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Manpower inventory development involves extensive coordination between Marine Corps agencies that may have competing objectives. This paper explores this complex interaction, through the lens of the Street-to-Fleet team, using Organization Structure, Operational Design, and Organizational Change perspectives to identify resource shortfalls. The Street-to-Fleet team has historical significance in the Marine Corps and the team's efforts are more important than ever based on recent guidance and planning documents that emphasize not only quantity but quality in personnel.

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Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Operationalizing Manpower: How Can Organizing and Resourcing the Manpower Street-to-Fleet Process Support Operational Demand?

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AUTHOR:

Major Alexandra C. Fitzgerald

AY 2018-19

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: J. W. Gordon

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 4/22/19

Oral Defense Committee Member: [Signature]

Approved: P. M. DIENHART - STABILE USMC

Date: 29 APR 2019

S.A. KELLY, CDR, USN

[Signature]

4/29/19

Executive Summary

Title: Operationalizing Manpower: How Can Organizing and Resourcing the Manpower Street-to-Fleet Process Support Operational Demand?

Author: Major Alexandra C. Fitzgerald, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps will continue to change its force structure through the capabilities development process to address emerging threats; however, the institution will not be able to realize its fullest manpower potential until adequate resources are applied to the Human Resources Development Process (HRDP) and the appropriate organizational structure is applied that holds stakeholders accountable.

Discussion: This study reviews a portion of the HRDP through the accession-level, enlisted production process and cross-functional team known as “Street-to-Fleet.”

Conclusion: Manpower inventory development involves extensive coordination between Marine Corps agencies that may have competing objectives. This paper explores this complex interaction, through the lens of the Street-to-Fleet team, using Organizational Structure, Operational Design, and Organizational Change perspectives to identify resource shortfalls. The Street-to-Fleet team has historical significance in the Marine Corps and the team’s efforts are more important than ever based on recent guidance and planning documents that emphasize not only quantity but quality in personnel.

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Preface

The Marine Corps has always valued the individual Marine as a capability available for any fight above equipment, weapons, or technology. The process to generate this manpower involves close coordination within an enterprise-level, cross-functional team. As a Manpower Officer, I did not fully understand the complexities of generating such a capability even after experiencing battalion, regimental, and group-level manpower. Staying tied in with the operations sections at each unit broadened my perspective and I continue to advocate operationalizing manpower processes to support not only the commander, but the warfighter. I arrived at Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department at a time when 0180 Primary Military Occupational Specialty (Adjutants) changed to 0102 (Manpower Officer) and during a period of fluctuating manpower end strength. From this vantage point, I was able to participate in action officer cross-functional teams that worked daily to address manpower readiness and inventory issues, which complemented my experience from the fleet. I gained a deep appreciation for the complexities of manpower, from 0102s and non-0102s, alike while a planner for enlisted accessions, active component end strength, and future manpower operations.

My work on this topic would not have been possible without the support and guidance from my military faculty advisor, Commander Steve Kelley; my thesis advisor, Dr. Gordon; my second reader, Lieutenant Colonel Dienhart-Stabile; Mr. J. Scott Alley, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bowers, Mr. Brian Gahagan, Major Lucas Crider, Captain Scott Steele, Mr. Lane Beindorf, Captain Greg Jaunal, and Major John Dick. My sincerest appreciation also extends to my friends at Command and Staff College, my loving family members to include my mom, sisters, in-laws, and my dearest husband, Mark, for being the most patient man on Earth and my constant source of strength and inspiration.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“MARINES ARE THE MISSION.” The James Wesley Marsh Center at Quantico proudly displays this motto at the entrance of the building shared by Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department and Marine Corps Recruiting Command Headquarters. The Marsh Center plans and executes actions that impact the entire lifecycle of every Marine from accession and recruiting plans to orders and eventually separation. This study expounds upon the planning side of the Human Resource Development Process (HRDP) that drives inventory development and personnel assignments to units.

The Marine Corps continually changes its force structure, through the capabilities development process, to address emerging threats, and in turn, perpetuates personnel inventory to force structure mismatches. The Street-to-Fleet team, a cross-functional team within the HRDP, aims to optimize the production of enlisted personnel inventory to support commanders. The Street-to-Fleet team reflects the complexities and equities of stakeholders across the Marine Corps embedded in the HRDP. To ensure the most ready institutional force, the Marine Corps should adequately resource and organize the Street-to-Fleet team, with the appropriate authorities, organizational structure, and resourcing in order to consistently produce manpower inventory that attains force requirements.

