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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

ORGANIZING FOR FAILURE DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Organizing for Failure during the 2003 Iraq War

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Thesis: Assigned as the lead agency, the Department of Defense failed to produce a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan bridging the transition from combat operations through the restoration of civil authority. This occurred because once in the lead, the Pentagon isolated itself from United States Government partners, and did not retain clear chains of command inside of its own structure, leading to dysfunction in execution.

Discussion: When the Bush administration initiated planning for war with Iraq, they sought to improve on intergovernmental missteps from the US experience in postwar Afghanistan where interagency parochialism stifled mission success. To minimize this problem in Iraq, the Bush administration charted a new path, unifying all aspects of campaign planning underneath Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense. Rumsfeld believed this new alignment would bridge the gap between traditional combat operations and the more fluid postwar period sure to follow Saddam's ouster. Rather than utilizing this leadership role to lead the interagency, Rumsfeld's Pentagon instead isolated itself from its intergovernmental partners, particularly the State Department, and sought to manage the postwar without outside assistance. To this end, the Department of Defense created a series of ad hoc headquarters to plan and execute the postwar mission, namely the Office of Special Plans, Joint Task Force 4, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Coalition Provisional Authority. These improvised organizations were neither staffed, nor trained to accomplish the missions they were assigned. Their duties and responsibilities were often unclear, with significant overlap into each other's spheres and uncertain relationships with the rest of the national security enterprise. In the resulting confusion, significant mistakes were made during the US occupation of Iraq following Saddam's defeat, namely the de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi government and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army.

Conclusion: Despite its leading role, DOD did not produce a comprehensive interagency plan because Defense isolated itself from USG partners and thereafter failed to unify civil-military planning inside of its own chain of command.

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Preface

My interest in the Iraq War is perhaps more than academic. It has its roots in my own deployments in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, once as a platoon commander during 2005, and then again as a company executive officer in 2006. As formative as those experiences were, it was the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the United States (US), that brought Iraq back into focus for me as an object of study. ISIS's capture of the Iraqi towns and cities where I previously served were difficult for me to ignore. Consequently, I resolved to better understand how things went so wrong in a country where the US once possessed such lofty goals.

I chose to write this paper in a manner that could be understood by a general audience. I wanted to avoid clouding my findings with a deluge of military vernacular that might dissuade or confuse those of a different background. As such, I fully acknowledge that in some portions of my work, more precise language could be utilized, particularly for organizations and relationships. An example of one of these generalizations can be found in my references to the Department of Defense and the Pentagon throughout the work. In truth, most of these allusions are actually directed towards Secretary Rumsfeld's staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) rather than the entirety of the Defense enterprise. In the end, I do not believe that my interchangeable use of these terms detracts from the thrust of the paper. Another qualification that deserves to be considered is that this paper is written from open, or unclassified, sources. I recognize that access to classified, or compartmentalized, information might change some of the findings in this work.

As I close, I would be remiss not to take this opportunity to acknowledge some important individuals whose contributions to me were indispensable. First, I would like to thank Dr. Jill Goldenziel for the many hours she put into this paper to help me bring it to completion. Second,

I would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Pennella for his mentorship and leadership throughout this year, as well as his willingness to assist as a second reader for this work. Third, I would like to recognize the indirect impact on my work that comes from the memories of my comrades-in-arms from my deployments to Iraq. Some of them never returned, and many of those who did come home, remain forever changed. Finally, I want to thank my dear wife, Betsy for her support to me throughout this endeavor. Without her encouragement, I could not have brought it to completion.

Introduction

There is little doubt amongst historians and observers that significant mistakes were made during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Foremost are criticisms regarding the United States' (US) clumsy and uncoordinated efforts to effectively carry out postwar stabilization and governance operations. Despite devoting years towards developing a campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein, after US ground forces captured Baghdad on 9 April 2003, Iraq descended into a state of civil disorder. Not only did US forces fail to establish stability in post-invasion Iraq, but decisions by the coalition actually fostered unrest. With ample time to prepare, why did the US Government's (USG) planning for the Iraq War result in an incoherent campaign concept that was disjointed between decisive combat operations and follow-on stabilization and governance activities?

Determined to improve on previous US experiences managing the aftermath of armed conflict, President Bush assigned the Department of Defense (DOD) as the lead government agency for the invasion and stabilization of Iraq.¹ The purpose of this arrangement was to facilitate a unified, interagency approach under the supervision of a singular lead agency. In military parlance, the goal was to improve operational command and control by simplifying lines of communication between tactical executors on the ground and senior stakeholders at the national level of government. In some ways, this system was meant to parallel the models employed by US forces in post-World War II (WWII) Germany and Japan by consolidating civil-military responsibilities underneath the military.² Unfortunately, this theory translated poorly during the Iraq War. Assigned as the lead agency, the Department of Defense failed to produce a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan bridging the transition from combat operations through the restoration of civil authority. This occurred because once in the lead, the

Pentagon isolated itself from USG partners, and did not retain clear chains of command inside of its own structure, leading to dysfunction in execution. To understand how these conditions prevailed requires a review of the prelude to the war in Iraq as well as a chronological examination of the multiple organizational methods employed during Iraq planning. Further, identifying the causes of coordination failure inside the US Government during the Iraq Campaign can help the United States better prepare for future conflicts.

Formative Influences on Planning for the Iraq War

Saddam Hussein became a household name in the United States after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. His bellicose actions and subsequent refusal to withdraw his forces in the face of international condemnation set the stage for the 1991 Gulf War.³ After his ignominious defeat and expulsion from Kuwait by a US-led international coalition, Saddam agreed to give up his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program as a condition for cessation of hostilities.⁴ In the aftermath, Saddam's regime sought to convince the world of its compliance with the ceasefire terms; however, US intelligence maintained that Saddam duplicitously retained a WMD stockpile. Between this concern, and the regime's penchant for belligerence towards its neighbors, Iraq remained a major US foreign policy concern after the Gulf War.⁵

For the next decade, UN weapons inspectors played a series of cat and mouse games with members of Saddam's regime while attempting to enforce weapons sanctions against Iraq. After the international community condemned Saddam's persecution of Iraqi Kurds and Shiite Muslims, a coalition led by the United States enforced no-fly zones in a series of named operations over significant portions of southern and northern Iraq.⁶ These no-fly operations featured hostile interactions between coalition forces and Iraqi forces on a routine basis. Based

on this history, when President George W. Bush came into office in 2001, Iraq unsurprisingly remained one of America's foremost security concerns.

