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The following series of essays explore how the United States' should successfully use deception in a future fight against a near peer adversary. First, the new character of warfare will require deception and feints to incorporate increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains. Second, the deception plan and feint of the future must be incorporated at all levels, tactical through strategic, and tie the desired ends of the deception plan and feint to their ways and means with increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains. Third, the DoD should procure technological capabilities that affect the three elements of perception with additional emphasis in understanding how the enemy uses technological capabilities to perceive their environment.

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
THE ENDURING NATURE AND EVOLVING CHARACTER OF DECEPTION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Enduring Nature and Evolving Character of Deception:

Part I – The New Character

Part II – Sun Tzu to World War II

Part III – The Korean War to the Next War

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Thesis: The following series of essays will explore the question of how to further develop the United States' employment of deception in a future fight against a near peer adversary such as North Korea. First, the new character of warfare will require deception and feints to incorporate increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains. This is required in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process consisting of more vulnerabilities such as susceptibility to information overload from a great breadth of avenues of information collection. Second, the deception plan and feint of the future must be incorporated at all levels, tactical through strategic, and tie the desired ends of the deception plan and feint to their ways and means with increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process. Third, the Department of Defense (DoD) should procure technological capabilities that can affect one or all of the three elements of perception. Additionally, the DoD should add proportional emphasis in planning and peace time intelligence gathering to better understand how a potential enemy uses their technological capabilities to perceive their environment. These two points combined will enable successful deception operations to include feints in a future war.

Discussion: There is currently a strong push in the professional military education (PME) institutions throughout the DoD to emphasize the new joint warfighting function of information. As the cyber domain continues to expand and USCYBERCOM becomes its own function Combatant Command (COCOM), old doctrine and theory is tested once again against the new backdrop of a quickly evolving character of war. While military deception (MILDEC) is not a new idea, it is one area to reassess. The question remains on how much the art of deception has changed with increased complexity and increased information? The Marine Corps has charged its forces to evaluate a number of concepts in order to solve the problem statement outlined in the Marine Corps Operating Concept. The Marine Corps acknowledges is not prepared for the next fight against a near peer adversary. History provides many examples of how inferior forces used deception to defeat a larger adversary. While the United States is still the top major world power, these lessons learned are worth retaining and implementing into the next generation of doctrine. The following essays will analyze what is deception in the past versus now and how the character changed, what are common trends from successful examples of deception over the past 2000 years, and how should the DoD effectively execute deception and feints into the future.

Conclusion: In summary, the DoD should procure technological capabilities that can affect one or all of the three elements of perception. Additionally, the DoD should add proportional emphasis in planning and peace time intelligence gathering to better understand how a potential enemy, such as North Korea, uses their technological capabilities to perceive

their environment. These two points combined will enable successful deception operations to include feints in a future war. Definitions do not need to be updated, and more concepts do not need to be added. Further, increased emphasis on complexity and information in today's environment is already in full circulation at the war colleges, new concept documents, and doctrine. Thoughts of evolving character and enduring nature of warfare passed from Clausewitz on through the years and into MCDP-1, *Warfighting*, is still a valid truth. The few examples provided in this series over a two-thousand-year period attest to that. However, greater emphasis on beating the enemy's strategy and decision-making instead of his forces should be applied to actual war OPLANs and their updates, which is currently not sufficient. The time to develop deception plans is not just before a large conflict. It should also not be added on after the main effort and course of action have been developed. New technology will be essential and enabling, but the greatest weapon to be cultivated is the gray matter between the ears. In this, there is great potential and room for improvement using the exponentially growing technological means available in 2020 and beyond to deceive the adversary.

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DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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PREFACE

There is currently a strong push in the PME institutions throughout the DoD to emphasize the new joint warfighting function of information. Many facets of doctrine and theory are being revisited and tested to ensure validation against the next generation of warfare that is strongly information based. How should the ancient idea of deception be applied into 2020 and beyond? My intent is to provide a background on MILDEC, assess the nature versus character of MILDEC, and finally recommend a focus for MILDEC in the future on how the enemy achieves perception and adopting technologies that can affect all elements of their perception.

Numerous individuals helped me throughout the research and writing process for this paper. I would like to thank Dr. Benjamin Jensen for his guidance and mentorship. His insatiable appetite for learning and mentoring pushed me to explore ideas to a much deeper level and directly contributed to my understanding of deception and feints among many other subjects. I would also like to thank the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and Dr. Jensen for allowing myself along with the other students participating in the Advanced Studies Program, *Fight Club*, to utilize their spaces as a venue to explore our ideas through writing, wargaming, and real-world planning applications. The many hours invested among my peers has paid unmeasurable dividends to my personal growth and development.

While the aforementioned individuals provided invaluable advice during the writing of this paper, the views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper are strictly my own. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions in this paper. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Brittney, and my son and daughter, Caden and Devin, for their unwavering support throughout my Marine Corps career and during this busy year.

PART I: The New Character

Ancient Greeks believed wrestling provided a foundation and was a precursor to hoplite fighting. Euripides describes the duel between Eteocles and Polynices to display how Eteocles adopted a wrestling feint to one in armed combat to defeat Polynices. The idea applies to wrestling, boxing, and armed combat. Most fighters are right handed and have a stance with their left foot forward. Southpaws, lefthanded boxers, can throw off righthanded boxers just by their stance similar to how a lefthanded pitcher can throw off a righthanded batter in baseball. Eteocles starts off with a righthanded fighting stance, left foot forward, and his feint consists of stepping back with his left foot while drawing his shield in close to protect his body resulting in Polynices pressing forward thinking he is forced to give ground, or perhaps stumbles in following his change of direction. Eteocles swivels to let him pass, then with a quick forward step of the right foot, he drives his sword into his foe as Polynices' impetus leaves a gap between his shield and body where the thrust may pierce him.¹

Just as wrestling provided the foundation for the Greeks, the history of deception and the feint provides a foundation for how to effectively apply these classical ideas in the ever-evolving information environment (IE) and re-emerging “gray zone” warfare of today.² The isolated near peer adversary, North Korea, is a possible future enemy of the United States from the “4+1 framework” presented by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Joseph Dunford.³ The country’s defense-in-depth consists of entrenched positions in caves and thoroughly prepared

¹ Borthwick, E. K. “Two Scenes of Combat in Euripides.” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 90 (1970): 18-19.

