

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)		2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

U.S. Marines and The Department of State: Common Understanding is an Uncommon Virtue


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

Special Agent Matthew Kearse
Diplomatic Security Service

AY 17-18

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Jonathan Phillips

Approved:  _____

Date: 2 March 2018

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Lynn Tesser

Approved:  _____

Date: 3-7-18

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

Executive Summary

Title: U.S. Marines and The Department of State: Common Understanding is an Uncommon Virtue

Author: Special Agent Matthew Kears, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State

Thesis: U.S. Marines and Department of State (DOS) personnel working together are not properly educated on their counterpart's authorities, capabilities, responsibilities, and limitations which lead to misunderstandings, ineffectual employment, and decreased operational effectiveness.

Discussion: U.S. Marines and DOS have been working side-by-side for over 240 years around the world. Marines have accompanied diplomats in establishing first contact with foreign powers, protected them in continuing their diplomatic mission, and evacuated them when situations become untenable. The Marine Corps' expeditionary mind-set, adaptability, and logistical capabilities compliment DOS in its necessity to be in harm's way for the conduct of diplomacy. However, despite a significant history of cooperation, the vast majority of Marines and DOS personnel are ill-educated and unprepared to work in the interagency environment. Further, few training opportunities exist in either organization that address this shortcoming, and of those that do, restrictions exist that inhibit greater attendance.

Conclusion: Interagency familiarization training needs to be created, implemented, and given to all Marine Non-Commissioned Officers, Staff Non-Commissioned Officers, Commissioned Officers, as well as all DOS personnel early on and throughout their careers. Additionally, DOS needs to ease restrictions on personnel attending DOD professional military education or require and incentivize attendance for promotion. These actions will greatly improve interagency interoperability by giving each organization a deeper understanding of its counterpart.

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

Table of Contents

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ii
DISCLAIMER	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS AND DEPARTMENT OF INTERACTION.....	3
CHAPTER TWO: THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP.....	6
CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERAGENCY COOPERATION.....	9
CHAPTER FOUR: HOW AND WHY INTEROPERABILITY FAILS.....	13
CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.....	20
CONCLUSION	22
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	24
ENDNOTES.....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY	29

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

Acknowledgements

I want to thank the various supervisors I have served under during my Marine Corps and Department of State career. I specifically want to thank my civilian faculty member and MMS advisor Dr. Jonathan Phillips, Colonel Vincent Ciuccoli, who inspired me to write on this topic, and Supervisory Special Agents Robert Kimbrough and Joe Jung, who mentored and guided me in a challenging interagency environment.

I have the coolest job in the world, and this thesis is an attempt to improve the organizations that have given so much to me.

Introduction: The Problem with Marine Corps and State Department Interoperability

The United States Marine Corps and the Department of State (DOS) have a long and celebrated history together. From the evacuation of Saigon to the shores of Tripoli, warfighters and diplomats have accomplished great feats. More than 69,000 Foreign Service generalists, specialists, civil servants, and locally employed staff* are present in over 250 U.S. embassies, consulates, missions, and interest sections overseas every day.¹ Alongside those DOS personnel are Marines Security Guards (MSGs) assigned to 148 diplomatic facilities and charged with protecting Americans, property, and classified material.² Marines are also assigned in embassy Defense Attaché Offices (DAO). They are continuously forward deployed in Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST) and Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) around the world and are trained and equipped to intervene when Americans require security or evacuation. Marines and DOS are linked in a mutually supportive and complementary relationship.

However, apart from DAOs, MSGs, FAST commanders, Marine Special Operations Command operators, and anyone who has attended joint-service professional military education like a Command and Staff College (CSC) or a War College, the vast majority of Marines below the rank of Major have no idea how to operate successfully in an embassy or how to work with DOS. Concurrently, with the exception of military veterans who join DOS, most DOS personnel are equally unprepared to work with their military counterparts and often struggle to understand Marine terminology, history, camaraderie, legal limitations, and culture. Few Marines know who the ambassador is, what Chief of Mission (COM) Authority is and how it differs from Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) authority, what Title 22 is and how it differs from

* Direct-hire Foreign Service generalists and specialists are required to serve overseas while Civil Servants may choose to serve overseas but are not generally required to. Local Employed Staff members are personnel hired locally at embassies and consulates, are generally from the country they were hired in, and remain in place for the duration of their career.

Title 10, who the Regional Security Officer (RSO) is and what they do, what limits on legal responsibilities the embassy has, and what a person under COM authority can and cannot do. Most embassies and consulates have an MSG detachment and a small DAO; likewise, all DOD GCCs, functional combatant commands, and most service subordinate commands include DOS political advisors who serve vital functions. But aside from these isolated venues and personnel, the rest of the Marine Corps and DOS personnel have no idea what the other does, what they bring to the table, and how to best employ their assets in furthering their own mission.

This knowledge gap expends needless time, blood, and treasure with delays in understanding, integration, operational effectiveness, mission planning for emergencies, and interagency crisis management. Affirmed by retired U.S. Army General George Joulwan, “We know how to do joint operations with all the services, we know how to do combined operations with our allies, but how do we do interagency operations?”³ Though Marines and diplomats have been working and studying side by side for nearly 240 years, they speak different languages, don’t understand the other’s capabilities and responsibilities, and few venues effectively address interoperability. Countless examples of success can be illustrated where Marines have accompanied and assisted DOS in their mission or escaping harm’s way when the situation deteriorates. There are also equally as numerous, although seldom recorded, examples of Marines and DOS experiencing friction and delays when working together from lack of interagency knowledge. A 20-year veteran of DOS, seven embassy tours, and current Deputy Chief of Mission at a major U.S. Embassy agreed and stated,

While there is great sympathy and support at the highest levels of DOD for the imbalance in people and funding between DOS and DOD, many general officers have difficulty translating that understanding to our daily activities. We are frequently handed the keys

after military operations and are told, ‘Here, I’ve done the hard part, now you win the peace,’ demonstrating a lack of appreciation for the fact that ‘the peace’ is often much more difficult and messier to bring about than a battlefield victory, especially when we are allocated millions not billions of dollars, and our people are measured in dozens, not thousands. Additionally, because our DOD colleagues often rotate every 6-12 months, they require an enormous amount of collaboration in order to achieve the results we’re looking for. This can be tiring for a lone-officer or specialist who is responsible for liaison with dozens, if not hundreds, of military counterparts, but it has to be done.⁴

Interoperability is the buzz word in this post-9/11 world, yet that is exactly what Marines and DOS lack. The Marine Corps and DOS need each other, and to be more interoperable for future operations, Marines and DOS personnel need to receive familiarization training on their counterpart that is revisited throughout their careers. Additionally, DOS needs to ease restrictions on its officers completing military education to allow for greater attendance, if not create it as a requirement for promotion and incentivize attendance for career progression. Doing so will yield new generations of warfighters and diplomats who have a greater understanding of the other and, thus, can increase interoperability abroad, in training, in crisis planning, and in emergency situations.

