REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
26-04-2018	Master of Military Studies Research Paper	July 2017 – April 2018

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Theater Support Challenges

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
James, Chad O. Major, USMC

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

N/A

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Jonathan Phillips, PHD

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

14. ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to conduct a capability and capacity study of the Army and Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Forces (CCF). The research looks into the Army's force structure, contracting workforce, and past trends to determine possible future outcomes. Through two case studies and other corresponding information, it was decided that budget cuts and force reductions have genuinely affected the Army's ability to support multiple contingency operations. As such, the Marine Corps must be prepared to overcome its shortfalls and find efficiency in its contracting organizations. Finally, the report offers recommendations to the Marine Corps to minimize the risks and optimize its forces in achieving better effects during contingency operations.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Expeditionary Contracting; CCO; ECP; CCF

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			Marine Corps Command and St
UNCLASS	UNCLASS	UNCLASS	UU	34	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*

The United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Theater Support Challenges
(Theater Support and Support Responsibilities)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major Chad O. James

AY 17-18

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Jonathan F. Phillips, Ph.D.
Approved: 
Date: 21 May 2018

Oral Defense Committee Member: Michael A. Hamilton, LT COL, USAF
Approved: 
Date: 2 May 2018

Executive Summary

Title: Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Theater Support Challenges

Author: Major Chad James

Thesis: If the US Army cannot provide theater support contracting for multiple contingency operations, service organizations like the Marine Corps Expeditionary Contracting Platoons (ECP) must be prepared to "fight tonight." To that end, the United States Marine Corps must identify potential Army shortfalls, recognize gaps in ECP capabilities, and provide a solution that minimizes risk to the mission while providing sustainable depth in their ability to support long-term contingency operations.

Discussion: Over the last few years, 0the01 000US Army has reduced its uniformed contracting force from 1,100 to 770. Conceivably, this force reduction has created gaps in the Army's ability to mutually support contingency operations on multiple fronts. For example, with over 180,000 forces deployed on a daily basis in over 140 countries, it has become increasingly difficult to meet the Army's demands, let alone the needs of the Marine Corps or other services. Indeed, the loss of nearly thirty percent of its forces has caused the Army to resist traditional contracting arrangements, and in some instances, it refuses to support outside agencies. As such, the Marine Corps must prepare its contracting officers to become the lead service-contracting branch, if ever the Army is not capable of fulfilling its Title 10 responsibilities. From task organizing the Marine Corps contracting forces administrative support under the supervision of Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM) to implementing better operational contracting procedures, this report will suggest various options the Marine Corps must consider to prepare the expeditionary contracting forces for the lead role in any contingency situation.

Conclusion: To sustain US forces during contingencies, the Marine Corps must consider increasing the size of the expeditionary contracting forces and establish a contracts administration office to give the Marine Corps ECPs more flexibility until the arrival of a more substantial contracting force.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

Preface

I chose this MMS topic based on my experience as a Contingency Contracting Officer. After multiple contracting tours with both I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and III MEF Expeditionary Contracting Offices, I have had the opportunity to evaluate the Marine Corps' operational capabilities and the Army's contracting capabilities, and I am prepared to suggest some valid ideas to better prepare the Marine Corps for the long fight. A very talented Marine once said, "If we do not identify fundamental changes to warfare (sustainment included), and fail to adjust to those changes, we will lose the fight."

I would like to thank the Marines from 1st Marine Logistics Group, Installations & Logistics (I&L) Headquarters Marine Corps Logistics Branch, the Gray Research Center, Dr. Phillips, Maj Eastman, MGySgt Scoffield, Mr. Robinson, and MGySgt Boyd, and everyone who provided me with the technical analysis needed to make recommendations for the Marine Corps. Last but not least I would like to thank my family for giving me the strength to persevere and complete this project.

Table of Contents

Lists of Tables

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADC	Assistant Deputy Commandant
AMOS	additional military occupational specialty
AOR	area of responsibility
AT&L	Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
CAR	Contract Action Report
CCF	Contingency Contracting Force
CCM	contracting competency model
CCO	Chief of Contracting Office
CLP	continuous learning point
CONUS	continental United States
COR	contracting officer representative
COTS	commercial off-the-shelf
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DC	deputy commandant
DOD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
ECP	Expeditionary Contracting Platoon
EDA	Electronic Document Access
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
GCC	Ground Combatant Commander
HCA	Head of Contracting Activity
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
I&L	Installations and Logistics

KO	contracting officer
LPC	Logistics Policy and Capabilities Branch
MARADMIN	Marine Administration Messages
MARCORSYSCOM	Marine Corps Systems Command
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MCI	Marine Corps Installations
MCO	Marine Corps order
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MDAP	Major Defense Acquisition Program
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MLG	Marine Logistics Group
MOS	Military Occupational Specialties
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OCS	operational contract support
OJT	on-the-job training
OUSD	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PD2	Procurement Desktop-Defense
PMOS	primary military occupational specialty
PR	purchase request
SPS	Standard Procurement System
USAASC	United States Army Acquisition Support Center

Introduction

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has relied extensively on the use of contingency contracting officers (CCOs) to carry out a wide range of service-related missions. The CCO mission to procure goods and services on behalf of the US government plays a significant role in America's ability to project power. Indeed, the act of contracting is an absolute force multiplier and adds to the nation's overall strength. However, to accomplish this very delicate mission, the United States must have a sophisticated contracting workforce capable of carrying out the tasks of the nation. For example, in 2001, when the country went to war with the Taliban, then the Iraqi conflict in 2003, the United States called on the contingency contracting community to support the war efforts.

However, by 2007, a series of incidents plagued the contracting community, forced Congress and the Army to conduct a series of investigations. Later that year, an independent Commission on Army Acquisitions released the Gansler report outlining several issues within the Army's contingency contracting organization. The report called for a more extensive workforce, more training, and better organizational checks and balances. Indeed, the Army worked diligently to rectify a majority of the issues identified by the Gansler report. Nonetheless, in 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act, which reduced military spending by nearly 25 percent.[1] As a result, the DoD was required to make tremendous sacrifices to meet congressional budgetary mandates. Thus far, the military's active duty workforce has been reduced by thousands, and military reductions, particularly in the Army, have had a strategic impact on specialized occupations, such as the uniformed contracting workforce.

