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14. ABSTRACT This paper discusses the myths associated with General Joseph Hooker during the Chancellorsville campaign and his decision making process during his most criticized moments throughout. While Hooker made many controversial decisions during the Chancellorsville campaign, this analysis will discuss three of the more important decisions he made: Pulling his forces back to Chancellorsville; response to General Jackson's flank attack; and withdrawing from Hazel Grove, demonstrating the logic in his decisions and the variables that influenced them.					
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HOOKER'S LOGICAL DECISIONS

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Executive Summary

Title: Hooker's Logical Decisions

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Thesis: General Joseph Hooker was a capable commander that, despite ultimately being defeated, executed sound logic in his decisions during the Chancellorsville campaign.

Discussion: General Joseph Hooker is a commander that receives much criticism after relinquishing command of the Army of the Potomac in 1863. Several more recent studies focus on his performance in the Chancellorsville campaign in order to compare him against General Robert E. Lee to demonstrate what a capable commander looks like, and what a bad commander looks like. However, the results of the Chancellorsville campaign should not be enough to discredit General Hooker. A removal of the myths that have tarnished his reputation and a closer analysis of his decisions made during the campaign will demonstrate that there were clear logical reasons to his decisions. While Hooker made many controversial decisions during the campaign, this analysis will discuss three of the more important decisions he made: Pulling his forces back to Chancellorsville; response to General Jackson's flank attack; and withdrawing from Hazel Grove, will demonstrate the logic in his decisions and the variables that influenced them.

The value in analyzing this campaign from Hooker's perspective is that it provides an opportunity to improve in two critical areas. First, is that these key points reinforce the importance of asking the right questions. As military professionals it is imperative to get to the ground truth of a situation by asking good questions and eliminating myths. Second, is that Hooker highlights the importance of turning defeat into success. This can be seen in his reaction to terrible tactical actions or how he transitions his forces as disaster occurs.

Conclusion: Putting his overall reputation aside, and ignoring the myths about him, a better analysis of General Hooker's decisions surfaces. Throughout each of the major decision points conducted, there are clear logical reasons as to why he chose them. In many cases, there were no real alternatives given his situation.

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Introduction

General Joseph Hooker is a commander who has received great criticism from both contemporaries and historians since relinquishing his leadership of the Army of the Potomac in June of 1863.¹ Several more recent studies have focused on his performance in the Chancellorsville campaign comparing him against General Robert E. Lee to demonstrate what a capable commander looks like, and what a bad commander looks like. Notable older works by John Bigelow and Walter Hebert, as well as other writers, add similar negative perspectives of General Hooker and his decisions during the campaign. Several more recent writers such as Stephen Sears and Frank O'Reilly offer a more balanced view of General Hooker, however, the broader myths and criticism continue to reinforce a false narrative towards him and unfairly disparage his decisions.

One such example can be found in the commonly cited myth that Hooker “lost faith in himself during the Chancellorsville campaign.” This myth was created by the 1910 work of John Bigelow and his inclusion of a letter from Major E. P. Halstead, a staff officer for Abner Doubleday. Halstead recounts in the letter that Hooker and Doubleday were riding towards Gettysburg a couple of months after Chancellorsville when Doubleday asked “Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? Some say you were injured by a shell, and others you were drunk; now tell us what it was.” According to Halstead, Hooker replied “Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hooker and that is all there is to it.”² Under closer examination of the incident, Halstead’s account does not add up. Hooker was injured by a shell, suffered a massive concussion, and he was never in a position to ride with Doubleday after the Battle of Chancellorsville. Distance between Hooker and Abner Doubleday would have put them miles apart following the conclusion of the Chancellorsville Campaign

further discounting Halstead's claim.³ These myths need to be challenged in order to gain a better understanding of why the commander was making the decisions they made.

The command climate of the Army of the Potomac as Hooker was appointed as Commander was dire. General Ambrose Burnside had left his successor with many problems to face and he did not have the support of General Halleck, the General-in-Chief.⁴ Hooker's appointment was made by President Lincoln alone that left out any reservations that General Halleck may have had, causing a more distant divide between the General-in-Chief and the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker, however, did have a favorable relationship with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, further demonstrating that his appointment was politically motivated and highly favorable with the Republicans of the time.⁵

Although there were many administrative issues, such as desertions and organizational structure issues for him to fix, his most challenging problem after assuming command was in dealing with the officers within the Army, many who were Democrats. Even though Hooker was able to remove many of the officers that he thought would give him trouble, or replace vacancies, those that remained were still not fully supportive of Hooker.⁶ Many of the Corps commanders did not like the changes that were being made to the Army of the Potomac, or were still partial to General George B. McClellan, and still perceived that there was a better replacement for Burnside other than Hooker. This tense relationship between Lincoln, Halleck, Hooker and the Corps commanders left the overall climate for the Army of the Potomac strained at best.

Hooker received his commission on 3 August 1861, as a Brigadier General, and his early battles placed him in many of the more significant battles of 1862. This includes the Seven Days Battles, 2nd Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.⁷ In each of these battles as a commander he performed admirably and was well respected by both his men and peers alike.

His reputation during this time, that of a skilled fighting general, created additional myths such as the nickname “Fighting Joe,” an error added by newspapers of the time.⁸ Those campaigns did not highlight him as a person of questionable decision making or inability, but one that was very capable. Questioning his myths and analyzing Hooker’s more commonly criticized points will demonstrate the logic in his decision making. Overall, this analysis will argue that General Joseph Hooker was a capable commander that, despite ultimately being defeated, executed sound logic in his decisions during three primary points during the Chancellorsville campaign: Pulling his forces back to Chancellorsville; response to General Jackson’s flank movement; and the withdraw from Hazel Grove.

