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Title: The Dragon's Safari: A Growing Power's Application of "Soft Power" in Africa

Author: Major Blair W. Faulk, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Chinese application of soft power has served to shift alignments for short periods of time in Africa, and, without action by the United States, may have a lasting impact on America's global hegemony.

Discussion: This study reviews Chinese application of co-optive, or soft, power in Africa as an attempt to shift allegiances away from the United States and towards China. It argues that shifting allegiances and gaining influence will enable China's pursuit of hegemony by offsetting the United States current position atop the balance of power. It reveals specifics of Chinese soft power application, identifies (through analysis of United Nations voting) temporary shifts in allegiances towards China by the African bloc, and argues that these temporary shifts may become permanent without action by the United States.

Conclusion: The United States is in real danger of losing its allegiances in Africa to the Chinese and must develop a coherent strategy that can be executed by the boots on the ground to offset Chinese gains.

DISCLAIMER

OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT

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Preface

Having spent most of my formative years in Nigeria, from 1990-2001, Sub-Saharan Africa will always hold a special place in my heart. At the time, America was at the top of the African food chain. China was viewed as being untrustworthy and not following through on promises, due to the failed railway reconstruction project. Watching the United States lose power and influence to the Chinese throughout the 21st Century has been simultaneously confusing and heart breaking. I chose to research and write this paper in the hopes that it may play a small role in shaping US-African relations going forward, should America choose to right the ship on this strategically important continent.

Many people are due thanks for the outcome of this paper. First and foremost, the Dean, Dr. McKenna for listening, believing, steering and helping me as I made my way through the process. Being a part of your final class of mentees is truly an honor. To Dr. Jensen, thank you for helping me narrow down the topic, pushing me to actually do it and finally providing invaluable assistance as I used the “Jensen Foreign Relations Model.” Beers are owed to the DQTC, FW and RP for listening to me rattle on about this topic for countless miles on the trails. Conference Group Niner-Hard, Dwayne, Fog, Frank, Joel, Tyler and Von, thanks for pushing me to stay the course, reading my drivel and kicking me in the hindquarters when I needed it. Finally, my family, thanks for understanding why I still “don’t come home even though all the other dads are home,” read books that no one has ever heard of and occasionally just need to turn my brain off; let’s go back to the fleet!

Introduction

On 15 May 2017, following the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Forum in Beijing, the president of a French think-tank stated, “The "One Belt, One Road" initiative opens a new chapter in the course of globalization. This initiative is an extremely important change of the global governance.”¹ This statement is one way of saying that some view the People’s Republic of China’s (China’s) actions under OBOR as potentially offsetting the United States’ current global hegemony. One key locale of the Chinese strategy is the African continent, where China has gradually increased its interactions during the 21st century. During these interactions, China has attempted to co-opt new allies through tailored soft power application. This study will seek to determine “whether or not the Chinese application of soft power in Africa has led to an alignment shift away from the United States and towards China?” Research shows that Chinese application of soft power has served to shift alignments for short periods of time in Africa, and, without action by the United States, may have a lasting impact on America’s global hegemony.

The OBOR initiative is steeped in history, tracing its roots to the ancient Silk Road which connected China to Africa and Eurasia during the Han through Ming dynasties.² In particular, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road seeks to re-open the ports opened by the voyages of Admiral Zheng He.³ Zheng He led seven fleets across the Indian Ocean during the Ming dynasty, opening the ports of the Arabian Peninsula and Africa to Chinese trade.⁴ This

¹ “Quotable quotes on Belt and Road from world intellectual, business personnel,” Quotable quotes on Belt and Road from world intellectual, business personnel - Xinhua English.news.cn, accessed November 09, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/English/2017-05/15/c_136285939.htm.

² Mercy A. Kuo, “One Belt, One Road: A Convergence of Civilizations?” *The Diplomat*, May 24, 2017, accessed November 23, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/one-belt-one-road-a-convergence-of-civilizations/>.

³ Tim Winter, “Heritage diplomacy along the One Belt One Road,” International Institute for Asian Studies, June 20, 2016, accessed November 23, 2017, <https://iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/heritage-diplomacy-along-one-belt-one-road>.

⁴ Ibid.

represented the high-water mark of Chinese exploration, as the later years of the Ming dynasty sought to consolidate power and closed China's doors, a policy which was continued by the Qing dynasty and governments from 1911 until the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.⁵

In 1949, China announced the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' during Mao Zedong's statement on the formation of the Central Government.⁶ These principles, which included mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference, peaceful co-existence and cooperation for mutual benefit, struck a chord with African nations spreading their wings in the post-colonial period.⁷ China went farther than words in 1955, holding the Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia.⁸ This conference led to Egypt becoming the first African nation to open diplomatic relations with China in 1957; by 1979, 37 of 56 African nations had established diplomatic ties with China.⁹

Balance of Power

The 21st Century has seen Chinese relations with Africa grow even more, paralleling the rise of global Chinese power. Over the same period, the United States has sat atop the global power structure as the only great power. Balance of Power theory tells us that the United States' global hegemony will produce coalitions who seek to shift power away from the hegemon; China will seek to form those coalitions as they ascend the power ladder.¹⁰ African nations without

⁵ Chris Alden and Christina Alves, "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa Policy," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (2008): 46, doi:10.1080/03056240802011436.

⁶ China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, accessed November 23, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/tl8053.shtml.

⁷ Ibid. Alden and Alves, "History and Identity," 47.

⁸ China's Initiation of the Five Principles.

⁹ Alden and Alves, "History and Identity," 47.

¹⁰ This study identifies the United States as the hegemon that the coalitions will be formed against. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" *International Security* 35, no.1 (2010): 12, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00001.

clearly delineated relations with the United States could form the coalitions that help China shift the balance.

Like the United States, China has many of the characteristics that Balance of Power Theorists Levy and Thompson use to define a maritime or economic power. Maritime powers seek to establish relationships that allow them to gain control of markets, rather than territory.¹¹ Gaining control of markets provides China a strengthened base from which to shift power away from the United States' global hegemony.¹² Developing nations may choose to align with China to reap the benefits of association with a quickly growing economy.¹³ The importance of China's economy comes into greater focus with changes in thought on Balance of Power.

Recently, scholars have hypothesized that balance of power no longer hinges primarily on military might (as it did during the Cold War), but rather centers on the economic strength that Levy and Thompson placed in the background.¹⁴ This view of balance of power is in line with Chinese strategic thought, and dates back to Sun Tzu. Economic strength is bloodless and may allow the Chinese to defeat "the enemy without even fighting" or maneuver the rival "into a position from which escape is impossible."¹⁵ In fact, since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has re-written its assessment system, placing greater weight on economics, foreign investment and ownership of natural resources than military strength when determining national power.¹⁶ Chinese strategists who subscribe to this view find validation in facts. Since 2000, as the United States economy has struggled and posted annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 1.97

¹¹ Ibid, 18.

¹² Ibid, 12.

¹³ Ibid, 18.

¹⁴ Graham Allison, *Destined for war: America, china, and Thucydides's trap* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 20.

¹⁵ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (London, England: Penguin, 2012), 28.

¹⁶ Michael Pillsbury, *The hundred-year marathon: China's secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower* (New York: St. Martins Griffin, 2016), 47.

percent annually, whereas China's GDP has grown by 9.24 percent annually.¹⁷ In real terms, China's GDP in 2014 was \$7 trillion, making it the world's second largest economy.¹⁸ This growth is projected to continue, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting an annual 6.4 percent increase in GDP through 2020.¹⁹ In addition to validating the Chinese view of national strength, the growth of the Chinese economy validates their view of balance of power.

The Chinese view of balance of power is rooted in their history, and dates back to a quote that is often attributed to Confucius, "There are not two suns in the sky, there cannot be two emperors on earth."²⁰ Scholars and diplomats agree that China wants to be that one "emperor," the hegemon who controls the balance of power; China's economic strength makes the goal of being the hegemon seem realistic.²¹ The late Lee Kuan Yew, who Xi Jinping called "our senior who has our respect," said in 2008, "It is China's intention to be the greatest power in the world."²² China confirmed this view in their white paper, *China's National Defense*, when they claimed this about the 21st Century, "It is the aspiration of the Chinese government and people to lead a peaceful, stable and prosperous world into the new century."²³

¹⁷ Averages compiled by the author. Data found on: "United States and the IMF," IMF, accessed January 12, 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/USA>. "Peoples Republic of China and the IMF," IMF, accessed January 12, 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN>.

¹⁸ Andrea Burgess, *The Economist pocket world in figures 2014 edition* (London: Profile Books, Ltd., 2013), 24.

¹⁹ Staff, *Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation*, report no. 17/247, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2017), 9.

²⁰ Allison, *Destined for war*, 138. Pillsbury, *The hundred-year marathon*, 20. Steven W. Mosher, *Bully of Asia: why China's dream is the new threat to world order* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, a division of Salem Media Group, 2017), 33.

²¹ Karl W. Eikenberry, "China's Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," *The American Interest* 10, no. 6, June 9, 2015. Though experts agree that China sees itself as destined to become a hegemon, they do not agree as to China's vision of their sphere of influence. The author has seen an almost even split between views that China wants to become the dominant global power, and views that China merely wants to control the Pacific region.

²² Lee Kuan Yew et al., *Lee Kuan Yew: the grand master's insights on China, the United States, and the world* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013), xv and 3.

²³ Staff, *China's National Defense*, People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council (PRC, July 27, 1998), 1.

Soft Power

As China seeks to lead the world into the new century, Lee Kuan Yew stated that “countries will need to decide if they want to be China’s friend or foe.”²⁴ In addition to sharing the benefits of association with a quickly growing economy, China will likely seek to entreat African nations onto their side of the power scale through application of soft, rather than hard, power. Where hard power is more coercive and operates through force and sanctions, soft power is co-optive and “operates largely through culture, political ideals, and foreign policy.”²⁵ These (primarily) nonmilitary tools, including economic statecraft, place China in a favorable position to organize a balancing coalition against the United States.²⁶ China has placed itself in a position to achieve this balancing coalition by creating a “somewhat idealistic impression of the distant partner or big brother in the East.”²⁷ This message goes hand-in-hand with Chinese strategic messaging that they view Africa as a “strategically significant region,” rather than a “source of instability” (as many Western nations seem to.)²⁸

Throughout the 21st Century, China has focused primarily on utilizing economic soft power in Africa. Sino-African trade has increased from \$10 billion in 2000 to over \$200 billion in 2013. Beyond trade, China has made low-interest and zero-interest loans to further African economic development. These loans stem from a view that Premier Zhou Enlai captured succinctly; “Mutual economic assistance among the Asian and African countries was the kind of

²⁴ Lee Kuan Yew, *the grand master’s insights*, 6.

²⁵ Theo Neethling, “China’s International Peacekeeping Contributions and the Evolution of Contemporary Chinese Strategic Considerations,” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 37, no.2, 10.

²⁶ Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 17, doi:10.1162/0162288054894607.

²⁷ Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” *African Studies Review* 50, no. 03 (2007): 81, doi:10.1353/arw.2008.0014.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 94.

assistance between poor friends who were in the same boat pulling oars together.”²⁹ With this statement, he infers that Chinese economic assistance is for the greater good, not just the betterment of China, furthering the message of partnership. Over a three-year period, from 2010-12, China provided \$13.4 billion in aid to Africa and announced a willingness to provide an additional \$60 billion worth of financing to African nations beginning in 2016.³⁰ At least one-third of these loans are ultimately repaid with natural resources, helping fuel the Chinese economy.³¹

China has applied soft power in Africa in areas beyond economics. During the 21st century, China has published several documents, primarily their *Africa Policy* and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) action plan(s), which outline the application of soft power. China’s *Africa Policy*, first published in 2006, is based on Mao’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and focuses on cooperation between China and Africa.³² Economic cooperation is at the forefront of the policy, but an entire paragraph is dedicated to cooperation in the realms of education, science, culture, health and society. Of particular interest is the subparagraph on “Media cooperation,” where China states that they will “encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation...to enhance understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other.”³³ This media cooperation plays a huge role in how China is

²⁹ Gilles Carbonnier, Michel Carton, and Kenneth King, *Education, learning, training: critical issues for development* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), 153.