After the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks by Al-Qaeda against the American homeland, the national security spotlight transitioned to Afghanistan. The attacks caught both the intelligence and military communities by surprise. For the US intelligence agencies, the inability to anticipate the attacks was a stunning, public failure. The military fared no better. When the President looked to the Pentagon for recommended military responses, he was disappointed to find that Defense did not have an off-the-shelf plan for ground combat in Afghanistan.⁷ Despite this faltering start, US planners conceived a creative solution to initiate Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) with minimum delay by utilizing Special Operations Forces (SOF) from both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD.⁸ The deployment of special operators, with their light logistical footprint and discrete size, provided speedy deployment and lethality in the field, and enabled the execution of an unconventional warfare campaign against the Taliban.⁹

As a result, the military's approach to OEF marked a significant departure from the heavier and more conventional order of battle employed in previous conflicts, such as the Gulf War.¹⁰ Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld appreciated this light, mobile, and lethal approach to battle. In his mind, OEF's opening gambit demonstrated a modernized approach to warfare where technological advantages meant that a lighter, more flexible force could deploy to the combat zone faster and cheaper while accomplishing outsized results.¹¹ This method of war seemed to give Defense greater flexibility while minimizing the human and financial costs.

While this plan allowed for rapid retaliation and bought the Bush administration time to organize and deploy conventional military forces, key weaknesses regarding the coordination

between military and civilian partners emerged. The primary issue identified by the administration was that the Afghanistan operational concept lacked a unified command structure to oversee the execution of the war. Defense, the CIA, and State all had important roles, but each executed in a vacuum with deconfliction cumbersomely occurring at the National Security Council (NSC) level. In her memoir, then-Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) Condoleezza Rice captures an exchange between President Bush and his NSC Principals, where Bush becomes frustrated with the lack of clear roles and responsibilities in Afghanistan between his primary agencies. Rice concludes that the NSC construct is suboptimal for managing modern warfare.¹² These experiences from Afghanistan left powerful impressions on senior officials of the Bush administration and were foundational for future national security policies oriented towards Iraq.

The Department of Defense Takes the Lead

Unlike the Afghanistan experience, the initial phases of planning for conflict with Iraq were proactive, allowing deliberate preparation by US Government agencies. Nevertheless, producing a whole-of-government war plan proved difficult, and during the process the Bush administration experienced frustration with the limitations of the US national security construct. Traditionally, Defense and State were the two principal agencies responsible for managing a war and its aftermath. When considering Iraq, these two organizations had clear roles on either side of overthrowing Saddam's regime. During a military invasion to defeat Saddam's army, the Department of Defense would be the obvious lead agency. In the aftermath of overthrowing the Ba'athist regime, a new Iraqi government would be established, and eventually the Department of State would assume the leading role for USG efforts in Iraq. It was the area in between these events where interagency responsibilities were blurred which caused confusion.

Post-invasion stability operations and the eventual reestablishment of governance tended to create significant coordination challenges inside the interagency. Worse, as historical experience in both Kosovo and Afghanistan demonstrated, these phases of armed conflict tended to be protracted and difficult to complete.¹³ This complex portion of the campaign invited duplication of effort and interagency conflict. Consequently, the Bush administration was determined to find a way to unify command of USG postwar efforts. Without an immediate solution to this dilemma, early USG Iraq planning occurred inside agency stovepipes with the NSC responsible for coordinating and deconflicting efforts. As the limitations of this construct emerged, President Bush assigned Secretary Rumsfeld's DOD the role to manage the entire process from invasion through establishment of Iraqi governance.

Initial Coordination for Iraq Planning in the National Security Council Staff

On 21 November 2001 President Bush instructed his principals to review military options for Iraq to ensure that, should the need arise to confront Saddam, the United States would be ready.¹⁴ As Defense and State began their planning, APNSA Rice organized her NSC staff to avoid repeating Afghanistan's mistakes. To overcome agency parochialism, Rice created several coordination cells to synchronize the interagency. The senior NSC staff organization responsible for coordination of Iraq planning was a committee named the Executive Steering Group (ESG).¹⁵ Led by NSC official Frank Miller,¹⁶ the ESG met three times weekly from spring 2002 until March 2003 on behalf of the NSC Deputies Committee.¹⁷ Subordinate to the ESG was a full-time working group named the Iraq Political-Military Cell (IPMC), responsible for conducting daily coordination and providing feedback directly to the ESG. The purpose of the IPMC was "to secure agreement on strategic planning guidance" for the interagency.¹⁸ Another critical interagency organization was the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IR+R) working group,

responsible for “humanitarian relief in the immediate postwar period, as well as long term reconstruction.”¹⁹ Although these cells generally facilitated information sharing and helped align policy inside the national agencies, they were not organized, and did not possess the authority, to generate a singular whole-of-government plan.

Initial Iraq Planning in the Department of State

Over at Secretary Colin Powell’s Department of State, planning for the Iraq War began in support of the President’s instruction. Initially, State’s primary contribution to war planning came in the form of the Future of Iraq (FOI) project. The purpose of this initiative was to examine current societal conditions in Iraq and consider favorable objectives for a post-Saddam world. However, because the US did not have diplomatic relations with Saddam’s regime, State had little information on life inside contemporary Iraq. Therefore, DOS had to rely on inputs to its planning from indirect sources such as academics, experts, and Iraqi expatriates. These contributors participated in State-hosted working groups where they grappled with numerous governance and civil service issues, including de-Ba’athification.²⁰ Consisting of over 2000 pages and 13 volumes, the working groups from the FOI project generated the most comprehensive assessment of postwar requirements by the US Government.²¹ In the “Economy & Infrastructure” working group, members presciently noted the importance of maintaining Iraq’s electrical and water systems to ensure that the businesses and basic services could function post-conflict.²² Its “Defense Policy” working group recommended that the Iraqi Army be handled carefully. Further, the FOI project recognized that the Iraqi military would need to be down-sized and that care must be taken to properly reintegrate former soldiers into society to avoid “organized crime.” Although reservations existed regarding the Iraqi Army, most

contributors held that it would provide a critical stabilizing function in the country in the aftermath of a war.²³

While the FOI project captured useful information, it was never fully developed into a plan for postwar actions in Iraq. It identified desired conditions and objectives, but did not answer important questions regarding responsibilities for tasks, resources, and timelines. Additionally, the volume of its outputs made it difficult to digest and implement by USG agencies. Regardless of its usefulness, the FOI project never seriously factored into campaign planning for Iraq since it was not released to the rest of the interagency until October 2002.²⁴

Despite its work on the FOI Project, the State Department gained a reputation as a reluctant participant during preparations for the Iraq War. This perception was based partially on State's traditional diplomat culture, which embraced political solutions over military intervention. But it also stemmed from Powell's own convictions. Powell's previous government service included time as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1991 Gulf War. Based on his judgment, war should only be fought as a last resort, and when it was pursued, it should be done with overwhelming force.²⁵ As such, Powell encouraged President Bush to pursue more conservative options than a unilateral invasion, for managing Iraq.²⁶ Further, in case of a military invasion, Secretary Powell did not believe that his organization possessed the manpower and resources to implement a postwar plan. He even commented to APNSA Rice during an NSC meeting, "There was a reason that George Marshall was not a Foreign Service officer."²⁷ Powell's reticence opened a window of opportunity for the Department of Defense.

