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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Recommendation for a Marine Corps Consolidated Casualty Replacement Concept to
Regenerate the Force**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Recommendation for a Marine Corps Consolidated Casualty Replacement Concept to Regenerate the Force.

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Thesis: In order for the Marine Corps to succeed in the next near-peer global conflict, it must establish a consolidated casualty replacement concept that adequately guides personnel on the handling of historical manpower concerns of procurement, cohesion, personnel system types and training of its casualty replacement force.

Discussion: The United States Marine Corps prides itself on being the force that is most ready when all others are not. They advertise slogans such as “America’s 911 Force” and the “First to Fight.” As past conflicts like WWI, WWII, and Korea emerge, the Corps like most other services has remained in a reactive sequence of having to mobilize large numbers of military personnel from a contracted peacetime force while actively participating in open conflict, taking sizable casualties and looking for military and civilian combat replacements all at the same time. As a “shock troop force” known for “mission accomplishment” and a “can’t afford to lose ethos” the Marines, out of all other services must have a “bench ready” replacement force that is fluid, cohesive, trained, ready and equipped to maintain continual pressure during a long war of attrition in a high intensity environment.

There are four factors that need addressing to ensure that the Marines and Sailors that initially go forth at a moment’s notice are provided the best trained and ready replacements for overall success in combat and exclusively take advantage of the sacrifices many will have to make to God, Country, and Corps at the start of a near-peer confrontation. This notion distills down to one main goal, which is to provide a pace and tempo of force regeneration/replacement that will outpace a near-peer opponent during the early phases of a global conflict. It is imperative that the Marine Corps implement a consolidated casualty replacement concept/policy/process prior to the beginning of the next global conflict to ensure that the initial tempo, flow, and pressure of forces remains constantly engaged with the enemy, allowing the enemy no time to replace the large number of casualties they will suffer in the initial assault phase. This will be a primary factor in how the rest of the war plays out as the concept focuses on the assumption that if you can overtake your opponent in the early phases of the war through reduction of operational pauses associated with casualty replacement; you limit the enemy’s ability to regenerate their forces which decreases personnel casualties in the long run and shortens the duration of the conflict.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps should integrate the following factors into one casualty replacement concept: **1.) PROCUREMENT 2.) COHESION 3.) COMBAT REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS 4.) TRAINING.** In doing so, the Marine Corps is establishing a foundation that allows the casualty replacement concepts, procedures, and techniques to be taught and consolidated in one location. This instruction, as shaping tool, will assist planners in affecting operational outcomes.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT

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INTRODUCTION

The Marine Corps currently advertises itself as the organization that is most ready when all others are not. Yet, presently it does not have a consolidated casualty replacement concept that provides service level instruction on procedures, techniques and conceptual aspects of force regeneration and their connection to operational planning. Per the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC), the corps' central concern for the future is that "The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet the demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime domain." While true, the looming challenge is the effects that each of those will have on manpower in a near-peer conflict where overwhelming enemy fire effects aided by rifle scopes, chemical weapons, global positioning satellite tracking, tactical nukes, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and smart bombs will have upon the Marine Corps' all-volunteer force during the initial phases of a global conflict.

As an organization that preaches readiness at all levels, it is important to understand that the Corps is unprepared to meet the combat replacement demands of a near-peer conflict if it were to occur today. Future combat outlooks suggest combat losses in a near-peer conventional war, which could quickly shift to a nuclear conflict, will be massive, sudden, and highly diverse in nature, consequence, and degree of disruption to the organizational structure of troops.¹ Recent studies on initial personnel losses in a near-peer nuclear war from all types of weapons assume 60 to 70 percent losses during the initial phases of conflict² Threats such as lack of air superiority, tactical nukes, and chemical weapons will easily disrupt combat effectiveness causing immediate assistance and replacement of personnel on a scale that will involve battalion,

regimental, and possibly full divisions that will need to be replaced immediately. As it stands currently, the Marine Corps' mobilization policy commits its active duty forces first to combat operations.³ If the previous statistic is correct, then such a policy will result in the wholesale elimination of the active duty force in the initial stages of a near-peer conflict. Hence, it will be the combat replacement, or "bench ready," forces of, the Ready Reserves, Standby Reserves, Retired Reserves, and newly procured civilians that will have to quickly transition into the fight after the initial sacrifices. In order for these replacements to take advantage of any successes of the initial engagements, the Marine Corps, "America's 911 Force," will have to have a casualty replacement concept in place that adequately guides its personnel on the handling of historical manpower concerns of procurement, cohesion, system types and training of its combat replacement force.

Marine Corps Order 3000.19b provides the most up to date USMC service order supporting the overarching US government guidance on mobilization.⁴ Per the policy, this order supports contingency planning, crisis action planning, and sustained operations leading to augmentation and/or reinforcement of the active component (AC) of the United States Marine Corps. Since, this is the primary mobilization guidance provided to Marine Corps forces globally, it is important that appendix B of this order (Individual Casualty Replacements and Unit Replacements methodology), remain the base of evaluation because this is the sole Marine Corps service level casualty replacement concept provided if a near-peer conflict were to occur today. This evaluation will hopefully promote conversation among readers and decision makers to address the various advantages and disadvantages of this appendix and shift their efforts towards expanding it into a casualty replacement concept that will teach and instruct on the

procedures, techniques and conceptual aspects of force regeneration and their connection to operational planning.

MANPOWER PROCUREMENT

In keeping with the consistency of the themed message in this document, it is important to first point out that the Marine Corps' current concept/methodology does not guide or teach personnel in the processes and procedures for dealing with the manpower concerns of force regeneration and casualty replacement. The ability to win wars depends on the nation's resolve to mobilize sufficient manpower to defeat its enemies.⁵ Hence, when assessing the topic of manpower procurement, the Marine Corps, as America's initial contact force, cannot afford to do the math calculations and in stride preparation of administrative and operational planning while expanding infrastructure to support massive numbers of newly procured personnel once a near-peer conflict occurs.

Within the United States, there has continuously been a long-standing debate as to how manpower forces develop during times of war. From 1775-1898 for the most part, the United States relied upon volunteers to provide a fighting force during times of conflict. Major, conventional wars during those periods included the Revolution, War of 1812, Mexican war, Civil War, and the Spanish American War.⁶ However, as wars erupted into the 21st century the trend shifted towards conscription, but there were various reasons for this. In the Civil War, militia drafts for local defense were rarely enforced. In fact, Congress rejected the proposed plan, i.e. the "Knox Plan" of 1790. During the Civil War, there was no need to enact conscription until further into the war due to manpower quotas being met, but exclusion was the big concern. In an effort to stimulate voluntarism conscription became the choice with violence

often used to sway citizens. Today's selective service is still a requirement but it is stagnant in practice, acceptance of the status quo and is not a favorable option for raising U.S. forces. Regardless of the choice of procurement, the Marine Corps must have a prepared casualty replacement concept that addresses the many logistical, operational and training concerns of manpower procurement during times of national emergency. In the 20th century, Congress used conscription was during times of conflict, but the context for that decision an important aspect in understanding why the Marine Corps must make greater efforts to conceptually plan for expansion of its forces prior to a near-peer conflict occurring in the 21st century.

PRACTICES

WWI

Past use during WWI, WWII, and Korea in regard to conscription and wartime recruiting have caused concern in the United States' present all-volunteer force's ability to fight and win against a near-peer competitor. From the start of WWI, the United States had too small a force to be sent overseas and immediately engage in combat to support British and French troops. The prewar Army, with regiments of 1,000 or 1,200 men and companies of about 100 men, did not fit into the European fighting structure which had regiments approximately at 2,800 officers and enlisted men. The companies contained as many as 264 men. General Pershing, before sailing for France, approved a new organizational plan that increased the size of units calling for more replacements in the form of raw recruits. The new divisions created contained more than 28,000 men practically double the French and German divisions.⁷ However America's entrance into the war stalled as the factors of recruiting, drafting, training and equipping the force took time. Although, US participation in WWI lasted from 1917-1918 some 2,810,296 or 60 percent of the

total 4,734,991 service members were draftees that mobilized to fight primarily on the Western Front.⁸

During this period the Entente powers of France and Britain needed immediate replacements, but Americans were reluctant to become a replacement depot for them.⁹ These appeals, at times almost demands, continued on both sides of the ocean until the tide of the war turned against the Germans.¹⁰ By 20 October 1917, the First US division, under the command of their own officers, attached for training purposes to French regiments. By 31 December 1917, there were 176,655 American troops in France, but no American troops other than those of the 1st Division had been in combat, a delay which was displeasing to the British and French.¹¹

Although, the US only contributed fighting for the one year, they lost close to 7 percent of the force in that 12 month period with casualty statistics that reflected 320,518 injured or killed personnel, most of which occurred in the summer and fall of 1918.¹² The Marine Corps, the smallest of the four services, went from a force of 13,725 active duty personnel in April 1917 to 63,714 Marines by November 1918.¹³ Some 18 percent or 11,612 Marines (3,620 KIA and 7992 wounded), were either killed or wounded during this period.¹⁴ From August to October 1918, the Marine Corps volunteerism process temporarily stopped. Even though, some 78 percent of the Corps' manpower prior to this shift came from voluntary service. This is important because it shows that irrespective of the branch of service, nationwide recruiters were meeting their quotas. Every branch of the military felt the effects of President Wilson and Congress' decision to legislate conscription in 1917 rather than rely on voluntary enlistments.

However, the reason for this decision was to prevent indiscriminate voluntarism and avoid difficulties with long-term recruiting such as the British experienced, not because there was a shortage of volunteers in the following months after the US declared war.¹⁵ The decision

focused on maintaining a quality equitable spread of various classes of men in the industrial workforce. Selective Service went into effect 18 May 1917 and approached registration differently than was the case during the Civil War period. The right to volunteer was taken away and the state was authorized to decide which citizen had the “right and duty” to serve. The WWI draft was voluntary and orderly but did have 171,000 evaders, 360,000 deserters who never responded to their induction orders and 64,693 conscientious objectors.¹⁶ When the war ended, the US went back to a peacetime force that meant conscription also ended.¹⁷ However, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would pull it off the shelf again with threats of war against Germany and Japan in 1940.