³⁰ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation in a global context* (Acton, ACT, Australia: Australian National University Press, 2015), 383, 387. Beyongo Mukete Dynamic, “China’s environmental footprint: The Zambian example,” in *Control: China Story Yearbook 2016*(S.l.: ANU Press, 2017), 299.

³¹ Sautman, “Friends and Interests,” 80. “Credit limit,” *The Economist*, April 30, 2016, accessed January 12, 2018. URL in bibliography.

³² People’s Republic of China, *China’s Africa Policy*, August 20, 2006, URL in bibliography.

³³ Comparatively, the sub-paragraph on media cooperation is larger than the sub-paragraphs on financial cooperation, infrastructure, or resources cooperation. People’s Republic of China, *China’s Africa Policy* (2006).

viewed by African nations and how the people of China view Africa, helping China shift allegiances on the African continent.

The FOCAC is a platform for “collective consultation and dialogue and as a cooperation mechanism among developing countries” that is attended by Chinese and African leaders, as well as members of international organizations.³⁴ FOCAC first met in Beijing in 2000, with the stated goals of charting the “direction for the development of a new, stable and long-term partnership featuring equality and mutual benefit between China and African countries.”³⁵ FOCAC met most recently in 2015, and published their action plan for 2016-2018. This action plan, before discussing economics directly, speaks in depth to infrastructure development. Chinese assistance in African infrastructure development has already paid dividends in improving Sino-African relations, and will continue to be a primary focus area for soft power application going forward, as an important part of the OBOR initiative. Infrastructure development is likely to be in the forefront of the FOCAC discussions at the upcoming 7th Ministerial Conference in Beijing (2018), as China looks to capitalize on recent successes such as the Kenya Standard Gauge Railway (SGR).³⁶ This project, completed in 2017 (18 months ahead of schedule), connects Mombassa with Nairobi, and is the first installment of a line that will extend westward into six additional countries.³⁷

³⁴ The most important international organization which attends FOCAC is the African Union. “Africa - China,” China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), accessed January 05, 2018, https://au.int/en/partnerships/africa_china.

³⁵ “The First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC,” accessed January 02, 2018, <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157577.htm>.

³⁶ Alpha Daffae Senkpeni, “Beijing Officials Meeting Sets Tone for 2018 China-Africa Cooperation Summit,” *FrontPageAfrica*, December 01, 2017, accessed January 12, 2018. URL in bibliography.

³⁷ Rebekka Rumpel, “Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway,” Chatham House, June 20, 2017, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography. Conor Gaffey, “What you should know about Kenya’s mega-railway, built with Chinese money,” *Newsweek*, June 05, 2017, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography.

FOCAC and the *Africa Policy* also focus on Sino-African educational cooperation. In the *Africa Policy*, China states that their educational assistance to Africa will be part of two-way learning, as “China and Africa... learn from and draw upon each other’s experience in governance and development.”³⁸ Until 2009, the FOCAC action plan did not go into specifics for education, but the 2010-12 action plan set tangible goals for higher education, by increasing long-term Chinese scholarships to 5,500 per annum in 2012.³⁹ This goal was reportedly met by 2010 when China offered 5,710 scholarships to African students.⁴⁰

In addition to formal higher education, China provides a large quantity of technical education and advisory teams to African countries, governments and corporations. One example is Chinese funded Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDC). At the 3rd FOCAC summit in 2006, China proposed construction of 10 ATDC, and subsequent FOCAC pledged additional funds; as of 2012 there were 23 ATDC in various stages of construction and operation.⁴¹ These centers, run by Chinese technical personnel, conduct research, demonstrate agricultural techniques and train African farmers for a period of three years, before being turned over to local ownership, and becoming business operations aimed at improving the agribusiness of the host nation.⁴² Though the sustainability of these projects is still undetermined, the Chinese have trained at least 3,000 farmers in 23 different countries, helping increase the yield of African agriculture.⁴³

³⁸ King, *Education, learning, training*, 155. People’s Republic of China, *China’s Africa Policy* (2006).

³⁹ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), November 12, 2009, accessed December 23, 2017, <http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbjzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm>.

⁴⁰ “Home > The 5th Ministerial Conference,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), July 18, 2012, accessed December 23, 2017, <http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm>.

⁴¹ Lu Jiang et al., “Chinese agriculture technology demonstration centres in Southern Africa: The new business of development,” *The Public Sphere: Journal of Public Policy*, 2016 edition, 10-11, accessed January 12, 2018.

⁴² *Ibid*, 14.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 32. “Home > The 5th Ministerial Conference,” <http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm>.

Measuring Allegiance Shifts

These examples show the varied ways by which China applies soft power in Africa to co-opt allegiances and offset the United States' global hegemony. One place where shifts in allegiance can be measured is in voting within the United Nations (UN), which maintains excellent voting records online.⁴⁴ Additionally, the United States State Department maintains an online repository that records all of the United States' votes in the UN General Assembly and Security Council from 2000-2016.⁴⁵ Although voting shifts in the United Nations may be attributable to other causes, and are not the only indicators of shifting allegiances, they are suggestive of Chinese attempts to shift the balance of power.

This study suggests that China's application of soft power in Africa is shifting allegiances away from the United States and towards China. A shifting of allegiances is required to offset the United States' global hegemony. Gaining allegiances allows China to become a larger regional hegemon, and potentially replace the United States as the global hegemon.⁴⁶ Therefore, data analysis of the General Assembly and Security Council will center on a comparison of African nations' and China's voting practices to those of the United States in order to highlight allegiances. For purposes of this study, any year where a nation votes with the United States with the same or a lesser frequency than China, the author considers an indication that said nation's allegiance may be shifting towards China. An occurrence of the nation voting with the United States at the same or lesser frequency as China in subsequent years verifies, at a minimum, a temporary shifting of allegiance towards China.

⁴⁴ "UNBISnet - UN Bibliographic Information System," United Nations, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://ubisnet.un.org/>.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, accessed October 30, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm>.

⁴⁶ Africa's proximity to the Indian Ocean place, at a minimum, the East Africa nations part of the region that China wants to influence. The five focus nations listed later in this paper indicate that China is attempting to shift allegiances across the continent.

This study focuses between the years 2000 and 2016, due to China's increased soft power applications in Africa during the 21st century. General Assembly voting analysis began with the 56 African members of the UN. Subsequently the voting records of seven nations were removed from analysis due to the presence of three or more years where that country did not actively participate.⁴⁷ The relatively high number of African absences from votes (13.5 absences per country/per year) was isolated in this study by comparing only votes in which the countries participated. Votes where the African nation or China were absent or abstained were removed from the comparison to votes with the United States.

Since 2000, the United States averages 83 votes per year in the UN General Assembly, with the fewest votes (65) coming in 2000, and the highest number of votes (99) occurring in 2016. Over the studied period, the 48 African nations, whose votes were considered, voted in alignment with the United States 26% of the time. This is a 2% greater concurrence than China, who voted with the United States in 24% of votes. The lowest year of concurrence came in 2007, with African coinciding with the United States on only 8.5% of votes, whereas China coincided with the United States on 9.3% of votes. 2011 saw the greatest concurrence between the United States and China, with their votes agreeing 39.7% of the time.⁴⁸ African concurrence with the United States was greatest in 2016, when the studied African nations voted in alignment with the United States on 45.8% of votes.⁴⁹

During twelve of seventeen years, the African nations voted in line with the United States more often than China. The only years where China sided with the United States more often than the African nations were 2006-09 and 2013. Even during these years, the only years where

⁴⁷ Central African Republic (2000-02, 08, 13), Guinea-Bissau (2000-02), Liberia (2000-03), Niger (2000-02), Seychelles (2000, 2005-08), Somalia (2000-01, 08), and South Sudan (Not a member until 2011)

⁴⁸ African concurrence with the United States was 40.2% in 2011.

⁴⁹ Chinese concurrence with the United States was 38.1% in 2016.

the majority of African nations voted less with the United States than China did were 2006 and 2007.⁵⁰ Of particular note in those two years is the nation of Sudan, which voted against the United States on a particularly low number of issues. It is likely not a coincidence that Sudan had been the number one African recipient of Chinese aid in 2004 and 2005.⁵¹

Voting practices in the UN Security Council were also analyzed in this study. Twenty-Four African nations were members of the Security Council between 2000 and 2016, serving as non-permanent members, for two year terms, alongside the United States and China who are both permanent members of the Security Council.⁵² Security Council voting analysis is slightly more complicated, as a vote of “no” by a permanent member constitutes a veto of the motion. Because of this, the permanent members tend to abstain from voting on matters where they disagree, but do not feel strongly enough to veto.⁵³ The African nations selected to participate in the Security Council participated fully, unlike in the General Assembly; none of the 24 nations were removed from consideration due to physical abstention from voting.

Two significant areas of conflict, Israel and Syria, must be removed before detailed analysis can be conducted in regards to security council voting. Since 2001, the United States has vetoed or abstained (without support) any votes that shine a negative light on Israel, or the Middle East peace process.⁵⁴ The same holds true for China, who in every case since 2006, have

⁵⁰ In 2006, 30 of 48 African nations and in 2007, 35 of 48 African nations voted with the United States at a lesser concurrence than China.

⁵¹ Sudan’s votes were as follows: 2006 (5 with United States, 75 against United States), 2007 (4 with United States, 73 against United States)

⁵² The UN Security Council has a total of fifteen members. Ten of those are non-permanent members, who join the permanent members (Russia, United Kingdom, United States, France and China) for two-year terms.

⁵³ The UN does not maintain consistent records of votes in matters that were vetoed. In most instances, the veto is the only vote recorded, making consistent research more difficult. During the studied period, 58 total votes were noted where the United States, China, or the African representatives (hereafter referred to as “Studied Nations”) voted no or abstained from voting.

⁵⁴ 15 of 58 instances where the “Studied Nations” were not in concurrence directly related to Israel. Votes on Israel accounted for 10 of the United States 12 total vetoes and 5 of 9 abstentions during the studied period.

vetoed or abstained from any votes which reflect negatively on Syria, or are unfavorable to the current Syrian regime.⁵⁵ Angola and South Africa, African nations with whom China has very close ties, have supported the Chinese in these motions on Syria. For example, during 2012 deliberations on extending the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission (UNSMIS) in Syria, China utilized veto power and South Africa abstained from voting, providing tacit approval of the Chinese action.⁵⁶

Once Israeli and Syrian issues have been removed, analysis of Security Council voting shows that in the 21st century, recommendations that do not receive 100% concurrence typically fall into three categories. 1) Recommending that the UN begin/continue a mission or issue a mandate, including expanding the UN Mission in Sudan in 2006 and establishing a UN enforced no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. 2) Recommending sanctions or international action, such as sanctioning Sierra Leone's export of diamonds in 2000 and referring the leaders in the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005. 3) Issuing a public condemnation/commemoration or requests, examples of which include reaffirming the Annapolis Mid-East peace agreements in 2008 or commemorating the anniversary of the Bosnian conflict in 2015.⁵⁷ During the studied period, seven votes fell into category one, seventeen in category two and eleven in the third category.

In this study, resolutions that received unanimous approval were discarded, as they did not highlight allegiances. Additionally, resolutions which received non-concurrence from

⁵⁵ 8 of 58 instances where the "Studied Nations" were not in concurrence related to Syria. Votes on Syria accounted for 5 of China's 7 vetoes and 2 of their abstentions.

⁵⁶ South Africa served on the Security Council twice during the studied period (2007-8 and 2011-12). From 2007-8, South Africa abstained alongside China in the only case where China chose to abstain. Between 2011-12, immediately following South Africa's admission to BRICS (Brazil, India, China, South Africa association), South Africa abstained in 2 of 3 votes regarding Syria.