Initial Iraq Planning in the Department of Defense

Meanwhile in the Department of Defense, planning for war in Iraq began in earnest with President Bush's directive. Despite Central Command's (CENTCOM) principal commitment to running OEF in Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld demanded that planning for an Iraq contingency be given top priority. The starting point for planning was a previously constructed Iraq concept created by former-CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni, named Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003.²⁸ OPLAN 1003 called for a massive ground force of over 400,000 servicemembers to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.²⁹ The premise for these numbers was based on the anticipated postwar challenges of managing the 24 million-strong, ethnically segmented population of Iraq, while also securing the country from malicious interference by neighboring states.³⁰

Rumsfeld felt that Zinni's plan did not reflect the modern capabilities of the US military, or the lessons derived from Afghanistan.³¹ Accordingly, he directed the current commander of CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks to review the OPLAN's foundational assumptions to determine how to substantially reduce the overall force numbers.³² Rumsfeld expected a contemporary fight against Saddam's forces would be a reprise of the 1991 Gulf War where the Iraqi Army quickly surrendered to the US-led coalition. Further, he believed that the Iraqi people would treat members of a US invasion force as liberators from Saddam's oppressive regime. Based on these assumptions, Rumsfeld believed that CENTCOM could compensate for a reduction in the size of the US invasion force by employing the Iraqi Army to assist in post-invasion stability operations.³³ As a result, Rumsfeld asserted that he needed an invasion force of around 100,000 troops, which could be augmented by a military formations deployed into theater at a later date.³⁴ Unfortunately, as will be examined later, the interconnected nature of

the US ground force's size to the role of the Iraqi Army during a US occupation would be forgotten in the aftermath of the invasion.

Based on the Afghanistan experience, when it came to the management of postwar Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld believed that the entire campaign could be simplified by making it a Defense-led endeavor. In August 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the Pentagon's Undersecretary for Policy, Doug Feith, to create a planning cell focused exclusively on Iraq.³⁵ Given the nondescript title of the Office of Special Plans (OSP), this organization was expected to drive policy planning for DOD efforts in Iraq, to include postwar efforts. It was also intended to be the primary organization by which Defense coordinated with the NSC staff.³⁶

Over time, the OSP served as an able platform through which Rumsfeld could consolidate power inside the interagency for Iraq War planning. Feith's OSP became notorious for its inability to work well with other key players, including the NSC staff and the Department of State. Since Defense was the lead for developing the initial invasion plan for Iraq, the rest of the interagency tended to be reactionary to the Pentagon's plans. By September 2002, Feith's OSP became acknowledged as the *de facto* lead organization for interagency postwar planning.³⁷ Ironically, General Franks did not share Rumsfeld's enthusiasm to lead USG postwar efforts, a fact he made clear during a brief to President Bush in December 2001. Through this conversation, he sought to separate his command from the responsibility of reconstruction by informing the Commander-in-Chief that, "the military [does] not do nation building very well."³⁸ Throughout the Iraq planning process, Franks maintained that postwar stability and rebuilding were not CENTCOM's mission, but belonged to the Department of State.

The Emergence of Defense as the Lead Agency

During the initial war planning, and despite the need for a cohesive interagency plan, a gap existed in the Iraq War campaign's plan that characterized the separation between the parochial interests of the Departments of Defense and State. Worse, the NSC staff could not reconcile this issue. Much to Secretary Rumsfeld's satisfaction, President Bush decided to cut through this dysfunction in October 2002 with the assignment of the Department of Defense as the lead government agency responsible for the entirety of the Iraq War. It would be the Pentagon's responsibility to build a campaign plan which accounted for both invasion and postwar operations through the reestablishment of governance in Iraq.³⁹ With this organizational decision, the remainder of the interagency, to include the Department of State, became relegated to a supporting role to the Department of Defense's efforts.

Improvisation and Isolation from the Interagency

Upon receiving the leading role for all aspects of the Iraq campaign plan, Rumsfeld set about creating structure inside of his agency to manage postwar efforts. To accomplish this, he decided to fashion from scratch two headquarters for postwar management. One headquarters would be a military joint task force responsible for leading postwar security and the second would be a Defense-owned, civilian-led entity charged with overseeing reconstruction and governance.⁴⁰ Fatefully, the creation of these headquarters inserted into Rumsfeld's own chain of command, the civil-military divide traditionally present between State and Defense. The primary difference in this case was that all the entities worked directly for Rumsfeld. In theory, these organizations would be comprised of members from the interagency, working for a Defense-owned team. In reality, Rumsfeld preferred to fill these organizations with "company men," and was particularly suspicious of volunteers from the Department of State.⁴¹ As a result,

much of the postwar planning conducted by Defense occurred with little input or participation from the rest of the interagency. This deficiency undermined the viability of Defense's already-inadequate, and improvised, postwar headquarters.

Military Postwar Planning

In December 2002, Rumsfeld stood up the first of his two ad hoc, postwar headquarters. Named Joint Task Force (JTF) 4, this organization was to be led by Brigadier General Steve Hawkins and was intended to be the nucleus of a future combined joint task force (CJTF) to run Iraq. Hawkins's mission proved next to impossible. Led by a junior general officer, the under-resourced JTF 4 struggled to fill its rosters with the requisite staff for operations. With a nebulous mission, no budget, and scant resources, JTF 4 was poorly supported by the Department of Defense and was never a player for the larger interagency. Even CENTCOM, technically JTF 4's higher headquarters, distanced itself by subordinating Hawkins's organization to 3rd Army, also known as the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC).⁴²

Lieutenant General David McKiernan's CFLCC was the senior tactical unit responsible for the Iraq ground invasion. Headquartered in Camp Doha, Kuwait, McKiernan and his staff had been immersed in war planning since September 2002.⁴³ They had given considerable thought towards the execution of the Iraq campaign, to include the transition period after the overthrow of the regime. To this end, CFLCC initiated its own internal post-invasion planning cell led by Major General Albert Whitley, a British officer on McKiernan's staff. Despite their efforts, Whitley's planners were limited by the fact that they did not have a higher headquarters concept or plan towards which they could align. When JTF 4 arrived at Camp Doha, Kuwait with a roster of 58 members, Whitley's planners hoped that they could resolve this knowledge

gap. After learning that JTF 4 knew less about postwar operations than CFLCC, McKiernan subsumed Hawkins team into Whitley's postwar operation, marking the end of JTF 4.

Despite these challenges, Whitley's planning team succeeded in producing OPLAN ECLIPSE II, named after the Allied plan for post-World War II Germany.⁴⁴ In this document, Whitley's planners presciently identified the need to control Iraq's borders, protect key areas and infrastructure, maintain public order and safety, restore basic services, and assist in reinstating the Iraqi government.⁴⁵ Critically, CFLCC staff recognized that with a reduced-sized invasion force, they did not have enough manpower to accomplish these tasks. According to one planner, "The campaign would produce conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives."⁴⁶ CENTCOM maintained that the CFLCC's manpower shortage during postwar operations could be compensated for by employing Iraqi military and government personnel. Without interagency partners against with whom to test this assumption, CFLCC's planners deferred to their higher headquarters.