WWII

In WWII, the US joined the war from 1941-1945 after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. The US attempted to stay neutral during the war when it began in September of 1939. Yet, by the 1940's the nation began to understand that its combined numbers of active duty and National Guard forces would not be enough to meet manpower demands if they had to enter the war. Surprisingly, public opinion at the time had shifted in favor of conscription with Gallup polls indicating public sentiment regarding compulsory military training had changed from 61 percent against, in October 1939, to 64 percent in favor, in July 1940.¹⁸ This change in public opinion along with President Roosevelt's message of equal sacrifice, civilian political influence from actors like Greenville Clark, Henry L. Stimson and Robert P. Patterson, led to a peacetime conscription bill that passed one year and three months prior to Japan's attack on Hawaii. During the period, some 16,112,566 service members would enlist in the armed forces.¹⁹ Surprisingly, 63 percent of the total force in that period or 10,110,104 service members were also individuals that did not choose to join the military of their own accord.²⁰ Similarly, over a four

year period, the US again sustained injured and killed casualty statistics that remained around 7 percent of the force or some 1,076,245 service members.²¹

The Marine Corps comprised 5 percent of the 16 million men and women serving in the armed forces at the time but they suffered 10 percent of the nation's combat casualty losses.²² This is most likely associated with their large use in the Pacific as an amphibious assault force and an initial shock force around the globe. During the four year period of WWII, the Marine Corps suffered 86,940 casualties (19,733 KIA, 67,207 wounded).²³ They expanded from a force of 65,881 personnel to a force of 485,433 by wars end.²⁴ Some 18 percent of the Marine Corps' total force became casualties of the war and a major portion of these losses replenished due to conscription efforts. These efforts strongly assisted the Marine Corps as some 46 percent of Marine Corps structure (224,000 Marines), came from draftees inducted into the Marines.²⁵ Post-WWII President Harry S. Truman and his administration pushed hard to maintain the draft as the US needed a sizable force to meet the occupational demands of Germany and Japan. Congress and public opinion countered his teams' argument and the draft ended on 31 March 1947.²⁶ Nevertheless, in similar fashion to WWI the size of the volunteer force would not be enough to meet the operational demands of a war with Korea and still have enough forces to counter fresh threats from the Soviet Union.

Korea

Since the end of WWII, the draft has only lapsed one time, March 1947.²⁷ One year later, it became re-enacted because our volunteer requirements were 30,000 recruits per month but the system was only producing 12,000 during a period of worsening soviet relations.²⁸ The beginning of the Korean War caught US forces with very few divisions fully manned, equipped, and ready for combat. This resulted in regiments and battalions going to combat undermanned.

US participation in the Korean War 1950-1953 was being fought in one location but could be likened to WW I and II because US forces were fighting in Korea, but also were expanding their presence in Europe to counter Russian interference and maintaining a necessary presence in Japan post WWII simultaneously. During that period, the US had 5,720,000 service members with 27 percent of that force i.e., 1,529,539 provided from the practice of conscription.²⁹ From the force of 1,789,000 services member in the Korean theatre close to 1 percent (150,000) were Marines.³⁰ Additionally, of the 85,612 casualties suffered in theatre, some 33 percent (4267 KIA and 23744 wounded) were Marine Corps personnel.³¹

If a war had broken out in Europe, or Russia had attempted to regain their territories lost to Japan back in 1904, there would have been an increase in operational demand for military forces which would have led to an upsurge in the number of civilians drafted during that period. When assessing the use of conscription in the Korean war it is important to understand that its use was not associated with a lack of volunteers but with budget cuts and constraints that had affected and reduced the active duty authorized strengths numbers just prior to the war beginning. The North Korean invasion caught the US by surprise, so the need for manpower was immediate; but there was not a need for vast numbers of draftees. Secondly, a required method of selection needed to fairly spread the burden of wartime duty across the populous and the draft filled that need.

Discussion

The above historical review highlights several valid points when looking at manpower procurement of military personnel. The above mentioned near-peer conflicts suggest that the US would not have a problem with sourcing wartime manpower through volunteerism. However, there is a high probability of the use of conscription because it allows the nation to procure

personnel on an immediate operational need and to indiscriminate voluntarism. The United States, at its current all-volunteer force size of 1,374,742 active duty and 818,000 reservists (2,192,742 service members); must empower the Marine Corps to have a force regeneration concept in place that accounts for all the issues and concerns that will arise from an immediate expansion of its force structure.³²

The US military is grossly undersized when compared to near-peer countries like China who has an active and reserve force of 3,712,500 and Russia who has 3,371,027 service members.³³ Fundamentally, the choice is not between picking a drafted force or a volunteer force to counter our competitors because both methods have negative aspects associated with them. Conscription is less strict on quality of personnel, targets the young and less powerful, adversely affects economy labor force, is expensive, favors deferment to the rich and is socially costly. On the other hand, it also promotes national unity, promotes high levels of governmental awareness, provides useful skills and benefits to lower classes and promotes equality amongst the classes. While the use of an All-Volunteer Force (AFV) is more efficient, reduces personnel turnover and increases the amount of experienced service member. On the other hand, it does attract individuals with lower civilian wage opportunities which could lead to personnel quality issues. Further, it affects the employment rate inversely which, means that the lower the rate compared to civilian wages, the harder it is to recruit volunteers. Likewise, lower military pay leads to two options, a smaller force or lower entry standards to meet strength targets.³⁴ Options like the aforementioned negatively affect factors like cohesion, replacement system use, and training so, it is important to ensure that the new concept addresses these topics in greater detail. Moreover, the true verdict will be based off the state of the force when the near-peer conflict occurs and just how quickly the initial phases of war eat away at the active and reserve

personnel. As seen historically, this will drive society as a whole to make a time-constrained decision on equality of service and what sort of mix between draftees and volunteers is necessary.³⁵ However, it may be too late if all labors develop under reactive circumstances which will negatively affect cohesion, replacement system use and training.

COHESION

In combat, there is a multitude of situations where each warfighter places their lives in the hands of a fellow service member. For this reason, it is important to know and understand how cohesion i.e. relationships/bonds affect the combat capability and survival of individuals and units on the battlefield. Cohesion is the act or state of sticking together tightly.³⁶ After much debate, it has come to light that there are two types of cohesion. The ability to break it down into two separate forms has allowed those who study the subject to better analyze how interpersonal dynamics impact the performance of small organizations— e.g., teams and small military units, such as squads and platoons.³⁷ The two types of cohesion are as follows: Task cohesion, is a shared commitment among members to achieve a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal.³⁸ The other type is social cohesion or the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another. For all intents and purposes, this study will focus on factors within the order that foster and promote greater task cohesion as it is this type of bond that pushes Marines and Sailors alike to sacrifice their own lives for a fellow service member and it is this type of connection that fosters team building and trust.

When evaluating appendix B of MCO 3000.19b there is no mention of the word cohesion or promotion/emphasis from Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA) to the Command Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES) on ensuring their procedures aim to strengthen cohesion. This should be a large concern as all manpower actions and successes tie to the individual Marine and Sailor and their ability to connect with one another in battle. Early military writing discussed cohesion in monolithic terms as an important contributor to military performance and winning on the battlefield.³⁹ Current policy guidance reveals that initial casualty replacement actions will strictly come from active duty forces, minimum first 30 days and then shift to DC M&RA identifying active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) replacements. This is similar to WWI Divisions that had trained nuclei that were on the ready for foreign service much earlier than those made up entirely of green troops (replacements); so Regular Army (active duty) and National Guard divisions were the first to go overseas.⁴⁰ As these active forces rapidly degrade, the process for requesting combat replacements begins.

Currently, the planning procedures for requesting combat replacements are exhaustive and incohesive as DC M&RA relies on the supported MARFORs to reach down to their subordinate commands for course of action (COA) development feedback. Hence, the request process is already unfair because the casualty replacement estimations for each campaign phase predominately generate from multiple units at a subordinate/tactical level, each engaged in combat and each with its own manpower requirements and priorities. Whoever's campaign is the most important will have service level priority and all others will have to make do. A good example of this was in WWI, where three Army replacement battalions had the mission of providing replacements for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Field Artillery Regiments, but due to operational demand, these battalions had to be sent to France and spread among the regiments of the 1st

Field Artillery Brigade. Later calls for replacements for the 5th, 6th and 7th were filled by drafts from the regiments training back in the United States but not without negative effects that resulted in lowering of efficiency and interruption of training.⁴¹

The replacement process is even more convoluted presently because the Marine Corps does not currently have a Casualty Replacement Model (CRM) per January 2018 statements from the Manpower Plans and Policy section in Quantico and the USMC Administrative Schoolhouse located at Camp Johnson North Carolina. The Casualty replacement model is important as it allows manpower planners to be proactive in their efforts to obtain the required personnel with the correct grade, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), experience and certifications for each phase of an operation. In situations where sourcing of certain replacements cannot be met early identification of needed replacements allows alternative solutions to be addressed prior to the operation occurring. Lack of a CRM is a large concern as history has shown that the United States entered World War I without any precedent for an organized personnel replacement system and the outcome led to greater numbers of killed and wounded personnel.⁴²

PRACTICES

WWI

During WWI the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff was responsible for the calculations of loss replacement rates in 1936. During this period there was no study available within the division covering the subject.⁴³ The staff, not well trained in casualty estimation used various methods to make their best "educated guess," which is a surprisingly similar process that the Marine Corps still uses presently in 2018. War Department preparations for the war had not gone beyond the planning stage even after the severance of diplomatic

relations with Germany. General Pershing stated it best: "Little more than a gesture was made to get ready for eventualities; in fact, practically nothing was done in the way of increasing our military strength or of providing equipment."⁴⁴