⁵⁷ Category 2 consists of areas that the Chinese would consider "interference" in the affairs of other countries.

nations other than China, the United States or an African nation were discarded, because they were outside the parameters of this study. Between 2000 and 2016, African participation in the Security Council led to non-unanimous approval of recommendations to begin a mission or issue a mandate on seven occasions. African nations led the charge in countering these votes, entering at least one abstention on four occasions; Mali and Namibia provided the only dissenting votes in a 2000 resolution on extending the UN Mission in Western Sahara.⁵⁸ In four of the non-unanimous votes on missions/mandates, China was amongst the non-concurring parties. In the majority of these occasions at least one African nation sided with China, who abstained unilaterally only twice. The United States has only vetoed/abstained one time in regards to beginning/continuing a mission, a 2002 vote on extending the UN Mission in Bosnia.⁵⁹

On the seventeen occasions that a Security Council vote on imposing sanctions or conducting international action did not receive unanimous approval due to African participation, both the United States and China dissented on several occasions.⁶⁰ The United States chose to abstain on two occasions, both of which were unilateral actions; America did not receive any international support.⁶¹ Chinese abstentions received far more international support; China acted unilaterally in only six of fourteen abstentions. Most recently, in 2016, China received a surge of support when abstaining in these matters. The Security Council voted on whether or not to impose sanctions twice in 2016; on both occasions, China abstained and the majority of the African contingent abstained as well.⁶²

⁵⁸ S/Res/1301.

⁵⁹ S/2002/712.

⁶⁰ Whereas the United States and/or China utilized veto power at least once in areas one and three, neither nation chose to veto a motion on imposing sanctions or conducting international actions.

⁶¹ S/Res/1372 and S/Res/1506.

⁶² S/Res/2317 recommended enacting an embargo on both Somalia and Eritrea, and though China abstained alongside Egypt and Angola, the resolution ultimately received enough votes to pass. S/2016/1085 recommended

The Security Council participated in eleven votes falling into the third category of issuing a public condemnation/commemoration or requesting something of the world community during the studied period where African votes were part of non-unanimous approval. America did not vote with the majority on two occasions, and did not receive African support in either case.⁶³ China chose to exercise her veto power twice in these matters, preventing condemnation of the regime in Myanmar and expression of concern over the outcome of Zimbabwean elections.⁶⁴ In cases where China chose to lodge an abstention, African support was there.⁶⁵ Of note, this third category was the one where African nations were most likely to voice a difference in opinion, regardless of the views of the permanent members. Three times, African nations were the only abstentions presented, and more impressively, though Chad supported China in S/2014/916, Nigeria and Rwanda abstained on the measure, contributing to the failure of Security Council affirmation of the sovereignty of Palestine.⁶⁶

Overall, analysis of Security Council voting shows that African nations on the council trend towards greater support for China. In 13 of 21 cases (outside of Israeli and Syrian matters) where China chose to abstain, at least one African nation voted with them. This trend has experienced a rapid increase recently however, corresponding to the increase in Chinese application of soft power. Prior to 2015, China never had more than one African nation vote with them on a proposed resolution. Beginning in 2015, in 80% of votes where China has

placing an arms embargo on South Sudan; abstentions by China and the entire African contingent (Angola, Egypt and Senegal) as well as Russia doomed the recommendation to failure.

⁶³ The United States was the only abstention for S/Res/1828, which publicly acclaimed the report of the Secretary General on the Sudan. The United States and China both voted to establish a special prosecutor for the ICC in S/Res/2269; the African members all abstained.

⁶⁴ Records in the early part of the 21st Century do not annotate whether any nations absented themselves from these votes.

⁶⁵ S/Res/2220, S/2015/508 and S/2015/562.

⁶⁶ S/2014/916 affirmed the sovereignty of Palestine. Though the United States ultimately vetoed the resolution, the willingness of two African nations to vote against the measure shows that China's influence is not all-powerful.

abstained, at least two-thirds of the African contingent has abstained with them (all three African nations voted with them on 40% of occasions.) This highlights a potential shift in alignments towards China and away from the United States, less visible in the General Assembly, which votes more often and on a more diverse set of issues.

Focus Nations

Five countries where China has focused its attentions extensively are Ethiopia, Zambia, Angola, the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania) and Nigeria.⁶⁷ These countries serve as broadening examples of how China applies soft power in Africa; the means of application in each country are as varied as the cultures of the countries themselves. The allegiances of those countries have all shifted towards China, for varying durations. These five nations are all regional power brokers, and if China can shift their allegiances permanently, they may influence their neighbors and shift the continental balance of power towards China.

Ethiopia

Situated strategically in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has been the recipient of Chinese soft power for almost a half-century. Sino-Ethiopian diplomatic relations began in 1970 when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Ethiopia during an African tour and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie reciprocated with a visit to China in 1971.⁶⁸ In 1988, the Sino-Ethiopian Agreement for Economic and Technological Cooperation was signed, followed by a \$15 million Chinese loan to

⁶⁷ The five focus nations were selected for the following reasons: Ethiopia - Strategic location in the Horn of Africa, proximity to the Indian Ocean/inclusion in OBOR and Chinese manufacturing focus. Zambia - To date Chinese involvement has centered around Zambian resources. Unique to Zambia, outcry over the environmental impact of Chinese corporations in Zambia has forced reaction and changes on the part of the Chinese. Angola - Chinese engagement in Angola highlights how far the Chinese will go to obtain “precious” resources. Tanzania - A central African power broker and important to the OBOR initiative, Chinese interactions have included highly developed humanitarian assistance. Nigeria - Africa’s most populous nation, rich in natural resources; Chinese interactions have run across the full spectrum of assistance. China is willing to entertain Nigeria’s desire for influence.

⁶⁸ Seifudein Adem, “China in Ethiopia: Diplomacy and Economics of Sino-optimism,” *African Studies Review* 55, no. 01 (2012): 144, doi:10.1353/arw.2012.0008.

improve Ethiopian infrastructure.⁶⁹ Following a revolution in Ethiopia, Sino-Ethiopian relations surged again in 1998 when the China-Ethiopia Joint Commission was formed to regularly review and address bilateral relations.⁷⁰ Trade between the two nations began strengthening, reaching \$100 million in 2002, and exponentially growing to \$562 million in 2006. In 2008, China announced that they would establish at least five Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Africa to “attract significant local and foreign investment, create African employment, promote exports and elevate industrial competitiveness.”⁷¹ One of the first SEZ(s) was created near Addis Ababa in 2008.⁷² The Ethiopian SEZ’s focus was textiles, leather goods and building materials, with the stated goal of making Ethiopia the leather center of Africa.⁷³

In addition to these economic applications of soft power, China pledged during the 2000 FOCAC to provide educational aid for Ethiopians as well. The first announcement was the Ethio-China Polytechnic College in Addis Ababa; the Chinese pledged not only to build, but equip and staff the college.⁷⁴ An initial \$12 million were allocated in 2003, and China ultimately spent \$13.5 million to complete the school, which focuses on 3rd and 4th level technical and vocational certifications.⁷⁵ A second school opened in Ethiopia in 2009, also focusing on vocational training, with a capacity of 3,000 students.⁷⁶ These schools benefit both Ethiopia and

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 145.

⁷¹ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift: the real story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 97. Deborah Brautigam and Tang Ziaoyang, “African Shenzhen: Chinas special economic zones in Africa,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 01 (2011):29, doi:10.1017/s0022278x10000649.

⁷² Adem, “China in Ethiopia”, 146.

⁷³ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 99, 214.

⁷⁴ Carbonnier, *Education, Learning, Training*, 164.

⁷⁵ AidData China, Aiddata, accessed January 03, 2018, <http://china.aiddata.org/projects/1440>.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 158. Courses include construction skills, architecture, engineering, electronics, electrical engineering, computers, textiles, and apparel.

China; the vocations being taught in the schools are areas of interest for the hundreds of Chinese companies operating in Ethiopia.⁷⁷

Ethiopia is one of the key nations in the OBOR initiative due to its high capacity for manufacturing and trade. This capacity is limited, however, by the fact that most Ethiopian exports travel through Djibouti. Until recently, transportation of goods to Djibouti by road took up to seven days.⁷⁸ China helped alleviate this, by investing in Ethiopian infrastructure and building a high-speed railway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, cutting the travel time to about ten hours.⁷⁹ This railway is part of a planned network that will link all of East Africa with the pivotal OBOR ports of Djibouti and Dar es Salaam.⁸⁰

As with the interactions between any countries, there are negatives to Sino-Ethiopian relations. A study of African university students and faculty conducted in the late-2000's found that Sino-Optimism was on the rise, and views of Chinese among Ethiopians were generally among the most positive in Africa, but the prevalent perception is that China is only in Africa for natural resources.⁸¹ Of particular interest in that study, while the vast majority of Ethiopians said that Chinese involvement helps the local economy, a majority believe that it helps while still being a source of problems for local people.⁸² Some of this may potentially be blamed on claims of regional disparity in Chinese involvement in Ethiopia; of Ethiopia's nine, distinct, ethnic

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "Ethiopia, Djibouti launch Africa's first modern electrified railway," Ethiopia, Djibouti launch Africa's first modern electrified railway - Xinhua English.news.cn, October 05, 2016, accessed January 06, 2018, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/05/c_135733669.htm.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Cobus Van Staden, "One Belt One Road and East Africa: Beyond Chinese Influence," Jamestown, November 10, 2017, accessed January 04, 2018, <https://jamestown.org/program/one-belt-one-road-east-africa-beyond-chinese-influence/>.

⁸¹ Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, "African Perspectives on China-Africa Links," *The China Quarterly* 199 (September 2009): 746, doi:10.1017/s030574100999108x.

⁸² Ibid, 739.

regions, Chinese investment appears to focus on the region around Addis Ababa, creating tensions.⁸³ Diversification of Chinese investment in Ethiopia, along with a continued dedication to tangible projects such as infrastructure and education, may help maintain the current Sino-Optimism in Ethiopia.

Zambia

Zambia is another African nation that has felt the application of Chinese soft power, beginning in 1963 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai pledged to invest in Zambian infrastructure and construct a railway from Zambia to Tanzania.⁸⁴ This railway allowed Zambia to export copper without transiting through Zimbabwe or South Africa, decreasing transit fees and avoiding conflict zones.⁸⁵ Zambia was able to repay China, somewhat, by providing a key African vote in favor of China replacing Taiwan in the UN General Assembly through Resolution 2758.⁸⁶

Economically, Zambia benefits greatly from its relationship with China, due to rich deposits of copper and other prized minerals.⁸⁷ 1997 saw the Chinese government direct the state owned Bank of China to open a branch office in Zambia, helping facilitate Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which reached \$292.9 billion in 2013.⁸⁸ Chambishi, Zambia was the beneficiary of one of the first SEZ announced by the Chinese government in 2008.⁸⁹ The Chambishi SEZ was designed to pull the industrial chain back, giving Zambian industry the

⁸³ Adem, "China in Ethiopia", 153.

⁸⁴ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 385.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 67.

⁸⁷ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 397.

⁸⁸ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 82. Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 390. Mukete, "China's environmental footprint," 300.

⁸⁹ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 101.

ability to turn their own natural resources into exportable products.⁹⁰ Fueled partly by the SEZ, Zambian exports to China have risen, accounting for 25.5% of Zambia's total exports in 2013.⁹¹ By 2016, Chinese investment in the SEZ, and throughout Zambia had risen to over \$5.2 billion, fueling growth not only in exportable products, but facilitating the harvesting of uranium, coal and gemstones as well.⁹²

Zambia has also received Chinese soft power application through the media, primarily, Chinese provided FM radio technology. China provided FM transmitters that provided services for seven provinces in 2002, and further extended transmission capacity in 2006.⁹³ This transmission technology was coupled with training by Chinese media experts on broadcasting, and coincided with election years where the pro-Beijing Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was chasing votes.⁹⁴ China's "Year of Africa" in 2006 took time to focus on Zambia, with a special on China Central Television about the construction of the aforementioned Tanzania-Zambia railway, hailing it as a "glorious achievement" for both Zambia and China.⁹⁵

Negative views of Chinese involvement have been a major issue in Zambian elections during the 20th century as opposition parties have tried to unseat the Chinese-supported MMD, who have ruled since 1991.⁹⁶ In the 2006 election, one opposition candidate, Michael Sata made Chinese labor practices a rallying issue, choosing to call the Chinese "infestors" rather than investors in his public speeches.⁹⁷ Though he ultimately lost that election, Sata won 29 percent

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 396.

⁹² Mukete, "China's environmental footprint," 300.

⁹³ Michael Leslie, "The Dragon Shapes its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa," *Africa Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 3-4 (December 2006): 164.

⁹⁴ Fackson Banda, "China in the African Mediascape: Doing Better Journalism," *Rhodes Journalism Review* 29 (September 2009): 52.

⁹⁵ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 40.

