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14. ABSTRACT Modern USMC resident Command and Staff College begin in 1990 with the creation of Marine Corps University. Since that time, there have been three significant curricula. Though there were minor variations each year, the school taught the same curriculum from 1990 through the end of the 2005 academic year. Beginning in the fall of 2005, the school designed a new curriculum to immediately prepare field grade officers for service in Iraq or other counterinsurgencies/limited wars. Over a two-year period from 2012 to 2014, the school again underwent a zero-based curriculum review. The zero-based curriculum addressed the problems of an uncertain future: either small wars or great power competition.						
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: USMC Command and Staff College Curriculum Analysis

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Executive Summary

Title: USMC Command and Staff College Curriculum Analysis

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Thesis: A historical analysis of USMC resident Command and Staff College's curriculum provides current curriculum decision-makers with a framework of best practices and content.

Discussion: Modern USMC resident Command and Staff College begin in 1990 with the creation of Marine Corps University. Since that time, there have been three significant curriculums taught to students. Though there were minor variations each year, the school taught the same curriculum from 1990 through the end of the 2005 academic year. Beginning in the fall of 2005, the school implemented a completely new curriculum. The school designed this new curriculum to immediately prepare field grade officers for service in Iraq or other counterinsurgencies/limited wars. Over a two-year period from 2012 to 2014, the school again underwent a zero-based curriculum review. The zero-based curriculum review recognized the changing operational environment with the reducing impact of only counterinsurgency and the need to balance between great power competition and small wars.

Conclusion: The three major curriculums provide a foundation for identifying what the best practices have been over the past three decades. Although the future operating environment will continue to change, the foundations of the curriculum remain the same.

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Preface

As the security landscape changes, the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College must adapt to provide the education necessary for field grade officers. My interest in this topic has been related to my undergraduate work in education. I also served at The Basic School which showed me the methodology the Marine Corps believed in for training and educating officers. At the beginning of the academic year, the overall method of this course remained a mystery as to how and why the school was teaching courses the way they were. This sparked my interest in researching the history of the school and the curriculum, specifically, how the current curriculum came into being.

I would like to thank Dr. Jonathan Phillips for his mentorship through this process. Conversations with him provided stimulation and direction for continuing my research. Dr. Phillips put me in contact with Dr. Donald Bittner, who's tenure at the College provided a framework for my research and winnowed down the overall focus. Additionally, the numerous instructors who provided valuable feedback for insight into the design of this paper: LtCol Owen Nucci, LtCol Erin McHale, Dr. Nathan Packard, LtCol Jeff Dennis, and Dr. Craig Swanson. Lastly, I would be remised if I did not thank my wife, Natalie, for her continued love and support during this project. Especially her understanding as I sprawled all my materials across our kitchen table.

I. Introduction

Just as Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge searched for a purpose and relevant curriculum to teach at Marine Corps Schools in the late 1920s and 1930s, so too must every generation question whether the course content and delivery method is appropriate to achieve the desired outcome.¹ More than 80 years later the Wilhelm Study contemplated the same questions as did General Breckinridge, but to answer the question for the modern era.² While Marine Corps schools date back nearly a century, the modern era began with Commandant Al Gray's mandate to establish a "world-class educational institution," and the creation of the Marine Corps University in 1989.³ With both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy calling for a revitalization of professional military education, this paper will serve as a foundation for the Marine Corps Command and Staff College's (CSC) in-resident program curriculum sponsors to guide the school through its future challenges.⁴ Three transformational academic years will guide this research for historical perspective: 1990-1991, 2005-2006, and 2014-2015. The analysis of those years will provide the basis for the future curriculum, methodology, and course structure continuing into an uncertain and volatile future.

The academic years selected represent seismic shifts in the curriculum offered at CSC. The AY 1990-1991 was the first year of the remodeled curriculum following the establishment of the University. This curriculum stemmed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Skelton Report from the House Armed Services Committee in April 1989. This is largely the curriculum that received Joint accreditation in 1992 and Masters-awarding accreditation in 1994. Therefore, this year represents the origination of the modern CSC curriculum and serves as the foundation for where the school would go over the next decade.

The academic year 2005-2006 was the first massive overhaul of the modern curriculum. This curriculum represents the lessons learned from the battlefield in Iraq as well as served as an immediate training ground for field grade officers who would likely deploy immediately upon graduation. The curriculum used the framework of the previous curriculum, but the school altered the focus points to teach skills necessary for operating in Iraq with a known operational environment.

Finally, the academic year 2013-2014 was born of a MCU President zero-based curriculum review from 2012. This curriculum forms the foundation for the current CSC curriculum. Though not an immediate implementation, the school phased this curriculum in through the academic year 2014-2015, with minor revisions after that. The school designed the curriculum to educate the skills necessary for operating in a more undefined world after exiting Iraq and Afghanistan while preparing for the next conflict. The zero-based review guidance demanded that the developers start with a blank slate when creating the new curriculum and not merely modify the existing one.

