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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

AN ARGENTINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS PROPOSAL: LEARNING FROM THE
FALKLANDS (MALVINAS) WAR.

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Executive Summary

Title: An Argentine Special Operations Proposal: Learning from the Falklands (Malvinas) War.

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Thesis: The Falklands experience in the use of special operation forces (SOF) shows the need for the creation of the Argentine Joint Special Operations Command. This command should be subordinate to the Joint Staff Command, operating permanently from peace and in all stages of the conflict.

Discussion: In 1982 Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain participated in the Falklands War (Malvinas War). During that conflict, both countries made an active employment of the special operation forces. However, among other things, the Argentine Armed Forces have not been able to capitalize on the lessons learned from such employment, not having at this moment, for example, a Joint Special Operations Command. This issue is important because the success of special operations depends not only on the good training of personnel and equipment, but mainly on proper command and control and inter-service coordination. Based on the importance of a Joint Special Operations Command, it is the intention of this work to analyze the lessons learned during the Falklands War regarding the use of the SOF by both countries and later to propose the organizational improvements for the Argentine Armed Forces in terms of the creation of a Joint Command in the light of the doctrine of SOF.

Conclusion: As a result of the analysis, the need to form a Joint Special Operations Command subordinated to the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces from peacetime was demonstrated, in order to allow the anticipation of the crisis. The organic structure of the command and the missions of each one of its members were determined. The Joint Special Operations Command will be available to the Military Strategy, to affect the various expressions of power of the opponent, even from peace, also seeking dissuasion.

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Preface

The Falklands War (in Spanish, Guerra de Malvinas) was a war between Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that took place in the Falklands Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. The war took place from April 2, the day of the Argentine landing on the islands, and June 14, 1982, the date of the Argentine surrender in the Falklands.

The Falklands War was the first war of the twentieth century which the Argentine Armed Forces participated and, at the same time, the first one in which they used their special operation forces (SOF). Particularly, the first actions that were developed on the island were those carried out by the amphibious commandos and the tactical divers, both belonging to the SOF of the Argentine Navy, when they landed on Port Stanley on April 2, 1982.

During the rest of the conflict, both country employed their SOF during different missions, but, with a different transcendence, which was related with the level where those operations were conducted, and also, the experience from both sides on the employment of SOF.

As a Marine officer from the Argentine Navy, and also a former Commander of the Argentine Amphibious Commando Group, between 2014 and 2015, it is the purpose on this paper to analyze the lessons learned during the Falklands war in relation to the employment by the United Kingdom and by Argentina of their SOF, and the impact of that employments had for the achievement of the operational and strategical objectives of each country during the conflict.

Finally, I will use the lessons learned to propose an organization within the Argentine Armed Forces that centralized, under a unique Joint Command, the SOF of the three services and subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In that sense, it is necessary to clarify that there is not yet a unified command within the organization of the Argentine Armed Forces that brings together its SOF.

INTRODUCTION

Those who know war do not wander when they move and do not become exhausted when they climb. When you know yourself and your men, victory is not in doubt.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

During the Falklands War, the United Kingdom and Argentina made use of their SOFs elements. However, due to its experience, and because it has a consolidated SOF organization, the United Kingdom demonstrated greater success and transcendence in the employment of this type of forces. Argentina, on the other hand, without previous experience and without have an organization prepared for the employment of SOF, made use of them in operations of relative and / or null transcendence during the conflict.

In addition, after the conflict, the United Kingdom was able to apply the lessons learned from it, and for closer coordination between the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), in 1987 created the Special Forces Headquarters Group, under the Director of Special Forces, usually an SAS brigadier with an SBS colonel as second-in-command.¹ However, the Argentine Armed Forces have not had until now a unified command of SOF that unifies SOF doctrine and promotes coordination among the SOF of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Currently, globalization, the revolution in military affairs, and the characteristics of the information war have created new conflict scenarios, as well as new features that adorn the operational environment. These global scenarios present transnational, complex and multidimensional risks that are interconnected. Today a crisis situation, be it political,

¹ James Adams, "Secret Armies: Inside the American, Soviet, and European Special Forces", 1st Ed. ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988), 199.

economic, social or military, can rapidly evolve unfavourably and indirectly or directly affect the interests of the State itself, for which the SOF must be able to provide a first response. This imposes permanent preparation.

The conflicts are under the paradigm of hybrid war, with the threat of extremist, violent or criminal groups, which try to create failed states. These scenarios, so different, require political and military leadership to have employment tools for different situations with a minimum of time for recruitment and projection. Thus, the SOF are the element able to provide a response in a wide spectrum of scenarios and situations to the Argentine government. War and warfare will always exist,² and irregular warfare between states and non-state foes may well be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come.³ The future threats that can engage Argentina in a conflict could be related to adverse climate change, resource rivalries and shortages (food, water, and energy), overpopulation, terrorism, and insurgencies.⁴

The need to anticipate the crisis and the execution of operations in times of peace, by the SOF, justifies, among other causes, the creation of a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), subordinate to the Joint Staff Command (JSC), operating permanently in peace and in all stages of the conflict.

² Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. (London: Phoenix, 2006), 24-25

³ Ibid.

⁴ Colin S. Gray, "The 21st century security environment and the future of war." *Parameters* 38, no. 4 (2008), 25.

The JSOC has to be ready to perform operations throughout the Theater of War (TW)⁵ and not only in the Theatre of Operations (TO)⁶, on objectives from the National Strategic (NS) and Military Strategic (MS) level. These kinds of objectives can be inside or outside the TO.

This work will analyse the special operations (SOps) executed by the SOF of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain during the Falklands War under the light of the principles of the SOF, concluding on the need to modify the current organic structure and dependence on the elements of the Argentine SOF. Subsequently, it will propose the organizational characteristics for its conformation and organization.

