A Successful Failure? The British Expeditionary Operation to Take Philadelphia, 1777

Abstract

Throughout the war, the British willingly used their naval superiority and experiences to maneuver their army by the sea. They did so in 1777 in their quest to take the rebel capital, Philadelphia. Using MCDP-3 as a means of analysis and a guide, this paper examines General Howe's 1777 expeditionary operation to understand why the British were not able to achieve a decisive victory through the combined efforts of their highly capable joint force. Examination of General Howe's planning efforts with London, followed by an in-depth look at operational and tactical decisions, illustrate how close and yet how far the British came to an actual significant victory.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 24, 2018
Accession Number
AD1177040

Entities

People

  • Colin A. Graham

Organizations

  • Marine Corps University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • American Revolution
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Delaware
  • Delaware River
  • Deployment
  • Marine Corps
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • New England
  • New Jersey
  • New York
  • North America
  • Standards
  • Supply Depots
  • United States
  • United States Military Academy
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.