⁹⁶ Sautman, "African Perspectives," 749.

⁹⁷ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 151.

of the popular vote, showing the strength of anti-Chinese sentiment within Zambia at the time.⁹⁸ Much of this sentiment stems from concerns over Chinese labor and environmental practices. Since 2011, three Chinese copper mining companies have had their operations suspended by the Zambia Environmental Management Agency, and been forced to pay restitution due to failure to maintain proper anti-pollution controls.⁹⁹ In Sautman and Hairong's survey of university students, 57.7 percent of Zambian students thought that China was only in Africa for the natural resources.¹⁰⁰ Fifty percent of those polled said that Chinese policies on the continent were both beneficial and harmful, ten percent more than any of the other countries surveyed.¹⁰¹ Steps such as China's Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection's 2013 release of the 'Guidelines on Respecting Overseas Environmental Standards and Managing the Environment' will likely help improve Sino-Zambian relations, if properly enforced by the Chinese.¹⁰²

Angola

China has been applying soft power in Angola since the 1960s, when they provided both covert and overt support to various factions during the Angolan Civil War.¹⁰³ This support ranged from training to weapons, and was, at the time, an attempt to shift the balance of power away from the Soviets.¹⁰⁴ This support was provided with the knowledge and support of the United States, as they attempted to maintain dominance in the balance of power struggle against

⁹⁸ Sautman, "African Perspectives," 749. Sata ultimately won the Zambian presidential election in 2011, continuing to campaign on an anti-China campaign: Alan Cowell and Jeffrey Gettleman, "Zambia's Acerbic Leader, Michael, Sata, Dies at 77," *The New York Times*, October 29, 2014, accessed January 05, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/world/africa/michael-sata-sharp-tongued-president-of-zambia-dies-at-77.html>.

⁹⁹ Mukete, "China's environmental footprint," 301, 304-5.

¹⁰⁰ Sautman, "African Perspectives," 737.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 740.

¹⁰² Mukete, "China's environmental footprint," 305.

¹⁰³ Alden and Alves, "History and Identity," 50.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ Though covert support and military aid may not fit the traditional definition of soft power, they do fit Nye's original definition; this support was provided by China to help form Angola into a nation that wanted what China wanted, without becoming directly involved in the war.¹⁰⁶

When the civil war ended, Chinese soft power shifted from the military to the economic realm, as China courted support in a nation rich in natural resources, primarily oil. In 2004, China began offering "no strings attached" loans to Angola that by 2009 totaled between \$13.4 and \$19.7 billion.¹⁰⁷ These loans fueled development of Angolan industry and natural resource production, and opened the door for outside trade. This has been mutually beneficial for both China and Angola; as of 2012, Angola accounted for 21% of Sino-African trade, and 1% of China's overall annual trade.¹⁰⁸ Perhaps more importantly than the total numbers, in 2006, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's greatest source of oil, providing fifteen percent of her oil import totals.¹⁰⁹

As in several other African nations, China gained access to Angola's oil through investment in infrastructure. An October 2004 deal, which saw China buy Shell's fifty percent share in a major Angolan oil block, hinged on \$2 billion in promised aid to revitalize Angolan

¹⁰⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (London, England: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 819.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 166.

¹⁰⁷ Ricardo Soares De Oliveira, "Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 02 (2011): 301, doi:10.1017/s0022278x110005x. Chinese "no strings attached" loans indicate the Chinese policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. This is in contrast to American policies on lending and investment; for example, inclusion in the American led African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) requires African nations to be "working to improve its rule of law, human rights, and respect for core labor standards." Agoa.info, "Aggregate Bilateral Trade between AGOA Countries and the United States," Agoa.info - African Growth and Opportunity Act, accessed January 18, 2018, <https://agoa.info/data.total-trade.html>

¹⁰⁸ Lloyd Thrall, *Chinas expanding African relations: implications for U.S. national security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 25-26.

¹⁰⁹ Sautman, "Friends and Interests," 80.

infrastructure.¹¹⁰ This aid, from China's Exim bank, will be used to renovate roads and railways, including the key Benguela Railway between Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹¹ Renovations to the Benguela Railway were completed in 2013, allowing Angola to increase the speed of transit during export of its natural resources.¹¹² More recent Chinese supported infrastructure projects have sought to provide tangible relief to Angolan problems, including the large population living in slums. Outside the Angolan capital of Luanda, Chinese construction firms are currently constructing four "satellite towns" with low-cost housing and supporting infrastructure; as of 2013, these firms had completed work on 1,500 residential buildings in Kilamba, the flagship "satellite town."¹¹³

Much of the construction work being completed by Chinese firms is conducted with imported Chinese, not local labor.¹¹⁴ As of 2006, there were an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 Chinese workers living in Angola, and up to an additional 10,000 Chinese businessmen had visited Angola.¹¹⁵ The business opportunities in Angola have led to an increase of stories in the Chinese media, seeking to entreat additional business travel to Angola as China seeks to build 'citizen diplomacy' in Angola.¹¹⁶ Stories such as "Angola's Economic Miracle cannot be

¹¹⁰ Cindy Hurst, *China's Oil Rush in Africa*, publication, Institute for the Analysis of Energy Security (Washington D.C., 2006), 9.

¹¹¹ Ian Taylor, "China's oil diplomacy in Africa," *International Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September 2006): 948, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00579.x. Aurea Mouzinho, *Understanding the Angolan FDI Regulatory Landscape*, occasional paper no. 238, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (October 2016), 19.

¹¹² Mouzinho, *Understanding the Angolan FDI Regulatory Landscape*, 19.

¹¹³ David Benazerf and Ana Alves, 'Oil for Housing': *Chinese-Built New Towns in Angola*, policy brief no. 88, Global Powers and Africa Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (2014), 3.

¹¹⁴ Assis Malaquias, *Angola's Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Recalibration*, occasional paper no. 84, Foreign Policy and Foreign Drivers Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (May 2011), 11.

¹¹⁵ Yoon Jung Park, *Chinese Migration in Africa*, occasional paper no. 24, China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International Affairs (January 2009), 4. Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, "New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (March 2008): 33-34, doi:10.1080/03056240802011394.

¹¹⁶ Shubo Li and Helge Ronning, *China in Africa: Soft power, media perceptions, and a pan-developing identity*, report no. 2013:2, Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway, April 2013), iv.

missed” (*People’s Daily*, 28 August 2008) paint a rosy picture of the opportunities in Angola for Chinese who may be willing to emigrate.¹¹⁷

Negatives of Chinese involvement in Angola focus around charges of corruption; the 2004 oil deal included a \$1.1 billion government “signature bonus” that had no stipulations as to how it could be spent.¹¹⁸ A Human Rights Watch report in 2004 stated that up to \$4 billion dollars in oil revenues (10 percent of Angola’s GDP at the time) were lost to corruption between 1997 and 2002.¹¹⁹ This corruption is visible in the allocation of funding to infrastructure projects; recently, more funds have been allocated to flashy projects such as a soccer stadium and new government buildings in Luanda, rather than projects that improve the quality of life for the majority of Angolans.¹²⁰ China continues to offer loans for development, however, ignoring calls for transparency by quoting their policy of ‘non-interference’ in foreign domestic affairs.¹²¹ In 2011, the Chinese Caixin News group published a set of stories, highlighting the Chinese Investment Fund’s controversial activities with the government of Angola, helping increase transparency, the first step towards fixing the problem.¹²² In addition to this reporting, in August 2015, the Angolan National Assembly passed a new Foreign Investment Law, aimed at increasing Angolan ownership of the FDI process, and improving anti-corruption monitoring.¹²³

Tanzania

Chinese application of soft power in Tanzania has also increased over the past half century. Economic soft power application in Tanzania has focused primarily in the realm of

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 8.

¹¹⁸ Taylor, “China’s oil diplomacy,” 945.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 946. Arvind Ganesan, *Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights*, report, Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

¹²⁰ Oliveria, “Illiberal peacebuilding,” 295.

¹²¹ Taylor, “China’s oil diplomacy,” 948-49.

¹²² Li, *China in Africa*, 11. About Caixin, accessed January 07, 2018, <https://www.caixinglobal.com/about/>.

¹²³ Mouzinho, *Understanding the Angolan FDI Regulatory Landscape*, 9-13.

infrastructure development. After Sino-Tanzanian diplomatic relations were opened in 1964, the first example of soft power application was the construction of the previously mentioned Tanzania-Zambia railway.¹²⁴ This project was completed by the Chinese Railway Engineering Corporation, and was financed through a \$500 million interest free loan from the Chinese government.¹²⁵ Recently, Chinese investment in Tanzanian infrastructure has continued; creation of the ‘maritime Silk Road’ includes construction/improvements of several deep water ports in Africa, one of which is Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.¹²⁶

In 2008, the Chinese Development Bank announced they would help fund the creation of an SEZ in Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika that will ultimately link via rail to the Dar es Salaam deep water port.¹²⁷ This SEZ has the primary goal of being the gateway to outside trade for the Great Lakes Region that includes Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.¹²⁸ The government of Tanzania has exempted investors in this (and two other economic zones) from multiple taxes, tariffs and duties to help entice further investment.¹²⁹ Infrastructure improvements have already taken place in Kigoma, including refurbishment and expansion of the airport; Chinese Eximbank provided a loan of \$100 million in 2010 to complete a fiber-optic

¹²⁴ Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 34.

¹²⁵ Johanna Jansson, Christopher Burke, and Tracy Hon, “Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Tanzania,” Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, October 2009, 2, accessed November 28, 2017, http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/ccs_tanzania_briefing_paper_october_2009.pdf

¹²⁶ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 393.

¹²⁷ Johanna Jansson, “Patterns of Chinese Investment,” 3.

¹²⁸ Annelies Smets, *Fram Kanga to Kitenge: exploring patterns of cultural change in the Kigoma region*, Interns and Volunteers Series, International Peace Information Service (Antwerp, Belgium: IPIS, 2011), 12. *Kigoma Special Economic Zone Brochure*, Regional Administration and Local Government, United Republic of Tanzania: Prime Minister’s Office (Kigoma, Tanzania: Kigoma Special Economic Zone Co. Ltd., 2015), 5.

¹²⁹ Ben Watts, “Tanzania to target investment through Special Economic Zones,” *African Review*, December 03, 2013, accessed January 13, 2018, <http://www.africanreview.com/finance/economy/tanzania-to-target-investment-through-special-economic-zones>.

backbone project linking Dar es Salaam to Kigoma, bringing broadband connectivity to the region.¹³⁰

Chinese investment in Tanzanian infrastructure has also included the construction of factories to increase local manufacturing capacity. These manufacturing projects have met with varying levels of success across the country. Examples of success include the Chinese funded Ubungo Farm Implements Factory, which makes 85 percent of Tanzania's hand tools.¹³¹ The China-Tanzania Friendship (Urafiki) Textile Factory, built with Chinese funding in the late 1960's is an example of where Chinese manufacturing aid has met reduced success.¹³² Initially, this Chinese built factory was managed by Tanzanians, who had to learn from their own mistakes; by the mid-1980s, the factory had fallen into disrepair and the Tanzanian government reached back out to China for assistance.¹³³ In 1997, the Urafiki Textile Factory received direct investment from the Yuemei company, who purchased a 51% stake in the factory, and imported new technology as well as skilled management from China.¹³⁴ As sales have increased exponentially in the 21st Century, the Yuemei company plans to form a complete industrial chain in Tanzania to buy cotton, process, spin, weave, dye and export.¹³⁵ Continued investment of this sort, throughout the Tanzanian manufacturing sector (Tanzania was the 7th largest recipient of

¹³⁰ Kigoma airport refurbishment was completed with funding from the European Investment Bank, highlighting the potential created by the establishment of an SEZ with Chinese support. Richard Willis, "Airports across Tanzania to be upgraded with European funding," European Investment Bank, February 13, 2012, accessed January 15, 2018, URL in bibliography. Deborah Brautigam and Xiaoyang Tang. *An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania*, discussion paper no. 01214, Development strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (2012), 11.

¹³¹ Sautman, "Friends and Interests," 87-88.

¹³² Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 197-8.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid. "\$150 Million to Restructure the Tanzania-China Friendship Textile Co. Ltd.," *Corporate Digest*, accessed January 10, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹³⁵ Ibid. Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 200.

