contains a graphic comparison of infantry battalion readiness that depicts the compounding impacts of all unstructured demand through the lens of 1st Marine Division. Lastly, Annex E contains a summary of recommended changes to readiness reporting non-deployable categories that would provide a more accurate assessment of unit personnel readiness.

Current Environment

“This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history. In this environment, there can be no complacency—we must make difficult choices and prioritize what is most important to field a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting Joint Force. America’s military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.”

National Defense Strategy, 2018⁶

As the U.S. emerged from 14 years of continuous war, the demand for a global U.S. military presence has not lessened. In this evolving operational environment, the Marine Corps remains at the forefront of crisis response, providing ready capabilities with a ten percent reduction in force strength from its height of 202,000 Marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).⁷ In 2016 alone, with a 184,000 end strength “the Marine Corps executed over 210 operations, 20 amphibious operations, 160 Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, and participated in 75 exercises.”⁸ These operational commitments and the demand on the force required the Marine Corps to accept some service-level risks and make some deliberate sacrifices. Specifically, the service reprioritized costly service initiatives, postponed recapitalization and modernization efforts, and delayed critical infrastructure projects – all combining to have a negative impact on overall service readiness.⁹ Further compounding the problem, high operational tempo resulted in compressed deployment timelines and higher deployment rates. According to Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert B. Neller, “Marines in the operating forces are averaging a two-to-one deployment-to-dwell ratio, typically deploying for six months, then spending 12 months or less at home station before deploying again.”¹⁰ As a result, high deployment frequency with no room built-in for unit recovery exponentially degrades unit and personnel readiness, and ultimately puts the service at risk of

culmination.¹¹ Essentially, there is an imbalance between operational demand and available resources.

In 2017, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to focus on producing innovative capabilities, growing the force, and restoring readiness to operate at “sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across a range of military operations,” to include major war.¹² Based on emerging national security threats identified in the NSS, the Marine Corps determined that it is “not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment” and could no longer postpone capability modernization, infrastructure initiatives, or readiness recovery.¹³ Essentially, the readiness of the force was in question. The challenge for the Marine Corps is doing all things necessary to improve its lethality and readiness within the means available, while concurrently maintaining its obligation to global operations.

Understanding the Problem

Stakeholders and Processes. The multiple and complex factors that degrade manpower readiness must be evaluated holistically and begins with an understanding of the enterprise-level shaping factors.¹⁴ There are multiple agencies that concurrently impact, assess, or consume the finite manpower resources across the service. Their responsibilities are formally codified by policy, standard operating procedures, and programs of record. Those agencies do not share a common lexicon, procedures, timelines, metrics of analysis, or Marine Corps Authoritative Data Source (ADS) systems. Based on the complexity and depth of their disparate, yet connected missions, they are staffed by well-educated and experienced professionals and managed by senior military leaders who are invested to support and enforce their respective processes. The amalgamation of these processes form the relationships between service manpower supply and

demand. By design, those processes are in a constant cycle and meant to be mutually supporting, not independent work flows with isolated purposes. Problems arise when there are major changes to one process and all others do not evolve to synchronize and balance the force. To fully appreciate how these processes generate layers of demand on the force, it is first important to understand how force development, force structure, manpower management, and force management processes are designed to work, as well as understand the relationship between these processes and where disconnects generate risk.




Figure 1. Development, Distribution and Assessment. This figure is a conceptual description of the linkages between force development, force structure, manpower management and Global Force Management/Readiness Assessments.¹⁵

Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) are responsible for integrating Marine Corps concepts, capabilities, and requirements to include force development. This begins with the conceptual development of the warfighting capabilities needed to accomplish the Marine Corps' wartime mission and current national security objectives. This process is co-led by Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) and Futures Directorate (FD) branch and feeds force development. Within this process, the

Capabilities Development Directive (CDD) takes the conceptual requirement for the future force and identifies an optimal number of personnel with specific skills that when combined produce a desired warfighting capability. The Marine Corps designs the force through its warfighting principles; each personnel requirement identified builds on another's ability to accomplish the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL).¹⁶ Once there is a conceptual desired end state, the service publishes the Marine Corps Enterprise Integration Plan (MCEIP) and the process transitions to the development of force structure, which is executed by Total Force Structure Division (TFSD), CD&I.¹⁷ This generates the table of organization (T/O) or troop list. As planners develop the T/O, there is no excess manpower built into the organization. The end result is a detailed list of "the minimum quantity of personnel required by a command or unit to effectively and efficiently accomplish their wartime mission."¹⁸

Human Resource Development Process. Once force structure is complete, TFSD collaborates with Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) to develop the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). This report calculates the budgetary constraints placed on the service and optimizes the personnel requirements outlined in the T/O against the allocation of authorized end strength. The promulgation of the ASR is also known as the manning process and results in a list of billets that the service can afford to buy. Its completion is the point of departure where M&RA planners take the lead and produce the Grade Adjusted Recapulation (GAR) analysis. The GAR subtracts the population that is in a Transient, Training, Patient, and Prisoner (T2P2) status and provides the actual inventory available for future assignment. The Marine Corps had an average of 27,000 Marines in a T2P2 status.¹⁹ With this information, Manpower Management (MM) employs the staffing goal (S/G) model to manage and distribute the current and forecasted

inventory.²⁰ Figure 1 graphically depicts the interrelated connection between stakeholders and their respective processes.

Of note, the transition from structure development through the manpower assignment process is also known as the Human Resource Development Process (HRDP). In the past, TFSD and the entire HRDP process was managed under one roof by M&RA to facilitate economies and efficiencies across the enterprise. The Marine Corps later reorganized TFSD under CD&I. While this reorganization improved the relationship between force and structure development, it requires an extensive amount of collaboration and coordination between all stakeholders to synchronize efforts and work effectively.




Figure 2. Marine Corps Officer Population. This figure captures how the “available” officer population decreases from T/O through staffing goal.²¹

In the context of service-level manpower readiness, the ASR and S/G are points of accepted risk to the wartime mission. The Marine Corps accepts that risk under the premise that if there was a need to execute the mission, Title 10 statutes would allow the service to grow the force to T/O end strength (reserve mobilization, stop-loss, draft etc.).²² Alternately, there is no process that fills the void for steady state operational commitments. Once M&RA assigns a population, the risks or manpower shortfalls associated with sourcing unstructured personnel requirements are absorbed by the units. Figure 2 illustrates how the Marine Corps’ officer

population decreases from the initial T/O requirements through the actual available population determined by the staffing goal.²³ There are approximately 4,600 leadership billets in the Corps' organizational structure that are vacant. Every billet vacancy has its associated impact and requires the respective unit to accept and mitigate the risk caused by that leadership gap. Prior to OEF and the exponential growth of operational demand, this leadership gap was a manageable risk. Since then, it has become one of the many contributing factors that negatively impact service readiness. (Figure 3 provides an example of the additional factors that affect officer populations once assigned to a unit.) Understanding the potential impacts to unit readiness underscores the importance of providing M&RA with clear and timely service priorities for the distribution of all manpower resources, prior to the planning and execution of the staffing goal model. Doing so empowers Manpower Management planners to minimize institutional risk across the force and relieves some of the burden on the operating forces.




Figure 3. Notional Battalion Command: Officer Population. This figure is an example of all the factors that affect the officer population within a battalion.²⁴

Global Force Management Process. The Global Force Management (GFM) process was created in 2005 to formalize and manage the tremendous growth of operational demand for military forces across the DoD.²⁵ It was designed to provide a venue that integrated and synthesized: the established priorities of the national security strategy, the combatant commanders' (CCDRs) requirements to execute their regional missions for both steady state and wartime, and the services' assessments of forces available to meet those demands. GFM is employed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to "assign, apportion, and allocate service generated forces (units and individuals) to CCDRs for employment."²⁶ Through this process the services make risk-informed decisions to meet registered CCDR requirements with the available forces ahead of planning and deployment milestones. Figure 4 provides a summary of how forces are assigned, allocated and apportioned by the services.

Force Category	Assigned Forces	Allocated Forces	Apportioned Forces
Assigned by	President/SecDef	SecDef	SecDef
Authorities	Unified Command Plan (UCP), Forces for Unified Command Memo, GEF, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 161, 162, 167	GFMIG, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 162	GFMIG, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 153
Force Description	Forces assigned under Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM) of a CCDR.	Forces transferred from one CCDR or Service to another CCDR for operations/missions.	Resources for planning purposes only.
JS lead	J-8 manages force assignment for SecDef & CJCS	J3 manages force allocation	J-5 manages force apportionment
USMC lead for coordination with JS	DC PP&O Plans and Strategy Division (PL)	DC PP&O Operations Division (PO)	DC PP&O PL Division

Figure 4. Assigned, Allocated & Apportioned Forces Summary.²⁷

The SecDef publishes two documents that drive the assignment of forces to combatant commands: the Unified Commands Memorandum (odd number years) and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) (even number years). In accordance with those two documents, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Marine Corps Forces Command

(MARFORCOM), and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) are the primary assigned Marine Corps force providers to CCDR's registered requirements. Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policy, and Operations (PP&O) is the force provider for supporting establishment forces and the DC lead for the GFM process. The remaining unassigned forces are left to the control of the service.²⁸ Figure 5 summarizes the workflow between the Marine Corps and the Joint Staff in support of the GFM process.




