

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

THE MARSOC MODEL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 2017-18

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Date: 19 April 2018

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Date: 19 April 2018

Executive Summary

Title: The MARSOC Model of Special Operations

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Thesis: MARSOC has created its own unique model of special operations (SO) that places significant focus on enablers, training, and future plans. However, the MARSOC model should be refined further to provide the U.S. military with the most effective approach to SO.

Discussion: As the pace of major combat operations slows and the character of warfare continues to evolve, the focus on using less conventional approaches to military operations, like special operations forces (SOF), increases. In 1987, to address this evolution and a dangerous lack of coordination of SO, the United States created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to synchronize the planning of SO and provide the SOF geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) require to conduct effective SO. In 2006, almost 20 years after the creation of SOCOM, the Marine Corps joined the construct in the form of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). With its late entry into the SOCOM realm, MARSOC took advantage of other services' experience and lessons learned to create its own unique model of SO. As the MARSOC model evolved and matured, significant focus was placed on enablers, training, and future plans. While MARSOC has achieved noteworthy success in these areas, MARSOC should continue to improve their model by refining these areas, and the MARSOC model and the best practices it generates should be considered for further refinement or adoption across SOCOM to provide the U.S. military with the most effective approach to SO.

Conclusion: Within the U.S. military, the Marine Corps has a unique history and ethos, operational mission sets and structure, and plans for the future. Being composed of Marines, it is no surprise that MARSOC formed a model of SO that benefits from these unique characteristics. The research shows that the MARSOC model of SO has achieved noteworthy success and warrants consideration by all elements of SOCOM to improve the overall effectiveness of the SOCOM construct and increase the strength of the United States' military instrument of national power. However, there are a number of ways the MARSOC model can and should be refined further, and lessons-learned and best practices that result should be considered by other SOCOM elements for possible implementation. Now over 30 years on, SOCOM should conduct a thorough study of its history and evolution to identify areas where lessons-learned can be implemented across the entire SOCOM enterprise. By examining the history and evolution of the MARSOC model of SO, especially the focus it places on enablers, training, and future plans, SOCOM and the national defense of the United States may derive specific benefit from the experience and example of MARSOC.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

My career and personal life have been shaped by many things, including my interactions with the United States Marine Corps. This thesis has its roots in such an interaction – a professional relationship that began in 2005 and the friendship that formed out of it contributed significantly to my decision to write on MARSOC. Since, I have regularly interacted with the Marine Corps in a number of different ways for a variety of reasons. More recently, a previous assignment found me participating in MARSOC training as role player and consultant. Building on my observations there and my collective experience with the Marine Corps, I knew my interest in the MARSOC mission would make writing about it a pleasure. My only hope is that the work I've done contributes to the dialogue about the manner in which MARSOC conducts special operations and how it can continue to improve.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of countless people, most of whom are Marines. Special thanks go to my faculty advisor, Dr. Bradford Wineman. LtCol Ben Pappas and Dr. Paul Gelpi also deserve special thanks for their guidance and participation in my panel.

Two MARSOC Marines, a senior enlisted Marine and a team leader, made significant, continuous contributions to this work, and I owe much to them for their input, guidance, and expertise. A number of other MARSOC Marines made significant contributions and donated large portions of their time to this work, including general and field-grade officers, enlisted Marines, and headquarters and command personnel.

Introduction

Special Operations (SO) encompass the use of relatively small numbers of soldiers for direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. Special operations require units with combinations of specially trained personnel, equipment, and tactics that may exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. Special operations are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations.¹ In 1987, the U.S. created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to provide the functional solution to a changing problem set. In 2006, the Marine Corps joined SOCOM in the form of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

With its late entry into the SOCOM realm, MARSOC took advantage of the experience of other services already present in SOCOM and lessons learned to create its own unique model of SO. The current MARSOC model of SO places significant focus on enablers, training, and future plans. This paper argues that MARSOC has achieved noteworthy success in these areas. However, the MARSOC model should be refined further by improving upon these areas, and best practices should be considered for further refinement or adoption across SOCOM to provide the U.S. military with the most effective approach to SO.

The paper utilizes historical research, examination of doctrine and publications, and interviews with subject matter experts. While highlighting unique aspects of MARSOC, nothing should be interpreted as discounting another service's unique contributions to SOCOM.

History

Overview of Special Operations in the U.S. Military and the Creation of SOCOM

Special operations, specifically within the U.S. military, enjoy a unique history and perception. It can be argued that SO-like forces have existed in the U.S. military since the creation of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) for the specific purpose of conducting amphibious operations during the Revolutionary War. Regardless of when and how SOF were created within the U.S. military, as approaches to the military instrument of national power have evolved over time, additional focus has been placed on SO to achieve military objectives.

Though SOCOM now represents a competent and respected contributor to military instrument of national power, the current state of SO within the U.S. military owes much to its history. The failed rescue attempt of American hostages being held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran in 1980, known as “Desert One,”² culminated a period of decline for SO within the U.S. military that had begun in the post-Vietnam era.³ Thereafter, a desire for reform developed within U.S. lawmakers.

In April of 1987, after much debate and significant efforts on behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of October 1986. Nunn-Cohen established a unified combatant command led by a four-star general over all U.S. SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and a new Major Force Program to protect SOF funding. President Reagan then approved the establishment of U.S. SOCOM to serve as the functional solution to a changing problem set.⁴ Initial service contributions to SOCOM included Navy SEALs (1987); Army Special Forces, Rangers, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (1989); Air

Force Special Operations wings and squadrons (1990). Each service brought with it unique capabilities, approaches to operations, and heritage.

