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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Prevailing in the "Age of Everything": Marine Special Operations Command and Improved Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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
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Executive Summary

Title: Prevailing in the “Age of Everything”: Marine Special Operations Command and Improved Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence

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Thesis: Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and its service conventional partner, the Marine Corps, have increased integration, interoperability, and interdependence (I-3) since 2006 when MARSOC was formed. To be better prepared for future threats and challenges in what has been called, “The Age of Everything,” MARSOC will be required to build upon MARSOC-Conventional Forces (CF) I-3 and strengthen and build interagency I-3. In order to identify and combat future threats, MARSOC must continue to develop further I-3 between service, joint conventional forces, and its increasing interagency partners. MARSOC-CF I-3 begins with understanding the future threats. MARSOC-USMC I-3 and MARSOC-Interagency I-3 are the fundamental concepts of increase I-3 for MARSOC.

Discussion: To build and increase I-3 between MARSOC, the Marine Corps, and the interagency the future operating environment in which all three players will respond to must first be identified. Once the future operating environment is established, MARSOC can align with the Marine Corps and its interagency partners by better integrating, becoming more interoperable, and interdependent. MARSOC shares many core tasks with the Marine Corps and has numerous solutions for future I-3. These MARSOC and Marine Corps solutions are represented in: Marine Corps air capabilities (Marine Air integrated with SOF for tailored response operations, utilizing already established fixed and rotary wing assets to conduct SOF training and operations), Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and SOF capabilities (MAGTF-SOF Capabilities, Marine Corps assistance to SOF core tasks, MAGTF-SOF digital systems interoperability and operations/intelligence fusion), MARSOC-Marine Corps I-3 in Common Operating Areas (Liaison elements between SOF and USMC, sharing geographic alignment responsibilities), I-3 through Intelligence (Enhanced concept of intelligence, filling the Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities gap, networking for rapid/precise fires, and USMC and MARSOC theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)) and lastly through training (Urban operations and complex terrain, and expeditionary logistics). MARSOC and its interagency partners can seek to expand I-3 through expanding the global SOF network, increasing liaisons, and through MARSOC’s further and expanded commitment to Irregular Warfare.

Conclusion: In order to combat future threats, MARSOC will have to increase its I-3 with CFs and its interagency partners. By examining the future threats and operating environments there are multiple I-3 solutions and themes that assist the Marine Corps, MARSOC and the interagency to better combat future threats. MARSOC will be required to further develop service relationships with the Marine Corps in overlapping area within training, equipping and operationally. Additionally, MARSOC must further develop established interagency

partnerships. The I-3 solutions represent a model to identify, coordinate and implement better I-3 between MARSOC, CFs and the interagency.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Prevailing in the “Age of Everything”: Marine Special Operations Command and Improved Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence

Since the creation of Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) in 2006, integration, interoperability, and interdependence (I-3) between the Marine Corps and conventional forces (CF) has improved. To be better prepared for future threats and challenges in what has been called “The Age of Everything,” MARSOC will be required to build upon MARSOC-CF I-3 and strengthen interagency I-3. This paper first examines future challenges for MARSOC and a way forward that supports multiple future operating concepts. It will then examine relationships with the greater Marine Corps focusing on manpower, training, and equipping. Finally, it will explore MARSOC-interagency relationship with the aim of enhancing whole of government I-3.

In addition, this paper develops a “concept” for I-3. For the purpose of increased understanding of I-3, the below definitions are critical to understanding the theme of this concept. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.¹ Interdependence is the purposeful reliance on each other’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both.² Lastly, interoperability is the ability of both organization’s systems, units, and forces to exchange information and services to operate in synergy in the execution of an assigned task.³ In 2016, the Marine Corps created *The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC): How an Expeditionary*

¹ U.S. Joint Staff, *JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, GL-8.

² MCRP 3-30.4, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*, 2014, P. 1.

³ U.S. Joint Staff J7 Irregular Warfare Assessment and Integration Division, *Special Operations Forces – Conventional Forces: Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence Final Report*, April 2015, Pg. 5.

Force Operates in the 21st Century to describe how the Marine Corps will conduct the range of military operations (ROMO) in accordance with its Title 10 responsibilities.

Part 1: MARSOC's Future Operating Environment, The Age of Everything

SOF provides critical capabilities to resolve future crises and support major operations. Success in the future environment will be determined by SOF's ability to navigate conflicts that fall outside traditional peace-or-war constructs. SOF's greatest value to the nation lies in its global perspective, coupled with the ability to act early with partners to provide a range of options for policy makers. Operating ahead of crisis allows SOF and partners to develop long-term and cost-effective options to prevent or mitigate conflict.⁴ MARSOC will be required to develop a deeper understanding of the environment to see and act ahead of flashpoints of instability, inform the development of US options, and reduce operational and strategic blind spots.⁵ In order to create critical tasks needed to be prepared for the future operating environment, MARSOC must establish a future operating concept that draws upon joint, service and SOF future operating environments. The degree to which MARSOC will contribute to the United States' (US) future defense will depend on its ability to recognize and adapt to the challenges of the future operating environment.⁶ The joint operating environment (JOE) focuses on powerful states and non-state actors that establish their own sets of rules against the US and its interests (contested norms). The joint future operating environment also directs the joint force to address a second issue where weak states become increasingly incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance (persistent disorder).⁷

⁴ U.S. Special Operations Command. *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept*. Tampa, FL. (1 February 2016): Commander's Forward.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶ U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018): 2.