The unpreparedness and lack of proper casualty estimation methods in WWI led to the inability of the Regular Army and National Guard units to provide their own fillers. This led to large numbers of personnel deploying from the National Army, which then led to many replacement divisions being unable to train the number of replacements required. Other efforts to fix the replacement issue included a recommendation to draw men proportionately from all available divisions in training. The recommendation came back approved by the Army Chief of Staff with the caveat that, all early divisions sent overseas contain about 25 percent recruits. The shortage of replacements became so serious that divisions began stripping men in the training pipeline and began to skeletonize units to obtain replacements for combat divisions. Field commanders complained that this process of stripping divisions of men resulted in inefficiency and brought discouragement to the men.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, operational demand and lack of meaningful missions pushed the Marine Corps to aggressively pursue requirements for active combat. This meant disturbing the cohesive aspect of Marine units/divisions by breaking certain regiments away from their divisions and placing them under Army control in order to get into the war in France. At the time, the Corps had no organized regiments in the United States so the 5th Regiment, was made up of 1200 Marines from various parts of the globe. Initially, there was no casualty estimation process associated with replacing these Marines and they embarked on ship as the only organization of Marines headed to France at the time.⁴⁶ Some months later the 6th Marine Regiment was sent to France but there was no sort of casualty replacement estimate or plan tied to their deployment. As the

war progressed, the Marine Corps sent some 834 officers and 31,315 Marines to Europe to support the American Expeditionary Forces and for Shore duty with the Naval Service.⁴⁷ Amongst those forces were the 1st, 2d and 3rd replacement battalions, 1 casual company, 1st machine gun replacement battalion, and 1st/ 2d casual replacement battalions. This is important because it shows that as casualty amounts increased replacements and estimations became an important part of operational planning prior to deploying into combat. The Marine Corps in a similar fashion to the Army, over time, found it necessary to estimate and plan for combat replacements. However, a little over twenty years later, as planners prepared for WWII, the lessons from WWI were overlooked and the US would again learn a hard lesson through unnecessary loss of life.

WWII

During WWII, the US Army grew to an estimated 8,000,000 men.⁴⁸ Major Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was working on the “Victory Plan” for the War Department at the time, had projected that the Army would need over 215 divisions to win the war. However, the Army was only able to produce 90 divisions due to a flawed allocation formula.⁴⁹ There was an understanding that the US could not win the war without having a steady stream of ready, trained, and equipped personnel to completely field all 90 divisions. However, no one had thought about casualty estimations and the need to procure, train, and assign replacements for combat losses. The Victory Plan made no mention of replacements, and no other staff sections considered not having a casualty estimation and replacement plan a problem, as evidenced by the lack of an adequate replacement system at the start of World War II. This would eventually lead to the 90 divisions supporting each other with replacements through the use of an individual replacement system. As the replacement concept initially emerged, personnel often trained with

the unit which enhanced their fighting capabilities, boosted morale, and fostered cohesion. However, once D-Day occurred, the flaws of a "push" individual replacement system, i.e. having all your replacements forward and provided early to their units, were evidenced when several divisions began suffering heavy losses over 250 percent in less than twelve months of fighting.⁵⁰ In an effort to maintain combat effectiveness, many divisions had to be broken apart to provide individual replacements to the various 90 standing division.⁵¹ In hard-fought battles like Normandy, casualty estimations were inaccurate and far worse than anticipated with units like the 29th Infantry Division suffering 400 percent casualties in its rifle companies.⁵² This then caused a domino effect as the Army responded to a 300,000 man replacement requirement by gutting service support personnel from their units and placing poorly trained cooks, drivers, mechanics, clerks and other rear echelon personnel into highly kinetic infantry companies.⁵³

Other reactions due to not properly estimating combat casualties and poor execution and planning included the Army cutting down on basic training and other training schools timelines. Likewise, they had to reduce certain college programs that had accessible personnel and re-designate some 71,000 aviation cadets into ground force occupational specialties.⁵⁴ The regeneration policies and actions of the Army due to its inability to properly link combat regeneration procedures with operational planning forced tens of thousands of service members to hastily displace into ragtag combat units made of personnel drawn from all over the world that had never trained together.⁵⁵

Further attempts at increasing cohesion included the army providing units with small 250 man squads and platoons but the casualty rates overwhelmed this attempt at a unit replacement process.⁵⁶ Although, this attempt had positive effects several accounts blame the overwhelming need for more men on unit leaders breaking the 250 man squads apart and spreading them

through their commands vice keeping them together as a more effective force. An alternative perspective suggests that the army's replacement system was not cohesive but saved lives by shortening the war.⁵⁷ In other words, General Eisenhower stated it best when he said: "in war everything is expendable."⁵⁸ If this is the case then, discounting cohesion as a benefit and not a necessity to mission accomplishment justified the use of the individual replacement system and positively validates its overall efficiency as highly effective.

By the same token, issues that affected the Marine Corps' unit cohesion was in relieving British troops occupying Iceland. President Roosevelt ordered the Army to prepare a plan to assist the British. However, the Army did not have the personnel to do the task legally because a major portion of the 1.5 million troops they had were raw recruits gathered by Selective Service and called up by the National Guard. By law, they could not be sent to war past the western hemisphere unless they volunteered. This resulted in the mission being given to the Marine Corps who was reorganizing at the time and below normal strengths in all its infantry Regiments. Since all Marines, both regular and reserve, were volunteers, there were no, geographical restrictions on their use.

Due to operational demand, the Marine Brigade had a deadline to deploy in 15 days; this led to non-cohesive actions that brought 6th Marine Regiment to full strength by using personnel of the 2nd Marines, 8th Marines, and the 5th Defense Battalion. The option of planning for, acquiring and training combat replacements for the deployment remained unaddressed and they deployed without replacements. Similarly, other issues that contributed to issues with cohesion was that none of these units had worked or trained together but were expected to deploy and possibly fight in a matter of weeks under the control of the Army's I Corps.⁵⁹ The Marines gained valuable experience in occupying Iceland as the rigorous service in the field and

scattered/detached posts laid a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the young company grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. Yet, in this case, each allowed the adversity to develop and strengthened their training, experience and leadership which increased cohesion in the long run. Similarly, this situation portrays how the inability to estimate appropriately and acquire the proper amount of replacements early could easily effect a sister service causing them to take non cohesive actions to meet operational requirements. By the end of WWII, the military in historic fashion would begin to expediently downsize from 12 million service members in 1946 to 1.6 million by 1947.⁶⁰ As the threat of communism spreading into Korea and Europe began to emerge the individual service member would once more pay the cost as operational demand would again take precedence to ensure the sovereignty of South Korea.

Korea

In Korea, inaccurate casualty estimations also led to the complete gutting of the Army's General Reserve in the United States causing force regeneration and operational planning concerns. Its effects on infrastructure led to gutting formal schools, overseas units and the Inactive and Volunteer components of their Organized Reserve Corps.⁶¹ Inclusively, Units sourced from draftees, reservist, and active personnel were deployed into Korea and were expected to remain there on one year tours.

Throughout most of 1950's, the US forces struggled to find replacements. They had to bring units up to strength with South Korean civilian augmentation. Over 17,717 Koreans in five US Army divisions participated in the Inchon Invasion. Additionally, they asked for federalization of the National Guard, pulled permanent personnel from Infantry and Armor schools around the globe, and also augmented their forces with partial units and personnel that were in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Japan.⁶² Mixing different personnel and units to meet operational demands

became a common practice. Units often deployed with marginal to no unit training with readiness percentages that were well below 70 percent.⁶³

Similar examples include desperate defensive actions like what occurred in Hagaru-ri, Korea. The effects of not properly estimating replacements led to misuse of service support/specialist personnel like that of the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion, commanded by Army Captain Philip Kulbes. His unit aided as a defense force to secure a gap in the defensive line of an airstrip. His battalion's original mission was to build a command post for X Corps in the area but they assist in defending the AOR. None of the 77 Americans and 90 South Koreans in the unit had infantry training. A Marine Weapons Company lieutenant assisted the Army Major with preparing his personnel to defend the strip. That same day, a communications Army unit, the 4th Signal Battalion was installing communications equipment for General Almond's command post in that same area and quickly became re-assigned to assist with defending the airstrip. First Lieutenant John A. Colborn, like Captain Kulbes, reported that his men had no infantry training. 3d Battalion's Weapons Company commander provided a Marine Gunnery Sergeant to advise the lieutenant and his men on how to prepare for the attack.⁶⁴ Likewise, during the counter-attack at Hagaru-ri, there were no tactical units available to assist with the fighting so the attack consisted of a mixed force of service troops and stragglers found prowling in town. Each gathered together into a makeshift company of about 250 men, generally Marines but including a few soldiers.⁶⁵ Although, these units were doing what had to be done to survive and accomplish a strategic mission, their activities highlight the ugly consequences that can transpire when the casualty estimation process is avoided and replacements are not adequately projected early and made available to support combat unit actions.

Discussion

When assessing the topic of cohesion the Marine Corps, as America's initial contact force must have a Casualty Replacement Model (CRM) that can accurately capture the threats associated with a near-peer conflict. The Marine fighting force of today must understand that without a CRM each administrative section at the various MARFORs/MEFs/ and Major Subordinate Units (MSCs) cannot work with their respective operational planners (S-3, G-3) to properly identify the number of combat replacements by grade, MOS, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) element, and phase of the operation. All this information is what DC M&RA, who then globally finds the combat replacements, would need. Other non-cohesive effects of not having a CRM include DC PP&O, M&RA's inability to determine the proper number and locations of Deployment Screening sites (DSS), Reserve Support Units (RSUs), and Schools of Infantry (SOI) to process and train reserve replacement personnel.

Likewise, it affects the flow of casualty replacements using Mass Notification and Training and Education Command's (TECOM) ability to plan (ammo, ranges, instructors, facilities, medical) for Combat Refresher Training of reserve replacement personnel.⁶⁶ Not having a CRM effects Marine Corps Installations and Marine Forces Reserves' throughput planning, i.e. administrative support, billeting, and equipping of their replacements. The fact that a service-wide casualty model is not readily available, significantly decreases cohesion amongst the Marine Corps leaving the various units, MARFORs and Combatant Command working off of manpower requirements, calculations and assumptions that are not from a standardized service level system.