Figure 5. Global Force Management –Marine Corps. This figure provides a graphic representation of the complexity of GFM and service synchronization process.²⁹

During this period, the services provide the Joint Staff an estimate of the forces available for future assignment and allocation. This forecast is known as the “force offering” and drives the CCDR’s future expectations. Of critical importance at this point of the process is understanding that this “force offering” is an initial assessment that preempts the formal registration of the CCDR’s operational demand and therefore shapes their appetite for forces. This initial milestone is the point at which the Marine Corps can best influence future operational

demand on the force. The force offerings that the services provide feed the SecDef's Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). This document provides the services and CCDRs "relative priority of contingency plans, specific force levels, and supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective."³⁰

The second phase of GFM is the allocation or sourcing of specific forces to meet CCDR requirements. The CCDRs register their re-occurring demand for service-level forces through the annual GFM Allocation Plan (GFMAP). After submission of the GFMAP, any modifications that are tied to crisis response or other emergent requirements that cannot be fulfilled by assigned or allocated forces are registered through the Emergent Allocation Cycle.³¹ The GFMAP is managed through the LOGBOOK database that contains both Force and Joint Individual Augment (JIA) registered requirements. In general, and as expected, there is more registered demand than there are forces available and so the Marine Corps must perform a risk-based assessment to balance internal versus joint requirements. The Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command is the delegated coordinating authority responsible for the collection of risk and force availability assessments from the service's force providers. Through an assessment of all known variables, MARFORCOM develops recommended sourcing solutions for CMC approval. There are two key assessments MARFORCOM conducts on behalf of the service:

- Operational Assessment. MARFORCOM staff closely coordinates with numerous force providers within the operating forces and supporting establishment to assess the feasibility of support and operational risk and develop sourcing solutions.³²
- Institutional Assessment. Performs service-level reviews of sourcing recommendations (PP&O/M&RA) for approval and assesses institutional risk.³³

Subsequently, MARFORCOM makes necessary modifications or receives service-level approval to submit recommended sourcing solutions via LOGBOOK. Then PP&O and M&RA use their directive service authority to task sourcing requirements to force providers: PP&O via Marine

Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 3120 and M&RA via Manpower Requirements Tracking Module (MRTM) and message traffic. In isolation, the process appears relatively benign. However, because the process is cyclical in nature and requirements tend to breed additional requirements, the Marine Corps has found itself in never-ending dilemma where its persistently trying to meet the operational demand that has been assigned and allocated to the force.

Ultimately, the Marine Corps is a force provider and the GFM process is the base of movement for service force generation. Although the GFM process is relatively new in comparison to force development and the HRDP, it is the established platform that the Department of Defense will use to register and task operational requirements for both steady state and major combat operations in the future. If there are pre-existing inefficiencies within internal Marine Corps processes, those processes must be restructured and improved to enable the service to continue as an adaptive and responsive “force in readiness.”³⁴

Misalignment of Manpower Initiatives and Resources. In theory, all the processes described prior are meant to mutually support each other. Most have governing policies that identify the relationships and tasks between the deputy commandants (DC). However, with the new direction of the National Security Strategy and the growing demand for limited personnel resources, it is apparent that key synchronization points between the service-level stakeholders are frustrated. Essentially, there are many voices in the room, but few are being heard. Additionally, there is no overarching strategy or staff that aligns initiatives, sets universal priorities for all service manpower requirements, or balances the personnel “checkbook.” Hence, institutional stakeholders are competing for the same manpower resources to meet service strategic objectives. Without an overarching plan that prioritizes resources and synchronizes efforts, solutions to all manpower initiatives will continue to be developed in isolation of each

other with unintended second or possibly third-order impacts. Moreover, isolated solutions tend to divert attention away from the root causes they aim to solve and may further exacerbate the underlying problem.




Figure 6. Development, Distribution and Consumption.³⁵

As the Marine Corps postures to concurrently modernize, improve readiness, and support global force operations, internal stakeholders are leveraging additional requirements on the force to accomplish their respective missions. Those additional service-level requirements are the product of planning and assessments that evaluate problems that are specific to each stakeholder. The overarching issue is that each stakeholder is only looking at varying symptoms of the same personnel readiness problem. For example, between 2017 and 2018 the Marine Corps sanctioned a series of government studies to assess manpower-related problem areas identified by various stakeholders and recommend solutions. While each of these studies share a common manpower-related theme, they are not well synchronized and therefore, recommended solutions are proffered with unintended redundancy. That is, one solution to any manpower readiness problem may be made at the expense of another, causing another readiness problem that needs to be

solved. To provide context to this assertion, below are a few of the ongoing service studies and initiatives:

- Force 2025 (CMC; DC, CD&I).³⁶
- SecDef Non-Deployable Personnel Initiative (CMC).³⁷
- In-Stride Replacement Model for staffing deploying units (DC, M&RA).³⁸
- Smart Concept: NCO Infantry Units Staffing Initiative (DC, CF&I; DC, M&RA; Infantry Ground Board).³⁹
- Impact of Unstructured Manpower Requirements on Readiness and Execution of Plans Study (CG, I MEF; CNA).⁴⁰
- Fleet Assistance Program Impact on the Execution of Plans (DC, PP&O).⁴¹
- Marine Corps Readiness Integrated Data Environment (RIDE) Working Group, System of Systems Initiative (DC, PP&O).⁴²
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Set the Globe Initiative (DC, PP&O).
- Global Force Management-Availability Model (MARFORCOM).⁴³

There are numerous recently published service documents that outline plans and priorities to posture the Marine Corps to meet its current and future strategic objectives. For example, the Force Development Strategic Plan (FDSP) published by CD&I provides a framework for the Marine Corps to innovate and develop capabilities to win future conflicts in an era of competing security challenges and budgetary constraints. What the plan is missing is synchronization with other service documents and a means to implement it across the various deputy commandants.¹ Another example, the Military Manpower Modernization Campaign Plan published by M&RA, describes in detail a strategic plan to modernize the Marine Corps military manpower human resource system. However, while the plan sufficiently outlines its purpose to support the service's Title 10 responsibilities to provide trained and ready Marines to commanders, its relationship to other service-level plans is not completely aligned, unintentionally degrading the influence and the reach of the plan. Collectively, the various service-level plans (listed in Annex

¹ Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Force Development Strategic Plan*, 2nd Edition. Quantico, VA, January 27, 2017. Figure 9, in Annex C, provides a summary of the lines of efforts and tasks included in the Force Development Strategic Plan.

E) that outline tasks and synchronization points between stakeholders must be reconciled to properly align service-level priorities, clearly incorporate the direction of the NSS, and account for all of the evolving initiatives aimed to develop the force of the future.

“Without sustained and predictable investment to restore readiness and modernize our military to make it fit for our time, we will rapidly lose our military advantage, resulting in a Joint Force that has legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people.”

Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018⁴⁴

Readiness Assessments. As described throughout this analysis, there are several service-level risk assessments conducted by key stakeholders that inform critical manpower decisions. There is only one assessment that is both a DoD requirement and provides an opportunity for commanders to communicate their unit-level readiness assessments. This mechanism is the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) assessment. DRRS-MC reports interface with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) readiness system and (in priority order) are intended to support: “crisis response planning, deliberate or peacetime planning, and the management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for the combatant commands.”⁴⁵ Moreover, at the service-level, these assessments provide the Marine Corps with a reoccurring means to communicate on the negative impacts that resource shortfalls have on service readiness. The information in DRRS-MC is also used for service testimony, reports to Congress, and feed into joint automated systems (e.g. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, and Joint Planning and Execution Services) in support of the joint planning process.⁴⁶ It is critically important that readiness assessments are complete, accurate, and justified because DRRS-MC interfaces with numerous information systems and supports internal and external stakeholder decision-making

DRRS-MC assessments are promulgated on a monthly basis to evaluate the readiness and capability of Marine Corps units to carry out their assigned or core missions. The CJCS's readiness system defines readiness as the "ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels:"⁴⁷

- Unit Readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.⁴⁸
- Joint Readiness. The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.⁴⁹

Assessments use measurable aspects of readiness to calculate a rating and provide a venue for a commander's written assessment.⁵⁰ Although all the resources measured in DRRS-MC reports are key to calculate a unit's overall ability to meet its core or assigned mission, this thesis will only focus on the personnel attribute of readiness. Personnel readiness is calculated through the personnel-level (P-level) rating and is based "on the unit's ability to provide deployable, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel and DoD civilians to accomplish its missions."⁵¹ Simple in concept, the calculus used to determine personnel readiness can be misleading and cause inaccurate reporting.