⁷ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*. Washington, DC. (14 July 2016): 4.

In addition, the Marine Corps' Future Operating Environment (FOE) focuses on the control of information and defending across all domains. Conflict will be fought by ideologically aligned coalitions and their proxies. Armed intervention will be only one tool in an increasingly information-centered battlespace. The US and its allies will play a key role in how to counter the proliferation of old and new weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Information and influence operations will shape the political and social battlespace.⁸ The future operating environment will be characterized by an increasingly complex set of challenges in every part of the world. These challenges will range from the destabilizing influence of state aggression, to the expansion of radical networks across regions, to the growing threat of information warfare.⁹ Threats will be increasingly transnational, trans-regional, and multi-domain. This era of extraordinary security challenges has been described as "the age of everything," an age where commanders must meet the high demand for all types of missions and threats.¹⁰ Beyond the employment of improved technology, adversaries will continue to blend traditional and irregular techniques, capabilities, and resources to execute hybrid approaches in the gray zone¹¹, the space between peaceful competition and war.

To respond and prepare for future threats, MARSOC will continue its emphasis on a limited footprint and will find itself as a key constituent to any US response. The first US combat elements to respond to this future threat will be the US SOF and the MAGTF. MARSOC will have to grow in areas to be better equipped to respond to threats. Within all future operating concepts, the use of SOF as a tool will increase. In order to fully understand each problem that MARSOC is faced with and respond correctly without escalating tensions will entail accepting a

⁸ U.S Marine Corps. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity: *Future Operating Environment 2015-2025*. Quantico, VA. (15 March 2015): 16.

⁹ U.S. Special Operations Command. *SOCOM's Strategic Appreciation and USSOCOM 2035*. MacDill AFB, FL. 2017.

¹⁰ Carter, Ashton B., "Maintaining the Edge in the Age of Everything." Speech. 2 November 2015; Bradley Peniston, Work: "The Age of Everything Is the Era of Grand Strategy," November 2015.

¹¹ U.S. Special Operations Command. *White Paper: The Gray Zone*. 09 September 2015.

certain level of political risk. The complexity of a particular situation will likely require a wide range of interagency and allied partners to understand and an even larger network of capabilities to address.¹² This will require MARSOC to establish better interagency partnership and a better relationship with the Marine Corps.

MARSOC and the Marine Corps mission sets will include assisting in security missions, protecting vulnerable US diplomatic facilities, supporting counterterrorism (CT), and protecting innocents.¹³ Marine Special Operation Forces (MARSOF) will execute missions set against the context of regional competition or instability. The complexity of the operating environment will dramatically challenge the ability of leaders at all levels to understand it and come to meaningful solutions. MARSOC formations must be prepared to solve volatile, complex, multi-party, high-stakes problems that defy the application of traditional US strengths and solutions.¹⁴ As conflict moves further into the information and cyber spaces, MARSOF will find itself leveraging theater, interagency, and national level tools to achieve desired outcomes.¹⁵ Globally integrated operations will encourage collaboration across the Joint Force and with partners. These operations allow stakeholders to bring differing perspectives and capabilities to bear on complex challenges.¹⁶

Part 2: MARSOC-USMC I-3

Several Marine Corps capabilities intersect with special operations (SO) mission sets. By comparing a services' general-purpose forces (GPF) and its SOF component, the Marine Corps

¹² U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018): 6.

¹³ U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Intelligence Activity: Future Operating Environment 2015-2025*. Quantico, VA. (15 March 2015): 15.

¹⁴ U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018):6.

¹⁵ U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018): 7.

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*. Washington, DC. (10 Sept 2012): 8.

and US Army (USA) have the most overlap and ability for I3. All core tasks that MARSOC conducts are comprised of several functions that conventional Marine intelligence, logistics, aviation, infantry, communication, and reconnaissance units can support or conduct. This overlap is seen as many support personnel rotate between conventional and SOF units. SOF missions have resulted in a situation in which MARSOC and the “Big Marine Corps” retain significant overlap in mission competencies.¹⁷ Both MARSOC and the Marine Corps gain from integrating capabilities that ultimately sharpen each other’s skills. MARSOC can develop better I-3 in four areas: Marine Corps air capabilities, MAGTF capabilities, geographic common operating areas, intelligence collection, and training.

Marine Corps Air Capabilities within I-3: Marine Air Integrated with SOF for Tailored Crisis Response Operations, USMC HMLA (Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron) and MARSOC Relationship in the Conduct of SOF Training and Operations

Marine Air Integrated with SOF for Tailored Crisis Response Operations:

MARSOC and the Marine Corps can build on the relationships and capabilities that the Navy and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) already possess. U.S. Navy assault support helicopter platforms have already established effective relationships with NSW SOF elements. This relationship has established the very best tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for specific amphibious and maritime operations such as vessel visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations. MARSOC has worked to better its VBSS TTPs through working with these same U.S. Navy helicopter units. The USMC would gain from working with both NSW and U.S. Navy helicopter units in VBSS operations. By dedicating an Marine light attack helicopter squadron

¹⁷ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 24.

(HLMA) to both the east and west coast MARSOC elements that train specifically to SOF TTPs, the Marine Corps will gain experience that remains in its own aviation community. The Marine Corps and MARSOC gain by working with each other on these types of mission profiles on a regular basis and get bilateral training on critical mission sets.