In order to understand interoperability, this essay will first examine the history of Marine Corps and DOS interactions. Next, it will explore the current relationships followed by the importance of interoperability. Finally, it will demonstrate how interoperability fails and conclude with practical solutions for both Marines and DOS to adopt.

Chapter One: History of Marine Corps and State Department Efforts

U.S. Marines and DOS have been linked since before the United States officially existed. They have been side by side to bear witness to some of the most influential events of the last two centuries. In 1798 with the creation of the new Department of State, Marine detachments accompanied U.S. Diplomatic representatives to the French Royal Court.⁵ The following year, Marines assisted American Consul Edward Stevens in establishing diplomatic relations with Haiti.⁶ Lieutenant Pressley O'Bannon's celebrated mission across North Africa 'to the shores of Tripoli' in 1805 with former U.S. Consul William Eaton in his efforts to overthrow a wrongfully seated ruler of the Tripolitan Empire. Marine detachments aboard naval shipping, as early as February 1817, escorted ashore and protected the newly appointed commissioner to Chile.⁷ When the legendary Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry received orders to begin negotiations with the Venezuelan government Marines accompanied him.⁸ Marines continued to guide diplomats abroad in the opening decades of the 19th century and assisted DOS with establishing its first contact and trade with Vietnam, Thailand, and Oman starting in 1832 and China in 1842.⁹ The first Marine general and later 7th Commandant Jacob Zeilin, then a Major in 1851, set sail with Commodore Perry in his 'gunboat diplomacy' campaign and successfully assisted in opening trade relations with Japan.¹⁰ Interagency interoperability clearly existed in the 19th century yet in small pockets and usually during naval endeavors.

In the 20th century, the Marines' involvement in diplomatic affairs expanded greatly. Lieutenant Colonel James Breckenridge, then a Major, appointed in 1916 as the naval attaché in U.S. Consulate in Petrograd, Russia, held a unique vantage point during the Russian revolution and abdication of Czar Nicholas.¹¹ During World War I, Breckenridge went on to serve as naval attaché in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden and was awarded the Navy Cross for his distinguished service.¹² Marines were also tasked during the World Wars as armed couriers for highly

classified diplomatic mail and traveled at great peril around Europe in civilian attire.¹³ A few Marines took on diplomatic roles themselves based on their cultural knowledge, tact, and language skills. These included General James Holcomb, Major General John Russell, and Colonel William Eddy who served as Ambassadors to South Africa, Haiti, and Saudi Arabia respectively.¹⁴ For more than a century to come, Marines and diplomats worldwide remained side by side to establish contact, trade, and to protect U.S. interests abroad. Interagency interoperability succeeded as a function of necessity just like today, yet past success does not equal proper preparation just as confidence should not be confused with competence.

The most enduring relationship between Marines and DOS are Marine Security Guards (MSGs). Marines were assigned to protect the American legation, a precursor term for ‘embassy,’ in Peking, China in 1905.¹⁵ However, it was during World War II in London, that the four officers and fifty-five enlisted Marine guards would lay the foundation for the current MSG program.¹⁶ MSGs officially came into existence after discussions and legal debates between the War, Navy, and State Department. Up until that point, the majority of U.S. diplomatic facilities were guarded by either American civilians or foreign nationals. In 1948, the first *Memorandum of Agreement* between DOS and the Marine Corps created the MSG program. The Memorandum has evolved with time and, yet, changed very little from its original conception, tasking MSGs with the protection of classified material, American citizens, and government property abroad.¹⁷

The latter half of the 20th century would see rise to an even more interdependent relationship between Marines and DOS in war and under the threat of terrorism. The first MSG detachment to South Korea arrived in 1949 and consisted entirely of Marines, all of whom had experience in China before and after the war and who were combat veterans.¹⁸ Within a year and

upon invasion by the North Koreans, the MSGs acted heroically in destroying classified material and assisting in the evacuation of embassy employees in what would become a 48-hour whirlwind experience. Marines continued their service with DOS before, during, and to the bitter end of the conflict in Vietnam. In what would become some of the most iconic images of the 1970's, Marines worked around the clock in Operations: Frequent Wind and Eagle Pull to evacuate the last Americans from South Vietnam and Cambodia in the face of withering fire and great peril.¹⁹

The Marine Corps and DOS have had a long and colorful history together. Their actions together have helped shape America and the world. For over two centuries American diplomats have been empowered to push to every corner of the globe knowing Marines are nearby standing guard. This enduring relationship has defined both organizations and reaffirmed that greater work can be accomplished together.

Chapter Two: Current Relationships

Current Marine Corps and DOS relationships are most visible in embassies and consulates, and this is where confusion of authorities and limitations begin. In them, the U.S. ambassador, responsible for all U.S. Government employees in their country aside from those under the Geographic Combatant Commander, acts as the representative of the U.S. President. Under the ambassador, are a wide variety of personnel from DOS and other agencies devoted to the conduct of American diplomacy. Given the expeditionary nature of Marines, DOS has been able to push diplomats into an increasing number of unstable places and remain there long after danger spilled over the walls. The term 'expeditionary diplomacy' or 'transformational diplomacy' became a catchphrase circa 2006 after a speech by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in which she stressed that DOS needs to be present, even in the face of extreme danger, to

effect foreign policy.²⁰ Expeditionary diplomacy can only work if diplomats know that when everything falls apart, Marines will be there to protect and evacuate them.

Beyond the small detachment of MSGs present at most posts, the ambassador has other Marine assets that can be called upon for assistance. Marine Security Guard-Security Augmentation Units, or MSAUs, are approximately dozen-strong groups of highly-trained MSGs that can arrive within hours or days on diplomatic passports and assist in internal security. The 1,000-strong expansion of the MSG program and creation of MSAU was directed by President Obama in 2013 in response to the September 2012 attack on the consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Illustrating their utility, in its first two years of existence, MSAU augmented security on 54 occasions at embassies and consulates worldwide.²¹

The next level of Marine support available to an ambassador is a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST). FAST units are comprised of 'security forces'-trained infantry Marines in reinforced company-sized elements. They specialize in antiterrorism operations, riot control techniques, and strategic asset protection.²² FAST Marines are forward-deployed in Bahrain, Spain, and Japan, and travel via Marine Corps aircraft. When requested, FAST provides embassies and consulates with the ability to continue working in a degraded security environment or assistance in evacuating.