It is the responsibility of DC M&RA to approve/disapprove each MARFORs request for

combat replacements. Once approved, the process can easily become non-cohesive as units tasked for replacements have all the responsibility on them to find the correct Marine with the proper MOS, grade, experience, and certifications to meet the requirement. In most cases, they are already disappointed about losing structured personnel to other units. This can easily result in a substandard Marine being sourced or a Marine with a lower rank, knowledge and experience being sourced as the replacement. Other options include sourcing a replacement with a different MOS or a reduction in the number of a certain MOS leading to additional task for those replacements once deployed. By the same token, the replacement methodology also does not set a standard profile for the type of Marine that is best for selection as a replacement besides them being deployable, correct MOS and Grade (this is usually one up or down).

There is no guidance or standard for units to compare when looking for a replacement. This is an issue as there should be a standard profile as to what a proper combat replacement should exhibit. This would possibly include, no Non Judicial punishments within the past year, no combat deployments within the past year, not a single parent, within Marine Corps standards and been in the fleet longer than two years. Exemplified standards like this enhance unit cohesion and hold units accountable to provide a professional and ready replacement each time. These same standards need to apply when sourcing reserve replacement forces.

Presently, the effects of not having a casualty replacement model, along with non-cohesive planning and execution, reflect a replacement concept that is currently insufficient. The aforementioned issues of concern within the policy, pertaining to cohesion, foster in the same negative personnel relationship conditions portrayed in WWI, WWII, and Korean trends. Experiences in these near-peer type wars indicate that the average frontline troop could only take a minimum of 3 weeks on the frontlines before suffering combat stress.⁶⁷ Inclusively, studies

have found that psychological stress is a function of time and intensity from prolonged exposure to mid-intensity warfare or brief high-intensity war.⁶⁸ Cohesion is key to countering these effects but can only be fostered if personnel are successfully trained for the rigors of war and properly screened to ensure we are providing the right Marine for the job.

To counter the negative effects of war from a near-peer adversary, troops must use the cohesive efforts of fostering strong bonds, mutual trust, self-confidence, and group loyalty. However, the secondary aspect, which strengthens the above factors, is the responsibility of the service and involves proper training, screening, estimating, equipping, shipping, processing and every other part associated with augmenting a service member from garrison to combat. This is where the Marine Corps is failing in its efforts to boost service member cohesion. When the service fails to do the above-mentioned actions, the replacement system breaks down as exemplified in the historical evidence.

The message is clear, part of the Marine Corps' fighting success in a near-peer conflict, lies with the services' ability to accurately estimate its casualties. Failure to do so produces a domino effect that directly affects the execution and planning stages of the casualty replacement process. When this occurs, the process becomes overwhelmed forcing it to correct itself by conducting actions that are contrary to fostering cohesion. These acts include strategic level commands authorizing operational/tactical units to; shorten timelines for training, recklessly place service support personnel into combat billets, place untrained personnel into combat, use of foreign forces to augment US personnel, Lower acceptable combat effective unit strengths to keep troops on the battlefield, and expanding service member's time on the frontlines. Moreover, when it comes to sourcing these replacements it can lead to cutting the number of personnel to provide certain capabilities, lowering of grades and ranks, sourcing personnel with little to no experience,

cutting depth to dwell, use of a different MOS than what was requested by a combat degraded unit, as well as the cutting of certain capabilities for an operation due to a lack personnel i.e. (commander's risk). As planners it is important to recognize that Marine Corps personnel will most likely be the first force exposed to the psychologically terrifying effects of high-intensity war in a near-peer conflict. As a service that has a track record of winning, they must ensure that the new casualty replacement concept has the best teaching procedures and processes in place to combat the threat before it materializes. This includes having a system in place that ensures proper quantities of personnel fill ranks in the most operationally expedient manner possible to ensure combat effectiveness remains.

REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS

The military has two types of systems used for replacement of personnel. The first is the individual replacement system (IRS) which entails single individuals assigned as replacements to a specific unit to substitute personnel loss. The second system is the unit replacement system (URS) which sends personnel to a specific unit at one-time, usually platoon sizes and higher. This process can also include swapping out entire units if operational pace and demand allow. Historically, the preferred system for packaging replacements is in groups or units as they are more cohesive since, units usually train together before deploying. Currently, each military service uses a hybrid of both systems to replace personnel abroad combining the use of individual augments and unit deployment cycles/rotations to meet the global operational requirement.

When evaluating current Marine Corps replacement methodology on which replacement system, Individual Replacement System (IRS) or Unit Replacement System (URS) is preferred

there is no service level direction. Although, the current guidance is insufficient in regards to details on either system, current policy points towards the individual replacement system as the favorite because it seems to be the procedure that has been most used since Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF and Enduring Freedom began. The current policy does not define the systems, how they work or the benefits/reason for their use. Understanding that both systems are important, depending on what type of conflict the nation is in and the respective campaign phase, the policy gives zero recommendations or example on how to effectively use the systems during wartime. Thus, it leaves it up to the various MEFs MARFORs, combatant commands, and tactical level administrative shops to self-educate on how to effectively understand the systems' usefulness. The individual replacement (IR) guidance within the policy is catered more towards how the planning and CRM lead to a requirement for an (IR) and who is responsible for the equipment, examination, and training of the IR prior to deploying.

The unit replacement guidance leaves it up to the supported commander or service component to determine what a loss in combat effectiveness is. It further details how units should replace personnel at the company and platoon or aviation equivalent with the ability to replace aircrews when possible. This should alarm readers as historical war trends reflect that in a near-peer fight we will need the ability to replace multiple full battalions, regimental and possibly division sized units throughout the various phases of the conflict. Current policy also places the threshold of unit replacement on average to be 80 percent of the peace timetable of organization (T/O). As most units do not deploy with 100 percent of their T/O they are already at a disadvantage of becoming non-operational immediately if this threshold remains during a near-peer conflict. Lastly, the policy refers to the coordinated procedures for requesting a unit replacement, planning factors to consider throughout the process and specified task that need to

be carried out by the various levels of command. To illustrate and better understand the importance of each system it is best to review how each has affected war time efforts throughout the last few wars.

PRACTICES

Since the current policy provides no guidance on which system is best/preferred it is paramount to examine each system from its historical use throughout multiple wars. Countless lives have moved through each system so perhaps the true question is not which system is greatest but rather when is it logical and most efficient to use either system, understanding that each has its own strengths and weaknesses. The individual replacement system's adoption by most services occurred around 1912, just prior to the beginning of WWI.⁶⁹ The biggest issues that surrounded the use of this system was personnel arrived into combat hardened units with a lack of training and experience which led to the inability of service members to foster bonds of trust in the already formed and combat-exposed units. When accessing the historical trends of the individual replacement system we see how it developed and the advantages it provided as opposed to using a unit system.

WWI

At the start of WWI the Army was not able to field adequate divisions to rotate soldiers by unit; this forced them to use an individual replacement system. Due to the limitation of only having 90 divisions unit leaders had to cross support each other with replacements. As heavy combat occurred it was not uncommon for infantry regiments to suffer 100 percent casualty rates every three months. Individual replacements filled those losses as the unit replacement process would have taken too long to source and train a unit in the US and then ship them to France.

Training new individual soldiers to survive in combat was the primary focus of training at the division level, rather than unit training, throughout the war. The effects of this type of replacement system led to US divisions becoming ineffective due to extremely high turnover of infantry riflemen. This resulted in decreased combat efficiency of infantry personnel after their first series of combat actions.⁷⁰ Disagreeable consequences transpired immediately as unit cohesion suffered, as well-established small unit bonds disintegrated. Veterans were slow to accept, trust, and integrate individual replacements into their teams.⁷¹

In the Marine Corps' case, it deployed its first troops in June of 1917 (5th Regiment). As stated earlier, in order to meet this requirement the Corps had already used non-cohesive actions by combining various personnel from 1st Regiment, Philadelphia, 2d Regiment Haiti, and 3d and 4th Regiments from the Dominican Republic to source this regiment into one unit and expeditiously sending them overseas.⁷² Inclusively, senior leaders in the Marine Corps considered it vital to quickly raise a second Regiment to send to France as soon as possible and this meant piecing together another unit similar to 5th Marine Regiment. In this case, 6th Marines only had a few senior enlisted i.e. Sergeants, Gunnys, and First Sergeants remaining as most had to deploy with the 5th Regiment, all the privates for 6th Regiment came directly from boot camp.⁷³ The expectation from the start was the Marine Corps already struggling to create the initial forces, would source and send forward large replacement battalions to ensure that army soldiers would not restore Marine combat and operational losses.⁷⁴ Throughout the major periods of conflict, 15 March to 11 November 1918 this system re-generated 346 officers and 11,612 enlisted personnel. From April 6, 1917, to September 10, 1919, 131 officers and 3,489 enlisted men died a total of 3,620 Marine Corps deaths from all causes.⁷⁵ The push method, individual replacement system, although not perfect or cohesive had ensured that the Corps

successfully completed its mission. The successes of this system allowed the Army and the Marine Corps to meet the multifaceted demands of combat. Successful results like these would lead to further use of this form of replacement system as WWII emerged.

WWII

For Army personnel designated as individual replacements in WWII, half flowed from the US directly to France organized as a division the other half were primarily privates that were distributed pan the European theatre into the various individual unit companies as needed.⁷⁶

Almost half the three million plus men who served in the US Army in the European Theatre of operation (ETO) arrived as individual replacements.⁷⁷ The responsibility of the training for each replacement fell to the replacement system whose staff, often ignored training in an effort to ensure the maximum flow of personnel to the forward lines continued. First accounts in WWII likened being an individual replacement to being an orphan. Private Morris Dunn who was in the 84th Division stated;

“We were just numbers, we didn’t know anybody, and I’ve never felt so alone, miserable and helpless in my entire life-we’d been herded like cattle at roundup time.”⁷⁸

Due to a lack of cohesion, simple training techniques that could have saved lives such as lowering your voice in the field, not lighting up a cigarette at night and bunching together in groups did not pass from the veteran personnel to the new casualty replacements and this assisted with unnecessary deaths. Similarly, incidents such as combat replacements being assigned MOSs as tank crew members and expecting them to learn to drive, load, aim and shoot a tank at enemy targets just hours before heading into a combat mission could have been prevented if commanders made an effort to humanize the replacements and ensure they were properly

prepared to carry out their duties. In most cases, commanders and Noncommissioned officers alike put the mission ahead of the replacement and half became casualties within the first three days on the line.⁷⁹ The individual replacement system continues to be a system built on efficiency predominantly not focused on the quality of the replacement in an effort to ensure the requirements respective MOS quantities remain at capacity.