The growth of SOF in Argentina has evolved significantly since its creation. Initially, the Commando course has been carried out since 1965, but there was no organization that meets them with a defined mission. Subsequently, the availability of Commando elements is observed in each of the forces in isolation and at the Company level. Consequently, the formation of a Group of Special Operations Forces arose in the Argentine Army. This element brought together three Commando Companies. The Argentine Navy has two Special Operations Units, the Tactics Divers Group and the Amphibious Commando Group (which belong to the Argentine Marines Corps), but both units without a common Command. Finally, the Argentine Air Force has the Special

⁵ Theater of War. Zone of the globe, that includes the land, maritime and air spaces, that are or can be directly involved in operations of war. The TW involves several TO plus a Strategic security zone. (Argentine Army, *Conduction of the Land Forces*, ROB-00-01, 2015).

⁶ Theater of Operations. It will be that territory, both own and enemy, necessary for the development of military operations at the operational level. (Argentine Army, *Conduction of the Land Forces*, ROB-00-01, 2015).

Operations Group. All of these elements are isolated inside the different services and without any kind of coordination for doctrine, training, and employment.

Following this evolution, at present, it is sought that the SOF of the three Argentine Armed services set up a Special Operations Command under the Argentine Joint Staff Command. This work will analyse the necessity and feasibility of its structuring.

METHODOLOGY

This work has an exploratory research of documents and accounts of the actions executed by the SOF in the Falklands War, to then evaluate them qualitatively through the SOps principles. Subsequently, through a hypothetical and deductive analysis, it determines the organization and functional dependence of the SOF of the Armed Forces of Argentina.

The work was structured in a chapter of SOps theory. Secondly, it contains two chapters that analyse the use of the SOF of the United Kingdom and Argentina in the Falklands War, determining the actions taken.

Later, another chapter contains the proposal for the organization and structure of the Joint Special Operations Command to be established inside the structure of the Argentine Armed Forces.

The problem to be resolved is the need to structure a Command and Control element of the highest level of the military leadership which has the Command of the Special Operations Forces of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, for the execution of SOps.

This work will study the mission, structure, organization, and advantage that its structure presents, the scenarios in which the SOF could be used and the attitude, as well as the acceptability of the conformation.

THE THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The failure of Operation "Eagle Claw", executed in 1980 by the Special Operations Forces of the United States in order to rescue the American hostages in the Tehran Embassy during the Islamic Revolution, manifested the need for the United States to create the Joint Special Operations Command, because it was concluded that there was not enough synergy between the various elements that made up the operation. Later, this organization will change again, with the founding in 1987 of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).⁷

3.1 Definition of Special Operations

According to the Joint Publication 3-05, special operations⁸ require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk.

The SOps may differ from conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.⁹

3.2 Composition of Argentine Special Operation Forces and general missions

⁷ SOCOM, *Special Operations Command History*. USSOCOM/SOCS-HO 7701, Tampa Point Boulevard MacDill AFB, FL, 2007, 5-8.

⁸ Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for joint Special Operations*, United States Department of Defense (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), I-1.

⁹Ibid.

The three components of the Argentine Armed Forces possess SOF.

3.2.1 Argentine Army

According to the doctrine of the Argentine Army, the SOF are those elements with special training, organized, equipped, and instructed to satisfy the requirements demanded by the military strategic, operational and tactical levels, including the projection of military power, before, and during the military operations, or when the use of conventional forces of consideration is premature, inappropriate, and / or unfeasible.¹⁰

In addition, the Argentine Army divide the SOF into two different elements: the special forces (SF) and the commandos.¹¹ The level of objectives foreseen for the actions of each one of the elements that make up the SOF is different. For commando troops, the objectives will be usually of operational level. On the other side, for the SF, the level of the objectives foreseen for their actions will be strategic-national or strategic-military.¹²

The commandos, when assigned to a Joint Operations Theater, can form part of the Land Component, or forming part of the Army Component. Also, the commando element could be forming part of a Joint Task Force for the execution of commando operations.¹³

The SF can be organized temporarily forming a Joint Task Force formed by companies or sections of Special Forces and other elements of the armed forces necessary

¹⁰ Argentine Army, *Conduction of the Land Forces*, ROB-00-01 (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 2015), 49.

¹¹ Ibid., 50.

¹² Argentine Army, *Conduction of Special Forces*, RPO -66 -02 (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 2011), 09.

¹³ Argentine Army, *Conduction of the Commando Company*, RPO -61 -02 (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 1997), 8.

to participate directly or in support of a SOps. Due to its versatility, SF are especially apt to integrate transitory organizations.¹⁴

Commando operations will be brief, surgical, and deadly, seeking to collapse and destabilize the enemy at various levels of military and operational strategy, triggering high-value targets, usually conducting direct action (DA) operations and special reconnaissance (SR).¹⁵

For the SF, the priority of employment will be indirect action, as seeking to create conditions in future areas of operations by organizing local resistance forces to assist with commando actions by creating the operational environment conducive to the execution of their operations. Special forces do not achieve goals by themselves; they contribute to achieving them depending on other means and forces. Usually the SF will be employed in unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), hostage rescue and recovery, and counterinsurgency (COIN). The planning and the decision of execution normally occur at the strategic levels, mainly due to the transcendence of the objectives to be achieved and their effects.¹⁶

3.2.2 Argentine Navy

Within the organization of the Argentine Navy, there are two units of naval special operation forces (NSOF), which are the Tactical Divers Group and the Amphibious Commando Group. According to their doctrine, these units execute special naval operations (SNO) on vital tactical objectives or on vital strategic objectives. This type of

¹⁴ Argentine Army, *Conduction of Special Forces*, RPO -66 -02, 23.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

operations could exist in times of peace, crisis, or war, with fractions of reduced numbers, supporting the execution of conventional operations.¹⁷

3.2.3 Argentine Air Force

Within the doctrine of the Argentine Air Force, there is the Special Operations Group, which is made up of personnel and specialized material and with the adequate equipment to perform tasks in hostile territory, which facilitate and enhance the use of the Argentine Air Force's means (suppression of air defenses, objective signalling, recovery of facilities and hostages, rescue in combat, etc.). These SOF are characterized by the high degree of training of their personnel, which usually includes training as a paratrooper.¹⁸

3.3 Commandos Action Doctrine

The mission for the Commando Troops on the Argentine Army Publication ROP 61-01 expresses¹⁹

The commandos will execute commando operations on transcendent objectives of the enemy's military and / or national potential throughout the Theater of War, to satisfy high priority requirements for Strategic Military and Operational leadership and, exceptionally, for Tactics (higher levels), in order to create favourable conditions for future operations and / or supporting those that are in development.