To date, the Army's active duty contracting community suffered a 30 percent reduction in forces, despite added operations and increased complexity of the workload. The decreased number of troops has increased the workload of the remaining 70 percent and

minimized the Army's ability to build capacity or institute best practices within the organization. However, the Army has taken steps to increase the number of civilians to help equalize the reductions in active duty personnel. The *"*Civilian Expeditionary Workforce" and the "Reachback Division" are two civilian programs the Army introduced to compensate for gaps in the contingency contracting workforce. The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce gives civilians the opportunity to volunteer and support customers in the theater of operations, while the reachback division is designed to help customers and CCOs from a location outside the theater of operation. Conceivably, both programs will work in a non-kinetic environment or during stability operations. However, in reality, compensating civilians for uniformed CCOs in a dynamic battlespace may not be a viable option, given the added constraints for deployed civilian employees.

Meanwhile, as the Army's contracting active duty workforce juggles deployments, military exercises, humanitarian operations (both within the continental United States [CONUS] and outside the continental United States [OCONUS]), garrison support, and combat operations, the ability to support other services has become increasingly difficult and in some cases unattainable. For instance, from 2015 – mid-2017, the Army's 410th Contract Support Brigade (CSB) provided local and contingency contracting support to MARFORSOUTH. However, after significantly reducing the CSB's active duty workforce, and increasing its workload, the command could no longer provide dedicated support to MARFORSOUTH. The 410th CSB's lack of capacity forces the Marine Corps to look internally for an alternative solution to MARFORSOUTH's dilemma.

Needless to say, if the Army cannot provide theater-support contracting for multiple contingency operations, then service organizations like the Marine Corps ECP must be prepared to – per the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) 2025 – fight tonight.[2] To that end, the Marine Corps must identify potential Army shortfalls, recognize gaps in ECP

capabilities, and provide a solution that minimizes risk to the mission while providing sustainable depth in its ability to support long-term contingency operations.

This report will examine the following factors:

1) How the Gansler recommendations influenced change in the Army's contingency contracting structure.

2) How the passage of the 2011 Budget Control Act led to a thirty percent reduction in Army CCOs, thereby creating shortfalls in the Army contracting workforce.

3) How the current Army shortfalls affects the Marine Corps' contingency contracting force (CCF).

4) What the critical shortfalls are that affect the Marine Corps' ability to support long-term contingency contracting.

5) What solutions will offset CCF shortfalls, and prepare the Marine Corps for long-term contingency contracting.

Background

From 2001 through 2017, the United States spent over $1 trillion supporting the "Global War on Terrorism."[3] Indeed, the conflicts in both Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]) consumed an enormous amount of DoD-allocated funds and placed a tremendous toll on the active-duty contracting workforce. CCOs procured over $300 billion in military specific supplies and services during both conflicts and under the harshest of circumstances. However, the cost to American taxpayers was higher than expected, due to wartime price gouging and a lack of CCO experience.[4] There were numerous reports of fraud, waste, and abuse by CCOs across both countries. In response to the multiple allegations, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren ordered a full investigation into the Army's mismanagement and handling of theater support contracting.[5]

On October 31, 2007, Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, conducted an investigation and released a detailed report identifying internal problems that plagued the contingency contracting apparatus of the Army.[6] The report listed these four items as recommendations as follows:

> (1) Increase stature, quantity and career development for contracting personnel -- both military and civilian, particularly for expeditionary operations;
>
> (2) Restructure of the organization and responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management;
>
> (3) Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations; and
>
> (4) Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness, important in expeditionary operations.[7]

Additionally, the report stated, "the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into a theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support the warfighters."[8] There is no doubt that the Army has outstanding and competent personnel. Unfortunately, the Army failed in its attempt to maintain an adequate quota of trained CCOs to meet the mission's requirement. Indeed, Dr. Gansler's findings were consistent with the environment that led to so much waste and abuse of tax dollars. As a result of the Gansler report, and throughout the course of a year, the Army increased its uniform contracting workforce by approximately 400 CCOs and created the Army Contracting Command (ACC) and later the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC)—a subordinate one-star command—to establish clear lines of authority between the CCOs and their leadership. [9] Unfortunately, many of the steps taken to improve Army contract operations were short-lived due to the spending limitations contained in the Budget Control Act of 2011. The next section will address the shortfalls created by the impacts (cause and effect) of the Budget Control Act of 2011 to the Army's construct.

Identifying Army Contingency-Contracting Shortfalls

Manpower Reductions

Under the Budget Control Act of 2011, the DoD's budget was reduced by nearly 25 percent over a ten-year period.[10] The substantial reduction in budget required the DoD to reorganize and downsize forces to decrease spending or face the consequences of sequestration. The realities of the budget constraints were felt immediately across the Army as troops were reduced by the thousands and organizations looked to find efficiencies within the available workforce. Despite recommendations from the Gansler report, the GAO, and other governmental services, by 2017 the Army dissolved the ECC's headquarters and took drastic measures to reduce its active-duty contracting personnel to meet federal mandates. According to an interview with a U.S. Army senior contracting officer, "the active-duty contingency contracting workforce was reduced by nearly half its number by 2017."[11] Table 1 provides an overview of changes in the ACC.

Table 1. Army CCO Strength

Contingency Contracting	FY 14	FY 18
ACC Absorbs Direct Command of CSBs	0	770
ECC Force Dissolved	1,100	0
Contracting Brigades (CSB)	9	8
Contracting Battalion (CCBN)	17	13
Contracting Teams (CCT)	112 (1 Off / 4 Enlisted)	71 (1 Off / 4 Enlisted)

Source: Interview with Senior Contracting Officer on February 1, 2018.

