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*United States Marine Corps
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
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AUTHOR: Maj Christopher Sweitzer


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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Anne Louis Antonoff, Ph.D.

Approved: 

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Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Nathan Packard, Ph.D.

Approved: 

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Table of Contents

| | Page |
|---------------------------------------|------|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | i |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| REVIEW OF LITERATURE | 5 |
| HISTORICAL CONTEXT | 10 |
| RUSSO-UKRANIAN CONFLICT ANALYSIS..... | 16 |
| LESSON LEARNED..... | 24 |
| POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS | 30 |
| CONCLUSION..... | 33 |
| NOTES..... | 35 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 37 |

Executive Summary

Title: The Russo-Ukrainian Conflict Through the Lens of Sun Tzu

Author: Major Chris Sweitzer, United States Army, AY2017-2018

Thesis: The purpose of this paper is to analyze Russia's incursion into Ukraine to determine what their operations reveal about the present character of Russian warfare. In addition, the research will use the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Chinese strategic thought as an analytical tool to determine how the Russia engineered chaos at the tactical and operational levels of war utilizing nonmilitary methods such as cyber and information operations.

Discussion: Many scholars classify Russia's actions within Ukraine in 2014 as hybrid warfare since Russia combined both conventional and unconventional warfare to achieve its political objectives. Further investigation and analysis of the methods employed by Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War is appropriate as Russia's swift and decisive success could lead to similar operations in the future. Viewing and analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian conflict through the lens of Sun Tzu provides a unique perspective to the potentially evolving character of Russian warfare in the 21st century. In particular, Sun Tzu's strategic concepts of *Cheng* and *Ch'i*, Tao of deception, and nonmilitary means to achieve victory provide an excellent framework to analyze the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War for clues about the character of Russian warfare. Russia's evolution of hybrid warfare, specifically Russian influence over the information environment, is traced to Russia's historic use of active measures and reflexive control theory to affect the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. An analysis of Russia's incursions within Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 exhibits an evolution of Russian nonlinear doctrine and tactics subsequently refined during the Russo-Ukrainian War. In addition, using lessons learned from observing a multitude of color revolutions on its periphery, Russia seizes opportunities to prey upon conditions of social and political chaos to sow additional disharmony.

Conclusion: Similar to the ancient teachings of Sun Tzu or Mao's strategy of revolutionary warfare, Russian warfare in the 21st century has a penchant for attacking the mind of its enemy to sow disharmony as a means to further its strategic goals and intentions. To avoid the military strength of the West, it is evident Russia favors the application of nonlinear warfare over conventional warfare to further its strategic goals. Increasing the resilience of the United States against Russia's nonlinear warfare and its attacks on democratic institutions requires a whole-of-government approach that mobilizes all resources across the spectrum of US national power.

Introduction

Since the 2014 Russian incursion into Ukraine, military scholars have deepened their analysis of Russian strategic thought, looking for possible revelations about the potential changing character of Russian warfare. Military pundits have dissected the writings and speeches of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, among other Russian military leaders, searching for clues on the character of Russian warfare in the future. Of particular interest to military pundits is Gerasimov's writing of "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods a Carrying Out Combat Operations." Since the publication of Gerasimov's article in 2013 and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine, Western scholars have debated the significance of this writing, and others, as a potential bellwether for a new type of Russian warfare.

Many scholars classify Russia's actions within Ukraine in 2014 as hybrid warfare since Russia combined both conventional and unconventional warfare to achieve its political objectives. Frank Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as "any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mixture of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, catastrophic terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain desired political objectives."¹ Whether or not Russia's military actions in Ukraine represent a new type of Russian warfare, or a change in the character of Russian warfare, Hoffman's definition of hybrid warfare provides a baseline characterization for examining Russian military actions during the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian war.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Russia's incursion into Ukraine to determine what its operations reveal about the present character of Russian warfare. In addition, the research

will use the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Chinese strategic thought as an analytical tool to determine how the Russia engineered chaos at the tactical and operational levels of war utilizing nonmilitary methods such as cyber and information operations.

Sun Tzu: Achieving Strategic Victory through Nonmilitary Means

Sun Tzu's philosophy of warfare and strategic thought provide an excellent lens with which to view and analyze the strategic advantage gained by Russia through its use of hybrid and nonlinear warfare in Ukraine. To appreciate this analysis, one must first understand certain key concepts foreign to Western ways of thinking. In his book, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War*, Derek Yuen provides an in-depth analysis of Sun Tzu's theory of warfare and Chinese strategic thought. Yuen's analysis of Sun Tzu exposes the Western reader to a unique perspective reflecting the cultural and historical nuances of Chinese culture and strategic thought. Likewise, in his introduction to his translation of *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, Roger Ames provides a philosophical overview of the key concepts behind Sun Tzu's work. Most appropriate to the Russo-Ukrainian War is Sun Tzu's writings about gaining the strategic advantage over an adversary through nonmilitary means without fighting. Ames' analysis of Sun Tzu's writings identifies Sun Tzu's concept of *shih*, or strategic advantage, as the fundamental basis of Sun Tzu's theory woven throughout the text.² In addition, Sun Tzu's emphasis on the use of deception to disrupt the adversary's decision-making cycle and strategy is relevant to any discussion of this conflict. Finally, the Chinese concepts of *cheng* and *ch'i* – the orthodox and unorthodox – are pertinent to Russia's blending of conventional and unconventional warfare to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success.


For Sun Tzu, the best path to victory in warfare is conquest over one's adversary without expending blood or treasure on the battlefield. Sun Tzu states that "to win a hundred victories in

a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all."³ Fundamental to Sun Tzu's concept of winning without fighting is the use of nonmilitary means to gain a strategic advantage or victory. Yuen finds that "it is the process of 'militarization of war' and 'tacticization of strategy' that have blinded us from identifying and rediscovering the countless opportunities in the non-military spheres of war."⁴ While observing the United States' nonmilitary actions around the globe to secure its strategic interests, Russia has seemingly rediscovered, or renewed its emphasis on the utility of nonmilitary methods of warfare to stifle its adversaries. For example, Gerasimov's writings address his observation of a four to one ratio of non-military to military measures used in modern conflict. In addition, Gerasimov finds that the "emphasis in the content of methods of confrontation is shifting in the direction of extensive employment of political, economic, diplomatic, information, and other nonmilitary measures."⁵ Gerasimov's point about the growing use of nonmilitary methods within modern warfare to achieve strategic objectives is truly aligned with the ancient teachings of Sun Tzu.