Part 1, Pull back to Chancellorsville:

After assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, Hooker implemented a series of changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the force after the devastating defeat at Fredericksburg in 1862. On 31 January, shortly after taking command, Hooker received a letter from General Halleck that stated:

In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them⁹

This gave Hooker his initiating directive to begin to construct his plan for the spring campaign against General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. His overall operation consisted of three major parts. The first part of the plan would send the greater part of his cavalry corps with 9,895 men under General George Stoneman to penetrate Confederate territory and sever key lines of communication to the Army of Northern Virginia. This left a brigade of cavalry to remain with Hooker and the main force.¹⁰ The second part consisted of a reinforced VI Corps under General John Sedgwick, as well as the I and III Corps, to perform

demonstrations at Fredericksburg to fix Lee. Lastly, Hooker would take the rest of the Army of the Potomac and cross the Rappahannock and establish a defensive position to the west of Lee in order to force him to fight against overwhelming odds, or retreat to Richmond. General Stoneman and his forces set off to conduct their part of the operation on Monday, April 13th, officially starting Hooker's campaign. Due to rain, General Stoneman was delayed in his crossing of the Rappahannock and would wait to cross until the main force with General Hooker began their march on April 28th. Later that day, Kelly's Ford would be seized, and engineers would erect a pontoon bridge to cross and on April 29th, the V, XI, and XII Corps were able to cross the Rappahannock. On April 30th the greater portion of the Army of the Potomac was able to cross the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's Fords and reach the crossroads at Chancellorsville.¹¹ Those Confederate pickets engaged as Union forces crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were able to reach Lee and warn him of the Union force heading to Fredericksburg from the east.

Despite the initial secrecy, Hooker's initial stages of the operation were successful. April 30th saw the rapid transition of his forces across the Rappahannock and his plan to set up a defensive perimeter west of Fredericksburg seemed to be going as planned.¹² Hooker, after the arrival of the II and III Corps at Chancellorsville on May 1st, sent his forces out down three separate routes in order to place them on Lee's flank and rear in the following order:

The 5th corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the river road by the most direct route; the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott and Golin runs. The movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at 2 o'clock.

The 12th corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advance parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the 11th corps to take its position.

One division of the 2d corps, with one battery, will take a position at Tod's tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction

of the enemy.

The other divisions and batteries of the corps will be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville; these dispositions to be made at once.

The 3d corps will be massed as fast as it arrives, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States ford road, excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's tavern.

General Pleasanton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.

After the movement commences headquarters will be at Tabernacle church.

The 11th corps, with its batteries, will be massed on the plank road, about one mile in rear of the 12th; this movement to be completed at 2 o'clock.

By command of Major General Hooker.¹³

This order would place General George G. Meade's V Corps on the northern route along River Road, General Henry W. Slocum took the southern Orange Plank Road, and the 2nd Division from Meade's V Corps under General George Sykes took the central route down the Orange Turnpike Road. What Hooker envisioned was placing the Army of the Potomac in a strong defensive line along the ridge stretching from Banks' Ford to Salem Church in Lee's rear.¹⁴ This would allow Hooker to tie Sedgwick's forces and those south of the Rappahannock together.

Lee was initially slow to react to the approaching union force and quickly dispatched his forces under Richard H. Anderson to prepare trenchworks on top of the Zoan Church ridge.¹⁵ Work on these defenses continued the morning of May 1st until Stonewall Jackson arrived with a new plan to halt and fix the Union advance along the Orange Turnpike Road with Lafayette McLaws' Division, while he travelled down the Orange Plank Road to the south to flank the Union forces.¹⁶ At approximately 11:00 AM, McLaws foremost brigade under General William Mahone met with Sykes Division initiating the first day of the battle. After three hours of intense fighting, General Hooker ordered a withdrawal back to Chancellorsville to set up a defensive perimeter.

It is at this point in the Chancellorsville campaign where Hooker receives harsh criticism in his decision to pull back and establish a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville.¹⁷

General Meade expressed his frustration with the order when he said “My God, if we can’t hold the top of the hill, we certainly can’t hold the bottom of it.” Other critics echoed Meade’s disappointment and added additional criticism for not pushing forward or reinforcing Sykes with the II Corps. “The battle of Chancellorsville was lost right there,” a former staff officer from Hooker’s army would later state about the decision to not push to the high ground south of Banks’ Ford.¹⁸

In Hooker’s mind, this was far from the truth. While he wanted to see his army reach its first objective, his reaction to meeting Lee’s forces was actually reasonable. Hooker had already gained an assessment of the terrain around Chancellorsville as his force had arrived on April 30th. Chancellorsville offered a concentration of all main routes in Spotsylvania County at a point of high ground. Opposed to the wilderness that surrounded it, Chancellorsville had clear avenues of approach that overlooked open ground that Hooker could place artillery and fight a defensive battle if needed. His decision-making process becomes clearer knowing that he already viewed Chancellorsville to be a considerable piece of terrain before pushing forces out on May 1st.¹⁹

Hooker’s plan relied heavily on the element of surprise, and the early engagement on May 1st was not expected.²⁰ He did not expect that Lee would be that far west with a large portion of his forces. Hooker originally wanted to reach as far forward as Tabernacle and Zoan Churches to the west of Fredericksburg and place the rest of General Meade’s V Corps northwest of Fredericksburg to hold Banks Ford as a solid line of communication back to Army Headquarters in Falmouth.²¹ The defensive line based on these locations would have eventually

stretched from Banks Ford down past Tabernacle Church giving Hooker exactly what he was looking for, a position similar to Marye's Heights that would have the Confederates throwing themselves at a strong defensive position. With such a sound plan, there does not seem to be much logic then to pull troops back to Chancellorsville when the original plan was so favorable.