The senior contracting officer believes the active duty cuts did not expose capability gaps or pose an immediate risk to the Army's contingency contracting mission. He also pointed out a few challenges the ACC CCOs faced, such as the ACC's assumption of the Defense Contracts Management Agency's mission. In 2016, the ACC assumed all responsibility for the contract administration support mission for installation and logistics

support contracts in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Afghanistan.[12] As a result, Army contracting brigades are now responsible for sending multiple teams of contracting specialists into these countries on six to nine month rotations, placing considerable strain on the available forces. When asked if the additional workload combined with forced cuts would affect the contracting brigades' ability to support the warfighter on multiple fronts, Griffin said that "their ability to support the warfighter is not compromised, and the force [was] indeed the right size for current and future missions."[13]

However, in June 2017, the GAO carried out an inquiry to assess the Army's ability to manage and evaluate the size of its contracting workforce. According to the report, the investigator questioned several Army officials regarding the size and experience of the workforce at that time. Contrary to the assessment made by the senior contracting officer, the GAO raised doubts regarding the Army's ability to right-size the force for current and future missions. The GAO argued that "the Army had no way of forecasting or validating the appropriate workforce."[14] The GAO statement below identifies issues faced by the Army.

> The Army has not determined whether they have a large enough workforce to meet the department's contracting needs. As a result, Army leadership does not have the quantitative data necessary to determine whether the department's contracting enterprise has the capacity needed to operate efficiently and effectively.[15]

The GAO concluded that the Army leadership had not established metrics needed to evaluate the contracting workforce effectively. Additionally, there is no evidence that the Army conducted a Contingency Contracting Capability Total Force Assessment and Implementation Plan as required by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) Memorandum 2009.[16] The memorandum also mentioned that the organizations must plan for and have a force structure capable of supporting the current effort and future contingency operations, including contract administration and the Contracting Officer Representative.

Case Study

The following case study evaluates the potential risk facing the ACC after a thirty percent force reduction. The case analyzes the current CCO active duty strength provided by Senior Contracting Officer verses an OEF/OIF after action report written by the RAND Corporation, entitled, "Air Force Contingency Contracting." Although it is not possible to assess the full range of effects, the study identifies some likely probabilities if similar circumstances exist.

From 2004 to 2008, the Air Force provided nearly one-third of all CCOs in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to the lack of capacity of both the Army and Marine Corps. At the time, the Army possessed approximately 400 CCOs, whereas the Air Force had over 1,300. According to the RAND study, in 2004 the OEF/OIF mission required a total of 192 CCOs, of which the Air Force provided 134 (70 percent).[17] Nonetheless, by 2008, the task required 400 CCOs, and the Air Force accommodated approximately 280 CCO billets (70 percent). The following resulted from the increase in CCO support:

Table 2. Air Force Causes and Effects of Increasing OEF/OIF Support

Air Force Support to OEF/OIF	FY 2004	FY 2007	Causes and Effects
Total Deployed	• Workload increased by 350% • (134) CCOs to Conduct Mission in OEF/OIF	• (280) CCOs Required for Mission	• 108.96 Percent in Personnel Needed for the Deployments
Dwell Ration	• 1:2 Dwell (6 Months Deploy/12 Months Home)	• 1:1 Dwell (6 Months Deployed/6 Months home)	• 6 Months Deployed Per Year
Manning Needed to Maintain Dwell	• (402) Required to Maintain Dwell Ratio	• (560) Required to Maintain Dwell Ratio	• Could Not Sustain 1:2 Dwell Ratio
Available Forces	• 1,393	• 1,140 (750 Deployable)	• 22.19 Percent Attrition Rate

Source: John A. Ausink, Laura W Castaneda, Mary E. Chenoweth, Air Force Contingency Contracting: Reachback and other Opportunities for Improvement, RAND Report for the U.S. Air Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, March 31, 2011), 58-59

The table shows how three years of deployments significantly diminished the Air Force's contracting capability. The workload increased 350 percent, the workforce requirement grew by 108.96 percent, and the overall attrition rate escalated to nearly 23 percent within three years of supporting two large-scale operations. Table 2 also provides preliminary evidence that if the Army were in the same predicament as the Air Force—with the current number (770) of available forces—their readiness levels would diminish faster due to a smaller workforce and a more significant workload. However, to assist deployed personnel, the Army relies on a reachback policy to counter the lack of personnel.

Army Draws Support from Reachback Capacities

The official military definition of "reachback" is "the process of obtaining products, services, and equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed."[18] The concept provides commanders with an opportunity to leverage contracting capability in the CONUS, but the idea is designed to reduce the workload on forward deployed CCOs. Furthermore, reachback support minimizes the burden or need for a forward deployed contracting officer in the area of operations, potentially creating a safety net and a win-win situation for all.

The reachback policy also increases continuity within the contingency environment. For instance, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, CCOs were deployed at a cyclic rate of every six to nine months. As such, the management of long-term contracts would lose traction because of the limited amount of time a contracting officer could contribute to the process. In fact, throughout their deployment, CCOs typically spent fifteen to eighteen hours daily working through requirements and supporting the forces.[19]

As a result, in September 2008, after the release of the 2007 Gansler report, the ACC at Rock Island, Illinois, Contracting Command (RICC) was established as a standalone reachback facility to counter the massive workload presented to the Army.[20] The complaint

registered by the Army was that the staff and skill levels were not commensurate with the amount of work placed on the organization. Below are the purpose and benefits of the RICC standalone reachback branch.

> An independent reachback branch was established at RICC for the sole purpose of providing support to the Army's 408th Combat Support Brigade in Kuwait. A memorandum of agreement was signed in January 2009 that established a "CONUS-based Joint Contingency Contracting Reachback Branch." The purpose of this plan was to reduce the JCC-I/A workload, provide personnel continuity, and assist in executing strategic sourcing candidates.[21]

Reachback has improved the Army's capabilities by somewhat reducing the volume of contracts and slightly removing the burden from the deployed CCOs and distributing the workload amongst the dedicated personnel in CONUS. This model has worked for the U.S. Army for an extended period, and it continues to be routine practice for the ACC. However, there are drawbacks to this model of contracting.