Accurately measuring force readiness and specifically personnel readiness is a challenge and prone to subjectivity. Inaccurate reporting based on unsupported optimism, for example, can generate a false sense of readiness, despite an obvious gap in manpower capacity to support operational demand and core mission requirements. The problem is compounded in that commitments are made based on inaccurate data without trained and ready personnel in the bank. Senior leaders in the Marine Corps have acknowledged the existing flaws and inconsistencies in the current model. In 2017, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) chartered a

service working group “to improve the accuracy and value of readiness, information, enhance the interoperability of Marine Corps systems, and reduce the work load required to submit a readiness report.”⁵²

As the service is already working to improve the system, a deeper review of the metrics used to calculate readiness is prudent to provide a more holistic readiness evaluation that captures a true depiction of service readiness, identifies and mitigate risks to both core and assigned missions, and provides a comprehensive manpower assessment to support the full spectrum of crisis response planning (not just MCO focused).⁵³ More specifically, to inform crisis response planning for the full range of military operations, the calculation of personnel ratings need to be modified to provide a more accurate assessment of steady state operations. Currently, DRRS-MC non-deployable categories are the same for calculating core and assigned missions. Units do not fall under the same legal statutes as those that would support the execution of major combat operations when executing assigned GFM missions. Assigned missions are executed with the inventory available and are staffed in accordance with M&RA deployment staffing guidelines. Therefore, the current personnel rating calculation for assigned missions gives a false indicator of readiness. This thesis uses a case study of the 1st Marine Division Case Study to provide a real-time example of the disparity between the metrics used by service stakeholders to measure deployability and readiness (see Figure 9). Modifying deployable/non-deployable categories does not require a major modification to the DRRS-MC system. The data for all additional categories is already resident in the Marine Corps Total Force System or Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS), both of which are the authoritative data source systems that interface with DRRS-MC.⁵⁴

Furthermore, PP&O is conducting a study on the “Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) Impact on the Execution of Plans.”⁵⁵ When complete, this study will reveal the existence of FAP requirements that are necessary to sustain installations during a time of major combat operations. If in reality all Marines supporting FAP would not be recalled when the service has to execute its wartime mission, then those requirements identified as vital to sustain Marine Corps installations should be codified and subtracted from the “available” population when calculating the P-rating. Making these modifications to the P-rating would provide a more accurate analysis of the forces available and would properly align with the metrics used by M&RA to staff deploying units. Figure 18 in Appendix E provides recommended changes to non-deployable categories. These recommendations are practical modifications that could be further assessed and incorporated into the ACMC’s ongoing initiative.

Deployment-to-Dwell^{II} and Personnel Tempo^{III}. In 2016, the Marine Corps determined that the optimal balance deployment-to-dwell and service readiness was 186,000.⁵⁶ This estimate did not capture the increased operational demand in the past two years or the demand from modernization initiatives. Most recently Congress approved a service strength of 185,000. In testimony to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, General Neller emphasized that current “tempo is not sustainable as it does not provide options to train to our full mission sets and it puts unreasonable strain on our Marines and families.”⁵⁷ He determined that the ideal deployment-to-

^{II}Manpower and Reserve Affairs, *Deployment-to-Dwell, Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy Revision*. MARADMIN 346/14, July 14, 2014. Deployment-to-Dwell is the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or individual is operationally deployed to the time the unit, detachment, or individual is in dwell. The SecDef’s goal for operational deployment-to-dwell is 1:2; the SecDef’s operational deployment-to-dwell ratio threshold is 1:1. SecDef approval is required to deploy a unit, detachment, or individual to deploy with a 1:1 ratio or less. An individual may voluntarily waive their deployment-to-dwell threshold submitting an Administrative Action form (NAVMC 10274) to the first general/flag officer in the chain of command of the parent organization.

^{III} Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Deployment Tempo (DEPTempo) Policy Guidance*, ALMAR 026/01, May 12, 2008. PersTempo refers to the amount of time service members serve on official duty at a location or under circumstances that make it infeasible for them to spend off-duty time in the housing in which they reside.

dwelling ratio for the force is one-to-three. He affirmed that “a deliberate and measured capacity increase, reduction of our operational tasking, or a combination of the two, are solutions that would put us on the path to improve our deployment-to-dwelling ratio.”⁵⁸ Based on similar testimonies by senior military leaders, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study on military readiness that aimed to assess the root causes of degraded service readiness, to include the management of personnel tempo (PersTempo) when forces are mobilized and deployed ratios.⁵⁹ The study highlighted that the Marine Corps does not have reliable and complete data to monitor PersTempo (a DoD requirement).⁶⁰ As a response, the service has been tasked to evaluate its PersTempo and deployment-to-dwelling. The DoD distinguishes between unit operations and individual time away from home when discussing tempo; both categories are bound by established reportable thresholds (see Appendix E).

It is acknowledged that PersTempo and unit deployment-to-dwelling ratios directly impact force readiness. Tracking and capturing these categories are enduring service requirements and are a DoD concern. Both metrics should be tracked and assessed as a part of the holistic readiness picture that will “better align ends, ways and means to maximize the probability that the [Marine Corps] will meet its targeted policy objectives.”⁶¹ DRRS-MC is not a catch all system. Nevertheless, perstempo and unit deployment-to-dwelling feed decision making for crisis response options outside of MCO. The data to track these categories is also resident in Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) and can be automatically fed into the DRRS-MC system. Alternatively, if these categories cannot be immediately configured to the DRRS-MC personnel rating, the Marine Corps should implement a standardized form of articulating the added risk-to-mission and the force they bring. Finally, reviewing and improving the various definitions and metrics used to calculate the Marine Corps’ deployable population requires a large investment of

time and collaborative work and will ultimately create transparency, accuracy, and unity of effort.

Multiple Systems and Informal Processes. The service does not have a single source of integrated manpower information that can provide uniform manpower capabilities, assessments and trends. This is a contributing factor to the Marines Corps' ability to capture all demand on the force and properly assess the risks incurred. If higher headquarters receives the data through different systems, filters, and metrics, there is no common picture or assessment of the information. Moreover, due to the urgency of meeting service objectives, requirements are often generated, accepted, and levied on the force without a full understanding of the cumulative effect. Such requirements come from multiple agencies and through formal and informal channels. Since there is no standard process or system for tasking the force, the service does not have a clear picture on where all personnel resources are committed at any given time. This causes friction and misunderstanding that ultimately detracts from the ability of the service meet its strategic goals.

The absence of a standard system or process creates an administrative burden that exponentially increases as the demand filters down. Force providers struggle to compose meaningful data for both required readiness reporting and the sustainment of GFM or service manpower requirements. Without a service-level system that automates the tasking, sourcing, and assessing of demand, units create their own informal systems and relationships to attempt to Mitigate the problem. Many build ad hoc programs that allow them to capture the necessary information their commanders require to make informed decisions. However, with the current personnel rotation ratios and compressed timelines, local solutions become unsustainable. This problem was recognized as the number two priority for the Ground Combat Element Conference

(Ground Board 2-17).⁶² They concluded that the service must "develop analytical tools that provide an objective view that will inform institutional risk management and allows for the effective management of risk and readiness in human resources."⁶³ Not surprisingly, MARFORCOM had identified the same problem and has been developing a program to address the issue since 2015. They are in the last phases of developing a system that will:

Close the gap between how units are organized at the institutional level and how they are employed at the operational level - "balance the people checkbook"- enable visibility of manpower demand, align it against sourcing solutions, and reveal Marines remaining to support future requirements.⁶⁴

This system, called the GFM-A Model, brings transparency and will cut down on thousands of man hours that can be re-invested in service modernization or readiness recovery. If the GFM-A Model is properly resourced and supported by the service, it can align the efforts of several ongoing manpower initiatives and identify where other potential service gaps may exist. As the NSS stresses, "we must eliminate bureaucratic impediments to innovation and embrace less expensive and time-intensive commercial off-the-shelf solutions."⁶⁵ The GFM-A model is a step forward to resolving the manpower readiness problem and should be regarded a service priority.

1st Marine Division Case Study

"The operating forces are our focus of effort. As the source of the combat-ready MAGTFs that are our unique contribution to the defense of the Nation, the operating forces are the soul of the Corps...Accordingly we will promote the continued operational excellence of our units by addressing those issues that influence readiness, such as manning and funding. The operating forces will not be the bill-payer for other requirements! We need to protect them from becoming overextended."

32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, 1999⁶⁶

A case study of the 1st Marine Division is used to demonstrate the linkage between all the processes discussed in this analysis (Figure 1), their compounding effects across time, and the levels of risk to readiness that are incurred. These impacts are not the same for all types of

units, but the demand and readiness trends within 1st Marine Division are comparable to those experienced by the remaining operating forces. The data used for this analysis is primarily based on combat arms unit personnel and operational records from 2015 through 2017.