It was not until his forces under General Sykes with the 2nd Division of the V Corps and General Slocum's XII Corps found themselves pitted against an underestimated force emerging down the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank roads that he had to decide if his initial objective was better ground than what he occupied at Chancellorsville.²² What Hooker was not expecting was that General Lee's pickets and early warning mechanisms placed along the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers would report his movements as early as they did.²³ The dismissal of Hooker's logic in pulling back to Chancellorsville comes from two hindering biases. The first being the acceptance of the broader myth making that he had lost courage in himself, and secondly, by analyzing his decisions from an operational point of view. By isolating these problem sets, and viewing them from a tactical point of view, his decisions become clearer as one examines the first day of the battle and the position of some of the key elements on the battlefield. General Sykes' fight on the Orange Turnpike Road, the position of the V Corps on River Road, and XII Corps position on the Plank Road were all contributors to Hooker's mindset. Each of these tactical actions played heavily on Hooker's decision-making process at the operational level on May 1st.

The primary catalyst for pulling back to Chancellorsville on May 1st rests with General Sykes' 2nd Division from Meade's V Corps and his action on the Orange Turnpike Road. Sykes was in the unfortunate position of being the spearhead of the Union Army advancing down the Orange Turnpike Road, with the expectation that he would make his objective near Zoan Church

to establish a defensive position. What the entirety of the Army of the Potomac were unaware of, was that Confederate forces under Stonewall Jackson were ordered late on April 30th to march towards Chancellorsville down the same road.²⁴ Hooker had an expectation that the movement east would have little resistance. As the day began to unfold however, Hooker began to receive reports from Butterfield at Army Headquarters that the Sykes may be facing a considerable force.²⁵ Still, in Hooker's mind, he thought he should have an advantageous position should his plans unfold as originally designed. Those plans were still highly dependent on General Sedgwick and how capable he was on fixing the Confederate forces until the rest of the Army of the Potomac could get into position.

Hooker had ordered General Sedgwick to make his demonstration against the Confederate forces at on 1:00 PM on April 30th to ensure that the entire Confederate force was still in Fredericksburg. Even though that order was suspended by General Daniel Butterfield at Army Headquarters, Sedgwick was again ordered to make a demonstration the morning of May 1st.²⁶ Hooker had also ordered that if Sedgwick did not see the entirety of the Confederate force, he was to report back so Hooker had situational awareness. He also directed Sedgwick to attack with his entire force in order to take the defensive positions at Fredericksburg and pursue Lee should he retreat from those positions. This amplified Hooker's confusion as he did not receive information that there were significant Confederate forces moving toward Chancellorsville until noon on May 1st. T. S. C. Lowe, with the Union Army Balloon Corps, reported to General Hooker that there were two Corps moving toward him. This report was quite different from the 10,000 to 15,000 that General Butterfield then reported. If Butterfield's report was accurate, and if Sedgwick followed orders, General Hooker could logically assume that the forces he must employ against them were still enough to seize the ground. Hooker reported back to Butterfield

“the enemy may attack me – I will try it.”²⁷ Hooker’s confidence in his plan relied on Sedgwick being diligent and performing in such a manner that would keep Lee at Fredericksburg. With that confidence now diminishing, Hooker was left to salvage what he could and try and fight for the ground he wanted.

The ground that Sykes held as the two forces met was unfavorable and gave a distinct advantage to the Confederates. With the Confederates in wilderness terrain and along narrow roads, Jackson had denied the Union forces the ability to maneuver against them.²⁸ Jackson also held the ridge and the high ground from the area around Zoan Church. As the battle began to unfold, Sykes quickly realized that the force he was facing was much larger than what he was expecting. Hooker also realized at that point that the element of surprise was lost and that he could most likely be facing off against the entire Confederate force. By 1:30 PM, enemy forces under McLaws, Anderson, and Rodes had Sykes enveloped along the Orange Turnpike Road.²⁹ McLaws had Sykes fixed along the road with Mahone’s Brigade forming the center, and Rodes deployed throughout the woods parallel to the Orange Turnpike to the south ready to attack north.³⁰ Based on the terrain occupied by Confederate forces, Sykes could not receive support from either Meade or Slocum and was in dire jeopardy of losing his division.

The battle was not unfolding the way that Hooker had envisioned it. He had a Division pinned along roads within wilderness terrain and cutoff from adjacent units. Fortunately for Sykes, Hooker had made the decision to pull him back to Chancellorsville before Rodes could attack Sykes’ division from the south. If he continued to fight the battle down both the Orange Turnpike Road and the Plank Road, it would reduce Hooker’s advantage of superior numbers as he was dispersed against a concentrated enemy. Hooker’s reactions to the tactical actions occurring with Sykes demonstrates that he was analyzing the current engagement based on his

original operational plan. Hooker was facing uncertainty and lacked clarity on the size and intent of the force in front of him. He wanted a defensive fight against Lee, on the terrain of his choosing. If he had not pulled Sykes back to Chancellorsville, he would have been fighting an offensive fight unsupported against an enemy with terrain on their side. Hooker made a logical choice in pulling Sykes back to Chancellorsville.

General Meade's Corps being called back to establish the defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville is another decision made by Hooker that is commonly critiqued.³¹ Based on the tactical situation, there was no opportunity to push the rest of V Corps south to support Meade's 2nd Division. This proposal is similar to the argument that Hooker should have kept Sykes on the Orange Turnpike Road and fought for the high ground at Zoan Church. Meade would have been another unsupported element fighting on his own against an unknown force. Hooker's order to pull back to Chancellorsville took into account that Meade, Slocum and Sykes all had individual tactical scenarios going on and that he needed to integrate his forces to better fight Lee on his terms.