As the congressionally mandated, unified combatant command responsible for all Department of Defense (DoD) SOF, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps contribute forces to SOCOM for the purpose of conducting SO missions.⁵

The SO missions SOCOM carries out aim to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of general purpose forces (GPF) would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. To overcome these risks, SOF must directly address the sources of friction using qualities that result from the distribution of the attributes of SOF personnel.⁶

More specifically per SOCOM, there are five “SOF Truths” that govern SO. Humans are more important than hardware, quality is better than quantity, SOF cannot be mass-produced, competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies, and most special operations require non-SOF assistance.⁷

MARSOC

Specific to MARSOC, a number of theories exist as to why Marines were not part of the initial SOCOM force structure. These theories include that the commandant at the time did not want to relinquish control of Marines to another service’s commander, members of congress that were former Marines wanted to protect continued Marine Corps autonomy, and the domains of land (Army), air, (Air Force), and sea (Navy) were already covered. Additionally, the Marine Corps believed that Force Reconnaissance (Force Recon) Marines possessed the same SO abilities as their sister services’ SOF and were better utilized supporting Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) in the form of Special Operations Capable (SOC) elements attached to a MEU.⁸ Regardless of the reasoning, it was not until 2002 that the Commandant of the Marine Corps

presented plans to bring Marine Corps elements into SOCOM. Ultimately, on February 24, 2006, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, became the Marine Corps component of SOCOM.

Though MARSOC was created as a new, unique entity within the Marine Corps to support SOCOM-directed SO missions, SO have a deep heritage of their own within the Marine Corps. Specifically, there are three main units to consider when discussing the unique lineage of MARSOC – Marine Raiders, Force Recon, and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU).⁹ MARSOC places great emphasis on its heritage. While continuing to acknowledge the importance of its Force Recon and FMTU origins, MARSOC officially adopted the Raider heritage in 2015, thereby codifying it in their history and ethos.¹⁰

Since 2006, MARSOC has formed its own unique model of SO. Specifically, the MARSOC model places significant emphasis on its enablers, training, and future plans.

The MARSOC Model of Special Operations

Enablers

MARSOC is unique from other SOCOM elements in the sense that none of its individual components existed within the Marine Corps prior to the creation of MARSOC for the purpose of dedicating forces to SOCOM.¹¹ Taking advantage of its late entry to SOCOM, MARSOC followed a model similar to that of USASOC by creating new, unique military occupational specialty codes (MOSes) for both the officer and enlisted corps.¹² While USASOC has its “18X” and “18A” MOS series, which includes special operations enlisted and officer personnel, in 2011 and 2014, the Marine Corps created the 0372 and 0370 MOSes for enlisted and officer personnel respectively. These Marines, known as Critical Skills Operators (CSOs) – enlisted – and Special

Operations Officers (SOOs) – officers – carry out SOF core activities on behalf of combatant commanders.”¹³

While CSOs and SOOs represent the operational core of MARSOC, the capabilities of MARSOC as well as those of all SOCOM components are largely dependent upon enablers – support personnel. To this end, the Marine Corps created the 8071 MOS for Special Operations Capable Specialists (SOCS). Enlisted specialists in fires, communications, geospatial and signals intelligence, counterintelligence/human intelligence, and all-source intelligence as well as multi-purpose canine handlers may apply for assessment and selection to become a SOCS. Marines selected to become a SOCS attend the SOF Training Course (STC),¹⁴ Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE), and advanced SOF-specific MOS training.¹⁵ SOCS are present at the team, company, and battalion levels and are assigned to MARSOC for five-year tours and are eligible to participate in for additional opportunities within the SO community.¹⁶ Upon completion of a tour in MARSOC, SOCS leave the SOCOM construct and rotate back to GPF of the Marine Corps. In doing so, SOCS take with them the knowledge, skills, and abilities they gained while serving within MARSOC and under SOCOM.

Additionally, MARSOC includes enablers in the form of combat support specialists (CSS). While SOCS are sourced only from the enlisted ranks, CSS can be either enlisted Marines or officers. CSS “provide intrinsic combat service support and logistics capabilities including administrative, fiscal, medical, engineer, ammunition and supply.”¹⁷ CSS receive training in “core skills for joint and interagency work as well as enhanced SOF combat skills training to enable successful integration and survivability in special operations environments.”¹⁸ CSS are eligible to support MARSOC operations on a temporary, as-needed basis; however, they maintain their primary MOS and continue to operate under the GPF of the Marine Corps when

not supporting MARSOC operations. Again, similar to the SOCS construct, this model allows CSS Marines to integrate with MARSOC elements conducting SO and then return the training and skills they received to the GPF upon rotation back.

The MARSOC approach to the operator/enabler relationship, from the organizational structure of MARSOC to the integration of enablers and operators prior to deployment, at the team level to the battalion level, provides MARSOC with capabilities that are more difficult for other SOF components to replicate, especially in the same amount of time. As a current Marine in a headquarters human resources position stated, “MARSOC deploys tailormade, fully independent, cohesive units that are capable of F3EAD without additional external support.”¹⁹ In short, we deploy with our own fires, intel, EOD, etc. that are organic to MARSOC and complete training as a cohesive unit. Other SOF components usually ‘bolt on’ just before deployment or they request that support once in theater.”²⁰

By ensuring operators and enablers train and deploy together to the lowest organizational level, this emphasis provides MARSOC with capabilities and agility that other service components do not currently enjoy. However, for CSO and SOO operators to be most effective in carrying out SO core activities, they require sufficient support of SOCS and CSS. Currently, the generally held belief is that the ideal ratio of support Marines (SOCS/CSS) to operators (CSO/SOO) should be 3:1. Unfortunately, difficulty in recruiting Marines that are both interested in MARSOC and can also pass the rigorous assessment and selection process results in a less-than-ideal current ratio of 2:1.²¹

Intelligence Support

The activities, operations, and accomplishments of U.S. SOF, especially since 9/11, are due in large part to the intelligence process. Since 2001, the U.S. Government has adapted and

evolved its pursuit of enemies as well as its ability to work in concert with the U.S. intelligence community (IC). In concert with IC agencies, SOCOM has developed its intelligence capabilities to provide networked support to operations around the globe.²² The MARSOC model continues these successes through the intelligence functions of its SOCS Marines.