Division Overview. 1st Marine Division's wartime mission is "to serve as a multi-role, expeditionary ground combat force employed as the ground combat element of the I Marine Expeditionary Force. It may provide task-organized forces for assault operations and such operations as may be directed."⁶⁷ In addition, the 1st Marine Division must be able to "provide the ground amphibious forcible entry capability to the naval expeditionary force and to conduct subsequent land operations in any operational environment."⁶⁸ To execute this mission, the Division's force structure is 24 units comprising approximately 22,000 Marines and Sailors.⁶⁹ In addition to its core mission, the division provides forces for four assigned Global Force Management (GFM) missions: 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEU), West Coast MEUs (11th, 13th and 15th MEUs), Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), the core of a regimental size Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and sourced over 1,000 individual augment (IA)s to deploy in support of GFM billets between 2015-2017.⁷⁰


Infantry Unit Readiness. The Division has three infantry regiments and each regiment has four subordinate battalions. In addition to managing and supporting their battalions, the regimental headquarters rotate in and out of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response – Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) Command Element mission. This GFM requirement requires a 14-15-month commitment: nine-month deployment with a five-month pre-deployment work up. At any given time, one regiment is deployed, one is in pre-deployment training and the other has just returned from deployment. This mission is not

sourced with the entire unit. Instead, the unit is composed through the individual augment process. This means that the regiment is not staffed for deployment by M&RA. This requires the unit to split off a small version of the command to manage the regimental mission, while the core of the regiment is deployed. Although the SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a legitimate operational mission; this perpetual demand significantly degrades the regiments' ability to command and control and properly manage their subordinate battalions to meet their own assigned and core missions.

Life-Cycle of an Infantry Marine

180 Day Cycles

Infantry Marine Deployment Life Cycle (1:2 Dwell)



270 Day Cycles:

Infantry Marine Deployment Life Cycle (1:2 Dwell)

Figure 7. Life-Cycle of an Infantry Marine.⁷¹

Analyzing the problem at the battalion level provides a similar perspective. At any given time, four to five of the twelve division infantry battalions are deployed in support of GFM missions. Those respective missions are staffed for deployment by Manpower Management Integration Branch (MMIB), M&RA. MMIB executes unit staffing through the deployment unit cohesion model (also known as implementation/stabilization model). In 2011, the Commandant of the Marine Corps implemented this model to ensure “individual Marines [arrived] six months prior to deployment to train and become cohesive units prior to combat operations, and upon return, [remained] as a cohesive unit to allow for post-combat actions.”⁷² This model is based on a 15-month timeline to optimize the “timely arrival and unit longevity of captains, staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO)s and other key leaders and post-deployment unit stability.”⁷³

Furthermore, it was designed to maximize the length of contracts for first term Marines (depicted in Figure 7). Through this model, infantry battalions are “implemented” for their mission twelve months prior to their scheduled departure date.⁷⁴ The institutional goal is to staff battalions to 90 percent of their T/O (with only deployable personnel), before they are at six months from deployments (known as lock-on-date).⁷⁵ Figure 8, is a graphic representation of the process that would allow units to build and sustain cohesion and stability. Of note, when this model was designed the assumed pre-deployment period was six months.




Figure 8. Unit Cohesion Staffing Model.⁷⁶

Although the unit cohesion model was meant to provide units an optimal time to build up for deployment (14-15 months), infantry battalions within 1st Marine Division had an average unit deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:67 in FY16 and 1:1.8 during FY17 based on their operational commitments.⁷⁷ This means that on average, the units only had 10-11 months in between their scheduled deployments for GFM assigned missions. Due to the compressed timelines, the battalions were behind on meeting their administrative requirements to staff their units for their

next deployment before they returned from their current deployment. Upon returning from deployment, approximately 30-45 percent of the enlisted Marines in their battalions did not have the enough time remaining on their service contracts to meet the next deployment. The large population of Marines with an Expiration of Active Service (EAS), coupled with the compressed timeline, caused a volatile turnover of personnel after every deployment. Moreover, the intangible effects of the problem on unit cohesion, command climate, and resiliency are salient points worth considering as well, but currently beyond the scope of this thesis. Figure 9 provides a true depiction of an infantry unit build for deployment in the current manpower constrained environment.




Figure 9. Infantry Battalion Build. This graphic demonstrates how the volatile personnel turnover, late arrival of key personnel and compressed timeline have direct impacts on achieving unit training milestones for their assigned missions and no time on their TEEP for MCO training.⁷⁸ Annexe D provides a additional comparisons of infantry battalion deployment staffing trends.

1st Marine Division continues to execute its forecasted plan with the inventory it has available. With a delayed start and inventory constraints across the force, 1st Marine Division battalions reached deployment-staffing goals between one to six months prior to deployment. The late arrival of key leaders and large turnover ratios directly impacted the units' ability to train for their assigned missions.⁷⁹ Although the battalions eventually reached their forecasted deployment staffing goals, there were direct and negative impacts on unit cohesion and readiness. As a result of this cyclical problem, there is no excess time available for MCO training or readiness recovery.

Impacts of FAP/CAP. The Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) is the method used by Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander and the host supporting installation commander to negotiate and agree to the sourcing of personnel requirements beyond the personnel capabilities of the host installation command. The program is intended to provide the installation command with "sufficient manpower resources to accomplish current, new, or increased workload to support" the tenant MEF forces.⁸⁰ The secondary objective of the program is to "provide enhanced training opportunities for OpFor Marines whose Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) could be put to better use in a garrison situation" by the installation commander.⁸¹ This program has three billet requirement categories:

- Category 1. Billet requires specific MOS. Operational and training opportunities for individual MOS skill maintenance and improvement are found predominantly at the host command, with only limited opportunities at the tenant command. Tenant FMF units should support these identified FAP requirements to 100 percent of their assigned onboard strength in that MOS when the situation permits. Examples of billets in this category may include those in law enforcement, fire and rescue, weather forecasting, and air traffic control.⁸²
- Category 2. Billet requires specific MOS. Operational and training opportunities for individual MOS skill maintenance and improvement are equally available at both the host and tenant commands. Tenant FMF units should support the identified FAP billet requirements in proportion to their assigned onboard strength in that MOS when the

situation permits. Examples of billets in this category may include those in motor transport, communications, and postal services.⁸³

- Category 3. Any billet not in Category 1 or 2. Operating forces will support these billets in proportion to their overall onboard strength when the situation permits. Examples of billets in this category may include those in range, recreation, and other support staff functions. Accordingly, “Combat readiness of FMF units remains the primary consideration” and any billet not in Category 1 or 2 should be supported in proportion to MEF’s overall onboard strength when the situation permits.⁸⁴ Camp Augmentation Program (CAP) has the same requirements at category 3.⁸⁵

The service order that governs the FAP program was last updated in 1995. During that time, large FAP requirements were manageable and could be informally coordinated between local commands. As the Marine Corps faced end-strength and budget reductions, the supporting establishments took the largest cuts in military structure and funding for civilian/contracting support. Over time, the Fleet Assistance Program has been used to compensate for the deficiencies those cuts caused. Consequently, 1st Marine Division has absorbed a large portion of the FAP burden because of its population size and the dispersion of its units between five geographical camps within two major bases. For example, during FY16/17, the division sourced an average of 850 Marines to support FAP/CAP and over 40 percent of FAPs were Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO).⁸⁶ The duration of these FAP assignments removed individual Marines from their assigned units for 6 to 12 months.⁸⁷ The preponderance of division’s requirements are “category 3” or CAP billets that demand for deployable Marines of any MOS between E1 to E5. However, there are no excess deployable Marines. Therefore, the division makes the difficult decision to meet those requirements with either young Marines who have not yet developed MOS credibility or experienced NCOs that have just returned from deployment. With the significant increase in operational demand, in combination with unstructured manpower demand, every requirement that consumes the operating forces has a negative operational impact.

If the Marine Corps aims to build capacity and facilitate readiness recovery, it is time to register, validate, and prioritize all unstructured requirements at the service level.

Impacts on the Individual Marine. At any given time, there were approximately 1,200 unstructured requirements taking individual Marines away from their assigned units. This includes an average of 350 Individual Augments that are primarily comprised of officers, SNCOs, and high-demand, low density occupations. When the total number of unstructured requirements is viewed in aggregate, the impacts seem relatively small. However, that absent population is equivalent to one infantry regimental headquarters and one infantry battalion.^{IV} Once those requirements are combined with constrained service inventories and compressed deployment timelines there is a significant impact to leader-to-led ratios, unit readiness, and cohesion. This strain is shared by all three Marine Divisions.

In a deliberate attempt to improve this situation, Ground board 2-17, PP&O and M&RA endorsed an initiative “to implement a series of policy changes to ensure rifle squads are more consistently staffed with mature, educated, and trained sergeant squad leaders.”⁸⁸ Although, this initiative is well-intended, the reality is that there is no excess. Every decision involving the consumption or reallocation of manpower resources has a direct, and negative second order impact on the manpower of another unit, population or mission. Comparatively, if the unstructured demand is not reduced. There will continue to be a comparative level of leader-to-led gaps at the battalion level. The Ground Board has taken a leap to improve the current situation. The service must balance all unstructured demand for this initiative to be successful.