² Frank G. Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War," 2016 Index of US Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation: 25.

³ Dews, Fred. *Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on “4+1 framework” and meeting transnational threats*. Brookings Now, February 14, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/>.

positions combined with decoys manned by a population ready to follow their dear leader in a cultish fashion down to the last man and woman.

At the same time, ideas and information are moving at the ever-increasing speed of cyber. Joint doctrine just added a seventh warfighting function, information, to the classic six warfighting functions.⁴ While information is not new, the fifth warfighting domain of cyber is relatively new and growing each day at an exponential rate in how much it impacts individuals throughout the world. In order to bate the North Koreans out of their defenses and into a position of vulnerability should the need arise, the United States and her allies will need to apply lessons learned and classical ideas of deception and feints to new character of information flow and digestion.

This is the first part of a three-part series of essays aimed at answering how to apply deception and feints to the new character of war in and beyond 2020. Part I will examine the new character of deception and feints against current and old definitions. Part II will assess traditional examples of deception and feints pre-Korean War. Part III will assess examples of deception and feints post-Korean War and provide an assessment for a possible way forward. The journey starts with an analysis of what deception and the feint mean. While the future fight will have a new character involving autonomous systems, advanced stealth, robotics, over the horizon weapons, artificial intelligence, and more precise weapon systems, the nature of warfare and sub elements of deception and feints will remain the same. The new character of warfare will require deception and feints to incorporate increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process consisting of more

⁴ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC, July 2017, I-18.

vulnerabilities such as susceptibility to information overload from ever increasing avenues of information collection.

Before looking at historical examples and modern examples in Parts II and III, definitions of both terms need to be explored and compared. Since feints fall under the broader umbrella of deception, deception is examined first. Deception is an active process consisting of elaborate steps and continuous efforts to mislead the enemy to friendly force intentions. Where camouflage hides, deception creates a false impression or picture through possibly withdrawal of information, concealment, or an ambush. The target is the adversary's decision-making process with the end state of achieving a desired behavior.⁵ Deception is not simply important but essential for military success.⁶ Deception can occur from the lowest tactical level to the highest political level, but all efforts must be woven together and coordinated in order to be successful.

However, Sun Tzu and the ancient Chinese see it as much more; deception is the fundamental basis of warfare. Deception consists of the concealment of information but also includes an active measure of war and the starting point for the development of war strategy. Stratagems are deceptions which disguise the true strategies of action. The Chinese idea of stratagems or deception is not kept secret, because they are interpreted as a sign of intelligence and not a negative thing. The deception plan end state or goal is to force the enemy to act the way you want him to act, so that the enemy's behavior serves your purpose or advantage, which may include active control of the enemy's resources. Attacking the enemy's resources leads to the pragmatic counterpart of deception as a strategic basis of warfare by its use of unorthodox

⁵ Daly, John H. 1983. "Tactical Deception Gives an Edge." *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 24. and Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations*. Washington, DC, November 2014, II-10 and Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China", GIGA Working Paper, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, No. 88, Sep 2008, 25.

⁶ Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. "A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION ANALYSIS." In *Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations*, 27-48. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2002, 29.

tactics defined as flexible or surprising use of armed forces.⁷ Sun Tzu's emphasis on deception and knowing how important integration at all levels is to success of deception urges future planners to put more emphasis on the deception plan and information as the seventh warfighting function at the beginning of strategy formulation during problem framing.

Turning towards current definitions, the Marine Corps states the purpose of military deception (MILDEC) is "to cause adversaries to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions by feeding information through their intelligence collection or information assets. Military deception targets the adversary decisionmaker's intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems and requires a thorough knowledge of adversaries and their decision-making processes." MILDEC operations are defined as "actions executed to deliberately mislead the adversary's military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations; thereby, causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission."⁸ Marine Corps definition aligns with the joint definition and both emphasize attacking the enemy's decision-making process in order to achieve a desired behavior from the enemy.⁹ MILDEC operations are powerful but come at a cost. A key takeaway for all deception operations is increased sophistication, details, and coordination leads to increased believability. This takeaway will only become more important as technology continues to advance. In order for them to be believable,

⁷ Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China", GIGA Working Paper, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, No. 88, Sep 2008, 23&25.

⁸ Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-32: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, DC, May 2016, 3-1.

⁹ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations*. Washington, DC, November 2014, II-10. and Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-32: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, DC, May 2016, 3-1.

resources must be committed to them which could be a possible detriment to other aspects of the operation.¹⁰ But how does a feint fall under the higher deception plan?

Deception operations may contain a feint, demonstration, ruse, display, and/or any combination of these four elements. The Marine Corps defines a feint as “a limited objective attack that involves contact with the adversary”, and it is “conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action.”¹¹ A supporting attack is a feint when it is sold to the enemy as the main effort. It could be one attack or a series of attacks that have the objective to make the enemy grow accustomed to a certain pattern. The main attack could then be interwoven and receive no additional attention from the enemy, because they are accustomed to the limited feints.¹² Some historical examples to be discussed utilize multiple feints for a single cumulative effect. Regardless of how the feint or feints are conducted, they are integrated into the overall deception plan, normally, during offensive operations. Feints are employed and have been employed throughout history with the goal of having the enemy react in one of three ways: employ reserves improperly, shift supporting fires, or reveal defensive fires.¹³ How the friendly force desires the enemy to react is the desired end state of the feint. Deception effects include mask, misdirect, and confuse, which can be thought of as the ways to execute feints.¹⁴

¹⁰ Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-32: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, DC, May 2016, 3-1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Daly, John H. 1983. “Tactical Deception Gives an Edge.” *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 25.

¹³ Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-32: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, DC, May 2016, 3-1 and Daly, John H. 1983. “Tactical Deception Gives an Edge.” *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 25.

¹⁴ Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. "A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION ANALYSIS." In *Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations*, 27-48. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2002, 37.