Sun Tzu provides another relevant strategic concept for analyzing Russian operations within Ukraine: the Tao or "way" of deception. Deception is a strategic tool used to instill confusion within the mind of the enemy in order to gain a strategic advantage. Yuen finds that deception is a "form of strategic manipulation" with the purpose of "not just to deceive or mislead; the Tao of deception instead aims for a higher goal whereby an enemy can be manipulated and controlled."⁶ Russia has proven highly capable of exploiting the information domain as a means to sow discord, thus setting the conditions to control and manipulate the operational environment. Russia's effective use of information operations reflects Sun Tzu's

belief that “the enemy should be unraveled even before the battle begins” in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage prior to conventional operations.⁷

Finally, the Chinese concepts of *cheng* and *ch'i* – the orthodox and unorthodox – provide a basic framework to analyze Russian hybrid warfare. Yuen offers that the “heart of *ch'i-cheng*, as Sun Tzu always emphasizes, is to attack the enemy’s mind.”⁸ Russia has proven adept at “attacking the enemy’s mind” in recent conflicts as the lines between war and peace are blurring in an increasingly complex world. While reflecting on the character of modern warfare, Gerasimov finds that “today the blurring of the lines between a state of war and peace is obvious.”⁹ As new information technologies evolve, along with methods to employ them against a targeted population through cyber warfare and information operations, the distinction between war and peace is often unrecognizable (figure 1). Moreover, the argument can be made that Russian tactics associated with its use of hybrid warfare, as seen through their occupation of Crimea, constitute Russia’s *chi*. The Russian military operated outside of the conventional realm to employ warfare through an unorthodox combination of cyber warfare, information operations, and special forces. Russia has harnessed these developments to its advantage as it “attacks the enemy’s mind” to attain its geopolitical objectives without the need to conduct full-scale conventional combat operations.



Source: Charles Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right." *Military Review* 96, no. 1 (2016): 30-38.

Figure 1: Graphic from Gerasimov article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier*, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

Review of Literature

Since the publication of the Gerasimov Doctrine and Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2014, a large quantity of scholarly literature has emerged examining the character of Russian warfare. In his original 2013 article, Gerasimov alleged that "a combination of nonmilitary methods, including the protest potential of the population, covert military measures, information operations, and special forces activities, are being implemented by some nations to control conflict."¹⁰ In this statement, Gerasimov was referring to the multiple color revolutions that have transpired since the fall of the Soviet Union in certain former Soviet states, such as the

2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. In addition, although he attributed to Western nations the use of nonmilitary methods within conflict to achieve political objectives, Gerasimov seemed to be describing the methods of warfare soon to be employed by the Russians during their invasion of Ukraine.

Timothy Thomas examines three recently published Russian military articles as a means to infer the characteristics of Russian warfare and its changing nature. In his analysis of the articles, Thomas finds that “Russian military thought consists of five basic elements: trends in war’s changing character, forecasting, strategy, and the correlation of forces along strategic axes, forms and methods of the means of struggle, and the use of past lessons.”¹¹ In addition, Thomas finds Russia’s military use of “new-type” warfare is characterized by “the necessity of gaining information superiority, forecasting war’s probable direction, and developing an appreciation for the changing character of armed conflict, such as an increased role in nonmilitary operations.”¹² An important concept identified by Thomas that is of great significance to Russian warfare is the initial period of war (IPW). During the IPW, Russia leans heavily on nonmilitary operations such as cyber and information operations to gain an operational and strategic advantage. While many studies characterize Russia’s operations within Ukraine as depicting a new form of Russian warfare, others do not believe the Russians exhibited any novel doctrinal templates.

When conducting analysis of the Russian Ukraine operations scholars are in disagreement regarding Russia’s innovative development of a next generation warfare. Charles Bartles argues that many Western scholars have incorrectly attributed Gerasimov’s writings to “a new Russian way of warfare that blends conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as hybrid warfare.”¹³ Russia’s use of cyber warfare and information operations combined with special operations forces to obtain its political objectives

in Ukraine has raised concerns among some in the West that Russian military doctrine is indeed evolving. Bartles believes that Gerasimov is not proposing a new way of war, but instead is attempting to forecast the future of warfare, so that Russia is better prepared to defeat emerging threats from the West. While reflecting on Gerasimov's writings, Bartles finds that "Gerasimov is simply explaining his views of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine."¹⁴ Instead of developing a new type of warfare, Gerasimov seeks to develop capabilities to defeat future threats, and therefore is calling on the Russian scientific community to look at the character of future warfare as a reflection of the West's alleged clandestine support of color revolutions.

Roger McDermott shares Bartles's skepticism that Russia has developed a unique form of hybrid warfare. McDermott does not find any evidence that the Russian military is developing next-generation warfare replicable in other environments outside of Ukraine, but instead claims the Russian military has "retained their distinctive approaches, traditions, and uniqueness."¹⁵ McDermott attributes Russia's decisive operations in Ukraine to the ripe political environment that facilitated the Russian incursion into Ukraine along with the traditional ethnic fault lines that enabled Russia's swift triumph. Both McDermott and Bartles acknowledge the belief held by the Russian military that the West has implemented hybrid warfare to advance its political interests through the color revolutions that transpired within certain former Soviet states.