These academic years provide a foundation for devising future iterations of the curriculum. As the security environment continues to evolve, the school must continue to evolve with it. However, the foundations of the curriculum remain consistent with educating mid-level officers for combat operations. CSC has oscillated from teaching students only how to conduct operations on one extreme to only defining an operational environment on the other. As the school must teach students how to define an unknown and chaotic environment, it must remain balanced in educating officers for how to operate in known situations, as well. This sustains the lessons of the military history and security studies, but requires that the school devotes equal

importance to warfighting and leadership. The balance must not simply be a measurement of time, but equal in value and ensuring learning outcomes.

The methodology for this study is a review of the pertinent curriculum materials from each of those years to include the schedules, syllabi, course content review boards, student surveys, and leadership messages or philosophies. The assessment will elucidate how CSC has used curriculums in previous strategic contexts to provide decision makers with the holistic understanding of the best curriculum for future iterations. The author does acknowledge that the University is subject to multiple and competing inputs from different executive agents that therefore results in compromises in the curriculum, but this paper will attempt to identify those compromises as appropriate.⁵

II. Academic Year 1990-1991

The importance and energy of academic year 1990-1991 was evident right from the Marine Corps University President's welcome aboard message. Then-Brigadier General Paul Van Riper articulated the significance of the year with the message that:

The Commandant has directed those in leadership positions at Quantico to take all necessary steps to enhance our schools to the point where they are the premier institutions of their kind in the world. We are well on the way to that goal with the Command and Staff College in the lead...You will enjoy a curriculum based on a solid historical foundation covering all aspects of warfare from strategy and policy, to operations and tactics...We eagerly await your arrival in August."⁶

The Director of Command and Staff College, Colonel David Vetter reaffirms, "our entire professional military educational system has been dramatically enhanced, and Quantico is the intellectual heart of both the effort and of our Marine Corps."⁷ This language amounted to more than trite words as the curriculum was completely revamped from the previous academic year, taking input from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Skelton Report from the House Armed

Services Committee in April 1989, and the luminary leadership of Commandant Al Gray and President of Marine Corps University Paul Van Riper.

The school designed the curriculum with four courses: Theory and Nature of War, Strategic Thought, Operational Level of War, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations. The school taught the first three courses during the first half of the year with MAGTF Operations covering the second half of the year. Theory and Nature of War conducted a survey history of warfare to teach major military theorists and the immutable nature of warfare. This course covered approximately the first month of the course (August – September). Strategic Thought, taught during the second month (September – October), covered national security policy and elements of international relations and political science. October through the end of the calendar year CSC taught Operational Art, which discussed campaigns studies that focused on command organization, planning, employment, logistics, and mobility at the operational level of war. The remainder of the academic year, January - May, taught MAGTF Operations, the primary emphasis being warfighting. However, MAGTF Operations synthesized military history, diplomacy, joint education, theory, tactics, and operational art.⁸

Theory and Nature of War has been a steadfast of teaching at CSC for much of its history. The AY90-91 schedule was well-received by the faculty and student body. The course began with a lecture on Frederick the Great detailing limited warfare, then to Napoleonic Warfare nationalist war. The school spent three full days discussing Jomini and Clausewitz in both a lecture and seminar format. The leadership changed the sequencing of the classes so that the Prussian Reform course followed the Napoleonic Wars to provide a better lead-in for Jomini and Clausewitz. The course then moved to the end of the 19th Century to discuss Mahan and Corbett's sea-power theories. With the students now possessing a maritime and continental

understanding of projecting power, they underwent a Mackinder-esque discussion on both strategies and how geostrategy played a vital role in their development.⁹ The final class teaching the nature of war was an introduction to air power. The school dedicated the last weeks of the course to the theory of war, specifically Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, western views, the American way of war and just war theory; and lastly the Marine Corps way of war. The culminating event in this course, aside from the marked requirement, was the Chancellorsville Staff Ride. The Staff Ride was the segue that covered the nature of war and primed students for the next course on Strategic Thought.¹⁰

A unique and defining characteristic of the Theory and Nature of War Course was that most of the instructors were world-class historians brought in to lecture on their assigned topics. CSC had only one full-time Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) on staff at that time, which is partly why the school brought in so many outside experts. However, with some of the leading names in their field, such as Dr. Williamson Murray (Ohio State University), Dr. Allan Millett (Ohio State University), Dr. Russell Weigley (Temple University), Dr. Joseph Strange (Air War College), and Dr. Jay Luvaas (Army War College), among others, allowed an in-depth exploration of the subjects that may not be the area of focus for the CSC faculty.¹¹ Additionally, a well-developed lecture can elucidate many of these topics as well as other teaching methodologies. Even though the school was a survey course that provided a liberal education, it exposed students to the leading voice in a particular area and not the views of a faculty member that perused the leading scholars' material.