MARSOC and the USMC should also explore the use of Marine Corps aircraft to set up VBSS elements. The Marine Corps is not currently equipped to support “bottom up” or boat assault force (BAF) operations. The Marine Corps conducts limited bottom up VBSS operations and requires navy assistance. The Marine Corps is able to support “top down” or helicopter assault force (HAF) VBSS operations through organic MAGTF air support. MARSOC and the USMC should partner to create USMC aerial support element for VBSS operations. The aerial support element would consist of a Marine assault force (Marine Corps reconnaissance element or MARSOC), a rotary wing assault support element, a possible rotary wing escort element, and a fixed wing element to command and control the task force and provide initial sensor support on the target.

USMC HMLA (Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron) and MARSOC

Relationship: MARSOC is not set to establish its own aviation element in the near future but, can establish relationships with Marine Corps aviation elements that accomplish similar results. In order to better develop a relationship between MARSOC and the Marine Corps, both elements should focus on strengthening each other’s strongest capabilities. Assault support, ISR, close air support (CAS), Close Combat Attack (CCA) and an ability to provide overhead command and control, are critical to both MARSOC and the MAGTF, however, both elements do not greatly assist each other in training or during combat operations to the full extent. The Marine Corps and MARSOC would greatly benefit in forming a HAF element that works solely with SOF elements

and trains to specific special operation (SO) missions. This element would not solely be utilized by SOF elements. The HAF element should be comprised of Marine aviation assets both rotary and fixed wing. The concept has functioned inside of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) but has since been lost. The concept also worked between the navy and NSW through the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadrons (HSC). Although only a single HSC squadron still exists, HSC-85 is dedicated to special operations support as its primary role and can be tasked by USSOCOM. HSC-85 and NSW elements train and specialize in special operations missions as well as being deployed in support of each other. The concept has proved very successful with a pool of seasoned aviators with extensive SO experience who solely focused on SO, SOF support.

The Marine Corps and MARSOC do now have a relationship where a tasked Marine squadron provides direct support (DS) or specializes in SO mission to MARSOC. The concept has worked operationally during combat SO HAF missions but has not cemented any type of relationship. The Marine Corps was able to create a tailored assault support element that was comprised of Marine Corps CH-53s that were escorted by Marine Corps AH-1s. The assault support and escort element was scalable depending on the size of assaulters. The Marine Corps provided overall command and control through the fixed wing Harvest Hawk (KC-130J) and interoperability between conventional and SOF systems was established in extensive rehearsals. The Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, Command and Control (C2), Close Combat Attack (CCA), Close Air Support (CAS), and the assault support elements will all be comprised of Marine Corps air assets. Marine Corps aviation possesses the required assault support, escort, attack helicopter, fixed wing C2, sensors and payloads needed for world class HAF operations. The Marine Corps would gain from aligning a HAF squadron that provided DS to MARSOC and other SOF elements. This relationship would be mutually beneficial and

strengthen each other's ability to integrate and increase special capabilities. A dedicated HMLA would be similar to the navy-NSW HSC model where a Marine squadron would specialize and maintain resident knowledge on SO missions and SOF tactics. The Marine Corps could dedicate two HMLAs (one to each coast) and concentrate its highly skilled aviators to these units for high risk mission and building inherent trust into a relationship between MARSOC and Marine Corps aviation planners and operators.

MAGTF-SOF I-3: MAGTF-SOF Capabilities, USMC Assists with SOF Core Tasks, MAGTF-SOF Digital Systems Interoperability and Operations/Intelligence Fusion

Integrating MAGTF-SOF Capabilities: The Marines Corps and US SOF are naturally aligned in terms of mission approach and execution. Both are forward-deployed in similar geographical areas, both are actively engaged in shaping operations and are able to respond immediately to crises with a tailored response, and perform operations in an enduring campaign. The MAGTF possesses powerful capabilities that complement SOF operations.¹⁸ Marines and SOF can combine their unique mission orientations and approaches to be better postured to defeat the modern enemy operating around the globe. The effectiveness of this combined force of Marine and SOF interconnectedness must be strengthened, expanded, and formalized to better support geographic combatant command (GCC) requirements.¹⁹

Forward-deployed MAGTFs and MARSOF, operating within the same region, provide increased opportunity for interoperability between the Marine Corps and the special operations community.²⁰ A forward-deployed SOF, with an established footprint, communicates the

¹⁸ U.S. Marine Corps. *United States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability*. Washington, DC. (28 July 2017): 7.

¹⁹ U.S. Marine Corps. *United States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability*. Washington, DC. (28 July 2017): 2.

²⁰ U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Special Operations*, MCWP 3-05. Washington, DC. (1 June 2017): 8-2.

evolving situation to the MAGTF, which provides a sustained national response.²¹ SOF access and relationships present significant advantages for the integrated Marine and SOF team. This access and relationships give Marine Corps forces the visibility on crisis response or plans the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) is working on in support of the GCC.²² This allows the Corps to suggest ways that Marines could support such plans, ideally in an integrated manner.

SOF and CF often share the same operational areas for extended periods when they are mutually reliant on each other's capabilities. SOF-CF synchronization facilitates unity of effort and maximizes the capability of the joint force which allows the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to optimize the principles of joint operations in planning and execution.²³ MAGTFs also execute phase zero operations or respond to crises, often without the advantage of local area knowledge and preexisting relationships. USSOCOM's global presence and foreign partnerships developed with strong language and cultural expertise, are critical to working with the local populace and security forces and can assist the MAGTF.