Perspective and Scope

The author’s perspective developed from experiences as a manpower analyst, and manpower officer, with enlisted accession planning, end strength planning, and manpower future operations experience while serving as an action officer with Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department. A fairly recent change to the 01XX community brought more attention to the manpower field. In fiscal year 2015, the Adjutant military

occupational specialty (0180) changed to Manpower Officer (0102). From personal experience and interaction with various 0102s, the roles and responsibilities for Manpower Officers range greatly from general administration, like awards and correspondence, to operational planning and manpower staffing. The Manpower, Personnel, and Administration Doctrine, currently in a draft status, is on the verge of publication to solidify roles and responsibilities that are not only beneficial to the 01XX professional, but the Marines who evaluate them or receive support.¹

The focal point of this study is a subset of the Human Resources Development Process, the enlisted Street-to-Fleet team, which consists of a body of stakeholders dedicated to enlisted accession production processes. Manpower Plans and Policy Division leads the current Street-to-Fleet efforts but must coordinate extensively with and rely on adjacent Headquarters Marine Corps entities. Competing timelines and changing requirements complicate this team's efforts. This study also explores historical documents, from the team's creation in the 1990's, and the dilemmas the institution continues to face with respect to manpower and training. This historical context provides an understanding of how and why present-day Street-to-Fleet processes exist, but also as a base comparison for institutional progress. These complex Marine Corps manpower issues are not simply a service issue, but have impacts to the joint force. The services fulfill the responsibilities for the "functions of recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining" personnel.²

Manpower Literature Review

This abbreviated literature review focuses on select manpower studies conducted by two manpower experts who have extensive experience with operational manpower distribution, staffing, and readiness. These studies inspired the current course of study, but also provided a framework to explore gaps in manpower processes and planning that will aid in implementing their

assignments based recommendations. Common observations and challenges noted between both studies include: a need for a common operational picture, unity of effort, management flexibility, and extensive coordination between the customer (operating forces) and service-level processes.

In “Manpower Management: No Tiered Readiness- Enabling the Nation’s Force in Readiness” the author’s thesis states, “Through detailed review of the Human Resource Development Process for process improvement, specifically systems and policy modifications, the Marine Corps can ensure sustainment of its manpower resources for decisively engaged leadership and combat capabilities in warfighting units.”³ This paper focuses not only on the conundrums that units face with personnel staffing by offering a series of solutions to prioritize and distribute personnel inventory, but also potential changes to systems and policies in the interest of pursuing efficiencies.⁴

The author proposes a “Common Operational Picture” model as a long-term solution for stakeholders, but also compares and contrasts a series of staffing concepts to improve readiness. The concepts range from the aggregate to by-unit detail. Starting with the regional concept, the author discusses that the benefit of this approach is major subordinate command primary military occupational specialties (PMOS), on the aggregate, can be pooled to address shortfalls within the region; however, the pitfall is that individual monitored command codes are not considered.⁵ In the next concept, major subordinate commands manage PMOS staffing and redistribute personnel internally.⁶ While this option provides visibility at the major subordinate command (MSC) level, this course of action leverages additional responsibility on the MSC staff. Lastly, in the most detailed scale, the monitored command code removes the staffing burden from the MSC or region, but also results in rigid assignment, or best fit, by PMOS and grade to individual units.⁷

The Masters study, “Does the Corps have a “Ready Bench?” An Analysis of the Disparity

Between Supply and Operational Demand,” continues the discussion regarding manpower readiness at the operational level through an analysis of competing requirements and processes owners that utilize the Marine Corps’ human capital. The author posits, “Without a holistic appreciation of the impacts weighing on personnel readiness, the Marine Corps is unable to properly balance force readiness against operational demand to meet its current and future strategic goals.”⁸

The author recommends that the service appropriately account for all operational manpower requirements, select a deputy commandant to synchronize manpower readiness efforts, develop a campaign plan to guide the process, and develop a manpower system to automate manpower data and support decision making.⁹ The key takeaway brought to light is that Marine Corps’ stakeholders are competing for the same precious human capital and until a plan can synchronize the supply and demand, the institution will continue to strain available resources and inefficiently manage risk.¹⁰