3.3.1 Objectives of the Commandos Operations

¹⁷ Argentine Navy, *Procedures for Naval Special Operations*, R.O - 2-034, (Buenos Aires: Argentine Navy, 1998), 1.1-1.

¹⁸ Argentine Air Force, Operational Conduction Regulation RAC 3, (Argentine Air Force, 2010 PROJECT), 15.

¹⁹ Argentine Army, *Conduction of Commando Troops*, ROP 61-01 (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 1994), 20.

According to the doctrine of the Argentine Army, the objectives of the Strategic Military level for the execution of commando operations are:²⁰

1. Decision centers (governors, ministries, armed forces staff).
2. Enemy personalities, military and civilians.
3. Communication centers (land stations that regulate satellite traffic, post offices, telegraph, telephone, television, and press),
4. Thermal, hydraulic and nuclear power plants.
5. Railway networks and their rolling stock.
6. Industrial complexes (war material factories, blast furnaces, refineries, pharmaceutical industries and / or research centers).
7. Hostage rescue.

These strategic objectives do not directly affect the Theatre of Operations (TO), but will affect it indirectly or in the long term. These objectives show effects to produce in public opinion, in morals, in the capacity of political decision-makers, and in the development of technology weapons that will influence the TO in the medium term.²¹

The objectives for commando operations at the operational level, are:

1. Command posts.
2. Supply tanks.
3. Communications and surveillance centers.
4. Weapons systems.
5. Relevant structures, such as bridges and highways.

²⁰ Ibid., 33.

²¹ Ibid.

6. Railway networks.
7. Concentration of transport material.
8. Port facilities.
9. Ports, airports, aerodromes, and air navigation equipment.

3.4 Doctrine of Special Forces

According to the doctrine of the Argentine Army, the operations of the Special Forces are actions conducted by military or resistance forces, specially organized and instructed to obtain military objectives and other objectives that affect the enemy war potential through non-classical military means in complex operational environments.²²

The operations of the Special Forces can be open and / or covert operations conducted by Special Forces, characterized by the need to apply a combination of indirect and eventually direct, violent, and non-violent means, for the achievement of military and non-military objectives, whatever the operational environment, and even within the framework of peacekeeping operations.²³

To generate combat power, the Special Forces must comply with the following guiding principles applicable to special operations: freedom of action, objective, and simplicity.²⁴

First, *freedom of action* is relevant since special operations require centralized planning, where actions are coordinated and tested in detail. But once the execution has been launched, considering the probable conditioning factors of the operational

²² Argentine Army, *Conduction of Special Forces*, RPO -66 -02, 20.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid. 23.

environment, the Special Forces must be able to freely apply the combat power according to their own intention, without the enemy being able to prevent that from happening.²⁵

The *freedom of action* will acquire particular importance for the Special Forces because normally they operate with very small elements and with little possibility of obtaining additional support. *Freedom of action* can be obtained and maintained through an education focused on the habit of decentralized command exercise and constant application of the initiative, according to the intention of the superior command and in search of the effects that he want to achieve.²⁶

Given the strategic level in which special operations are executed, the relationship between the purpose pursued by the superior command and the selection of the Material Objective that allows achieving it, will be fundamental. Therefore, the principle of *objective* is of relevant importance at the moment of having to execute special operations. In his book *Spec Ops*, William Mc. Raven also makes mention to the principle of *objective*, but calling it “purpose.”²⁷

Finally, special operations tend to be complex and high risk due to multiple causes, such as the intervention of several weapons systems (joint / combined), degree of detail and coordination that procedures and techniques demand, isolation and sensitivity of its probable objectives, the actions of the enemy, and conditioning factors of the different environments. Only a simple and clear conception will allow success to be achieved at the lowest cost. To follow the principle of *simplicity*, it is important to comply with three

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 24.

²⁷ William McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.), 21-22.

critical elements, which are: limited number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation.²⁸

3.4.1 Theory for the execution of SF operations

The theory for the employment of SF establishes the need to recognize non-military implications, facilitate inter-agency work, start only when necessary, consider the long-term effects, ensure the legitimacy and credibility of special forces, anticipate and control the psychological effects, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, ensure support for a prolonged period, have adequate intelligence, balance security, and achieve technological independence.

3.4.2 Success factors

The Argentine doctrine establishes the following success factors for the execution of Special Forces operations: comprehension, anticipation, sufficiency, decision, synchronization, surprise, and security.²⁹

Comprehension is the combination of the principle of objective with that of legitimacy and aims to give priority to non-military objectives over the military. Before starting operations, the Special Forces element must know the operational environment to be able to influence it. Special Forces must be sure of the objectives and strategies of all the actors present and consider how they interact with each other.³⁰

The *anticipation* factor derives from the principles of offensive and maneuver and adaptability. Special forces require a proactive approach to solve their military problems.

²⁸ Ibid., 11.

²⁹ Argentine Army, *Conduction of Special Forces*, RPO -66 -02, 27.

³⁰ Ibid.

They must anticipate the requirements of the upper echelon and its operational environment to exploit situations that allow the enemy's weaknesses to be attacked.

Sufficiency derives from mass and the economy of force, as well as from the limited use of force and technological independence. Special Forces do not seek to break the enemy's will to fight, except at the lowest level, because of the magnitude of the force or firepower. Instead, they seek to apply combat power to accomplish the mission without civilian casualties.