USMC assists with SOF core tasks: The GCCs are increasing their demand for tailored forces to conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with a wider number of partner nations. Security Force Assistance (SFA), joint combined exercise training (JCET), and phase zero activities are important elements for both the Marine Corps and MARSOC's engagement strategy and the GCC's theater campaign planning. These activities ensure access prior to the start of contingencies and contribute directly to the reduction of ungoverned spaces from which

²¹ Ibid., 8-4.

²² U.S. Marine Corps. *United States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability*. Washington, DC. (28 July 2017): 8.

²³ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05 - Special Operations*. Washington, DC. 16 July 2014: III-23.

future adversaries may originate.²⁴ The Marine Corps must develop additional opportunities for regional rotational training bases that improve interaction with partner militaries, increase regional knowledge and keep Marines forward deployed. The Marine Corps and MARSOC would benefit from partnering during these types of rotations by deploying to similar regions and working together while deployed. Security cooperation and Marine Corps train and assist units could reduce the redundancy by partnering with MARSOC regional security elements.

Prior to MARSOC, the Marine Corps conducted Foreign internal defense (FID) and SFA through the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU). The FMTU structure and personnel were used to create the Marine Raider Regiment staff and a third Marine battalion that was known as the Marine Special Operations Advisory Group (MSOAG). Since then the Marine Corps has not fully re-established a robust ability to conduct FID and SFA. Several units exist in the Marine Corps that conduct special operation type missions and train to SOF core capabilities. Following FMTU becoming part of MARSOC, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) and Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) filled the Marine Corps role in security cooperation (SC) programs around the globe. Both Marine units combined in 2011 to create the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG). Globally, Marine Corps personnel deploy to conduct similar missions as their MARSOC counterparts. Both units include advisor skills, training and assessment expertise, and security assistance program management with the major difference being in training, equipment, funding, and authorities. The MCSCG mission is to execute and enable SC programs, training, planning, and activities in order to ensure unity of effort in support of our Corps and Regional Marine Component Command (MARFOR) objectives, and in coordination with operating forces and

²⁴ United States Marine Corps, Combat Development and Integration, *Expeditionary Force 21 – Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future*, March 2014, Pg. 9.

MAGTFs. MARSOC and MCSCG would greatly benefit from assisting one other. The Marine Corps should increase MCSCG overall staff and missions. There are numerous SC missions that are designated as SOF missions that are unable to be filled due to the shortfall in US SOF. MCSCG could work with MARSOC to conduct supporting and geographically connected missions. This would allow for shared training, culture and regional expertise and increased involvement with CF and SOF during deployment area of operations.

MAGTF-SOF digital systems interoperability and operations/intelligence fusion:

Interoperability is a lower state of SOF-GPF interaction than integration. CF and SOF often use different digital systems from radios to computer systems. Integration can be achieved in the absence of interoperable systems. MARSOC and the Marine Corps should seek interoperable systems or train to share information. Because MARSOC must work with both USSOCOM and Marine Corps units, it is important to understand each other's systems. MARSOC must lead the way on digital systems interoperability and seek like systems or work arounds. Interoperability of systems lowers the barriers to integration and reinforces the shifts in thinking, operations, and culture described above.²⁵

MARSOC-USMC I-3 in Common Operating Areas: Liaison Elements Between SOF and USMC, Sharing Geographic Alignment Responsibilities

Strengthen Liaison Elements between SOF and USMC: Liaison between SOF commands and the Marine Corps has improved over the last ten years. For starters, the Marine Corps has been involved in using the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) as a critical point for SOF-CF coordination and synchronization of special operations activities

²⁵ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 13.

with other joint operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conducts operations in support of a CF. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander.²⁶ Since MARSOC was established, the SOF Liaison Element (SOFLE) has evolved to be more than a task organized rotational SOF element deployed within a specific nation or embedded within CF to conduct liaison activities to a permanent liaison within Marine Corps organizations. The SOFLE is tasked with coordination, assessing, and recommending training, equipping, and engaging opportunities with host nation (HN) forces or provide connectivity and synchronization of expeditionary forces.²⁷ Having a permanent SOFLE on Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) was created by the USSOCOM Commander and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to facilitate greater cooperation between SOF and Marine forces.²⁸ This greater cooperation was successful in the integration of Marines and SOF through the deployment of a SOFLE with Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG)/MEUs.²⁹ The first ARG/MEU SOFLE conducted a workup and deployed with the 11th MEU in July 2014 and continues to today with each east and west coast MEU. The SOFLE provides the critical links to the SOF network, the TSOC forward-deployed SOF elements, and interagency partners. Collaboration between SOF and Services will facilitate cross-organizational knowledge and communication for dynamic responses to rapidly evolving events.³⁰ To demonstrate the importance of the SOFLE, in 2017, the USSOCOM commander made the program an operational requirement. The SOFLE program has been a wide success for the Marine Corps as well. Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOC) have increased their

²⁶ Ibid., III-18.

²⁷ Ibid., III-22.

²⁸ Insinna, Valerie. "Marine Corps Adds Special Operations Element to Expeditionary Units." *Defense Daily* (20 April 2015).

²⁹ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 3.

³⁰ U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Special Operations*, MCWP 3-05. Washington, DC. (1 June 2017): 8-4.

need for Marine MEU aviation, logistics and intelligence support. MARSOC has trained all SOFLEs since it was created. The Marine Corps has reciprocated this by placing a “Marine liaison element” (MARLE) in the TSOC.³¹ This has allowed the Marine Corps to provide more responsive and tailored, MAGTF centered, crisis response options to the TSOC.