Course of Study

This qualitative study analyzes active component, enlisted Marine production processes only and guides the reader through a four-step process. First, the reader receives context for topic relevance with a short review of planning documents and the history behind the Street-to-Fleet team. The thesis will be reviewed through a Marine Corps Planning Process lens using Operational Design and problem framing to understand the current and desired future states for HRDP interactions and stakeholder dynamics. Lastly, Organizational Change analysis will provide recommendations to address the problem set. Since manpower and equipment readiness items generate daily questions for commanders and action officers alike, the Marine Corps, as an

institution, will benefit from a holistic explanation and analysis of the Human Resources Development Process.

Chapter 2: Context

Marine Corps Strategies

The Marine Corps Operating Concept, published in 2016, guides the Marine Corps' collective efforts "to ensure future readiness and relevancy."¹¹ A recurring theme is the requirement for a "flexible and versatile" force prepared to meet a full spectrum of challenges.¹² The environment and threats have expanded into domains like space and cyberspace that place an emphasis on cognitive skill sets.¹³ Manpower is a key component to executing this concept that requires a significant time investment to realize. One of the critical tasks in the Marine Corps Operating Concept is to "Exploit the Competence of the Individual Marine" through the pursuit of quality personnel from recruiting, training, and retention activities.¹⁴ The service-level guidance can achieve success with the support from all Marines. The service mission clearly depends upon people. General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps emphasized in testimony that, "Recruiting and retaining quality men and women of character in today's Corps is our friendly center of gravity and our highest priority."¹⁵

Realizing the Commandant's vision requires coordination from multiple Headquarters Marine Corps departments. One of the primary stakeholders is the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The Marine Corps Military Manpower Modernization Campaign Plan provides a framework to achieve service-level goals through four desired ends: continue to enhance quality and resilience in the force, increase leader-to-led ratios, maintain family readiness, and balance readiness to meet requirements across the range of military operations.¹⁶ From a strategic level, the Manpower and Reserve Affairs plan describes the human resources value chain within the Human Resources Development Process to attract, retain, and support Marines and their families.¹⁷ The plan describes the human resources value chain business model as consisting of seven functions ranging from requirements development to employment and utilizes feedback mechanisms to sustain and improve processes over time.¹⁸

From the Street to the Fleet

“You’ll never get the institutional training process unscrewed until the flag officer who is in charge of the Marine Corps School System has command of ALL parts of the System, and he has the authority to bite someone in the leg to make it work from the streets of Brooklyn all the way through the process until that Marine reports to C, 1/8.”¹⁹

The Street-to-Fleet process traces its origins back to the efforts to improve recruit quality and the training management system. Process improvement efforts shifted heavily to Manpower and Reserve Affairs from Marine Corps Combat Development Command during the mid-1990s. Much credit goes to the extensive documentation on Marine Corps systems and organization by Colonel Patrick Collins, USMC (Retired). His detailed research and dedication to improving Marine Corps processes extended far beyond his time on active duty.

In November 1987, Colonel Collins sent a series of memoranda to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on tracking recruits between the depots and Schools of Infantry, recruit attrition and the effects on manpower overhead, and the need for a training management system to maintain the quality emphasized by General Wilson over a decade earlier.²⁰ In February 1993, now retired Colonel Collins, wrote the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to encourage the continued development Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command to be the sole commander of institutional training and to maintain momentum on continuous training management system efforts initiated in 1979 by General Barrow.²¹ By January 1995, Marine Corps Combat Development Command initiated a proposal for an Enlisted Accession, Training, and Sponsor Committee to enable coordinating efforts between Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Marine Corps Recruiting Command to minimize time awaiting training time.²²

Colonel Collins continued his process improvement efforts with a missive in February 1996 to Lieutenant General VanRiper, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, that discussed manpower-led working groups to address unit cohesion and personnel replacements.²³ Colonel Collins' understanding from interacting with the then Commandant, General Krulak, and Lieutenant General VanRiper, is that the future of the Marine Corps relies heavily on "the effectiveness of manpower systems and productivity of training systems."²⁴ The symptoms that plagued the system at the time include poor training performance standards, a lack of trained instructors, excessive non-expiration of active service attrition, and command and control mechanisms over schoolhouses.²⁵ Colonel Collins' observations foreshadow many agenda items experienced by today's efforts.