The *decision* coming from the principles of mass and offensive. Special Forces do not have superiority of combat power in the same sense as conventional forces. The decision is obtained by accepting risks to achieve decisive results sequentially.

The *synchronization* derives from the principles of objective and control unit. The synchronization of Special Forces must be vertical and horizontal with the local resistance forces (FRL), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), nearby units, etc. The synchronization covers both military and non-military aspects. Special Forces must not compromise the long-term objectives of the superior command to achieve immediate tactical effects.

The *surprise* factor in the operations of special forces is the use of asymmetric means. Special forces must take advantage of the enemy's lack of understanding of the operational environment.

Security is a decisive factor of success within the operations of special forces, since the errors committed in this sense transcend the tactical level and have an impact on the strategic level, affecting the credibility and legitimacy of the State.³¹

³¹ McRaven, op.cit., 8. McRaven mentions *security* and *surprise*, but under the name of principles of special operations.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS EXECUTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE FALKLANDS WAR

4.1 Composition of the Special Operation Forces.

The British Special Operation Forces contingent during Operation “Corporate” was made up of elements of the Special Air Service (SAS), the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), and members from the marines’ Mountain and Arctic Warfare (MAW) cadre. The SAS provided D, G Squadrons, and a detachment from B Squadron, totalling approximately 128 men. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rose commanded these elements.³²

The SBS provided an element about the size of an infantry rifle company, with around eighty-four men, and under the command of Major J. J. Thomson.³³

A group of twenty officers and NCOs, supported by a further twenty of their students, conformed the marine’ Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre. Captain Rod Boswell commanded this unit.³⁴

4.2 Summary of executed operations

On April 5, the SAS began its movement from Great Britain to Ascension Island materializing the strategic projection to an intermediate base.³⁵

The actions carried out in the Falklands and South Georgia, that is, within the Theatre of Operations, were:

- Strategic Recognition:

³² Alastair Finlan. "British Special Forces in the Falklands War of 1982.", *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13, no. 3 (2002), 84.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*. 1st American Ed. ed. (New York: Norton, 1984), 289, 352.

³⁵ Seymour, William. *British Special Forces*. (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985), 309-310.

With the purpose of obtain information related to the Argentinean “Order of Battle”,³⁶ the Special Forces executed exploration with observatory posts, and also characterized as public service workers in Port Stanley. In addition, the SBS made the recognition and determined the feasibility of the landing beaches. It should be noted that these actions of recognition and exploration began during the political negotiations and coincided with the projection of nuclear submarines.³⁷

- Identification of weak points in the Argentine defences (SBS and MAW).

They were made before the disembarkation in San Carlos. The information was relevant for the determination of the lines of action of the 3 Commando Brigade. Also, the MAW cadre carried out intensive patrolling and observation operations well forward of the British positions.³⁸

- Raid on Pebble Island:

On May 14 the SAS performed a raid on the Argentinean aerodrome of the Pebble Island, where the Argentine Armed Force had a radar and several aircraft that could threaten the landing in San Carlos.³⁹ This action was a complete success.

- Raid on Rio Grande City:

With the name Operation “Mikado”, elements of the SAS tried the execution of a raid to destroy the Super Etendards aircraft and the missiles EXOCET, that was in

³⁶ Sandy Woodward and Patrick Robinson, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 78.

³⁷ Hastings, Jenkins, op. cit., 176-177, 181.

³⁸ Ibid., 289.

³⁹ Ibid., 198-201, 209, 217.

the city of Rio Grande, on the Argentinian mainland. It was planned at the highest level of the conduct of the war. It was not successful due to climatic conditions.⁴⁰

- Psychological operations:

Members of the SAS operated the radio of the locality of Port Stanley to carry out psychological operations and to send information to the command of the British fleet.^{41 42} In addition, SAS member, disguised as workers of the city council of Port Stanley, sent information about the movements of the troops in Port Stanley.⁴³

- Direct Action on South Georgia:

Elements of the SAS carried out a DA on Grytviken to neutralize the Argentine garrison established there. The action was successful.⁴⁴

- Raid and combat at Mount Kent:

Elements of D Squadron SAS moved forward by helicopter and held a position in Mount Kent to support the advance of the British forces towards Port Stanley.⁴⁵

Throughout the Campaign, elements of the SAS and SBS acted as spotters of the naval fire on the Argentine positions, which contributed over the wear and tear on the morale of the Argentine troops at Port Stanley.

4.3 Particular analysis of Operation “Mikado”

⁴⁰ Alastair Finlan, op. cit., 91.

⁴¹ Seymour, William, op.cit., 316.

⁴² Falklands Aftermath : Forces '85. (London: Marshall Cavendish, 1984), 41.

⁴³ Isidoro, Ruiz Moreno, *Comandos en Acción: El Ejército en Malvinas* (Buenos Aires: Booket, 2007), 368.

⁴⁴ Alastair Finlan, op. cit., 88-89.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 90.

After the outbreak of the Falklands conflict, the Argentine Naval Aviation began to use the French Exocet AM-39 missiles carried in Super Etendards aircraft, managing to sink on the 4th of May the British cruiser *HMS Sheffield*.⁴⁶

The British intelligence discovered that there were more Exocet missiles that were gathered in the Argentinean naval airfield in Rio Grande. If the missiles managed to affect the *HMS Hermes* carrier or the *HMS Invincible*, the results could be catastrophic for the Task Force. That is why the Commander of the Theater of Operations determined that the Argentina's Exocet AM-39 missiles are the Centre of Gravity (COG) during the approach to the islands of the Task Force.⁴⁷

Margaret Thatcher's war cabinet decided that the missiles must be discovered and destroyed. The mission was given to the sixty-five men of the SAS B Squadron, in a secret operation called "Mikado".⁴⁸

This element had to fly to the naval base of Rio Grande, destroy the missiles, the Super Etendard aircraft, eliminate the pilots, and exfiltrate to Chilean territory, neutral country, with the excuse of a technical failure. But the difficulty of the meteorological conditions caused the fall of the helicopter that infiltrated the SAS. The SAS members managed to return to Chile and were subsequently evacuated.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Jorge R. Bóveda, *Operation Plum Duff* (Buenos Aires: Boletín del Centro Naval, Jan/Jun 2015), 79-98. <http://www.centronaval.org.ar/boletin/BCN840/840-BOVEDA.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Jorge Muñoz, *Ataquen Río Grande: Operación "MIKADO"*, (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 2005), <http://www.libreria-argentina.com.ar/libros/jorge-munoz-ataquen-rio-grande-operacion-mikado.html>

⁴⁸ Alastair Finlan, op. cit., 91.

