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Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and, to a lesser degree Harry Truman, worked diligently together to conduct World War II in a more unified manner than did the principals of the Allied and Associated Powers in World War I, and they achieved a different resolution than did their predecessors by remaining unified in a few critical aspects: these leaders would meet with each other frequently throughout the war to coordinate grand strategy and their war aims, and they would begin the war with a solidly-founded concept for how the post-war world would look that they would

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Executive Summary

Title: Complex Coalitions: Contrasting the Allied Conduct of War and the Settlement of Peace in the First and Second World Wars

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Thesis: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and, to a lesser degree Harry Truman, worked diligently together to conduct World War II in a more unified manner than did the principals of the Allied and Associated Powers in World War I, and they achieved a different resolution than did their predecessors by remaining unified in a few critical aspects: these leaders would meet with each other frequently throughout the war to coordinate grand strategy and their war aims, and they would begin the war with a solidly-founded concept for how the post-war world would look that they would work together to develop throughout the war to expand their common understanding.

Discussion: Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked closely together throughout World War II in a way that the leaders of the Allied Powers in the First World War did not. The various wartime heads of state for England, France, Italy, and Russia during the First World War relied on the traditional diplomatic methods of coordination for the majority of the war, primarily using letters and emissaries to communicate. This proved to be inadequate to contend with the new, grander scope of a conflict taking place simultaneously in both Eastern and Western Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, particularly when national interests and unified war aims conflicted.

Conclusion: The principals of the Allied and Associated Powers during the First World War worked independently of one another and this led to difficulties in finding consensus regarding the conduct of the war and the making of the peace afterwards. The leaders of the Allies in the Second World War built a more robust coalition that was better able to coordinate their war efforts and war aims. Additionally, the Allies of the Second World War were better able to resolve their conflicts and their post-War visions through personal diplomacy.

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Acknowledgements

The idea for writing about how, and why, the Allied principals of World War II conducted their war and subsequent peace differently than did the principal leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I occurred to me after reading Margaret MacMillan's extraordinary book about the peace conference held at the end of the First World War, *Paris 1919*. The subsequent research was fascinating, forced me to confront and discard some of my own deeply-held misapprehensions about both wars, and left me with a profound appreciation of the difficulties that all of the men involved had to contend with in building and maintaining their coalitions. The questions they dealt with were seemingly intractable and often, starkly existential.

I would like to express my gratitude to all of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College faculty who provided guidance and reassurances during the writing process. Lieutenant Colonel Terje Broueygard, an officer of the Norwegian Army serving as a military faculty advisor at the school, gave me focus at the halfway point in the journey of writing when I badly needed it. Commander Stephen Kelley of the United States Navy gave me invaluable feedback on each draft of my thesis as my second reader. Dr. Lon Strauss, my thesis advisor, gave me innumerable resources to draw from and helped me find my way out of the jungle I had written myself into. I am grateful to each of them.

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The conduct and ending of World War I was extraordinarily problematic, for a number of reasons. The leaders of the Allied Powers were ineffective in coordinating their efforts during the majority of the war, and a decisive victory eluded them. The post-war governing body they would come to propose was shakily born into disunity among them, and their reach would exceed their grasp when they nobly endeavored to remake the world for enduring peace. The architects of the Grand Alliance in the Second World War would choose to conduct their war, and how they defined the peace afterward, differently. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and, to a lesser degree Harry Truman, worked diligently together to bring World War II to a different resolution. In this, they partially succeeded, and they did so in spite of extensive disagreements by remaining unified in a few critical aspects: these leaders would meet with each other frequently throughout the war to coordinate grand strategy and their war aims, and they would begin the war with a solidly-founded concept for how the post-war world would look that they would work together throughout the war to expand.

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked closely together throughout World War II in a way that the leaders of the Allied Powers in the First World War did not. The various wartime heads of state for England, France, Italy, and Russia during the First World War relied on the traditional diplomatic methods of coordination for the majority of the war, primarily using letters and emissaries to communicate. This proved to be inadequate to contend with the new, grander scope of a conflict taking place simultaneously in both Eastern and Western Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, particularly when national interests and unified war aims conflicted.

Proactive face-to-face meetings among the heads of state to drive operations and visions of the future, which were a vital and integral aspect of working through complicated disagreements during the Second World War, did not take place during the First. When

questions affecting England and France arose during the First World War, brief reactive conferences for the heads of state would be held in London or Paris to resolve immediate issues, and then the leaders would retreat back to their own day-to-day concerns in relative isolation.[1] Not until the Supreme War Council was established at the Rapallo Conference in late 1917 in the aftermath of a disastrous Italian defeat would the Allied political leadership commit themselves to regular, personal coordination of the war.

To the extent that they saw a need to do so, the Allies during the First World War struggled to coordinate their efforts, both across theaters of operation and even internally. In 1915, the French aggressively pursued victory beginning with the Artois offensive in hopes of rapidly ending the war with themselves as the primary contributors to victory in order to dictate peace terms.[2] Some public sentiment in France held that the British were, perhaps, attempting to do the same in early 1916. David Lloyd George, at the time England's Minister of Munitions, relayed to his government the French opinions to which he was privy regarding their perception that the British were "forsaking" France to build up an army for their own purpose.[3] Certainly the British in 1915 had attempted to find less costly approaches to combat the Central Powers, as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill supported operations in the Balkans and Gallipoli, respectively.[4] This was in keeping with the tradition of the British Empire, which had traditionally leveraged its naval might and its diplomatic and economic power to defeat its enemies instead of opting to confront them openly with large land armies.