Hooker had no intention of making Chancellorsville a permanent fixture in his plan, but he did have ambitions of using it as a consolidation area for his forces as they crossed the Rappahannock.³² Slocum was the only Corps commander that received an order in regard to Chancellorsville on April 28th. He made no mention of Chancellorsville as an objective other than on April 30th when he stopped the Army around Chancellorsville to ensure he had massed enough combat power before pushing east on May 1st.³³ Even though Meade crossed at Kelly's Ford last, his path was clear to his objective.³⁴ After traversing Ely's Ford Road south east towards the Orange Turnpike, he would briefly stop at Chancellorsville and then on May 1st, head north east toward Banks Ford to secure it. This would also allow Hooker to create a

crossing at Banks Ford and link the two wings of his army together.³⁵ Hooker split off a division under Sykes to head down the Orange Plank Road to establish the right flank of Meade's V Corps. From Meade's point of view, he was moving swiftly and unimpeded down River Road and was well on his way to securing his objective. As he approached his objective, General Meade had a growing sense that this operation would prove successful. When the orders came for him to fall back to Chancellorsville, he was confused. He should not be pulling back the majority of his V Corps when they were so close to the objective. Meade was executing what Hooker wanted to do at a tactical level, but he did not have the perspective that Hooker had at the operational level. Meade had very little idea what was occurring to his south with his 2nd Division commander.³⁶

What was going on with Sykes and his 2nd Division was not being reported effectively to Meade, however, it was being reported straight back to Hooker. For Meade, one could see how a decision to pull him back would be illogical as he was in a position to utilize Bragg Road to support Sykes from the north. Additionally, Meade could not see how the Confederate forces were arrayed to his south or what was still left at Fredericksburg. Hooker had a similar problem. The information that he was receiving during the battle left him making decisions based on what he was receiving from Sykes and Slocum, his two most involved units. With how easily Meade had made his way down River Road, it would seem that the element of surprise was still on their side until actions with Sykes were initiated.

One of the most critical factors when analyzing Meade, his position on the battlefield, and Hooker's decision to pull him back involves terrain. This is not uncommon to the many other factors in Hooker's decisions, but certainly makes an impact at this point in the campaign. The ridge stretching from Zoan Church down to Tabernacle Church was well defended by

Confederate forces by April 30th. This was the original piece of terrain that Hooker hoped to reach early in the campaign.³⁷ The ridgeline gave a commanding view of Fredericksburg and would allow for a suitable position to repel Confederate attacks. The issue was that this terrain was under Confederate control as early as the night of April 30th. Even if Hooker had reached the ridgeline on May 1st, he would have been fighting a battle against dug in positions on the ridgeline.

With the element of surprise vanquished, Stonewall Jackson had a clear plan to take the fight to the Army of the Potomac and deny them the space needed in order to out maneuver the Confederate forces. Jackson ordered his men to put down their spades and take up their guns and the Confederate positions began to advance forward to choke Hooker in the wilderness.³⁸ If Meade had traversed Bragg Road down south he would have run into the flank of McLaws and still be canalized by the ridgeline to the east and the wilderness on either side of Bragg Road heading southeast. Meade's route to traverse south down Old Mine Road, or Bragg Road just past Banks Ford, would have placed him between General Lee and General Early's Division that could be swiftly cut off from support and defeated. If Meade had not been pulled back, it would have committed Hooker to fighting the fight offensively. Just as with Sykes, Meade would be fighting an enemy with the terrain as an advantage. Hooker was set on positioning his Army in such a manner that it would force Lee to either retreat or fight against a well defended force.³⁹ He had anticipated that the Zoan ridge would be unoccupied and was unable to take the ground he originally envisioned for his operation. Because he did not get the terrain that he wanted, Hooker had no other option but to pull him back to establish a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville to capitalize on the fact that the Army of the Potomac was still south of the Rappahannock and a threat to Lee.

South of Sykes along the Plank Road was General Slocum and the XII Corps. Anderson's Division held a distinct advantage of having a large stretch of wilderness that separated them and Slocum's XII Corps. The position of Anderson's cannons was also at an advantage, because if Slocum wanted the ground that Anderson was occupying, he would have to fight through the wilderness terrain and face the cannons on the other side of the tree line if he wanted it. This blunted the advance from Slocum and prevented him from being able to mutually support Sykes to his north.⁴⁰

Even though Slocum had no way of communicating with Sykes, he was doing him a service initially. Slocum's position on the Orange Plank Road denied Jackson the ability to completely turn Sykes. It was not until Slocum's advance was halted that Jackson's men could start to find the gap between Slocum and Sykes' forces. Once this seam was found, Rodes began to deploy to exploit it. Had Hooker not received the request for additional forces from Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren on behalf of Sykes, he may not have been able to visualize the threat on Sykes' right flank. Jackson had also begun to push out Gen. Wright's Brigade to look for Slocum's Flank. If Hooker not ordered Slocum to fall back, he too would have been facing a Jackson flank attack that would have had dealt severe damage to the XII Corps on the first day of the battle.⁴¹

Hooker also received much criticism for not employing the II Corps in reinforcing Sykes, primarily from Couch himself commanding the II Corps. When discovering that Hooker had ordered him to return to the lines that he had previously occupied at Chancellorsville, he was infuriated. Couch had sent General Winfield Scott Hancock's division forward to assist Sykes with the withdrawal. By the time the division arrived, Sykes was on the retreat and Hancock was relegated to covering his retreat. Couch also realized that with Sykes retreating to

Chancellorsville, he would jeopardize Hancock's division if he did not follow the order. Couch later recalled that "to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets, was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man." Hooker did not employ the II Corps offensively because the intelligence he was receiving appeared to validate that Jackson's Corps was massed in front of him and he could not consolidate his forces to meet him. By the time Couch would have been able to deploy the entire II Corps, Sykes and Slocum would have been outnumbered and potentially routed.⁴²