Division Lessons Learned and Applied. Bottom up refinement is key to improving any

^{IV} FY18 1st Marine Division Table of Organization Report. Total Force Management System. October 9, 2017. FY17 T/O for an infantry regiment was (241) Marines and Sailors and (963) for an Infantry Battalion. Total Force Structure Division.

plan or process. “Commanders realize how important it is for them to understand and give way to more collaborative and decentralized approaches that informed from the bottom up and driven by the co-creation of context.”⁸⁹ Although most of the manpower processes described in this analysis have an established feedback loop in policy, they are diminished in execution due to current demands and compressed timelines. For example, Table of Organization and Equipment Change requests (TOECR) are the established process for commanders to submit requested changes to their structure. Based on ongoing changes to force structure and evolving manpower initiatives, TOECRs have been in a moratorium for the past five years. Additionally, there is no feedback loop on the development/modification of staffing goals and a narrow window to influence the deployment staffing process. 1st Marine Division recognized the limited opportunities to provide senior leadership and higher headquarters a true depiction of the division’s readiness, the actions taken to mitigate risk, and clear actionable items that could improve the strain on division units.

In an effort to maximize resources and achieve unity of effort, the Division Chief of Staff enforced standardization of briefs to the commanding general and higher headquarters, to include DRRS-MC reporting. The intent was for all subordinate units to use the same language and standard of measurement to allow the staff to consolidate information and look for trends, critical shortfalls, and inefficiencies across the division. Standardization created efficiency and ensured that the staff was working on the right problem sets and/or communicating with the responsible organizations to address them.

Within the division staff, the G1 and G3 were consistently planning and synchronizing efforts to relieve the readiness impact on subordinate units. The division G3 understood that if deploying units did not meet their deployment staffing milestones, there was a direct impact to

training readiness. Comparatively, units that had higher individual augment requirements also had degraded leader-to-led ratios and critical high demand low density (HDLD) occupational shortfalls impacting unit cohesion and ability to achieve specific mission essential tasks. In response, manpower milestones were added to the Division Training, Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP) to create unity of effort and priorities of work in support of deploying units and IA teams. In addition, the Division G1 staff instructed operational manpower classes at the executive officer and operations officer courses, providing them an overview of Division trends, shortfalls, and upcoming individual augments that would impact their units. The operations and executive officers would see the current state of their battalion's personnel readiness in comparison to adjacent battalions, and the staffing milestone they needed to reach in preparation for their next deployment. The goal was for these officers to understand how different manpower process impacted their unit and be able to recognize the causes of their personnel shortfalls or degradation of manpower readiness. Through education, the units began to clearly articulate their shortfalls or degradation of readiness in their organizational briefs/reports. With that information, the Division G1 could verify the root cause, identify unit trends that required a Manpower Management solution, or shift GFM requirements to a lesser affected unit.

In absence of a service-level program that facilitates the manning, staffing, and sourcing of all manpower requirements, the 1st Marine Division G1 staff created their own ad hoc system. They designed and developed a Microsoft Access database that captured all tasked requirements and determined manpower availability by filtering out committed and non-deployable personnel from the assigned population. The database was designed specifically to support decision-making; it operationalized G-3 planning, and informed update briefs to the commanding general.

While effective, the database was not automated and therefore was time-consuming to manage. It required four Marines and a combined 80 man-hours per week to maintain the database.

The combination of actions taken by the Division staff was integral to improving unit readiness, however those actions did not resolve the systems that were caused the readiness problems. Furthermore, the solutions that were implemented are temporary in nature, unfunded, and unsustainable. The Division staff faces similar revolving personnel turnover issues as their subordinate units. During the summer of FY17, over 80 percent of officers turned over, to include the Commanding General.⁹⁰ Consequently, the staff is no less competent or experienced, and must relearn the lessons of the previous staff to positively manage Division manpower resources.

From the top of the Marine Corps organization to the battalion or squadron, leaders at all levels recognize the symptoms of the problem and are attempting to resolve the issue at their level and through their perspective. As the problem precipitates down to the operating forces, the impact is felt at a greater rate. The strain for the same manpower resources manifests itself most significantly at the MSC level and below. The amalgamation of the high turnover ratios, compressed deployment timelines, and growing unstructured manpower demands ultimately places the burden on unit commanders and increases the risk unit commanders must absorb to accomplish their mission. The risk that comes with low personnel readiness further increases when combined with myriad operational and administrative training requirements and low material readiness. The comprehensive picture of the affects is not captured in current readiness assessments. Unfortunatley, this type of analysis tipically only occurs after there is a mishap or serious misconduct in a unit. Regardless, the Marine Corps has the leadership, expertise, and

information necessary to improve current processes and systems to relieve that burden, optimize the force, and balance supply and demand.

Supply and Demand Impact on the “Ready Bench”




Figure 10. Supply and Demand Impact on the “Ready Bench.”⁹¹

Recommended Solutions

“The future fight will involve rapidly changing and evolving technologies and concepts, which will force us to be more agile, flexible and adaptable.”

Marine Corps Operating Concept, 2017⁹²

Military readiness is a stated national priority. With a renewed focus on modernization and the resources required to improve readiness, the time is now for the Marine Corps to invest in a service-level plan that resolves institutional capability gaps – from equipment, to personnel, and training.⁹³ The relevancy of the Marine Corps is not in question, so long as the service maintains the capability and capacity to fulfill strategic and service-level objectives. The following lines of effort provide a recommended approach to begin discussions on how best to

improve and sustain manpower readiness, while concurrently providing relief to the operating forces and supporting establishment.

Lines of Effort (LOE)s.

- LOE 1. Accountability and registration of all service demand.
- LOE 2. Identify a service lead.
- LOE 3. Develop a campaign plan and operationalized Service-level Manpower TEEP.
- LOE 4. Improve Manpower Information Sharing.

LOE 1. Accountability and registration of all service demand. All operational requirements must be accounted for to accurately understand the demand on the service. This enables the Marine Corps to prioritize and maximize resources within acceptable risk to force and mission. Accountability would bring transparency and expose the imbalance of available forces to all unstructured manpower demand. It will serve as a forcing function to bring all stakeholders to the table to validate and prioritize all requirements. The service can then choose to redistribute manpower resources or grow the force through restructuring initiatives. In the past, no platform existed that could provide a means to register all personnel requirements across the service. With MARFORCOM's newly implemented GFM-A Model, the Marine Corps will benefit from an optimal venue to register and manage all demand, forecast force availability, and improve decision-making.

LOE 2. Identify a service lead. The sustainable distribution of limited manpower supply for operational requirements must be approached and balanced through a responsible agent and a continuous, accurate, and standardized assessment process that enables risk-based decision-making. The service must identify a deputy commandant to lead and synchronize all facets of manpower readiness and facilitate unity of effort to account for, validate, and prioritize all manpower demand across the service. Validation and prioritization of those requirements would follow registration of all demand. Inevitably, and most significantly, prioritization will result in

requirements beyond the capacity of the service that will go unfilled. In this light, the service lead must be able to broker negotiations between the stakeholders and adjudicate the competing priorities to balance the manpower checkbook.

LOE 3. Develop a service campaign plan with operationalized Service-level Manpower TEEP. The Force Development Strategic Plan paved the foundation to “conceptualize, analyze, and assess the future force.”⁹⁴ With the Commandant’s current direction, stakeholders and their staffs aim to collaborate and support each other; yet they are also understaffed and overtasked. If there are no well-defined requirements and associated timelines for them to meet, they can only wager their best efforts as time and resources permit.

The development of a campaign plan and an operationalized service-level manpower TEEP will achieve two important objectives: (1) it will provide a strategic and integrated plan with an overarching purpose that balances operational demand against finite manpower resources and (2) it will assign roles and responsibilities under the cognizance of a lead organization. Moreover, the campaign plan will provide the framework to implement fundamental change where necessary to meet strategic objectives, manage force structure, and align warfighting strategies.⁹⁵ Through this campaign plan, the service can standardize the tasking process, prioritize manpower requirements, and synchronize service and operational manpower initiatives to optimize resources and facilitate information sharing.⁹⁶ Through a service-level manpower TEEP, stakeholders can plot key events and milestones within their reoccurring processes to reconcile critical information prior to key decision points that have bearing on the force. Planners can then focus attention on critical areas on the TEEP in time and space, where information in one area informs or influences another with predictability.

LOE 4. Improve Manpower Information Sharing. The Marine Corps needs a manpower system that automates and synthesizes manpower data, integrates manpower information to accurately assess trends and ready capabilities, and supports manpower sourcing and decision-making. The information all stakeholders need to improve their current risk-assessments and projections of force readiness is resident within several Marine Corps authoritative data systems. The Marine Corps needs an automated system that can interface with and synthesize all data elements to support analysis, improve process efficiency, and enable timely decisions throughout all chains of command.⁹⁷ The GFM-A Model can fill part of that void if the service properly resources and prioritizes its development and sustainment. Once the service has a true depiction of available forces, this information can be tested and validated. With accurate data that reflects service trends, the Marine Corps will be better informed on what units are most ready at specific times of the year. This improved forecast would support large scale contingency planning and would also provide better options to meet current GFM requests for forces. Furthermore, realistic standards for personnel readiness could be tested during realistic training scenarios for large scale exercises, theater security cooperation events, and service experimentation initiatives.

Conclusion

"For the strength of the Corps is the Marine, and the strength of the Marine is the Corps."