⁴⁹ Hastings, Jenkins, op. cit., 162.

Even though "Operation Mikado" was not successful, Great Britain succeeded in preventing France, and the international arms market, from selling more Exocet missiles to Argentina. However, it is noteworthy that the purpose of the mission entrusted to the SAS had the importance and characteristics of a special forces operation.

4.4 Conclusion

From the analysis of the actions carried out by the SAS, SBS and MAW forces, at first it is evident that the employment in action like the incursion in the Pebble Island was adequate, since it managed to reach operational level objectives affecting the Argentine Air Force aircraft that could impede the disembark in San Carlos. The second suitable operation was in the actions for the recovery of the South Georgia islands, since their loss caused an impact on the morality of Argentine Forces. On the other hand, the actions of Psychological Operations through the use of radio transmission, the selection of landing beaches, and the execution of special reconnaissance, contributed to operational-level objectives. But missions such as the occupation of Mount Kent, and the patrols deployed as naval fire spotters, could well have been accomplished by other means of the Task Force, as being of tactical significance.

The only operation outside the TO was Operation "MIKADO", becoming an operational and even military strategic objective. The Super Etendard-Exocet system posed a threat to the British fleet, so it was an objective of relevance importance, and it was outside the TO and its involvement implied diplomatic and intelligence contacts at the highest level, as well as secret agreements with other countries.

In addition to the operations successfully carried out by the British SOF, another profitable effect for the use of the British Special Forces would have been to destroy the Mirages aircraft of the Argentine Air Force, and the transport planes, located on Argentine

mainland. The effects to achieve by the Special Forces would have been to obtain the air superiority in the Theater of Operations and isolate the Argentine Forces on the islands.

To fulfil that objective, the British Special Forces should have operated within Argentinean mainland, depending on a different Chain of Command from the British Task Force on the Falklands, which should carry out the operational design of the Special Operations. These actions should have started when the British fleet was located at a distance from the islands and coinciding with the collapse of the *ARA General Belgrano*, since at that time the level of security and enlistment of the Argentine forces in air bases and aircraft on the mainland was much lower. The main cause of the failure of the Operation "Mikado" was related not only to the short planning time and meteorological conditions, but also due to its opportunity of execution.

SPECIAL FORCES ACTIONS EXECUTED BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS WAR

5.1 Composition of the Argentine Special Operation Forces

During the conflict of the Falklands, SOF elements of two different services were deployed to the islands. The Argentine Navy deployed the Tactical Divers Group (APBT) and the Amphibious Commando Group (APCA).⁵⁰

The Argentine Army deployed two elements, the 601 Commando Company and the 602 Commando Company.⁵¹ The Falklands war founds the Argentine Army with a number of former commandos dispersed throughout the army and without recent commando training. It is very relevant to mention that the Argentine Army hurriedly collected these men and formed the 601 and 602 Commando Companies with about forty men each.⁵²

5.2. Summary of executed operations

- Initial Action.

Direct Action of the APCA and APBT, to capture alive the Governor of the Islands and to neutralize the Royal Marines garrison in the Falklands, held between the 1st and 2nd of April. This mission was successfully accomplished.⁵³

- Previously to the British Task Force landing on San Carlos.

⁵⁰ Falklands Aftermath: Forces '85. (London: Marshall Cavendish, 1984), 68-69.

⁵¹ Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 5-7.

⁵² Middlebrook, Martin. *The Fight for the "malvinas": The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War*. (London, England: Viking, 1989) 62.

⁵³ Carlos Busser. *Operación Rosario*. 3a Ed. ed. (Buenos Aires: Castelar, 2006).

Execution of exploration missions and strategic reconnaissance and contact with the population in search of clandestine radio stations, carried out by elements of 601 and 602 Commandos Companies.⁵⁴

- After the Task Force arrived to San Carlos.

Execution of reconnaissance and surveillance missions at the front of the defensive device, which caused the Special Forces to remain engaged in contact with the British Forces and without the possibility of supporting fire.⁵⁵

- Execution of ambushes on the British Land Forces advance.

Patrols belonging to the 601 and 602 Commandos Companies deployed on San Carlos to interdict the British Forces advance. In most cases they had little or no transcendence due to lack of mobility and fire support. These missions had tactical characteristics.

- Execution of aerial ambushes

Patrols of 601 Commando Company elements were deployed with Blowpipe missiles, to performing anti-aircraft gunships in the air corridors of Sea Harrier aircraft and British helicopters. All of them with tactical characteristics.⁵⁶

- "Operation Algeciras" or "Operation Gibraltar".

It was a frustrated Argentine military plan, which was attempted to covertly and unofficially execute during the Falklands War in 1982, from Spanish territory.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 103.

⁵⁵ Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 189-193.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 106.

⁵⁷ Falklands Aftermath : Forces '85, 48.

The aim was to sabotage the British Royal Navy, trying to sink warships at the British base of Gibraltar, and prevent them from going to the Falkland Islands. The plan would consist of the use of tactical divers carrying underwater mines.

5.3 Causes of Failure

- Execution opportunity.