The pinnacle of Marine Corps support to DOS is the MAGTF, usually a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). A MAGTF is, "...a balanced air-ground, combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander that is structured to accomplish a specific mission."²³ Of the seven MEU's in existence physically or on paper, there are a few deployed on rotations in areas of heightened danger conducting training and preparing to respond the needs of Americans.²⁴ MEUs generally consist of about 2,200 Marines and Sailors onboard

naval shipping and bring together a ground combat element of around 1,200 Marines, an air combat element of heavy-lift and attack helicopters along with fixed-wing close-air support, a logistics combat element capable of supporting the MEU for 15 days, and a command element supervising all the aforementioned units.²⁵ Although most embassy evacuations are executed without military assistance, roughly half of the evacuations in the last 20 years have been completed with the assistance of a MEU.²⁶

Defense Attaché Offices, in which several dozen Marine Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Staff NCOs serve, also provide a vital function in the joint, combined, and interagency environment. “Falling under Defense Intelligence Agency, DOD Embassy and Consulate Services (DECS) serves as the Liaison Office between DOD and DOS by representing DOD elements under the Chief of Mission, and the Combatant Commands authorities that use the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services.”²⁷ DAOs coordinate administrative and security matters for all in-country U.S. military personnel, work as part of the embassy’s “Country Team,” the ambassador’s key advisory team, and also provide language skills and local area knowledge.²⁸ DAOs often bridge the knowledge and language barrier between DOS, DOD, and host nation military officials through their established relationships.

The last enduring relationship Marines and DOS share is that of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOFLE). Established in 2006, MARSOC joined the special operations community and currently employs approximately 3,000 operators.²⁹ By being present in country, conducting various training and security missions, Special Forces (SF) units can be loaned, if available, from the GCC to the COM for embassy security reinforcement often on very short notice. SF members also can serve at embassies in SOFLE tours, where they act as the “connective tissue between organizations”

like the Special Operations Command, MEUs, and DOS.³⁰ A recent example of MARSOC support to DOS is in 2015 when terrorists attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali and killed 27 people. Two MARSOC operators responded with the RSO and entered the hotel in spite of automatic fire and grenade blasts to rescue trapped Americans and Malians.³¹ SOFLE elements are very small but play a vital role in communicating across the government spectrum when the security environment breaks down.

DOS and Marine Corps are linked by over two centuries of coordination and cooperation. Though it can be argued that the expeditionary nature and deployable speed of Marines has emboldened diplomats to push further and further into harm's way and stay much longer than they should have when security deteriorates, this will not be addressed in this thesis. What is evident is that DOS needs the Marine Corps to do its mission, and the more this relationship can thrive, the more efficiently DOS will be able to progress American diplomacy abroad.

Chapter Three: The Importance of Interagency Cooperation

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrated that despite spending more on defense than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, the UK, Japan, and Germany combined, having 17 intelligence organizations, and having over 24,000 DOS American officers abroad, when the interagency community don't speak the same language or are unwilling to share information, problems can strike.³² "Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no participant is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a common operational picture."³³ Interagency efforts under the Executive branch, though separated by tactical level differences, are often a part of the same operational level focus. For instance, almost immediately after a major military operation, American diplomats are on DOD's

heels to conduct in-person engagement with the government, albeit with much smaller numbers and resources. The interviewed Deputy Chief of Mission added, “This was made vividly clear to me one day when I was invited to speak to a mixed group of State and DOD people when I was the Acting Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs. Introducing myself, I said, ‘We have a total of about 40 people working on Iran, roughly half of those in DC, and half in the field.’ Hearing the gasps from the audience, I joked, ‘I heard your reactions. DOS people were thinking, ‘How on earth did you get so many people working on one issue?’ and DOD people were thinking, ‘Only 40 people? How can you possibly function?’”³⁴

The U.S. Government is an incredibly large, hundred-armed monster with personnel, assets, and organizations worldwide performing simultaneous missions. “It is comprised of multiple components and capabilities, which means that no one entity has the capability to face challenges independently. In an environment of finite resources, ensuring that effective collaboration and cooperation occurs is imperative to ensure the success of our nation for addressing complex issues.”³⁵ Partnerships across agency lines not only increase fiscal longevity but also increase mission capability. Supervisory Special Agent Anthony Smith, a 19-year member of DOS and 7 embassy tours, 11-year Army veteran including 8 years in Special Forces, and graduate of the Marine Corps CSC, stated, “Professional relationships matter. Staying focused on the mission and the ultimate goals is important, but realizing it takes a team to accomplish goals and objectives in an interagency environment is critical. Leveraging each other’s strengths and resources and leaving behind the institutionalized cognitive biases will lead to ultimate success.”³⁶

“A number of civilian agencies and organizations—each with their own mandates, capabilities, authorities, and objectives—interact with the Armed Forces of the United States...”³⁷

With DOD fielding a staff in the low millions, a budget in the hundreds of billions, and the logistics to move mountains, coordination is paramount for success. And strategic level interoperability generally exists due to seasoned interagency veterans, interaction and coordination on the operational and tactical level is fraught with friction. Henry Nuzum, in *Shades of Cords in the Kush*, concluded, “the American societal concept of war still reserves the battlefield for the military, expecting little political interference or civilian participation at the operational level and below.”³⁸

Asserted in the 2017 National Security Strategy, “Relationships, developed over time, create trust and shared understanding that the United States calls upon when confronting security threats, responding to crises, and encouraging others to share the burden for tackling the world’s challenges. We must enable forward-deployed field work beyond the confines of diplomatic facilities, including partnering with military colleagues in conflict-affected states.”³⁹ By recognizing the importance and necessity of unity of messaging, communication, cooperation, coordination, cultural awareness, and lessons learned, both DOD and DOS have taken affirmative steps to address these shortcomings. For instance, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, “which applies observations, insights and lessons from its operational experiences, as well as those provided by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community, with the aim of guiding future force transformation. Rapid, continuous lessons-learned processes ensure the latest enemy and friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures are available for use in training, exercises and combat operations.”⁴⁰

Furthermore, in 2012, the Director of the Joint Staff on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, reviewed the lessons gleaned from the 9/11 period-“Decade of War” Study and, among others, concluded that understanding the operating environment, processes

facilitation rapid adaption, and “robust interagency coordination and participation” were vital to success.⁴¹ Interagency harmonization is necessary everywhere there is a U.S. Government presence, principally in conflict zones, areas of economic and civil strife, and where mission sets are complementary.