The combination of these separate tactical engagements, Sedgwick's failure to fix Lee's forces, and the perpetual communication breakdowns between Union commanders were beginning to make negative impacts on the overall operation. Hooker understood that his plan was unraveling and began to implement control measures to preserve the campaign. Hooker realized that his center column was his weakest and that it could be crushed before Meade, Slocum or Couch could support him.⁴³ The Army of the Potomac was dispersed and ill-suited to fight a battle against a more consolidated and Confederate army. What the Army of the Potomac was facing, up to the point that Hooker made the decision to pull back to Chancellorsville, was an enemy using the wilderness with terrain to their advantage and employed in an offensive mismatch that would attrite his larger force. Hooker's decision to pull back to Chancellorsville and utilize terrain that had already been assessed as a strong defensive position would allow him to salvage much of the misfortunes of the first day. Hooker still had the advantage within the campaign. His forces were on the south side of the Rappahannock and he had not yet given anything up. His decision put the pressure back on Lee to make the next move.

Part 2, Decisions in the face of a flank attack:

Hooker's earlier decision to pull back to Chancellorsville set the conditions for the Army of the Potomac to set up the strong defensive position that he visualized. While it was not the ground he originally wanted, it was still a dominant piece of terrain that allowed him to present Lee the same dilemma as before: Attack a well defended position or retreat south. General Daniel E. Sickles, when asked by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (JCCW) about his thoughts on Hooker's plan for Chancellorsville stated:

The selection of the places for crossing the Rappahannock, the maneuvers by which the army was thrown across the river, and the placing it in position for battle, were all conducted with perfect success, and without any considerable loss on our part-with much less loss than is usual in such operations. In its main features it was conducted with so much address as to be a complete surprise to the enemy. That is all that any general could do in the initiation of a movement.⁴⁴

Hooker's actions on the night of May 1st and early morning of May 2nd ensured that the Army of the Potomac was ready to receive an attack from Lee approaching from the east. What he was not ready for was the flank attack that General Jackson orchestrated in the afternoon of May 2nd.

The flank attack was the most damaging incident throughout the entire campaign to the Army of the Potomac. It is another area where Hooker is strongly criticized for allowing Jackson to maneuver on him and let it happen.⁴⁵ When General Oliver O. Howard's XI Corps was attacked, it not only caused massed chaos and confusion, but also shifted the terrain available that Hooker wanted to use to fight Lee on. In a follow-on question to General Sickles earlier statement on the plan for the Chancellorsville campaign, the JCCW asked General Sickles what he attributed was the ultimate failure of the campaign. To which he replied, "to the giving way of the eleventh corps on Saturday."⁴⁶ Further analysis of this incident from Hooker's perspective demonstrates that if anything, Hooker first believed that the Army of Northern

Virginia was retreating. Secondly, even though he believed the Confederates were retreating, he took precautions to prevent an attack on his flanks.

Hooker had realized at this point that there was no credible enemy force left in front of Sedgwick and subsequently ordered him to stay on the north bank of the Rappahannock to protect the supply lines and Army Headquarters.⁴⁷ This allowed him to also bring in Reynolds' I Corps upriver to Chancellorsville.⁴⁸ Based on the reporting that Hooker received from the BMI, he was convinced that he would receive a frontal attack from Lee in order to allow the larger portion of the Army of Northern Virginia to flee south.⁴⁹ With the quiet night on May 1st, Hooker could reason that the Confederate forces were contemplating what course of action they would take now. What could be seen of Confederate movements would suggest that they were retreating. This was even more apparent after there were no immediate attacks after the fighting on May 1st.

Jackson made particular care to utilize roads that would indicate that they were moving south instead of west to attempt a flank attack.⁵⁰ Confederate scouts were sent out for the purpose of entering Union lines and reporting that Jackson was heading to Richmond.⁵¹ Receiving these reports, Hooker could assume that Lee was directing a demonstration to allow Jackson to escape south with the bulk of the Confederate forces. Knowing that Lee was a well-educated and experienced military commander, Hooker knew that the possibility of Lee dividing his army again against a superior force would be improbable.⁵² This further supported the notion that Lee was demonstrating for a retreat south. Throughout most of the morning of May 2nd, the reports of movements supported Hooker's belief that the enemy was going to retreat. Regardless of what he thought the enemy was going to do, Hooker was actively riding his lines to ensure

that his defenses were well prepared for an attack. He had also recognized during this time that his defenses on his right flank were inadequate.⁵³

As Hooker returned to the Chancellor's House, a little past 09:00 AM, he received reports that the enemy movements were detected moving towards his right flank. Couriers from General Birney, who was observing the enemy movements from Hazel Grove, informed him that a large movement of Confederate forces were continuously moving to the right and were followed by trains, guns and ambulances, and had been on the move since 08:00 AM that morning.⁵⁴ This information further strengthened that the Confederate forces were either retreating, or they were attempting a flank attack. Not knowing the true nature of the Confederate movements, and after persistent requests from General Sickles, Hooker issues orders to Sickles at noon on May 2nd to push south with Birney's division to Catharine Furnace to identify the intent of the Confederate forces. Even if he did not know what Lee and Jackson were about to attempt, Hooker knew that he needed act and be ready. He immediately sent out orders to Generals Slocum and Howard stating:

I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.⁵⁵

By 09:30 AM Hooker realized that his right flank could be in jeopardy of attack and took precautions to strengthen his right flank. For Howard, his confidence in a retreating enemy was strong even up to the point that the flank attack occurred.⁵⁶ Howard had even sent Barlow's

division to Catharine's Furnace to pursue Jackson. Hooker's orders to Slocum and Howard were clear, but more important were the actions he took as he rode the lines early that morning.