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[1] Maurice, Frederick Major-General Sir. "Unity of Policy among Allies." *Foreign Affairs (Pre-1986)* 21, no. 000002 (01, 1943): 323. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/198171729?accountid=14746

[2] David Stevenson, *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy*. (New York, New York: Basic Books, 2004), 127

[3] Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson., *The Somme*. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 30

[4] Prior and Wilson, 6-7

David Stevenson suggests that the British may have been behaving in a manner to confirm French suspicions — that Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener preferred at first to keep the New Armies, built from volunteers to bolster the remnants of the tiny British Expeditionary Force of 1914, out of the war in 1915 and 1916. According to Stevenson, Kitchener believed that the Russians and the French would bear the brunt of fighting until a more pivotal moment in the war was reached in 1917, at which time the reconstituted British forces would be committed to carry the day and thereby ensure that the British would hold the upper hand in peace negotiations.[5] Elizabeth Greenhalgh takes a contrary view, pointing out that Kitchener immediately began deploying divisions from the New Armies to France as they became available.[6] Greenhalgh's view seems better supported by the evidence; Kitchener sent 25 divisions of the New Armies to France in 1915 alone. The confusion regarding French needs and English capabilities would play itself out with serious potential consequences in 1916 and 1918.

For the British in 1914, it was politically more beneficial to have a stronger French influence on continental Europe than a dominant German one. As Prime Minister Asquith noted in his correspondence, it would be "against British interests should France be wiped out as a Great Power."[7] However, when the British War Council agreed to support the Somme offensive in 1916, an influence on their decision making was that England had received warnings that the French might entreat with Germany separately if English support was not forthcoming.[8] Lord Kitchener warned that the French might break at Verdun, leaving Paris open to conquest. David

[5] Stevenson, 127
[6] Greenhalgh, Elizabeth "Why the British were on the Somme in 1916." *War in History* 6, no. 2 (04, 1999): 150. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/224146976?accountid=14746
[7] *Ibid*, 151-153
[8] Stevenson, 136

Lloyd George, in his role as England's Minister of Munitions, reported that his opposite number in France, Albert Thomas, said that the British must come to France's aid or "they would be knocked out."[9] Prime Minister Asquith did not meet with French President Briand to discuss his personal assessment of the situation.

Certainly the French were more than ready for England to play a larger role on the Western Front. French General Joffre had proposed the joint 1916 offensive with the British in December of 1915 to force their hand and put them in a position where he could hold them to his own schedule.[10] However, the British did not see the agreement that Sir John French had made with Joffre as truly binding. In January of 1916, Prime Minister Asquith pointed out to the British War Council that the agreement had only committed them to make "every effort…to prepare for such an offensive" but maintained that there still had not been a final decision.[11] It seems doubtful that France truly was on the brink of surrender in July of 1916 given that they and England had both just rejected Woodrow Wilson's first offer to serve as a mediator among the belligerents and that Wilson had offered to declare an American war on Germany at the time if they refused to come to the table.[12] Could the slaughter of the English at the Somme have been obviated had Asquith met with Briand at the time to assess how truly close the French were to capitulation? There were valid military reasons for the offensive to be conducted when, where, and how it was, and certainly the reduction in French forces participating in the attack because of the desperate situation they faced at Verdun increased their need for the British offensive instead of lessening it. However, the final decision to support the operation was not

[9] Prior and Wilson, 29-30
[10] Peter Hart, *The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front.* (New York, New York: Pegasus Books, LLC, 2008), 35
[11] Prior and Wilson, 18-19
[12] Stevenson, 120

made after a personal discussion between the two principals. Instead, the decision was made at some remove and based on warnings from intermediaries.

In 1918, French suspicions regarding English commitment came to a head as Germany launched their spring offensives. France had called up and committed to combat vast swaths of their military-aged men, and had not been nearly as particular about disqualifying men with minor physical disabilities from military service. The only men capable of serving in the military who were working in vital war production jobs in France in 1918 were those who had already served on the front. England, by comparison, was not sending 18-year-old conscripts or men with lower draft classifications to France, and had exempted men working in war production or those who were needed for Home Defense.[13] Clemenceau was outraged, and the rumor began circling between the French government, Foch's Headquarters, and Pershing's Headquarters that the British had between 700,000 and 1,000,000 able-bodied soldiers being held in reserve in England for protection of the Islands.[14]

The drama played out with acrimony within the aforementioned Supreme War Council, with Clemenceau accusing Lloyd George of hiding the 6,000,000 soldiers that France believed England had mobilized "somewhere or other," and Lloyd George blaming the British Army Chief of Staff for their absence. In fact, England had hundreds of thousands of men mining coal and serving in the merchant marine, both of which were vital for France's survival, and millions more who had emigrated to other Dominion countries and were undoubtedly serving in the war in the armies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.[15] Importantly, only by 1918 were the

[13] Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. "DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, AND THE 1918 MANPOWER CRISIS." *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 2 (06, 2007): 400-401. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/194955253?accountid=14746

[14] *Ibid*, 405

[15] Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. "DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, AND THE 1918 MANPOWER CRISIS," 406-410

leaders of England and France finally engaging in tete-a-tete discussions about their war efforts. The venue provided to them via the Supreme War Council allowed Clemenceau and Lloyd George to get past the difficulties posed by the manpower crisis, and led to the establishment of truly unified command under French General Foch of the Allied powers and their associated power, the United States, which was narrowly able to withstand the German offensives.