Chinese bilateral FDI in Africa) can only serve to increase Tanzanian manufacturing, and reap beneficial allegiances for China.¹³⁶

Tanzania has been the recipient of greater Chinese soft power in the area of medical aid than many other African countries. More than 1,000 Chinese medical workers have spent time in Tanzania, treating patients and teaching Tanzanian medical professionals since 1968 when the first medical exchange occurred.¹³⁷ In 1976, China played a key role in the foundation of the Institute of Traditional Medicine in Muhimbili, Tanzania, where Chinese doctors and pharmacists now instruct regularly at the Muhimbili University Centre for Health Services, Tanzania's leading teaching hospital.¹³⁸ During Premier Wen Jiabao's 2006 African visit, he promised more than \$500k in aid to furthering the development of nursing and midwifery programs in Tanzania, helping alleviate a severe shortage of midwives in the country.¹³⁹ Most recently, in November 2017, the Chinese hospital ship *Peace Ark* visited Dar es Salaam on an eight day humanitarian mission, the second mission to Tanzania in seven years.¹⁴⁰

FOCAC pledges have also played a role in Tanzanian receipt of medical aid. Following the 2006 FOCAC summit, China pledged to create anti-malarial centers in ten African nations, including Tanzania, before the end of 2007.¹⁴¹ The first grouping of medical personnel

¹³⁶ Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 390.

¹³⁷ Johanna Jansson, "Patterns of Chinese Investment," 3. Tanzania has been paired with Shandong Province, China since 1968. The majority of Chinese medical professionals providing aid in Tanzania are from Shandong.

¹³⁸ Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jean-Raphael Chaponniere, *Tanzania-China All-Weather Friendship from Socialism to Globalization: A Case of Relative Decline*, discussion paper no. 1/2016, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University (Stellenbosch, South Africa, 2016), 24.

¹³⁹ Li, *China in Africa*, 9. It is not uncommon for Tanzanian midwives to deliver up to 30 babies in one shift, with one Tanzanian hospital having overseen more than 11,000 births in 2016. Jarrod Lucas, "How Tanzanian midwives can deliver up to 30 babies per shift," ABC News, April 20, 2017, accessed January 10, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁴⁰ "Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark arrives in Tanzania," World - Chinadaily.com.cn, November 20, 2017, accessed January 12, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/20/content_34757172.htm.

¹⁴¹ The Chinese pledge included a total of 30 anti-malaria centers to be built by the end of 2009. "10 anti-malaria centers to be set up in Africa," Xinhua News Agency, October 15, 2007, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/health/228080.htm>.

designated to staff the Tanzanian center traveled to the Jiangsu Centre of Verminosis Control and Prevention in October 2007, to receive advanced training in malaria treatment and control.¹⁴² Many of the medications being used in these anti-malaria centers are being grown and produced in Tanzania, following a Chinese corporation's \$6 million investment to begin growing the anti-malarial herb *Artemisia annua* and produce pharmaceuticals locally.¹⁴³ In addition to these anti-malaria centers, China also pledged to provide funding for a cardiac surgery, treatment and training facility in Dar es Salaam.¹⁴⁴ China ultimately contributed \$10 billion to the project, opened in 2014, which will serve as a grassroots cardiac medicine training facility with the assistance of 48 Chinese medical specialists who made up the initial staff.¹⁴⁵

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1964, Tanzanians have generally held China in very high regard. A 2008 Pew research study found that China received a 71% favorable rating in Tanzania.¹⁴⁶ 72% of those polled in the same survey saw China as an important partner, rather than an inhibitor to success.¹⁴⁷ As always though, there are dissenting views, most of which arise from Chinese involvement in the Tanzanian economy. Some Tanzanians express concern when Chinese aid leads to the construction of manufacturing capabilities without training the local population to operate the factory, making these factories a "burden on the back of two governments" when they stop operating properly.¹⁴⁸ Others express concern that these same factories are using a high degree of mechanization, with a Chinese labor

¹⁴² Li Anshan, *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Discussion Paper no. 52, Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet (Uppsala, Sweden, 2011), 17.

¹⁴³ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 72.

¹⁴⁴ "China Funds Construction of Cardiac Surgery, Treatment and Training Facility in Dar es Salaams," Aiddata, accessed January 12, 2018, <http://china.aiddata.org/projects/32963>.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. Saumu Mwalimu, "Kikwete opens MNH centre for heart diseases," National *The Citizen*, April 28, 2014, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁴⁶ Sautman, "African Perspectives," 732. This was an increase of 1% from 2007, likely linked to the Kigoma SEZ.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 59.

force as the operators and managers; as one Tanzanian critic quipped, “You don’t even contribute to employment because you bring your own labor.”¹⁴⁹

Nigeria

Africa’s most populous nation receives focused application of Chinese soft power regularly. Nigerians have viewed Chinese support positively since the late 1960’s, due to the lack of colonialist ambitions on the part of the Chinese.¹⁵⁰ Chinese economic soft power application in Nigeria began in 1979, when a Chinese aid team began a humanitarian construction project. Following completion of the humanitarian project, the team registered as a local company and began bidding on further projects, kicking off Chinese economic activity in Nigeria.¹⁵¹

Chinese economic interaction with Nigeria grew slowly over the decades, peaking in 2014 with China’s largest FDI ever, a planned 1,400 kilometer railway to link Calabar and Lagos.¹⁵² Ultimately, this construction project should create 200,000 construction jobs in Nigeria and generate \$4 billion in Chinese equipment exports.¹⁵³ This project, with its job creation, highlights a trend of Chinese economic investment in Nigeria, which does not necessarily translate to other African nations: local national ownership of the project. China has helped create two SEZs in Nigeria, Lekki and Ogun, both of which focus on detailed manufacturing.¹⁵⁴ Unique to Nigeria, the national and local governments own 40% and 18%, respectively, of these SEZ(s), whereas the SEZ(s) in Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania are currently 100% Chinese

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 193.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 10. Nigeria received its independence from Great Britain in 1960, having lived under colonial rule for 99 years.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 64.

¹⁵² Ligang Song et al., *Chinas domestic transformation*, 391.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Deborah Brautigam, “African Shenzhen,” 31-33.

owned.¹⁵⁵ This willingness of China to accept Nigerian ownership helps satiate Nigeria's desire to be viewed as a power who can gain positions of influence.

Much like in Ethiopia, China has taken steps to increase vocational training in Nigeria. Huawei, China's major telecom company, has established a training center to prepare Nigerians for the operation and maintenance of wireless and broadband systems, providing them with a sustainable workforce as telecommunications infrastructure rapidly grow across the country.¹⁵⁶ Huawei, along with Zhong Xing Telecommunication, have a near monopoly on telecommunications in Nigeria, with a reported 90% market share.¹⁵⁷ Adding to the workforce will help Huawei maintain this dominance of the Nigerian market through sustained, quality service.

Chinese educational aid does not stop with vocational training in Nigeria. It includes links in formal education and higher learning as well. A Nigerian think tank, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, was included in China's 2013 "Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan" in Beijing.¹⁵⁸ When the think tanks met in Beijing during October, 2013, one key item of discussion was how to "enrich the mode of Sino-African academic exchanges and cooperation and strengthen innovation."¹⁵⁹ One of Nigeria's largest universities, the University of Lagos (UNILAG), is also participating in an educational exchange, thanks to FOCAC promises.¹⁶⁰ Following the 4th FOCAC ministerial conference, UNILAG was partnered with the Suzhou

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 160.

¹⁵⁷ Shubo Li and Helge Ronning, *Winning Hearts and Minds: Chinese Soft Power Foreign Policy in Africa*, CMI Brief, Chr. Michelsen Institute, vol. 12, no. 3, (Bergen, Norway, 2013), 2.

¹⁵⁸ This think tank partnership was mooted in the Beijing Action plan of the 5th FOCAC; "Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)," The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), July 23, 2012, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t954620.htm>.

¹⁵⁹ "Initiative for the China-Africa Think Tanks 10 + 10 Partnership Plan," Beijing, China, October 2013.

¹⁶⁰ King, *Education, learning, training*, 166.

University, with the goal of building capacity for quality engineering education.¹⁶¹ In 2017, this partnership showed the fruits of its labors, as UNILAG used the relationship it had built with both Suzhou and Tsinghua Universities to become the pilot location for online engineering courses in West Africa.¹⁶²

In a venture that combines both educational and cultural applications of soft power by China, of the 33 total Confucius Institutes in Africa, two are in Nigeria.¹⁶³ The first, at Nnamdi Azikwe University in Akwa, opened in 2007, with a second at UNILAG opening in 2009.¹⁶⁴ The focus of these Confucius Institutes is to promote Mandarin and Chinese culture, increasing the number of Nigerians who can speak Chinese well enough to travel to China, teach it to others and seek employment with Chinese companies.¹⁶⁵ As of 2017, up to 90% of the Nigerian students in Chinese universities had learned Chinese at the Confucius Institute in Nnamdi Azikwe University.¹⁶⁶ The relationship between Nnamdi Azikwe University, and its Chinese sister school, Xiamen University, is set to become truly reciprocal as Nigerian professors were to begin teaching Igbo language and culture there in 2017.¹⁶⁷

One area of Chinese soft power that has helped allay Nigerian fears of colonialism or extractive desires is agricultural assistance. Though less than 30% of Nigeria's GDP is

¹⁶¹ Ibid. *Report on the Development of China-Africa Educational Cooperation*, report, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2011), 13.

¹⁶² "China Launches University of Lagos Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC) Platform in Beijing," University of Lagos, June 01, 2017, accessed January 15, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁶³ King, *Education, learning, training*, 162.

¹⁶⁴ Samuel Ramani, "China-Nigeria Relations: A Success Story for Beijing's Soft Power," *The Diplomat*, July 12, 2016, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography. Emmanuel Edukugho, "Confucius institute opens at Unilag for teaching of Chinese language," *Vanguard News*, November 04, 2009, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁶⁵ King, *Education, learning, training*, 162.

¹⁶⁶ Tooni Akinkuotu, *Youth on the move: An emerging relationship in China-Nigeria relations*, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos (2017), 17.

¹⁶⁷ Ramani, "China-Nigeria Relations." Chukwuemerie Udchukwu, "China opens cultural research centre in Nigeria," *Premium Times Nigeria*, June 29, 2016, accessed January 12, 2018, URL in bibliography.

accounted for by the agricultural share, many Nigerians still eke out an existence through subsistence farming, and dream of making more of their lives.¹⁶⁸ As of 2013, Nigeria had the third most approved Chinese farming proposals in Africa, a full two-thirds of which are dedicated towards improving production in both grains and cash crops.¹⁶⁹ Nigeria has begun to scratch the surface of China's agricultural market, and with China's assistance has begun experimentation in biofuel production for both domestic use and export to both the Chinese and European markets.¹⁷⁰ Through these ventures, in time, Nigeria hopes that agricultural exports will help it reduce its dependency on oil exports and transportation fuel imports, allowing them to achieve the self-sufficiency required to be a global player.¹⁷¹

Nigeria, like Zambia, has received focused application of Chinese media soft power. This application of media power began in 2006, when the Nigerian government purchased Chinese satellite technology that came packaged with a training program for its proper use.¹⁷² This satellite technology will increase the transmission coverage area of the Xinhua News Agency (the Chinese government's most traditional news service).¹⁷³ Xinhua News, along with other programming, will be brought into Nigerian homes through the StarTimes corporation, who offer digital set-top boxes and mobile television kits to Nigerian users, with the goal of

¹⁶⁸ Emanuele Santi and Maxime Weigert, *China-Africa Co-Operation Beyond Extractive Industries: The Case of Chinese Agricultural Assistance in West Africa*, Policy Insights 30, South African Institute of International Affairs (November 2015), 6.

¹⁶⁹ Deborah Brautigam and Haisen Zhang, "Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 9 (2013): 1680, doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843846.

¹⁷⁰ Emanuele Santi, *China-Africa Co-Operation*, 4. Helen Lei Sun, *Understanding China's Agricultural Investments in Africa*, occasional paper no. 102, China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International Affairs (November 2011), 12.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. Juliet Ben-Iwo, Vasilije Manovic, and Philip Longhurst, "Biomass resources and biofuels potential for the production of transportation fuels in Nigeria," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 63 (September 2016).