For example, the MARSOC model of SO includes its own organic intelligence structure, which includes a Marine Special Operations Intelligence Battalion that provides fully integrated, task-organized all source (open source, geospatial, CI/HUMINT, weather, and SIGINT) operational intelligence teams to the Marine Special Operations Team, Company, and Battalion.²³ To support this emphasis on intelligence, MARSOC intelligence operators are recruited and selected, assigned for five years, receive formal SOF intelligence training at the MARSOC Multi-Discipline Intelligence Operators Course (MDIOC),²⁴ and receive the SOCS MOS of 8071.²⁵

This investment in SOF-specific intelligence has resulted in arguably the best organic intelligence force structure of HUMINT collectors, SIGINT collectors, geospatial intelligence specialists, all-source fusion analysts, and staff in all of SOCOM. The Marine Corps builds on this success by providing SIGINT and CI/HUMINT capability to deployed MARSOC elements down to team level.²⁶

Training

Training is another important area of the MARSOC model that warrants discussion as well as critical examination by all of SOCOM. As the last entry to the SOCOM enterprise, MARSOC took advantage of existing constructs, from both SO and GPF communities, as well as the addition of its own new requirements to create its training program. Required of both CSOs and SOOs, the individual training course (ITC) consists of five (for enlisted) or six (for officers)

phases over the course of 36-40 weeks. Notably, the ITC includes many of the aspects of the Special Forces Qualification Course and Marine Corps Force Recon training.²⁷ The current training program includes courses of instruction on all of the SO core activities,²⁸ and MARSOC continues to make significant progress by increasing the integration of interagency personnel and refinement of courses of instruction to better support MARSOC operations.²⁹ MARSOC also places a notable focus on assessment and selection. Like AFSOC, and true to one of the Marine Corps' mottos of "Every Marine is a rifleman," MARSOC accepts applicants only from the existing corps of enlisted and officer personnel. This approach further supports an assertion found within MARSOF Publication 1 that states, "Special Operations are what we do, Marines are who we are."³⁰ Conversely, both NSW and AFSOC allow for "street-to-fleet" applicants, meaning a civilian may apply for a position within NSW and USASOC without any previous military experience.³¹ This practice allows individuals to join the SO community without any previous background in military operations or culture.

With respect to enablers, MARSOC requires all SOCS to attend the Special Operations Training Course (STC), which trains SOCS in the warfighting skills necessary to support MARSOC units in diverse, distributed environments.³² To support how they will deploy, the MARSOC model of SO includes operators training together with SOCS for a majority of their collective training (see Appendix A). And, as discussed, CSS Marines receive training in core skills to support joint and interagency operations and enhanced SOF combat skills training to enable successful integration and survivability in SO environments.

The MARSOC model of training represents important progress in the field of SOF training that should be further refined and evaluated for implementation by SOCOM as a whole.

However, additional improvements to the SOCOM training construct should be considered to promote interoperability, reduce inter-service rivalries, and enhance effectiveness of SOF.

Future Plans

MARSOC history and ethos help shape its current form, and current MARSOC operations help define its model of SO. However, MARSOC is also undertaking efforts to plan in a way that best prepares it for the conflicts of the future. Planning for future conflicts is happening across the entire U.S. military, within the Marine Corps as a whole, and between MARSOC and SOCOM. In 2011, the Joint Staff released the “Decade of War” to help ensure the U.S. military learned from the lessons of the previous ten years of warfighting. “Decade of War” identified integration between SOF and GPF as one of the most important themes of the United States’ wartime experiences since 2001.³³ With this in mind, in 2015, MARSOC asked an external, non-profit research and analysis organization “to analyze and generate actionable recommendations to improve the integration of SOF and forward-deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).”³⁴ The study found that there are numerous drivers for and obstacles to SOF/GPF integration and made a number of recommendations for the Marine Corps to address to improve this integration. Building from there, in September of 2016, the Marine Corps released its “MCOC,” or Marine Corps Operating Concept. In the MCOC, the Marine Corps identified integration of MAGTF/SOF capabilities as a key step in accomplishing the critical tasks facing the Marine Corps. Specifically, the Marine Corps stated: “To enhance MAGTF-SOF integration, interoperability and interdependence (I-3), we will continue to work with the U.S. Special Operations Command to solve common challenges.”³⁵

The Marine Corps is undertaking additional efforts to advance this concept. Specifically, in July of 2017, the Marine Corps and SOCOM together released a publication entitled the

Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability, or I3 for short. I3 provides a framework to improve institutional and operational cooperation in an effort to enhance the manner in which the two organizations work together. A summary of the formal I3 agreement between the Marine Corps and SOCOM can be found in Appendix B.

I3 provides the Marine Corps and SOCOM with unique recommendations that allow the forces to better work together and advance the collective mission of national defense. While USASOC has advanced a similar concept, no other SOCOM element has taken such detailed and deliberate steps in advancing an I3-type concept.³⁶

The Marine Corps continues to build on these concepts internally as well. Shortly before the release of the I3 document, in June of 2017, the Marine Corps published its Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-05 – the Marine Corps accompaniment to JP 3-05 that addresses joint special operations. In MCWP 3-05, an entire chapter is devoted to MARSOC and MAGTF interoperability and interdependence.³⁷

Improving the Model

Enablers

As the senior enlisted officer of a MARSOC support battalion said, “It only takes a few personnel on the ground to finish a target, but it takes dozens of support personnel behind the scenes to find, fix, and support the finishing of a target...or any other SOF core activity for that matter.”³⁸

Unfortunately, as mentioned, an effective ratio of enablers to operators does not exist. To address issues associated with the proper enabler to operator support ratio and improve upon the current operator/enabler construct in general, MARSOC should conduct a formal study to determine a most effective ratio of CSOs and SOOs to SOCS and CSS Marines. Results should

be supported and codified as appropriate within Marine Corps doctrine. The study should also focus on how best to capitalize upon the experience and lessons learned of SOCS and CSS when they rotate back to the GPF of the Marine Corps, possibly by recommended specific roles for such Marines upon return to the GPF of the Marine Corps.