Other scholars do attribute Gerasimov's writings about the changing character of war to the development of Russian hybrid warfare. Mirosław Banasik finds that the hybrid tactics used by Russia seek to "blur the lines between war and peace" to establish an advantage over its adversaries. An important theme that runs throughout Banasik's writing, and that of other Russian military scholars, is Russia's use of information warfare to sow discord among a

targeted population. Banasik finds that Russia's information war either "allows political objectives to be reached without the use of armed force" or "shapes the conditions for the use of armed force."¹⁶ Similar to Banasik, Tad Schnauffer references Russia's inclination to rely on all instruments of national power to achieve its political objectives as a way to avoid a conventional conflict. Schnauffer describes the nonmilitary methods used by Russia in Ukraine; however, Schnauffer establishes a distinction between hybrid warfare and nonlinear warfare. For Schnauffer, nonlinear warfare was defined by Gerasimov in 2013 as "a means to reach desired strategic orientation and geopolitical outcomes primarily using nonmilitary approaches."¹⁷ Russia's use of hybrid warfare to achieve its military objectives is nested within its strategic use of nonlinear warfare as a means to achieve greater political goals. In order to avoid the strength of Western militaries, Russia turns to the use of nonlinear warfare to promote its interests.

Some scholars find Russia's success in Ukraine as an evolution of Russian strategic thought that successfully weaves together military and nonmilitary methods to achieve its geopolitical goals. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard attributes Russia's operations in Ukraine to a shift in Russian strategic thought versus an evolution in Russian military doctrine. Ven Bruusgaard believes that the Russian military borrowed tactics from the West "for nurturing regime change by using political, economic, or military support to selected groups, covert action and information operations."¹⁸ In addition, the author notes Russia's recent display of "strategic innovation" as the Russian military continues to knit its nonmilitary methods with its conventional doctrine to counter Western strengths.

Similar to Ven Bruusgaard's in his reluctance to define Russia's recent use of hybrid warfare as a cutting-edge form of Russian war, Michael Kofman finds that Russia is simply employing all instruments of national power to achieve its political objectives. Kofman does not

believe that the Gerasimov Doctrine is a harbinger revealing the evolution of Russian warfare, but instead finds recent Russian military publications to be “a blend of intellectual currents among Russian military leaders and responses to how they view NATO operations.”¹⁹ The success of NATO and the United States in actively promoting democratic institutions and values on Russia’s periphery has served as a reminder to Russia of the value of incorporating political, information, and economic domains into its geopolitical strategy.

In sum, scholars disagree concerning Russia’s use of hybrid or nonlinear warfare. Some scholars believe that Russia’s operations within Ukraine constitute a paradigm shift in how the Russian military conducts operations while providing the West an indicator of the character of future Russian warfare. Other scholars do not believe that either Russia’s Ukrainian operations or the Gerasimov Doctrine provides an indicator of future Russian doctrine. Instead, those scholars believe that recent writings and speeches by Russian military leaders reflect Russia’s concerns over perceived meddling by the West in former Soviet states. For example, both Thomas and Bartles use evidence to argue that Russia perceives the use of hybrid warfare as a Western invention used by both the United States and NATO to weaken Eastern European governments at Russia’s periphery. Regardless, further investigation and analysis of the methods employed by Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War is appropriate as Russia’s swift and decisive success could lead to similar operations in the future. Viewing and analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian conflict through the lens of Sun Tzu provides a unique perspective to the potentially evolving character of Russian warfare in the 21st century.

Historical Context

Russia's use of hybrid warfare exhibited during its 2014 invasion of Ukraine is an evolution of Russian warfare that can be traced back to the establishment of the Soviet Union. In particular, Russia's use of information operations to gain a strategic advantage over its adversaries has become the cornerstone of its hybrid military operations. James Sherr finds that "today's Russian state has inherited a culture of influence deriving from the Soviet and Tsarist past . . . it bears the imprint of doctrines, disciplines and habits acquired over a considerable period of time in relations with subjects, clients and independent states."²⁰ More recently, Russia has perfected its culture of strategic influence as evidenced through the Russian cyberattacks in Estonia in 2007 and its use of information operations combined with conventional military operations during the invasion of Georgia in 2008.

To understand Russia's manipulation of the information environment as a means to achieve its political objectives, it is helpful to reflect upon Gerasimov's findings that "the information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy."²¹ Russia's evolution of hybrid warfare, specifically Russian influence over the information environment, is traced to Russia's historic use of active measures and reflexive control theory to affect the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. In addition, an analysis of Russia's incursions within Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 exhibits an evolution of Russian nonlinear doctrine and tactics subsequently refined during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Active Measures

When examining Russia's employment of hybrid warfare, in particular its activities associated with the cyber and information domains, it is necessary to reflect on Russia's historic

practice of using political propaganda to influence the strategic environment. Since the 1920s, Russia has used active measures “to influence political attitudes and public opinion in non-communist countries through deceptive and covert means.”²² Steve Abrams finds, “With roots in Leninist thinking, over generations the Soviets mastered a range of techniques known as *aktivnyye meropiyatiya* or active measures.”²³ Russia’s use of active measures to influence both its own population and the populations of sovereign nations on its periphery has functioned to control the narrative as Russia sought to promote its political and social interests at home and abroad. Historically, Russia has executed active measures through a variety of methods including political influence operations and deception campaigns designed to influence the media and public opinion.

The Cold War offers a multitude of examples of Russian active measures designed to influence political institutions and public opinion through deception and disinformation. Soviet political influence operations often functioned under the guise of governmental institutions with a goal of promoting a Soviet foreign policy agenda. For example, The World Peace Council (WPC), established in 1949, operated in mostly communist countries to promote the Soviet Union’s anti-Western agenda.²⁴ A more common example of the Soviets’ use of active measures is their disinformation campaigns employed through the use of media and public opinion. Dennis Kux finds Soviet disinformation campaigns sought “to gain public acceptance for the distortion through repetition and periodic resurfacing” such as a 1983 news story that claimed the United States and Israel were deploying cruise missiles on the African continent.²⁵

More recently, the concept of Russian active measures to influence public opinion has resurfaced as a consequence of the Russian intrusion into the 2016 US presidential elections. Prior to the inauguration of Donald Trump, then-Director of National Security James Clapper

released an unclassified report finding that Vladimir Putin had ordered an information campaign designed to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process.”²⁶ The US government continues to investigate the extent of Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election with many US officials warning of similar actions by Russia during the upcoming 2018 mid-term elections.