¹⁷² Yu-Shan Wu, *The Rise of China's State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa*, Occasional paper no. 117, The China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International Affairs, June 2012, 15.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 10-11.

increasing digitization.¹⁷⁴ StarTimes has made its technology and the services offered extremely inviting to Nigerians by providing the widest football coverage of any service (along with news) and by appointing Kanu Nwankwo as their brand ambassador.¹⁷⁵ In addition to these services, StarTimes also broadcasts a multitude of Chinese television shows and the Chinese Super League, dubbed in English or the local language, for free or at a minimal fee.¹⁷⁶ This media engagement is directed at a country that truly does not need the outside assistance (in 2009, Nigerian media had the second highest sustainability rating in Africa), but is directed to counter negative views of China in Nigeria and help shift Nigerian allegiances.¹⁷⁷

Generally, Nigerians view China in an extremely positive light, due in part to the soft power that Nigeria has felt. The majority of Nigerians want to be viewed by the world as, at a minimum, a strong regional power, at least a middle-power and potentially even an African superpower.¹⁷⁸ China is willing to support Nigeria in the attainment of these goals, by providing enablers such as technology, which the United States may not. As one Nigerian official noted, “the Western world is never prepared to transfer technology - but the Chinese do... it is better to have Chinese technology than none at all.”¹⁷⁹ Negative views of the Chinese in Nigeria initially stemmed from their support of the Biafran revolution in the late 1960’s, and have since shifted to

¹⁷⁴ Fei Jiang et al., “The voice of China in Africa: media, communication technologies and image-building,” *Chinese Journal of Communication* Vol. 9, no. 1 (2016): 4, doi:10.1080/17544750.2016.1141615.

¹⁷⁵ Kanu was the captain of Nigeria’s Gold Medal winning team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, who went on to have a storied international career. Lolade Adewuyi, “StarTimes appoints Kanu Nwankwo as brand ambassador,” *Goal.com*, October 30, 2015, accessed January 13, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁷⁶ As of 2015, the entry level StarTimes package cost N600 (<\$3) a month. Free channels include the basic news and sports programming. Bell, “StarTimes acquires Chinese Super League exclusive rights,” *Telco TV News*, July 06, 2016, accessed January 13, 2018, URL in bibliography. “StarTimes’ African expansion plans,” *Digital TV Europe*, September 14, 2017, accessed January 13, 2018, URL in bibliography.

¹⁷⁷ Wu, *China’s State-Led Media Dynasty*, 20.

¹⁷⁸ Adriana Erthal Abdenur et al., *Rising Powers and the African Security Landscape*, CMI report no. R2014:4, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (Bergen, Norway, 2014), 38. Gregory Mthembu-Salter, *Elephants, Ants and Superpowers: Nigeria’s Relations with China*, occasional paper no. 42, China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International Affairs (September 2009), 4.

¹⁷⁹ Sautman, “Friends and Interests,” 80.

resentment over loss of manufacturing jobs due to increased Chinese imports and a perceived lack of Chinese desire to follow through on promises.¹⁸⁰ Overall however, Nigerian perspectives of China remain overwhelmingly positive.¹⁸¹ Perhaps more importantly, Sautman and Hairong's study found that 75.1% of Nigeria university students found China's path of development positive, which aligns with the 70% who saw Chinese involvement in Nigeria as being for altruistic reasons.¹⁸²

Allegiance Shifts Amongst the Focus Nations

Of the five focus nations in this study, four of five showed a minimum of one, two-year period where their voting swung towards China in the General Assembly. Two periods saw the majority of these swings: 2006-07 and 2014-15. The first period, 2006-2007 coincides with China's announcement that they were offering the SEZ program.¹⁸³ Zambia voted against the United States with a greater occurrence than China for four straight years (2005-2008). Zambia concurred with the United States at its lowest percentage of the 21st Century in 2007, on a mere 5.4% of votes.¹⁸⁴ Ethiopia joined Zambia and voted in a similar manner for two years of the same period (2006-07).¹⁸⁵ At the time, both Zambia and Ethiopia were amongst the ten African nations bidding for inclusion in the SEZ program, and the Chinese government was determining

¹⁸⁰ Mthembu-Salter, *Elephants, Ants and Superpowers*, 6, 8, 11. A \$529 million contract awarded to the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to rehabilitate Nigeria's rail system was never completed. Reports were released in 2009 that Nigeria had paid for Chinese military aircraft, but none had been received. Nigerian trade unions blame Chinese imports for the loss of up to 350,000 manufacturing jobs, primarily in the textile industry, once a staple of Nigerian manufacturing.

¹⁸¹ A 2015 Pew Research study on Global Attitudes and Trends found that 70% of Nigerians had a positive view of China. Michael Leslie, "The Dragon Shapes its Image," 168.

¹⁸² Sautman, "African Perspectives," 736-7.

¹⁸³ Deborah Brautigam, "African Shenzhen," 31.

¹⁸⁴ Zambia voted in concurrence with the United States 2005-2008 (difference between Zambia and China) 2005: 12.8%(-1.6%), 2006: 13.8%(-2.3%), 2007: 5.4%(-3.9%), 2008: 16.0%(-4.0%). Following this period, in 2008, Zambia voted with the United States on 16% of votes, equal to China.

¹⁸⁵ Ethiopian concurrence with the United States 2006-2007 (difference between Ethiopia and China) 2006: 15.7%(-14.5%), 2007: 7.8%(-1.5%). In 2008, Ethiopia voted with the United States on 17.1% of votes, 0.6% greater than China.

the overall sustainability of the project.¹⁸⁶ Voting against the United States during this period is a way that these nations could prove their alignment was shifting towards China. After the SEZs were announced in 2008, both countries' voting shifted back to voting with the United States with greater occurrence than China.

During the second period where the focus nations voted against the United States with more regularity than China, 2014-15, Tanzania and Angola stand out. Since 2000, Tanzania has voted with the United States, on average, 4% more than China has. From 2014-15, however, they voted with the United States less than China did.¹⁸⁷ Angola showed an even greater swing; 2014-15 are the only years during the studied period where Angola voted with the United States less than China did.¹⁸⁸ Nigeria joined Tanzania and Angola for a single year (2015) during the period; like Angola, this was the only year in the study where Nigeria voted with the United States less than China.¹⁸⁹ All of these nation's voting shifts coincide with Chinese investment in the respective nations. Nigeria's vote shifted in 2015, immediately following the announcement of China's investment in the Lagos-Calabar railway.¹⁹⁰ The Ethiopian vote shift coincides with the signing of the "African Union - China Deal" at a summit hosted in Ethiopia.¹⁹¹ This deal officially brought OBOR to Africa, and as the most substantial project the African Union has ever signed. It will, if successful, connect the continent from ocean to ocean by road, rail and

¹⁸⁶ Deborah Brautigam, "African Shenzhen," 31.

¹⁸⁷ Tanzania concurred with the United States 2014-2015 (difference between Tanzania and China) 2014: 34.6% (-1.3%), 2015: 28.6% (-1.7%). Following this swing, in 2016, Tanzania voted with the United States on 38.5% of issues, 0.4% greater than China.

¹⁸⁸ Angola concurred with the United States 2014-2015 (difference between Angola and China) 2014: 35.8% (-0.1%), 2015: 20.0% (-10.3%). 2016 saw Angola return to voting with the United States on 45.5% of votes, a 7.5% greater occurrence than China.

¹⁸⁹ Nigerian concurrence with the United States 2015 (difference between Nigeria and China) 2015: 30.1% (-0.2%). In 2016, Nigeria returned to voting with the United States on 47.2% of votes, a 9% greater occurrence than China.

¹⁹⁰ Ligang Song et al., *China's domestic transformation*, 391.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 393. Julia Breuer, "Two Belts, One Road? The role of Africa in China's Belt & Road initiative," *Blickwechsel: Stiftung Asienhaus*, July 2017, 2.

air.¹⁹² For Angola, the voting shift aligns with the global decrease in oil prices, a costly blow to a nation whose top export is oil.¹⁹³

These voting swings represent short periods of time when the Chinese were able to “rent” the alignment of African nations.¹⁹⁴ All of the swings can be tied to economic soft power application by China within each specific nation. The nations choose to vote against the United States because it is in their interest to prove allegiance to China. When they vote with the United States less than China does, it proves to China that they are willing to help offset the United States’ global hegemony. The economic investment required to shift the balance of the African continent away from the United States permanently is untenable for China in the long-term.¹⁹⁵ The United States should watch, however, for an increase in the application of other means of soft power, which parallel an increase in economic soft power.

Three of the five focus nations (Angola, Nigeria, Tanzania) had the opportunity to sit on the UN Security Council with China and the United States during the surveyed period.¹⁹⁶ As previously discussed, during the 21st century, recommendations that do not receive 100% concurrence typically fall into three categories.¹⁹⁷ During the first 11 years of the 21st Century,

¹⁹² Bruer, “Two Belts, One Road?,” 2.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 396.

¹⁹⁴ Research conducted by AidData in 2015, showed a direct correlation between an African nation’s voting in the General Assembly, and the amount of financing provided by China for the social sector (public works and infrastructure) in that country. There was a correlation in aid flow to the economic and production sectors, which was mitigated by level of recipient debt. Axel Dreher et al., *Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa*, working paper no. 15, Aid Data (AidData, October 2015), 18.

¹⁹⁵ As of 2014, Africa accounted for more than 50% of the Chinese government’s outward FDI. The next closest region was Asia at ~30%. As China attempts to cement regional hegemony of the Asia-Pacific, a shift in FDI to countries closer to home is likely. It is unknown whether or not governmental influence in private-led FDI could compensate for this shift. Miria Pigato and Wenxia Tang, *China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context*, report, Investing in Africa Forum, World Bank (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2015), 24.

¹⁹⁶ Angola: 2003-04, 2015-16; Nigeria: 2010-11, 2014-15; Tanzania: 2005-06.

¹⁹⁷ 1) recommendations that the UN begin a mission or issue a mandate, 2) recommendations of sanctions or international action, 3) public condemnation or requests.

when Angola, Nigeria and Tanzania each had an opportunity to sit on the Security Council, their tenures are marked by allegiance to the United States, rather than China.¹⁹⁸ Beginning in 2015 however, there is a marked change; in seven of eight occasions where China varied from the United States, the sitting focus country voted alongside China. In eight of nine instances where China chose to abstain, a minimum of one focus nation joined them. This included votes on extremely varied topics, ranging from S/2016/2085 that would have extended an arms embargo on South Sudan to S/Res/2220, aimed at strengthening coordination and action against the proliferation of small arms.¹⁹⁹ This swing, where the focus nations now side with China on nearly ninety percent of issues, is directly attributable to the increase in China's soft power in those countries during the 21st century. Both Angola and Nigeria, who sat on the Security Council during that time period, depend on Chinese support to continue their rise in power.

What can the United States Do?

To this point, this essay has sought to: 1) Provide the basics of Balance of Power theory. 2) Discuss the basics of soft power while examining generalities of Chinese soft power application in Africa. 3) Conduct a detailed examination of the myriad and varied Chinese application of soft power in five focus nations. 4) Examine trends and changes in African (particularly focus nation) voting within the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council that indicate a shift in allegiances. This information all indicates that as China's power continues growing, her ambitions in Africa (including resources, influence and allegiances) will

¹⁹⁸ China did not receive focus nation support in the following abstentions: (2004 - Angola) S/Res/1556 - Demand Sudan stop arming militias; S/Res/1559 - Express support for elections in Lebanon; S/Res/1564 - Threaten Sudan with Sanctions. (2005-06 - Tanzania) S/Res/1591 - Threaten sanctions on parties impeding peace in Darfur; S/Res/1593 - Refer Darfur to the ICC; S/Res/1672 - Impose sanctions on Sudanese leadership; S/Res/1680 - Force Syria to delineate their border with Lebanon; S/Res/1706 - Expand UN Mandate in Sudan.

¹⁹⁹ The only instance where China did not have focus nation support was S/Res/2304, extending the UN Mission in South Sudan. China, Egypt and Russia abstained, Angola voted in favor.

continue to wax as well. This is an uncomfortable position for the United States, but one that she has brought upon herself.