Feints focus on two of the three effects or ways, misdirect and confuse. A Feint can be a misdirecting technique whose purpose is the clear and unambiguous transmission of a false signal. Often the hope is to divert attention, resources, or attacks away from real assets or activities. An enemy faced with misdirecting techniques must refine their capabilities for discerning true from false, which increases work load separate from the efforts of improving acquisition of the targets once confirmed and identified as actual targets. A feint can also be a confusing technique that “seeks to degrade or paralyze the target’s perceptual capabilities through voluminous background noise, oversaturation, unpredictability, and the need for haste.”¹⁵

With feint ends and ways defined, deception and feint means are last to be discussed to round out the ends, ways, means comparison. Means of deception are form or morphological and function or behavioral.¹⁶ An airplane with stealth material is an example of form or morphological mean while flying on airways trying to look like airliner is functional or behavioral mean. While these are not examples of actual attacks, a requirement to be defined a feint, they convey the point and definition. Additionally, forces must have the means as well as the training to sell the feint as the main effort attack or precursor to. And as said already, details and sophistication matter, and it requires intelligence and time.

Decision makers use data gained from perception to create knowledge or intelligence. Perception has three elements. First, a military force of today has sensors to include but not limited to radars, forward looking infrared (FLIR) pods, signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, ears, and eyeballs. Older forces only had the eyeball and their ears, but today, they receive

¹⁵ Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. "A FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTION ANALYSIS." In *Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations*, 27-48. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2002, 36 & 37.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 39.

information from a much greater and ever-growing number of sensors. Second, military forces employ their sensors in certain ways including but not limited to in depth, inch by inch, random patrols or patterns, in zones or sectors, widely or concentrated, and/or around key population centers or installations. Increasingly, sensors are integrated into common pictures, which allows for comparison of information gathered to discern what is actual truth data. Third, military forces have to process data once it is gained through its command and control (C2) structure, wire, radio, signaling, cyber, and/or decision-making cycle.¹⁷ These C2 structures have their own networks filled with actors, nodes, links, and interactions. As stated above, the complexity of the environment today only makes these networks even more complex. Regarding time, the objective of the feint will determine the lead time for it to occur. If the goal is to have the enemy employ his or her reserve improperly, this will require more lead time.¹⁸ Understanding the enemy's three elements of perception through intelligence gathering during peacetime and war time is paramount and will be addressed again in the third part of this essay series.

Quickly, demonstrations must be differentiated from feints. Demonstrations aim to do everything a feint does except it does not involve contact with the enemy. While commanders do not desire to have contact with the enemy without due cause in order to preserve their forces, a chief disadvantage of the demonstration is convincing the enemy to your deception without contact.¹⁹ Therefore, in the IE of today and beyond where everything can be videoed, uploaded, and shared quickly, actual contact will be more likely to be required to achieve desired deceptive effects.

¹⁷ Ibid, 44.

¹⁸ Daly, John H. 1983. "Tactical Deception Gives an Edge." *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 25.

¹⁹ Ibid.

With deception and feint defined, does the definition of either need to be changed due to the increased emphasis added to the IE to include the cyber domain in today and tomorrow's character of war? While the answer is "no", the imagination required of commanders and their staffs to affect the enemy's decision-making process in order to behave in a desired manner is increasing. While there is never enough information, there is not enough time to process all information in a wartime environment where speed and initiative matter. This sounds bad at first, but there is an upside. With increased technological complexity and technological reliance comes more available avenues into the enemy's decision-making process for exploitation such as information overload to create incapacitation or inaction. Diving head first into envisioning the new way of deception and feints is highlighted by the recent release of the *MAGTF IE Operations Concept of Employment*. New concepts mean eventually new doctrine followed by new Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs).²⁰ Finally, gray zone conflict and ambiguous warfare will require deception and feints be applied to "deliberate multidimensional activities by a state actor just below the threshold of aggressive use of military forces." In the current character of gray zone conflicts, "adversaries employ an integrated suite of national and subnational instruments of power in an ambiguous war to gain specified strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of overt conflict." U.S. military deception efforts will require integration during U.S. defined "peace time" with the other elements of national power. An important note to remember is our adversaries do not embrace the idea that "war and peace are binary conditions".²¹ Again, this does not require a change of definition, but it requires new imaginative application.

²⁰ Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment*. Washington, DC, Jul 2017.

²¹ Frank G. Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War," 2016 Index of US Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation: 26 & 30.

While the future fight will have a new character involving autonomous systems, advanced stealth, robotics, over the horizon weapons, artificial intelligence, and more precise weapon systems, the nature of warfare and sub elements of deception and feints will remain the same. The new character of warfare will require deception and feints to incorporate increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process consisting of more vulnerabilities such as susceptibility to information overload from ever increasing avenues of information collection. To build on definitions and evolving character of deception and feints, Part II will look at the evolution of the two from Sun Tzu to World War II.

PART II: Sun Tzu to World War II

This is the second part of a three-part series of essays aimed at assessing how to apply deception and feints against North Korea or one of the other “4+1 framework” adversaries.²² Part II looks at the evolving character and common trends that will still apply to deception and feints today. Two thousand years ago warriors used their eyes, ears, and horseback messenger as some of the tools to gather information to inform decision-making. Today, an infinite set of options exist to include but not limited to multiple and integrated C2 systems, multiple social media outlets, news media through television, secure radios, satellite communications, and telephones. However, the end state of deception was and is still to achieve a desired behavior from an adversary through attacking his or hers decision-making processes.

In order to bate the North Koreans out of their defenses and into a position of vulnerability should the need arise, the United States and her allies will need to apply lessons learned from historical examples of deception and feints while pulling out common trends for success. There are commonalities found on the subject from ancient China through to the great power struggle of World War II that still apply to the new character of war in and beyond 2020. While the future fight will have a new character involving autonomous systems, advanced

²² Dews, Fred. *Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on “4+1 framework” and meeting transnational threats*. Brookings Now, February 14, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/>.

stealth, robotics, over the horizon weapons, artificial intelligence, and more precise weapon systems, the nature of warfare and sub elements of deception and feints will remain the same. Throughout time and into the future, an effective deception plan and feint begins at the same time an effective strategy takes form, during problem framing or initial planning. The deception plan and feint must be incorporated at all levels, tactical through strategic, and tie the desired ends of the deception plan and feint to their ways and means with increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process. A key trend to remember is an ever-increasing number of vulnerabilities to the enemy's decision-making processes that corresponds with an increased amount of coordination and integration to achieve a successful deception plan.