DOS also understands the need for interagency coordination and takes steps to improve that relationship. George Staples, former Director General, three-time Ambassador, 26-year DOS employee, and eight-year Air Force veteran, concluded, “Understanding our military, its role and its importance in interagency decision-making, should be a high priority for diplomats—especially for those beginning their careers.”⁴² Heeding this advice, DOS took tangible steps and applied lessons learned to improve operations. Founded in 2016, the Foreign Service Institute’s (FSI) Center for the Study of Conduct of Diplomacy, “...provides mid-career officials the opportunity to benefit from lessons learned and best practices by drawing on diplomatic correspondence, open-source materials and interviews to analyze how U.S. diplomats execute policy.”⁴³ At the Center’s creation, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken affirmed its mission and called for leadership that draws on the military, the foreign service, and alliances to best accomplish diplomacy.⁴⁴ The Diplomatic Security Service, also looking to record lessons, founded the computer-based Center for Lessons Learned in February 2015. “The center is a clearinghouse for sharing best practices, operation planning methods, and products of the Deliberate Planning Process in order to provide critical knowledge that supports Diplomatic Security (DS) and its partners in their complex and evolving work of mitigating threats and protecting people.”⁴⁵ Clearly, lessons learned are important to avoid repeating mistakes; however, more emphasis needs to be placed on proactive educational measures.

DOS recognizes the need for improved communication, operations, and information sharing across the whole of government and provides many ‘elective’ style courses. The Foreign Service Institute, DOS’ “premier foreign affairs training provider, is dedicated to ensuring the career-long learning opportunities required for success in today’s global arena. FSI promotes substantive, regional, and linguistic expertise, leadership finesse, personal resilience and innovative problem-solving.” FSI offers over 800 resident and distance education courses, enrolls over 170,000 students annually from across the government, and teaches language training, area studies, applied information technology courses, and leadership training.⁴⁶ Improving the knowledge and mission capability of all who conduct American diplomacy, both in and out of uniform, is a priority of DOS. Yet with all these courses, few effectively address interagency interoperability. Of the ones that do, officers are usually too occupied with other mandatory training or unable to attend due to fiscal or personal shortages.

Neither the Marine Corps nor DOS challenge the notion that interagency coordination is important, yet in spite of a decade and a half of trials and tribulations since 9/11, 240 years of working together, and the creation of new training and requirements to cover professional development, the majority of Marines and DOS personnel are still not equipped with baseline knowledge of the other.

Chapter Four: How and Why Interoperability Fails

Interagency interoperability is not a concept that inherently exists in the U.S. Government. It is an unnatural act to cross agency lines and potentially lose leadership authority. There is risk of mission creep when warfighters join forces with diplomats. This fear stems from the Constitution itself. “The Framers of which did not want an efficient government. They wanted a better government than that provided by the Articles of Confederation, but they

feared for the future of liberty in any too strong concentration of power. They thus deliberately and with intent set about to create a divided government, one in which power was both separate and shared in order to inhibit coordination. Consequently, the foundation of the U.S. concept of government is deeply embedded with obstacles to coordination that cost a political price.”⁴⁷ The division of power, creation of multiple agencies and branches of the military, checks and balances, and civilian oversight, created a government where no one entity is above the law. Consequently, agencies and branches formed their own languages and cultures and avoid interoperability. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Martin, a senior DAO Officer with several embassy tours in Middle Eastern countries concluded, “DOD does not always comprehend the duties and lack of immediate decision-making authority that DOS has available in a timely fashion. There are many more levels of authorities that need to be taken into consideration. Conversely, broadly speaking, inexperienced DOS personnel do not always understand the rank structure of DOD, duties, and responsibilities in a joint-planning environment, that are entrusted to mid-level Officers and Senior NCOs.”⁴⁸

This opinion is equally shared by DOS perspective. Supervisory Special Agent Robert Kimbrough, veteran of six embassy and consulate tours, agreed and stated, “The perennial challenge in my 19-year career is DOD’s lack of understanding of DOS’ authorities and responsibilities. In particular when referring to the difference between Title 10 and Title 22 environments and how those authorities and responsibilities shift. DOD personnel are routinely surprised to learn that we do not have unlimited personnel to throw at problems and even more surprised to discover the small size of our offices. DOS personnel lack understanding on tasking DOD to conduct certain actions such as responding to a crisis at an embassy. The assumption is that DOS can pick up a phone and call the nearest DOD entity.”⁴⁹

If Marines are not trained to work in the interagency environment, confusion of authorities will inevitably arise. Supervisory Special Agent James Bloomer, a 14-year veteran of DOS, stated “In my experience DOD does not understand that they have been called to assist DOS in a DOS mission. They are not taking over DOS mission, they are there to supplement DOS in what they are trying to do. They report to the Ambassador who will then normally give command of DOD forces to the RSO.”⁵⁰

Marines who do receive interagency training are either offered it too late in their career or given too little instruction to improve their knowledge. For instance, officers attending the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) and Marine Command and Staff College (CSC) receive a significant exposure to the interagency environment; though, Marines attending Marine Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), DAO officers, MSGs, and FAST Marines receive very little. MCWAR is a 10-month senior level Professional Military Education (PME) designed for O-5 grade officers and offers approximately 348 hours of seminar, lecture, practical application, and field study in diplomacy and statecraft.⁵¹ MCWAR sets the bar high for exposure to interagency topics woefully too late in their career. CSC, also a 10-month intermediate level PME designed for O-4 grade officers, incorporates 340 hours like MCWAR to various interagency related topics.⁵² CSC’s mission clearly encapsulates this focus, “To provide graduate level education and training in order to develop critical thinkers, innovative problem solvers, and ethical leaders who will serve as commanders and staff officers in service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations confronting complex and uncertain security environments.”⁵³ Expeditionary Warfare School, a 41-week resident course for O-3 grade officers, hosts three classroom courses on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) plus a four-day NEO planning exercise with DOS representatives participating.⁵⁴ DAO

officers, in addition to their significant language and cultural skills acquired at the Defense Language Institute, receive a five-day course entitled Joint-Foreign Area Officers Course and includes topics like Combatant Commander and DOS familiarization, embassy operations, the interagency environment.⁵⁵ MSGs in their eight-week school taught jointly by DOS and Marine Corps, only receive a few classes on DOS rank, command structure, and embassy life.⁵⁶ FAST Marines receive almost no interagency training but get exposure during a handful of exercises with DOS representatives present to impart their experience.⁵⁷

Beyond the above and for those directly tasked to the interagency environment, is the almost absence of any interagency training and education to the rest of the Marine Corps. New enlistees in Recruit Training, School of Infantry, and Combat Training receive no interagency knowledge or familiarization. This trend continues until enlisted Marines reach very senior positions. “At no point in enlisted PME ranks E-3 to E-7 are the topics of interagency covered, only at the E-8 level to enlisted Marines begin to receive exposure to interagency topics.”⁵⁸ New officers in Officer Candidate School and The Basic School receive not a shred of information on interagency culture, authorities, and capabilities.⁵⁹ Most of these venues, with only a few hours of additional training, could serve as ground zero for the foundation of interagency interoperability.