General James L. Jones, 32nd Commandants of the Marine Corps, 1999 ⁹⁸

Manpower is the single most important resource that allows the Marine Corps to “fight tonight” at the right time and place. The readiness of the force to perform its statutory functions demands that the Marine Corps take a holistic approach to force readiness that works to resolve the fundamental drivers of manpower deficiencies with a “specific focus on optimization and efficiency across the enterprise.”⁹⁹ The purpose of this analysis was not to place blame or create

division within the institution. Rather, it was to dissect the multi-organizational responsibilities, functions, and processes that impact manpower at the lowest levels and make recommendations to improve manpower readiness across the force. The operational demand for manpower continues to strain the Marine Corps' capacity to resource and there is no indication of relief anytime soon. The Marine Corps needs to balance the manpower checkbook. Assuming no significant increase to service-level end strength, the Marine Corps has limited options: register all service demand, prioritize all requirements, and fill only what can be resourced within acceptable risk.

This study has shown that solutions to the manpower problem cannot be effectively solved in isolation between the various stakeholders. More to the point, unilateral manpower solutions without full context of the cause-and-effect relationships of those solutions are counterproductive and exacerbate the problem. The path to resolution is achievable through a well-synchronized strategy that is managed by a service-lead organization vested with the authority to balance current and future demand against the bank of manpower. The synchronization of service manpower initiatives will promote unity of effort among the stakeholders and prevent force commitments that are unsustainable, further exhaust an already questionable ready bench, weaken combat readiness, and potentially delay the "fight to tomorrow."

APPENDIX A

Terms and Acronyms

Assessment. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. It is the basis for adaptation, keyed to the overall purpose, oriented on the future, and focused on emerging opportunities. Successful assessment requires the commander's situational understanding and his recognition of the difference between planned goals and the situation as it exists. This difference between what was planned and what actually happened becomes the catalyst for decision-making, either to correct deficiencies or seize opportunities. An effective assessment process requires four elements (MCDP 1-0 W CH1, 3-24):

- A basis for comparisons in the form of planning goals, which include tasks, purpose, conditions, and effects.
- Feedback that allows approximation of the situation as it exists.
- Analysis and synthesis to determine the causes and difference between plans and execution.
- Recommendations for change.

Assigned Mission. The mission which an organization/unit is tasked to carry out. Note: an assigned mission may also match the unit's wartime mission, i.e., purpose for which the unit was designed. (MCO 3000.13, I-1) Global Force Management unit missions are considered assigned missions.

Authoritative Data Source (ADS). A recognized or official data production with a designated mission statement or source/product to publish reliable and accurate data for subsequent use by customers. Note: An ADS may be the functional combination of multiple, separate data sources. (MCO 3000.13, I-1, MCO 3000.13A, 2)

Authorized Strength Report (ASR). 1. The optimal allocation of planned or authorized end strength across the force structure based on Marine Corps Staffing Precedence Order. 2. A reflection of how many billets the Marine Corps can afford to buy. 3. The ASR represents an ideal solution, and the results of this process are published semiannually for the current year, the execution year, and the following nineteen out-years. (MCO 5320.12H, 1 - 2)

Available Personnel. When calculating the DRRS-MC P-rating, personnel are considered available if they are assigned to a reporting unit, are physically present or can be present within the prescribed response time and are not restricted from deploying or employing with the unit for any reason. (MCO 3000.13, I-7)

Billet or Position. Programmed manpower structure space typically defined by grade and occupation and associated with a specific unit or organization. A billet or position may be funded (authorized) or unfunded (generally called an unfunded requirement). (DoDI 7730.64)

Deployability. The sum of factors that assess the Marine's medical, legal, contract limitation, physical limitation, future orders limitation, force control, or other factor that precludes the screened Marine from making a specified deployment, known for the Marine's present or future unit if under orders reported in manpower systems, with acceptable parameters to provide for unit training, deployment, and a transition from service at EAS should the Marine not continue service (Manpower Management: No Tiered Readiness-Enabling the Nation's Force in Readiness, 59).

DOTMLPF. doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (JP 1-02).

Defense Readiness Reporting System - Marine Corps (DRRS-MC). (MCO 3000.13A)

Deployment-to-Dwell. Deployment-to-Dwell is the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or individual is operationally deployed to the time the unit, detachment, or individual is in dwell. (MARADMIN 346/14)

Force Generation. Per reference. A Service process that focuses efforts across Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), the SE, and the Operating Forces toward efficient and effective preparation of designated Marine Corps personnel and units for specific operational deployment/ Employment. (MCO 3120.12, 2)

Force Synchronization. A Service process promoting a holistic approach to resourcing validated requirements through identification, deconfliction, and scheduling of Marine Corps forces through forming, organizing, training,

and deployment life-cycles. Directives issued prior to this Order refer to this process as conventional force synchronization and allocation. Per reference (a), force synchronization is the first phase of the Marine Corps force generation process and addresses both Joint (CCDR) and Service requirements. (MCO 3120.12, 3)

Force Deployment. Per reference. A Joint and Service process for management, scheduling, and oversight of the deployment and redeployment actions for Marine Corps forces and equipment in support of Joint (i.e. CCDR) and Service force flow requirements. Force deployment and execution planning actions may run concurrently with force synchronization actions. (MCO 3120.12, 3)

Future Force Implementation Plan (FFIP). A plan that drives subsequent actions within the force development process. (Force Development Strategic Plan, 2017, 49)

G-1. Marine Corps component manpower or personnel staff officer (division or higher staff). (MCO 5311.1E, A-3)

Global Force Management (GFM). A process to **align assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces** to CCDRs in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements. (DODI 8260.03, 24) GFM presents strategic-level planners with comprehensive visibility of the global availability and operational readiness of conventional military forces and a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes. (I MEFO P1300.1, 2-1)

Global Sourcing. The process used to source IAs wherein the DC, M&RA ensures that the Marine Corps Total Force (active, reserve, operating forces, supporting establishment and retiree's) is resourced for the most qualified Marine to fill a tasked requirement, whether DoD or Service. (MCO 1001.61A, 1-2)

Global Force Management – Availability (GFM-A) Model. (GFM-A Model, Business Case)

Human Resource Development Process (HRDP). As the HRDP owner, DC, M&RA is responsible for human resources. In meeting its total force military manpower needs, the Marine Corps uses a total force concept. The unified, integrated, cooperative team approach satisfies total force manpower requirements, whether regular or reserve, officer or enlisted, male or female. This total force manpower approach **avoids duplication of effort** and helps **realize economies and efficiencies**. The Marine Corps exercises the HRDP to **realize this concept through the combined efforts of DC, M&RA, DC, CD&I's Total Force Structure Division (TFSD) and Training and Education Command (TECOM), and Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC).** (Manning and Staffing Primer)

Individual Augment. 1. Any **temporarily attached member deployed** as an individual (vice as part of a unit or detachment) in a unit or organization that is not a part of their parent command (i.e., a unit or organization that is not a subordinate element to the command they were assigned via permanent change of station/assignment orders). (MARADMIN 125-03)

- Individual Service Augmentee (ISA). An individual augment **sourced internally** within the Service to meet Service-specific requirements and tasks. It is a position established and validated under approved Service procedures for the purpose of satisfying a grouping of tasks, capable of being performed by one individual, for which **no authorized position has been established in the unit's manning documents.** (CJCSI 1301.01D)
- Joint Individual Augmentation/Augmentee (JIA). A JIA is an unfunded temporary manpower requirement (or member filling an unfunded temporary manpower position) identified on a JMD by a supported CCDR to **augment Joint Task Force staff operations during contingencies.** A JIA will fill Task Force HQ requirements; tactical-level deployment is not appropriate for JIA sourcing. Sourcing by JIA **is meant to be the last method for obtaining manpower for positions.** This includes positions at permanent organizations required to satisfy an elevated mission in direct support of contingency operations. (CJCSI 1301.01D)

Intermediate Level Commands. They include Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Brigades (when deployed), Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Divisions, Marine Aircraft Wings, Marine Logistics Groups, Regiments, Marine Aircraft Groups and Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Groups. (MCO 3000.13, I-5)

Line of Effort (LoE). Lines of effort link Major objectives and multiple tasks using **logic of purpose to focus organizational efforts** towards establishing and then achieving operational and strategic institutional goals unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces (MNFs) and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical. (Force Development Strategic Plan, 2017, 49)

Major Objective (MO). MOs are **clearly defined, attainable goals** achieved through execution of Critical Tasks with measurable outcomes. (Force Development Strategic Plan, 2017, 49)

Manning: The portion of a unit's T/O&E which, within budgetary constraints, is authorized to be filled with Marines. The ASR determines USMC manning. (MCO 3000.13, 10-11)

Manning Precedence Level (MPL). Prioritizes the allocation of planned and available inventory against T/O requirements. (MCO 5320.12H, 2)

Marine Corps core competencies. The set of specific capabilities or activities fundamental to a Service or agency role. They define the essential contributions to the overall effectiveness of the Department of Defense and its unified commands. The Marine Corps' core competencies are as follows (MCRP 1-10.2, II-43):

- Conduct persistent forward naval engagement, always prepared to respond as the Nation's force in readiness.
- Employ integrated combined arms across the range of military operations, able to operate as part of a joint or multinational force.
- Provide forces and specialized detachments for service aboard ships, on stations, and for operations ashore.
- Conduct joint forcible entry operations from the sea, and develop amphibious landing force capabilities and doctrine.
- Conduct complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals and other challenging environments.
- Lead joint and multinational operations, and enable interagency activities.