It is apparent that Russia’s use of active measures against the West never subsided even after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia has a rich history and culture of influence that continues to this day. From Lenin to Putin, Russian leaders have sought psychological influence and control of the Russian population and the populations of countries within the Russian sphere of influence.

Reflexive Control Theory

Another historical component of Russian nonlinear warfare as it relates to their practice of disinformation to influence the strategic environment is reflexive control theory (RC). Timothy Thomas defines reflexive control as “a means of conveying to a partner or opponent specifically prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of action.”²⁷ The Russian military developed reflexive control theory as a means to propagate *Maskirovka* (deception) dating back to the establishment of the Russian Army’s *Maskirovka* school in 1904. The primary goal of reflexive control is to disrupt the opponent’s decision-making process as a means to sow confusion and discord through the use of propaganda or disinformation. Once the adversary’s decision-making cycle is manipulated, the architect of RC can effectively exploit fissures to shape the outcome of the adversary’s tactical, operational, or strategic decision.

Russia's use of reflexive control remains a staple within its information warfare kitbag and plays a significant role in Russian nonlinear warfare. Can Kasapoglu finds that Russia's practice of reflexive control as a component of Russian nonlinear warfare creates "a 'hallucinating fog of war' and consistent deception that aims not to paralyze the West's intelligence and anticipatory capabilities, but to alter Western analytical end-results and perceptions of Russia's strategic intentions."²⁸ For example, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 saw the swift invasion and capture of the Crimean Peninsula before the West or the government in Kiev could counter Russia's hybrid military operations on the peninsula. Furthermore, Russia's highly effective manipulation of the cyber and information domains created a haze of disinformation that stunted the West's response time, allowing for the creation of a *fait accompli*. Nonlinear warfare within the information age offers the Russian government amplified opportunities to shape strategic outcomes through the use of both active measures and reflexive control. Russia's manipulation of the cyber and information domains to promote its political interests was initially demonstrated in the former Soviet republic of Estonia.

2007 Russian Cyberattacks on Estonia

In 2007, Russia founded a cyber laboratory in a former Soviet bloc country to exercise its evolving unconventional warfare doctrine through the use of offensive cyber operations. After the removal of a Soviet World War II statue from the Estonian capital, the Estonian government and population soon found itself in the midst of a cyberattack. Prior to the attack, Russian sympathizers had warned the Estonia government not to remove the Soviet statue or else the Estonian people would face malevolent consequences. A subsequent distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Estonian cyber networks, allegedly traced to Russian hackers,

paralyzed Estonian government and financial institutions. Russia's cyberattack on Estonia demonstrated to the world Russia's capability to manipulate the cyber domain to punish Estonia for moving away from Russia's political orbit and toward the West. Although Russia's disruption of Estonian government and financial networks seemed limited in scope, it provided Russia with a baseline to plan and implement similar nonlinear warfare techniques in the future. Emily Tamkin finds that since Russia's 2007 cyberattack in Estonia, "Russia has melded cyber into broader strategies that combine hacks with information war, hybrid war, or old-fashioned conventional war in a bid to advance Moscow's aims."²⁹ Only a year later, Russia's amalgamation of conventional and unconventional warfare was on display during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Russo-Georgian War: 2008

Historically, political tensions have remained high between the Russian Federation and Georgia due to disputes regarding the South Ossetia province of Georgia. Ethnic, economic, and geopolitical issues boiled over in August of 2008 when the Russian military, supported by the Ossetian militia, engaged the Georgian government and military over political and economic disputes. Significant to Russia's incursion into Georgia was Russia's implementation of nonlinear tactics prior to the start of the ground conflict. David Hollis claims that Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia "appears to be the first case in history of a coordinated cyberspace domain attack synchronized with major combat actions with the other warfighting domains."³⁰ Similar to the Russian cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, Russian hackers were able to overwhelm Georgian government and financial websites through a coordinated DDoS attack. In addition, Russian hackers defaced several Georgian websites that included the websites of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and the National Bank of Georgia. When compared to the Russian cyberattacks on Estonia, Russia's military actions within Georgia demonstrated an evolution of Russian nonlinear warfare as it added the components of information and psychological warfare to its operations.

A common theme that runs through current research and discussion surrounding Russia's incorporation of nonlinear warfare into its operations is the use of information and psychological warfare to promote Russia's geopolitical interests. Emilio Iasiello contends that during the 2008 operations in Georgia, Russia engaged in "concurrent information and psychological operations-including propaganda, information control, and disinformation campaigns-with varying results."³¹ Russia's information and psychological operations in Georgia propagated themes painting the Georgian government as the aggressors while justifying Russia's actions in defense of ethnic Russians living in South Ossetia. Through the use of television, "Russia controlled the flow of international information and sought to influence local populations by dictating news, sharing the progress of Russian troops protecting Russian citizens, and propagandizing Georgian atrocities."³²

In addition, it is significant to acknowledge the Georgian government's ability to counter the Russian narrative with their own use of an information campaign designed to communicate Georgia's legitimacy to the global community. Lessons learned from the Russo-Georgian War were significant for Russia, particularly concerning its deficiencies in doctrine and equipment related to both conventional and unconventional warfare. Russia's improvements in these areas were demonstrated six years later during its invasion of Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 served as a shocking occurrence to the West that demonstrated Russia's

distinctive ability to combine its nonlinear and conventional warfare capabilities to promote its geopolitical agenda.