DOS attempts to impart interagency knowledge but is equally lacking in not preparing its officers to serve with DOD. Unfortunately, this can be lost on DOS employees unaccustomed with working with the military. An Army Major in DAO with 13 years of service including Special Forces agreed and stated, “DOS personnel generally don’t understand the difference between various military offices in an embassy including DAO and the Security Cooperation Office. These two offices are usually haphazardly combined under the generic label ‘the

military.’ This vagary is sometimes to our advantage, but usually convolutes billing, official documentation, and to a lesser extent, reporting.”⁶⁰

Supervisory Special Agent Joe Jung, a 16-year member of DOS and 4-year veteran of the U.S. Army, believes, “Most nonmilitary veteran DOS employees have no understanding of the complexities and breadth of military operations. The military has the ability to do anything, unfortunately, most DOS employees do not know how to leverage those abilities for diplomatic issues/problems.”⁶¹ Adding to this, Foreign Service Officer (FSO) Roberto Custodio, an 11-year member of DOS and 6-year veteran of the Army National Guard, stated, “I must say that many of my DOS colleagues have served in some capacity at DOD prior to become DOS employees. Moreover, I would like to highlight that former Marines whether enlisted or commissioned have made strides at DOS.”⁶² Luckily, as of 2016 almost 33% of federal employees are in their second career, military veterans, and are, on average, 49 years old.⁶³ This statistic increased five percent since 2009 when President Obama mandated increased hiring preferences of veterans by the federal government.⁶⁴ Having more worldly experience, being more mature about civilian and government matters, and having a notable portion who formerly wore a uniform, better prepares federal employees like those in DOS to work with DOD. Unfortunately, the remaining majority of non-veterans face a steep learning curve.

Moving in the direction of interoperability, DOS, along with many civilian federal agencies, allow officers to join DOD at certain resident PME institutions with the goal of improving the interagency system and earning Master’s degrees. Opportunities like the CSC, MCWAR, and various other military professional education institutions. Ted Strickler, a retired Senior FSO, praised PMEs and stated, “...One way to become a team player with the military is to take full advantage of its extensive educational and training opportunities, and to further

support its planning efforts. Giving greater emphasis to continuing professional education, the military stands ready to welcome increased numbers from the Foreign Service to its existing programs.”⁶⁵

However, these highly beneficial opportunities are not widely attended or easily accessible to DOS personnel. Of the approximate 24,000 DOS generalist, specialist, and civil servants, only a few dozen per year attend some form of DOD PME. This is further complicated by the fact that to be eligible to attend a DOD PME, a DOS employee must have been promoted within the previous six years to FS-3/GS-13, FS-2/GS-14, FS-1/GS-15, the ‘unofficial rank equivalent’ of an O-4, O-5, and O-6, respectively.⁶⁶ By contrast, DOD stands well above DOS in that all O-4 grade officers are required to attend a CSC to be eligible for promotion to O-5. Interagency education should be as available to DOS employees as it is a requirement for DOD officers.

While DOS does attempt to empower its new officers with a baseline knowledge of the interagency environment, it falls short. For instance, initial orientation training for DOS specialists and generalists is three and six weeks, respectively, and includes courses like Department of State: History, Authorities, and the Interagency Process, Orientation to State Overseas, Orientation to an Overseas Mission, and Washington Tradecraft.⁶⁷ Though being that this training is only given once and at the start of their career, there is little chance the information will be absorbed and remembered.

Later in their careers, DOS personnel can take training from FSI in interagency topics like Navigating the Interagency, Information Sharing Environment, and Political-Military Affairs.⁶⁸ Though with busy work schedules, restrictive supervisors, conflicting training, and being physically away from FSI, DOS personnel do not attend these courses in as great of

numbers as intended. The interviewed DCM added, “The problem with DOS is much deeper than imparting knowledge to officers and specialists. We largely do not invest in training, so you’d have to start doing that before you could add a mandatory piece on relations with DOD. We already have an FSI course that covers this, but if you’re transferring from one post to another, you have precious little time to focus on ‘non-essential’ courses like that one.”⁶⁹ The assumption is for DOS employees to learn interagency operations on the job. Luckily for DOS, embassy life inherently requires interagency coordination daily across civilian and DOD lines. For the unprepared DOS employee, as with uneducated military personnel, the learning curve is steep and often causes delays in support and miscommunications. DOS employees, if they rise high enough to become an ambassador or deputy chief of mission, will have DOD members assigned under their charge, and hopefully, through long careers reaching that point, are empowered with the baseline knowledge to properly employ uniformed service members legally and efficiently.

RSOs are generally regarded within the embassy as subject matter experts on Marine Corps interoperability and are also to whom the ambassador first looks when security questions arise. As the operational commanders of the MSG detachment, RSOs must be knowledgeable in DOD culture and authorities arguably more than any other member of DOS. From managing the MSG detachment in physical and procedural security, to coordinating with the greater DOD entities in reinforcement and emergency evacuations, RSOs must be versed and comfortable with DOD to rapidly and effectively employ crisis response activities. Unfortunately, despite RSO training being twelve weeks long, only a few hours are devoted to DOD interoperability and MSG management.⁷⁰

The lack of basic interagency familiarization in both DOS and DOD on nearly all levels contributes to an inefficient system. Although this disjointed nature has led to a widespread culture of inter-service rivalry and ‘esprit de corps,’ it has also created natural barriers to communication and understanding. The vast majority of military members do not know how DOS works nor how to work under an ambassador. Likewise, most DOS personnel do not know how DOD works, how to speak DOD language, nor how to employ DOD members. Despite pockets of subject matter experts in both organizations and the expectation of success regardless of the obstacles, U.S. Government interagency interoperability will remain a pipedream until all members of DOD and DOS are empowered with a baseline knowledge of the other.