Marine Corps Enterprise Integration Plan (MCEIP). The Marine Corps' annually produced, fiscally tethered (through the Program Objective Memorandum or POM), prescriptive plan **capturing the objective capabilities analysis** conducted across the strategically aligned and Marine Requirements Oversight Council, approved Marine Corps Capabilities Base Assessment process. (Force Development Plan)

Marine Corps Task List (MCTL). A comprehensive list of Marine Corps tasks, doctrinally based, designed to support current and future mission-essential task list development. (MCRP 1-10.2, II-44)

Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). The authoritative source for unit personnel status and used to determine Assigned Strength. It also records, processes, and maintains personnel and pay data for all active, reserve, and retired personnel. (MCO 3000.13, I-5)

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The grouping of duty positions requiring similar qualifications and the performance of closely related duties. (MCO 3000.13, I-6)

Mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore.
2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (MCO 3000.13, I-6)

Mission-Essential Task List (METL). The list of a command's essential tasks with appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission accomplishment. (MCRP 1-10.2, II-44)

Non-Deployable Personnel. Personnel assigned to a reporting unit that are not physically present, cannot be present within the prescribed response time, or are restricted from deploying or employing with the unit. Note: non-deployable service members degrade a unit's personnel strength. Non-deployable personnel are identified by the types of personnel using non-deployable codes. (MCO 3000.13, I-6)

Personnel Rating (P-Rating). A personnel resource rating determined by the lowest percentage between personnel strength and MOS fill. (MCO 3000.13, I-7)

Personnel Tempo (PersTempo). PersTempo encompasses all days that Marines are not afforded a chance to return to their residence or billeting area at their assigned permanent duty station because of military commitments. DepTempo and non-DepTempo, compose the total sum of PersTempo. (ALMAR 026/01)

Possessed/On-hand Strength. Total number of military personnel physically present with an organization (including personnel present for temporary duty). (MCO 3000.13, I-7)

Readiness. The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels. (JP 1-02)

- Unit Readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. (MCO 3000.13, I-9)
- Joint Readiness. The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. (MCO 3000.13, I-9)

Military Risk. The estimated probability and consequence of the Joint Force's projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission). (CJCSM 3105.01, C-8)

- Operational Risk (Risk-to-Mission). Reflects the current force's ability to attain current military objectives called for by the current NMS, within acceptable human, material, and financial costs. Operational risk is a function of the probability and consequence of failure to achieve mission objectives while protecting the force from unacceptable losses. This risk subset considers the ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near-term (0-2 years). The normal military planning process allocates enough time and dialogue to develop operational plans that can work in a war or crisis. These plans illuminate risks against known threats or crises. The collective assessment of these plans factors into risk assessment for the CRA, **emerging crises, global force management, and other assessments**, such as integrated priority lists (IPL). The SecDef's interim progress review planning process is one of the methods used to identify risks for future plans. The time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) for each of these plans serves to identify and limit risk to the force. Plans without a verified TPFDD have more risk. Commanders consider the feasibility of these plans in conjunction with operational concerns to assess risk to a threat adequately. (CJCSM 3105.01, C-8)
- Future Challenges Risk (Risk-to-Mission). Reflects the future force's ability to achieve future mission objectives over the near and mid-term (0-7 years) and considers the future force's capabilities and capacity to deter or defeat emerging or anticipated threats. Future challenges risk is a function of the probability and consequence of failure to meet future mission requirements. (CJCSM 3105.01, C-9)
- Force Management Risk (Risk-to-Force). Reflects a Service and/or Joint Force Provider's ability to generate trained and ready forces within established rotation ratios and surge capacities to meet current campaign and contingency mission requirements; force management risk is a function of the probability and consequence of not maintaining the appropriate force generation balance ("breaking the force"). This risk subset considers the ability to execute plans today (e.g., "fight tonight" on the Korean peninsula) to contingency missions (e.g., potential conflict arising over an economic exclusion zone or a disputed territory) in the near-to mid-term (0-7 years). (CJCSM 3105.01, C-9)

- Institutional Risk (Risk-to-Force). Reflects the ability of organization, command, management, and force development processes and infrastructure to plan for, enable, and improve national defense. Institutional risk is a function of the probability and consequence of the DoD or Services failing to perform established functions. The timeframe associated with this risk subset is much broader. All three time categories—near-, mid-, and far-term—will impact institutional risk (0-20 years). It considers organization and process effectiveness, including the acquisition process, as well as Program Health, Health of the Force, and the Defense Industrial Base. (CJCSM 3105.01, C-9)

Staffing: 1. The portion of manning to be filled with assignable inventory in accordance with the priorities established by the CMC” as described in reference (l). As the HRDP owner, DC, M&RA is then responsible for the staffing of units in accordance with the allowable manning as set forth in the ASR. (MCO 3000.13, 10-11) 2. The objective of the staffing process is to make the optimal match of current assignable inventory to maximize the fill of staffing goals. The output of the staffing process is an individual assignment to a specific billet within a specific command.

Sourcing. Actions taken by DC, M&RA, MARFOR, SE and MCICOM commanders to provide IAs to commanders requesting augmentation. (MCO 1001.61A, 1-1)

Sourcing Priorities. (MCO 1001.61A, 2-8)

Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E). A document that prescribes the wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and equipment and personnel requirements for military organizations. (MCO 3000.13, I-8)

Task Organized Unit. A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. Task organization involves the distribution of available assets to subordinate control headquarters by attachment or by placing assets in direct support or under the operational control of the subordinate. (MCO 3000.13, I-9)

Training, Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP). (MCTP 8-10, H-1)

Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS). 1. TFMS is an enterprise system that combines manpower and equipment data for the purpose of managing the Total Force. The primary mission of TFSMS is to serve as the primary data source and business process engine for the activities defined in Marine Corps Order 5311.1D. 2. TFMS is the single, authoritative source which documents all force structure requirements and authorizations, to include: unit descriptive and geographic hierarchy data; billet descriptive and unit relationship data; Principal End Item (PEI) attributes, including AAOs, and Unit AAOs; Manning and Staffing Precedence Levels established by reference (i); unfunded requirement quantities; and planned procurement quantities. (MCO 5311.1D)

Wartime Mission. The fundamental mission for which a unit was designed or organized. Wartime, core, and designed missions are the same. (MCO 3000.13, I-10)

Wartime Requirements. Doctrinally established requirements needed by type units to full perform as designed and as part of the total force. (MCO 3000.13, I-10)

APPENDIX B

Stakeholders and Mission Statements

M&RA Mission Statement. 1. The mission of Manpower & Reserve Affairs is to assist the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Director, Marine Corps Staff, in the execution of the **Human Resources Development Process (HRDP)** by planning, directing, coordinating and managing the following: **manpower assignment, planning, programming and budgeting policies; manpower information systems;** military and civilian manpower management and administration; Equal Opportunity (EO) policies, programs and activities; civilian personnel human resources management and policy; Marine and family programs; Semper Fit and Exchange services; assignment and distribution of Reserve military assets; and the functions of the Wounded Warrior Regiment.¹⁰⁰ 2. The M&RA Department employs an **integrated manpower system** across the Service enterprise that attracts, develops, retains, and supports our Marines, their families, and our civilian workforce as they pursue their professional aspirations and personal career goals, in order to provide our commanders, the **human "steel" necessary to fight and win** the Nation's battles.¹⁰¹

MCCDC/CD&I Mission Statement. MCCDC and CD&I **fully integrate Marine Corps concepts and requirements-based** warfighting capabilities; including doctrine, **organization**, training, materiel, leadership and education, **personnel**, and facilities in order to ensure the Marine Corps is **properly organized, trained, and equipped** now and in the future.¹⁰²

PP&O Mission Statement. The Plans, Policies and Operations Department serves as the focal point for the interface between the Marine Corps and the joint and combined activities of the JCS and the unified commanders-in-chief, and various allied and other foreign defense agencies; is responsible for coordinating the development and execution of service plans and policies related to the **structure, deployment, and employment** of Marine Corps forces in general and is the commandant's principal staff agency for the development and articulation of a **wide spectrum of concepts, plans, and policies;** and to direct and supervise execution and/or implementation of those policies and operational matters to include ground task force (MAGTF) matters; **combat readiness;** security matters; amphibious and prepositioning matters; **the structure (combat element (CE) and ground combat element (GCE)),** employment, and combat requirements of the FMF, and certain base and station structures; and special operation/low intensity conflict matters, also, directing the counter-narcotics effort.