Even though operationally MARSOC has enjoyed great success with respect to the SOCS/CSS construct, currently no career path design exists to ensure maximum benefit of a SOCS or CSS Marine's SOCOM service. Therefore, to best support and properly recognize the contributions of SOCS and CSS, MARSOC should work with the Marine Corps to develop career paths for each that properly support their work while also incentivizing their service. Such an effort would necessarily include increased emphasis on the recruiting of SOCS and CSS and would likely result in greater interest in and understanding of the MARSOC mission from within the Marine Corps at large.

One possible way to incentivize service as either a SOCS or CSS Marine would be by making them special duty assignment (SDA) B-billets. B-billets consist of any assignment outside of a Marine's primary MOS. However, only five B-billets are currently considered an SDA, and service as a MARSOC support Marine is not one.³⁹ Successful service in an SDA demonstrates a Marine's ability to excel in an area where he or she is not a subject-matter expert and indicates to promotion boards that the Marine is comfortable with being uncomfortable. Successfully serving in an SDA also signals to promotion boards that the Marine possesses the type of diverse leadership qualities and substantive knowledge that are sought in Marines. SOCS and CSS Marines in MARSOC consistently perform duties outside of their normal MOS duties. In many cases, in part due to the limited number of enablers allowed to deploy with an Marine Special Operations Company (MSOC), support Marines are tasked with performing additional

MOS-specific duties and responsibilities outside of their primary MOS. Formally recognizing the support of enablers with thoughtful career paths and enhanced promotion potential would almost certainly reduce the previously referenced difficulties in recruiting that have resulted in a less-than-optimal enabler to operator ratio.

As such, MARSOC could be used to further develop the human resources of the Marine Corps. As mentioned, MARSOC has created a system that allows SOCS to serve five-year tours with MARSOC and then rotate back to the GPF of the Marine Corps. The system also allows CSS Marines to serve with MARSOC as needed. In the process, SOCS and CSS Marines receive additional, specialized training and a better understanding of SO and the importance of effective interaction between SOF and the GPF of the U.S. military. SOCS and CSS Marines take this experience back with them to the Marine Corps' GPF, enhancing capabilities of the GPF and serving as important ambassadors for SOF. This process supports I3-type concepts, enhances the overall effectiveness of the Marine Corps by providing participating Marines with skills and training they otherwise would have never received, and helps recruit for MARSOC by serving as a form of publicity to the Marine Corps' GPF. Further, because of the nature of many of the MARSOC missions, MARSOC Marines gain an understanding of complex problem sets, locations, and cultures that other Marines do not.

As the smallest service with one of the most complex mission sets, the Marine Corps must adapt quickly to remain competitive. As such, the Marine Corps should consider a research and development (R&D) concept for MARSOC that extends beyond personnel. With a command and task organization that lends itself well to adaptability, the Marine Corps should exploit these facts by testing concepts, equipment, mission sets, etc. using MARSOC as the vehicle for proof of concept. Lessons learned from such an approach could then be incorporated

into the GPF of the Marine Corps as appropriate. The lessons learned that originate in and are proven effective by MARSOC should be freely shared with the GPF of the Marine Corps. Should the Marine Corps' GPF need MARSOC to test a concept, equipment, mission, etc., the GPF should fund the endeavor.

Another way to capitalize on the success of the MARSOC enabler model is organizationally. Specifically, enablers should be fully integrated, ideally at the O-5 (LtCol or battalion) command level. This would eliminate the latent effect of bureaucratic desynchronization that the current model of separate commands causes. In the proposed integrated model, command requirements in administration, manpower, training, funding, would be synchronized across operators and enablers. This structure would also support a more integrated culture, help eliminate misconceptions and cultural bias, as well as mirror how MARSOC actually deploys – fully integrated companies. Specifically, the integrated task organization used for deployments that allows MARSOC to deploy companies scaled-to-mission requirement would be maintained all the way to the battalion level.

Such an organizational restructuring would further exploit the benefits of the current MARSOC approach to the enabler/operator relationship. However, it also lends itself to additional organizational refinement to improve efficiency and capabilities. For example, the current construct includes 1st Marine Raider Battalion (MRB) and 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion (MRSB) on the West Coast, based out of Camp Pendleton. Both 2nd and 3rd MRB and MRSB are based on the East Coast out of Camp LeJeune, NC. Should operators and enablers be integrated through the battalion level, two integrated battalions under a regimental command, each led by a colonel, could be formed on the West Coast and one regiment with four battalions on the East Coast. Thus, two-fully integrated regimental task forces would be formed, each with

its own collocated regimental command, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. Such a construct would provide MARSOC with improved responsiveness, better coordination, enhanced integration, and proper task-organized resources.

Using the MARSOC example as point of reference and a type of proof of concept, other SOCOM components should consider adopting approaches similar to those already proven effective within MARSOC, such as the SOCS/CSS rotational model. Additionally, should MARSOC explore any of the recommendations herein regarding using MARSOC to develop personnel or serve as a proof of concept for equipment, tactics, etc., SOCOM and individual SOCOM components should consider adopting those that prove beneficial.⁴⁰

Intelligence Support

While the MARSOC model has made great strides in improving its organic intelligence capabilities, the critical role of intelligence in SO means additional progress should be sought. To do so, a required basic SOF intelligence course, similar to the MARSOC MDIOC, should be created at an integrated SOF training facility (discussed later). To better support joint operations, SOF intelligence personnel could be trained in the skills necessary to provide intelligence support to any deployed SOF component, not just their respective branch of service. Further, creating such a course should include basic SOF training requirements and standardization of assessment and selection processes similar to those in use by MARSOC for its SOCS and CSS Marines. Doing so would further improve the MARSOC model through interaction with and contributions from other SOCOM elements and also mean all SOF intelligence personnel could properly support joint SOCOM operations. Such a course would provide SOF intelligence personnel with the basic combat skills needed to operate effectively in SO environments.