Strategically, the requirement for individual replacements and a reliable system of personnel distribution led to the creation of NATO USA Replacement Command in May 1944. The command had several objectives that included; 1. Make orderly disposition of all personnel in the theater. 2. To conserve manpower and to deliver men properly classified to the armies as expeditiously as the need arose. 3. To locate replacement depots as close to the front as practicable. 4. To keep depots properly stocked with balanced amounts of personnel based on latest reports of the needs of the armies. In order to meet these objectives, the Army had generated 4 replacement depots, 19 replacement battalions, and 66 replacement companies (of which 9 were provisional). Current service level wars, particularly in the Marine Corps, have never dealt with a force re-generation problem of this magnitude. And yet, if it is to succeed in the next near-peer conflict this is the type of manpower training issue that needs addressing in exercises.

To train personnel of these units it took 642 commissioned and warrant officers and 3,758 enlisted men. By June 1944 some 2,646 officers and 43,994 enlisted men in the replacement system were awaiting assignment to units. Nonetheless, large scale operational requirements like the 7th Army's landing in southern France would quickly deplete replacement depots in mass numbers requesting troop numbers of 1800 individual replacements and greater in a single request.⁸⁰ In fact, the 40,200 capacity of the replacement system had proved inadequate

so, the 24th Depot quickly activated on 24 July.⁸¹ The activation of the 24th Depot would assist with increasing the average strength of replacements held in the system between July and September to 65,000 and by 1 September 1944, the system which then was designed to handle 49,400 actually was handling an average of 74,000. The successes of this system although not perfect had allowed the Army to meet the multifaceted demands of combat. This would again lead to further use of this form of replacement system as the Korean War emerged.

Korea

The Korean War began at a historical time when society was still dealing with the aftermath of WWII. Politically and militarily, the public of the United States wanted nothing to do with the armed forces or another war. The government had most recently cut back on excessive military spending and draft calls had stopped. The US was rapidly demobilizing the armed services' manpower from 12,000,000 personnel to 1, 600,000 service members.⁸² By 1947, the armed services had shifted to an all-volunteer force and although the draft had ceased for WWII, a new Service Act of 1948 permitted it as a response to foreign external threats.⁸³ As the Korean War quickly flared up, the above dilemmas as well as the fact, that President Truman and other US leaders wanted to continue fighting in Korea, sustain a military force in Europe, organize and sustain an Army Anti-Aircraft Command for air defense, as well as rebuild a general reserve to support the Eighth Army in Korea; it became necessary to continue the use of an individual replacement system.⁸⁴

In June 1950, Congress reduced the Army to an authorized strength of 630,000 but the actual strength was 591,487.⁸⁵ From June 1950 all the way up to March 1951 the Army struggled to fill its ranks using the primary option of cannibalizing units in the country for combat replacements to fill personnel vacancies for upcoming operations.⁸⁶ By July 1950 Far

East Command had established replacement training centers in Yokohama and replacement training battalion at Sasebo, Japan, and Pusan, South Korea. This would provide replacements both for the Eighth Army in Korea and for the skeletonized 7th Division in Japan.⁸⁷ In mid-August General Collins, the Army chief of staff had already informed General MacArthur, Commander of UN forces that no replacements could be sent to Korea before the summer of 1951 and disapproved the sending of the only combat-ready division in the General Reserve (82d Airborne) because it would strip the General Reserve.⁸⁸ However, draft calls began in September with the first call requesting some 50,000 individual replacements. By April 1951 the United States armed forces reverted back to an individual rotation policy.⁸⁹ However, due to the lag in replacements deploying from the US, the Army would have to find other ways to fill the gaps in its ranks. This would come through the use of South Korean augmentation.

Although typical American Army Division's war strengths were at 18,855; commands like the 3d Division had US soldier strength of 15,735 with Republic of Korea (ROK) and civilian South Korean individual augmentation of some 2,553 that managed to keep them at a total strength of 18,288. However, the combat value of the South Korean men were limited as most were untrained levies dragged at gunpoint from their villages and often sent to the front lines.⁹⁰ Actions like this underscore a system that was purely quantity based, discounting the necessary training and qualification of the individuals being into combat.

In like manner, direct support replacements for units like tank battalions consisted of individual replacements from infantry and Armor schools and whatever personnel were available. This is exemplified by one battalion in the eighth Army receiving a mix of 2d Armor Division soldiers and various individual soldiers sourced from Japan.⁹¹ These actions were occurring not only in the Army but also within the Marine Corps which provided 1st Marine

Division as a forward fighting force. As General MacArthur's request for one Marine Division was granted, the Marine Corps was placed on a compressed 1-month timeline to build up 1st Marine Division to war strength. This resulted in the 1st Marines being expeditiously augmented by a combination of Unit and individual augments/replacements that included; transfer of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLant)-selected personnel, 2d Division/Wing air and ground units, of 6,800 men, and transfer of 3,600 regular individual Marines from 105 posts and stations throughout the US. In addition, it included the mobilization of 2,900 Marines from early Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) ground and air units; and utilization of two replacement drafts, numbering 900 Marines.⁹² During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and 15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six months. The ability to maintain a steady stream of manpower developed through the use of monthly individual replacement drafts that ranged from 1,900 to 2,500, personnel depending on the combat situation and needs of the Marine Corps. Throughout the war, the Marine Corps conducted 34 replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time attached to the division was about 10½ months).⁹³

Although the individual replacement system was sufficient to keep 1st Marine Division in the fight, the system had negative effects that included monthly rotation drafts of Marines assigned to go back to the states or other duty stations from Korea were often smaller than their incoming numbers due to operational demand. This similar issue was occurring within the Army as the combat effectiveness of the unit was the priority, if adversely affected due to the likelihood of an upcoming operation, the experienced soldiers and officers' tours would often involuntarily extend.⁹⁴ This would have an upsetting effect on troop morale. Further, ranks and

MOS of replacement personnel did not always meet the requirements of the division requests which decreased efficiency and capability. In some cases, the division found ways to mitigate these deficiencies through in-country specialty training. The individual replacement systems effects made an impact at all levels in the Marine Corps to include the tactical level. Casualty quantities like those at Bunker Hill led to the common practice of reassigning rear area service personnel and support units to fill the vacancies.⁹⁵ Nearly 200 Marines all of them volunteers, were individually provided to 1st Marine Division to offset some 49 Killed and 313 wounded within the division during Bunker Hill. Again these actions kept the Marines in the fight but did little to increase the cohesive bonds that save lives during war or extend the survivability of the individual service member.

UNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

The unit replacement system use dates back as early as the Civil War.⁹⁶ As casualties increased the various commands remained in combat and would reorganize internally to ensure they remained combat effective. During the civil war period, it was not uncommon to find units at 30 percent strength.⁹⁷ Since volunteers made up a large majority of the forces, the Union and Confederates lacked the ability to continually raise regimental size armies forcing both sides to implement a form of the individual replacement system. Before 1910, the Army attempted to follow a policy of replacing units on Foreign Service rather than replacing individuals. In order to get ready for Foreign Service, a unit in the United States would transfer all its members who were to serve less than the required overseas tour and who indicated they did not care to reenlist. Such an extensive turnover prior to the departure of a unit was unsatisfactory. In 1910, the system was changed and transferred personnel strictly accounted for only those persons who had

less than 4 months to serve at any specific regiment.⁹⁸ The ability to source units with personnel that had more than 2 or 3 years left on their service contract eventually became too demanding and the time left on contract to deploy was set at less than 4 months. This practice largely ended the use of short period unit replacement rotations.⁹⁹

PRACTICES

WWI

During WWI the Marine Corps, directed by the President and Secretary of the Navy provided the army with units in the form of the 4th Brigade which consisted of 5th and 6th Marine Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. As Germany captured Soissons in Jun 1918 and headed towards Paris, the Army 2d Division which, consisted of the Marine Brigade would be committed to stopping the German advance. They successfully repelled the Germans along the Paris-Metz highway, captured hill 142, and Belleau Woods. This came at a high cost with Second Division suffering 1,811 KIA's (1,062 were Marines) and suffered additional casualties amounting to 7,252 (3,615 were Marines).¹⁰⁰ Regardless of the number of casualties, the 4th Brigade remained in the front until July of 2018. As an augmented replacement unit to the Army, they were able to regenerate forces by having replacement battalions that included First Replacement Battalion, Second Replacement Battalion, Third Replacement Battalion, Casual Company, First Machine Gun Replacement Battalion, First Casual Replacement Battalion, and Second Casual Replacement Battalion.¹⁰¹ These units trained and provided individual replacements forward in France ensuring 4th Brigade remained at strength during the war.

Similarly, US officials had to make a decision on whether the American Army would fight as a unit or whether American military forces would become a replacement pool for the British and the French. The eventual compromise was that Americans did serve with the armies of the Allies, but the United States did not give up its military organization; small American units served as parts of British and French divisions. By 20 October 1917, American battalions of the 1st Division, under the command of their own officers, attached for training purposes to French regiments in the Luneville sector. By 31 December 1917, there were 176,655 American troops in France, but no American troops other than those of the 1st Division had been in combat.¹⁰² As casualties mounted and combat replacements became scarcer The United States Army absorbed units from the National Guard as replacements. Issues that emerged from the use of the unit replacement system were that the ability to recruit personnel from one local area to fill a unit was tasking and often not obtainable. Requirements for certain specialists were difficult to find in sufficient numbers from certain parts of the country, this caused capability gaps. For example, men with mechanical skills were mostly in manufacturing regions and were scarce in agricultural areas.¹⁰³ Additionally, a military investigation that produced the “Baker Board Report” had found that drawing reinforcement units for divisions, from the corresponding home divisional areas, resulted in unequal combat loss distribution throughout the country. This had been the case with both the British and the French troops.¹⁰⁴

The report also recommended abandoning the unit system and shifting towards provisional units not larger than battalions. This recommendation would foster in the use of the individual replacement system as casualties mounted in the US, specifically the Army shifted away from a unit replacement system and began to rely solely on an individual replacement system.¹⁰⁵ Since attacking an objective came at a high cost in the trenches it became necessary to

keep units engaged in contact with the enemy as much as possible. As a result, the individual replacement system had a negative effect on the soldiers' morale and unit readiness, it promoted sending poorly trained personnel into battle with units and individuals they had no rapport with.¹⁰⁶ It further lowered the moral of the new units and disrupted the training schedules of the old units as training timelines were cut to meet operational demand this often lead to a decrease in unit effectiveness. Understanding the negative variables that come with the use of an individual replacement system the Army would attempt the use of a Unit distribution system at the start of WWII.