According to a study conducted in 2011 by RAND Corporation, "reachback has not solved all the problems in the theater support contracting, and there are still workload challenges."[22] Reachback is not and should not be considered a long-term plan for shortfalls in the workforce. CCOs serve several roles when deployed and will require a staff of highly trained team of forward-deployed forces that share the same sense of urgency.

The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) is a program developed by the DoD and employed mainly by the Army and Air Force. The plan was adopted in January 2009 as a means to recruit DoD civilians to augment the deployed workforce and reduce the burden on the active duty forces. However, the Army's use of the CEW is limited to contingency operations. And unlike the reachback division that remains in garrison to provide long-distance support, the CEW is designed to give interested civilians the opportunity to participate in contingency operations abroad. There is not a lot of information regarding this

topic, and unfortunately, the report could not get a reasonable assessment of the program and its ability to increase the Army's overall capacity in a contingency operation.

Case Study

This case study evaluates the Army's 410th CSB and its inability to support Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) staff, and the challenges Marine CCOs face in support of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Southern Command (SPMAGTF-SC) mission in South America. The 410th CSB's mission is "to plan and execute contingency contracting support for US Army South in support of Army and Joint Operations throughout the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR)."[23] The 410th CSB headquarters is in Fort Sam Houston, TX., but maintains a contracting office at the USSOUTHCOM Joint Base, Miami, Florida.

The 410th CSB is the only contracting office on the installation, and at one point was responsible for providing contracting support to USSOUTHCOM and its component commands. At the time, this did not affect MARFORSOUTH, because Marine Corps provided them with a trained warranted contracting officer to address the needs of the staff. However, in 2015, the Marine Corps restructured the contingency contracting forces (CCF), and removed the contracting officer billet and replaced it with an unwarranted Operational Contract Specialist (OCS). As a result, the MARFORSOUTH staff became entirely dependent on 410th CSB for all contracting support. Nonetheless, by mid-2017, contracting support to MARFORSOUTH came to an abrupt halt, as the 410th could no longer provide support to the Marines. According to Major Eastman, his conversation with the contracting office generated the following statement:

> The Army's uniformed contracting force reductions from 1,100 to 770 has impacted their ability to provide support outside their specific service. The 410th alone received a nearly one-third reduction in staffing. Moreover, the office in Miami lost all of its uniformed contracting officers and is now solely staffed with civilians. What further complicates the staffing problem, is that the cost of living in Miami is so high they cannot get anyone to accept and keep a position below GS-12.[24]

Because of the personnel shortfalls, MARFORSOUTH can no longer receive procurement support from the Army even though they are a small staff, and work hand and hand with members of the 410th CSB on an Army installation. The Marine Corps is working on a solution to fix the MARFORSOUTH problem without jeopardizing other missions or placing additional stress on its already small CCF workforce.

Additionally, support to MARFORSOUTH staff is not the only issue MARFORSOUTH has to deal with. The II MEF ECP is responsible for providing support to the Marine Corps' largest operation in South America, SPMAGTF-SC. SPMAGTF-SC is a task force, comprised of approximately 300 Marines and sailors, operating in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.[25] Indeed, by size, scale, and complexity, the SPMAGTF-SC is the Marine Corps' most massive operation in South America and requires a unique blend of professional specialties to ensure mission success, and CCOs are a considerable part of their success. However, due to the number of competing missions and size of the CCF workforce, the Marine Corps assigns 1 CCO to carry out the mission. It is important to note that sustaining an entire SPMAGTF can be a difficult task for multiple CCOs, let alone 1 Marine CCO supporting various missions in numerous countries across the continent of South America. To put it differently, if the Army were responsible for supporting the SPMAGTF-SC, it would deploy a CCT (five soldiers [1 Major, 4 Senior Enlisted]) to support an operation of this magnitude.[26] According to a former lead Staff Sergeant Hickman, SPMAGTF-SC-17.2 CCO, the use of 1 CCO led to multiple issues, to include delayed payments, problems with timely delivery schedules, and an overall lack of flexibility for the CCO due to a massive workload and an outdated contracting writing system used by the Marine Corps.[27]

Many of the issues encountered during the SPMAGTF mission are indicative of the many shortfalls that besiege the CCF workforce today. For instance, the addition of one or

more CCOs could have reduced the workload allowing the deployed CCO more time to train units and implement better processes. Additionally, an automated contracting writing platform – unlike the twenty-year-old Standard Procurement System–Contingency Contracting System (SPS-C) – manual contract systems used by the CCF today – would have increased productivity through the use of sophisticated tools and software designed to improve efficiencies and reduce errors. There are multiple platforms available for the Marine Corps to use; however, after much debate, the CCF is confined to manual contracts until an ideal contract writing system is available. To move forward in a positive direction, it is essential to identify further Marine Corps shortfalls and provide recommendations to prepare the CCF for the next engagement.

Marine Corps Shortfalls

Manpower Shortage

The Marine Corps has a total of 154 contingency contracting Marines.[28] Although the budgets did not affect the Marine Corps contracting population, the contingency contracting community still has hurdles to overcome. Given the gravity of the Army's contracting decline, the Marine Corps must outline a plan to defeat the current shortfalls. Generally speaking, at any given time, there are approximately seventy Marines available to fill the role of CCO in Marine Logistics Groups (MLG). There are additional billets across the Marine Corps that must be filled by a CCO, inevitably consuming a preponderance of available resources to include the regional contracting offices (RCOs), OCS billets, and Marine Corps B-Billets (drill instructor, recruiter, etc.). Besides a growing list of billets, CCOs are in an endless cycle of deployment across the globe. From multilateral and joint exercises to contingency and humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations, within a three-year MLG tour, Marines will experience a 1:1 deployment ratio. Unlike the other service branches, the

Marine Corps does not have a massive pool of contracting officers to draw from, causing overlap in deployments. An unnamed source provided the following as an issue.