With Part I defining deception and feint, historical examples shed light on the enduring nature and evolving character of the two. Some famous scholars have key literature on the subject as well. As the examples and writers are examined, focus should remain on the enemy's view point in order to remain focused on the desired end state, affecting the enemy's decision-making process. Sun Tzu lived around 544 BC and wrote "All warfare is based on deception," and "Deception and surprise are two key principles." He went on to emphasize the general must conceal true dispositions and ultimate intent, feign incapacity, when near make appear as far, and when far away make it appear near. The primary target of the general is the mind of the opposing general and engaging this target requires imagination.²³ This ties directly to current military definitions of deception that emphasize achieving desired behavior from an adversary, to include generals, through attacking their decision-making processes.²⁴ Sun Tzu also writes that

²³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 41 and 53.

²⁴ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations*. Washington, DC, November 2014, II-10. and Department of The Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication*

retirements should be designed to entice the enemy in order to unbalance him or her creating a situation for a decisive counter-stroke. Some future examples to be discussed will prove this point as very effective. As mentioned above intelligence and time are key considerations for deception operations. Sun Tzu urges generals to act swiftly and decisively when opportunity arises.²⁵ The famous quote, “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster” applies to deception operations. Without knowing the enemy’s decision-making process, one cannot properly deceive or feint. Mao Tse-tung was among the many heavily influenced by Sun Tzu and said, “war demands deception.”²⁶ Sun Tzu’s ancient thoughts apply today as much as they applied two and a half millennia ago. Two hundred years after Sun Tzu’s time, the great Greek general and emperor, Alexander the Great successfully applied deception and feints.

One of his successful examples occurred in 344 BC where Alexander the Great fought the Battle of Granicus, the first of three major battles against the Persian Empire. Alexander knew the Persians main goal was to kill him and that their focus would be on where he was located. He knew his enemy and his decision-making process. Alexander used his advance force of 2,000 cavalry and infantry for deceptive purposes by giving the impression that a full-scale attack was underway towards the Persian reinforced left. He also started out on the Macedonia right or Persian left to reinforce the idea that the majority of his forces would attack the Persian left. This lured the Persians into committing more cavalry to their already reinforced left resulting in a weakened center. As the Persian cavalry maneuvered, they were drawn out of their formations and pinned down by the advance force. The advance force dual hatted as the feint

3-32: *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*. Washington, DC, May 2016, 3-1.

²⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 41 & 43.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 50 & 53.

force and covered the Alexander's 1,600 companion cavalry's right flank as it advanced diagonally to the left, across the Greek rear and toward the Persian left center. Alexander was able to successfully punch a hole in the center of the Persian lines with his triangular-shaped wedge formation.²⁷ The collapse of Persian center caused cavalry to route and yield victory of the battle to Alexander.

This example aligns with the discussion above regarding intelligence and understanding the way an enemy makes decisions. Alexander knew his starting position would sell the Persians on where the main attack would come from, and he combined this with the advance force feint to misdirect the Persian general. Once Alexander shifted his companion cavalry left of the advance force, he further confused the Persian general and achieved his desired end state of affecting the general's decision-making and creating a gap in the center for exploitation through physical displacement. The success did not come without cost. The feint force consisted of considerable resources and sophistication in order to convince the Persians of an actual attack. The advance force suffered significant casualties attacking into the center of the Persian strength while Alexander and the companion cavalry maneuvered left and towards the center. This is a key risk decision when applying feints throughout time. History of this battle also shows Alexander moved quickly in formulating his strategy and future examples will show speed and mobility becoming ever increasingly important. The feint and deception plan also made the basis of Alexander's strategy or stratagem aligning with Sun Tzu's thoughts on the subject.

Fast forward through the dark ages to Niccolo Machiavelli during the sixteenth century, and he wrote some paralleling thoughts and examples on warfare, deception, and feints in the only book of his to be published during his lifetime. In Book VII of Machiavelli's *The Art of*

²⁷ Mixer, John R. 1997. "Alexander's Feint Attack: A Reappraisal." *Military History*, 12, 54.

War, Machiavelli discusses multiple examples of deception and feints. One example is when Domitius Calvinus, a Roman general, besieged a town. He accustomed the besieged town by habitually circling the walls of the city every day with a good part of his forces, an example of multiple feints to achieve a cumulative effect. When the townspeople, believing he was doing this for exercise, lightened the guard, Domitius assaulted them and achieved victory. Machiavelli also warns towns under siege that many have been lost when the enemy attacked from a side they did not believe would be assaulted. This deception occurred for two reasons: the place is strong and believed to be inaccessible, or the enemy cunningly assaults him on one side with feigned uproars and silent real assaults on the other. The term “cunning” will be discussed further with Carl von Clausewitz’s writings. Another example provided by Machiavelli applies to bating the enemy out of their positions during the Punic Wars. Scipio, another Roman general, desired to occupy several castles and garrisons emplaced by the Carthaginians when he was in Africa. He feigned several assaults on them and eventually drew away from them making it appear as if out of fear of the Carthaginians. Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, fell for the trap and withdrew his garrisons in order to pursue Scipio with a larger force. Once the garrisons were withdrawn, Scipio sent Maximus, his Captain, to capture them.²⁸ This provides a great example to ponder on how to bate a current or future enemy.

Additionally, Machiavelli offers 27 general rules to follow in warfare. None of them specifically mention deception or feint, but two do apply closely to the subject. Machiavelli writes, “no proceeding is better than that which you have concealed from the enemy until the time you have executed it,” and “new and speedy things frighten armies, while the customary and slow things are esteemed little by them.”²⁹ Concealing your plan from the enemy falls

²⁸ Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Art of War*, (1521), 163 & 165.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 168-9.

directly in line with secrecy and deception, and other famous scholars will parallel deception's requirement of speed and expand on the psychological effects of surprise and speed to include Carl von Clausewitz.