MARFORCOM Mission Statement. Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (COMMARFORCOM), commands Active Component (AC) Service-retained operating forces; **executes USMC force generation actions across the AC/RC Components in provisioning of joint capable Marine Corps forces,** and directs deployment planning and execution of Service-retained operating forces in support of combatant commander (CCDR) and Service requirements; serves as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (CG, FMFLANT) and commands embarked Marine Corps forces; coordinates Marine Corps-Navy integration of operational initiatives and advises Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) on support to Marine Corps forces assigned to U.S. Navy ships, bases, and installations; and conducts Service-directed operational tasks as required.¹⁰³

1st Marine Division Mission Statement. The 1st Marine Division is a multi-role, expeditionary ground combat force employed as the ground combat element of the I Marine Expeditionary Force. It may provide task-organized forces for assault operations and such operations as may be directed. The 1st Marine Division must be able to provide the ground amphibious forcible entry capability to the naval expeditionary force and to conduct subsequent land operations in any operational environment.

APPENDIX C

Lines of Effort

Figure 11, contains the Force Development Strategic Plans' Lines of Effort "to provide an organization-wide focus on the MCCDC/CD&I priorities established to most effectively achieve the Commandant's force development objectives."¹⁰⁴ Figure 12 is a depiction of the "Force Development and Management Framework" within the most current Force Development Strategic Plan. It "depicts actions required to develop the future Marine Corps and manage the current Marine Corps are closely linked and addressed by a number of directives. The general framework of designing the force, building the force, preparing the force, generating the force, and employing the force are supported by the actions necessary to resource and assess the force."¹⁰⁵

The LOEs and framework are missing the relationships to the other deputy commandants that are part of the generating the force and the directives that govern their processes.




Figure 11. Force Development Strategic Plan, Lines of Effort.¹⁰⁶




Figure 12. Force Development and Management Framework, Force Development Plan, 2017¹⁰⁷

Recommended Summary of Service Sourcing Requirements					
Reg. Category	Reg. Originator	Reg. Validator	Sourcing Coordinator	Requirement & Sourcing Tracking Tools	Final Approval Authority
CCDR Operations	CCDR	JS J-35N	JS J-35S, DC PP&O, MARFORCOM	JCRM, LOGBOOK, USMC Force Synch PLAYBOOK GFMAP, MCBUL 3120	SecDef via SDOB
JIA's	CCDR	JS J-35N, JS J-1	JS J-35S, DC M&RA, MARFORCOM G-1	eJMPAS/JMDs, MFC JIA USMC Force Synch PLAYBOOK, MRTM, GFMAP, GFM-A	SecDef via SDOB
CCMD/Joint Exercises	CCDR	JS J-35S	MARFORCOM Joint & Service Training	JTMS, USMC Force Synch PLAYBOOK MCBUL 3120, GFM-A	JS
ISA	Marine Corps Commands & Organizations	DC PP&O, DC M&RA	DC M&RA, MARFORCOM	MSG TRAFFIC, MRTM, GFM-A	CMC
MAGTF Augmentation	Operating Forces	MARFORs, DC PP&O	DC M&RA, DC PP&O, MARFORCOM	USMC Force Synch Playbook, GFM-A	CMC
Service Training	Operating Forces	DC PP&O	MARFORCOM Joint & Service Training	USMC Force Synch Playbook	CMC
Conventional Forces ISO MARSOC	USSOCOM, MARSOC	DC PP&O	DC PP&O, MARFORCOM	JCRM, GFMAP, USMC Force Synch Playbook	SecDef via SDOB
COMREL	USMC Communication	DC PP&O	MARFORCOM	MSG TRAFFIC, USMC Force Synch Playbook	CMC
Testing & Evaluation	MCWL, MCSC, MCOTEA	DC PP&O	MARFORCOM Joint & Service Training	USMC Force Synch Playbook	CMC
BISOG	Operating Forces	DC PP&O	MARFORCOM, USFFC, OPNAV	USMC Force Synch Playbook	CMC
FAP	Installations	DC I&L, DC PP&O, MARFORCOM	DC I&L, MARFORCOM	GFM-A	CMC
Other	Other Government Organizations	DC PP&O	DC PP&O, MARFORCOM	USMC Force Synch Playbook	CMC

Figure 13. Recommended Summary of Service Sourcing Requirements.¹⁰⁸ This table is an update to the summary of force requirements and associated sourcing steps provided in MCO 3120.12.

APPENDIX D

Infantry Battalion Readiness Comparison

- This line represents the total amount of Marines assigned to the battalion at any given time.
- This line represents the “deployable” population at the battalion at any given time.
- - - - This line represents the Marines the population who the battalion retained for a second deployment.
- - - - This line represents the “non-deployable” Marines that did not deploy, but remained assigned to the battalion throughout the deployment (includes Marine without the EAS for the deployment).
- - - - This line represents the new joins that arrive as part of the deployment staffing process.




Figure 15. Infantry Battalion Readiness Comparison. The three infantry battalions selected were the base units used for the development of Figure15 within the 1st Marine Division Case Study. They were selected because they had three distinct assigned missions that were executed during the same time period. The unit identification information was removed to prevent crossing a classification threshold.

The base charts were produced by Maj N.J. Freeman, USMC as part of thesis research. Data from DC M&RA Manpower Information Systems (MI) Task Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) records. See Nicholas J. Freeman, “Improving the Force Generation Process for Marine Corps Infantry Battalions: Developing a Multi-Component Model to Optimize Force Synchronization Decisions and Assess Readiness Impacts.”¹⁰⁹

APPENDIX E

DRRS-MC - Recommended Changes to Non-Deployable Categories

Figures 15 and 16 are the categories used to calculate the P-rating for monthly DRRS-MC reports. Figure 17 provides recommended modifications to non-deployable categories to give a more accurate assessment of deployable personnel when a unit calculates their assigned mission.

DRRS-MC Deployable Personnel Categories
On duty in a billet that serves the overall mission of the command, to include personnel attending local command schools
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)
Fleet Assistance Program (FAP)
Terminal leave voluntary request to transfer FMCR (not at Service limit)
Annual leave
Deferred hostile fire
Restricted as result to non-judicial punishment
Assigned, but not departed for next duty station (PCS)
Insufficient security clearance
Exceptional family member
Request retirement
Retirement approved (voluntary request, not at service limits)
Request resignation
Resignation approved

Figure 15. DRRS-MC Deployable Personnel Categories. This figure contains the current list of Non-deployable categories used to assess DRRS-MC P-rating. ¹¹⁰

DRRS-MC Non-Deployable Personnel Categories
Medical
Medically intermediate personnel
Not medically ready personnel
Administrative
End of active service (EAS) within 7 days
Home awaiting orders (PEB)
Mandatory retirement within 90 days
Awaiting administrative separation disposition by separation authority other than for expiration of enlistment or fulfillment of service obligation
Unauthorized absence
Absentee or deserter
Captured or prisoner of war
Missing in action
Sole surviving son or daughter
Hazardous area restrictions
Undergoing primary MOS training/school
Humanitarian transfer or temporary additional duty
Hardship discharge approved
Legal
Confined awaiting action by higher authority
confined awaiting trial by general court martial
Confined serving sentence from general court martial
Involuntary hold beyond EAS as a court martial prisoner
On leave awaiting results of appellate review
In the hands of civilian authorities

Figure 16. DRRS-MC Non-Deployable Personnel Categories. Above is the current list of Non-deployable categories used as part of the P-rating calculation.¹¹¹

Additional Non-Deployable Categories for Assigned Mission
On dwell 1:1 ^{*Note 1}
On dwell 1:2 ^{*Note 2}
End of Active Service - cutoff for deployment ^{*Note 3}
Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) ^{*Note 4}
Terminal leave voluntary request to transfer FMCR (not at Service limit) ^{*Note 5}
Assigned, but not departed for next duty station (PCS) ^{*Note 5}
Insufficient security clearance ^{*Note 5}
Request retirement ^{*Note 5}
Retirement approved (voluntary request, not at service limits) ^{*Note 5}
Request resignation ^{*Note 5}
Resignation approved ^{*Note 5}

Figure 17. Additional Non-Deployable Categories for Assigned Mission.

Note 1. The SecDef's goal for operational deployment-to-dwell is 1:2; the SecDef's operational deployment-to-dwell ratio threshold is 1:1. SecDef approval is required to deploy a unit, detachment, or individual to deploy with a 1:1 ratio or less. An individual may voluntarily waive their deployment-to-dwell threshold submitting an Administrative Action form (NAVMC 10274) to the first general/flag officer in the chain of command of the parent organization.¹¹²

Note 2. PersTempo refers to the amount of time service members serve on official duty at a location or under circumstances that make it infeasible for them to spend off-duty time in the housing in which they reside. SecDef has tasked the service to set "measurable thresholds on PersTempo and collect reliable data to monitor PersTempo."¹¹³

Note 3. When a unit has an assigned GFM mission, there is an EAS cut of determined by MMIB that feed the unit's deployment staffing plan. Marines must have prescribed time on contract to be considered deployable for that battalion.

Note 4. If the study conducted by PP&O identifies FAP billets that are critical to maintain during conduct of MCO, they should be subtracted from the available population.

Note 5. Categories highlighted in red are currently considered deployable personnel when calculating the P-Rating for both core and assigned mission.

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