Civilian Postwar Planning

In January 2003, with President Bush's concurrence, Rumsfeld appointed retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner to serve as the leader of the civilian headquarters responsible for the initial postwar effort. He chose Garner due to his standout performance providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds during the Gulf War in 1991.⁴⁷ Reporting for duty at the Pentagon on 16 January 2003, Rumsfeld informed Garner that he would work for Defense and be responsible for managing post-invasion Iraq. On 20 January 2003, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, formally outlining the responsibilities of Garner's office, named the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).⁴⁸

Garner's responsibilities were significant. NSPD 24 assigned nine key tasks for the

ORHA:

- Assisting with humanitarian relief
- Dismantling weapons of mass destruction
- Defeating and exploiting terrorist networks
- Protecting natural resources and infrastructure
- Facilitating the country's reconstruction and protection of its infrastructure and economy
- Assisting with the reestablishment of key civilian services, such as food supply, water, electricity, and healthcare
- Reshaping the Iraqi military by establishing a reformed, civilian-controlled armed forces
- Reshaping the other internal security institutions
- Supporting the transition to Iraq-led authority over time⁴⁹

Further, the document instructed elements of the US interagency to assign senior members (GS15 or SES) to Garner's staff. Finally, NSPD 24 ambiguously conveyed that a "US Charge d'Affairs" would eventually assert itself in Iraq in the place of ORHA.⁵⁰ Implied in NSPD 24 was the need for Jay Garner to untangle the previously-laid web of interagency concepts for Iraq reconstruction, and put them back together into a coherent plan.

In February, Garner travelled to the White House to meet with President Bush and his National Security Council to discuss the mission of his team. During this meeting, Garner confirmed the importance of retaining 250,000 Iraqi soldiers to assist in postwar security and stabilization.⁵¹ This generally aligned with previous planning assumptions presented by CENTCOM and was roundly supported inside the NSC. More concerningly, Garner warned the President that his small team could not possibly accomplish four of the tasks assigned in NSPD 24, namely dismantling WMD, defeating terrorists, reshaping the Iraqi military, and reshaping the other internal Iraqi security institutions. These tasks needed to be the responsibility of the military. This assertion was unchallenged by any member in the NSC.⁵² With less than a month remaining until the invasion, questions remained unresolved regarding postwar Iraq.

Garner's concerns were well-founded. Similar to the challenges facing JTF 4, Garner's duties to build, orient, and then employ his office in support of the mission bordered on the impossible. An ad hoc organization, ORHA was chronically understaffed and struggled to attract serious interagency players.⁵³ Two major factors contributed to this challenge. First, while war planning occurred in earnest in the Department of Defense, the rest of the interagency took its signals from the White House and the Bush administration's official position remained focused on finding a diplomatic solution to the WMD issue. This incongruent narrative created challenges for Garner, who found elements of the interagency sympathetic to his needs to build a team, but unwilling to support until the administration's plan clarified.⁵⁴ Secondly and perhaps more significantly, Garner worked for the Department of Defense. Bringing interagency players onto a team subordinate to Rumsfeld's Pentagon was always going to be a tall order.

With time running short, Garner sought to compile and reconcile interagency planning by holding a coordination meeting from 20-22 February in Fort McNair, Virginia. During this conference, Garner became acquainted with the leader of the Department of State's Future of Iraq project, Tom Warrick. Shockingly, Garner was unaware of the existence of the FOI project. Excited to gain an important asset from the interagency, he immediately asked for Warrick to join his team.⁵⁵ Within three days, Rumsfeld directed Garner to release Warrick. Rumsfeld wanted people that were "truly committed" to the postwar mission and the State Department's Warrick did not fit the bill.⁵⁶ As a result, the Future of Iraq project was never incorporated into ORHA's planning.⁵⁷ This episode is emblematic of the interagency issues that prevailed after the establishment of Defense as the lead war agency. Throughout this period, Rumsfeld's Pentagon entrenched itself and actively chased off interagency support. The decision to reject State's FOI project completed Defense's isolation from the rest of the interagency.

Reaping the Whirlwind in Execution

The ORHA experience preparing for deployment was frustrating, but the staff soon found that the execution of their postwar mission was a greater challenge. From the moment the ORHA arrived into theater, things fell apart. Improvised, under-resourced, and inexperienced, Garner's organization had scant contact with the rest of the interagency as well as an unclear relationship with the military forces on the ground. Thus, in execution the ORHA proved woefully inadequate to solve the problems of transition from combat operations to reconstruction. When this became evident following the invasion, Secretary Rumsfeld scrambled for a new, improvised headquarters by which to solve his postwar problems. His solution, in the form of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) caused more problems than it resolved.

The ORHA in Iraq

Garner deployed his team to Kuwait in March 2003, optimistic that proximity would improve his coordination with McKiernan's CFLCC and allow him to clarify how the two headquarters would manage the post-conflict transition.⁵⁸ He was disappointed. Although responsible for postwar Iraq, the ORHA was largely sequestered from the CFLCC staff as an "outsider" agency. Under the auspices of security concerns, McKiernan denied Garner's ORHA permission to reside in the military facilities at Camp Doha. They stayed in a Kuwait City hotel instead.⁵⁹ Worse, when detailed coordination finally occurred between the headquarters, Garner learned that McKiernan's operational design, focused on using a smaller force to exploit tempo and momentum against the Iraqi Army, invalidated aspects of the ORHA's plan.⁶⁰ CFLCC's available manpower was fully taxed by the tactical mission; McKiernan had no units to spare to provide security for Garner's ORHA. In fact, the operational plan assumed that the ORHA

would not enter Iraq until after 60 days into the campaign.⁶¹ Based on CFLCC's troop limitations, Garner would have to wait in Kuwait for Baghdad to be secured and would not have the opportunity to seriously impact matters on the ground in Iraq immediately following the invasion.⁶²

Ironically, preventing such dysfunction was the precise point of giving the Department of Defense ownership of the postwar portion of the campaign. Ostensibly, the difficulties between the ORHA and CFLCC could have been resolved by Franks at CENTCOM, but for the informality of his relationship with Garner's headquarters. In fact, during discussions before Garner's deployment, the two men agreed that they would approach the war as co-equals.⁶³ As presented by Franks, this was an opportunity for Garner to have a direct line to Secretary Rumsfeld. In reality, this approach enabled Franks to avoid the albatross of postwar reconstruction he so abhorred. Worse, it prevented the unification of operational command in theater.