Training

Currently, service-specific SOCOM components train separately using SOCOM-provided requirements. Not only does this lend itself to multiple interpretations of the same material, it does not support the reality of SOCOM operations in the field. Oftentimes the largest operations carried out by SOCOM elements are truly joint in nature, involving multiple SOCOM components. However, the units involved may have never trained together, thus efforts should be undertaken to eliminate these types of situations by ensuring uniformity of at least basic SOF training.

To help eliminate lack of training uniformity and insufficient shared knowledge that contribute to failed operations like Desert One, SOCOM should seek to properly balance differences and similarities of individual SOCOM elements related to training. Specifically, SOCOM should consider creating a SOCOM-wide, collocated basic training program similar to the design of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).⁴¹ At FLETC, over 90 federal law enforcement agencies collaborate to establish standardized curriculum in support of all of the basic duties and responsibilities of federal law enforcement officers (LEO) – the federal LEO version of core activities. Instructors at the FLETC are made up of “cadre” (or permanent FLETC instructors that serve as continuity, program managers, and curriculum development process owners), “detailees” (or employees of participating federal law enforcement agencies that serve in positions as temporary FLETC instructors for a finite period of time, usually two to three years, bringing unique perspective and current experience from their sending agency), and rehired, former federal LEOs (bringing with them experience, wisdom, and history). This diverse workforce representation helps FLETC ensure proper consideration of varying, and often dissenting, perspectives while also combining fresh ideas from each rotation of detailee staff with the institutional knowledge that the continuity of cadre staff provides. Balancing this

collective approach while preserving uniqueness and autonomy, almost every agency represented at FLETC sends its students to agency-specific add-on training after completion of FLETC basic training, most of which is located elsewhere based on where that particular agency is headquartered. This design ensures a basic understanding and competency in the core tasks associated with being a federal LEO while preserving the individuality of each agency and their associated unique training requirements. Further, the intermingled, collocated FLETC construct encourages relationship building, helps eliminate misconceptions based on inadequate understanding of varying cultures and histories, and promotes collaboration in a truly “joint” manner.

Further, as discussed earlier related specifically to MARSOC, each SOCOM component benefits from its own unique heritage. However, currently no formal SOCOM heritage exists. Such a training center could be used to help create and promote a stronger sense of unity effort across SOCOM by providing educational courses focused on the unique history and ethos of individual SOCOM elements and SOCOM as a whole. Doing so would accentuate the strengthens associated with the individual component’s identity, creates a sense of belonging and comradery, and can be used as an historical reference point for current operations and future plans. Such an approach would encourage a collaborative approach to SOCOM missions and reduce unnecessary and oftentimes counterproductive inter-service rivalry. Additionally, understanding SOCOM’s history would help avoid mistakes of the past and encourage building on previous SO successes.

As discussed, individual SOCOM elements have varying assessment and selection processes. A coordinated, collaborative approach to training should also address these assessment and selection differences. Specifically, basic minimum performance and service

requirements should be agreed upon by all SOCOM components and enforced as prerequisites for attending the joint training center – to include whether or not prior service in a GPF is mandatory. To properly serve the unique needs of each SOCOM element, additional performance and service requirements could be enforced during each individual component's add-on training.

Creating such a training center would ensure standardization of basic training, a commonality of skillsets, create a comradery that would serve to improve inter-service relationships, dispel misconceptions, increase SOCOM components' interoperability, and improve operational effectiveness – just to name a few. Currently much of SOF add-on or more specialized training takes place at the Joint Special Operations University located at MacDill Air Force Base Florida. SOCOM could use this location and existing infrastructure to begin building a FLETC-type concept. Such a design would improve the quality and efficiency of SOF training and would likely save SOCOM significant amounts of money that could possibly be reprogrammed to support areas in need of funding or allow SOCOM to take on missions that were previously unfeasible.

Should such an approach prove unfeasible for SOCOM as a whole, MARSOC could further improve upon their service-specific model of SOF training by applying I3-type concepts to training. Specifically, MARSOC should consider a partnership between the Marine Raider Training Center (the Marine Corps entity responsible for MARSOC assessment, selection, and training)⁴² and the Expeditionary Operations Training Groups (the Marine Corps entities responsible for providing special skills training to Marine Expeditionary Units, or MEUs, of the Marine Corps' GPF).⁴³ While the GPF of the Marine Corps should still own the majority of the MEU pre-deployment training, integrating MARSOC personnel and expertise into the more

SOF-like special skills training and developing training modules would increase MEU familiarity and interoperability with SOF. Such an organization might also help establish and maintain more personal ties between MARSOC and Marines of the GPF, which would further enhance I3-type concepts as both communities continue in their careers.

Future Plans

As discussed, much progress in support of I3 concepts has been made and continues to be sought. However, as the smallest and newest member of SOCOM and as the SOF component of a service that often struggles to maintain relevancy as it relates to the other more domain-specific services, MARSOC faces challenges that other SOCOM components do not. This often manifests itself in the form of taking on a disproportionately large number of missions as it relates to the size of MARSOC when compared to other SOCOM elements. Additional progress as it relates to best use of all available resources can and should occur to maximize the effectiveness of the MARSOC model, ensure proper cooperation between SOF and GPF, and to improve U.S. national defense capabilities.