> In 2015, the Marine Corps realignment of the CCF (Contingency Contracting Force) unmapped almost all the contracting Marines from the USMC Base/Installation contracting offices, which resulted in the realignment of over 75 percent of the CCF's workforce to the operating force, MLG, MEFs, and MARFORs. As a result of the realignment effort, the OCS mission is aligned to the CCF. The OCS attachment to the CCF has substantially expanded the roles and responsibility of the community, particularly the senior GySgts, MSgts, MGySgts, and Officers, as well as created new training and education gaps within the community.[29]

Because of the shortage of personnel and increased workload, contracting is ranked at No. 38 of the 389 military occupational specialties (MOS) for the highest deployment tempo in the Marine Corps. As such, Marine Corps CCOs spend on an average 64.7 days per year deployed supporting exercises, humanitarian contingencies, and combat operations (see Table 3).

Table 3 Population Average Tempo

PMOS	Population	Max Personnel Tempo Day	Avg Personnel Tempo Day	Median Personnel Tempo Day
3044	112	382	64.7	13

Source: Master Gunnery Sergeant Brian Boyd, e-mail message to author, January 5, 2018.

Operating Systems

In accordance with PGI 204.270-2(b), "agencies shall perform, upon deployment of any contract-writing system or other source of contractual documents to be posted to Electronic Data Access (EDA), an analysis to verify adequate controls are in place to ensure that contract documents, including attachments and contract data published to EDA, are accurate representations of the contract."[30] It is mandatory that all contracting officers adhere

to the guidelines and post or upload an accurate representation of their respective contracts. The uploads can be a daunting task, given the present state of the Marine Corps' contract-writing system. The Marine Corps, unlike other services, has not invested much time, money, or resources into developing an automated contracting option for deployed CCOs. It is not clear why such issues are not addressed; automation is standard across DoD. However, the lack of available resources has drastically increased the Marine Corps' workload and decreased efficiency. For example, the ECP uses the Marine Corps' Standard Procurement System–Contingency Contracting System (SPS-C).

SPS-C is deployed primarily on laptop computers and is designed to run in either a standalone or in a client/server configuration. When deployed, even if a networked environment exists in the area of operation, CCOs do not have the flexibility to accommodate automated purchase requisitions and back-end reporting capabilities because of the lack of server and repository support. During deployments, the pressure and speed at which Marines work are indicative of mission success. Callanan and Barbaris, authors of the "United States Army Contingency Contracting Operations," made the following comments about how automation could help improve operations.

> Almost all those interviewed agreed that electronic contract files would help improve modern wartime contracting. One individual who is currently in Iraq said that some of the current processes within his contracting office are entirely electronic, but not everything is online. He felt that many current procedures would be improved if there was one electronic system for all team members to utilize, particularly in routing documents for approval up the chain of command. He also said that many higher authority reviewers did not use the same system that subordinates did, which often made a prolonged and inefficient review process. Additionally, once a document moved on to the next approval level, reviews would get kicked back for questions and often the "visibility" and status of the documents would be lost.[31]

No Enterprise Contracting Capabilities

The contingency contracting office does not have sufficient reachback capability in place. Unlike other service branches, the ECP and the RCO serve separate missions. The ECP

is responsible for all OCONUS expeditionary contracting efforts, and the RCOs are responsible for base support and units training in CONUS. The only interaction these two organizations have is that the RCO is tasked with providing on-the-job training (OJT) for entry-level enlisted and officers. For reachback, deployed Marines depend on members of the ECP to offer sustainable reachback capability. The idea was established with good intentions, but the concept is flawed due to the constant flow of individuals and the lack of continuity within the ECP.

In reality, lack of continuity within the ECP infringes upon the quality of support to the forward-deployed contracting officer. As such, the ECP is staffed with all active-duty CCOs who, in most cases, are actively employed, deployed, or preparing to deploy, so finding individuals who can assist is crucial. Although every ECP has an office of dedicated Marines, due to the operational commitment of the organization, it is increasingly challenging to levy quality reachback, as well as provide the administrative assistance required to surge the contracting forces. Also, without a quality contract writing system, deployed CCOs are required to scan and then email any work requiring a legal review or assistance.

Experience Level

The experience level of the average CCO is falling as senior enlisted personnel and officers retire from the Marine Corps. Because of the operational tempo and opportunity for further advances, the population that served in Iraq and Afghanistan is leaving the Marine Corps at a rapid pace. It is essential that junior Marines quickly acquire necessary procurement skills because someone has to fill that void immediately. For example, junior officers are moving into senior field-grade officer positions with no contracting experience, and junior enlisted Marines are filling more and more mature contracting billets. This is

primarily due to the restructuring of the CCF and the additional OCS billet assumed by the MOS.

As Level III contracting officers depart their current billets after three years, many of these assignments are filled by untrained, inexperienced contracting specialists, and the remaining jobs are left vacant due to a lack of available personnel (see Appendix A for Level III certification standards). Table 3 below is a snapshot of experience levels faced by the Marine Corps:

Table 4. Levels of Competency

DAWIA Levels	Required Level	Required Level Achieved	Have Not Achieved Any Level
Officers			
Level III	8	4	**1**
Level II	11	6	**2**
Level I	11	8	**3**
Enlisted			
Level II	71	39	**19**
Level I	**48**	**8**	**40**

Source: Angela Rowan, emailed message to author on January 29, 2018.

The chart indicates that the Marine Corps has eight Level III contracting officer billets but can only fill four of the eight strategic billets. In fact, one of the vital billets is populated by a contracting specialist, meaning that the officer filling the billet does not have the level of experience, nor the qualifications required to perform the functions of an experienced contracting officer. Note that Level III billets fall into one of two acquisition categories: Critical Acquisition Positions (CAP) or Key Leadership Positions (KLP). KLP and CAP billets are defined the following:

> 1) KLPs are senior acquisition positions that require special ASN(RDA) attention about qualifications and accountability.
>
> 2) CAPs are senior acquisition positions with significant responsibility, primarily involving supervisory or management duties, in acquisition systems.[32]

The Marine Corps CCF does not have KLP billets; however, the CCF has assigned CAP billets. According to Title 10 U.S.C. 1733 (CAP), "a critical acquisition position may be filled only by a member of the Acquisition Corps."[33] Additionally, these CAP billets are assigned by the Secretary of Defense and must be occupied by officers serving in the grade of lieutenant colonel and higher. Although, U.S.C. 1733 states explicitly that CAPs billets are filled by a lieutenant colonel and above, 80% of the Marine Corps CAP billets are held by majors and below. It is also important to note that, to become a member of the Acquisition Corps, an active duty service member must be the rank of major or above.