Without the heads of state engaging in regular, in-person meetings, unifying post-war aims among the Allied powers was difficult as well. From 1914 to 1916, the French entered into secret, bilateral negotiations with Russia to partition Germany after the war, and with England to divide post-war Africa and the Middle East upon the presumption of victory.[16] The Russian negotiations were understandable from the standpoint of the French and the Russians, who traditionally were most threatened by German revisionism, and the negotiations with the English made sense based on where both countries had made pre-war investments and perceived their national interests would lie in the future. However, the opacity of this "old" diplomacy was not without its dangers. When Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin made secret deals with one another, they still had frequent open dialogues as a group to establish a common understanding to fall back upon as a protective buffer for the alliance. The lack of this type of coordination among the principals of World War I meant, for example, that when the Bolsheviks exposed the French-Russian plan to divide up Germany in the event of an Allied victory after the Russian Revolution, there was a frosting of relations between England and France. British Foreign Secretary David Balfour was forced to assure the House of Commons that no one in the British government had been aware of French designs towards that end.[17]

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[16] Stevenson, 114-115

[17] Ferdinand Czernin, *Versailles, 1919*. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), 44-45

The British may not have realized that in this new global conflict the lack of political coordination was "a handicap."[18] However, this divide among the principals themselves led to things like the October, 1918 threat by Colonel Edward House, Wilson's representative, to Lloyd George and Clemenceau that the Americans would seek a separate peace with Germany if the English and French refused to accept Wilson's Fourteen Points as a consensus basis for peace negotiations.[19] Even at the end of the war, then, the Allied countries were not viewing their efforts holistically in the way that the leaders of the Second World War largely would. The Allied leadership of the Second World War approached the oversight of a global conflict differently.

The leaders of the Allies during the Second World War attempted to achieve and maintain unity throughout the war. They had many of the same challenges that faced their predecessors and new ones besides; their alliance was not perfect. However, they were committed to personal meetings throughout the war to allow them to work through these challenges. In addition to personal meetings, the three principals corresponded and communicated through intermediaries extensively, as in the older diplomatic model, but this was done as a supplement to, and continuance of, their personal diplomacy.

Even before the American entry into the war, Churchill seized upon Roosevelt as a natural and important ally. Indeed, Churchill publicly made plain his desire for an American ally. In his famous June 4, 1940 speech in the aftermath of the Dunkirk evacuation, he was directly addressing the British House of Commons. However, Roosevelt and the American people were clearly his real audience, as he swore that England would fight on against Germany

[18] Maurice, 322

[19] Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I: 1917-1921.* (New York, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1985), 131-132

"…until in God's good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old." Privately, he wrote bluntly and directly to Roosevelt about the peril facing England and Europe from the Nazis, and requested aid in the form of ships, planes, and steel.[20] Roosevelt had agreed to provide support to Great Britain and the Soviet Union in March of 1941 via Lend-Lease, and had further allowed the British Joint Chiefs of Staff to secretly meet with his own in Washington, DC to commit the United States to the defense of Europe if Germany were to declare war on America.[21] Churchill and Roosevelt met in August of 1941 at the Argentia Conference in Newfoundland, and they were even then envisioning a world after the war concluded. Jointly, they wrote and signed the Atlantic Charter, which included language about an early vision of the United Nations.[22] Churchill came away from the meeting with the impression that he and Roosevelt shared a vision of "the disarmament of the guilty nations, coupled with the maintenance of strong united British and American armaments both by sea and air for a long indefinite period."[23] Churchill was only partially correct; the guilty nations would be disarmed, but British strength had been permanently supplanted by American and Soviet ascendance by the end of the war. Still, it was a critical and unifying conversation of a type that did not take place in 1914 among Tsar Nicholas II, Prime Minister Asquith, and French Premier Viviani. World War I marked the end of the older order of the world and demonstrated how modern complexity had created insurmountable challenges for the old diplomacy.

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[20] David M. Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War 1929-1945.* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 441, 445

[21] Morison, Samuel Eliot. "Thoughts on Naval Strategy, World War II." *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 1 (Winter, 1998): 58-59. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/20592475o?accountid=14746

[22] Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 437

[23] Churchill, 441

After that initial meeting, Churchill and Roosevelt would personally meet an additional seven times during the war, and Stalin would join them twice, in 1943 at the Teheran Conference, and in 1945 at the Yalta Conference.[24] As early as November of 1941, Churchill and Stalin were corresponding regarding the war's conduct and aims, with Churchill stating:

> Our intention is to fight the war in alliance with you and in constant consultation with you to the utmost of our strength, and however long it lasts, and when the war is won, as I am sure it will be, we expect that Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the United States will meet at the council table of the victors as the three principal partners and agencies by which Nazism will have been destroyed. Naturally, the first object will be to prevent Germany, and particularly Prussia, breaking out upon us for the third time.[25]

Churchill and Stalin would meet bilaterally during the war as well. The meetings between the principals of the Second World War allowed them to avoid some of the perilous challenges that faced the more disconnected leaders of the First World War. The personal meetings in 1942 between Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington, DC and Churchill and Stalin in Moscow would, through Churchill's deft diplomacy, usher the Grand Alliance past its greatest military hurdle — one which was very similar to that faced by the British and the French in 1916 prior to the Somme.

In 1942, the German Army continued wreaking the terrible havoc on the Soviet Union that it had begun in 1941. In May of that year, the Soviets lost half a million soldiers killed or captured in just two battles, at Kharkov and the Crimean Front. Throughout the summer, the German forces of Army Group South pushed farther and farther east towards the Caucasus.[26]

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[24] Frank, Catherine M. "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Conference Advisers: The Determination of the Influence of Certain Men and Institutions on Franklin D. Roosevelt from August 1941 to April 1945, Particularly in Making Certain Conference Decisions and Agreements." Thesis for Doctorate of Philosophy, Fordham University, 1955, 4 https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1923142585?accountid=14746

[25] Churchill, 532

[26] Gerhard L Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II.* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 412-415

When Moscow was threatened, Stalin had been so desperate as to request British or American armies with British or American officers on Soviet soil.[27] Now, though, he wanted a second front in France to relieve pressure on his front by forcing the German Army to defend itself on two flanks. Just as the French could claim to have borne the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front in early 1916, so could Stalin claim to have done so against the *Wehrmacht*.

