Botswana and the Case for Judicial Oversight of the Intelligence Services
Abstract
The primary intelligence oversight committee in Botswana, the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (PCIS) has failed to provide an oversight report on the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS) since 2010. The legislative committee is tasked with a mandate to oversee the financial expenditure and administrative needs of the DISS, but does not have the mandate to oversee the operational activities of the intelligence agency. The only oversight structure with a mandate to oversee the operational activities of the DISS is the Tribunal, a three-member appellate body that does not have the capability to oversee the DISS's activities at planning or during active operations. The Tribunal also does not have the democratic independence to initiate investigations against the DISS at its own discretion. This weakness in mandate, as provided for by the Intelligence and Security Services (ISS) Act of 2008, affords the Director General (DG) DISS the power to make decisions without accountability to any oversight entity. To ensure accountability by the DISS, Botswana should review the ISS Act and adopt the judicial oversight mechanism as its primary intelligence oversight body because, apart from resisting political influence, the professional maturity of Botswana's judicial system has the power to ensure legality and propriety of the DISS. The judicial intelligence oversight mechanism is also better placed to oversee the intelligence operations in all the phases: before the start of operations, during the operations, and after the operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 05, 2018
- Accession Number
- AD1177129
Entities
People
- Mbako R Molopo
Organizations
- Marine Corps University