WWII

In 1939 the United States Army was still a tiny force of 187,893 men, of whom only 13,039 were officers.¹⁰⁷ Had the US Congress agreed to support Britain and France when the war first broke out, the US would not have been able to support them in any practical way. Once Pearl Harbor occurred, the process of conscription increased manpower training requirements which overwhelmed the Army Training system. This eventually led to fresh recruits transitioning directly to their divisions for training. During this period the unit replacement system was that of "division rotation cycles" whereby, full divisions would swap out after being overseas for one year or longer. The biggest issue however was the Reception Training Centers of the Army could not produce enough augments to fill the alerted division tables of organization. This resulted in fillers coming from other divisions that were in training or "robbing Peter to pay Paul." In similar fashion, the alerted units, often still in training, were being stripped of personnel to fill combat replacements losses at divisions already forward. At a later date, fresh inductees coming from replacement centers would back fill those replacement but they would have little to no training in most cases.

Demand for immediate replacements often led to training being delayed or stopped due to lack of experience within the ranks and large differences in where personnel were in their training phases. Experienced enlisted and officer personnel alike, often were pulled out of the division when close to being complete on training and used as cadres to train new divisions entering the pipeline. In addition, as the need for more divisions increased expeditiously all the experienced warfighters transitioned to units in combat leaving the inexperienced troops to train the even more inexperienced inductees. In one situation, 10 separate divisions in training had completed the Army Ground Forces training and maneuvers exercise but, due to immediate casualty replacement requirements, they stripped almost 40 percent of the personnel they had done training with. New inductees would, eventually fill the losses, just prior to deployment of the division.¹⁰⁸

By 1944 combat loss rates were at 40 percent or more per week. The unit replacement system was in such disorder by this period that General McNair, commander of Army ground forces attempted to establish a redline policy on the maximum stripping of a division and on mandatory training requirements but his efforts were too late. Due to the ongoing increase in combat casualties the Army had no choice but to shift to an individual replacement system. In August 1944 after 8 weeks of fighting the entire replacement pool for infantry units in Europe was depleted to one single soldier.¹⁰⁹ In early 1945, 47 Regiments in 19 Divisions had suffered 100 to 200 percent casualties. By stopping division level unit replacement and moving to an individual replacement system the war department replaced those losses.¹¹⁰ As the Korean War started there would begin to be a hybrid use of both systems to meet the manpower needs on the battlefield.

Korea

In assessing the Korean War, the United States' objective to preserve large forces in Europe while fighting a campaign in Korea forced several unit replacement actions that included integration of black and white units, activation of the KATUSA program which integrated groups of poorly trained units of Korean soldiers into Army divisions.¹¹¹ Likewise, unit replacement efforts included integrating different service units such as the 1st Marine Division, who participated in the amphibious landing on Inchon and served under the Army's X Corps and I Corps conducting combat efforts that included the defense of the Pyongyang–Seoul corridor. Even more, when the Eighth Army's full organizational structure needed restoring back to eleven infantry battalions; it was the unit replacement process that enabled this to occur. Units such as the 3d Infantry division provided two battalions and three battalion cadres. The 14 Regimental Combat Team provided the third battalion.

Other examples include; the 34th Infantry becoming combat ineffective so, it reassigned two of its remaining battalions to the 24th Infantry Division. Also, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, was sent from Hawaii to Korea as a reassigned reinforcement force to the third regiment of the 24th Infantry Division.¹¹² The URS attempted to provide unit training and team building to inspire and occasionally lead to wartime victories. Yet, in most cases, operational demand took precedence continuously forcing units to cut their training timelines and often break apart their cohesive units in an effort to keep the various units across the AOR combat effective once in country. This is of particular concern because in a near-peer global conflict where casualty percentages for initial assault units are estimated to be at 90 percent or higher there must be a system in place that allows full units to be easily accessible as these units must be formed, trained, ready and equipped to step into a highly kinetic environment immediately.

Discussion

When assessing the topic of system replacement i.e. individual verses unit replacement, the Marine Corps, as America's single flexible force, has been insufficient in guiding its manpower/administrative personnel in the use of either system. The current concept makes no effort to define what either system is or how they tie into the operational planning process. More importantly, it fails to teach the benefits and disadvantages of each system. As the Corps prepares for the next near-peer conflict they must focus on the biggest threat to operational tempo which is a loss of "mass" i.e. manpower.

It is my belief that the use of the wrong system during certain phases of an operation inversely affects the number of casualties and the duration of combat. In looking at the historical trend for WWI during its initial phases, the dominant system was the unit replacement system. One can assume that the large number of casualties associated with the concept of open warfare, the emerging concept of trench warfare and an increased use in machine guns and artillery guided planners towards the unit replacement system. Yet, as the operational pace and casualty rates decreased and policy shifted towards keeping units engaged at the front, the individual replacement system was able to be ushered in. On the contrary, given a situation like Korea, the trend showed that the individual replacement system was the preferred method due to forces having only the units in the country to use as combat replacements during the initial phases of the war. As the war continued, unit casualty rates increased and combat ineffectiveness grew, unit manpower requirements like the Eighth Army's need to replace eleven infantry battalions materialized and the most efficient and cohesive system of use transitioned to the unit replacement system on those occasions. There are several positive attributes to the unit replacement system beginning with its ability to foster cohesion and positive relationships

amongst unit personnel that train and labor together on a daily basis prior to deploying into a combat environment. This is important in situations where personnel receive exposure to excessive firepower and extreme battle casualties. Research has revealed that psychological stress is a function of prolonged exposure to mid-intensity warfare or brief exposure to high-intensity war and is sufficient to cause a mental breakdown.¹¹³

The ability to have close personal relationships as a cohesive group or unit allows individuals to come together as a team and share their wartime experiences, build faith and trust in their abilities to support, protect and inspire each other. An additional concern is stability; often service members used as replacements witnessed several changes in leadership resulting in a new list of priorities, standards, and procedures each time.¹¹⁴ This is contradictory to the effort to create a team atmosphere, in order for service members to become one and build a bond they should not be changing units constantly. This is even more important for those persons in key billets that influence policy, training, leadership and the overall morale of the troops. The biggest downside of the unit replacement system is the required time necessary for units to form and properly train in order to be successful in an active contingency.

Replacement systems must help to foster conditions that promote variables like the above and the conceptual use and techniques should be captured in the new replacement concept. In a near-peer conflict where initial force engagements casualty rates are close to 90 percent, a manpower planner has to understand "why" an individual replacement system, that currently authorizes personnel up to 36 to 44 days to report into a country, will not be conducive to the situation. Likewise, there must be an understanding of the "push" and "pull" concept associated with these systems. If operational planning projections reveal that multiple units will decrease to combat ineffective statuses during their initial engagements; the proper procedure would be to

ensure you have unit replacements pushed forward to regenerate the force and maintain the operational tempo. However, this type of technique and conceptual guidance is nonexistent in the current concept. The present replacement concept solicits a mindset that assumes the individual replacement system will be able to handle a near-peer global threat and this is a grave mistake.

TRAINING

One of the biggest concerns that have continuously repeated itself throughout the 20th century has been the failure of the respective services to ensure that combat replacements received proper training prior to their deployment into a combat environment. When the respective service does not provide initial basic training and refresher training to personnel prior to placing them into combat they fail the service member. Training allows for familiarity with the environment, equipment, procedures, tactics, and methods. It further helps with mental preparation and physical hardening for what is to come. Equally, it fosters relationships, cohesion and unified confidence creating bonds which can then lead to increased performance. There are several training issues of concern dependent upon what pipeline the combat replacement originates from, (reserve vs active) and there is a large correlation between operational planning and the standard of training each replacement receives. In order for the Marine Corps to succeed in the next near-peer global conflict, they must make greater efforts to operationalize manpower in a manner that ensures proper operational planning emphasizes time for pre deployment training as a major key to wartime victory.

The current casualty replacement methodology does an inadequate job of teaching how operational planning affects overall training during wartime. When reviewing the current

concepts initial planning section, the guide indirectly links the Casualty Replacement Model with the planning efforts of DC, PP&O and M&RA's ability to determine the number of processing and training sites. Similarly, it shows a linkage between the CRM's results and School of Infantry (SOI) and combat refresher training i.e. obtaining (ammo, instructors, ranges and medical). Yet, it does not teach or example how the data from the CRM is used to assist the unit/organization with planning or how the model works. Due to the CRM inputted data being formed at the tactical level and submitted up to the respective MARFORs a review of the process should be re-assessed.

In clarifying how the data is used at the strategic level the individual units can ensure the quality and specifics of their work are aligned with the replacement models data requirements. Under the execution section of the replacement concept, it directs active duty casualty replacements to report to a Reserve Support Unit (RSU) for training but provides no basis as to why the providing unit cannot oversee the training of the replacement or any guidance on how the losing command selects the correct RSU. This same concern also resides with the activation of reserve force replacements. Similarly, one of the crucial flaws of this concept is its lack to address combat refresher training (CRT), which is one of the biggest causes of combat casualties. The concept states that CRT is determined by the service and supported Combatant Commander (CCDR) based on CG TECOM established CRT POI, operational considerations, and additional training requirements. This summarizes to CRT being optional depending on how bad the war gets and that some replacements may not get CRT training if some other type of training takes priority. A great example of this would be a cook who is re-designated as a 3531 MOS, truck driver and needs to attend drivers training. The current service replacement concept focuses solely on filling replacements by Grade and MOS, waives the CRT and sends the member (cook)

to Motor T School. The member receives the 3531 MOS and is sent directly into combat knowing how to drive but not knowing how to properly shoot the new M-4 that was given to him 4 days before his first tactical convoy. Tough, operational considerations/demands like this, which affect service member training, have been a threat to member's survival over multiple wars. However, as the Marine Corps invest more into teaching its administrative personnel the connection between combat operational planning and manpower force re-generation the training opportunities prior to combat, afforded to the combat replacement will increase thus enhancing combat effectiveness.