Chapter Five: Proposed Solutions

The interagency education gap is the key to improving interagency interoperability. A study published in 1997 by the RAND Corporation on U.S. Army interagency coordination summarized that soldiers both in the Pentagon and the field are in dire need of training and education on interagency coordination. To be able to make sound decisions with regards the interagency community, they need to understand limitations, advantages, and develop relationships.⁷¹ Interagency familiarization training must be widespread, easily accessible, and digestible to all Marine NCOs, Staff NCOs, Officers, and DOS employees. Marines and DOS personnel must be empowered with the same baseline knowledge of their counterpart. And most importantly, it must be henceforth incorporated into the training of both agencies if true interagency interoperability is to be achieved.

All Marine Officers, NCOs, and Staff NCOs have reached the points in their careers when they should be exposed to DOS culture and authorities. Sergeant Major Scott Hamm, with over 25 years in the Marine Corps, holder of two Master’s degrees, and the current director of

the Senior Enlisted Academy stated, “I believe at the NCO level, Marines should be taught about the various other agencies and their missions. At the E-6 grade and then again at E-8 they should be taught the ins and outs of authorities granted to each agency, how they conduct their missions, how those other missions cross paths with DOD, and what legal support and cooperation the military can and should provide. It should be taught via a short lecture or reading followed by subject matter expert panel discussion and actual case studies of good and bad interaction.”⁷²

The foundational knowledge Marines should know about DOS will provide them a common understanding of the background of DOS, importance of interagency interoperability, and ‘what is in it for them.’ This training can be accomplished in less than four hours, be taught in-person or via computer-based training, and be of minimal impact to the existing training curriculum. These learning objectives should be revisited at successive major training schools and academies throughout the Marines’ careers. It should include a brief history of DOS, terminology and acronyms, highlights of Marine Corps and DOS historical coordination, what embassies and consulates are, what ‘sovereignty’ means, a brief overview of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, what an ambassador is and what their responsibilities are, what DOS employees and RSOs are and what their capabilities and responsibilities are, what ‘Title 22 authority’ is and how it differs from ‘Title 10,’ under what circumstances authority shifts from COM to GCC and vice versa, and who falls under GCC and COM authority.

DOS employees also have a knowledge gap to fill on their Marine counterparts and can easily do so by incorporating this information into training. DOS familiarization training on the Marine Corps can also be accomplished in less than four hours. DOS personnel should be knowledgeable about the following, history of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps terminology and

acronyms, highlights of Marine Corps and DOS historical coordination, importance of esprit de corps, discipline, uniforms, and the birthday ball, what a GCC is and what their responsibilities are, what 'Title 10' is and how it differs from 'Title 22,' under what circumstances authority shifts from COM to GCC and vice versa, and who falls under COM and GCC authority.

Most DOS employees after their first tour in an embassy and consulate, can answer most of the above learning objectives; though by that point, needless delays have already occurred from lack of understanding. All DOS employees, aside from receiving the learning objectives in initial training such as the FSI orientation for specialists and generalists, should revisit these topics during in-service refresher training like Basic Special Agent Course, RSO training, and Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course. As with Marines, education on their counterpart should be initiated on entry and revisited throughout their career to develop and sustain a fully interoperable workforce. Additionally, DOS should ease restrictions on DOS employees attending DOD PME from those who have been promoted within the last six years to anyone who is at the required grade or requiring attendance for promotion like the military. Doing so will increase attendance of joint-service institutions and substantially improve interagency interoperability.

If interagency interoperability is truly to be achieved, it must be engrained in all Marines and DOS employees and revisited at milestone educational venues. Forcing Marines and DOS to 'wing it' in the field delays operations, causes disagreements, and reduces mission capability. Yet if any random group of Marines and DOS employees were to be thrust together after the proposed training, their speed and success of interoperability would greatly outpace their untrained compatriots.

Conclusion:

The Marine Corps and DOS have bled and died in each other's service. The bond between Marines and DOS is stronger than any other military branch and civilian agency. If interagency interoperability is to be achieved, education must be pushed out to wider audiences and lower levels of DOD and DOS, it must be reinforced at milestone educational venues, and DOS needs to ease the restrictions on DOD PME attendance and either mandate or incentivize attendance. It is in the best interest of both organizations to work better together, and this relationship can be strengthened by greater education and in-person interaction. The history between Marines and DOS has shown that anyone, regardless of occupation, can be called upon to work in an interagency environment. Thus, all Marine NCOs and higher along with all DOS employees should be empowered with a basic level of knowledge of their counterpart to improve interagency interoperability.

Master of Military Studies Requirements for the Degree

List of Acronyms

CSC: Command and Staff College
COM: Chief of Mission
DCM: Deputy Chief of Mission
DOD: Department of Defense
DOS: Department of State
DAO: Defense Attaché Office
DECS: Department of Defense Embassy and Consulate Services
DS: Diplomatic Security
EWS: Expeditionary War School
FAST: Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team
FSI: Foreign Service Institute
FSO: Foreign Service Officer
GCC: Geographic Combatant Commander
MAGTF: Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARSOC: Marine Special Operations Command
MCWAR: Marine Corps War College
MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit
MSG: Marine Security Guard
MSAU: Marine Security Guard-Security Augmentation Unit
MOA: Memorandum of Agreement
NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer
NEO: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
PME: Professional Military Education
RSO: Regional Security Officer
SF: Special Forces
SOFLE: Special Operations Forces Liaison Element

Notes

¹ U.S. Department of State, “What We Do,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed on December 17, 2017, <https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission/>.

² Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, “MCESG History,” *Marine Corps Embassy Security Group* accessed, on December 17, 2017, <http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/About/MCESG-History/>.

³ Richard H. Shultz Jr, *In the Aftermath of War: Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUSE*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1993), 64.

⁴ Interview with a Department of State Deputy Chief of Mission on January 21, 2018.

⁵ Leo J. Daugherty III, *The Marine Corps and the Department of State: Enduring Partners In United States Foreign Policy, 1798-2007*, (McFarland & Company Inc: Jefferson, NC, 2009), 1.

⁶ *Ibid*, 7.

⁷ *Ibid*, 31.

⁸ *Ibid*, 31.

⁹ *Ibid*, 13-14.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 18.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 63.

¹² *Ibid*, 65.

¹³ *Ibid*, 65.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 83-84.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 37.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 85.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 88.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 97-100.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 154-176.

²⁰ Congressional Research Service. “Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy,” *United States Congress*, Order Code RL34141, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1.

²¹ Suzanne Whang, “When the Marines Show Up at a U.S. Consulate,” *Marine Corps Embassy Security Group*, August 15, 2015, “<http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/News/Article-View/Article/613877/when-the-marines-show-up-at-a-us-consulate/>.”