The lack of a unified operational commander, and the absence of mutual support between CFLCC and ORHA, created disfunction as the invasion commenced. By the time Garner and his staff arrived in Baghdad on April 21, the security situation had already deteriorated.⁶⁴ Since hostilities continued after the capture of Baghdad in the second week of April, McKiernan's forces continued to be focused on engaging the enemy north and west of the capital. Considering the uncertain situation prevailing in Baghdad during this period, it is surprising that Secretary Rumsfeld decided to curtail the prearranged flow of forces deploying into the CENTCOM theater. On April 21, the 1st Cavalry Division's deployment orders were officially rescinded notwithstanding the scenes of unrest in Iraq's capital.⁶⁵ Despite these challenges, Jay Garner continued to search for solutions in Baghdad.

Invoking his contacts from his prior Iraq experience, Garner's team established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), consisting of a broad array of ethnic and religious groups to assist as a steering committee for reestablishing governance. In another example of progress, the ORHA staff gained contact with several Iraqi Army commanders and attained rosters for 137,000 soldiers.⁶⁶ Garner's team intended to initiate a program to pay these soldiers, bringing them back to help with security and reconstruction. Before any of these actions were carried to fruition, the Bush administration became impatient. Having lost confidence in the ORHA's ability to deliver results in the chaotic aftermath of the invasion, the administration decided to make a change.⁶⁷ On April 24, three days after Garner arrived in Baghdad and before his first meeting with the IGC, Secretary Rumsfeld informed him that he would be replaced by a Presidential Envoy in the form of an administrator for the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).⁶⁸ After the war, Garner derisively noted that this change made him a "lame duck" before his work began.⁶⁹

Changing a Postwar Headquarters in Stride

On 12 May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Iraq to assume the role of CPA administrator. In keeping with NSPD 24, he was presumably expected to nest his efforts on top of the foundation established by the ORHA. This was not to be. From the beginning, the CPA experienced several problems. The CPA's reporting requirements were confusing; Ambassador Bremer worked for multiple masters. He was the special-envoy to Iraq for President Bush, the administrative leader of the Iraqi people, the civilian leader of the international coalition, and finally, since his organization was dependent on the Department of Defense for support, he was tasked to report to the President through Secretary Rumsfeld.⁷⁰ Similar to Garner's experience with the ORHA, Bremer's relationship with the military forces in Iraq was unclear.⁷¹ Although an experienced diplomat, he had no Middle East experience and

was unfamiliar with the situation on the ground in Iraq. During the creation of his team, Bremer experienced staffing problems similar to those of the ORHA, but on a grander scale. With only weeks to composite, the CPA struggled to recruit personnel from across the interagency.⁷² The resulting staff was an incongruous mash-up of military, retired-DOS, and civilians of various backgrounds who arrived piecemeal into theater. Worse, the CPA had not participated in pre-invasion planning and even its key leaders possessed only a hazy understanding of the dynamic conditions on the ground in Iraq. Accordingly, the poor coordination of the CPA's initial efforts is unsurprising.

The poorly coordinated change from the ORHA to the CPA proved fateful. Within four days of arriving in Iraq, Bremer sought to make a drastic course correction with the issuance of the first of two momentous directives. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society" was a terse document that disbanded the Ba'ath Party of Iraq.⁷³ The removal of Ba'athists from the senior leadership of the Iraqi government had always been part of the Bush administration's plan for Iraq, but the depth of Order 1 represented a particularly aggressive revision to policy previously considered by the NSC. For his part, Garner protested that this change was too severe, and that this edict would drive thousands of Ba'athists underground, including elements critical for reconstruction, but Bremer remained steadfast.⁷⁴ Events proved Garner right. After decades of living under a brutal totalitarian regime, most Iraqi governmental officials chose to simply disappear rather than risk being subjected to criminal proceedings from an occupying military force. Order 1 irreversibly eliminated the possibility of retaining Iraqi governing partners, or senior members of the Iraqi military, to work with the CPA. The new Iraq ministries would be built from scratch.

On 23 May 2003, Bremer made another drastic change by issuing CPA Order Number 2, “The Dissolution of Entities.” In this directive, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi military, intending to rebuild it from scratch. In their 2008 analysis of the CPA, the RAND Corporation estimates that this decision resulted in the disaffection of approximately 230,000 Iraqi servicemembers.⁷⁵ Similar to de-Ba’athification, demobilization of the army was an integral part the ORHA’s NSC-approved prewar planning.⁷⁶ The assumption that the Iraqi Army would be incorporated into coalition’s reconstruction efforts was integral to both Franks’s and Garner’s plans. Bremer’s ill-conceived directives undermined essential campaign assumptions. Further, they initiated widespread protests by former-members of the Iraqi Army, fostering the conditions of unrest which eventually progressed into the Iraqi insurgency.⁷⁷

Even in hindsight, the origin of these decisions is uncertain. What is known is that when Garner pushed back on Bremer’s changes by appealing directly to the Pentagon, Rumsfeld dodged saying, “This is not coming from this building.”⁷⁸ Paradoxically, APNSA Rice notes in her biography that she was unaware of Bremer’s intentions and that they were different from decisions agreed upon previously in the NSC and approved by the President. She contends that she learned about Bremer’s controversial decisions by reading the newspaper.⁷⁹ For his part, Bremer insisted that he received instructions regarding his actions from Rumsfeld, via Undersecretary Feith.⁸⁰ The decisions even caught CENTCOM by surprise.⁸¹ The fact that confusion abounded reveals the convoluted nature of the postwar’s improvised organizational structure and its lack of NSC accountability. This uncertainty also predominated inside the CPA where its members were unsure exactly what authorities the organization possessed. In his 2006 book, *Fiasco*, Ricks quotes a former CPA official as saying, “Chain of command, of all the problems in Iraq, this was the biggest problem.”⁸² Ironically, even though Rumsfeld was

Bremer's immediate US superior during the beginning of the CPA's tenure, the ad hoc nature of the arrangement ensured that confusion abounded throughout the US Government and on the ground in Iraq.⁸³

In the chaos of postwar Iraq, the Bush administration reaped the whirlwind of its attempt to unconventionally manage the Iraq Campaign. Bremer's edicts, made possible by the fluctuating and uncertain chain of command, dashed the last of the United States' hope for a smooth transition from combat operations into stabilization. As a result, the Iraqi government and its army went underground and then mobilized into an active resistance to the US occupation. Meanwhile, the US military on the ground was unnecessarily shorthanded and confused regarding its relationship to both the ORHA and the CPA. In these early days of the war, the seeds for a lengthy insurgency were unwittingly sown thanks to a convoluted and extemporized decision-making apparatus that resulted in self-defeating policies.