Lack of High-Dollar Contracting

The Marine Corps CCF falls into the same category that many CCOs fell into during the onset of OEF and OIF. The soldiers were inadequately prepared to handle high dollar contracts and in most cases were subjected to wartime price gouging. According to MGySgt Scoffield, operations contract support chief, HQMC, I&L, LPC-4, the Marine Corps lacks the necessary skills and training to conduct large complex contracts because most Marines will spend a majority of their career writing Firm Fixed-Priced (FFP) contracts under the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT)."[34] SAT and FFP contracts are defined as follows.

> Simplified Acquisition Threshold means $150,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined by the head of the agency, are to be used to support a contingency operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack (41 U.S.C. 428a), the term means—(1) $300,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, inside the United States; and (2) $1 million for any contract to be awarded and completed, or purchase to be made, outside the United States.
>
> A Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) (FAR Subpart 16.2) contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment by the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.[35]

On the one hand, the Army RICC spends approximately $5 billion and processes about 38,000 actions per year, equipping the warfighters with supplies and services.[36] On the other hand, the Marine Corps ECP spends approximately 5 million dollars per year, with nearly 90 percent of all purchases being low-dollar and below the SAT (see Table 3). Ideally, the contracting professionals must have the ability to prepare long-term, high-risk, high-dollar transactions to support the force, and unfortunately, that is becoming a rare commodity in the Marine Corps. Table 5 provides three years of ECP historic workload.

Table 5. I-III MEF Historical Workload

	FY15 (5 Feb '16 – DoD Freeze)		FY16 (13 Feb '17 – DoD Freeze)		FY17 (29 Jan '18 – DoD Freeze)		FY18 (28 Feb '18)	
Unit	Actions	Dollars	Actions	Dollars	Actions	Dollars	Actions	Dollars
1st MLG	299	$4,459,949	70	$6,876,951	57	$1,160,787	7	$327,771
2nd MLG	419	$4,146,390	306	$6,089,452	253	$5,860,744	40	$561,300
3rd MLG	1,009	$12,226,440	500	$7,949,085	420	$7,491,372	13	$169,934
	1,727	**$20,832,779**	**876**	**$20,915,488**	**730**	**$14,512,902**	**60**	**$1,059,004**

Source: Master Gunnery Sergeant Brian Boyd, e-mail message to author, January 5, 2018.

Recommended Solutions

Fight Tonight

The words "fight tonight" can be found in the Marine Corps Operation Concept (MOC). The MOC states that leaders with the grade, experience, and technical/tactical qualifications associated with their billets are essential to the Marine Corps as a "fight tonight" force.[37] Marines have a unique history in America's ability to project power and win its wars. However, in an increasingly complex environment, Marines cannot always dwell on

past victories to anticipate future conflicts. That is not to say that leaders should not look to the past to analyze events of similar origin. Nonetheless, the CCF is in a unique position to review the Army's past errors to build more capacity and efficiency in the many shortfalls plaguing the Marine Corps CCF. The Marine Corps does not have the necessary CCF personnel to execute a long-term contingency operation; it is just not built that way. However, by leveraging existing contracting vehicles and implementing new structures, the Marine Corps CCF may be able to maintain the forces through long-term operations.

Establish Larger Contracting Vehicles

By and large, the future requires exceptional CCF leaders who will challenge the status quo and leverage capabilities in preparation for future contingencies. Therefore, to alleviate the immediate stress on CCOs responding to an emergency, the Marine Corps must establish significant contracts in locations most prone to large-scale contingencies. For example, the use of an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract would be an excellent supplement to give CCOs added flexibility. An IDIQ contract is defined as "a contract that has been awarded to one or more vendors to facilitate the delivery of supplies and services."[38] The purpose of an IDIQ is as follows:

> An IDIQ contract provides flexibility in cases where the government cannot determine the exact quantities and required timing of a product or service. Under an IDIQ contract, the government must order, and the contractor must provide an agreed-upon minimum number of products or services, also known as a minimum guarantee. Also, the contractor must give any other quantities ordered by the government up to a stated maximum.[39]

Based on the mission, the CCF can adopt a contract type that offers the best assistance to the personnel and organization. The benefits of having signed contracts in place will give CCOs flexibility while facilitating the adjustments as conditions change on the battlefield.

The trade-off to large contracts is the tremendous amount of administrative maintenance that accompanies the IDIQ contracts, and the ECPs are not currently staffed to handle additional regulatory requirements. Hence, the ECPs must establish an administration

office, much like the Army's RICC reachback division, to manage all OCONUS IDIQ contracts. The administration office would remain cognizant of all large contracts, and the ECPs would be given authority to write task and delivery order contracts on the IDIQ. Each major contract would be tied to a component command's area of responsibility (AOR), preferably a location vulnerable to natural disasters or humanitarian assistance issues. For example, the CCF would establish multiple IDIQs in the Philippines, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) AOR, due to the frequency of typhoons and military operations in that country. The best place to manage these contracts would be the Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM), Albany, Georgia.

MARCORLOGCOM Manages Large Contingency Contracts

MARCORLOGCOM is responsible for providing vital prepositioning logistics support for combat capabilities sets to reduce crisis response reaction time and ensure timely support of MARFORs during all phases of expeditionary operations.[40] As such, MARCORLOGCOM is the ideal placeholder for OCONUS IDIQ contracts for several reasons.

1) MARCORLOGCOM has an inherent responsibility to prepare the theater for overall logistics support. Contracting is considered a sub-function of logistics and should be a huge consideration in MARCORLOGCOM's strategic or operational theater support plans.