With the conclusion of Theory and Nature of War, CSC moved into the Strategic Thought course from September to October. This course was a tremendous debut, but it proved to need some revising. The school's approach to this course was to combine all concepts of

strategy - military, national, and grand strategy - into one course that did not differentiate the concepts well. The school used a case study at the end of each topic to demonstrate the idea proposed. However, the school used a different case for each topic, so there was not a coherent approach or clear understanding of each case. Additionally, there was a deliberate emphasis on geostrategy since this is an underlying concept in every strategic consideration.¹²

One notable feature of this course was that it did not focus solely on international politics and strategy from a purely academic approach. The school brought in practitioners from the highest levels of the US government to articulate strategy formulation from their vantage point. These lecturers included former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci to teach about the National Security Council; Arnold Punaro, the Staff Director for the Senate Armed Services Committee to instruct on ends, ways, and means of military strategy; and John Collins from the Congressional Research Service to discuss new directions for national defense.¹³ Bringing in individuals that were directly responsible for the research and creation of strategy from the highest levels of two branches of government exposed students to more than the theoretical framework of strategy, but also how it applies in practice. This exposure helped students in their professional career as it allowed them to graduate the school and immediately begin working for these senior leaders without needing to translate the theory they learned into practical application.

The Operational Art course that ran from October through December was very different from how schools teach it today. This difference is understandable as it was still a nascent concept within the defense community. The focus of the course was Unified Combatant Command's strategies and how they operated. The title in the first class was The Bases of Future Soviet Military Strategy, which was a detailed look at the Soviet operations and what American analysts thought would be their future operations. The course then moved into how

the Combatant Command's conduct planning, both for crises and contingencies. After assessing how each Combatant Command conducted planning, the school taught Joint Doctrine and all the documents that go into creating national strategy. The school then winnowed the focus from the doctrine that creates national strategy into the process of how it occurs. Finally, the school looked at how a theater commander takes all those inputs to create a campaign plan to achieve the theater objectives effectively.¹⁴

The MAGTF Operations course comprised the heart and soul of CSC. Covering roughly half of the academic year, CSC designed this course to merge all the other courses with tactical and operational warfighting skills. Although the course's concept was excellent, the presentation fell short at times. However, with only minor revisions in presentation, mostly notably fewer hours of lecture on a topic, the course would turn into an outstanding opportunity to broaden the student's abilities.

The first two months of the course consisted of classes that taught all aspects of the MAGTF. Taught mostly by lectures, the classes ranged from the construction of a MAGTF to how every staff section functioned within the command element, and how each major subordinate command operated. While the content was vitally important, the resounding response of the faculty and students was that the delivery was a "disappointment, [with] readings and lectures lower in quality."¹⁵ For nearly two months the students underwent tedious lectures to understand every staff section and component of the MAGTF. With forty lectures geared towards every aspect of tactical operations, it is understandable that observers viewed this part of the course as less than successful.¹⁶

Out of the tedium of the minutia lectures, fantastic learning opportunities nonetheless arose. Following the MAGTF lectures, the course began segments that covered different

Geographic Combatant Commands. Beyond studying the Combatant Command for a working knowledge and to fulfill the joint PME requirements, the school combined the study of the Combatant Command into an all-encompassing study of the command, the military history of the region, international politics with countries in the region, and tactical and operational military problems. A culminating planning exercise wrapped all these topics into coherent learning outcome for the region.

The students studied US European Command for the first Geographic Combatant Command (then known as Commander-in-Chief, European Command, CINCEUR). This module lasted for approximately a month. The curriculum had already covered the historical aspect of the module during Strategic Thought (World War II case studies), so there was not a history portion. The international relations covered an in-depth analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its history since its inception. Collecting all the knowledge inputs of World War II history, NATO relations, and strategic objectives, the students set out on a planning exercise that incorporated all that knowledge into a CINCEUR order and a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) order. The school had detailed planning outcomes that also taught tactical and operational planning requirements. Operations in CINCEUR required the students to develop a plan for an amphibious assault from both the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) perspective, MEF offensive operations ashore, joint logistics over the shore, Combined NATO operations, coastal defense, and naval construction. The operation had a very noticeable amphibious and maritime approach to emphasize the nature and character of Marine Corps operations.¹⁷ The course was able to achieve such an amphibious nature because of the makeup of the student body; almost every

conference group contained two Naval officers, two International Officers, one Army and Air Force Officer, and the remainder were Marine Officers.¹⁸