MARSOC can further integrate with the USMC by placing liaisons at various MAGTFs. SOF liaison elements at CF headquarters play a critical role in SOF-CF I-3.³² The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the USMC’s Special Purpose MAGTFs for crisis response (SPMAGTF-CRs)³³ would be ideal due to similar training and capabilities. Liaison elements could help mitigate the lack of trusted relationships, SOF misunderstandings and could help educate MAGTF leaders on how to utilize SOF as an additional option or capability.

Sharing Geographic Alignment Responsibilities: The Marine Corps and MARSOC have yet to align forces in support of each other’s geographic expertise. The Marine Corps has cultural, language, intelligence and tactical expertise within each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) that could benefit from the current geographic alignment of MARSOC’s construct. MARSOC remains tied in some way to a region through an established partner force either for a long period of time. A MEF and an Marine Raider Battalion (MRB) can begin habitual relationships that support each other through training and operationally. Due to MARSOC’s enduring commitment to several partner forces and expertise in several regions of the world, increased integration of Marine Corps forces into these geographic areas would be mutually beneficial. Talks must begin between the MEF and MARSOC commanders and their staffs to

³¹ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 34.

³² Wesbrock, Jason, Glenn Harned, and Preston Plous. “Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence.” *Prism 6*, no 3 (2015): 91.

³³ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 3.

begin coordination between MRBs and USMC general purpose force (GPF) battalions conducting these deployments. These relationships facilitate the involvement of MARSOC and MEF units (SPMAGTFs and MEUs) in each other's pre-deployment training and work-up cycles (MARSOF play in the MEU certification exercise (CERTEX) and USMC GPF observation of the MARSOC RAVEN exercises).³⁴

I-3 through Intelligence: Enhanced Concept of Intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities Gap, Networking for Rapid/Precise Fires, USMC and MARSOC Theater ISR

Enhanced Concept of Intelligence: Future forces will increasingly rely on sensors, networks, architectures, and tradecraft to establish and maintain situational awareness, influence the operating environment, and support decision-making at higher headquarters and on down to the point of action. The MAGTF must complement this with information harvested from commercial and social information sources. A deeper understanding of the environment developed from the collected observations, information, and experiences of Marines up and down the echelons of the force. MARSOC and Marine Corps elements must seek to capture the value of pushing networked intelligence down to tactical units.

Intelligence sharing between the Marine Corps and MARSOC is a requirement in order to maintain an edge on future threats. Marines and SOF have access to formidable operational, theater, and national intelligence capabilities. Both the MAGTF and SOF are equipped to generate tactical intelligence but require reach-back support for analytical depth and capacity. With its robust communications and ISR architecture, a MAGTF not only can generate a multi-

³⁴ Schroden, Jonathan, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans. *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*. Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA. (December 2015): 12.

source, multi-discipline intelligence picture organically, but also possesses a robust reach-back capability through the Marine Corps' Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) that provides ready access to a broad range of Service and Intelligence Community resources.³⁵ MCISRE and the Marine Corps can further develop a better relationship with USSOCOM through MARSOC. No agency or service has sufficient ISR capacity and would benefit by assisting each other.

Preparation of the environment and phase zero operations are integral to both SOF and CF. SOF conducts preparation of the environment prior to the arrival of follow-on force³⁶ and has significant organic all source intelligence collection assets as well as a robust reach back capability that extends into all intelligence agencies within the US. Special operations forces take actions to prepare the operational environment for potential operations by various means but in many cases overlap with Marine Corps intelligence collections. SOF focuses on preparation of the environment (PE) during the shaping phase of an operation, as well as developing and preparing for the entry of conventional forces. SOF also supports agencies that resolve conflicts using either lethal or nonlethal action. SOF are usually located within an area and assigned to conducting PE. CF also play a large role in supporting PE through supporting special operations advance force operations (AFO). CFs are also forward-deployed or stationed in areas to conduct PE either alone or along with SOF. AFO encompasses many PE activities, but are intended to prepare for near-term direct action. The MAGTF along with several specialized units within the Marine Corps could greatly assist or take the lead on PE activities. Special operations AFO may include, but are not limited to, close target reconnaissance; tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL);

³⁵ U.S. Marine Corps. *United States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability*. Washington, DC. (28 July 2017): 9.

³⁶ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05 - Special Operations*. Washington, DC. 16 July 2014: II-4.

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces; infrastructure development; and terminal guidance.³⁷

The Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities Gap: Manned and UAS payloads can be equipped to support MAGTF and SOF operations. The Marine Corps will incorporate an EW capability into current and future UAS platforms as EA-6B Prowlers are being phased out. The Marine Corps addresses EW requirements through an approach called MAGTF EW where an integrated, platform-agnostic, EW capabilities, can be placed on manned and unmanned assets. The Marine Corps' vision is on developing a system or using existing systems like the Intrepid Tiger II (ALQ-231) that can be placed on any manned or unmanned aviation platform in the Marine Corps. Electronic Warfare Service Architecture (EWSA) allows data exchange and hardware protocol intended to connect EW/SIGINT airborne nodes to ground operators, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Coordination Cells (CEWCCs), and other air EW nodes. MARSOC and MAGTF operations can use the EWSA and have "on-demand EW fires" in operational conditions under CEWCC control, and will unite Air EW, Ground EW, and SIGINT via an adaptive network with multiple waveforms.³⁸

Networking for Rapid/Precise Fires: In future conflicts MARSOC and the Marine Corps will operate against adversaries with effective ISR and the ability to place long-ranged fires both with precision and for massed effects. In the current fight with Islamic State (IS) both SOF and CFs have fought against an enemy with these capabilities. SOF depend on unmanned aircraft (UA) with imagery, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and other intelligence collection capability to provide persistent, high-fidelity intelligence on an adversary that moves and

³⁷ U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Special Operations*, MCWP 3-05. Washington, DC. (1 June 2017): 2-3.