The only Argentine SOF units that exist prior to the start of the Falkland's conflict were those corresponding to the Argentine Navy, the APCA and the APBT. The Argentine Army created the 601 Commando Company on the 2th of April, at the same moment that the Falklands conflicts begins, under the base of the HALCON 8 Unit, but it increased by two thirds the effective force prior to deployment to the Falklands. Afterwards, the Argentine Army created the 602 Commando Company, at the middle of May and during the conflict. This Unit had and important lack of previous training. Many of their men were not well physically prepared because they have performed the commandos course several years before, and they have spent the previous years in conventional forces units.⁵⁸

- Freedom of action.

Once the British Task Force reached the Falklands, the Argentine Forces lost the air superiority and the British Forces gain the initiative in the actions. On the other hand, the static defensive conception of the Argentinean Land Component Commander (ALCC) in the islands, did not make an offensive use of the elements of Special Forces.

- High value goals.

⁵⁸ Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 134-151, 301-306.

Due to the chain of command, the Argentine SOF were subordinated to the ALCC. That meant that the operations of the SOF did not have an strategic focus and even of the operational level. The employment of the Special Forces was mainly limited to perform as advanced combat positions or cover forces to the land combat elements.

- High level decision.

The Argentine SOF had a dependence on the ALCC within the Falklands Theater of Operations, which indicates that the decision maker did not have the necessary intelligence to decide the use of SOF over transcendent objectives. Secondly, this Commander did not have and Staff with the knowledge and the means to plan Special Forces operations. The most appropriate dependence would have been a Joint Commander of Special Operations, directly subordinated to the Commander of the Theater or the highest military authority within the continent, in order to achieve objectives of the military strategic level or operational level. These kinds of objectives could be targets at the British head beach in San Carlos or outside the TO, like Ascension Island or Gibraltar.

- Proper command structure.

The two SOF units that remain on the islands until the end of the war where the Commando Companies 601 and 602. Both of them under the command of two majors. There never existed a command of special forces that integrate under its command the different elements to plan concurrently, coordinate and synchronize the actions of both units.

- Flexibility

The special forces did not have the necessary scientific and intelligence means to plan their operations. For this reason, the information and cartography with which they had of the TO was scarce.

- Projection.

The Argentine SOF did not have means with projection capacity. Of the techniques of infiltration that characterize the elements of SOF (air, water and land), it was used mainly land and air. But after the loss of air superiority, the displacements were by land, since there were no helicopters pilots specially trained for special operations and assigned to them.

5.4 Conclusion

The 601 and 602 Commando Companies should have been formed before the start of the Falklands conflict. Likewise, there should have previously been a Joint Special Forces Command to anticipate the incidence of the conflict and establish the possible operations to be carried out inside and outside the TO.

For the use of the Argentine SOF, all strategic and tactical options should have been considered.

- Prior to the Conflict.

Recognition of objectives of interest that contribute to the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

- During the Conflict.

Use of SOF outside the TO, to discourage any British response to Argentine actions in the Falklands, such as direct actions on British naval bases on Ascension Island or Gibraltar, for example.

ARGENTINE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

In this Chapter, it will be presented proposal for the organization of the Joint Special Operations Command.

6.1 General Mission

The general mission for the Argentine Joint Special Operations Command will be: Execute special operations, during peace, tension, crisis or war, where the National and / or Military Strategy establishes it, to contribute to the dissuasion during peace and maintain the freedom of action of the country during the conflict, in order to contribute to protecting the vital interests of the nation.

6.2 General Mission Analysis

We will analyse the different components of the proposed mission for the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

6.2.1 Execute Special Operations

Special operations are those operations that, due their characteristics, acquire a different physiognomy from the rest of the operations, because they impose procedures, organizations, particular means, and they require specially trained Forces. They can be carried out in the framework of conventional or non-conventional operations.

The special operations will then be actions carried out and executed by Special Forces elements, to act on the political, military, economic and / or psychosocial objectives of the opponent or his allies in complex operational environments.

6.2.2 During peace, tension, crisis or war

Special operations can began long before other conventional operations (Phase Zero) and remained after the war still go on.

- During peace.

The SOF could contribute to deterrence due to the threat that can represent for a potentially enemy state the rapid deployment capability of highly trained and equipped SOF elements. Also, the participation of the elements of SOF in combined exercises could work as dissuasion due the own military capacity.

Secondly, the SOF can participate in support for peace and humanitarian operations, due their particular training and capabilities.

Also, the SOF during time of peace can collaborate with the civilian authorities to deal with cases of serious risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public necessity of a similar nature, carrying out those missions that due to their high risk, or need to apply special procedures and techniques, cannot be executed by other conventional units.

The SOF are able to perform collaboration with friendly countries for advice and instruction to third parties.

Finally, during time of peace, the SOF are one of the most value elements to perform territorial preparation (Phase Zero), area reconnaissance and link with the local population. The Joint Special Operation Command can send modular SOF teams, to the embassies in countries where future conflict scenarios are foreseen, in order to know the language, culture and social characteristics, as well as determine the possible objectives for future special operations.

- In crisis situations.

In addition to the above considerations, the SOF can obtain information on points and areas of interest in a specific operations area, checking compliance with international agreements, participating in the location and recovery of personnel

and material. They can also support crisis management mechanisms, activating the defense preventive measures and the military response options that are determined.

- In time of war.

The SOF can execute the special operations necessary to affect the enemy's national potential.

6.2.3 Dissuasion during peace and maintain the freedom of action of the country during the conflict

As an element of dissuasion, the SOF can provide the country with freedom of action, as an element that threaten to inflict unfavourable damages to the opponent, if the last one proceeds with a line of action opposite to the own objectives. The requirements to dissuade another state are to have the capacity (strength for success), communication and credibility (that the deterrent is determined to meet the threat).