Russo-Ukrainian Conflict Analysis

Russia's incursion into Ukraine in 2014 was motivated by historical and geopolitical elements. Furthermore, the currents of political and social chaos within Ukraine accelerated that speed at which Russia was able to take control of the Crimean Peninsula and portions of Eastern Ukraine. The political and social unrest associated with Euromaidan Revolution eventually culminated with the removal of Ukrainian President Yanukovitch from power. Yanukovitch's removal from power provided the trigger that led to the Russian annexation of Crimea as Russia sought to punish Ukraine and the West for the removal the pro-Russian Ukrainian leader. Russia's historic connection to "Little Russia," or Ukraine, dates back to the eighteenth century when Russia took certain lands from the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, important to recent history, the Ukrainian territory has provided a strategic buffer between Russia and the West. Seeing the Ukrainian Revolution and Ukraine's drift toward the West as an existential threat to Russia and its regional influence, Vladimir Putin seized the opportunity to regain control of Crimea while stoking chaos in Eastern Ukraine.

While active measures and reflexive control serve as homegrown theory for Russian and Soviet actions, classical Chinese military thought provides a useful theoretical lens through which to analyze and understand recent events and their implications for future Russian conflict. In particular, Sun Tzu's strategic concepts of *Cheng* and *Ch'i*, Tao of deception, and nonmilitary means to achieve victory provide an excellent framework to analyze the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War for clues about the character of Russian warfare.

Cheng and Ch'i during the Russo-Ukrainian War

Attacking the enemy's mind prior to the initiation of conflict and during military operations is the preferred indirect technique of warfare used by Russia in Ukraine. Yuen finds that "Sun Tzu's emphasis on the mental phase prior to actual battle may appear to suggest that he has a strong, philosophical preference for psychology and mind games, rather than real, violent conflict in order to achieve victory."³³ Russia's penchant for mind games and psychological warfare is woven into the fabric of Russia's psyche as evidenced by its historic use of active measures and reflexive control to influence its adversaries. Moreover, Russia prefers to attack the West's strategy through asymmetric means as a mechanism to avoid the strength of the US military. Janis Berzinis claims, "The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind, and as a result, new-generation warfare wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare."³⁴ For Russia, the human mind is the most vulnerable system within a conflict that can be influenced through deception and misinformation. Russia's proclivity for employing cyber and information operations during modern conflict – especially during the initial phase of a conflict – was apparent during the first days of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

During the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia's accelerated actions during the initial phase of the conflict proved to be overwhelming to the Ukrainian government and its Western supporters. Following the Euromaidan protests and the exit of President Yanukovitch from Ukraine in February 2014, Putin and Russian military forces moved swiftly to secure Russia's interests on the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine. With a strategic and operational advantage of having Russian military forces already positioned on the Crimean Peninsula at Sevastopol Naval Base, Russia's Crimean campaign did not require a massive military deployment. In fact, Russia

“deployed less than 10,000 assault troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel.”³⁵ Once Russian military forces were able to neutralize the Ukrainian military forces positioned on the Crimean Peninsula without significant fighting, Russia turned to propaganda and information operations in order to quell resistance from domestic and international populations.

Much like Sun Tzu, Russia values and employs the psychological component of warfare to avoid a costly conventional war. Once the threat from the Ukrainian military was exhausted, Russian information operations “proactively targeted pro-Russian rebels, the domestic population, and the international community to alienate Ukraine from its allies and sympathizers.”³⁶ By attacking the minds of the Ukrainian government, populace, and the international community through targeted information operations, Russia secured a strategic victory on the Crimean Peninsula without further opposition from within Crimea or from the government in Kiev. Russian international news outlets – such as RT and Sputnik – broadcast programming that discussed the “Western puppet government” in Kiev while enflaming long-standing grievances within the ethnic Russian populations in Eastern Ukraine.

In addition, Russian cyber-hackers targeted the Ukrainian elections attempting to cast doubt and delegitimize the rising pro-Western government in Kiev. Shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukraine prepared for presidential elections in May 2014 to replace the ousted former President Yanukovich who had fled to Russia. The presidential election arose at a critical time as the government in Kiev sought to move past the political and social unrest that had dominated the country during the months leading up to the Euromaidan Revolution. In

addition, Ukrainian officials hoped the election would serve as a referendum for a pro-Western government and denouncement of Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

Just days before the presidential election, the Ukrainian election commission suffered a debilitating cyberattack that nearly derailed the election. In addition to cyberattacks on the Ukrainian election commission, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military were afflicted by an array of cyberattacks (Figure 2). Though ultimately unsuccessful, the cyberattack on the election commission was later linked to CyberBerkut – a Russian based hacking group – and explained as an effort that aimed to sow disharmony among the Ukrainian population by “crippling the online system for distributing results and voter turnout throughout election day.”³⁷ Similar to Russian actions within Estonia and Georgia, the cyberattacks on Ukrainian government networks proved to be disruptive as Russia sought to obstruct Ukraine's gravitation towards the European Union and the West.

Russia's use of orthodox and unorthodox methods of warfare during the initial period of the Russo-Ukrainian War were highly successful. As forecast in their 2013 writings, Russian military leaders consider the opening period of conflict to be decisive. It involves the use of information operations, electronic warfare, and sometimes involves kinetic operations such as high-precision weapons and long-range artillery.³⁸ Although the Ukraine conflict did not initially experience a high level of kinetic operations, information and cyber operations did play a pivotal role in Russia's early success. Through its use of information operations, Russia was able to spread propaganda and disinformation to deceive the Ukrainian government and the international community about its plans.



Source: Margaret Coker and Paul Sonne, "Ukraine: Cyberwar's Hottest Front," *WSJ.com*, November 9, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-cyberwars-hottest-front-1447121671>.

Figure 2: Infesting Ukraine with Cyberattacks

Russian Deception

Sun Tzu's Tao of Deception places the psychological and cognitive elements of warfare at the epicenter of effective strategy. Russia is steeped in the tradition of using deception – or *Maskirovka* – as a tool to gain an advantage over its adversaries. *Maskirovka* – never removed from Russia's toolkit of deception – remains a strategic tool of influence used most recently in the Ukraine conflict. When examining the Russo-Ukrainian War, Julian Lindley-French finds that Russia's use of *Maskirovka* demonstrated "a purposeful strategy of deception that combines use of force with disinformation and destabilization to create ambiguity in the minds of [NATO] alliance leaders about how best to respond."³⁹ *Maskirovka*, combined with reflexive control, provides Russia with the ability to disrupt and confuse the adversary's decision-making cycle through disinformation and deception. From the Crimean Peninsula to Eastern Ukraine, Russia's

strategic and operational use of *Maskirovka* and reflexive control provided ample maneuver space that allowed Russia to gain a strategic advantage over Kiev and the West.