In April of 1942, Harry Hopkins and George C. Marshall met as Roosevelt's representatives with Churchill in London and briefed him on an American plan for a joint Anglo-American cross-channel invasion consisting of 48 divisions scheduled for 1943 codenamed Operation Roundup. Churchill agreed with them in principle, but hastened to meet with Roosevelt personally in Washington, DC in June of 1942, where he convinced the President that American forces wouldn't yet be ready for so ambitious an operation and that North Africa and Operation Torch should be the "second front" in 1942.[28] He followed up on this feat by traveling to Moscow in August to convince Stalin himself of the wisdom of delaying the opening of a second front on the European continent.[29]

At the Casablanca Conference in 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met personally with Stalin's Foreign Minister Molotov. Molotov reiterated Stalin's request for a second front. This time, Churchill proposed operations in the Balkans and Sicily. General Jacob Smart, attending the conference as a member of General Hap Arnold's staff, perhaps unwittingly hearkened back to the 1918 manpower dispute between Lloyd George and Clemenceau when he assessed the British position as, "British thinking stemmed from the determination to preserve the British

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[27] Welles, Sumner. "Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit." *Foreign Affairs (Pre-1986)* 29, no. 000002 (01, 1951), 193

[28] Kennedy, 574-577

[29] Umholtz, Robert M. "The Grand Alliance: From Necessity to Suspicion, Development to Decline." Order No. 10000398, University of New Hampshire, 2015. 55-56 https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1759634909?accountid=14746

Empire ... at the least cost in human terms, notably British personnel." Churchill again succeeded in postponing the cross-Channel invasion in favor of invading Sicily. However, Roosevelt assuaged Stalin's concerns by personally committing English and American forces to an invasion of France in 1944.[30]

All three of the members of the Grand Alliance would repeat this discussion together at the Teheran Conference in late 1943. Again, Stalin would demand his cross-Channel invasion, which the Western Allies had by that time delayed throughout the entirety of 1942 and 1943, although the need was no longer as critical with the reversal of fortunes on the Eastern Front. Again, Churchill would propose operations in the Mediterranean for 1944, and this time Roosevelt would carry the day and commit Anglo-American forces to invading France.[31] Because of their personal familiarity from their extensive coordination and in-person meetings, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had a working relationship, if not exactly a level of trust, that had allowed the Alliance to survive the challenges of 1942 and 1943 based on their shared understanding and regard for one another.

The leaders of the Allied Powers in the First World War had desired the unconditional surrender of Germany. As discussed above, France and England rejected Woodrow Wilson's offer to mediate in 1916. However, whatever chance there might have been for an unconditional surrender was lost when Woodrow Wilson intervened after Germany threw themselves on the clemency of Wilson's Fourteen Points in the Fall of 1918. Lives were undoubtedly saved by the signing of the Armistice and the cessation of the war, but the harsh terms the Armistice imposed

[30] *Ibid*, 58-59

[31] Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 467

on Germany, of disarmament and Allied occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads, were only a prelude to the eventual severity of the Treaty of Versailles.

At the end of 1918, President Wilson saw what he deemed to be an incredible opportunity to finally bring the slaughter of the Western Front to a merciful close. German Prince Max von Baden, representing a nascent democratic republic in Germany, reached out through a Swiss intermediary to Wilson directly to negotiate an armistice.[32] In a move that set an ominous precedent, Wilson ignored American Congressional pressure to reject the offer and responded with armistice terms on October 8, 1918.[33] The Allied nations only accepted this unilateral action grudgingly, in spite of the fact that it led to a cessation of hitherto unimaginable devastation, as the tide of the war at that point with greater American involvement and unified military command had finally turned in favor of the Allies and the Associated Power. Germany would eventually reject it as having not been made in good faith.[34] However, Germany did not sign the Armistice with their own unified good faith, either. Indeed, Erich Ludendorff, by this time the Quartermaster General for the German Army, embraced the Armistice as a means of forestalling a German collapse that he felt was threateningly close. Ludendorff would hold out the possibility of using the Armistice merely as a strategic pause for his forces, noting, "…accepting Wilson's program might be harmless because the Fourteen Points were vague and open to interpretation; moreover, if the enemy demands proved excessive Germany could renew the fighting after having rested."[35]

[32] Czernin, 5
[33] Czernin, 6
[34] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919*. (New York: Random House, 2001), 19-20
[35] Stevenson, 382

By offering the Armistice to Germany, albeit with the noblest of intentions, Wilson ensured that the full weight of defeat was never felt by the German populace.[36] Some parts of the German Army marched in a relatively orderly fashion back to Germany from the Western Front. American Major General C.D. Rhodes wrote an alarming report for General Pershing describing disciplined columns of German soldiers who appeared to still be "full of fight" returning to Germany, where he believed they would still be capable of military action.[37] In other units, though, that order was not maintained.

In December of 1918, the Western Army reported to the Reich Demobilization Office that approximately one million men, or one-third of the Army, had simply demobilized themselves, and it was estimated that half a million more of the soldiers who had been in Germany at the time of the signing of the Armistice abandoned their units.[38] However, while Germany had felt privations at the end of the war, particularly in coal and food as the soldiers returned, cities and villages did their best to welcome them home with speeches, flags, parades, money, and cigars.[39] There, they remained as a potentially sizable force in readiness, even though they had been disarmed to a substantial degree by the Armistice.