To this end, MARSOC should balance its unique nature and its similarities to other SOCOM elements and the Marine Corps' GPF through the types of missions it pursues and ultimately carries out. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and its history of involvement in so called "small wars" mean the Marine Corps' GPF shares a number of similarities with its SOF component – MARSOC. While these shared attributes support a number of the concepts presented in I3, it does not allow for the level of unique identity within the Marine Corps that other SOF components possess as it relates to their respective parent branch's GPF. As detailed when discussing the history and origins of MARSOC, much of its original force structure and its current operations can be attributed to its Force Recon roots. The

wholesale absorption of Force Recon and other “special operations–capable” Marine units into MARSOC, combined with the predilection of SOCOM to assign MARSOC units so-called “low end” SOF missions results in a situation in which MARSOC and the GPF of the Marine Corps retain significant overlap in mission competencies. Further, the original absorption of existing Marine units and the relatively short history of MARSOC have allowed little time for the MARSOC and the GPF of the Marine Corps to “drift apart.”⁴⁴ The graphic in Appendix C illustrates this situation for the Marine Corps as well as other SOCOM components.⁴⁵

Because of this overlap in mission sets, MARSOC should undertake efforts to accentuate their strengths in mission sets that are farther on the spectrum from those carried out by the Marine Corps’ GPF. This can be done by lobbying the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) for the assignment of such missions.⁴⁶ Specifically, MARSOC should seek to carry out more missions to the left of the spectrum of operations, meaning those that involve a greater degree of SOF-unique competencies. Working with and through the TSOCs, MARSOC should consider more foreign internal defense (FID – an area in which MARSOC already excels and that would allow it to enhance partnerships with the interagency community and especially the Department of State), unconventional warfare (UW), and counterterrorism missions. Doing so would reduce unnecessary and detrimental mission set competition between MARSOC and the GPF of the Marine Corps that often presents itself in the form of pursuing similar operational objectives in tactically distinct ways, many times with negative operational effects. Efforts to eliminate this overlap of mission sets and the corresponding redundancy would actually increase the complimentary nature of the MARSOC/Marine Corps’ GPF interaction and help make the I3 concept more impactful and agility as opposed to its currently somewhat redundant form.⁴⁷

As the Marine Corps' GPF/MARSOC relationship exists now, integration in such areas as crisis response, a strength of both the Marine Corps' GPF and MARSOC, manifests itself in an overlap that can result in more competition than integration.⁴⁸ Currently, the MARSOC focus on missions that are similar to those that are historical strength of the Marine Corps' GPF results in unnecessary intra-service rivalry and friction. In a number of interviews conducted for this research, Marines from the GPF and specifically the Force Recon community cited aspects of this intra-service rivalry that result in avoidable and unproductive angst between the GPF of the Marine Corps and MARSOC. By encouraging MARSOC to focus on mission sets that are not historically strengths of the GPF of the Marine Corps, the GPF of the Marine Corps would face less competition in mission sets on which its history and ethos were built and its current operations depend. Such a clear delineation of responsibilities would also help preserve resources and maintain readiness of both SOF and GPF by not redundantly tasking either and by better defining expectations of each.

As it relates to the SOCOM enterprise as a whole, further refinement of the MARSOC model should also focus on developing a more well-defined niche and the identity it brings with it, something other SOCOM components already enjoy. Interestingly, in seeking to better define itself within SOCOM by distancing itself from the GPF of the Marine Corps, MARSOC would help share the burden of the types of SOF-specific missions that overtax other SOCOM elements. More clearly defined mission sets, improved complimentary nature of SOF/GPF, and a unique identity would properly demonstrate the ideal character of MARSOC and prevent floating from random mission to random mission as the U.S.'s involvement in conflicts changes over time.

Applying a model similar to that suggested for capitalizing on the contributions of SOCS and CSS Marines, MARSOC could further evolve and contribute to the GPF of the Marine Corps through an exchange program with its senior CSO and SOO Marines by transferring them back to the GPF of the Marine Corps for a two- to three-year tour within a division-sized element or larger as operations officers or operations chiefs. This practice would share the knowledge and experience of experienced, senior MARSOC operators with the GPF of the Marine Corps while also providing CSO and SOO Marines a relevant and necessary understanding of the Marine Corps' current task organization, priorities, and challenges.

The GPF of the Marine Corps could also make significant contributions to MARSOC. The Marine Corps task-organizes into a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or MAGTF. The MAGTF consists of four core elements – a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element. Currently, MARSOC task-organizes in the same manner with the exception of an aviation combat element. To provide SOCOM with an accurate and ideal representation of Marine Corps capabilities, MARSOC should endeavor to obtain a dedicated aviation element.⁴⁹ The addition of an aviation element would no doubt involve a huge commitment on behalf of the Marine Corps and require judicious allocation of aviation resources. However, at a minimum, a rotational or as-needed ad hoc approach similar to that used with SOCS and CSS Marines should be considered. Such an approach would ensure SOCOM benefits from a MARSOC contribution that includes dedicated aviation resources while also ensuring scarce aviation resources (personnel and equipment) are available to MARSOC when needed and rotate back to the GPF of the Marine Corps when they are not.

The MARSOC model of SO places noteworthy focus on future plans, especially I3-type concepts. However, as it exists now, SOCOM interacts on varying levels with the service

components' GPF on matters of I3. Specifically, only MARSOC and, to a lesser degree, USASOC, have adopted I3-type concepts. NSW and AFSOF have yet to take similar steps. This lack of uniformity and coordination does not support the joint construct for which SOCOM was created, and resulting models that vary from component to component do not support effective joint operations in the field or interchangeability of SOCOM elements. Without coordinating I3-type concepts across SOCOM elements, the risk exists that certain traditionally GPF competencies or SOF core activities could be unintentionally neglected by the U.S. military and atrophy. To address this, efforts should be undertaken to create coordinated I3-type concepts with all service components. Doing so would properly balance the collective SOF components' contributions to national defense with the contributions of the combined GPF of the U.S. military while ensuring a coordinated effort across SOCOM.

The U.S. will inevitably be involved in more large-scale combat operations in the future (possibly the very near future). However, as large-scale combat operations are at a relatively low point in the history of SOCOM, I3 coordination should happen now to ensure the military's readiness when large-scale combat operations necessitate more effective and better coordinated SOF/GPF operations. Once coordinated at the SOCOM-level across all components, one way in which SOCOM could institutionalize these efforts and the concept would be by creating a type of exchange program that would require the embedding of inter-component personnel from SOCOM within each component's headquarters element. These personnel could share best practices, communicate across services quickly, bring unique accesses and information conduits, and serve as liaison-type positions for their respective component.