³⁸ Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, "Electronic Warfare," *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs*, accessed December 2017, <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/aviation>

operates among civilians.³⁹ Marine Corps units will have to learn to train and operate these capabilities down to the lowest level as MSOTs have been doing since their existence. MARSOC and the Marine Corps must acquire means to interdict and destroy enemy UAS capabilities. This shortfall affects both SOF and conventional forces. The Marine Corps and MARSOC must partner to integrate testing teams that explore ways to defeat enemy UAS capabilities.

The find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate (F3EAD) model that was developed over the past several years of conflict serves to fully integrate intelligence and SOF operations in a continuous ISR and targeting cycle.⁴⁰ Airborne ISR, specifically full motion video (FMV) and SIGINT, is essential to COIN and counter-network operations. Outside of SOF it is clear that services are behind in providing adequate resources to deployed forces. The Marine Corps would benefit in purchasing similar program of record small and tactical UAS platforms. Airborne ISR is most effective when it is massed, synchronized with operations, integrated with all-source intelligence, and employed under a unity of organization. Forward deployed SOF and CFs must have forward processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) integrated into the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). MARSOC does not currently possess a system can PED and is integrated into a TOC. MARSOC must continue to develop this capability within each Marine Special Operation Company (MSOC). Marine Corps infantry units must have this capability at the infantry battalion level with the capability to conduct operations out of each company. This will require significantly increasing the personnel trained in managing ISR, purchasing appropriate level unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and establishing fully integrated TOCs. Airborne ISR is the centerpiece of the F3EA because it is tightly synchronized with a finishing

³⁹ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05 - Special Operations*. Washington, DC. 16 July 2014: II-6.

⁴⁰ Joint Special Operations University. *Special Operations Intelligence: Guiding the Tip of the Spear, JSOU Report*, November 2015. JSOU Press: MacDill AFB, FL: 96.

force.⁴¹ Marine aviators that fill the role of forward air controllers (FAC) within MARSOC and the Marine Corps down to the MSOC and infantry battalions are ideal for managing small and tactical UAS programs. This includes the ordering, training and sustaining of the personnel and equipment. To further integrate UAS operations into MARSOC and Marine Corps operations, the FAC should be used as a vital part of the company or battalion operations section. MARSOC is set to expand its UAS personnel by integrating permanent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) military occupation specialty (MOS) trained Marines. These MOS trained UAV operators can be pushed down to the MSOC level and further deliver UAS support to operations.

USMC and MARSOC theater ISR: MARSOC and the Marine Corps have been working on ways for conventional Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU) to support SOF operations through their various UAS platforms. The concept yielded negative results over the last two years but serves as an excellent starting point. Although the initial idea seemed to be sound, the VMU squadrons were too large and burdensome to support SOF effectively. The large footprint, in addition to the unrealistic force protection requirements, poor sensors, and limited flight hours made integration difficult.

The difficulty in integrating the VMU to support MARSOC does not negate the need for MARSOC and the Marine Corps to have an organic capability that can provide full motion video (FMV) processing, exploitation, and dissemination collaboration (PED) capability that supports the MAGTF, MARSOC, and the joint force. MARSOC units did not gain from having the VMU support and were able to address the UAS problem with organic and purchased small UAS (SUAS) and tactical UAS (TUAS) managed internally to the MSOC. Outside of the VMU, ISR was supplemented with contracted ISR that required little to no footprint, had more advanced

⁴¹ Flynn, Michael T, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell. "Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices" *Joint Force Quarterly*, 50, 3rd Quarter (2008): 61.

payloads and could fly additional hours. Lastly, MARSOC gained from the sourced conventional and SOF specific theater ISR that was far superior to the VMU capabilities. The support relationship that existed between the VMU and MARSOC forward deployed units was an excellent start, however, inferior sensors and the reasons listed earlier have slowed progress. Since the Marine Corps' entry into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and now Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) the demand for dedicated unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems has grown exponentially. ISR collections through organic UAS has played a critical part in supporting the MAGTF's aerial reconnaissance requirement as well as other missions such as communications relay and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collections.⁴² For starters, the Marine Corps or MARSOC must purchase its own theater level UAS unit. Currently, the Marine Corps only operates TUAS (RQ-7B Shadow), Small Tactical UAS (STUAS) (MQ-21A Blackjack), and various SUAS (RQ-11B Raven, RQ-20 Puma and Wasp IV). In 2013, United States Special Operations Command upgraded to the MQ-1C Grey Eagle and is operated under the Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). The added range, endurance, and available payloads provides a capability that directly supports the service. MARSOC does not possess the structure to support the MQ-1C but VMU squadrons are capable of supporting a more capable system than they currently field. The Marine Corps is far behind all other services on group 4/5 UAS. An upgraded VMU could provide an added fires and collection capability for the MAGTF and MARSOC.