Quickly, the Allied and Associated Powers realized that, perhaps, they had squandered an opportunity by not continuing the war to its bitter end.[40] On November 12, 1918, the day after fighting ended, British politician Eric Geddes reflected that perhaps more concessions could have been gained from Germany had the Allies better understood the condition of the German

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[36] Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds. *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 216

[37] Scott Stephenson, *The Final Battle: Soldiers of the Western Front and the German Revolution of 1918.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3

[38] Richard Bessel, *Germany After the First World War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 74

[39] *Ibid*, 84-85

[40] MacMillan, 54, 157

Army and populace.[41] By contrast, as the spring of 1919 dragged on, the Allies were forced to ask: for how much longer would they be in a position to impose the conditions of the Treaty, whatever those might be, onto Germany once they were decided upon? This was a question of grave importance, and added the pressure of time to the other factors complicating the negotiations in Paris. Indeed, when the conditions of the Treaty were finally presented to Germany, they were so far beyond the expectations of the German government that it would balk at signing the Treaty at all, necessitating planning in June of 1919 for the American, British, and French forces occupying the Rhine bridgeheads to push further east into Germany. Only the resignation of the German government and its replacement by another, more conciliatory one on June 22 averted this.[42] By contrast, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin ensured that Germany would know it had been vanquished and would not be able to reject any imposition.

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin jointly established that unconditional surrender of the Germans would be the only outcome that they would accept. In June of 1941, Churchill led the way via a radio address to the British people:

> We have but one aim and one irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us—nothing. We will never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its peoples from his yoke.[43]

For his part, by early 1942, Roosevelt's State Department had formed a Subcommittee on Security Problems. This group argued that Germany threatened the world precisely because it

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[41] Reynolds, 25

[42] Barnes, Alexander and James Ebertowski. "PEACE IN PERIL IN MAY-JUNE 1919." *Defense Transportation Journal* 67, no. 2 (04, 2011): 20-24. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/867849521?accountid=14746

[43] Churchill, 372

had not been forced to submit at the end of World War I, and that unconditional surrender should be the American war aim. Roosevelt found that logic sound and informed the Joint Chiefs in January of 1943 that that would be the end he sought.[44] Roosevelt publicly announced this position in concert with Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, stating that "Peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power…[which] means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan."[45]

Churchill's position regarding unconditional surrender for Germany was not surprising. During World War I, Churchill had been "implacably opposed to any peace negotiations until the enemy had manifestly been defeated."[46] He demonstrated that he still felt that way early in the war, both publicly through his radio address to the British people discussed above, and privately in correspondence with both Stalin and Roosevelt. To Stalin, he proposed replenishing Russian shipping losses from hypothetically defeated German and Italian navies.[47] To Roosevelt, he wrote, in 1941, "It is twenty-seven years ago today that the Huns began their last war. We must make a good job of it this time. Twice ought to be enough."[48] Churchill's Foreign Office prepared a study that went further, explicitly stating that Germany would have to be occupied and governed by the Allies at the war's end, although even in 1943 the study recognized an impending conflict: the Soviets would play a significant role in settling peace terms, but they should also be kept "as far east as possible."[49]

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[44] Herbert Feis, *Churchill - Roosevelt - Stalin: The War They Fought and the Peace They Sought*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), 108-109
[45] *Ibid*, 108-109
[46] Roy Jenkins, *Churchill: A Biography*. (New York: Penguin Group, 2001), 331
[47] Churchill, 463-464
[48] Churchill, 428
[49] Michael Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe*. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), xviii

As for the Soviets, on May 1st, 1945, the Chief of Staff of the German Army informed them of Hitler's death and requested a cease-fire, which was refused. Stalin forbade any negotiation with Germany other than unconditional surrender.[50] He was keenly aware of the problems that had arisen from the manner of the First World War's end—he was adamant that Germany would surrender to the Allies in Berlin, their capital. The German people would have no doubt that they had been defeated.[51] All three leaders of the Grand Alliance were, for most of the war, monolithic on this key point.

The third difference between the Allied leaders of the First World War and the Second is that Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had extensive discussions during the war about what their post-war organization for world security would look like and how it would operate. Although it would evolve extensively during these discussions from his first conception, Roosevelt had a highly-developed vision of how this body would operate even before the beginning of the war. By contrast, Wilson had an embryonic and unilateral vision for the League of Nations that he then attempted to flesh-out more fully with the Allied Powers as a part of the Peace Conference. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, meanwhile, had different views of what the League should be and do and had no equities in Wilson's vision because it was thrust upon them as a part of the end of the war.

The addition of the United States as an Associated Power to the Alliance in 1917 made this disunity even worse, particularly insofar as Woodrow Wilson's idealism flew in the face of French and British expectations for the territorial and monetary concessions they expected to get from Germany after the war. Lloyd George expected to seize the German fleet for England, and

[50] Montefiore, 487, 491
[51] Neiberg, 63

money from Germany as well, but not so much that Germany, a vital trading partner for the British economy, would be permanently crippled.[52] Clemenceau, on the other hand, expected France to be repaid for the horrific losses she had suffered. However, he was surprisingly flexible for how this could be accomplished: through a more lenient approach to Germany if America would loan France money and the English and Americans would align to defend France from German aggression in the future, or through extracting enough from Germany to ensure that it would not re-emerge as a threat in the future, even if England and America proved unsympathetic.[53] Wilson spoke often of ending the war on the basis of his Fourteen Points: a path, in his mind, to a "peace without victory" and "impartial justice" for aggressor nations, a settlement of national boundaries across Europe and the Middle East in the interest of self-determination, freedom of the seas, and the creation of a League of Nations to ensure future peace for the world.[54] The League of Nations would prove to be particularly difficult.