From the start of the Ukraine conflict, the Russian government offered a narrative to the international community that sought to confuse and hinder a Western response. Shortly after the incursion into Crimea, Russia disseminated propaganda on Russian state-controlled television and social media platforms that supported the rights of ethnic Russians living within Crimea to break away from the government in Kiev. Furthermore, the Russian government initially denied involvement during the Crimean uprising as the “little green men,” wearing Russian military uniforms without unit designation, secured key terrain and infrastructure on the peninsula. Lindley-French finds that “Moscow has established a new level of ambition – strategic *Maskirovka* – by which disinformation is applied against all levels of NATO’s command chain and wider public opinion to keep the West politically and militarily off-balance.”⁴⁰ From the onset of the conflict, Russia’s application of strategic *Maskirovka* increased chaos within Ukraine and the international community as NATO and the West struggled to comprehend the events emerging on the ground in Ukraine.

Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, a Russian separatist movement began in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Pro-Russian protests eventually evolved into an armed conflict with Ukrainian forces as separatists took control of Ukrainian government buildings and territory throughout the region. Eventually, the Ukrainian armed forces responded by launching the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) to halt the separatist momentum and attempt to recapture lost territory. Intelligence analysis and reporting from the conflict acknowledge Russia’s support for the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas. With clandestine military assistance, coupled with Russian provided advanced weaponry, training, and

troops, the separatists were able to thwart Ukraine's ATO efforts. Russia's influence and manipulation of the Russian ethnic populations living within the Donbas demonstrates that "the business of war does not occur as some independent and isolated event, but unfolds within a broad field of unique natural, social, and political conditions."⁴¹ Russia is uniquely positioned to recognize and exploit the social and political disposition of Eastern Ukraine due to the two countries' shared history, culture, and geography. This perspective allowed Russia to effectively manipulate the population while using the deteriorating political conditions within Ukraine as an opportunity to win what Sun Tzu would call an easy and unexceptional strategic victory.

Russian Nonmilitary Means to Achieve Victory: Sun Tzu and Formlessness

For Sun Tzu, the greatest victory is gained through the use of nonmilitary methods, which is described by Sun Tzu as "winning easily and unexceptionally." Achieving an easy and unexceptional victory during the initial phase of a conflict requires one to conceal one's form (*hsing*), or become formless. Yuen finds that "one of the most important tasks for those engaged in the battlefield involves evaluating the enemy's *hsing*, while concealing one's own or making it unfathomable."⁴² To avoid a conventional conflict and the military might of the United States and NATO, Russia looks for opportunities that will provide easy and unexceptional strategic wins. To accomplish this, Russia leans heavily on nonmilitary or nonlinear means such as information and cyber operations. Russia's skillful use of information and cyber operations in Ukraine allowed for the masking of its strategic objectives until Russia had already achieved its operational goals in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

An analysis of Russian nonlinear warfare in Ukraine reveals their subversive targeting of the Ukrainian population through cyber and information operations to gain a geopolitical victory

against the West. However, before taking a deeper look at examples of nonlinear warfare within the Russo-Ukrainian War, a working definition of nonlinear warfare is required. Tad Schnauffer defines nonlinear warfare as “the application of collective subversive measures on a state(s) by another actor, targeting its government, population, and vital social functions, in order to fulfill a grand strategy” without a declaration of war.⁴³ Subversive measures demonstrated through nonlinear warfare seek to undermine political systems by stoking chaos and confusion among the populace. Furthermore, some pundits argue that the spread of globalization witnessed through interconnected markets and increasingly networked populations provides fertile ground for the employment of nonlinear warfare. A hyper-connected world, coupled with the continued development and growth of cyber technologies, permits certain states or non-state actors to malevolently target governments and populations to sow disharmony. Similar to conventional warfare, the employment of nonlinear warfare is most often motivated by a grand strategy.

In a speech to the Russian legislature in 2005, Vladimir Putin characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical disaster” and has since sought to reclaim Russia’s geopolitical influence.⁴⁴ As political and social chaos erupted on the ground in Kiev, the 2014 Ukraine crisis provided Russia with a golden opportunity to insert itself into the fray. The annexation of Crimea, along with provoking ethnic grievances in Eastern Ukraine, served to promote Russia’s grand strategic goals: to return to prominence on the geopolitical stage and to diminish the West’s political and ideological influence within Russia’s traditional spheres of influence. However, to achieve its strategic goals, Russia believes it must turn to nonlinear warfare to avoid the conventional military strength of the United States and NATO. To accomplish this, Russia chooses to remain “formless” and hide its true intentions from the West, using subversive measures to realize its geopolitical objectives.

At the heart of Russia's subversive measures displayed through nonlinear warfare is their practiced use of *Maskirovka*, active measure, and reflexive control to spread disinformation and disrupt the decision-making of its adversaries. In Ukraine, Russia employed its full collection of subversive measures primarily through the information and cyber domains. Timothy Thomas finds that the rise of information technology has "flattened" the levels of war as new technologies have "reduced the distance" between adversaries.⁴⁵ The flattening of the levels of war through the evolution and maturity of information technology allows Russia to easily influence the tactical and operational levels of war to gain a strategic advantage. Moreover, the cyber and information domains provide Russia with contemporary instruments to remain formless as they apply their ageless techniques of deception and disinformation to stoke chaos.

Lessons Learned: The Character of Russian Warfare

Since the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War, volumes of scholarly journals have been published as defense and national security experts examine the conflict searching for indicators on the future of Russian warfare. Seeing the conflict through the lens of Sun Tzu provides a distinctive tool for analysis and making inferences on some characteristics of Russian warfare. To avoid the military strength of the West, it is evident Russia favors the application of nonlinear warfare over conventional warfare. In addition, using lessons learned from observing a multitude of color revolutions on its periphery, Russia seizes opportunities to prey upon conditions of social and political chaos to sow additional disharmony.