When evaluating the current Marine Corps' force regeneration Concept, the document does an adequate job of displaying the School of Infantry as an example of the CRT process. It reveals several manning level options, casualty replacement throughput and how the school will be augmented dependent upon the option selected. It further shows a notional timeline of throughput for a combat replacement who receives orders all the way up to arriving in theatre. Yet, this is the major indicator that the Marine Corps must focus even more on a near-peer conflict and the effects that it will have on replacement training.

What the casualty replacement timeline demonstrates is that from the reception of orders until arrival in theatre is 36 to 44 days depending on the 7 or 15 day CRT period of instruction! This explains why the current concept also comes with what I'd like to call a "warning" label stating, "These timelines may be shortened depending on the urgency of the crisis and waiver of delay by the SECDEF."¹¹⁵ This timeline as it currently stands is not realistic and places the combat replacement, in a near-peer conflict, at risk of receiving no training prior to going into theatre. Again, plans like this indicate that the current concept is insufficient and exposes a

system that focuses on quantity output and not quality and historically has been effective but works against the survival rate of the individual combat replacement.

PRACTICES

When looking through the history of service member's opportunities to receive training prior to entering a war, accounts in WWI, WWII, and Korea each echo cases of non-infantry service members receiving no initial or refresher combat training prior to being sent to the frontlines to fight. Other incidents reveal full divisions having their training and maneuvers timelines reduced or stopped due to the gutting of their units or early deployment to the combat zone. History has shown that the personal survival of the service member continues to be a risk based effort as each near-peer wartime engagement develops into a war of attrition. Training is a key component to the survival of each service member as it is the glue that links group loyalty and discipline to each warfighter and builds trust in his fellow member to his left and right.

It further provides the ability of an individual to build familiarity with equipment, tactics, and confidence in one's abilities. Hence, it is vital that the new casualty replacement concept address the technical and conceptual links between manpower and operational plans that influence and effect training opportunities for future combat replacements. Factors such as inaccurate casualty estimations, lack of training facilities/cadres, casualty replacement demands, loss of experienced cadres, operational demand and lack of proper equipment have continued to cost the government a fee in unnecessary deaths. This can only be avoided through in-depth consolidated efforts to afford the individual replacement proper time and training.

WWI

The manpower requirements for WWI were designed for a war of attrition. Organizational tactics and wartime demands had forced the US Army to grow from a peacetime size of 300,000 personnel to over 3,000,000 by the close of the war.¹¹⁶ During this time, the War Department had expected to train all loss replacements in depot brigades at the National Army cantonments but it soon developed that these 16 camps were not adequate. As a result, the Army sent freshly procured individuals directly to the division in the form of replacement drafts where they received training.¹¹⁷ This negatively affected the units and troop cohesion decreased due to disruptions in training as there remained a steady need to redistribute forces across the various divisions to keep them combat effective.

Other issues that effected training included units that were training receiving personnel after the period had already begun. Similarly, as the war continued commanders request for forces produced a manpower overage of personnel. Depot brigades in many cases were unsatisfactory for training replacements of a 30-division program and as more replacements arrived they became inadequate for the 80-division programs. Immediate takeover of entire camps began as soon as they became available from the departure of National Army divisions departing for overseas service.¹¹⁸ By March 1918, the depots contained more men than they could handle, as a result, all that the depots could accomplish was to receive draftees into the Army; separate the fit from the unfit, the literate from the illiterate; classify the men as to intelligence and vocational ability; put them in uniform and impart to them the rudiments of discipline; and, finally, group and entrain them for their units. There was little time for the training of replacements.¹¹⁹ Eventually, through a request from Major General John F. Morrison, director of Training, the War Department authorized the use of replacement training camps.

These camp courses, although helpful failed to train replacements on certain needed capabilities such as chemical warfare, tank, or air service units in the course of development. Lack of properly trained personnel also filtered into the Air Service which obtained service squadrons through the transfer of supply organizations no longer needed for other purposes. Air Service officers were being supplied from graduates of flying and balloon schools.

During this period, the war department issued regulations announcing that the term "replacement and training camp" no longer would be used. Installations known under that name were re-designated as "training centers." units engaged in training replacements were referred to as "replacement battalions" in both the training centers and the depot brigades.¹²⁰ As the training centers became operational more concerns would arise with the amount of time it took to source cadres for replacement training camps as the training pipeline extended. The first replacement camps were established in April 1918, but several months were required to get them operating. Reasons for the delay included: the cantonments which the camps were to occupy could not be made available until the divisions that had trained there were sent overseas; after the divisions moved, considerable alterations were necessary, officers and instructors had to be trained, and the recruits assembled.

By the end of 1918, divisions were able to devote their entire time and attention to combat training, with minimum distractions and without losses from requisitions to fill other units.¹²¹ Men trained as replacements for particular arms and services but were often used to meet immediate needs in other occupational specialties and jobs. A fine example of this was the first field artillery replacements sent overseas after completion of a course of training never reached field artillery units but were put to work on the railroads under the Corps of Engineers.¹²² The constant demand for combat replacements and the amount of time and

resources required to procure, house, train and equip such a large force led to drastic actions to ensure operational needs were met. The war would be won but the lessons learned from not properly training the bench ready force would not be learned as these same misguided actions would again repeat themselves in WWII.

WWII

Strategically, President Roosevelt's decision to declare a state of national emergency on 8 September 1939 had damaging impacts. Roosevelt insisted the Army Air Corps be expanded at the expense of the Army ground forces simultaneously with sales of military equipment to Britain and France, and his insistence that rearming of American forces not interfere with the Lend-Lease program made it very difficult to equip new units and train them with proper weaponry.¹²³ This would affect the type of ground force being created as training was key to the quality of a fighting force. By May of 1940, the Army was already discussing expanding the force beyond its limits. However, the existing mobilization plan did not provide for enough physical installations to house and train new replacements, nor did it include enough service units to support, such a larger army.¹²⁴

As casualty rates became excessive the Army refocused its commanders on retraining programs that advertised providing the maximum number of combat replacements from their own resources. This was to be done by assigning limited assignment service members to appropriate combat positions, thus forcing out of certain positions men who were physically qualified for combat. Actions like this were dangerous for moral and unit effectiveness, subordinate commanders were often reluctant to replace efficient men with untrained men, but service level leaders stressed that the success of the program depended upon the personal efforts of top commanders to break down this resistance.¹²⁵

Moreover, at the tactical level, the concept of “keeping the flow” of personnel at maximum speed without regard for what was going into the flow, was having a negative effect on personnel.”¹²⁶ This was due largely to the timing of the war which had caught the US military off guard with a small force and outdated insufficient equipment. This resulted in many replacements arriving in country having never held or fired a weapon, thrown a grenade or handled a mortar.¹²⁷ Examples from 1942 include some eight Divisions having been properly trained, and equipped but, lacking proper levels of ammunition, were only able to sustain two divisions. This was a common storyline throughout the combat zone.¹²⁸ Due to a lack of ammo, key weapons, communications gear, and transport equipment, training suffered making it difficult to teach soldiers how to fight and maintain the resources they would be using. Further, it limited commanders in their ability to practice how to fight their unit prior to going into the combat zone.¹²⁹ In some cases, the training situation was so depraved that replacements received M-1 rifles in combat even though, they were trained on 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles.¹³⁰ This organizational wide risk taking behavior of balancing training options against operational demand fostered a negative stigma that the combat replacement was bad luck and an easy target so, veterans avoided assisting and interacting with them for personal safety reasons. It can be highly assumed that there was a military wide acceptance in reducing training standards, requirements, timelines and expectations in order to keep large amounts of bench ready forces in the fight. This method, although unorthodox, would continue to be an acceptable means of regenerating replacements as the Korean War ramped up.

Korea

During this period, incidents of substandard training included the Army waiving draftee Initial Military Training (IMT) and shipping draftees directly to the combat zone from reception centers.¹³¹ Likewise, training delinquencies revealed the Marine Corps' efforts to offer a 4 week advanced infantry training package to no-prior service Marine reservist just before sending them into combat in Korea.¹³² Due to the aggressive loss of personnel a reduction in the individual training of the service member continued to be a trend as each wartime engagement developed into a war of attrition. Training is a key component to the survival of each service member. Yet, in order for optimal training to occur, there must be prior planning conducted to ensure all the necessary resources are present before the new inductees and replacements arrive. At the start of the Korean war, the Army, similar to WWII was not prepared for the large influx of personnel; some fifty-thousand selectees arrived every few months at the start of the draft. So, deficient manpower and time to open new training facilities they placed the burden on the regular Army CONUS divisions. Further training requirements shifted to National Guard forces because the divisions remained overwhelmed with providing basic training.

Examples include incidents where, operational demand was a priority, causing countless officers and enlisted personnel to receive new combat arms MOSs but they received little to no training. Inclusively, many prior service reservists that had been out of the military for several years received no training and were sent directly to combat.¹³³ In contrast, programs like the Army's Career Guidance Program, which placed officers into specific military occupational specialties, proved an impediment in shifting personnel into MOSs that needed fillers. Many officers with the leadership ability and training experience so sorely needed in combat units

missed opportunities to be in command of troops, because their noncombat specialties had been mandated under the career program.¹³⁴

Tactically, situations like those involving the Marines Iceland provided training lessons that stressed realistic/useful training. This was one of the biggest complaints of the individuals that had trained in Iceland prior to arriving at the Chosin Reservoir. Many stated the temperatures in Iceland never got below 10 degrees and the conditions never favored the ability to use skis and snowshoes.¹³⁵ Environmental effects such as snow, ice, avalanches, and harsh winds each come with dangers that expose individuals to the opposing enemy and to life-threatening concerns for Marines, Soldiers and Sailors alike. Therefore, it is important to remember that training should be tied into the operational design of the plan, allowing personnel to train to standards and situations that will most likely be experienced in the combat zone is vital.