General Krulak issues Commandant's Planning Guidance regarding the issue of vacant school seats to which Manpower Plans and Policy Division responds with the results of the Enlisted Accession, Training, and Structure Committee's study (also known as the Enlisted Accessions, Training, Classification and Assignment Committee).²⁶ The committee's tasks included:

- Ensure trained Marines meet manpower requirements
- Improve the interface between recruiting and training cycles
- Reduce awaiting training time
- Reduce lost training opportunities²⁷

The committee used the Business Process Improvement steps which requires members to:

- Learn the process
- Identify levers to adjust the process
- Test alternate courses of action
- Provide recommendations to optimize the system while minimizing unintended consequences²⁸

The Business Process Improvement report on the Street-to-Fleet Process focused on addressing long awaiting training time, missed school seats, and MOS imbalance symptoms.²⁹ Common themes and issues from committee participants included: inefficient processes, missed school seats, mismatch between training and accession phasing, ownership, metrics, meeting force

requirements, meeting training requirements, quality of recruits, cost, standard measures for awaiting training time, and measurements for production success.³⁰

Chapter 3: Methodology

Design Framework

The Marine Corps Planning Process' design methodology identifies limiting factors that prevent a desired state from emerging under current conditions. According to MCDP 5-10, "the purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate conceptual solution."³¹ The design methodology identifies the current and desired states for current Street-to-Fleet processes along manpower plans, recruiting, training, and assignment lines of effort and with a comparison to efforts from 1996. To achieve the desired state, the following analysis considers Doctrine, Organization, Training/Education, Materiel, Leadership/Communication Synchronization, Personnel, Facilities, and Cost (DOTMLPF/C) solutions.

A Human Resources Development Process Baseline

Problem framing begins with the requirements development process to fully understand the demand signal that drives Marine Corps personnel readiness and manpower planning and production efforts. Total Force Structure Division, under the purview of the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, owns the Total Force Structure Process Order and maintains the Marine Corps' force structure development process.³² The development of this capability examines significant changes through the assessment of Doctrine, Organization, Training/Education, Materiel, Leadership/Communication Synchronization, Personnel, Facilities, and Cost pillars (DOTMLPF/C).³³ The DOTMLPF/C process enables pillar representatives to comment on second and third order effects to the institution. The Total Force Structure Process Order mentions the Human Resource Development Process periodically, but the HRDP itself is not explained to the reader.

The three largest stakeholders in the HRDP are the Deputy Commandants for Combat Development and Integration, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command.³⁴ Other significant stakeholders include the Commanding General, Training and Education Command and the Directors of Manpower Management and Manpower Plans and Policy Divisions.³⁵ The complexity of coordination between these Headquarters Marine Corps agencies can be seen in figure 1 as integrated into an annual budget cycle.




Figure 1: A depiction of the Human Resources Development Process lifecycle within a fiscal year with tasks color-coded for stakeholder responsibilities

Unfortunately, a Human Resources Development Process order does not exist. The recently published Marine Corps Enlisted Production Process Order serves as a proxy for this gap and describes the role of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs as the Human Resources Development Process owner.³⁶ The Enlisted Production Process Order states that the Human Resource Development Process “encompasses manpower planning, recruiting, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) classification, Primary MOS training, and concludes with qualified Marines available for assignment.”³⁷ A recent overview brief of the Human Resources Development Process describes the system as “the process to attract, retain, and develop Marine to increase warfighting readiness and maximize individual potential.”³⁸ A primary goal in the process is to “reduce the gap between inventory and structure.” The recurring concepts between the two definitions, originating from Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, is that the process end state is to optimize force readiness and assignments through coordinated actions that produce Marines with the desired qualities in accordance with Marine Corps quantity requirements.

The absence of a formal Human Resources Development Process order and single process owner has not prevented incremental progress. Human Resource Development Process stakeholders agreed upon continuous process improvement deployment charters in October 2008 and April 2010.³⁹ Coordination and progress is limited as Manpower Plans and Policy Division leads HRDP sub-processes between a wide range of stakeholders that do not fall under the Manpower and Reserve Affairs hierarchy.