If Woodrow Wilson had strong and long-held feelings about national self-determination, he neglected to speak or write about the concept before 1914, and, as it turned out, he had not given any thought to the difficulties in implementing a platitude, no matter how noble, as a policy.[55] Stevenson thinks, that, perhaps, Wilson's abortive attempt to mediate in 1916 piqued his interest for ensuring peace.[56] Regardless, his thoughts regarding the best way to ensure peace began to evolve quite quickly. In 1915, a number of international lawyers, professors, and

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[52] Charles L. Mee, Jr., *The End of Order: Versailles 1919*. (New York, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1980), 33, 56
[53] *Ibid*, 55
[54] Czernin, 5, 13-19
[55] LYNCH, ALLEN. "Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of 'National Self-Determination': A Reconsideration." *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 2 (04, 2002): 424, 427. doi:http://dx.doi.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/10.1017/S0260210502004199. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/204897281?accountid=14746
[56] Stevenson, 255

university presidents had founded the League to Enforce Peace, which proposed an international body that would unite against any member who went to war without first raising their grievance to the consideration of the group. Wilson would tell leaders of that group in March of 1918 that he opposed a "forceful league." However, by August of 1918, he had begun to believe that his own League must be "virile, not a paper League."[57]

The development of his Fourteen Points as a whole was equally indicative of how quickly his thoughts were evolving. On December 19, 1917, Wilson indicated to Colonel House his desire for a basis of European and world peace. By December 22, 1917, House had convened a group of academics, authorities on history, geography, and economics known as the Inquiry, who proposed a prototype of the Fourteen Points. Wilson worked to refine the Points in apparent isolation, which was perhaps a reflection of an innate comfort in scholarship from his experiences as an academic. On January 17, 1918, when he read them to Robert Lansing, his Secretary of State; Wilson presented the Fourteen Points to Congress the next day.[58] This pace, while remarkable, would prove tragic. Wilson had an image of how the Fourteen Points, which included the League of Nations, would serve the world, but his image was a late arrival to World War I. Further, the leaders of the Allied Powers did not understand or share Wilson's exact conception, nor even did they initially accept his Fourteen Points, as discussed above.

Clemenceau was initially dismissive of the League, and denigrated the concept to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1917.[59] Once the war had ended, though, France, understandably, perceived an opportunity for mutual defense in the League that was not in line with Wilson's objectives. France wanted to shape the League of Nations into a military alliance

[57] Ferrell, 162-164
[58] Ferrell, 124-125
[59] Czernin, 84

to ensure French security in perpetuity, a body with an international army and French generals.[60] England and the United States did not. For four painful months, the French delegation doggedly argued for their alliance; the English and Americans were equally determined not to succumb.[61] There was no consensus among them, and this was because the idea of the League had not been discussed in detail by the principals during the war. It was a radical departure from traditional European diplomacy, and was not effectively realized through after-the-fact negotiations.

Even more tragically, Wilson elected to include the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles, believing that this would force the Senate to ratify the Treaty so that the United States could join the League.[62] This was an unfortunate miscalculation on Wilson's part; the Republican-controlled Senate, having been excluded from Wilson's negotiations, had no greater sense of equity in the League than did his Allies. The Senate would reject ratification of the Treaty on March 19, 1920.[63]

Among Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, however, there was a great deal of careful negotiation during the war to ensure post-war clarity regarding the United Nations. Over two decades, Roosevelt had thought deeply about the League of Nations and how it could be improved. His position on the League evolved as well, but more methodically and in concert with his allies. He recognized the magnitude of the opportunity that had been missed at the Paris Conference. In a 1919 speech to the New York Bar Association, he had advocated for the League of Nations, saying that European opinion was that "out of [the First World War] must come something else."[64] Roosevelt had spoken in favor of the League of Nations many times as

[60] Mee, Jr., *The End of Order*, 64
[61] Czernin, 88, 94
[62] Mee, Jr., *The End of Order*, 61
[63] Smith, 175-176
[64] *Ibid*, 175-176

a Vice Presidential candidate during the campaign in 1920 as well. He even wrote a revision of the League Covenant in 1923 for consideration for the American Peace Award, in which he envisioned an Executive Council with greater authority and only a two-thirds vote required for action instead of unanimity. Roosevelt also published an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1928 criticizing the Hoover Administration for its failure to engage with the League of Nations. He praised the League in a speech to the Wilson Foundation after his first election as President of the United States. However, he was also pragmatic enough to recognize the League's failings, for example its inability to protect Ethiopia from Mussolini's aggression in 1935.[65] Most importantly, the idea of the League, or something like it, was turning over in Roosevelt's mind throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

This contemplation began to come to fruition even before the United States joined the Second World War. From the earliest concept of a United Nations that the President and the Prime Minister discussed at the August, 1941 meeting in Newfoundland that led to the Atlantic Charter. At that time, Roosevelt expressed to Churchill his perception of the unfeasibility of a recreation of the League with its "100 different signatories" to satisfy. His thoughts hearkened back to his 1923 revision of the Covenant, as he expressed to Churchill that power should be concentrated in a much smaller group of nations. In early 1942, Roosevelt relayed this view to Stalin's Foreign Minister Molotov, who in turn informed Roosevelt that Stalin concurred with the logic.[66] More fully-fleshed constructs for the post-war international body were established at the Teheran Conference with Stalin and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference by representatives of

[65] Schild, Georg, "The Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations: Re-Creation or Rejection of the League Experience." 1995.*World Affairs* 158 (1) (Summer): 27-28. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/211150430?accountid=14746

[66] *Ibid*, 28-29

Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Questions were raised and settled by the principals. In July of 1942, Roosevelt met with Stalin's representative in Washington, DC to discuss both the conduct of the war and how they could secure peace afterwards.[67] How would a United Nations be organized? Would any group of nations have primacy in the body? How would conflicts among the most powerful members be resolved? The Allied leaders in World War II bargained and clarified to reach a common understanding.[68] Unlike during the First World War, each leader in the Second World War had not only the luxury of time to develop a shared the vision of what the United Nations would be and to have equities in its creation, each also had their experiences of the League to draw from and to build upon.