Hooker's order came after he had personally issued guidance to his commanders on strengthening the Union lines. During that morning, Hooker rode his entire line to examine positions of his troops and gaining better situational awareness of the battlefield.⁵⁷ In any case where Hooker found unsatisfactory positions, he addressed them, and they were changed, to include the positions under General Howard. When Hooker observed the position of the XI Corps, he immediately noticed vulnerabilities. Engineer Cyrus B. Comstock also saw many of the vulnerabilities on the right flank and expressed to General Howard "General, do close in those spaces!" to which Howard pointed out the thick wilderness and how "thick and tangled; will anybody come through there?" Engineer Comstock reiterated "Oh, they may!"⁵⁸ Howard was well aware of the vulnerabilities of the right flank and more so that Hooker had expressed dissatisfaction in them.

With the litany of directives and order directed towards General Howard, it is a wonder how the position on the right flank was not more secure. Even through numerous reports from his own Corps and evidence that Confederate forces were building on his position, Howard also thought the enemy was retreating. When Major Gustave Schleiter, Adjutant-General to General Alexander Schimmelfinnig, reported the buildup of enemy forces to General Howard, he was greeted with a smile and told to report back to General Schimmelfinnig to hold his position and stop reconnoitering. Two hours later the flank attack commenced.⁵⁹

Howard evidently had a strong desire to not move his men and had a drastic overconfidence in the ability of the forest to impede movement. Hooker being concerned about his flank being "up in the air" advised Howard to contract his position and secure a better

position facing west. Howard eventually convinced Hooker to leave the lines as they were because he feared that further orders for movements would demoralize his men. Howard expressed to Hooker that his positions would be strengthened “with breastwork and abatis.” Howard also dismissed any support that Hooker attempted to send to him from the III Corps. He assured General Hooker that he could hold right where he was.⁶⁰ He failed in all of his assurances.

Hooker clearly demonstrated that from the time that he pulled his forces back to Chancellorsville, that he kept a defensive mindset. While there was clearly an indication that Confederate forces were withdrawing south, Hooker took precautions to ensure that his forces were ready to receive an attack.⁶¹ He was vigilantly riding his lines to ensure that the Army of the Potomac was ready. Hooker issued the orders necessary to strengthen the right flank and was mostly dismissed by Howard. Hooker also tried to set the conditions to receive the attack on his flank by ordering Sickles into motion to pursue Jackson and to also seek help from the XI and XII Corps. Sickles narrowly missed Jackson’s rear elements as he traveled south to prepare for an attack on Lee’s left flank. The III, XI, and XII Corps and cavalry under Pleasanton were responding to orders from Hooker just as the collapse of the XI Corps began. As the flank attack commenced, it was apparent that there was only one person to blame for the unpreparedness of the XI Corps, General Howard.⁶²

Despite the chaos and confusion caused by the flank attack, Hooker did what was necessary to stem what was lost by the XI Corps. He immediately called for Berry’s division from the III Corps to move in and form a new defensive line near Chancellorsville to thwart the attack by Jackson.⁶³ Hooker spent most of the evening on May 2nd directing forces to form a new defensive position to check the Confederate advance through elements of the I, III, V, and

XI Corps.⁶⁴ Knowing that his rear area was in dire jeopardy, he utilized Reynold's I Corps to block any avenue that Lee had to cut him off from river crossings.⁶⁵

Even though Hooker was able to form up a new defensive line, the results from the flank attack were damaging. Hooker had many new dilemmas to deal with now, including the now exposed position of the III Corps on Hazel Grove. With the loss of such key terrain on his right flank Hooker is left to consider shifting his defensive line again to better fight the campaign. He immediately put his engineers, Warren and Comstock to start working out a new defensive position should his current lines become more vulnerable.⁶⁶ Hooker also relayed to Warren his plans for the next day to flank Jackson's forces and destroy them. These plans relied heavily on Sedgwick executing Hooker's orders he issued to him as the flank attack was occurring. Hooker ordered Sedgwick to take his force and meet him at Chancellorsville.⁶⁷ His new defensive line would put Bullock House at the center with a strong perimeter anchored to the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers.⁶⁸

Despite the criticism that Hooker routinely receives for the flank attack, he issued clear orders on the morning of May 2nd to protect his flanks. He undoubtedly made a series of decisions to prevent his forces from being exposed to further threat. This reinforces that Hooker was making logical decisions to better position his forces to fight in a stronger defensive position. His quick action during the flank attack again salvaged the army during a devastating attack that should have never been able to occur. Hooker's ability to employ immediate forces in Berry's division does not demonstrate an incapable commander that was losing his nerve, but one that was calm under pressure. His proactiveness to draw up a new defensive line demonstrates that Hooker was envisioning what was to come the following day and still trying to find a way to turn failure into success. In all cases before, during and after the flank attack there

was sound logic in his decision making. Throughout the events leading up to, and during the flank attack, Hooker demonstrated that he was not negligent, but overconfident in his assessment of the Confederate retreat.

Part 3, Withdraw from Hazel Grove:

As expected, the many misfortunes that had occurred during the campaign gave Hooker many problems to consider. On the night of May 2nd, Hooker was still in a position to turn the battle around in his favor. He was still optimistic that Sedgwick would be able execute his orders and fall on Lee's rear. After drawing up plans for the following day, Hooker sent Warren to go persuade Sedgwick to expedite his movements. Just as Hooker had expected, Confederate forces attacked in the morning of May 3rd. Lee and Jackson's forces, now under the command of Jeb Stuart, relentlessly pressed on both Slocum's XII Corps and Sickles III Corps to take Hazel Grove.