The Enlisted Production Process Order acknowledges immediately that no single organization owns the Street-to-Fleet process that starts with manpower planning and ends with Marines reporting to their first duty station.⁴⁰ The complexity of this cross-functional team is

inherent in the span and number of prominent stakeholders that make the system function. Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Training and Education Command, and Marine Corps Recruiting Command are primary stakeholders in the Street-to-Fleet process; however, each entity is not only governed by the Enlisted Production Process Order, but their own command orders and directives.⁴¹ A more detailed interaction and some of the products exchanged between the Street-to-Fleet stakeholders can be seen in figure 2.




Figure 2: The Street-to-Fleet Process and major waypoints for manpower production⁴²

The enlisted production process intends to support the service-level responsibilities to man and train the force as evidenced by the current mission statement which reads, “The entry-level production process develops the inventory to support USMC force structure requirements while maximizing efficient use of resources, and minimizing time awaiting training.”⁴³ Manpower Plans and Policy Division (Plans, Programs, and Budget Branch; MPP) serves as the Street-to-Fleet

working group lead for monthly coordination and reconciliation meetings between stakeholders to address efficiency and resourcing issues.⁴⁴ O-6 and O-7 level meetings also occur at a minimum, quarterly and annually, to address Street-to-Fleet issues.⁴⁵

MPP's plans impact and drive other stakeholder requirements. MPP produces three main enlisted accession plans: Program Plan, Classification Plan, and a Training Input Plan.⁴⁶ The Program Plan specifies monthly Program Enlisted For (PEF) allocations for Marine Corps Recruiting Command, the Classification Plan guides recruit PMOS assignment by Manpower Management Division and other schoolhouse sub-classification authorities, and the Training Input Plan provides entry-level seat requirements for Training and Education Command.⁴⁷ The Street-to-Fleet team focuses on seven objectives that range from developing efficiencies in the current process through communication, coordination, evaluation, implementation, and quality assurance between stakeholders to educating and conducting site visits to schoolhouses.⁴⁸ The Street-to-Fleet team's efforts were formally published via Marine Corps Order in 2018.

Understanding Organizational Structure

Organizational structures enable a hierarchy of authority and the formalization, specialization, and centralization of functions.⁴⁹ This study considers functional, divisional, and matrix organizational structures to incorporate into the Street-to-Fleet team's problem framing and design processes. The functional organization is a common structure seen in Marine Corps staff headquarters (see figure 3). Functional organizations enable skill development and communication between superiors and subordinates through functional groups lead by specialists.⁵⁰ However, the functional organization can result in limited coordination between departments and a narrow perspective for managers as a result of the focus on skill specialization.⁵¹ As seen in figure 3, Marine Corps staff sections can specialize in administration, intelligence, logistics, and so forth,

but coordination between the sections may be challenging based on priorities within those functional areas.




Figure 3: Illustration of a Typical Functional Marine Corps Organizational Structure

Organizations with a divisional structure focus on products or services enabled largely by its own resources.⁵² While the divisional structure orients leaders or managers to unit or organizational results, the structure may not utilize resources efficiently or truly focus on the organization's overall goals.⁵³ Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict divisional organizations within Headquarters Marine Corps that produce specific products and services for the Corps. The divisional organizational structure may also result in multiple roles being placed on unit members.⁵⁴ A good example of this assignment of duties can be seen in the dual-hatted responsibilities of the Marine Corps Recruit Depots to Recruiting Command and Training and Education Command in figure 5.⁵⁵




Figure 4: Manpower and Reserve Affairs Divisional Structure




Figure 5: Marine Corps Recruiting Command Organizational Structure

Matrix organizations have divisions or groups that blend characteristics from the previously two discussed structures and combines the dual-nature of specialization and demand.⁵⁶ Benefits of a matrix-style organization include improved communication between leaders and the flexible utilization of specialists.⁵⁷ There are three types of matrix sub-organizations: weak, balanced, and strong.⁵⁸ The strength of a matrix organization depends upon the project manager in the situation.⁵⁹ Arguably, the Street-to-Fleet team construct can be viewed as a weak matrix organization since the team lead from Manpower Plans and Policy Division has little autonomy over the other team members outside of the Street-to-Fleet forum (see figure 7).