Analysis of Defense's Role Leading the Interagency

The previous sections present the progression of US Government planning for the Iraq War. Iraq planning began as separate interagency efforts with supervision from the NSC. As war with Iraq increased in likelihood, the Bush administration decided to change to a "single agency approach" with the Department of Defense in the lead. Initial planning inside Defense underneath Feith's OSP, gave way to the tactical-level offices of JTF4 and the ORHA. Created to help bridge the civil-military divide, these offices were ad hoc and lacked legitimacy. When these headquarters failed to reconcile a campaign plan with McKiernan's CFLCC, they were replaced by the CPA. The CPA's authorities and responsibilities were even more confusing than its predecessors. The net result of the ever-changing assortment of postwar offices was

confusion in both DOD and the greater interagency. Without clear and understood postwar leadership structure, the Iraq War spiraled out of control.

Overall, consolidation of all power under Defense was intended to create a unified command structure that would synchronize the efforts of military and civilian leaders while streamlining decisions.⁸⁴ For Defense, this rise to a leading role for Iraq was an opportunity to correct mistakes from Afghanistan where reconstruction efforts were tainted by interagency disagreement. In reality, Defense lacked the broad expertise required to tackle the problem.⁸⁵ Rather than reaching across the government for important, if sometimes divergent input from partner agencies such as State, DOD chose instead to freeze others out. Secretary Rumsfeld resisted outsider participation in the ORHA and actively worked to isolate his postwar organization from the rest of the interagency. This construct removed important stakeholders from campaign planning below NSC-level discussions. Assigning DOD as the lead for the entire Iraq War effort empowered a single agency for unity purposes at the expense of input from the rest of the interagency, to include the NSC staff. As a result, the NSC struggled to ensure that Defense planning incorporated, or even considered, the concerns of adjacent government agencies. Perhaps most importantly, this approach cut out APNSA Rice's ability to actively oversee interagency support for the war, leaving her aloof and unable to provide timely and informed advice to President Bush. The damaging effects of this anemic construct were readily visible when Bremer issued his two initial CPA proclamations without any consultation with the NSC.⁸⁶ In the end, the decision to center all planning under Defense caused more problems than it solved and was detrimental to national policy goals.

Perhaps this parochial approach could be overlooked if Defense had managed to unify campaign planning inside of its own agency, particularly between Garner's ORHA and

McKiernan's CFLCC, delivering a coherent transition from combat to reconstruction. Unfortunately, without the unifying function of a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to coordinate actions between the ORHA and CFLCC, coordination between the two entities floundered. Because Franks retained operational control of the Iraq War, this coordination was his responsibility. However, he neither wanted the role of supervising reconstruction, nor was he properly equipped to personally manage a JTF-type responsibility given his broader obligation to the entire CENTCOM area of operations, not to mention the ongoing war in Afghanistan. As a result, when the poorly supported and makeshift headquarters of the ORHA deployed forward, it was quickly overwhelmed by the postwar conditions of Iraq and received scant assistance from either CENTCOM or the greater US Government. When the ORHA struggled to manage the postwar situation, Secretary Rumsfeld decided to hastily construct a new organization to replace the ORHA. Rather than helping solve the coordination problems inside the Defense chain of command, the CPA created larger problems. With the issuance of his now-infamous first two CPA orders, Bremer effectively eliminated any near-term chance of utilizing Iraqi institutions to rebuild the nation. Moreover, he inflamed a smoldering insurgency against the US occupiers. Concerningly, not only were these moves poorly conceived, but they were expressly counter to the courses of action approved by President Bush with the input from the NSC.⁸⁷ The informality of the DOD chain of command created ambiguity and eliminated accountability for its most important decision-makers.⁸⁸

Despite attempting to consolidate power in the Department of Defense to avoid the dysfunction present during interagency coordination in Afghanistan, confusion reigned anyways. Challenges in planning the transition from invasion into reconstruction are expected regardless of the organizational approach employed by the US Government. However, this time, the civil-

military rift lacked the supervision of an honest broker, in the form of the NSC. As a result, beyond causing problems during planning, it ensured that the Iraq War spiraled out of control in execution.

Implications for the Future

The key implication from the Iraq experience for future US campaigns is the need for improved organizational approach to planning and managing a campaign. The US experiences in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, were unique in that both campaigns were conducted with the intent of defeating and replacing a totalitarian regime. In execution, neither campaign proceeded smoothly after the defeat of the belligerent government. Instead, a breakdown in campaign continuity occurred during the transition from combat operations into stability and reconstruction. This paper analyzed the organizational failings of the US Government in Iraq and how these contributed to a fumbled campaign. It is essential that moving into the future, the US Government attempt to find a solution to resolve the vexing problem of interagency planning for campaign transitions. This is particularly important considering the ongoing possibility of a military confrontation with totalitarian regimes in places such as Iran and North Korea. To increase the likelihood of a successful outcome to such a campaign, the US Government must improve its structural approach to developing a whole-of-government campaign plan.

In a future regime change scenario, a more traditional approach to developing a whole-of-government campaign plan should be embarked upon, leveraging the full participation of both Defense and State. The first step in such an endeavor would be to stand up a CJTF to provide a singular headquarters with responsibility for the mission. Depending on the anticipated duration of the operation, it is possible that this CJTF might eventually be grown into a subunified command.⁸⁹ Whichever approach is adopted, creating this organization at the commencement of


planning empowers the interagency to work with a single military organization charged with the success of the operation. Of note, this does not absolve the Geographic Combatant Commander from coordinating with the Pentagon or other members of national leadership; rather, it elevates the CJTF to a level where it can directly impact national-level discussions. A CJTF commander would likely have the opportunity for an unfiltered audience with the President of the United States to ensure he fully understood his assignment, as was the case for General Petraeus while he was commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq. This relationship is important because it places the CJTF commander in the position of operationally bridging the void between policymakers in Washington and tactical execution of the mission in his theater of operations. It also avoids the shell-game of blame which existed in the Iraq War where General Franks attempted to manage the war from his chair in CENTCOM without a subordinate CJTF.

In addition to providing a more suitable command and control function inside the military chain of command, the use of a properly organized CJTF could alleviate some of the civil-military challenges faced in Iraq. During a campaign where regime change is an objective, it is inevitable that the Department of Defense will serve in a leading role during the initial phases, however, this role will eventually be passed on to other interagency partners, particularly the State Department. Crucially, developing a campaign with a whole-of-government input enables the determination of how and when this transition of leading responsibility occurs based on desired conditions on the ground. A systematic campaign approach to this handover prevents the chaotic environment which persisted in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion. To construct a campaign plan in this manner, rather than attempting to recreate State capabilities inside the Defense establishment through makeshift headquarters such as the ORHA, Defense

should focus on incorporating important interagency planners into its concept development at an early stage.

Collaborative planning with the interagency can be done through an interagency planning cell inside the CJTF in the form of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). According to joint doctrine, a JIACG, “is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the [Combatant Commander (CCDR)] and tailored to meet a supported CCDR’s requirements, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian departments and agencies.”⁹⁰ Utilizing a JIACG below the GCC-level, as a part of the CJTF staff, allows for interagency coordination while providing an appropriate level of detail back to parent agencies, and by extension the NSC, regarding military planning. The JIACG would be scalable in keeping with the CJTF’s life cycle. It would begin as a relatively small element, staffed by junior members, but would grow in seniority and size as planning progressed. The JIACG could eventually be expanded to include senior interagency members, some of whom might eventually leave the CJTF to form the nucleus of their agency efforts as operations commence.