The most important critique attributed to Hooker, however, during this time is why he decided to withdraw Union forces from Hazel Grove and allow Confederates to seize it. Colonel Porter Alexander, the commander of Confederate artillery, stated that, "There has rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battle-field."⁶⁹ This, as well as other critiques, places another myth and thoughtlessness to his decision to withdraw from Hazel Grove. It does not consider Hooker's logic at key points after Jackson's flank attack and the unique position it left the Army of the Potomac in. While he was able to reform his defensive lines the night of May 2nd and the morning of the following day, he still had a significant element of his force in Sickles III Corps exposed and in danger of destruction on top of Hazel Grove.⁷⁰

It was only under necessity that Hooker decided to pull General Sickles off the ground and integrate his forces back into the defensive perimeter.⁷¹ But the key terrain after the flank

attack had shifted. On May 3rd, from a Confederate perspective, Hazel Grove did give a dominant view of the Union lines and a point that artillery fires could enfilade most of the east part of the lines.⁷² From a Union perspective, the position did not give the same dominant view of the enemy. As earlier stated, Hooker already had it in his mind that the positions occupied on May 3rd would be altered based on the new positions mapped out by Warren. If Hooker already had plans to transition to the lines around Bullock House, then the only reason he would hold Hazel Grove would be to deny it from enemy use until he could better position his lines.

The largest issue Hooker had on his mind after the flank attack, and in regard to Hazel Grove, was the exposure of Sickles III Corps to two large Confederate forces. The flank attack had caved in the Union line so much so that Hazel Grove was left at the salient point of an almost spear like Union defensive perimeter. Those forces occupying Hazel Grove at the end of May 2nd were not integrated within the Union line and despite attempts by Union forces to support them, they mostly fought by themselves to try and press north to retake ground.⁷³ The mere fact that the III Corps took a preponderance of the casualties during the campaign supports their vigor in fighting from Hazel Grove.⁷⁴ With Lee pressing them from the east and Jeb Stuart relentlessly pushing from the west, Sickles was in jeopardy of losing a majority of his Corps on Hazel Grove. Hooker, still expecting Sedgwick to hit Lee in his rear, could not afford to lose multiple divisions trying to hold Hazel Grove. He needed his forces to remain intact in order to repel the Confederates until Sedgwick could arrive. Before first light that Sunday, Hooker called Sickles to the Chancellor house and ordered him to collect his two divisions and his batteries and march rapidly “by the most practicable route” back to Fairview.⁷⁵

The convergence of both Lee and Stuart on Hazel Grove would have made attempting to retake Hazel Grove impractical. Union artillery, under Captain Clermont Best, traded fires with

Porter Alexander from Fairview. Best had already lost 63 cannoneers and 80 horses to the relentless attacks by the Confederates, and ammunition shortages made efforts to repel the advance near impossible.⁷⁶ Hooker's decision before the campaign began to separate out his artillery under separate commanders made sense based on his previous experiences. Conducting an attack without the support of artillery was not a position that any commander would want to be in, and Hooker understood that better than most through his experiences in previous battles. In theory, partitioning out artillery assets to lower levels would give those commanders to have on demand support for an attack. As the campaign at Chancellorsville would show though, is that those commanders may not be as capable as the artillery officers in determining consumption rates for ammunition or laterally controlling fires to support others. As Stephen Sears highlights, if artillery was consolidated under the control of Henry Hunt, he could have potentially altered Hooker's perspective of Hazel Grove and made a better case to hold it.⁷⁷

As forces withdrew from Hazel Grove, and artillery was pulled back within Union lines at Fairview, Hooker was within a narrow time table to start transitioning to his new lines in order to preserve his forces. As the artillery placed at Fairview ran out of ammunition, the terrain was of little value to the Union other than denying it to the Confederates. His injury shortly after ordering Sickles off Hazel Grove would prevent him from making the immediate decisions needed to transition effectively to the new lines drawn the night prior. The timing of giving the ground up and transitioning did not go as Hooker had expected, and his subordinate commanders did nothing to help matters as he was injured.

The overall battle for Hooker, however, was still not yet lost, and he clearly demonstrated that he still felt that there was an opportunity to claim a victory. He transitioned to a new stronger line around the Bullock House with lines of communication still connected to Falmouth.

Ultimately, the withdraw of forces from Hazel Grove gave only a brief advantage to Lee until the Bullock House lines were established and was a logical decision as Hooker already had plans to move the Army to the new defensive lines.

Conclusion:

Even after the withdraw from Hazel Grove, Hooker had other issues in the subsequent two days of fighting that he had to contend with before he made his final decision to retire from the field on May 5th. Sedgwick and Stoneman had still not accomplished their objectives. There continued to be constant communication failures with both the telegraph lines and interpretations of orders, and Hooker still had to think about his first mission, to protect Washington.⁷⁸ The rain on May 5th then brought about new concerns for Hooker. Flooding began within the Rappahannock, increasing water levels by six feet. This posed serious risks to the pontoons that stretched across U.S. Ford and ultimately put the Army of the Potomac at risk of having the main line of communication cut off. That night Hooker summoned all of the Corps commanders, except Slocum who had become lost in the woods trying to find the headquarters in the dark.⁷⁹ Hooker explained the situation to the commanders and asked for their opinions as to whether they should stay and fight or fall back. Three of the commanders voted to stay and fight with two voting to retreat. Hooker made the ultimate decision that night, against the will of most of his subordinate commanders, to retreat while the opportunity still existed.⁸⁰

While the Chancellorsville campaign did not go as planned, Hooker's decisions throughout the battle were logical but require a more thorough analysis to understand why he made them. Many of the shortcomings of the campaign attributed to him were due to causes beyond his control. Of all the failings that occurred during the campaign, most can be attributed

to three of his subordinate commanders: General Stoneman, General Howard, and General Sedgewick.⁸¹

His actions on May 1st demonstrate that he did not anticipate the entirety of the Army of Northern Virginia to be that far west and made the logical decision to pull back and consolidate his forces at Chancellorsville. Based on the intelligence and movements of Confederate forces on May 2nd, Hooker logically reasoned that the enemy was retreating, and he still took precautions to prepare for attack. He made the logical decision to withdraw his forces from Hazel Grove in order to transition to the defensive positions he had designed the night of May 2nd. Even if his decision at the time did not turn out the way he expected, or was even the right decision, he was decisive.