Figure 6: Combat Development and Integration/ Combat Development Command Organizational Structure

The Street-to-Fleet team currently operates as a cross-functional team consisting of members pulled from across the Human Resources Development Process. Literature on the topic identifies cross-functional teams as “permanent or temporary group aimed at reducing conflicts in goals, languages, and process that require cross-functional integration”⁶⁰ and “individuals from various functional areas...that work together to obtain a specific goal.”⁶¹ The recurring meetings and coordination between the team members is not always the primary function or purpose of the organization’s chosen representative however. The mere existence of such teams does not guarantee success, but structure and support from top-level leadership have been proven to improve their effectiveness.⁶²




Figure 7: Street-to-Fleet Team Cross-Functional Make-up

Three internal elements must exist to increase the chances of success: a stage setting environment, shared leadership, and cohesion.⁶³ The benefits of cross-functional teams include improved communication between the members, reduced conflict, and maintained focus on organizational goals.⁶⁴

Current and Desired States

The desired state for Street-to-Fleet operations consists of minimized disruptions to personnel inventory production from attrition, wait times at school houses and screening processes in order to generate the right skill sets at the right times for using units.⁶⁵ This desired state also requires minimal changes to Marine Corps' force structure, synchronization between Street-to-Fleet stakeholder and adjacent military service planning timelines, and flexibility in the HRDP's capacity to make adjustments in throughput within the production pipeline.

The current state bears some resemblance to the Enlisted Accessions, Training, Classification and Assignment Committee's concerns and report from 1996. As previously mentioned, challenges to the existing system included a lack of unity of effort, missed training school seats, mismatches between training and accession phasing, concerns with attrition, deficiencies in trained instructors, and undefined standards and metrics for production. These themes still exist in today's Street-to-Fleet efforts. Presently, the Street-to-Fleet team achieves only unity of effort as team members come from three different commands or departments.⁶⁶ The Street-to-Fleet stakeholders use different planning horizons and phasing considerations over an annual period.

MPP attempts to maintain initiative in planning and execution through the production of multiple year manpower plans that enables for the proper coordination of resources needed with agencies within or outside the Marine Corps.⁶⁷ The challenge for Training and Education Command lies in coordinating with adjacent military services for school seats. Sister service school seat allocation timelines lead the Marine by a minimum of two years and are often inflexible to increases in Marine Corps school seat requests or heavily scrutinize the underutilization of seats.⁶⁸ Internally to the Marine Corps, Recruiting Command capitalizes on the quality of the high school graduation market by shipping close to half of annual recruits during the summer months.⁶⁹ This practice attains quality goals for the Marine Corps and reduces attrition levels; however, the surge of personnel from the recruit depots the summer months overwhelms schoolhouse capacities during the winter. Additionally, if the Marine Corps force structure changes significantly, within the known three-year planning window and all other efforts are in motion, the Street-to-Fleet team's challenge is closing the inventory to force structure gap and dampening the negative effects on units.⁷⁰

Another hurdle for the Street-to-Fleet team is monitoring the effects of screening procedures for potential and actual personnel inventory. At various stages in a Marine's life cycle, an individual's characteristics are reviewed through medical, academic, security clearance, and military occupational standards to minimize disruptions and optimize production.⁷¹ These screening procedures often take time and additional resources potentially delaying an individual's movement through the pipeline. Once a Marine meets screening requirements and initiates training at a PMOS producing school, the next challenge may be insufficient schoolhouse capacity due to lack of instructors or classes.⁷² Schoolhouse instructor shortages can also be exacerbated by reductions in force structure requirements at those locations or insufficient staffing due to unhealthy PMOS inventory, which further compounds the aggregate inventory issue.⁷³

Organizational Change

After analyzing organizational structure and reviewing the desired and current states, an organization can implement improvements through Kotter's Eight Phases of Change. Leadership expert John Kotter studied 100 companies experiencing transitions and compiled eight steps to enable successful organization change.⁷⁴ The eight steps are: 1) Establish a Sense of Urgency; 2) Form a Strong Guiding Coalition; 3) Create a Vision; 4) Communicate the Vision; 5) Empower Others to Act on the Vision; 6) Plan for and Create Short-Term Victories; 7) Consolidate Improvements and Maintain Momentum; and 8) Institutionalize New Approaches.⁷⁵