How America Got Here

During the Cold War, America encouraged Chinese involvement in Africa, as a means of offsetting the Soviet Union's influence there. In 1982, former President Nixon recommended to President Regan "I believe it is very much in our interest to encourage the Chinese to play a greater role in the third world. The more successful they are, the less successful the Soviet Union will be...."²⁰⁰ During the 21st Century, as China continued to increase her influence and soft power application in Africa, American influence decreased due to her focus elsewhere. By 2003, it was no longer a given that the majority of African nations would support the United States. When the Bush administration was building its coalition to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the African continent was split down the middle in its support; nations including Angola and Ethiopia joined the 'coalition of the willing' whereas Nigeria and Tanzania were among the nations who strongly criticized the operation.²⁰¹ American influence continues to wane. As the century has progressed, investors shied away, many deeming the continent too "unattractive or unstable."²⁰² Additionally, as African nations such as Nigeria and South Africa have grown into middle-powers, the United States is uncomfortable with reinforcing any fundamental shifts in the balance that bolster multipolarity.²⁰³ This unwillingness to recognize Africa's growing powers, and operate in a multipolar world, places the United States in a

²⁰⁰ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (London, England: Penguin Books, 2012), 393.

²⁰¹ Beth Elise Whitaker, "Soft balancing among weak states? Evidence from Africa," *International Affairs* 86, no. 5 (September 27, 2010):1112, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00931.x.

²⁰² Rudolf Du Plessis, "Trump and Africa: Making China great again," South African Institute of International Affairs, February 22, 2017, accessed January 10, 2018, URL in bibliography.

²⁰³ Andrew Cooper. *The Recalibration of Middle Powers under Conditions of Stress and Opportunity*, policy insights no. 09, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (March 2015), 2.

diminished position during negotiations, leading to an inability to create sustainable, long-term solutions.²⁰⁴

A Way Ahead

Currently, the United States does not have an executable plan to regain allegiances in Africa. If, after President Obama's "Pivot to the Pacific," 80% of the time at National Security Council meetings was still spent on the Middle East, one has to wonder how much time was spent on Africa?²⁰⁵ Africa's location, resources and support make it strategically important to the United States; it's time for America to recognize that importance and make a concerted effort to improve relations before time runs out.²⁰⁶ To counter China's rising influence in Africa, one option for the United States is to follow the Jensen Foreign Relations Model. By doing so, the United States can increase the success of their engagements in Africa by cohesively linking them to campaigning, strategy, policy and the national motivation behind them all.²⁰⁷ China has already used this model successfully, now the United States should as well.

When utilizing the Jensen model, the root of all foreign policy and engagements is the Thucydidean concept of motivation, stemming from either fear, honor or interest.²⁰⁸ A clear understanding of motivation will allow a country to focus their interactions with another country or region, otherwise interactions will be ineffectual due to a dispersion of efforts. China's

²⁰⁴ Examples of this unwillingness to recognize the middle powers include the deliberations on renewal of AGOA in 2015. Though AGOA was ultimately renewed until 2025, it came close to failing due to South Africa's inclusion. Many saw South Africa as creating barriers to American trade, due to its advanced economy and trade networks.

²⁰⁵ Allison, *Destined for war*, 8.

²⁰⁶ Africa's strategic location is highlighted by current United States operations in the War on Terror. 27 of 56 African Nations (48.2%) have U.S. military activity ongoing in them. This constitutes 35.5% of the total countries world-wide who are involved in this effort. 11 African countries are receiving counterterrorism training from the United States and serving as basing locations, while an additional 16 serve as basing locations or receive training. American combat troops are on the ground in four of those countries (Libya, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya.) *Current United States Counterterror War Locations*, map, Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (Providence, RI: Brown University, 2018).

²⁰⁷ Ben Jensen, "4112: The National Security Process" (seminar, August 25, 2017).

²⁰⁸ Allison, *Destined for war*, 39.

motivations in Africa are clear; they are primarily motivated by their interests and secondarily by fear. African allegiances guarantee China access to important energy reserves and rare minerals (interest).²⁰⁹ The ports and access in Africa, opened up by OBOR, help allay the Chinese fear of being choked off by an enemy.²¹⁰ The “Maritime Silk Road” effectively extends the Chinese coastline all the way to Europe and Africa, drastically decreasing the possibility that China’s enemies could enforce an effective blockade and strangle China into submission.²¹¹ This author would argue that were America to truly examine her motivations, the primary motivation for engagement in Africa would be honor. The United States believes that its mission is to spread democracy and freedom to the world, and has built a world order around the ideals of democracy and capitalism.²¹² America has thought this way since the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who said it is America’s duty to see that the world was “freed from their chains.”²¹³ Additionally, the United States has enjoyed its position of influence atop the balance of power for more than seven decades. If the balance of power in the continent shifts, Africa will be one of the fulcrums that shift the United States out of that position of power, threatening her honor.

Once motivations have been determined, leadership must create policy, or the conversion of national motivations into “a prioritized agenda for action.”²¹⁴ China has effectively done so, publishing their *Africa Policy* in 2006.²¹⁵ This document, with its tenets of non-interference,

²⁰⁹ Pillsbury, *The hundred-year marathon*, 161.

²¹⁰ Ibid, 143.

²¹¹ Ibid, 143-4.

²¹² G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (Jan. & feb. 2008): accessed January 09, 2018.

²¹³ Allison, *Destined for war*, 93.

²¹⁴ Philip Zelikow, “Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, no. 4, Spring 1994, 162. Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Security Interests in the 21st Century,” in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, vol. 5 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 14.

²¹⁵ People’s Republic of China, *China’s Africa Policy*, August 20, 2006, URL in bibliography.

mutual assistance and cooperation, are a codification of Chinese engagements with Africa since 1949. African nations know this policy and trust that China will abide by it, strengthening their relations and positively impacting their engagements. The United States does not have a similar policy; the closest thing that America has is the *National Security Strategy*, most recently issued on December 18, 2017.²¹⁶ The *National Security Strategy* speaks in generalities, which align with America's motivation of honor, including "Promote American Prosperity," "Preserve Peace Through Strength" and "Advance American Interest."²¹⁷ Each of these topics has subcategories that, again, beat the drum of American greatness. The final section of the *National Security Strategy* does discuss Africa, but only in the broadest of terms. Instead of using terms like non-interference, which resonate with Africans, the *National Security Strategy* talks of reform and reducing instability, ideas that most African leaders see as demeaning.²¹⁸

In the Jensen model, policy, in turn, drives strategy, or a "set of ideas of the ways to employ the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion" allowing a nation to achieve objectives at a higher level.²¹⁹ This is one area where the United States does, at least theoretically, outperform China. In 2012, the America published the *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*. This twelve page document outlines how the United States will "translate their words into action."²²⁰ China does not have a (published) corresponding strategy, instead basing all of their actions on the ideals of South-South (mutual cooperation). In some ways, however, the Chinese strategy resonates more with Africa. The *U.S. Strategy* does not dive into

²¹⁶ United States of America, President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: The White House, 2017).

²¹⁷ Ibid, v-vi.

²¹⁸ Sautman, "Friends and Interests," 94.

²¹⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* (Arlington, VA:U.S. Department of Defense, 2017), I-13.

²²⁰ United States, President (2009-2017: Obama), *U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington DC: The White House, 2012), 1.

specifics at all. Rather, it focuses on broad generalities and reads (in the slightly softer terms of the Obama presidency) much like the *National Security Strategy*. It speaks to “Four Pillars” of strategy: 1) Strengthen Democratic Institutions, 2) Spur Economic Growth, Trade and Investment, 3) Advance Peace and Security and 4) Promote Opportunity and Development. Many Africans may choose to view this as America, yet again, imposing her will on less powerful states. Nowhere is synchronization of effort visible; there are no mentions of the American military facilitating training while the Department of State negotiates for technology and arms sales and the Department of Energy works with the Corps of Engineers to develop hydroelectric power. China’s strategy of cooperation infers synchronization, and they have practiced what they preach. African nations know implicitly that if China offers assistance, it will be synchronized across the full spectrum of national power.

Campaigning, the link between the tactical employment of men and material and national strategic objectives, is the final level before engagements. A continent such as Africa, with its breadth of cultures, traditions and nationalities, requires detailed campaign plans and assessment to promote unity of effort, minimize waste and accurately assess results. Campaign planners use theories such as operational art to think broadly, anticipate issues, organize their thoughts, envision the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state, then plan, prepare, execute and assess.²²¹ Again, as in analysis of motivations and creation of policy, Chinese efforts make those of the United States look paltry. Throughout this document, examples of Chinese soft power application have been identified, which were revealed at FOCAC. Every three years, when FOCAC meets, one of the first items of business is a review of how successful the action plan outlined at the prior meeting was. Then, a detailed action plan is published that covers the

²²¹ Chairman, *Joint Publication 3-0*, II-13.

actions China and each African nation will take over the next three-year period. This action plan incorporates modifications (recommended by the members) to any lines of operation that proved less successful than desired over the previous triennial period. This planning is supervised and subsequently executed under the auspices of Africa's most important governmental organization, the African Union, lending legitimacy to the effort. In my research for this article, I have found no similar identification of a campaign, or action plan, from the United States. This lack of planning lends itself to Africa becoming merely a "destination for aid and charity work," and not the strategically important region that it is.²²²

The final step of cohesive foreign relations is to ensure quality engagements. In foreign relations, engagements are where the metal meets the meat, the actual meetings between the executors of policy. When these executors have a clear understanding of the decisions made by senior leaders and how those decisions link cohesively from motivation to campaigning, they may conduct successful engagements, assess results and make quality recommendations in preparation for future engagements.

Chinese engagements in Africa are successful because they are driven by motivations and policy, and are shaped by two distinct influences. The first influence is China's experience as an aid recipient.²²³ During its nascent years, China was the recipient of aid from both Japan and the West, and Chinese leaders learned how to make this aid part of their internal development plan. Today, when China engages with an African state, they ensure that everything they are offering fits within the plan, and is utilized wisely.²²⁴ The second influence is China's background as a

²²² Grant T. Harris, *Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security*, report, Africa Center, Atlantic Council (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, May 2017). 25.

²²³ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 18.

²²⁴ Wise use does not necessarily mean that the aid gets to its intended recipient. As discussed in the focus on Zambia, China understands that corruption will occur. Corruption that helps satiate Chinese motivations is tolerated.

developmental state.²²⁵ As a developmental state, China utilized state policies to accelerate growth.²²⁶ In engagements with African nations today, this means knowing what benefits they will expect the African nations to provide to the local nationals who provide assistance, as well as what benefits they are prepared to offer Chinese corporations who partner.²²⁷ These influences resonate with African audiences, who hope that their rise will one day mirror China's. As the president of the African Development Bank said of the Chinese in 2006, "we can learn from them how to organize our trade policy, to move from low to middle income status, to educate our children."²²⁸

American engagements, in contrast with those of China, are excellent at achieving localized success without any strategic impact. While the United States operated at a \$7.9 billion trade deficit with Africa in 2016, 61% of respondents to a survey on American policies in Africa still said that the United States is arrogant and pushy in its interactions with other countries.²²⁹ Additionally, whereas the Chinese representatives at an engagement are more often than not empowered to make decisions that can be followed through with, on the spot, American representatives have to wade through the nebulous world of the United States government to ensure that a decision is actually followed up on. This can be alleviated with proper, prior, planning where the representatives cover what will be discussed during the engagement, and bring enablers and/or decision makers with them as required.

²²⁵ Deborah Brautigam, *The dragons gift*, 18.

²²⁶ *Ibid*, 80.

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 98. Benefits extended by the African nation being invested in typically include reduced/removed tariffs, reduced prices on rents and access to infrastructure. The Chinese government will typically offer reimbursement of relocation cost, tax rebates and favorable consideration of low-interest loans from state-run banks.

²²⁸ ²²⁸ Sautman, "Friends and Interests," 80.

²²⁹ Agoa.info. Whitaker, "Soft balancing among weak states?," 1123.

Throughout a successful foreign relations campaign, based on the Jensen model, there must be feedback loops. These loops help decision makers assess the effectiveness of the entire model, from policy through engagement.²³⁰ Feedback from engagements can actually change policy, if the feedback loop is effective.²³¹

Much as she has in Afghanistan on numerous occasions, America needs to take a step back and look at her plans for Africa. This needs to occur in the very near future, before it is too late. This comprehensive review should start at the motivation level, and result in a clear-cut policy and strategy. If executed properly, this strategy can lead to a campaign plan that the boots (and oxfords) on the ground in Africa can execute and help stem the tide of African allegiances shifting towards China. If not, Africa will play a role whenever China decides that the time has come to shift America from her position atop the balance of power.