His fighting record up to Chancellorsville was commendable, and his continued service after Chancellorsville does not indicate that Lincoln or Congress were significantly swayed in his competence or ability. President Lincoln even stated after Chancellorsville that Hooker was a capable General that needed to be retained for further service when he said, "I have not thrown General Hooker away."⁸² Even if Hooker had a failing in one campaign at Chancellorsville, he potentially set the conditions that would allow the Army of the Potomac to win the war. This was seen in his creation of the BMI, changes to standard Corps instead of Grand Divisions, unit identifications, changes to logistics infrastructure, desertion and leave policies. More importantly were his contributions to repairing the morale of the Army and instilling a sense of pride. These traits would continue throughout the rest of the war and beyond. If Hooker had any deficiencies before or during the campaign, it was instilling within his Corps commanders the ability to operate from his intent. Many of the failures of Chancellorsville were largely based on communications failures and how each of the Corps commanders interpreted Hooker's orders.

Despite his character flaws, and when myths attributed to him are removed, the true logic behind his decisions begins to surface and paint a much different picture of him as a commander.

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- ¹ U.S. War Department, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Washington: Government Printing Office, vol. 1 (1863), vol. 1 (1865), LIV.
- ² Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 477-478.
- ³ Sears, *Generals in Defeat*, 124.
- ⁴ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 57-62.
- ⁵ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 10.
- ⁶ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 64-66.
- ⁷ Sears, Stephen W and Woodworth, Stephen. *Civil War Generals in Defeat: In Defense of Fighting Joe Hooker*. (University Press of Kansas, 2004), 134.
- ⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 56.
- ⁹ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, XLII.
- ¹⁰ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 121.
- ¹¹ Frank O'Reilly, "Chancellorsville: The Generals' Battle." *Blue & Gray*, vol. XXIX, Issue 4 (2013): 7-8.
- ¹² John Bigelow Jr. *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910), 221.
- ¹³ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, XLIV
- ¹⁴ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 241.
- ¹⁵ Frank A. O'Reilly, "The battle of Chancellorsville was lost right there: McLaws versus Sykes on the Orange Turnpike May 1, 1863" *Fredricksburg History and Biography*, accessed 2018: 1-25. 2.
- ¹⁶ O'Reilly, The battle of Chancellorsville was lost right there, 4.
- ¹⁷ Hebert, *Fighting Joe Hooker*, 199.
- ¹⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 212.
- ¹⁹ U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion – A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series 1, vol 25. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 292.
- ²⁰ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, XLIII; Frank O' Reilly Vol 4, Pg. 7
- ²¹ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, XLIII.
- ²² Frank O'Reilly, "Chancellorsville: The Generals' Battle." *Blue & Gray*, vol. XXIX, Issue 4 (2013): 10.
- ²³ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 213.
- ²⁴ Samuel P. Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, (Meadville, Pa., 1882), 60.
- ²⁵ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 325.
- ²⁶ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 322.
- ²⁷ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 326.
- ²⁸ O'Reilly, Chancellorsville, Issue 4, 19.
- ²⁹ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 208.
- ³⁰ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 244-245.
- ³¹ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 211.
- ³² *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 305.
- ³³ O'Reilly, Chancellorsville, Issue 4, 8.
- ³⁴ O'Reilly, Chancellorsville, Issue 4, 7.
- ³⁵ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 306.
- ³⁶ Hebert, *Fighting Joe Hooker*, 200.
- ³⁷ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 240.
- ³⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 198.
- ³⁹ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 119-120.
- ⁴⁰ O'Reilly, Chancellorsville, Issue 4, 21.
- ⁴¹ O'Reilly, Chancellorsville, Issue 4, 20-21.
- ⁴² Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 211-212.
- ⁴³ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 210-211.
- ⁴⁴ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, Sickles Testimony, 4.
- ⁴⁵ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 337.
- ⁴⁶ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW, Sickles Testimony, 4.
- ⁴⁷ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 228.
- ⁴⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 228.
- ⁴⁹ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 276; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 227.
- ⁵⁰ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 84.
- ⁵¹ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 84.

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- ⁵² Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 239.
- ⁵³ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 88.
- ⁵⁴ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 88.
- ⁵⁵ *Report of the Joint Committee*, JCCW General Hooker, XLV.
- ⁵⁶ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 98-99.
- ⁵⁷ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 88.
- ⁵⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 237.
- ⁵⁹ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 96.
- ⁶⁰ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 226, General Couch memoir, pg. 130 Old Colony Historical Society, Bates 89-90
- ⁶¹ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 84.
- ⁶² Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 89.
- ⁶³ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 104.
- ⁶⁴ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 302.
- ⁶⁵ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 302.
- ⁶⁶ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 303.
- ⁶⁷ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 303; Also in Official Records.
- ⁶⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 372-373.
- ⁶⁹ O'Reilly, *Chancellorsville*, Issue 5, 42.
- ⁷⁰ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 312.
- ⁷¹ Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 120.
- ⁷² Bates, *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, 123.
- ⁷³ O'Reilly, *Chancellorsville*, Issue 5, 8.
- ⁷⁴ Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 505.
- ⁷⁵ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 312.
- ⁷⁶ O'Reilly, *Chancellorsville*, Issue 5, 44.
- ⁷⁷ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 313.
- ⁷⁸ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 200-201, 216, 225-226.
- ⁷⁹ O'Reilly, *Chancellorsville*, Issue 5, 49.
- ⁸⁰ O'Reilly, *Chancellorsville*, Issue 5, 49.
- ⁸¹ Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 437-438.
- ⁸² Sears, *Generals in Defeat*, 139.

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