Discussion

When assessing the topic of training within the current Marine Corps concept, it was surprising to find that there is no guidance/stance on the importance of training the replacement. When looking at the Army's FM 12-16, they make a firm stance that, "The training of replacements while they are in the replacement system unburdens the unit commander from having to do so. Training also helps reduce soldier/civilian isolation, anxiety, and fear. It additionally states that training also gives or refreshes the skill that will help the soldier/civilian survive, cope, and contribute on the battlefield."¹³⁶ This again reiterates the point that the current Marine Corps methodology is insufficient because it does not teach, guide or prepare the manpower planners for the worst case scenario of global conflict.

The Marine Corps, as America's "Naval ground force", must find a way to doctrinally connect the casualty replacement process with operational demand. Currently, there are no procedures or techniques taught that focus on properly linking operational planning to the training of a combat replacement. Inclusively, the current concept places operational demand/considerations as a priority over training which, has historically led to an increase in combat replacement deaths. The current concept which should be a procedures and teaching guide fails to promote force regeneration actions that emphasize ensuring replacements are receiving some acceptable form of training prior to deploying. One of the most repeated findings of this analysis has been in seeing how the quality of training/or lack thereof on force regeneration, is associated with the ability of the service to estimate the initial casualty calculation process correctly. The better trained the manpower planner and the more tied in they are with their respective G-3/S-3 operational planning, the better the accuracy of the casualty estimate. This then should lead to more availability for the combat replacement to train.

The following is a list of prime training concerns that must be addressed prior to a near-peer conflict arising; Basic Training timelines for Volunteers/Draftees, Refresher Training for Active Reservist, In-Active Reserves, and Retired Reservist. Additional concerns include; Cross MOS training timelines for anyone re-designated and in-county refresher training for combat replacements and arriving active duty forces. Operational demand for combat replacements has been the overarching threat to combat replacement survival throughout each near-peer contingency and will continue to affect training. However, training opportunities can increase through the Marine Corps' proactive efforts that link operational planning and casualty estimations. Services may also look to create mandated training timelines/ periods that take precedence over operational demand.

Lastly, we must acknowledge that time is limited and affects training requirements. The current concept provided an example of the time it took to deliver a combat replacement orders and process them from the US to the combat theater. What evidenced was an unacceptable amount of days dependent upon what phase and type of the war you are in. This same question of time could apply to full units destroyed in theatre that have to regenerate with new personnel to include key leaders. What does their mission essential training timeline to regenerate look like? The current replacement concept does not attempt to address this issue.

It also does not voice concerns of reorganizing or regenerating combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units and their difficulties due to requirements for replacement of personnel in high demand/ low-density MOSs. Reconstituting units like these require more time, detailed planning, more extensive cross-training, earlier selection of units for use in regeneration, and increased reliance.¹³⁷ None of the above are taken into account in the current concept. The current casualty replacement concept fails to address the various nuances tied to training the combat replacement. It fails to emphasize the importance of training to the success of the combat replacement and it fails to highlight to the manpower planners the negative effects that operational planning can have upon training when done incorrectly. The new concept must make a greater effort to expound upon these issues.

CONCLUSIONS

The following study reveals that the current Marine Corps Casualty Replacement Methodology within MCO 3000.19b is insufficient with regard to encompassing and teaching all the procedural, technical, and conceptual information that is required for a manpower planner to successfully conduct force regeneration actions in a near-peer conflict environment. The study

further reveals that there is a necessary requirement for more in-depth instruction on various key topics within the force regeneration category i.e. procurement, cohesion, replacement systems and training and how to better enhance these topics in the various phases of operational planning.

The primary objective of this study centered on the following question: How does a new consolidated casualty replacement concept that is focused on consolidation, procurement, cohesion, replacement systems and training help the Marine Corps to succeed in the next near-peer conflict? The results show that the Marine Corps as a first responder force cannot afford to be reactionary in its efforts to establish a casualty replacement concept built towards the worst case scenario, (global war). In choosing to ignore the historical trends and develop further detailed procedures towards a well thought out methodology the Marine Corps may be nurturing an environment that sets the combat replacement and the service up for failure. There are several negative trends identified throughout the literature review that continue to show a holistic military acceptance of prioritizing operational demand over core survival requirements of the combat replacement. The following six major conclusions are drawn from this analysis:

1.) **Consolidated Concept-** Currently, Marine Corps manpower planners are not being provided a service level reference that teaches the procedures, techniques and conceptual aspects of force regeneration and their connection to operational planning. This lowers the quality of services aimed at force regeneration and negatively affects the topics of procurement, cohesion, replacement systems, and training each in a different way. A great model to base the Corps' conceptual way ahead would be the Army's FM 12-16. It defines objectives and standards for integrating continuous support into a joint or combined battlefield and outlines those conditions and missions the personnel must anticipate. In taking the steps towards a consolidated casualty replacement concept the Marine Corps is providing a sustained foundation that all manpower

planners can access for casualty replacement planning purposes regardless of their combative level

2.) **Casualty Replacement Model (CRM)**- The Marine Corps currently does not have one but must move quickly to acquire one. The CRM and its ability to conduct casualty estimates stabilizes the assessment process and provides a service level standard for how casualty estimates should be conducted. Currently, there is no standard, this has permitted each unit/command to use whatever mythical calculations they so choose to determine casualties per each operational phase. Similarly, the study revealed that casualty estimates are highly correlated with planner efforts towards procurement, cohesion, replacement system choice and training. The more inaccurate the casualty estimate the more harshly each of the aforementioned is affected. The new concept must have a CRM and teach the procedural, technical and conceptual use of the model at the tactical level all the way up to the strategic level in order to standardize the casualty estimation process. These initial estimates if done correctly will sustain the initial forces that engage in combat and reduce the delay in operational tempo associated with trying to re-generate a force and still conduct combat operations.

3.) **Procurement**- Current and past American public opinion towards conscription has consistently been negative. And this is understandable as historical trends reveal that the all-volunteer force has steadily been a reliable method for raising armies during times of war. However, as this study discovered, there still remains a high probability for the use of conscription because it allows the nation to procure personnel on an immediate operational need and to indiscriminate voluntarism, allowing a fair share of military service to be spread about the nation throughout all classes. This study, further addresses the notion that due to the small size of the US all-volunteer force, the government must empower the Marine Corps to have a force

regeneration/casualty replacement concept in place that accounts for all the issues and concerns that will arise from an immediate expansion of its force structure due to the use of conscription.¹³⁸ In attacking the problem conceptually before the real conflict occurs, the Marine Corps can more accurately project and plan for the many nuances that emerge from growing a small force during a rapid time constrained situation. Lastly, it is significant to understand that there is no decision between picking a drafted force or a volunteer force to counter our competitors because both methods have negative and positive aspects associated with each.

The significance to the argument is directed towards allowing the Marine Corps quality time to find the proper mix between a draftee and volunteer force that will be necessary to meet and defeat a near peer threat. With historical trends that reflect well over 50 percent of the force being conscripted personnel during periods of near-peer conflict, it would be a disservice to the future draftees i.e. combat replacements and the United States as a whole for the Marine Corps to not have a conceptual plan in place. In the new casualty replacement concept, the issue of conscription needs to be prearranged as early as possible to ensure success in the first phases of combat.

4.) Cohesion- The current casualty replacement plan does not address the factor of cohesion in its concept. Task cohesion, which is what the Marine Corps must work to foster amongst its warriors, is a shared commitment among members at achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. Historical trends revealed that the lack of cohesion is linked to the survival of the combat replacement. There were multiple testimonies and documentation throughout this research that revealed the disconnect amongst members due to numerous factors that included; lack of proper training, resentment towards replacements taking the place of a dead service member, connection between arrival of combat replacement and increase in combat

operations and type of replacement system used to distribute personnel across the battlefields. The new concept must emphasize manpower/ force regeneration actions that focus on creating greater task cohesion during the operational planning and throughout execution. This can only be completed through the efforts of the service to teach manpower planners procedures and techniques that promote cohesion during operational planning.

5.) **Replacement Systems-** The current casualty replacement concept makes no effort to define the combat replacement system types, how they work, or what the benefits of either system are. The Corps does not actively associate the systems to the operational planning process and fails to link casualty estimation accuracy with what replacement system a planner may be forced to use. It is my belief, that the use of the wrong system during certain phases of an operation inversely affects the number of casualties and the duration of combat. The present replacement concept tolerates a mindset that assumes an individual replacement system alone will be able to handle a near-peer threat but, historically this has not been the case. In order for the Marine Corps to be successful in the next near peer conflict, it is imperative that the service moves forward with a doctrinal method that trains and teaches the procedures and techniques for the use of both systems, in essence, creating a combat replacement hybrid system. In doing so, they strengthen the knowledge and efforts of the manpower planner and enhance the Marine Corps' success in the next global conflict.

6.) **Training-** The current replacement concept does an insufficient job of endorsing the importance of training combat replacements. It fails to explain the importance of the Casualty Replacement Model and its vital connection with training opportunities being generated and afforded to replacements. It does not clearly link casualty estimation inaccuracy with a reduction in time for training opportunities for the combat replacement. It does not

successfully teach planners the relationship between training and cohesion which, historical trends reveal has a significant effect on the performance of service member in combat and their willingness to bond for mission accomplishment. Inclusively, the current concept supports the negative practice of maintaining operational demand/considerations as a priority over training. This practice historically has led to an increase in combat replacement deaths. The current concept which should be a consolidated technique, procedures, and teaching guide falls short in its ability to present a force regeneration concept that is holistic and transparent in its efforts to assist the Marine Corps in its endeavors to provide a continuous flow of quality "bench ready" forces for the next global conflict. In the new casualty replacement concept, the need for training and an emphasis on operational planning ideas that foster training opportunities must be a priority to ensure the Marine Corps is providing its casualty replacements as many tools as possible in order to succeed in war.

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