President Roosevelt, for his part, applied the lesson from President Wilson and the League of Nations. The American public and Congress had been hesitant to engage in the international community after the First World War. In 1935, Roosevelt had proposed a treaty to affiliate the United States with the World Court in the Hague as a small but symbolic act to demonstrate American commitment to the world in response to what he perceived as a rising tide of militarized nationalism. He hoped this action might, at least, give some pause to aggressor nations and reassure those nations who felt that the United States was abdicating a role in world affairs after its inwardly-focused and unilateral response to the Great Depression. American radio and print media galvanized a public response to the Senate, which voted against the treaty.[69] Congress would formalize this isolation, in fact, by passing the first of the Neutrality

[67] Stettinius, Jr., Edward R. *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949), 8

[68] Welles, Sumner. "Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit." *Foreign Affairs (Pre-1986)* 29, no. 000002 (01, 1951): 201

[69] Kennedy, 232-233

Acts by the end of that year, and two-thirds of respondents would tell Gallup poll-takers in 1937 that they had "no opinion" about the Spanish Civil War.[70]

However, the public's opinion about American involvement in world affairs, and editorial positions in media outlets such as *The New Republic*, *Common Sense*, and *The Progressive*, gradually changed as Japanese aggression against China, Italian aggression against Ethiopia, and Germany's seizure of Austria and the Sudetenland showed the dangers of American passivity.[71] Roosevelt would drive this point home to the American people with his December 29, 1940 radio address, in which he emphasized the dominion the Axis Powers would have over most of the rest of the world if the United States provided no assistance to England. While he stopped short of suggesting that the United States should join the war in alliance with England, he said that America must serve as the "arsenal of democracy."[72] By January of 1941, two-thirds of Americans supported the Lend-Lease Act.[73] Similarly, Roosevelt noted with interest the public approval of the Atlantic Charter, which established the concept of a new governing body of nations to ensure peace after the war.[74] Roosevelt clearly recognized that a shift had taken place in the national conscience. The time had arrived when a majority of Americans would support internationalist ideas, as long as those ideas were carefully nurtured and shepherded through the Senate.

In 1943, President Roosevelt directed Cordell Hull to take the Four Power Declaration to Moscow for Stalin's acceptance. The Declaration committed the United States, England, the

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[70] *Ibid*, 393, 398-399

[71] Legro, Jeffrey W. "Whence American Internationalism." *International Organization* 54, no. 2 (Spring, 2000): 253-289. doi:http://dx.doi.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/10.1162/002081800551172. https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/219222577?accountid=14746

[72] Kennedy, 468-469

[73] Kennedy, 474

[74] Welles, 197

Soviet Union, and the Republic of China to establish an international governing body as quickly after the war's end as possible. Roosevelt, aware of the threat a recalcitrant Senate could pose to his desired United Nations from Wilson's experience, arranged for Hull to address a joint session of Congress to ensure the legislators understood and approved of the new, interventionist direction the President intended to take the country.[75]

Similarly, after negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference about how the members of a future United Nations Security Council would interact in the event of a conflict between them, Roosevelt argued that member nations should not be able to veto in cases to which they were a party, arguing with Stalin's representative about "the difficulty we would have in our Senate" with that clause.[76] Throughout the process of creating the United Nations, Roosevelt always kept one eye on American public opinion and eventual Senate ratification. He had learned Wilson's lesson well, the United States Senate would ratify the United Nations Charter about one month after it was signed by Roosevelt's successor after his death, Harry S. Truman.

There is one final way in which the architects of World War II would differ from their predecessors. At the Paris Conference in 1919, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau would nobly take on the challenge of redrawing the world's boundaries to alleviate grievances in attempt to forestall future wars. Given the way that nationalist enmity had exacerbated the First World War, it was understandable that they would have felt compelled to do so. As well, the war had effectively ended the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. Many borders no longer existed in the war's aftermath. However, taking this course created insurmountable problems for them. By contrast, the leaders of the Grand Alliance at the end of the Second

[75] Stettinius, Jr., 14-15
[76] Stettinius, Jr., 21

World War would not choose to do so. Outside of resolving the post-war division and administration of Germany, questions of territory were settled during the fighting of the war and were then not addressed afterwards.

Wilson and Roosevelt were alike in their desire for nations to have self-determination. Both men believed that sovereign and democratic nations would be most likely to uphold peace. Unfortunately for Wilson, his allies were markedly less progressive in their views. Also, his idealism led him to aspire to an inclusive process at Paris allowing all nations, or prospective nations, to have a voice in the process. This created two truly wicked problems.

First, Wilson sought a suitable settlement for the problem of central Europe as a means of ensuring peace in the future. Independent sovereign states, with the correct boundaries and containing the correct people, seemed to be the proper way to achieve this. In the midst of the myriad practical problems facing the Allied powers was this more conceptual one: what, exactly, should constitute a state? The question was confounding.