²² U.S. Marine Corps Security Forces Regiment, “U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command,” *U.S. Marine Corps Security Forces Regiment*, accessed December 22, 2017, <http://www.mcsfr.marines.mil/>.

²³ 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, “About Us and Our Mission,” *26th Marine Expeditionary Unit*, accessed December 22, 2017, <http://www.26thmeu.marines.mil/About/MEU>

²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ George R. Dixon, “The Need for a Joint Support Element in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 85, 2nd Quarter, (April 01, 2017), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-85/Article/1130662/the-need-for-a-joint-support-element-in-noncombatant-evacuation-operations/>.

-
- ²⁷ Department of Defense Intelligence Agency, “DoD Embassy and Consulate Services (DECS),” *Department of Defense Intelligence Agency*, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://www.dia.mil/About/DoD-Embassy-and-Consulate-Services-DECS/>.
- ²⁸ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, “Intelligence Department: Marine Corps Support to the Defense Attaché Services,” *Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps*, accessed January 8, 2018, <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Intel-OPS-PERS/Defense-Attache-Program/>.
- ²⁹ U.S. Special Operations Command, *Fact Book 2014*, (U.S. Special Operations Command: McDill Air Force Base, FL, 2014), 30.
- ³⁰ Richard Whittle, “Tiny Team Beefs Up Marines’ Comms to SOCOM,” *Breakingdefense.com*, April 17, 2015, <https://breakingdefense.com/2015/04/tiny-team-beefs-up-marines-comms-to-socom/>.
- ³¹ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Message and Setting the Course to 2035*, (Fort Bragg, SC, Volume 30, 2017), 12.
- ³² Peter G. Peterson Foundation, “U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries,” *Peter G. Peterson Foundation*, accessed January 02, 2018, https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, accessed January 02, 2018, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>; Amy Roberts, “By the Numbers: U.S. Diplomatic Presence,” *CNN.com*, May 09, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/btn-diplomatic-presence/index.html>.
- ³³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Cooperation*, xi.
- ³⁴ Interview with a Department of State Deputy Chief of Mission on January 21, 2018.
- ³⁵ Ronald Dempsey, “The Powel Program: One Step Closer to Cementing Interoperability With our Interagency Partners,” *Special Warfare*, Volume 28, Issue 3, July-September 2015, (U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School: Fort Bragg, NC), 33-35.
- ³⁶ Anthony Smith (Supervisory Special Agent with the Diplomatic Security Service), discussion with author, January 05, 2018.
- ³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Cooperation*, I-2.
- ³⁸ Henry Nuzum, “Shades of Cords in the Kush” (master’s thesis, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 71.
- ³⁹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 2017), 33.
- ⁴⁰ Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned,” *Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory*, (Quantico, VA), <http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/MCCLL/>.
- ⁴¹ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,” *Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, J-7*, (Suffolk, VA: June 15, 2012), 2.
- ⁴² George Staples, “The Value of Military Training for Diplomats: A Personal Story,” *American Foreign Services Association, AFSA.org*, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://www.afsa.org/value-military-training-diplomats-personal-story>.
- ⁴³ Charles S. Clark, “State Department Leaders Inaugurate New ‘Lessons Learned’ Center,” *Govexec.com*, February 03, 2016, <http://www.govexec.com/management/2016/02/state-department-leaders-inaugurate-new-lessons-learned-center/125673/>.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.

-
- ⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “Faces of Diplomatic Security: Year in Review 2015,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 05, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258336.pdf>.
- ⁴⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Service Institute,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 12, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/m/fsi/>.
- ⁴⁷ William J. Olsen, “Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or Essence of Indecision,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella, et al., 215-254 (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute), 223.
- ⁴⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Martin (Chief of Attaché Operations, U.S. Embassy Kuwait Defense Attaché Office), discussion with author on January, 08, 2018.
- ⁴⁹ Robert Kimbrough, (Supervisory Special Agent with the Diplomatic Security Service), discussion with author on January 05, 2018.
- ⁵⁰ James Bloomer, (Supervisory Special Agent with the Diplomatic Security Service), discussion with author on January 06, 2018.
- ⁵¹ Dr. Rebecca Johnson (Dean, Marine Corps War College), discussion with author on January, January 17, 2018; Marine Corps War College, “Diplomacy and Statecraft: Course Overview 2017,” *Marine Corps War College*, accessed January 18, 2018, <https://www.usmcu.edu/sites/default/files/MCWAR/curriculum/17-DS%20Overview%2020160713.pdf>.
- ⁵² Discussion with USAF Lieutenant Colonel (Marine Corps University Staff), February 1, 2018.
- ⁵³ U.S. Marine Corps, “Command and Staff College,” *Marine Corps University*, accessed January 05, 2018, <https://www.usmcu.edu/csc>.
- ⁵⁴ Robert Fawcett, (Dean of Academics, Expeditionary Warfare School), discussion with author on January 16, 2018.
- ⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Commissioned Officers Professional Development and Career Management, 600-3*, (DA PAM 600-3), December 03, 2014, 279.
- ⁵⁶ U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Embassy Security Group: School,” *U.S. Marine Corps*, <http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/Become-a-MSG/School/>.
- ⁵⁷ Discussion with USMC Major (Former FAST platoon commander), January 18, 2018.
- ⁵⁸ Sergeant Major Scott Hamm, (Director, Senior Enlisted Academy) discussion with author on January 18, 2018.
- ⁵⁹ U.S. Marine Corps, “Basic Officer Course, Course Content Review Board Lesson Card,” updated January 5, 2018, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command: Quantico, VA); U.S. Marine Corps, “Basic Officer Course Task Inventory Review Board Report Created for All Duties for The Basic School,” updated January 5, 2018, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command: Quantico, VA.
- ⁶⁰ Interview with Defense Attaché Officer at a U.S. Embassy, January 07, 2018.
- ⁶¹ Joseph Jung (Supervisory Special Agent with the Diplomatic Security Service), discussion with author, January 15, 2018.
- ⁶² Roberto Custodio, (Foreign Service Officer of the U.S. Department of State), discussion with author, January 10, 2018.
- ⁶³ Leo Shane III, “Veterans Make Up Nearly One-Third of Federal Workers,” *Militarytimes.com*, November 11, 2016, <https://www.militarytimes.com/military-honor/salute-veterans/2016/11/11/veterans-make-up-nearly-one-third-of-federal-workers/>.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ted Strickler, “Working with the Military: 10 Things the Foreign Service Needs to Know,” *Afsa.org*, accessed January 18, 2018, <http://www.afsa.org/working-us-military-10-things-foreign-service-needs-know>.