Much of Clausewitz's conclusions in *On War* are derived from assessing the French Revolution and how Napoleon Bonaparte conducted warfare. Napoleon was one of the most influential personalities from military history. He revolutionized the ability to deploy and maneuver large independent forces and simultaneously concentrate them at the critical moment of battle, which set an operational tone that successive commanders around the world have labored to replicate. His campaigns went on to aid the development of the operational art of war.³⁰ Part of his campaign genius lay in Napoleon's ability to conceal his own strength and intention from the enemy. Routinely, long before a campaign began, he would drop a "security curtain". He ruthlessly controlled the press and forced them to the information, often disinformation, that he desired the foe to receive. Additionally, weeks before a major military movement, the Emperor would close the frontiers to foreigners and double his surveillance by Fouché's secret police. Simultaneously, elaborate deception plans were implemented to create apparent military threats in areas where there were not any forces. This mirrors Sun Tzu's recommendations above. Tactically, once movement began, a light cavalry and dragoons would make up a dense and mobile screen that would deny enemy probing patrols any cueing of what lay behind. Cavalry screens patrol in irrelevant areas to increase the confusion of the enemy while protecting French lines of communication weaving back to the operational bases or intermediate centers of operations. Napoleon believed it crucial to keep these supply lines as short as possible. Finally, Napoleon often modified the composition of large formations in the

³⁰ Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips. *Historical Perspectives of Operational Art*. CMH Pub 70-89-1, 2005, 25.

middle of a campaign to further confuse enemy intelligence gathering.”³¹ As far as how these deception efforts impacted Clausewitz’s masterpiece, Clausewitz does not devote entire chapters to deception or feints.

However, in *On War*, Clausewitz eludes to the ideas behind deception and feints in two chapters of Book III on the subjects of surprise and cunning. Clausewitz ties the universal desire of any battle, relative numerical superiority, to surprise. Surprise is just as universal and without it, relative numerical superiority is hardly conceivable. Surprise has a psychological effect by confusing the enemy and lowering his or her morale. Clausewitz makes it clear that he is not talking about a surprise assault or attack, but he is specifically referring to the “desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces.” Clausewitz goes on to say, “surprise lies at the root of all operations without exception.” Additionally, two factors produce surprise, secrecy and speed.³² During the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries surprise was difficult due to technology available and character of warfare being limited to forced marches and horses for mobility and the eyeball for perception. However, the principles of secrecy and speed to achieve surprise or deceive the enemy applied back then and apply even more now.

Related closely to surprise, Clausewitz devotes Chapter X of Book III to Cunning. He implies it to mean “secret purpose” and states it has a great deal to do with “deceit”.³³ Clausewitz’s thoughts tie closely to Sun Tzu when he uses the word “stratagem”, and he references the idea has not changed since the days of ancient Greece. Strategy should be derived from cunning, and it indicates the essential nature of strategy. The goal is to surprise, and

³¹ Ibid, 32.

³² Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 198.

³³ Ibid, 202.

surprise is rooted in cunning. This aligns with the idea discussed above by Sun Tzu of deception, or as Clausewitz says, “surprise” and “cunning”, lies at the heart of strategy. However, Clausewitz does write in a somewhat contradictory manner, “To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with scale of the deception. Normally, they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect.”³⁴ Clausewitz recognized the difficulty of deception and feints during his time, but recognized if they were successful, they would achieve the universal principle of surprise. Just because deception and feints were difficult during the Napoleonic Wars does not mean they do not apply today, and this strikes at the heart of the nature of deception and feints. New technologies and increased speed and mobility opens new doors for creative minds to further exploit Clausewitz’s thoughts on surprise and cunning. Clausewitz appears to be ahead of his time in recognizing the limitations of his era but understands the greater possibilities in the future character of warfare.

Clausewitz’s ideas on numerical superiority and less on deception and feints were taken too close to heart during the Napoleonic Wars, the Civil War, and finally reached a breaking point with World War I. However, an Allied loss and the only Ottoman Empire victory of World War I provides a great lesson on deception among a horrific example of too much warfare of attrition. The focus of this example will be viewing Allied actions through the lens of the Ottomans and not Allied failures in executing amphibious operations. Otto Limon von Sanders commanded the Ottoman Fifth Army at Gallipoli. He successfully predicted two of the three Allied landing locations from his assessments of the beaches on the Peninsula prior to the landings. Despite these good predictions and intel confirming Allied landings were going to

³⁴ Ibid, 203.

occur, Limon von Sanders was very much uncertain to exactly where the landings would occur. From 25-28 April 1915, Limon von Sanders remained in the north near his headquarters and focused on Bulair while the Allies landed further south on the Peninsula at Ari Burnu and Sedd el Bahir. Limon von Sanders main error was focusing too much on his rear area and the possible landing at Bulair, which turned out to be the Allied feint. If the Allies could have exploited Limon von Sanders three day hesitation, they might have been able to capture the peninsula and seriously damage the Ottoman Empire.³⁵ Allies successfully continued employing the feint during the actual landings which provided enough misinformation to delay Limon von Sanders from realizing the Allies true intentions for 3 full days. The amphibious assault's errors of this battle are for another paper and discussion, but the example shows the increased potential for successful feints and deception with increased technological mobility.

During the interwar years between the World Wars, Col J. F. C. Fuller was one of many military leaders and thinkers attempting to learn the right lesson from the Great War and prepare for the next war. He is considered by some as the greatest British military thinker of his time. Not all of Col Fuller's ideas and readings were received well by his peers and divorced themselves from classical views of Clausewitz. However, he recognized the ability of mechanization and airpower to alter the character of warfare. Increased mobility would allow future forces to feint with a new method but old design. Napoleon urged, "The secret of war lies in the secret of the lines of communication...Strategy does not consist of making halfhearted dashes at the enemy's rear areas; it consists in really mastering his communications, and then proceeding to give battle."³⁶ This quote should be remembered when envisioning how to enter

³⁵ Travers, Tim. "Liman Von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915." *The Journal of Military History* 65, no. 4 (2001): 967-971, 978-979.

³⁶ Reid, Brian Holden. "Colonel J. F. C. Fuller and the Revival of Classical Military Thinking in Britain, 1918-1926." *Military Affairs* 49, no. 4 (1985): 192 & 195.

the rear area lines of communications in a North Korean scenario. Col Fuller believed technological improvements of weapons would allow the classical methods to be reinstated, but more emphasis would need to be on speed and mobility of forces.³⁷ History shows through technological advances of the interwar years that mobility and C2 capabilities to transfer information greater distances opened new doors for deception and feints. By World War II, examples of deception and feints at the tactical through strategic level become more apparent.

A tactical example of successful feints during World War II involved tanks in the Pacific Campaign. Medium tanks would close in on known Japanese positions and act as bait. The medium tank enticed the Japanese to come out of their concealed defensive positions and swarm over the tank to emplace a charge in order to destroy it. An Allied companion light tank would then fire a “buckshot” round directly at the heavier tank. The thumbnail-size projectiles would slaughter the attackers but would not penetrate the armor of the medium tank.³⁸ This parallels the problem the United States faces with a possible war with North Korea. The enemy positions are known, but they need to be flushed out in order to avoid attacking into the teeth of well-prepared defensive positions.