Conclusion

Within the U.S. military, the Marine Corps has a unique history and ethos, operational mission sets and structure, and plans for the future. Being composed of Marines, it is no surprise that MARSOC formed a model of SO that benefits from these unique characteristics. The research shows that the MARSOC model of SO has achieved noteworthy success and warrants consideration by all elements of SOCOM to improve the overall effectiveness of the SOCOM construct and increase the strength of the United States' military instrument of national power. However, there are a number of ways the MARSOC model can and should be refined further, and lessons-learned and best practices that result should be considered by other SOCOM elements for possible implementation. Now over 30 years on, SOCOM should conduct a thorough study of its history and evolution to identify areas where lessons-learned can be implemented across the entire SOCOM enterprise. By examining the history and evolution of the MARSOC model of SO, especially the focus it places on enablers, training, and future plans, SOCOM and the national defense of the United States may derive specific benefit from the experience and example of MARSOC.

¹ Army Command and General Staff College, "Introduction to Special Operations," in *SOF Reference Manual*, (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army, 2000), accessed March 31, 2018, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1/SOFREF_Ch1.htm.

² The name Desert One was given to the location in the Iranian desert that was to be used as a link-up and refueling site. Operation Eagle Claw was the overarching operation.

³ U.S. Special Operations Command History and Research Office, *United States Special Operations Command History*, (MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. SOCOM, 2008), p 5.

⁴ The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 made sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense. It reworked the command structure of the United States military and increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Goldwater-Nichols streamlined the military chain of command, bypassing the service chiefs, who were assigned to an advisory role to the President and the Secretary of Defense as well as given the responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

⁵ As outlined, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and accompanying Defense Authorization Act of 1987 made a number of changes to the Department of Defense, including the creation of SOCOM.

⁶ Robert G. Spulak, Jr., "A Theory of Special Operations – The Origins, Qualities, and Use of SOF," in *Joint Special Operations University Report*, (Hurlbert Field, FL: October 2007), p 41.

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- ⁷ U.S. SOCOM Office of Communications, *2018 Fact Book – United States Special Operations Command*, (Tampa, FL: U.S. SOCOM, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2018%20Fact%20Book.pdf>, p 57.
- ⁸ John P. Piedmont, *DET ONE: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, 2003-2006*, (Washington, DC: USMC, 2010), pp 1-29; Fred Pushies, *MARSOC: U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command*, (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2011), pp 17-18.
- ⁹ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, “MARSOC Heritage,” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed January 14, 2018, <http://www.marsoc.Marines.mil/About/Heritage/>.
- ¹⁰ U.S. Marine Corps, *0372/0370 – MARSOC By the Numbers*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/50911f6ce4b08a6452e3cde0/t/59a4cb7b9f8dce047340be6b/1503972232351/marsoc+by+the+numbers+2017.pdf>.
- ¹¹ Fred Pushies, *MARSOC: U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command*, (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2011), p 18.
- ¹² U.S. Marine Corps, *0372/0370 – MARSOC By the Numbers*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/50911f6ce4b08a6452e3cde0/t/59a4cb7b9f8dce047340be6b/1503972232351/marsoc+by+the+numbers+2017.pdf>.
- ¹³ U.S. SOCOM Office of Communications, *2018 Fact Book – United States Special Operations Command*, (Tampa, FL: U.S. SOCOM, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2018%20Fact%20Book.pdf>, p32.
- ¹⁴ The STC was created to provide SOCS and CSS with common warfighting skills and to substantiate the designation of “special operations capable.” Matt Lyman, “The first Special Operations Training Course helps close the gap between MARSOC critical skills operators and special combat support operators” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.marsoc.Marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/513714/the-first-special-operations-training-course-helps-close-the-gap-between-marsoc/>.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Marine Corps Force Special Operations Command, “Special Operations Capable Specialists,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/50911f6ce4b08a6452e3cde0/t/59a489bce45a7c218ce3d0f7/1503955393286/SOCS_Brochure_2017-FINAL-072817_web.pdf.
- ¹⁶ U.S. Marine Corps Force Special Operations Command, “Special Operations Capabilities Specialist,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <https://marsoc.com/socs-details>.
- ¹⁷ U.S. SOCOM Office of Communications, *2018 Fact Book – United States Special Operations Command*, (Tampa, FL: U.S. SOCOM, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2018%20Fact%20Book.pdf>, p32.
- ¹⁸ U.S. Marine Corps Force Special Operations Command, “Combat Service Support,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <https://marsoc.com/css-details>.
- ¹⁹ F3EAD is short for Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Assess, Disseminate.
- ²⁰ Interview with MARSOF monitor within Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Enlisted Assignment Branch on January 18, 2018.
- ²¹ Interview with senior enlisted Marine within a MARSOC support battalion on December 18, 2017.
- ²² Konrad Trautman, “Special Operations Intelligence: Guiding the Tip of the Spear,” in *Joint Special Operations Report*, (MacDill AFB, FL: November 2014), p xi.
- ²³ Under the current MARSOC organization, intelligence support activities fall under each support battalion and ultimately report to Marine Raider Support Group at the regimental level.
- ²⁴ The Marine Corps defines the purpose of the Multi-Discipline Intelligence Operator Course as “to train Marines in the general intelligence and 2000 level task per their respective Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS) designation as specified in the MARSOC T&R Manual. This course serves as one of the three courses required for a Marine to certify as a SOCS.” U.S. Marine Corps Force Special Operations Command, “Multi-Discipline Intelligence Operator Course,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/Units/Marine-Raider-Training-Center/MDIOC/>.
- ²⁵ See previous discussion of SOCS.
- ²⁶ Konrad Trautman, “Taking SOF Global, 2011 Through 2020,” in *Special Operations Intelligence: Guiding the Tip of the Spear*, (MacDill AFB, FL: The JSOU Press, 2014), pp 60-61.

²⁷ Department of the Navy, “NAVMC 3500.97,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2011), pp 2-2 – 2-7.

²⁸ The SO core activities are: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operation. Per SOCOM Direction, MARSOC participates directly in six core activities and supports two more but is prepared to execute any of the SOF core activities as required. (Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, 2014, II-3)

²⁹ Interview with field-grade officer within USMC Plans, Policies, and Operations on December 21, 2017.