The Street-to-Fleet process continues to evolve since its inception in the mid-1990s from a committee study body to a recurring meeting of stakeholders in a defined Human Resources Development Process. Overall, the present-day Street-to-Fleet team's processes – educate, communicate, coordinate, evaluate, implement, quality assurance, and site visits – align well with Kotter's framework; however, insufficient organizational structure and resources prevent the

effective attainment of Street-to-Fleet objectives. Table 1 below aligns Street-to-Fleet processes from the Enlisted Production Process Order with Kotter’s phases.⁷⁶ The table assesses how well existing Street-to-Fleet team steps integrate process improvements and influence organizational change. Content in the middle columns comes directly from the Enlisted Production Process Order. The far-right column presents actions currently taken by the Street-to-Fleet team that fulfill the intent of the written objectives.

Kotter’s Eight Phases of Change⁷⁷	Street-to-Fleet Process Execution⁷⁸	Stated Objectives⁷⁹	Observed Execution
Establish a Sense of Urgency	Educate	Educate stakeholders across the HRDP on concepts, processes, cohort development and management, stakeholder responsibilities, and current/future operations.	HRDP goal to reduce gap between inventory and structure; Attention provided to Marines-Awaiting-Training updates; Site visits
Form a Strong Guiding Coalition	Communicate	Maintain a fast, efficient network of communication within the Street-to-Fleet team and HRDP stakeholders to update changes to plans, identify resource limitations and shortfalls, and coordinate throughput timing.	Formal and recurring Street-to-Fleet meetings . Coalition consists of a cross-functional team at multiple levels.
Create a Vision	Coordinate	Coordinate changes to plans and the execution of plans to meet manpower requirements, resource constraints, service initiatives, etc.	Street-to-Fleet mission statement from the Enlisted Production Process Order.
Communicate the Vision	Evaluate	Develop common metrics across organizations and continually evaluate plans, processes, and MOS production to identify deviations and recommend corrective action.	Recurring meetings ; Street-to-Fleet site visits to formal learning centers.
Empower Others to Act on the Vision	Implement	Implement necessary process changes to reduce costs, limit wasted time, improve resource management, and match service initiatives.	Formal learning center site visits ; Meetings across the Street-to-Fleet team with feedback; Reception of process recommendations and changes by MPP.
Plan for and Create Short-Term Victories	Quality Assurance	Ensure that each Marine meets the MOS prerequisites as he/she transitions through the entry-level production process. The STF Team, to include individual formal learning centers, will ensure that individual Marine data is accurate and correct within Marine Corps data systems.	Evaluations with metrics; Accomplishment presentations at higher-level meetings .
Consolidate Improvements and Maintain Momentum	Site Visits	Conduct site visits across the HRDP, as necessary; to execute the above tasks and implement any service related information campaign.	Site visits to formal learning centers maintain momentum at the action officer level; Advocacy through O-6 and O-7-level meetings .

Institutionalize New Approaches	No specified task from the Enlisted Production Process Order (MCO 5300.19).	No corresponding objectives from the Enlisted Production Process Order (MCO 5300.19).	Discussion and implementation of institutional changes at general officer-level meetings (e.g. Executive Steering Group or Executive Offsite).
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Table 1: Analysis of the Street-to-Fleet Process Using Kotter’s Eight Phases of Change

In table 1, red highlighted rows identify opportunities for significant improvement, green highlighted rows indicate areas with satisfactory actions, and non-highlighted rows signify areas with opportunities for moderate improvement. The Street-to-Fleet team coordinates and communicates at all levels through meetings and site visits to formal learning centers. While the team identifies challenges and proposed changes well, strengthening formal relationships, reporting, and advocacy would better advance and solidify overall progress. The implementation step enables short-term solutions; however, an addition to the Enlisted Production Process Order decisively integrating long-term changes through senior leadership would ensure continuous progress.