An operational to strategic example from World War II is the feint by Allied forces at Calais prior to invasion of Normandy known as Operation Fortitude. The Germans expected the landings of Allied troops to occur at Calais and had troops massed there prior, during, and up to six weeks after the main effort landings at Normandy. The effort to sell the fake story consisted of decoys including airfields, aircraft, inflatable tanks, trucks, military equipment, radio networks, and activities of a large force preparing for embarkation.³⁹ If the Germans were able to

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Fuquea, David C. “Bougainville: The Amphibious Assault Enters Maturity.” *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1997), 114.

³⁹ Daly, John H. 1983. “Tactical Deception Gives an Edge.” *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 24.

observe the actual allocation of allied forces, it would not have been possible for the Allies to fool the Germans. The cost of fake Allied preparations at Calais was cheap compared to the cost of actual preparations made at Normandy. Germans knew that feinting a fake invasion was possible too. Thus, imperfect observation appears as a critical element for feints. This shows that successful feints with proper signaling can use but do not require sizeable fractions of the force attempting to use the feint as some scholars would argue.⁴⁰ This highlights the changing character of warfare from ancient Greek and Roman times. Germans also expected Allies to pick Calais due to its proximity to England. The Allies used this with proper imperfect signaling to deceive the Germans by playing into what they expected resulting in a great success.

In summary, in the future as well as in the past, as the historical examples above show, an effective deception plan and feint begins at the same time an effective strategy takes form, during problem framing or initial planning. The deception plan and feint of the future must be incorporated at all levels, tactical through strategic, and tie the desired ends of the deception plan and feint to their ways and means with increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process. Each subordinate unit of the MAGTF must have a deception plan. This will require detailed and centralized coordination from MAGTF C2 in order to integrate all efforts properly. Lack of effort and attention to detail in this arena could divulge to the enemy what is true and what is not. Deception consists of a lot of art and little science. Imagination is key. Future commanders should reference old examples to give their minds the spark or catalyst for a new idea with the new technological capabilities available. While deception is hard to measure and inherently risky, history has shown it is not just valuable but necessary for success. Deception does not

⁴⁰ Crawford, Vincent P. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions." *The American Economic Review* 93, no. 1 (2003): 135.

defeat the enemy in itself, but leaders should remember enemies do not have to actually be defeated to win, they just have to believe they are defeated. Deception also enhances the MAGTF by increasing survivability.⁴¹ Therefore, deception crosses increasingly more into force protection. Information and the cyber domain are increasing their impact in warfare with greater speeds and connecting larger audiences. Who today can get work done without internet connectivity? Information operations and deception need to take on a bigger role and emphasis during problem framing in training and in actual combat.

The next step will be to analyze lessons learned from the beginning of the Korean War through the end of the twentieth and into the beginning of the twenty-first century. Combining the information above with more recent examples of deception and feints will better guide commanders in building ideas and plans with current and future capabilities to crack the crazy North Korean nut, no pun intended.

⁴¹ Daly, John H. 1983. "Tactical Deception Gives an Edge." *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 25.

PART III: The Korean War to the Next War

Part I of this series emphasized the evolving character of warfare, specifically the element of deception and sub element of feints, increasing in complexity and sophistication. This new character will require deception and feints to incorporate increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process consisting of more vulnerabilities such as susceptibility to information overload from ever increasing avenues of information collection. Part II built on definitions and examples of the evolving character of deception and feints from the days of the ancients to World War II. It summarized that the deception plan and feint of the future must be incorporated at all levels, tactical through strategic, and tie the desired ends of the deception plan and feint to their ways and means with increased sophistication, mobility, and speed of action across all domains in order to defeat the enemy's decision-making process.

Part III will add one more thesis to tie it all together and hope to provide insight for how to effectively deceive a near peer adversary in a future war. The "so what" of the series incorporates the two previous theses in Parts I and II stated above with a key point mentioned in Part I of the series, perception. Decision makers use data gained from perception to create

knowledge or intelligence. Perception includes three elements, sensors, how they are employed, and ways used to process and disseminate gained information.⁴² The increased sophistication and complexity of technology in today's environment requires the addition of information as a seventh warfighting function to US joint doctrine.⁴³ The DoD should procure technological capabilities that can affect one or all of the three elements of perception. Additionally, the DoD should add proportional emphasis in planning and peace time intelligence gathering to better understand how a potential enemy, such as North Korea, uses their technological capabilities to perceive their environment. Together, this will enable successful deception operations to include feints in a future war. To start off Part III, it will begin with where it will end, the on-going conflict on the Korean peninsula.

The landing of US forces at Inchon, which started on 15 September 1950 after US and South Korean forces had been pushed far to the southeast behind the Pusan Perimeter, aimed to re-take Seoul along with the initiative of the war and deal a death blow to the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Operation CHROMITE is hailed by the grand majority of military scholars as an excellent example of operational art and maneuver. It successfully hit the soft under belly of the enemy while avoiding its strengths.⁴⁴ Surprise in this military classic is evident, but what about deception? Less commonly mentioned are the air operations that aimed to neutralize and deceive the NKPA from 4 September to 10 September. Numerous air attacks were conducted on both coasts of the peninsula in multiple locations to include Kunsan and Inchon among many other possible landing sites suitable for potential US amphibious assault.⁴⁵

⁴² Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. "A Framework for Deception Analysis." In *Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in the Future Urban Operations*, 27-48. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2002, 27-28.

⁴³ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC, July 2017, I-18.

⁴⁴ New Jersey Korean War Veterans Memorial Website, <http://www.nj.gov/military/korea/factsheets/chromite.html>.

⁴⁵ Heinl, Robert, Jr. *Victory at High Tide*, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1968, 77-78.

Additionally, a feint was conducted at Kunsan that included leaks, a loud speaker briefing, and psychological leaflet drops to accompany the aerial bombardment.⁴⁶ This highlights the increase in focus in the information warfighting function that had yet to be made doctrine. Calculating exactly how much the deception efforts aided in achieving surprise is arguable. Regardless, one can agree that building up an expectation for expecting an amphibious assault plays into the enemy's decision-making cycle when attempting to defend everywhere when faced against the United States. This leads to attacking the enemy's mind by getting him or her to think about what the other side thinks he or she thinks and so on and so on until the enemy is outpaced by a slower decision-making cycle or left indecisive. Saddam Hussein faced a similar problem of having to be prepared against so many avenues of approach. But before analyzing the deception used during Desert Storm, a smaller conflict in the Middle East provides some great lessons in deception in the second half of the twentieth century with increased use of misinformation and focus on how to affect the enemy's perception.