6.3 Division of Special Operations Forces

After the analysis of the general missions of the SOF, this paragraph will make a division of their functions. Those elements that carry out their operations through a Direct Action, such as the elements of Army Commandos, Marines Amphibious Commandos, Navy Tactical Divers, and Air Force Commandos, and those that executed Indirect Actions, like unconventional warfare. This is the case of the SF. That is why SOF are divided in Argentina between commandos and SF, according to the classification that is detailed in Table 1.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ The doctrinal division of the SOF between commando troops and SF belongs to the doctrine of the Argentine Army, since there is not joint Argentine doctrine on this issue, for which the author used that division for the present work.

Table 1: Special Forces and Commando Operations

Special Operations	Special Forces operations	Military Peace Operations
		Operations to Support Civil Authority-Civil Protection (FID)
		Operations with Local Resistance Forces (OLRF) ⁶⁰
		Evasion support Operations
		Operations to obtain information of military and political interest (SR)
		Direct Action Operations
		Social communication applied to combat (MISO)
	Commando Operations	Direct Action Operations
		Interdiction
		Strategic exploration.
		Military peace Operations.

Source: Argentine Army, *Conduction of Special Forces*, RPO -66 -02. (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 2011).

6.4 Area of Application

This type of classification will be applicable both to conventional and unconventional warfare, inside and outside the theater of operations and in the different stages of the conflict, including times of peace.

Within a TO, the SOF usually developed their actions within the framework of the “configuration” operations,⁶¹ in their own forces rearguard or in the enemy's rearguard.

⁶⁰ For the US doctrine, Unconventional Warfare (UW) to enables resistance movement or insurgency. Joint Special Operations University (U.S.). Press. *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*. Fourth Edition. ed. (MacDill AFB, Florida: JSOU Press, 2015), 1-7.

⁶¹ Configuration Operations: Will be those that create or preserve favorable conditions for the success of the decisive operation. It is achieved by acting on the variables of the enemy, the terrain and the relationship with the local population. The configuration operations can be carried out before, during and after the decisive operations. They must be designed on the needs of the decisive operation. They can be executed in the own rearguard or in the enemy's rearguard. The purpose of the configuration operations will be: a) Limit the enemy's freedom of action, increasing our own. b) Change the pace and consistency of its operations. c) Isolate the enemy forces involved in the nearby operation. (Argentine Army. *Conduction of the Land Forces*. ROB 00-01. Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 2015).

Outside a TO, it will be the most profitable use of the SF, because the opponent's military and national strategic level objectives will normally be outside the TO. However, it is necessary to have SF elements within the TO to satisfy the needs of the Joint Force Commander.

6.5 Design of Argentine Special Operation Forces

The design of a permanent organization of SOF withing the Argentine Joint Staff Command will allow the Argentine military to promote employment of SOF in more efficient operations due to the integration and better use of the specific capacities of the units of each force. This organization, dependent on the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, must possess the elements of SOF, both special forces and commandos of the three components of the armed forces, in order to allow a rapid and coordinated employment, both in time of peace , crisis or war, as noted in point 6.1.

6.6 Organization

Based on the subdivision of SOF operations, commando's operations and special forces operations, two elements with different task arise: *commandos and SF*. The characteristics and differences between commandos and special forces are detailed in Table 2.

The dependence of the JSOC must be of the highest level of the conduct of the war, this level will be subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, due to the transcendence of the effects to be achieved.

Based on this, it is seen as necessary that the JSOC has a particular organization based on the adhocracy (capacity to innovate and break the established schemes).

Table 2: Characteristics and differences between Commando and Special Forces Operations

Factor	Commandos	Special Forces
Level of objectives	Strategic military and/or national strategic operational, possibly tactical.	Strategic military and national strategic operational.
Type of objectives	Military and non-military.	Military and non-military.
Employment of fighting power	is employed in direct form on material objectives	is employed in indirect form generating fighting power in the local population
Means employed to fulfill the mission	Violent	Violent and non-violent
Interaction with civilians on the area of operations	Expendable	Essential
Time	Quick actions, brief.	Prolonged actions in time.
Autonomy	Shor and given for their ability to carry and replenishments	Given by their ability to carry, replenishments and resources within the Area of Operation
Actors	Two	Multiple
Operations that run	Direct Action – Interdiction-SR	Military Peace Mission – FID – OLR – Evasion – SR – Direct Action-MISO

Source: Argentine Army, Conduction of Special Forces, RPO -66 -02, (Buenos Aires: Argentine Army, 2011).

It is necessary to understand that by virtue of the multiple operations executed by the SOFs, they can be used in different scenarios, that is why the proposed modification of the organic dependency should be applied considering three vectors:

- Special Operations Forces dependent on each force (Army, Navy, Air Force).
- Special Operations Forces dependent on a Joint Special Operations Command.
- Special Operations Forces dependent on the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as liaison posts).




Figure 1: Organizational chart of the SOFs subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Each vector will carried out the missions expressed in table 3.

Table 3: Missions of the SOF of each level

Element	Mission/Scope	Size
SOF of each force	Special Operations within TO	1 Ca Commandos, 1 Pl SF, 1 Platoon Tactical Divers, 1 Platoon Amphibious Commandos, 1 Platoon GOE.
JSOC	Special operations across the spectrum, in time of peace, tension, crisis and war.	1 Batallion SOF Army, 1 Group Tactical Divers (APBT), 1 Group Amphibious Commandos, 1 Group SOF (Air Force).
SOF Link Posts	Advice on the employment of Joint SOF. Exploration and strategic recognition. Advice and instruction to third parties.	1 Group of High level advisors at the secretariat of planning of the Ministry of Defense, 1 Group of Advisors in the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The JSOC must have outside the organization "Liaison positions", this will be an advisory element, which should be located within the Ministry of Defense, in the planning secretariat, in order to advise on the best use of the JSOC to the highest level of decision.

It should be considered that the presence of an advisory element at this level will contribute to international defense relations and the possible intervention of the SOF in situations of peace or tension.

The current International Defense Policy seeks the projection of the values, principles and central guidelines of the defense policies of each nation, establishes priorities in terms of geographic areas and thematic areas of cooperation and promotes an international presence through different modalities that include the system of military attachés and representations in multilateral international organizations, defense and military cooperation missions, exchanges of technical-military training and contingents of observers and instructors in peace operations.