Wilson re-named the Inquiry who had originally provided him with his Fourteen Points the American Inquiry and commissioned them to expand, and interpret, his Fourteen Points for the other members of the Supreme Council. No sooner had they begun, though, before complications arose. Point VI excluded Poland from Bolshevik Russian dominion; "What is recognized as valid for the Poles will certainly have to be recognized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the [Latvians], and perhaps also for the Ukrainians."[77] The Inquiry continued on, noting Germans living in Czechoslovakia, Poles and Ukrainians living in Galicia, "several hundred thousand" Ukrainians living in Hungary, and Muslim Serbs in Bosnia "said to be loyal

[77] Czernin, 13-14

to the Hapsburgs."[78] The Yugoslavian delegation to Paris was comprised of at least five distinct nationalities and loyalties, with competing and contradictory agendas.[79] For all of Wilson's good intentions, his efforts failed to create even a temporary reduction in antagonism in central Europe, much less an enduring peace there.[80]

The second challenge was allowing the litany of nationalities, faiths, ethnicities, and disparate groups emerging from the war to each plead their cases—for territory, for sovereign statehood, or for reparations—to the Supreme Council. British Third Secretary Harold Nicholson described this in his diary from Paris as "a wastage of time and a falsification of proportion."[81] Countries jealously competed against one another to ensure that their positions were heard, both among wartime allies and rivals. Portugal wanted more representatives based upon their wartime sacrifice, Australia wanted more territory based upon theirs.[82] Not unreasonable expectations, perhaps, but the Supreme Council might find itself backed into uncomfortable corners if they acceded to the logic in one case but not others based on the political reality of post-war relevance.

Bulgaria, who had been an enemy combatant during the war, blamed their former government and expected concessions from the Allies for "suing for an armistice and thus starting the process that ended the war."[83] Desperate to move out of the quicksand of national boundary negotiations to more meaningful terms for the Treaty itself, the Americans were reduced to proposing a three-way exchange of territory between Rumania, Bulgaria, and

[78] Czernin, 17-18
[79] MacMillan, 109
[80] Neiberg, xvi
[81] Czernin, 77
[82] MacMillan, 57, 101-102
[83] MacMillan, 139

Yugoslavia, which fell on deaf ears.[84] Thus, the work of ending the war, which should have been the central focus of the Supreme Council, was interfered with at every turn by the crushing weight of rivalries, enmities, and important but galling minutiae.

Prior to his death, Roosevelt made clear his intent to avoid the trap of Paris in 1919 when he told British Foreign Secretary Eden that "he did not intend to bargain with the Poles or other small countries at the peace conference."[85] Stalin echoed this sentiment after Roosevelt's death when he told Truman's envoy explicitly that he "wished to avoid the Versailles model" at the Potsdam Conference.[86] Truman and Stalin ensured, in different ways, that these wishes were realized — at the Potsdam Conference, questions of the subdivision and administration of Germany were raised and settled.[87] However, when Churchill or Anthony Eden, his successor as Prime Minister, protested about moving Poland's western border from the Bug River to the Oder River, which the British statesmen felt encroached too far into Germany, Stalin superseded their concerns. Soviet wartime efforts had put them in a position to dismiss any need for negotiations about the region — any Germans who had been there were gone, therefore the region was now Polish by default.[88]

Wilson had originally intended for the League of Nations to transparently address the painful questions about nationalism and territory that arose in the aftermath of the First World War. He would have preferred that the Paris Peace Conference not devolve into such debilitating minutiae as questions about which groups should rightfully coexist within a country and what

[84] MacMillan, 136
[85] Feis, 121-123
[86] Neiberg, xx
[87] Feis, 626
[88] Neiberg, 220-221

territory was owed to whom.[89] Only when confronted with the confounding reality of the vacuums left by the death of the old order and the rise of innumerable rival factions outlined above did he take on the challenge of re-creating the map. In 1945, Truman would adopt Wilson's original position. Truman suggested that other questions about nationalities and boundaries should be left "until the peace conference" after the war. In a neat feat to avoid the type of quagmire that consumed the principals at the Paris Conference a generation before, Truman did not intend for there to be a peace conference after the war. With the world's most powerful economy and the atomic bomb, Truman had every expectation that America would only grow stronger in the future. He was not willing for the United States to be bound by agreements made at that time which would be deemed disadvantageous in the future.[90] By refusing to have discussions about how the world would look, he succeeded in this gambit.

The principals in both World Wars had to solve unbelievably difficult problems, and their respective coalitions were not easily gained nor held together. The leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers in the First World War in many ways faced the greater challenge, in that the resiliency of the old diplomacy had not yet been tested by the complexity of a modern global conflict. By comparison, the leaders of the Grand Alliance had the lessons of the previous war to draw from as they made their decisions. Significantly, although technological developments in the interwar years had increased the speed at which messages could travel from one leader to another across the spectrum of cable, wireless, or courier, these leaders would still opt for in-person diplomacy at critical moments before, during, and after the war.

[89] Lynch, 426

[90] Charles L. Mee, Jr., *Meeting at Potsdam.* (New York, New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1975), 20-21

Importantly, it is difficult to argue that the end result of the Second World War was in some way "better" than the end result of the First — the First World War ended with the stage set for the rise of nationalist aggression in Europe and around the world in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Second World War ended with the stage set for a global contest of wills between two superpowers for the next 45 years. However, these different ends were the result of conscious decisions by those in power, and the decisions made by the Grand Alliance during the Second World War were better adapted for the management of a global, coalition conflict than those made during the First World War. They were also better founded at their outset, particularly regarding the inadequacies of the League of Nations.

The close personal coordination of the war effort during World War II allowed Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin to more effectively unify their efforts into a whole-of-alliance approach, and also allowed them to better navigate the crises they faced. Maintaining their unity until Germany surrendered unconditionally put them in a position to dictate without any fears of a resurgent Germany that perceived itself as having been wronged lashing out in the future. Beginning the war with decades of thought about a replacement for the League of Nations allowed them to work throughout the war to find the consensus that evaded the principals of World War I. And finally, they avoided the Sisyphian task of remaking the world after the war in an attempt to mollify every ethnolinguistic or religious group that had a claim, or believed it had a claim, to territory. The Grand Alliance didn't achieve perfection, but they achieved better management of their crisis and a more straightforward end to it.

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