From his studies of Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong applied many concepts from *The Art of War* when developing his strategies directing the Chinese Revolution. In *On Protracted Warfare*, Mao Zedong advised "In order to attain victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind

and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.”⁴⁶ Similar to the ancient teachings of Sun Tzu or Mao’s strategy of revolutionary warfare, Russian warfare in the 21st century has a penchant for attacking the mind of its enemy to sow disharmony as a means to further its strategic goals and intentions. Three larger implications emerge from the record of recent Russian behavior.

1. Russian Nonlinear Warfare: Political Warfare Redux?

In 1948, George Kennan called upon the US national security establishment to institute measures to counter Russian overt and covert political warfare. Now declassified, Kennan’s political warfare memo defined political warfare as the “employment of all of the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”⁴⁷ In addition to providing recommendations to US policymakers to counter Russian political warfare, Kennan acknowledged the permanent geopolitical struggle between nations and the West’s inability to culturally recognize a world of persistent conflict.⁴⁸ Not much has changed since Kennan published his memo at the beginning of the Cold War. A resurgent Russia employs all instruments of national power to realize its geopolitical objectives using both overt and covert measures; however, the cornerstone of Russian geopolitical influence is covert measures exercised primarily through the information and cyber domains.

The complexity of warfare during the 21st century has intensified as the line between war and peace erodes with the proliferation of information and cyber technologies. Michael Kofman writes, “Russia has turned information into an instrument of national power and is using it to create space for itself and its interests in the international environment and global public opinion.”⁴⁹ Beyond creating geopolitical space for itself, Russia uses information as a tool to

apply nonlinear warfare to attack social and political systems. In 2015, Russian General-Lieutenant Andrew Kartapolov published his thoughts on the changing character of war. His observations and analysis of contemporary world conflicts – to include color revolutions – led to the development of his “New-Type” of War (NTW) hypothesis. Relevant to nonlinear warfare, Kartapolov claims that “information confrontations are conducted using falsifications, replacements, of the distortion of information.”⁵⁰ Kartapolov’s analysis provides a uniquely Russian perspective on the character of contemporary warfare, especially when applied to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.



Source: Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War.” *Military Review* 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 42.

Figure 3: Kartapolov’s “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Resources and Methods of Conducting Them”

Kartapolov's graphic (figure 3) displays many of the nonlinear warfare techniques employed by Russia during the Ukraine conflict. From cyberattacks to attacking the minds of the Ukrainian population and political leadership through propaganda and disinformation, Russia incorporated the nonmilitary methods identified by Kartapolov against Ukraine. If everything old is new again, then it is safe to assume that Russian political warfare has returned – or perhaps never left – and now has given way to contemporary descriptions associated with nonlinear warfare.

2. Color Revolutions: The West's Contribution to Russian Nonlinear Warfare?

Analysis of the character of Russian warfare in the 21st century requires an examination of the color revolutions and their influence on the psyche of Vladimir Putin and his military's strategic thinkers. From the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan to the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Russia views the political and social upheavals on its periphery as destabilizing and a threat to its sovereignty. In addition, Russia often holds the United States and NATO responsible for initiating and fanning the flames of popular protest. The West's responsibility for inciting the political protests that result in a color revolution is debatable; however, central to Russia's synthesis of the color revolutions that have transpired in a post-Soviet world are the lessons learned and how these lessons can be applied in the employment of nonlinear warfare.

In recent years, Russian military leaders and analysts have spent much time and energy examining the color revolutions. From Gerasimov to Kartapolov, Russian strategic thinkers have consistently acknowledged these events within their academic writings. One lesson drawn from these examinations resulted in Gerasimov's proclamation of a four to one ratio of nonmilitary to military measures observed in modern conflicts. Instruments of national power – also associated

with political warfare – are used more often than traditional military ways and means to achieve strategic goals. In his examination of the Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia analyst Charles Bartles finds that “while the West considers these nonmilitary measures as ways of avoiding war, Russia considers these measures as war.”⁵¹ From the lessons learned observing the color revolutions, Russia realized, or possibly rediscovered, the utility of diplomatic, economic, and political warfare in promoting its national interests.

Engaging in conflicts through the employment of nonmilitary methods provides Russia with the opportunity of winning the easy and unexceptional strategic victory. Moreover, engaging in nonlinear warfare allows Russia to promote its strategic goals with minimal resources by avoiding the expenditure of blood and treasure associated with conventional warfare. In addition, Russia’s ways and means to an unexceptional victory are enhanced through the cyber and information domains. These domains provide Russia with an uninterrupted pathway to stream disinformation and propaganda into targeted states. When provided an opportunity – as seen in Ukraine in 2014 – Russia will exploit social and political chaos to destabilize its adversaries.



Source: Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right.” *Military Review* 96, no. 1 (2016): 34.

Figure 4: From General Valery Gerasimov’s Briefing During the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Third Moscow Conference on International Security

3. Russian Opportunism: Is the Ukrainian Template Replicable?

The social and political upheaval demonstrated during the 2014 Maiden Revolution provided Russia with a window of opportunity to insert itself into the Ukraine crisis. Exploiting the growing chaos within Ukraine, Russia manipulated social and political fissures. In addition, Russian actions aggravated the disorder within the Ukrainian political and social systems. Russia's geographic, historic, and cultural connections to Ukraine clearly assisted their operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. A historic culture of strategic influence, combined with operational and strategic success in Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine serve as an indicator that Russia will continue to use nonlinear warfare to achieve its political and strategic goals. But for Russia to accomplish this, certain conditions on the ground must be met.

National security analyst endeavors to predict the most likely scenario that would allow Russia to replicate its success in Ukraine. Most pundits point to the Baltic States as a potential target for Russian intervention since the Baltics share similar characteristic with Ukraine. The challenge for Russia in replicating a similar operation in the Baltics is the ability to mask its intentions. From the perspective of Sun Tzu, Russia gained early success during the Ukrainian conflict as its strategic disposition remained formless to the international community. Since the conflict, the international community has analyzed the conflict and has discovered Russia's true "form" and inclinations for conducting nonlinear warfare.