In the interim, MARSOC and the Marine Corps have purchased a group 2 SUAS that will be utilized by both elements. Although the Stalker XE (SUAS) is not a group 4/5 UAS it is a very capable system and is a step in the right direction in I-3 and a more advanced and capable

⁴² Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, "Unmanned Aerial Systems," *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs*, accessed December 2017, <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/aviation>

UAS. The Stalker XE is already being field in both MARSOC and the Marine Corps. The system boasts longer endurance (playtime) than any current SUAS, low altitude silent operations, and it can be equipped with several multi-function, plug and play payloads. The most important feature is its ability to broadcast its signal beyond the tactical UAS operator and into a TOC to give decision makers better situational awareness, shorten the kill chain or develop targets and patterns of life all real time.

Training: Urban Operations and Complex Terrain, Expeditionary Logistics

Urban Operations and Complex Terrain: The Marine Corps is experimenting with new equipment, structing, and training that better prepares the Marine Corps to fight in the future operating environment within urban areas and complex terrain. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has spearheaded this effort with the Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 25) to ensure the MAGTF is postured to address the challenges of the future operating environment. Sea Dragon 2025 (SD 25) takes MCF 25 and creates an experiment roadmap to build an expeditionary force for the 21st century. SD 25 focused on the Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 2025) infantry battalion. Most of the equipment that was used to equip the infantry battalion is already been used by SOF. The Marine Corps would have benefited from integrating MARSOC into the training of this phase to give the Marine Corps a better understanding of what it takes to train, equip, and sustain these skills and advanced equipment. Lessons learned in MARSOC over the last ten years would have assisted in this effort.

The next phase of SD 25 will include dynamic concurrent experiment efforts focused on dense urban operations, 21st century fires, an adaptive threat force, and the continuation of the Marine Corps Experiment Operational Advisory Group (EXP OAG). All of these efforts must be integrated with MARSOC. Both elements are trying to solve the same problems by using

emerging concepts and technologies. This next phase of SD 25 has already started focusing on the MAGTF hybrid logistics and will proceed with information environment operations, and EAB operations. MARSOC and the Marine Corps must employ this concept for I3 during the remainder of SD 25.

Expeditionary Logistics: As described above, MCF 25 is addressing the logistics challenges of operating within the future operating environment through hybrid logistics experimentations. The Marine Corps is working to adopt a “hybrid” approach to expeditionary logistics that leverages the rapid development of unmanned/autonomous logistics systems, additive manufacturing, and “smart” logistics information technologies to support a widely distributed force in an anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) environment. Combat Logistics Battalions (CLB) 8 and 6 are serving as the USMC FY18 experiment forces and support live-force experiments. The focus will focus on tactical-to-strategic logistics in contested environments. This is another area where MARSOC and the Marine Corps must work together. Lastly, this portion of MCF 25, hybrid logistics also focuses on the medical support in these same environments.⁴³ The MAGTF and this increased medical support is another way the Marine Corps can provide added support to SOF forward-deployed units.

Part 3: MARSOC-Interagency I-3

MARSOC must be as comfortable working as a part of interagency or multinational efforts when serving inside of a Raider formation.⁴⁴ SOF, as part of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) network, must be increasingly flexible, agile, and capable of integrating operations across national and GCC seams to effectively neutralize threats

⁴³ Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Sea Dragon 2025 Assessment Conference.” *Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory*, accessed December 2017, <http://www.mcw1.marines.mil>

⁴⁴ U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018): 10.

to US interests.⁴⁵ Policy objectives are only achieved by the integration of JIIM partners' capabilities focused toward shared objectives and common goals. Understanding this, SOF will execute Integrated Campaigning as part of a larger JIIM team to achieve the Central Idea of this concept.⁴⁶

To achieve greater collective JIIM agility and flexibility, MARSOC will formally embed and exchange liaison elements with an evolving list of partners to achieve an unprecedented degree of understanding and capability for integrated action. MARSOC will modify organizations to ensure that each liaison element is properly structured and manned by SOF personnel with the education and experience to be valuable, productive contributors to partner organizations while advancing and protecting US interests globally.⁴⁷ Interagency interaction facilitates our development of Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCCs). These multilateral coordination forums established in key locations around the world are to promote multinational collaboration, education and training opportunities with partner nation SOF. RSCCs shall facilitate long-term relationships and burden-sharing to achieve mutual security objectives.⁴⁸ In order to expand the global SOF network for MARSOC, there must be better efforts to increase interagency liaisons and establish a further commitment to Irregular Warfare (IW) and specifically Unconventional Warfare (UW).

Increase interagency liaisons: MARSOC personnel must increase interagency billets along with increasing interagency partners brought in to fill billets within MARSOC. The most common way to achieve this is through increasing interagency liaisons through Special Operations Support Teams (SOST). USSOCOM elements in the national capital region (NCR)

⁴⁵ U.S. Special Operations Command. *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept*. Tampa, FL. (1 February 2016): 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁸ U.S. Special Operations Command. *SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear*. MacDill AFB, FL. (2013): 6.

facilitate interagency coordination between SOF and other interagency partners, and are a major element in the global SOF network that enables interagency coordination overseas. MARSOC must fill all current SOST billets and expand to additional agencies. Special operations support teams (SOSTs) are cornerstones of the USSOCOM. MARSOC Special Operations Officer (SOO) career path must allow for short rotations to fill SOST billets and encourage participation for O-4 and O-5s and sending quality officers to represent MARSOC. The key hurdle in filling critical interagency liaisons is still availability of MARSOC personnel.

The Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP) is the methodology for providing on-site facilitation of DoD planning with other USG departments and agencies for global operations against terrorist networks. The IAPP supports intergovernmental agency information sharing, improves security situational awareness, and builds a teamwork approach to unified security activities. SOSTs are USSOCOM representatives embedded with the NCR HQ of interagency partners to foster interagency coordination and collaboration. MARSOC would greatly gain from aligning the activities of SOF with USG functional lines of effort through additional liaisons. USSOCOM elements in the NCR are a major element in part of the global SOF network that strengthens the relationships of SOF with USG departments and agencies and other organizations.⁴⁹ Unconventional warfare requires significant interagency participation because the activity includes support to both the military and political aspects of internal opposition.⁵⁰

MARSOC's further commitment to Irregular Warfare: If MARSOC is going to take a more active role in the support to UW it must advance its strategic partnership with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). MARSOC planners and operations officers must be better integrated

⁴⁹ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05 - Special Operations*. Washington, DC. 16 July 2014: III-22.

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0*. Washington, DC. 17 May 2010: 24.

within the CIA to enable collaborative planning and execution of IW and UW activities. The CIA's intelligence activities that are authorized under Title 50 and MARSOC's military activities authorized under both Title 10 and Title 50 provide mutually supporting, not mutually exclusive, authorities. This provides a unique construct from which CIA and MARSOC planners can collaborate and complement unconventional options for national security needs.⁵¹

The CIA and the Marine Corps have been successful in partnering in unconventional warfare operations through counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam in programs like the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). PRUs were under the operational control of the CIA relied on specialized military teams from special operations and conventional units to conduct their unconventional recruiting, training and operations. The CIA drew upon service special operation units and Marine expertise in training, language skills, cultural and political understanding, and access and placement to be effective. Likewise, MARSOC still maintains MSOTs and MSOCs with a depth of knowledge on unconventional warfare both in training and practice. The CIA and MARSOC should establish a partnership that enables the CIA to utilize MARSOC elements in support of their UW operations.

Commander, United States Special Operations Command has assigned Commander, Marine Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC) the following SOF core activities: direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), counterinsurgency (COIN), support to CWMD, and support to UW.⁵² MARSOC is too small to be an expert at all of its core assigned tasks or to be the proprietor of several tasks. Instead MARSOC should further establish its role in

⁵¹ Joint Special Operations University. *Special Operations Intelligence: Guiding the Tip of the Spear*, JSOU Report, November 2015. JSOU Press: MacDill AFB, FL: 75.

⁵² U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Special Operations*, MCWP 3-05. Washington, DC. (1 June 2017): 2-4.

irregular warfare by specializing in certain aspects. Once considered largely the province of special operations forces (SOF), irregular threats are now understood to fall within the purview of the entire joint force. To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the U.S. military will apply some blend of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. MARSOC must first collaborate with other governmental agencies, multinational partners to understand the situation in depth, act in concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. Unconventional warfare must be the cornerstone of MARSOC's core tasks.

Unconventional warfare operations span from support to groups resisting government authority to the overthrow of the government. Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and other interagency partners evaluate diplomatic, environmental, and economic costs and benefits prior to recommending UW operations but SOF usually conducts UW operations because of its size and forces trained in UW. These UW operations present significant risks, but they can also help resolve international crises without overt, large-scale CF. Resistance movements and insurgencies commonly organize around interrelated elements of an underground, an auxiliary, and a guerrilla force.⁵³ By partnering with all US government agencies that plan for UW operations, MARSOC will be best suited to conduct and execute UW operations. UW activities are conducted in support of a resistance or insurgency in a denied area. The initial focus of UW activities in support of an opposition is typically conducted in areas or environments where the governing authority has the capacity to deny overt freedom of action to the opposition and is best suited for SOF. UW operations rely on synchronization of SOF and CF and unified action with one or more interagency and multinational partners.⁵⁴

⁵³ U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05 - Special Operations*. Washington, DC. 16 July 2014: II-8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, II-8.

Conclusion

In the “Age of Everything,” MARSOC will be required to develop, strengthen and build increased integration, interoperability, and interdependence (I-3) between the Marine Corps (MARSOC-USMC I-3) and its interagency partners (MARSOC-interagency I-3).

The concept above outlines several key MARSOC-USMC I-3 concepts such as potential Marine air integrating with SOF for specific crisis response operations and the establishment of relationships to conduct SOF training and operations. Globally integrated operations will encourage collaboration across the Joint Force and with partners. These operations allow stakeholders to bring differing perspectives and capabilities to bear on complex challenges.⁵⁵ There is also an opportunity for increased I-3 in commonalities between MAGTF and MARSOC capabilities, intelligence collection and capabilities and both training and operationally.

MARSOC can also increase I-3 within the vast interagency organization and expanding the global SOF network. The complexity of a FOE requires a wide range of interagency and allied partners to understand and an even larger network of capabilities to address.⁵⁶ This will require MARSOC to establish better interagency partnership. This can be accomplished through increasing interagency liaisons both inside and outside of MARSOC. Lastly, MARSOC must establish a deeper commitment to Irregular Warfare (IW) and within further develop an enduring relationship with the interagency partners that conduct and assist in IW.

⁵⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*. Washington, DC. (10 Sept 2012): 8.

⁵⁶ U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. *Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOFF) 2030 (Draft not approved)*. Stone Bay, NC. (January 2018): 6.

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