Conclusion

In 2015, Lloyd Thrall stated, “China’s growing presence in Africa is not a strategic threat to U.S. interests requiring bilateral competition with Beijing.”²³² China’s desires to sway allegiances towards herself were and still are manifestly clear. Her goal of swaying those allegiances permanently is becoming more and more achievable. Data show that, for now, China can only shift allegiances for short periods of time. Continued unchecked, application of soft power will allow China to effect permanent allegiance shifts. The United States’ position of global hegemony is safe for now; the Balance of Power has not moved. Corrective action, in the form of an executable foreign relations plan of action can keep it that way.

²³⁰ Examples of a strategy review changing policy include the 2009 and 2017 strategic reviews of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In both cases, a strategic review of Afghanistan led to national policy changes by Presidents Obama and Trump (respectively.)

²³¹ An example is President Trump’s policy shift in 2017 on kinetic engagements in Afghanistan, enabling lower level commanders to approve kinetic strikes and increasing the support for kinetic strikes at the tactical unit level.

²³² Lloyd Thrall, *Chinas expanding African relations*, 3.

Appendix A: UN General Assembly Voting Comparison Between Focus Nations, China and the United States

Country	% w/U.S.	China %w/U.S.	Difference
2000			
Angola	0.479166667	0.25	0.229166667
Ethiopia	0.372881356	0.25	0.122881356
Nigeria	0.333333333	0.25	0.083333333
Tanzania	0.338709677	0.25	0.088709677
Zambia	0.344262295	0.25	0.094262295
Average Difference			0.123670666
2001			
Angola	0.254545455	0.172413793	0.082131661
Ethiopia	0.242424242	0.172413793	0.070010449
Nigeria	0.212121212	0.172413793	0.039707419
Tanzania	0.223880597	0.172413793	0.051466804
Zambia	0.203125	0.172413793	0.030711207
Average Difference			0.054805508
2002			
Angola	0.173913043	0.175675676	-0.001762632
Ethiopia	0.196969697	0.175675676	0.021294021
Nigeria	0.265060241	0.175675676	0.089384565
Tanzania	0.233766234	0.175675676	0.058090558
Zambia	0.223684211	0.175675676	0.048008535
Average Difference			0.043003009
2003			
Angola	0.225352113	0.131578947	0.093773165
Ethiopia	0.194805195	0.131578947	0.063226247
Nigeria	0.197530864	0.131578947	0.065951917
Tanzania	0.2	0.131578947	0.068421053
Zambia	0.17721519	0.131578947	0.045636243
Average Difference			0.067401725
2004			
Angola	0.173076923	0.088235294	0.084841629
Ethiopia	0.137931034	0.088235294	0.04969574
Nigeria	0.148648649	0.088235294	0.060413355
Tanzania	0.119402985	0.088235294	0.031167691
Zambia	0.126760563	0.088235294	0.038525269
Average Difference			0.052928737

2005			
Angola	0.2	0.12987013	0.07012987
Ethiopia	0.140625	0.12987013	0.01075487
Nigeria	0.202380952	0.12987013	0.072510823
Tanzania	0.202380952	0.12987013	0.072510823
Zambia	0.128205128	0.12987013	-0.001665002
Average Difference			0.044848277
2006			
Angola	0.175	0.16091954	0.01408046
Ethiopia	0.015714286	0.16091954	-0.145205255
Nigeria	0.168674699	0.16091954	0.007755159
Tanzania	0.197368421	0.16091954	0.036448881
Zambia	0.137931034	0.16091954	-0.022988506
Average Difference			-0.021981852
2007			
Angola	0.111111111	0.093333333	0.017777778
Ethiopia	0.078125	0.093333333	-0.015208333
Nigeria	0.105263158	0.093333333	0.011929825
Tanzania	0.092105263	0.093333333	-0.00122807
Zambia	0.054054054	0.093333333	-0.039279279
Average Difference			-0.005201616
2008			
Angola	0.166666667	0.164556962	0.002109705
Ethiopia	0.171052632	0.164556962	0.00649567
Nigeria	0.173333333	0.164556962	0.008776371
Tanzania	0.180555556	0.164556962	0.015998594
Zambia	0.160493827	0.164556962	-0.004063135
Average Difference			0.005863441
2009			
Angola	0.276923077	0.272727273	0.004195804
Ethiopia	0.085714286	0.272727273	-0.187012987
Nigeria	0.3	0.272727273	0.027272727
Tanzania	0.323076923	0.272727273	0.05034965
Zambia	0.287878788	0.272727273	0.015151515
Average Difference			-0.018008658
2010			
Angola	0.306451613	0.298507463	0.00794415
Ethiopia	0.327868852	0.298507463	0.02936139
Nigeria	0.333333333	0.298507463	0.034825871

Tanzania	0.365079365	0.298507463	0.066571902
Zambia	0.333333333	0.298507463	0.034825871
Average Difference			0.034705837
2011			
Angola	0.441176471	0.397260274	0.043916197
Ethiopia	0.474358974	0.397260274	0.0770987
Nigeria	0.492307692	0.397260274	0.095047418
Tanzania	0.513888889	0.397260274	0.116628615
Zambia	0.394736842	0.397260274	-0.002523432
Average Difference			0.0660335
2012			
Angola	0.308823529	0.303030303	0.005793226
Ethiopia	0.357142857	0.303030303	0.054112554
Nigeria	0.369863014	0.303030303	0.066832711
Tanzania	0.356164384	0.303030303	0.053134081
Zambia	0.369863014	0.303030303	0.066832711
Average Difference			0.049341056
2013			
Angola	0.402597403	0.4	0.002597403
Ethiopia	0.407894737	0.4	0.007894737
Nigeria	0.425	0.4	0.025
Tanzania	0.419753086	0.4	0.019753086
Zambia	0.386666667	0.4	-0.013333333
Average Difference			0.008382379
2014			
Angola	0.358024691	0.358974359	-0.000949668
Ethiopia	0.379746835	0.358974359	0.020772476
Nigeria	0.382716049	0.358974359	0.02374169
Tanzania	0.346153846	0.358974359	-0.012820513
Zambia	0.375	0.358974359	0.016025641
Average Difference			0.009353925
2015			
Angola	0.2	0.303030303	-0.103030303
Ethiopia	0.314285714	0.303030303	0.011255411
Nigeria	0.301369863	0.303030303	-0.00166044
Tanzania	0.285714286	0.303030303	-0.017316017
Zambia	0.347222222	0.303030303	0.044191919
Average Difference			-0.013311886
2016			

Angola	0.455555556	0.380952381	0.074603175
Ethiopia	0.476744186	0.380952381	0.095791805
Nigeria	0.471910112	0.380952381	0.090957731
Tanzania	0.384615385	0.380952381	0.003663004
Zambia	0.471264368	0.380952381	0.090311987
Average Difference			0.07106554

Appendix B: UN Security Council, Non-Unanimous Votes (Due to Africa/China/United States) 2000-2016

Year	Number	Topic	Classification*	For	Against	Abstain
2000	S/Res/1301	UNMIS Western Sahara	1		Namibia	Mali
2000	S/Res/1306	Sanctions Sierra Leone	2			Mali
2000	S/Res/1322	Condemn events in Jerusalem	4			U.S.
2000	S/Res/1333	Monitor sanctions on Taliban	2			China
2001	S/2001/270	Israel	4		U.S.	
2001	S/2001/1100	Israel	4		U.S.	
2001	S/Res/1372	End sanctions against Sudan	2			U.S.
2002	S/2002/712	Extend Mandate in Bosnia	1		U.S.	
2002	S/2002/1385	Israel	4		U.S.	
2002	S/Res/1435	Demand end to Israeli actions in Ramallah	4			U.S.
2003	S/2003/891	Israel	4		U.S.	
2003	S/2003/980	Israel	4		U.S.	
2003	S/Res/1506	Lift sanctions against Libya	2			U.S.
2004	S/2004/240	Israel	4		U.S.	
2004	S/2004/783	Israel	4		U.S.	
2004	S/Res/1544	Demand Israel stop demolishing Palestinian homes	4			U.S.
2004	S/Res/1556	Demand Sudan stop arming militias	2			China
2004	S/Res/1559	Support elections in Lebanon	2			China, Algeria
2004	S/Res/1564	Threaten Sudan with sanctions	2			China, Algeria
2005	S/Res/1591	Threaten sanctions on parties interfering in Darfur	2			China, South Africa
2005	S/Res/1593	Refer Darfur to the ICC	2			U.S., China, Algeria
2006	S/2006/508	Israel	4		U.S.	
2006	S/2006/878	Israel	4		U.S.	
2006	S/Res/1672	Impose sanctions on Sudan	2			China

2006	S/Res/1680	Demand Syria delineate its border with Lebanon	5			China
2006	S/Res/1706	Expand UN Mandate in Sudan	1			China
2007	S/2007/14	Condemn Myanmar	3		China	
2007	S/Res/1757	Establish special tribunal for Lebanon	2			China, South Africa
2008	S/2008/447	Express concern over Zimbabwe's elections	3		China, Russia	
2008	S/Res/1828	Acclaim report on Sudan	3			U.S.
2008	S/Res/1850	Reaffirm Annapolis Mid-East peace agreements	3			Libya
2008	S/Res/1860	Call for an immediate Gaza cease fire	4			U.S.
2009	S/Res/1970	Impose sanctions on Eritrea	2		Libya	China
2010	S/Res/1945	Extend monitoring of sanctions on Sudan	2			China
2011	S/Res/1973	Establishment of no-fly zone in Libya	1			China
2011	S/2011/24	Condemn Israeli settlements in the West Bank	4		U.S.	
2011	S/2011/612	Condemn Syrian crackdown on protestors	5		China, Russia	South Africa
2011	S/Res/2023	Impose sanctions on Eritrea	2			China
2012	S/2012/77	Condemn the Syrian government's use of force	5		China, Russia	
2012	S/2012/538	Establishment of UNMIS Syria	5		China, Russia	South Africa
2012	S/Res/2016	Sanction regimes violating human rights of children	2			China
2014	S/2014/189	Ignore Crimean referendum	3		Russia	China
2014	S/2014/348	Refer Syria to the ICC	5		China, Russia	
2014	S/2014/916	Reaffirm state of Palestine	4	China, Chad	U.S.	Nigeria, Rwanda
2015	S/Res/2220	Strengthen coordination and action against small-arms proliferation	3			China, Angola, Chad, Nigeria

2015	S/2015/508	Commemorate anniversary Bosnian genocide	3		Russia	China, Angola, Nigeria
2015	S/2015/562	Establish war crimes tribunal on Malaysian Airlines crash in Ukraine	3		Russia	China, Angola
2016	S/Res/2269	Establish special prosecutor for ICC	3	China		Russia, Angola, Egypt, Senegal
2016	S/Res/2272	Reject UN delegations from countries who don't prosecute sexual predators	3			Egypt
2016	S/Res/2285	Extend UNMIS in Western Sahara	1			Angola
2016	S/Res/2303	Establish police mission in Burundi	1			China, Angola, Egypt
2016	S/Res/2304	Extend UNMIS South Sudan	1			Russia, China, Egypt
2016	S/Res/2016	Strengthen non-proliferation	3			Egypt
2016	S/2016/846	Establishment of no-fly zone in Syria	5		Russia	China, Angola
2016	S/2016/847	Establishment of no-fly zone in Syria	5	Russia, China, Egypt	U.S., Senegal	Angola
2016	S/Res/2317	Impose embargo on Somalia and Eritrea	2			China, Angola, Egypt
2016	S/2016/1026	Call for Syrian cease fire	5		China, Russia	Angola
2016	S/2016/1085	Impose arms embargo on South Sudan	2			China, Angola, Egypt, Senegal
2016	S/2016/2334	Call to end Israeli settlements in the West Bank	4			U.S.

* Classifications are abbreviated: 1) recommendations that the UN begin a mission or issue a mandate, 2) recommendations of sanctions or international action, 3) public condemnation or requests, 4) Israel specific, 5) Syria specific

** Focus nations are bolded for emphasis by the author

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