Figure 1: Contrasting Command and Control Options
Comparing the organizational structure used in Iraq circa April 2003 to a CJTF with JIACG Organizational Structure



Although the JIACG provides an opportunity for tactical-level interagency coordination, it is not a panacea. It does not eliminate the need for national-level coordination between Defense and State, it only ensures that interagency touch points occur both in Washington and inside the CJTF. This construct addresses interagency collaboration and assigns the issue of transition to the CJTF staff, while accepting that the plan will be closely observed at the NSC-level. To this end, the CJTF must still design an operational plan that aims towards turning over its campaign to civilian counterparts in the final stages. Here, the JIACG helps avoid the Iraq War pitfalls of isolationism, improvisation, and confusing chains of command. Further, by maintaining the integrity of the DOD and DOS responsibilities, this construct ensures that where critical civil-military differences arise that cannot be resolved through the JIACG, the NSC retains the ability to intercede.

Counterarguments

This paper argues that the post-invasion planning for the Iraq War faltered in large part due to the organizational approach used by the Bush administration which centered power in the Department of Defense. The counterargument to this assertion is that the postwar planning for Iraq did not suffer based on organizational flaws, but it failed due to the inability of key stakeholders to work together effectively. Numerous accounts of planning for the Iraq war note the commonness of discord amongst key leaders. For example, Vice President Cheney and several members of the Defense establishment, including Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, were eager to use military power to topple Saddam from power. These individuals were generally opposed by Secretary Powell, who saw the Iraq problem as a morass to be managed rather than attacked. For her part, APNSA Rice was unable to channel these disagreements into a useful discourse which sharpened decision making. Instead, these disagreements became personal to the point of hindering interagency coordination for the war. Therefore, it is conceivable that with a different array of personalities directing the Iraq War effort, the Defense-led approach might have proven successful.

Upon consideration, this argument's premise rests upon the hope of a utopian collection of personalities working homogenously in support of the President's agenda. In reality, the turf wars and rice bowl politics that detracted from the unity of effort for the Iraq War, are hardly uncommon. Indeed, it is exceedingly rare for Presidents to oversee national security teams that are not awash with political infighting and maneuvering. In fact, the executive branch's cabinet system recognizes that properly managed parochialism amongst its principals can be a source of strength. This arrangement ensures robust NSC discussions with diverse perspectives, and it avoids the danger of centering power in a single agency at the expense of others. Based on this assessment, the best way to conduct interagency campaign planning remains utilizing the NSC

for its expressed purpose, while conducting detailed operational planning at a JTF-level with the active participation of adjacent government partners.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the war in Iraq provides a useful lesson on how poor organizational design can lead to interagency dysfunction, eventually undermining the mission. The Bush administration's decision to centralize war planning under the Department of Defense resulted in the exclusion of the rest of the interagency. The capabilities of DOD to serve in this capacity and deliver a coherent product were overestimated. Not only did the Pentagon fail to incorporate expertise from across the interagency to refine its operational plans, but it subsequently partitioned its command architecture into military and civilian segments, forcing it to create several improvised postwar headquarters. This approach disrupted unity of command below the national level while placing an unmanageable operational burden on the Pentagon. It facilitated a campaign plan that suffered from stovepiped planning inside DOD while delivering uncoordinated actions in theater. Feedback from tactical level planners was filtered by intermediaries in Defense. Further, despite the opportunity to do otherwise, this information was not properly collated by Defense to provide a clear picture to NSC-level decision makers.

This is not to say that circumstances would have been perfect had the planning for the Iraq War been conducted simultaneously by DOS and DOD with the NSC staff providing mediation. This arrangement is cumbersome, lacks granularity, and is poorly suited for detailed deconfliction. While the bifurcated system where Defense and State are coequals creates challenges of its own, it is preferable to a situation that promotes bureaucratic totalitarianism. The national security process is messy and convoluted, but for all its shortcomings, employed properly, it facilitates healthy discourse and informed decisions. Regardless of its challenges, the

interagency process creates a critical balance that protects America's executive branch from insularism. By utilizing the structures available and familiar to USG agencies, such as the NSC for policy development and refinement, and CJTFs for operational planning with interagency involvement, the US can avoid retracing its steps down the tragic road in Iraq, where a poor organizational approach snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

End Notes:

¹ Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown/Broadway, 2011), Kindle edition, 190-192. Bush assigned DOD as the lead agency, but as mentioned in this paper's preface, more precisely, the lead was given to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This is a small distinction, but one that many uniformed members would prefer to be registered.

² Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) Kindle edition, 282.

³ Stanley Cloud, "Gathering Storm. (Cover Story)," *Time* 136, no. 10, September 3, 1990, 24.

⁴ Alan Cowell, "Iraq accepts U.N.'s terms for cease-fire Strict conditions to be met before allies withdraw War in the Gulf," *The Baltimore Sun*, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-04-07/news/1991097053_1_iraq-acceptance-persian-gulf.

⁵ Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), Kindle edition, 170.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 250.

⁸ Dwight J. Zimmerman, "21st Century Horse Soldiers - Special Operations Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom," *Defense Media Network*, <https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-4/>.

⁹ Franks and McConnell, *American Soldier*, 260-262.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 161.

¹¹ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 41-42.

¹² Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 95. In this incident, President Bush became frustrated by the uncoordinated planning for Afghanistan. He inquired as to which agency was responsible for the initial operational phases of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. After the principal agencies: the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department, each gave conflicting answers with no one assuming responsibility, the President demanded the chain of command be clarified.

¹³ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 162.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1. President Bush initiated this planning by directly tasking Secretary Rumsfeld to review his Operational Plan (OPLAN) for Iraq.

¹⁵ Nora Bensahel et al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 21. The ESG consisted of representatives from the Joint Staff, the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), the Office of the Vice President (OVP), and the Central Intelligence Agency.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁰ Schmitt, Eric, and Joel Brinkley, "THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: PLANNING; State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq." *The New York Times*, October 19, 2003, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/world/struggle-for-iraq-planning-state-dept-study-foresaw-trouble-now-plaguing-iraq.html>.

²¹ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 29.

²² Department of State. *The Future of Iraq Project - Overview*. (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2003), 16, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf>.