At the end of September 1973, Egypt and Syria had prepared themselves for a combined attack against Israel. The following conflict, the Arab-Israeli War, required the alliance to achieve strategic surprise through an elaborate deception plan in order to defeat a stronger and more capable opponent, Israel. However, an incident of chance between Syria and Israel aircraft resulting in a dogfight and the downing of (12) Syrian MiGs to (1) Israeli Mirage put Israel on high alert in expectation of a retributive attack from Syria in the north at the outbreak of the surprise combined attack. This incident played a role in Israel winning the conflict, but great lessons in deception are still worth mentioning. The following are just a few of the many elements of Egypt's deception plan in the south. Egypt used their annual peacetime maneuvers

⁴⁶ Daly, John H. 1983. "Tactical Deception Gives an Edge." *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 67 (8): 24.

accompanied by an announcement far in advance of the annual training to mask their intent and mobilization for war. A very high level of secrecy implemented from the highest levels down to the individual soldier to the point where platoon commanders found out the day of the attack six hours prior to stepping off. Newspapers printed stories of issues with military Soviet equipment, a demobilization of 20,000 troops, and a large number of grants of leave for Pilgrimage to Mecca all to paint a picture of unpreparedness. President Sadat created a story of being very ill and stayed out of public view just prior to the war. Sailboat races were announced to cover up the movement of Egypt's naval forces. Foreign diplomats were kept abroad to conduct normal business. On the morning of the attack, Egyptian soldiers were positioned as innocent fishermen on the Suez Canal. The entire plan successfully incorporated political and civilian spheres and implemented multiple means at all levels from strategic to tactical. Combined with Israel's over confidence, the plan worked to achieve surprise.⁴⁷ Egypt would lose in the end, but the lesson and focus here is how complex and integrated a successful deception plan had become by 1973. Additionally, Egypt understood how Israel perceived information through its sensors, their employment, and processing and dissemination of information through C2 structures about its neighbors and played to Israeli expectations and biases. Fast forwarding a little more than 20 years ahead, another example of great deception occurs from another weaker foe against a greater power.

The Chechen-Russian War of 1995 provides some examples of effective deception with increased breadth and complexity of effort by forces that were not as well armed and numerically inferior against a strong near peer adversary of the US, Russia. Chechens disguised themselves as Russian forces and members of the Red Cross, which does not align with the Law of Armed

⁴⁷ Gawrych, George W., *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (Leavenworth Papers, Number 21) (Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 23-25.

Conflict. However, more interestingly and internationally legal, the Chechens decoys were effective in drawing Russian fire. Dummies were incorporated with purposeful disinformation to overwhelm and confound Russian intelligence efforts. This confusion misled their order of battle and course of action estimates. Additionally, the Chechens used feints and demonstrations along with false radio transmissions in order to increase uncertainty. Contrast the sheer volume and diversity of deception efforts by the Chechens to examples of deception prior to this war continues to build the argument for how much and how fast complexity has increased in the character of warfare and will continue to increase into the future. Chechen deception was effectively employed for many objectives: force multiplication, force protection, and intelligence collection. “Further, the breadth and depth of techniques used indicate that the Chechens were placing a great deal of emphasis on deception and doing so with both forethought and adaptability.” Finally, “deception was used to achieve a variety of effects (masking, misleading, confusing) with a variety of means (disguise, decoys, camouflage, feints, etc.), suggesting that Russian intelligence assets were having to wage a continuous and difficult effort to visualize the battlefield accurately, with penalties incurred for any and every intelligence shortfall (whether in acquisition, identification, or uncertainty resolution).” While the US will not find itself as the weaker power in a conflict in the near future, US public opinion of wars with high death tolls will not allow protracted conflict unless it is in order to protect the very survival of its citizens. Increased emphasis on deception, while costly, can save lives and material in the end. Technological advances only last so long, and increasingly, any advantages gained last shorter and shorter. The Chechens also provide a great lesson that supporting a broad variety of

deception methods and effects requires resources to include but not limited to radios, uniforms, fuel, camouflaging materials, training, planning, active management, etc.⁴⁸

The US has a great example of integration of multiple information related capabilities coming together for an effective deception plan. In 1990-1991 during Operation DESERT STORM, all elements were interwoven into the deception plan. Iraqi intelligence assets were targeted, and as they were destroyed, deception efforts increased. Ground and amphibious attacks were conducted into central Kuwait and off the east coast respectively. Television coverage contributed to the plan as ground forces and amphibious rehearsals were televised. “Deception measures included broadcasting tank noises over loudspeakers and deploying dummy tanks and artillery pieces as well as simulated HQ radio traffic to fake the electronic signatures of old unit locations.”⁴⁹ Great ingenuity and use of actual forces creatively gave the impression of a greater number of forces, a true deceptive success. But, this ingenuity could have had a greater effect if technologies existed at the time as they do today to replicated electronic signatures of even greater sized forces. This type of capability would allow less forces to achieve the same result and leave more forces to the main effort.

Deception in a future war against a near peer adversary will be paramount. Without crossing into the classified realm, a few ideas will be discussed to spark the imagination in the areas of perception manipulation, autonomous systems, and cyber domain integration. Technologies are out there today that exploit signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Imagine if one ship equipped with a future technology could give off the signature of an entire fleet. What

⁴⁸ Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. “A Framework for Deception Analysis.” In *Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in the Future Urban Operations*, 27-48. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2002, 27-28.

⁴⁹ Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. "DECEPTION." In *The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations*, 15-36. RAND Corporation, 2000, 34.

amount of confusion with six ships with that capability produce off the coast of one of our adversaries while actual fleets inter mix among them or position off a different coast. It is harder to discern what is real and what is not when one relies on technology to discern truth versus false outside of visual limits. Imagine if this same idea could be replicated on the ground. What if a couple units within a feint force were equipped with small devices that increased or duplicated their signatures to create the impression of a much greater force. Current aircraft jammers confuse aircraft radars but the DoD should take this idea to another level and confuse multiple aircraft on multiple axis instead of one or two on a single bearing. However, with all of these ideas above, actual forces and lives are still at risk to create the false impression of a greater force.