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Professional Development Unit: Mid-Level Training Opportunities,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 14, 2018, <https://intranet.hr.state.sbu/Workforce/Assignment/Documents/PDU/Training-Eligibility%20Requirements-April2017.pdf>.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute, “Specialist orientation,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 14, 2018, <http://reg.fsi.state.sbu/CourseCatalog.aspx?EventId=PN106>; Ibid, “Generalist orientation” accessed January 14, 2018, <http://reg.fsi.state.sbu/CourseCatalog.aspx?EventId=PG101>.

⁶⁸ Ibid, “FSI Course Catalogue,” accessed January 14, 2018, <http://reg.fsi.state.sbu/CourseCatalog.aspx?ThemeId=ORIE>.

⁶⁹ Interview with a Department of State Deputy Chief of Mission on January 21, 2018.

⁷⁰ William Inman, (Supervisory Special Agent and Division Chief of Security and Law Enforcement Training) discussion with author on January 16, 2018.

⁷¹ Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army*, (RAND Corporation Arroyo Center: Santa Monica, CA, 1997), 30.

⁷² Sergeant Major Scott Hamm, (Director, Senior Enlisted Academy), discussion with author on January 10, 2018.

Bibliography

- Clarke, Charles S. "State Department Leaders Inaugurate New 'Lessons Learned' Center." *Govexec.com*, February 03, 2016. [Http://www.govexec.com/management/2016/02/state-department-leaders-inaugurate-new-lessons-learned-center/125673/](http://www.govexec.com/management/2016/02/state-department-leaders-inaugurate-new-lessons-learned-center/125673/).
- Congressional Research Service. "Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy." *United States Congress*, Order Code RL34141. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007.
- Daugherty, Leo J. III. *The Marine Corps and the Department of State: Enduring Partners In United States Foreign Policy, 1798-2007*. McFarland & Company Inc: Jefferson, NC, 2009.
- Dempsey, Ronald. "The Powel Program: One Step Closer to Cementing Interoperability With our Interagency Partners." *Special Warfare*. Volume 28. Issue 3, July-September 2015. U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School: Fort Bragg, NC.
- Dixon, George R. "The Need for a Joint Support Element in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 85, 2nd Quarter, April 01, 2017. [Http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-85/Article/1130662/the-need-for-a-joint-support-element-in-noncombatant-evacuation-operations/](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-85/Article/1130662/the-need-for-a-joint-support-element-in-noncombatant-evacuation-operations/).
- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis. "Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations." *Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, J-7*. Suffolk, VA: June 15, 2012.
- Marine Corps War College. "Diplomacy and Statecraft: Course Overview 2017." *Marine Corps War College*. Accessed January 18, 2018. [Https://www.usmcu.edu/sites/default/files/MCWAR/curriculum/17-DS%20Overview%2020160713.pdf](https://www.usmcu.edu/sites/default/files/MCWAR/curriculum/17-DS%20Overview%2020160713.pdf).
- Nuzum, Henry. "Shades of Cords in the Kush." Master's thesis, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.
- Olsen, William J. "Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or Essence of Indecision." in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*. Ed. Gabriel Marcella, et al., 215-254. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
- Roberts, Amy. "By the Numbers: U.S. Diplomatic Presence." *CNN.com*, May 09, 2013. [Http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/btn-diplomatic-presence/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/btn-diplomatic-presence/index.html).
- Shane, Leo III. "Veterans Make Up Nearly One-Third of Federal Workers." *Militarytimes.com*, November 11, 2016. [Https://www.militarytimes.com/military-honor/salute-veterans/2016/11/11/veterans-make-up-nearly-one-third-of-federal-workers/](https://www.militarytimes.com/military-honor/salute-veterans/2016/11/11/veterans-make-up-nearly-one-third-of-federal-workers/).

-
- Shultz, Richard H. Jr. *In the Aftermath of War: Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUSE*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1993.
- Staples, George. "The Value of Military Training for Diplomats: A Personal Story." *AFSA.org*. Accessed January 10, 2018. <http://www.afsa.org/value-military-training-diplomats-personal-story>.
- Strickler, Ted. "Working with the Military: 10 Things the Foreign Service Needs to Know." *Afsa.org*. Accessed January 18, 2018. [Http://www.afsa.org/working-us-military-10-things-foreign-service-needs-know](http://www.afsa.org/working-us-military-10-things-foreign-service-needs-know).
- Taw, Jennifer Morrison. *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army*. RAND Corporation Arroyo Center: Santa Monica, CA, 1997.
- The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C., 2017.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Commissioned Officers Professional Development and Career Management, 600-3*. DA PAM 600-3, December 03, 2014.
- U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP-1. Washington, D.C., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2017.
- U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Cooperation*, JP-3-08. Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 12, 2016.
- U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*. JP-3-68. Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 22, 2007.
- U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security. "Faces of Diplomatic Security: Year in Review 2015." *U.S. Department of State*. Accessed January 05, 2018. [Https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258336.pdf](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258336.pdf).
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Affairs Handbook (2 FAH-2 H-100) Post Management Organization*, April 20, 2017. [Https://fam.state.gov/fam/02fah02/02fah020110.html](https://fam.state.gov/fam/02fah02/02fah020110.html).
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Basic Officer Course, Course Content Review Board Lesson Card." Updated January 5, 2018. U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command. Quantico, VA.

-
- U.S. Marine Corps. “Basic Officer Course Task Inventory Review Board Report Created for All Duties for The Basic School.” Updated January 5, 2018. U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command: Quantico, VA.
- U.S. President. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. *Authorities and Responsibilities of United States Chiefs of Mission*, July 12, 1990. Accessed December 20, 2017. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28466.pdf>.
- U.S. Special Operations Command, *Fact Book 2014*. U.S. Special Operations Command: McDill Air Force Base, FL, 2014.
- U.S. Army Special Operations Command. *USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Message and Setting the Course to 2035*. Fort Bragg, SC. Volume 30, 2017.
- U.S. Strategic Command. *Commanders Action Group*, Powerpoint Presentation. Version 11-11, August 19, 2011. <http://slideplayer.com/slide/8942200/>.
- Wang, Suzanne. “When the Marines Show Up at a U.S. Consulate,” *Marine Corps Embassy Security Group*, August 15, 2015. <http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/News/Article-View/Article/613877/when-the-marines-show-up-at-a-us-consulate/>.
- Whittle, Richard. “Tiny Team Beefs Up Marines’ Comms to SOCOM.” *Breakingdefense.com*, April 17, 2015. <https://breakingdefense.com/2015/04/tiny-team-beefs-up-marines-comms-to-socom/>.