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- ²³ Ibid., 17.
- ²⁴ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 31-32.
- ²⁵ Colin L Powell and Tony Koltz, *It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership*, First Edition (New York: Harper, an Imprint of HarperCollins, 2012), Kindle edition, 266. This philosophy, utilized during the 1991 Gulf War, is often referred to as the Powell Doctrine.
- ²⁶ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 22. Besides encouraging Bush to avoid getting pushed by his cabinet into military action, Powell attempted to demonstrate the viability of utilizing the United Nations to pressure Saddam. At a minimum, he believed that United Nations' action, such as a Security Resolution, were required before an invasion could be conducted.
- ²⁷ Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 191.
- ²⁸ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 7.
- ²⁹ Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, 1st Ed. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 30.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 29.
- ³¹ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 40.
- ³² Ibid., 76.
- ³³ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 166.
- ³⁴ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 61.
- ³⁵ Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), Kindle edition, 90. Woodward portrays both Rumsfeld and Feith as active lobbyists to place Defense as the lead agency and to enable Feith to place postwar planning under the auspices of his office.
- ³⁶ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 24.
- ³⁷ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 91. As noted by observers, Feith's team went out of its way to avoid detailed coordination with the rest of the interagency. In a particularly visible case, Feith refused to participate in a NSC staff meeting on postwar Iraq because he believed the issue could be resolved by Defense.
- ³⁸ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 61.
- ³⁹ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 162.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 161.
- ⁴¹ Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 105. Throughout Garner's time preparing the ORHA for its mission in Iraq, Rumsfeld pressured him to replace State members with individuals from Defense.
- ⁴² Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 165.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 86.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 167.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 166.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 167. In fact, this foundational planning discrepancy was noticed by Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, who made his concern known during congressional testimony in February 2003. When asked his opinion regarding the size of force necessary to secure Iraq following an invasion, Shinseki broke from Rumsfeld and Franks, noting that the job would require several hundred thousand men. Shinseki went on to assert that Iraq's vast size and its ethnic tensions dictated the importance of this large number of troops. Finally, he noted that conducting a deployment of this magnitude would have significant ramifications for the US Army's global commitments elsewhere. These warnings were not heeded by Rumsfeld or the White House.
- ⁴⁷ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 104.
- ⁴⁸ US President, *Iraq Postwar Planning Office*, National Security Presidential Directive 24, January 20, 2003.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 1-2.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 2-3. The government organizations specifically tasked in the presidential directive include the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, and Education, as well as US Agency for International Development, the Office of Management and Budget, and the CIA.
- ⁵¹ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 133.
- ⁵² Ibid., 132.
- ⁵³ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 63.
- ⁵⁴ Franks and McConnell, *American Soldier*, 524.
- ⁵⁵ Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, "THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: PLANNING; State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq." *The New York Times*, October 19, 2003, sec. World.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/world/struggle-for-iraq-planning-state-dept-study-foresaw-trouble-now-plaguing-iraq.html>.

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- ⁵⁶ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 129. For his part, when he learned of this decision, Secretary of State Powell was furious that his agency's work was so easily dismissed by the Pentagon. After a series of heated discussions, Powell succeeded in getting a few members of DOS back onto the ORHA staff, but not Warrick.
- ⁵⁷ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 63.
- ⁵⁸ Jay Garner, "Interview with Jay Garner," interview by FRONTLINE, *FRONTLINE*, October 17, 2006, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html>.
- ⁵⁹ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 50.
- ⁶⁰ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 75. Garner specifically hoped that he would be able to work inside CFLCC's rear areas as they attacked into Iraq. He envisioned bounding his headquarters from Kuwait into Basra, Iraq. From there he hoped to follow CFLCC into Baghdad. Troop number limitations and the fact that McKiernan planned to bypass Basra completely, precluded this strategy.
- ⁶¹ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 531.
- ⁶² Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 67.
- ⁶³ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 116.
- ⁶⁴ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 533-539.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 529.
- ⁶⁶ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 188.
- ⁶⁷ Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 210.
- ⁶⁸ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 155.
- ⁶⁹ Jay Garner, "Interview with Jay Garner." By FRONTLINE staff, *FRONTLINE*, 11 August 2006. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html>.
- ⁷⁰ James Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 16.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁷³ Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), "CPA Order Number 1," *CPA Archive*, May 16, 2003. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/docs/9a%20-%20Coalition%20Provisional%20Authority%20Order%20No%201%20-%20205-16-03.pdf>. The declaration dictated that "full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of 'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), 'Udw Far' (Branch Member). 'Udw Shu`bah (Section Member), and 'Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, "Senior Party Members")," were forbidden from current or future government service and that they could expect to be investigated by the Coalition for criminal activity. Order 1 further stated that all Iraqis "holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba`ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security."
- ⁷⁴ Jay Garner, "Interview with Jay Garner." By FRONTLINE staff, *FRONTLINE*, 11 August 2006. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html>.
- ⁷⁵ Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 59.
- ⁷⁶ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 194.
- ⁷⁷ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 164. Former-members of the Iraqi Army stated during media interviews, "The only thing left for me is to blow myself up in the face of tyrants" and, "All of us will become suicide bombers." According to interviews by Ricks, several previously affable Iraqi citizens expressed fury at military personnel on the ground after the CPA pronouncements.
- ⁷⁸ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 194.
- ⁷⁹ Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 238.
- ⁸⁰ Woodward, *State of Denial*, 191.
- ⁸¹ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 163. General Frank's senior operations officer, Major General Renuart stated in his interview with Ricks, "We were surprised... [it] gave us a challenge."
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, 180.
- ⁸³ Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 242-243. As documented in her memoir, as late as September 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld managed the Bush administration's postwar effort.
- ⁸⁴ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 168.
- ⁸⁵ Bensahel et al., *After Saddam*, 239.
- ⁸⁶ Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 238.
- ⁸⁷ John, J. Ehrenberg et al, eds., *The Iraq Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 182-183.

⁸⁸ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 180. Even members of the CPA understood that without clarity, decision-makers could not be held accountable.

⁸⁹ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3 (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff), 17 January 2017, IV-5. “When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis IAW the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands. They exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally of attached forces in the assigned operational or functional area.”

⁹⁰ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 October 2017), 231.

APPENDIX A

Timeline for the Iraq War

2001

21 November President directs SECDEF to initiate Iraq planning
27 November Plan Order from SECDEF to CENTCOM for Iraq

2002

August NSC Staff's ESG established
August OSP established by Undersecretary Feith
16 October DOD lead approved by President Bush
18 December Brigadier General Hawkins arrives at the Pentagon to run TF IV

2003

9 January Jay Garner contacted by SECDEF office regarding ORHA job
16 January Garner meets with Rumsfeld and Feith at the Pentagon
20 January NSPD 24 signed by President Bush
21-22 February ORHA interagency ROC at NDU campus
16 March Jay Garner arrives in Kuwait
21 March US Ground invasion begins
9 April US forces enter Baghdad
11 April President Bush briefed on CPA concept
16 April CPA created by proclamation of Tommy Franks
21 April Garner arrives in Baghdad from Kuwait
24 April Rumsfeld briefs Garner he will be replaced by Bremer
6 May Bremer announced to the appointment of Presidential Envoy
12 May Bremer arrives in Baghdad
16 May CPA Order No. 1 - "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society" signed
23 May CPA Order No. 2 - "The Dissolution of Entities" signed
7 July General Franks retires
16 July General Abizaid takes over CENTCOM, declares Iraq a guerrilla-type war

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