2) MARCORLOGCOM has a competent contracts department with the right skill-set to manage large-scale service and delivery contracts. In fact, MARCORLOGCOM contracts department executes approximately $300 million in contracts on a yearly basis. In any case, MARCORLOGCOM is the second largest procurement agency in the Marine Corps, which makes them very capable of preparing and maintaining large OCONUS IDIQ contracts.

3) Lastly, assigning this responsibility to any other organization, without substantially increasing their workforce, could create significant shortfalls across the CCF population.

MARCORLOGCOM has the capacity to accomplish the management and contract administration of OCONUS contracts. However, the ability to manage the task orders in real-time may be an issue; after all, deployed CCOs are still executing manual contracts. Without a web-based automated contracting writing system, there is a loss of productivity and a lack of real-time data, but more importantly, there is a lack of transparency in the contracting process.

Use of Available Contract-Writing Systems

Multiple contracting writing systems on the market are compatible with the needs of deployed CCOs. The Defense Logistics Agency offers a contracting system called "oContrax." oContrax is an Internet-based automated system, used by the Air Force – in garrison and deployed – over the last few years. According to MGySgt Scoffield, the contracting writing system does not fully support all of the Marine Corps systems, such as Standard Accounting Budgeting Reporting System (SABRS), but it offers all other services, to include requirements set forth by the PGI 204.270-2(b).[41] To that note, the system is free to DoD and requires no system-specific training to use in a deployed environment. oContrax is a natural alternative to the overcomplicated, unreliable SPS-C platform.

Conclusion

This report demonstrates the need for a stronger Marine Corps contingency contracting workforce. The information presented identifies Army and Marine Corps shortfalls, and offers the Marine Corps available options to minimize risks to a contingency mission. Indeed, there is evidence that changes in the Army's active-duty contracting force

structure have created gaps and seams in the CSB's ability to support long-term or multiple contingency operations; the Army is already stretched too thin. Budget cuts and force reductions have genuinely encroached upon the Army's ability to surge CCOs on to the battlefield. Though the Army has gone to great lengths to correct the deficiencies highlighted in the Gansler report, there are still problems.

Additionally, the two case studies demonstrate that there are issues throughout the expeditionary contracting workforce. From personnel shortages in both services to deficiencies across the Marine Corps' contracting apparatus, it is incumbent upon the Corps to prepare the CCF for the challenges of theater support contracting. With this in mind, the Marine Corps must look at the solutions offered in this report. For instance, the Corps should establish a single reachback facility that provides administrative control over all significant Marine Corps contracts abroad. By developing an enterprise capability, the ECP can then prepare by cutting task orders instead of starting all contracts from scratch. This action alone will give the CCO an added advantage and the necessary flexibility to plan activities accordingly. The right facility to do this would be MARCORLOGCOM in Albany, Georgia. MARCORLOGCOM is the Marine Corps' operational logistics hub that deals with all of its functional logistics efforts. It is incumbent upon the Marine Corps to find the right balance of quantity and quality in its CCF. And lastly, the Marine Corps must learn from past issues that nearly destroyed the reputation of contingency contracting, and subscribe to a program that sets CCF up for future success on the battlefield.

APPENDIX A: U.S. Government Contracting Certification Level

Certification Level	Consideration Factors
Level III (Advanced)	• **Military Positions - This level is required for all KLPs, CAPs, O-5 and O-6 positions, and positions in the SPRDE-PSE career field.** • **Civilian Positions - This level is required for all KLPs, CAPs, and positions in the SPRDE-PSE career field.** For other positions, this level is typically assigned to positions located in organizations with a major acquisition mission, e.g. the systems commands. Level III would be appropriate for acquisition technical experts whose duties require a high level of knowledge and skills associated with major defense acquisition programs. For example, a GS-12/13 working in an ACAT I and II program office may require a Level III designation whereas a GS-14 (or equivalent) working in an Echelon III or IV activity may require Level I or II.
Level II (Intermediate)	• **Military Positions - This level is required for all O-4 positions.** This may also be assigned to positions in the Naval Acquisition Contracting Officer (NACO) and the Naval Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Developmental Programs. This level (or Level I) may be assigned to Enlisted acquisition positions at the E-4 grade level and above if in Contracting, and E-6 and above if other than Contracting. • **Civilian Positions - This level is appropriate for those in Intern development programs and journeymen or senior positions (non-KLP/CAP) that need an intermediate level of acquisition knowledge and skills.** For example, Level II would be appropriate for a GS-14/15 manager working in a Warfare Center or field activity who has subordinate acquisition technical experts.
Level I (Basic)	• **Military Positions - This level is required for all O-1 through O-3 positions (see exceptions for NACO and ILS Developmental Programs identified in Level II above).** This level (or Level II) may also be assigned to Enlisted positions at the E-4 grade level and above if in Contracting, and E-6 and above if other than Contracting. • **Civilian Positions -** Basic certification standards are designated to establish fundamental qualifications and expertise in the individual's career field. It is appropriate for entry level and other positions that require a basic knowledge of the acquisition systems.