It is precisely inside the embassies that the second element of "Liaison Posts" is located, which, as previously stated, will be responsible for monitoring the situation and obtaining strategic information on future sensitive objectives for SOFs.

The JSOC must be provided of information and intelligence for accurate planning, establishing a direct link with the Federal Intelligence Agency and the National Strategic Military Intelligence Directorate (DINIEM). There must be a matrix structure that will allow parallel links to provide coordination and support relationships.




Figure 2: Chart of organizational dependencies

6.7 The parts of Organization within the Argentine Joint Special Operations Command

Taking into account the different tasks that must be carried out within the organization, this is the proposal of the different elements that must have the Joint Special Operations Command.

6.7.1 Command Element

Within it will be the Commander of the JSOC as well as the member of the Staff. The Command element is that part of the organization that oversees the entire system, develops the organizational strategy, takes care of the relationship with the environment outside the organization and performs direct supervision.

6.7.2 Operational Core

It will be the one who will carry out the “basic work”. In this case it is divided into six major groups: Direct Action Subsystem, Indirect Action, Education, Projection, Combat Support and Combat Service Support.

- Subsystem of direct and indirect action: The elements that belong to the Direct Action (DA) Subsystem and the Indirect Action (IA) Subsystem, are those that will execute the actions that will materialize the desired effect through the execution of SOF operations. It is convenient to subdivide the scenarios for each Subunit to have specialists in each scenario.
- Subsystem of Education: The Education Subsystem will seek to obtain the necessary human resources for the different subsystems for which it developed the Commando Course, Special Forces Course, SOF Pilot Course, and complementary courses of Diving, free diving parachuting, tactical leaders, Security to VIPs, Close Quarter Combat, Amphibious Special Operations and Foreign Languages.
- Subsystem of Projection: It will be responsible for having the necessary aerial, terrestrial or amphibian means to be used by the AD and AI subsystems. This subsystem will be composed of transport aircraft, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, transport helicopter, surface and submarine vessels, exploration and reconnaissance aircraft, minor amphibious vessels, light and heavy all-terrain vehicles.
- Subsystem of Combat Support: Provide support on intelligence (liaison with the Federal Intelligence Agency), support with unmanned aircraft, and signal.
- Subsystem of Combat Service Support: It will provide Health Service Support, Transportation, Maintenance and Supply to all the subsystems.

This analysis of the operational core makes it possible to observe that for a Special Operation to be carried out, it will be necessary to have a large number of personnel that perform their functions, without that support the SOF element will fail.

6.7.3 Middle line.

To facilitate the Command and Control of the elements of the operational core, it will be necessary to have a middle line whose main function will be the link between the Command Element and the operational core, exercising direct supervision of the parties placed under its command. It can identify a possible grouping of the operative core according to the output that they provide in different subsystems. It is important to note that each of these subsystems will constitute an organization, and, therefore have a Commander and his staff to develop the planning, organization, direction, coordination and control of the different dependent subunits.




Figure 3: Organization of the JSOC

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The Special operations are distinguished from conventional forces by a different space-time framework, the nature of their objectives and the discretion that comprises their preparation and execution, which leads them to be normally of the "non-linear" type, where the connectivity and interoperability are fundamental.

From the analysis and study of the lessons learned in relation to the use of the SOF during the conflict of the Falklands and its analogy with the current doctrine for the use of the SOF, it can be concluded that it is fundamental to have an organization that gathers under a command unique to the SOF elements of the three armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force).

The use of SOFs must be foreseen from the peace, for which the previous field work is important in the future probable material objectives. During the actions of the Argentine SOF, the only operation planned and executed at the operational level or higher was the one carried out on April 1 and 2 of 1982. The rest were operations that by the level of transcendence and scope, were typical of conventional forces. The critical vulnerability of the British Task Force was its logistics, so that action in its supply chain would have been a profitable objective, but the Argentinean commander, never employed the SOF to attack that vulnerability.

The indirect approach seeks to, through the application of relative superiority over a certain vulnerability, destabilize the adversary. For this, the speed is decisive, which is obtained with anticipation of the conflict by previously splitting elements of SOF and freedom of action, materialized in a centralized command of SOF and a momentum that is imposed to the enemy.

The SOF, to build up a dissuasion, needs an organization that acts with that purpose, making their capacity for deployment credible with means of projection, communication and support. From the analysis of the conflict in the Falklands, we saw that the lack of an organization of a SOF command by the Argentine armed forces contributed to the failure of their employment. The design of the JSOC must be capable of projecting its combat power quickly and safely to execute special operations during peace, tension, crisis or war, on transcendent objectives of the national or military potential of the enemy or its allies.

Regarding the size and form of the organization, a flat organization dependent on the same command will facilitate flexibility and high dynamism, allowed to quickly adapt to complex problems that may arise in the probable employment scenarios.

Interoperability within the framework of joint operations will be achieved through technical and organizational compatibility, fundamentally based on a common doctrine and joint training, developed prior to the deployment. This will make possible the economy of forces, not superimposing missions, due all the SOF elements within the JSOC, depend to a single command.

The double dimension of the presence of SOF elements, both in each of the Forces and centralized in the JSOC, allows an initial division of the "where" each of them will operate. This implies that those elements that keep their dependence on each force must be prepared for the missions within the TO, responding to missions imposed by the Operational Level. The missions must be related to the affectation of the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy COG. The JSOC may assign elements of SOF to the Campaign Theater, to integrate a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) subordinated to the Theater Commander. Its operations will begin, logically, once the conflict starts, and after the conformation of the Theater.

The lack of a superior command, grouping the different elements of the Argentine SOF during the Falklands war, made clear their poor influence in the events of the conflict. Due to that, the unification of them in a Joint Special Operations Command that coordinate their doctrine and training, will contribute to a better readiness and employment in future conflicts.

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