³⁰ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, *MARSOC Publication 1*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: May, 2011), p 6.

³¹ U.S. Army, “Careers and Jobs: 18X and 18A,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, May 2017), accessed January 20, 2018, <https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/special-forces-candidate.html>; U.S. Navy, “Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land): About This Job,” (Millington, TN: Navy Recruiting Command, 2017), accessed January 20, 2018, <https://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html#ft-key-responsibilities>.

³² U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, “Special Operations Training Course,” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*; (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed March 19, 2018, <http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/Units/Marine-Raider-Training-Center/STC/>.

³³ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), *Decade of War, Volume 1*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff, 2012), p 2.

³⁴ Jonathan Schroden, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans, *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*, (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), p 2.

³⁵ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept*, (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2016), accessed March 31, 2018, <http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/young/MCCDC-YH/document/final/Marine%20Corps%20Operating%20Concept%20Sept%202016.pdf?ver=2016-09-28-083439-483>, p 15.

³⁶ USASOC is pursuing a similar course, which is detailed in its “ARSOF 2022” publication. ARSOF 2022 states that the “Army must achieve SOF and conventional force interdependence to lock in the advances of the last decade of conflict, more effectively counter future threats and shape the operational environment. The Army must establish a range of personnel, training and command and support relationships between SOF and GPF.” U.S. Army, “ARSOF 2022 – U.S. Army Special Operations Command,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), accessed March 31, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf.

³⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Special Operations – MCWP 3-05*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2017), 8-1 – 8-5.

³⁸ Interview with senior enlisted Marine within a MARSOC support battalion on December 18, 2017.

³⁹ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, “Five Things You Need to Know About HSST List,” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*; (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2015), accessed April 29, 2018, <http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/588505/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-hsst-list/>.

⁴⁰ SEAL Team Six, also known as Developmental Group (DevGru for short), is a member of JSOC and therefore is not discussed in detail as part of this research. Officially it was created in part to develop new equipment and tactics for all of NSW.

⁴¹ The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) serves as an interagency law enforcement training body for 91 United States government federal law enforcement agencies. It was created in 1970 in response to studies conducted in the late 1960s that revealed an urgent need for training by professional instructors using modern training facilities and standardized course content.

⁴² The mission of the Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) is to assess and select personnel for assignment for Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and to train and educate designated personnel in individual, basic, and advanced special operations in order to meet the MARSOC requirement to provide capable personnel to conduct special operations; U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, “Marine Raider Training Center,” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*; (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed April 29, 2018, <http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/Units/Marine-Raider-Training-Center/>.

⁴³ The EOTG provides training in select special skills and conducts and evaluates collective training in order to prepare Marine Expeditionary Units, (MEU) and other designated forces to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDR); U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, “Marine Raider Training Center,” in *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*; (Camp Lejeune, NC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), accessed April 29, 2018, <http://www.iimef.marines.mil/Units/Expeditionary-Operations-Training-Group/>.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Schroden, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans, *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*, (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), pp 22-25.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p 23; SA = special activities; CP = counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); CT = counterterrorism; UW = unconventional warfare; FID = foreign internal defense; SFA = security force assistance; CR = crisis response; COIN = counterinsurgency; StabOps = Stability Operations; MCO = major combat operation; Nukes = nuclear war; NMF = National Mission Force; AFSOC = Air Force Special Operations Command; USAF = U.S. Air Force; USN = U.S. Navy; USA = U.S. Army; and IA = interagency.


⁴⁶ “Since 1988 each of the theater unified commands have established a separate Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its theater-unique special operations requirements. As subordinate unified commands, the theater SOCs provide the planning, preparation, and command and control of SOF from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They ensure that SOF strategic capabilities are fully employed and that SOF are fully synchronized with conventional military operations, when applicable.” Federation of American Scientists, *Special Operations Force Structure*, (Washington, DC: FAS, 2000), accessed March 31, 2018, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1/SOFREF_Ch2.htm

⁴⁷ Jonathan Schroden, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans, *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*, (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), pp 22-25.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p 25.

⁴⁹ Stephen V. Fiscus, “A MAGTF Solution for MARSOC,” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, April 2009), pp 19-20.

APPENDIX A




APPENDIX B

Goals of the Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability (I3)

- Establish and charter a standing USMC – USSOCOM Capabilities Development Working Group to conduct ongoing DOTMLPF analysis of capability gaps, requirements deficiencies, and resource shortfalls that inhibit USMC – USSOCOM integration, interoperability, and interdependence.
- Ensure USMC and USSOCOM operations officers and planners attend the Theater Engagement Conference, Marine Forces Command Force Synchronization Conference, the USSOCOM Special Operations Synchronization Conference, and the Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group.
- ... it is imperative robust mechanisms that drive tactical, operational, and institutional interactions be created, developed, and maintained to mitigate the inevitable decline in interconnectedness that occurs when combat operations lessen and force turnover progresses.
- ...identify convergences in training events and exercises that support USMC – USSOCOM joint training requirements and readiness objectives.
- Prior to live-force experimentation and real-world operations, conduct wargames to determine effective ways to develop USMC – USSOCOM integrated command structures, employ complementary capabilities, strengthen tactical relationships, and identify potential vulnerabilities and/or points of friction.
- Concept-based, live-force experimentation is critical to the evolution and improvement of the Marine and SOF relationship.⁵¹

APPENDIX C



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⁵⁰ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, "MARSOC Combat Support Orientation Course (MCSOC) Information Brief," (Camp LeJeune, NC: MARSOC, April 09, 2018), slide 8.

⁵¹ United States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command, "Concept for Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability," (Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC: 2017), 17-20.

⁵² Jonathan Schroden, David Broyles, Vera Zakem, Jerry Meyerle, and Ryan Evans, *Improving SOF-GPF Integration for Crisis Response: An Action Plan for HQMC and SOCOM*, (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), p 23.

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