Chapter 4: Recommendations and Conclusions

Recommendations

The Marine Corps would benefit from a published HRDP order to clarify and strengthen Street-to-Fleet efforts. The current Enlisted Production Process order acknowledges that the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs owns the HRDP; however, the same order also states that no single entity owns Street-to-Fleet processes. These two statements do not complement one another and generate confusion regarding the accountability for personnel inventory. If Manpower and Reserve Affairs is responsible for personnel inventory, all orders tied to the HRDP need clear reporting requirements and relationships for unity of effort. This clarification would not alter existing organizational structures for HRDP stakeholders. Externally, adjacent organizations retain their functional structures (e.g. Recruiting Command- recruiting) and internally, organizations also maintain their divisional hierarchies (e.g. Manpower and Reserve Affairs- Management Division, Plans and Policy Division).

The current Street-to-Fleet team draws members from low-density billets whose responsibilities include additional, but parallel HRDP efforts. In the short-term, HRDP stakeholders should evaluate existing Street-to-Fleet team member billets, account for the defined Street-to-Fleet mission requirements, and augment existing organizations as needed. A stand-alone Street-to-Fleet team with dedicated billets potentially adds a layer of bureaucracy that simply requests data or information from action officers, further hindering and not complementing existing manpower efforts. However, the preferred way-ahead augments integrated billets, within the existing matrix structure, to support and enable the energy required to manage inventory production. The additional billets would come at a cost to the institution and should be carefully assessed for the return on investment through formal DOTMLPF analysis.

The throughput at schoolhouses depends heavily on instructors, which can determine the frequency of course offerings and classroom ratios. Unfortunately, supporting establishment units, like schoolhouses, can take significant structural cuts relative to operational units. This attempt to minimize risk can have negative impacts on the institution's ability to generate its full manpower requirement. Maintaining consistency and the integrity of instructors may not yield immediate results in specialties with significant deficiencies, but in the long run, steady and predictable instructor capacity should be maintained to benefit collective efforts in inventory development.

Lastly, further study is recommended to evaluate formal reporting hierarchies between stakeholders to assess what relationships need to be established. As stated earlier, the Commanding Generals at the Recruit Depots also hold Recruiting Region responsibilities and manage inputs (recruits) and outputs (Marines) to the institution. Manpower and Reserve Affairs has been designated HRDP owner, but the largest contributors and their respective processes and outputs, fall outside of Manpower's immediate purview. The Marine Corps has struggled with many of the organizational structure challenges and debated potential reporting hierarchies for decades without making significant adjustments to improve Street-to-Fleet and HRDP functionality.

In the short-term, based on the analysis conducted on organizational change, the institution should implement "dual-hat" reporting hierarchies within the larger HRDP construct, evaluate the effectiveness of these hierarchies and relationships after a one year period, and then determine if a long-term arrangement is warranted. Recruiting Command and Training and Education Command coordinate with Manpower and Reserve Affairs extensively through Street-to-Fleet efforts, but no other formal reporting relationship exists. Manpower and Reserve Affairs already directs Recruiting Command and Training and Education Command, annually via the Manpower Accession and Retention Plan (Memo-01), regarding the quantity of personnel to be recruited and

trained.⁸⁰ Adding a dual-hat reporting requirement to Manpower and Reserve Affairs on HRDP efforts reinforces an existing relationship with formal feedback to the process owner. This arrangement bears similarities to how the Recruit Depot and Recruiting Region commander holds dual responsibilities for the input and output of recruits and Marines at the execution of the HRDP.

Conclusions

Manpower inventory development involves extensive coordination between Marine Corps agencies that at times have competing objectives. This study explored this complex interaction, through the lens of the Street-to-Fleet team, using Organizational Structure, Operational Design, and Organizational Change perspectives to identify resource shortfalls. The Street-to-Fleet team's historical significance and efforts in the Marine Corps are more important than ever based on recent guidance and planning documents that emphasize the importance of not only quantity, but quality in personnel.

The Enlisted Production Process Order explains the authority of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to manage overall manpower inventory development; however, resource shortfalls such as schoolhouse throughput and instructor shortfalls can hinder overall production, which leaves the Human Resource Development Process with limited flexibility and capacity to respond to changes in manpower demand. Many of the Street-to-Fleet participants are dual-hatted and the value of this current cross-functional team warrants augmentation to the Street-to-Fleet team. The Street-to-Fleet team's successes occurred through centralized planning and decentralized execution across multiple commands and the team has proven its worth to the institution.⁸¹

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