From the first essay, an example from Alexander the Great highlighted the cost of an effective feint, it will suffer casualties. Nothing makes it look real like real people and forces involved in the feint. However, actual lives and forces in feints incurs the higher probability of loss of life when engaged with the enemy, which is a requirement per the definition of a feint from the first essay of this series. How can this loss of life be avoided while actually engaging the enemy? This is where autonomous systems could be exploited to reduce the cost of feints to only materiel costs instead of both life and materiel. However, materiel costs will still be incurred with feints, therefore, the systems procured need to balance effect and cost to allow greater procurement in numbers. Additionally, the autonomous systems could be combined with signature exploiting systems enhance effectiveness. Or they could be combined with real forces to reduce the mathematical probability of actual human forces being hit while increasing lethality. The decision of whether to go all autonomous or mixed will be situationally dependent. An adversary with multiple belts of obstacles and mines may require a small autonomous force

to be sacrificed in order to punch a hole through the defenses for follow on human or mixed forces. The likelihood of these systems working today is increased by the fact that forces are less likely to roll into a combat zone marching on foot due to lack of force protection. Neither US forces nor the enemy can normally see who, if anyone, is inside a mechanized vehicle, ship, or aircraft.

Transitioning to cyber, what if the C2 radar could be hacked to muddy the entire air picture? Executing systems analysis of the enemy C2 network will allow the force detect key links and nodes for exploitation allowing non-kinetic fires to be applied with greater precision. Still further, The United States should deep dive into all the information related technologies employed by a potential adversary and look to employ a method of deception against as many elements as possible while integrating all efforts to a single narrative. While many would argue for unity of effort with the narrative, why not create so many narratives, the true one cannot be ascertained? The cyber domain, which enables the information warfighting function, opens a whole new outlet for possible ways to affect countries that have high numbers of populace on social media and utilize communication technologies within the population and military.

The importance of intelligence is obvious. The three elements of perception addressed in part one of this series should be used as a filter for providing prioritization of intelligence collection of the enemy for deception purposes. What are their sensors, how are they employed, and how does C2 gather and assess information? However, not all nations are as easy to collect on as the United States. The United States is very open with much of its information. North Korea is at the opposite spectrum and maintains a very isolated posture with great control and censorship over its population. What would deceive the US will not necessarily deceive North Korea. While the DoD can know pretty well their sensors, their capabilities, and how they are

employed, understanding their C2 process through underground facilities has much greater uncertainty. This leads to the need to have a realistic assumption of how much intelligence can be gathered on North Korea's ways of perceiving its environment. While premeditative deception efforts can be planned into OPLANs for a Korean contingency, once the plan makes first contact, leaders must be prepared to apply adaptive deception quickly. Tactical level baiting has been used in many previous conflicts to include a mention with tanks in the Pacific theater in the second part of this series. The North Korean forces are dug in greater than any force the world has ever seen. Creative ways to bait them out of their defenses is absolutely necessary for success without massive casualties and loss of materiel. Future deception could be applied in some form or fashion with relatively protected real bait, fake bait through manipulating signatures, use of autonomous systems, or any combination of the three.

Finally, the United States should build upon on the pattern of attacking the enemy's decision-making cycle through their biases and winning the mental game through the indirect approach instead of relying on a capability advantage, which may no longer exist as seen with China or Russia. Thanks to the internet, many countries can read about how the United States, specifically, the Marine Corps favors amphibious operations throughout the twentieth century. Information operations combined with thorough deception plans could utilize this bias to affect an enemy's perception who has large amounts of coastline to defend. However, building a bias takes time, and actions should be executed today to build biases for exploitation tomorrow. To demonstrate how biases and expectation management can be attacked, the second part of this series uses an example from Book VII of Machiavelli's *The Art of War*. Domitius Calvinus, a Roman general, besieged a town. He accustomed the besieged town by habitually circling the walls of the city every day with a good part of his forces. When the townspeople, believing he

was doing this for exercise, lightened the guard, Domitius assaulted them and achieved victory.⁵⁰ Domitius built an expectation bias in the enemy's mind. Sun Tzu provides another example. Chu-ko Liang sent away the majority of his forces to another campaign and left minimal forces, 10,000, to defend Yang P'ing. Ssu-ma I knew Chu-ko Liang was in the city with few troops. Ssu-ma I wanted to take the town, but upon reaching it, the gates were left open and the streets clean inviting him to enter into an apparent peaceful and open town. This played into the logic of if it looks too good to be true it probably is too good to be true. Ssu-ma I suspected an ambush and retreated into the northern mountains. In reality Yang P'ing had his men lay down their banners and drums to clean up the streets and open the gates. There was no ambush, just the appearance of one, and it worked.⁵¹ Chu-ko Liang defeated his opponent's decision-making with creative thought and critical thinking. The US needs more emphasis in this type of thinking incorporated into current planning as well as peacetime actions for biases building that could be exploited in war time.

In summary, the DoD should procure technological capabilities that can affect one or all of the three elements of perception. Additionally, the DoD should add proportional emphasis in planning and peace time intelligence gathering to better understand how a potential enemy, such as North Korea, uses their technological capabilities to perceive their environment. Together this will enable successful deception operations to include feints in a future war. Definitions do not need to be updated. More concepts do not need to be created. Increased emphasis on complexity and information in today's environment is already in full circulated at the war colleges, new concept documents, and doctrine. Thoughts of evolving character and enduring nature of warfare

⁵⁰ Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Art of War*, (1521), 163 & 165.

⁵¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 97.

passed from Clausewitz on through the years and into MCDP-1, *Warfighting*, is still a valid truth. The few examples provided in this series over a two-thousand-year period attest to that. However, the emphasis on beating the enemy's strategy and decision-making cycle instead of his forces applied to actual war OPLANs and their updates is lacking and not sufficient. The time to develop deception plans is not just before a large conflict. While new technologies will greatly enable deception efforts, they should not be relied upon for success. The greatest weapon to be cultivated is not a new technology, but the gray madder between the ears. In this, there is great potential and room for improvement using the exponentially growing technological means available in 2020 and beyond to deceive the adversary.

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