Policy Recommendations

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies Russia as a rising threat to the values and interests of the United States. In addition, the policy document calls into focus Russia's increasing investments in its conventional weapon systems along with its hostile posturing along the borders of former Soviet bloc countries. Interestingly, the NSS provides little attention to Russia's subversive political activities other than a brief discussion about "Promoting American Resilience," finding only that "actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies."⁵² Furthermore, the NSS does not make any specific policy recommendations to combat Russia's disinformation and deception campaigns – simply calling upon the public and private sectors to "work together to defend our way of life."⁵³ Since the end of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, national security analysts – such as Frank Hoffman – have called on US policymakers to find solutions to the Russia's threat to the United States and democratic institutions.

In his 2014 writing that examined Russia's evolving character of war that was witnessed during the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts, Frank Hoffman recognizes the term "hybrid warfare" as many scholars soon began using the term to label Russia's actions in Ukraine. In addition, Hoffman describes the Russo-Ukrainian War as an "unconventional conflict" that might also resemble certain characteristics associated with the description of political warfare and defined by George Kennan in 1948.⁵⁴ Most important to Hoffman's findings is his charge to US policymakers to address the challenges that "unconventional conflict" poses to the United States and its allies. Hoffman finds that unconventional threats are not addressed in key US policy documents such as the National Security Strategy or defense planning documents.⁵⁵ Finally,

Hoffman presents several questions for US policymakers to guide them in addressing the unconventional threat, but two questions are the most pressing:

- “Where should the loci of U.S. capability and doctrinal development exist: Defense, State, Intelligence, or something uniquely joint/interagency?”
- “Who is studying this challenge today with any rigor and how well resourced is the effort?”⁵⁶

To answer Hoffman’s first policy question, perhaps it is time to revisit George Kennan’s 1948 memo on political warfare and his policy recommendations for countering Russian political warfare during the Cold War. In his 1948 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, Kennan writes “having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin’s political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare.”⁵⁷ Increasing the resilience of the United States against Russian nonlinear warfare and their attacks on democratic institutions requires a whole-of-government approach that mobilizes all resources across the spectrum of US national power. Kennan recommended a “directorate of political warfare operations” that would work closely with the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate actions and activities to counter Russian nonlinear warfare. A political warfare directorate is once again needed to provide interagency coordination to assist the United States in mobilizing its resources to counter the Russian threat. Due to the nature of Russian attacks on democratic values and institutions, efforts to degrade and defeat them deserve the attention at the highest levels of the US government.

In addition to creating a political warfare directorate responsible for harnessing all instruments of US national power to counter Russian nonlinear warfare, the United States should

take a more aggressive posture within the information and cyber domains. For example, instead of passively waiting for Russian cyberattacks prior to the forthcoming 2018 midterm elections, the United States should look for opportunities to demonstrate its offensive cyber capabilities to Russia. Demonstrating US cyber capabilities to Russia might soften Russia's appetite to again meddle in the US democratic process. Furthermore, within the information domain the United States should be more aggressive in countering Russian narratives while promoting narratives favorable to the United States and its allies. When discussing narrative warfare in the 21st Century, Ajit Mann finds that the United States "must meet the weaponized narratives of our adversaries, not just with a better weaponized narrative, but with a comprehensive narrative strategy."⁵⁸ From Twitter to its strategic communications abroad, the US government must sharpen its narrative and take advantage of opportunities to influence.

Finally, to address Hoffman's question concerning the study and resourcing of US efforts to counter Russian nonlinear warfare, the US Congress should take an active role in guiding policy solutions to the evolving threat. At times throughout American history, the US Congress has established special or select committees to examine policy challenges to US domestic and foreign policy. For example, to investigate fraud and waste as the US industrial base mobilized to meet the material demand in support of World War II, then-Senator Harry Truman established the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program – also known as the Truman Committee.⁵⁹ As the United States enters into a state of perpetual conflict with Russia, Congress should conduct investigations and hold hearings in order to establish an effective policy to respond to Russian nonlinear warfare. With oversight of the Executive Branch, it only makes sense that Congress lead the way in determining the suitable programs and initiatives – along with the required authorizations and appropriations – needed to defeat the Russian threat.

Conclusion

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues to rage with no evidence of cessation since the Minsk II peace agreement signed in 2015. Ukraine finds its goal of joining the European Union thwarted as Russia enjoys a geopolitical victory of driving a wedge between Kiev and Brussels. Moreover, Russian disinformation campaigns continue to attack Western democracies – from the United States to Germany – seeking fractures within targeted populations to plant the seeds of discord and chaos. Russia’s manipulation of social media – using internet trolls to spread disinformation and fuel hyper-partisan political environments – seeks to disrupt democratic institutions and political systems.

Russian tools of the trade – *Maskirovka*, active measures, and reflexive control – continue to factor into Russia’s manipulation of the cyber and information environments to promote its strategic interests. To avoid the military strength of the West, it is evident Russia favors the application of nonlinear warfare over conventional warfare. Sun Tzu and classical Chinese military thought provides a useful theoretical lens through which to analyze and understand recent events and their implications for future Russian conflict. Western policymakers are wise to use this tool to assist in establishing a sound policy to deter and defeat Russian nonlinear warfare and its growing threat to democratic values and institutions.

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act acknowledges the Russian threat posed to the United States and Western democracies. As it states, “Russia’s ongoing malign influence activities—misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks, election interference, active measures, and hybrid warfare operations—pose not only a threat to the security interests of the United States and those of our allies and partners in Europe but also to the integrity of Western democracies and the institutions and alliances they support.”⁶⁰ Increasing the resilience

of the United States against Russia's nonlinear warfare and its attacks on democratic institutions requires a whole-of-government approach that mobilizes all resources across the spectrum of US national power.

Notes

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