Citations

[1] Wikipedia, s.v. "Budget Control Act of 2011," accessed February 20, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budget_Control_Act_of_2011.
[2] Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, September 2016, 26,* http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/MOC/.
[3] Daniel Trotta, "Iraq war cost the U.S. more than $2 trillion: study," *Reuters*, March 14, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary/iraq-war-costs-u-s-more-than-2-trillion-study-idUSBRE92D0PG20130314
[4] Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, (*Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007).
[5] Ibid., 13.
[6] Ibid., 13
[7] Ibid., 13.
[8] Ibid., 16.
[9] Lee McMahon and Gary Sheftick, "*Gansler Commission Cites Systemic Problems in Army Contracting*," US Army, accessed January 8, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/5906/gansler_commission_cites_systemic_problems_in_army_contracting.
[10] Wikipedia, s.v. "Budget Control Act of 2011," accessed February 20, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budget_Control_Act_of_2011.
[11] Interview with a Senior Contracting Officer, February 1, 2018
[12] Ibid., February 1, 2018
[13] Ibid., February 1, 2018
[14] Government Accountability Office, Army Contracting: Leadership Lacks Information Needed to Evaluate and Improve Operations (Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 15, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685425.pdf.
[15] Ibid., 27
[16] Department of Defense, Contingency Contracting Planning, and Visibility, Report for Congress, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 2010), 18, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_regulations/dod/us_dod_report2010_contingency-contracting.pdf.
[17] John A. Ausink, Laura W Castaneda, Mary E. Chenoweth, Air Force Contingency Contracting: Reachback and other Opportunities for Improvement, RAND Report for the U.S. Air Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, March 31, 2011), 3-4.
[18] Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &Logistics, *Shaping Contingency Contracting Policy to serve our Warfighters Immediate and Future Needs*, access on Dec 8, 2017, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ops/docs/ATL-DPAP_CC_fact_sheet.pdf.
[19] Katherine MGySgt Scoffield, I MEF Procurement Chief, discussed with the author, January 29, 2018.
[20] U.S. Army, "Army Contracting Command" *Rock Island*," accessed Dec 8, 2017, http://acc.army.mil/contracting centers/acc_ri/.
[21] Ibid
[22] John A. Ausink, Laura W Castaneda, Mary E. Chenoweth, Air Force Contingency Contracting: Reachback and other Opportunities for Improvement, RAND Report for the U.S. Air Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, March 31, 2011), 58-59 file:///Users/chadjames/Downloads/RAND_TR862%20(3).pdf.

[23] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "410th Support Brigade," accessed February 15, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/410th_Support_Brigade_(United States).
[24] Major Justin Eastman, MARFORSOUTH, OCS Advisor, discussion with author, February 10, 2018
[25] Ian Sergeant Leones, "SPMAGTF-SC Marine conclude their deployment in Central America," News Display, accessed on February 17, 2018, http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1378390/spmagtf-sc-marines-conclude-their-deployment-in-central-america/
[26] Headquarters Department of the Army, *Contracting Support Brigade*," FM 4-92 (FM100-10-2), February 2010, 1-15.
[27] Staff Sergeant Hickman, SPMAGTF-SC-17.2 CCO, discussion with author, March 19, 2018
[28] MGySgt Scoffield, I MEF Procurement Chief, discussed with the author, January 29, 2018.
[29] Interview with Senior Contracting Officer, February 21, 2018.
[30] *Defense Procurement and Acquisition Polic*y, "DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information," accessed January 6, 2018, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2016/20161021/pgi-changes-20161021.pdf.
[31] Christine Callanan and Roxanne Barbaris, "United States Army Contingency Contracting Operations: Emerging Roles, Procedures, and Challenges Facing Contracting Professionals" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 71, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/.
[32]Commandant of the Marine Corps, *FY18-01 Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Acquisition Screening and Slating (MASS) PANEL,* MARADMINS096/18, February 9, 2018, http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/1437341/fy18-01-marine-corps-systems-command-marcorsyscom-acquisition-screening-and-sla/.
[33] Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 1733. (1993).
[34] Katherine MGySgt Scoffield, I MEF Procurement Chief, discussed with the author, January 29, 2018.
[35] *Defense Procurement and Acquisition Polic*y, "DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information," accessed January 30, 2018 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/HTML/Topical/simplified.html.
[36] U.S. Army, "Army Contracting Command" *Rock Island*," accessed Dec 8, 2017. http://acc.army.mil/contracting centers/acc_ri/.
[37] Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, September 2016, 26,* http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/MOC/.
[38] US Department of Navy, *Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA),* Operating Guide, December 21, 2011, 4, http://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/portals/105/acqworkforce/documents/dawia_operating_guide_21dec2011.pdf.
[39] Government Accountability Office, *Federal Contracts: Agencies Widely Used Indefinite Contracts to Provide Flexibility to Meet Mission Needs* (Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 8, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-329.
[40] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Logistics Command Strategic Plan, Operational – Level Logistics Support to the Expeditionary Force, (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2015), 12.

Bibliography

Ausink, John A., Laura W. Castaneda, and Mary E. Chenoweth. *Air Force Contingency Contracting: Reachback and other Opportunities for Improvement*, RAND Report for the U.S. Air Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, March 31, 2011), file:///Users/chadjames/Downloads/RAND_TR862%20(3).pdf

Callanan Christine, and Roxanne Barbaris. "United States Army Contingency Contracting Operations: Emerging Roles, Procedures, and Challenges Facing Contracting Professionals." (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Defense Technical Information Center, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/.

Commandant of the Marine Corps. *FY18-01 Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Acquisition Screening and Slating (MASS) PANEL,* MARADMINS096/18, February 9, 2018. http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/1437341/fy18-01-marine-corps-systems-command-marcorsyscom-acquisition-screening-and-sla/ Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations.

Department of Defense, *Contingency Contracting Planning and Visibility*, Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 2010. http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_regulations/dod/us_dod_report2010_contingency-contracting.pdf

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Contracting Support Brigade*." FM 4-92 (FM100-10-2). February 2010.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Logistics Command* Playbook. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, July 21, 2009. http://www.logcom.marines.mil/Portals/184/Docs/Sites/Contracts/files/LOGCOM_CCO_Playbook_0709dlb.pdf

Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Logistics Command Strategic Plan, Operational – Level Logistics Support to the Expeditionary Force*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2015.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Operational – Level Logistic*s. MCWP 4-12. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, June 2, 2016.

Trotta, Daniel. "Iraq war cost U.S. more than $2 trillion: study." *Reuters*, March 14, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary/iraq-war-costs-u-s-more-than-2-trillion-study-idUSBRE92D0PG20130314

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &Logistics. *Shaping Contingency Contracting Policy to serve our Warfighters Immediate and Future Needs.* access on Dec 8, 2017, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ops/docs/ATL-DPAP_CC_fact_sheet.pdf

Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Army Contracting: Leadership Lacks Information Needed to Evaluate and Improve Operations*. Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017. https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685425.pdf

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Federal Contracts: Agencies Widely Used Indefinite Contracts to Provide Flexibility to Meet Mission Needs*. Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17- 329