The students spent the next month learning about US Indo-Pacific Command (then CINCPAC). To begin the CINCPAC module, the students learned about the Korean War from a military history perspective. After learning about the War history, the students studied US relations with both Koreas since the armistice in 1953 and how that impacts strategy. Having now gained an understanding of the War's history and the history of relations with the countries, the students again conducted a planning exercise that incorporated all the strategic objectives at both the CINCPAC and the MEF level. For the CINCPAC scenario, the students had to plan for an operational defense, air defense of the MEF, operating in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, amphibious operations, conducting a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) offload, and incorporating host nation support with the use of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations (NGO/IGO).¹⁹

The final month of the academic year covered US Southern Command (then CINCSOUTH). Although there was no large war that the curriculum studied, the students looked at low-intensity conflicts and revolutions throughout the Area of Responsibility. Also, without a significant military threat in the region to prepare for conflict, there was no country for the students to study as a likely adversary. This module instead focused on low-intensity conflicts, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and special operations employment. The students created a campaign plan that incorporated these concepts for CINCSOUTH that allowed the students to demonstrate understanding and application of these concepts.²⁰

The class schedule for the AY 90-91 consisted of a regular workday; the students were usually in class five days a week from 0800 through 1600. While there was Professional Study

and Preparation Time (PSPT), it was typically sporadic and “inadequate given the volume of reading [and] papers.”²¹ The average throughout the academic year was one PSPT day every two or three weeks, with about one or two days each week having two hours of scheduled PSPT. The amount of reading also fluctuated dramatically with each class and course. While classes could often have only ten or fifteen pages of assigned reading that would cover an entire school day, other days may have had well over one hundred pages of reading.

The last significant aspect of CSC AY90-91 was the social element of the course. The school created a “register” that included every faculty member and student. Each person received one page that included photos of them and their spouse, a list of educational experiences, operational experiences, and contact information both while a student and permanent. The register provided a means for students to identify other students who had a similar background or had an experience that they were interested in. It also allowed students to remain in contact with one another upon graduation.²² Another social element that received mixed reviews was a mandatory intramural sports program. The school required every student to participate in some element of the intramural sports program, with competitions occurring during the school day. Also, the school hosted several parties for families to further engage in student and family interactions. Although the students voiced a requirement to balance having these functions with having too many, most of the students viewed them as a great benefit when they were part of the curriculum, but not add-on events.²³

The AY90-91 curriculum is an integral part of the CSC legacy. Although the curriculum was not perfect and needed revision, this was the first curriculum from across the Department of Defense that would receive Joint accreditation from the Joint Staff J-7 in 1992 and would later receive accreditation from the Southern Association for Colleges and Schools Commission on

Colleges to offer a Masters in Military Studies in 1994. The class would prove its value with the output of such luminaries as General Robert Neller, General (ret.) John Kelly, General Thomas Waldhauser, and Lieutenant General (ret.) John Wissler, Lieutenant General (ret.) Steven Hummer, and Colonel (ret.) and theoretician T. X. Hammes, among others.²⁴

III. Academic Year 2005-2006

The academic year 2005-2006 was a second significant evolution in the Command and Staff College curriculum. Many factors conspired to generate a complete remodel of how the school had taught for the previous fifteen years. The most significant impact was the war in Iraq that began in 2003. Then-Colonel John Toolan assumed the directorship of the College after having returned from service as a Regimental Commander in Iraq during both the initial invasion then again during clearing and stability operations in 2004. Colonel Toolan recognized that none of his prior education prepared him for his requirements in Iraq, especially during stability and counterinsurgency operations. At the same time, the President of Marine Corps University commissioned a study on the current state of officer professional military education. Recognizing that the school's curriculum needed revitalization and that the student officers would almost immediately find themselves in Iraq, the school's new curriculum would reflect those needs.

Beginning with a completely blank slate, the school's curriculum designers began in the 2004-2005 academic year creating a new program. The new construction would consist of five significant courses: Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO), Leadership, Command and Control Information Management (C2IM), Operational Art, and Warfighting from the Sea (WFTS). Each student would also select two electives, one related to Operational Art and the other tied to CIAO. Unlike the previous curriculum where the school taught a course in one

block before moving on to the next course, this curriculum would teach every course concurrently and each one would run throughout the entire year.

The primary focus of the curriculum was the CIAO course. This course would consist of five sub-courses and a practical application called “Immersion Week.” It was a liberal education that included topics like history, regional cultures, the national security enterprise, and other NGO/IGOs that to provide the students with a robust understanding of events in a country, region, and battlefield. The next course was the Leadership block, which had evolved from the previous curriculum’s discussion of Theory and Nature of War and the Strategic Thought course. The old curriculum’s MAGTF Operations course evolved into WFTS by incorporating joint operations and concepts as well as MAGTF operations. Operational Art maintained the same course name as previously, but the school was able to improve the content after fifteen more years of study on the topic. It now consisted of the study of military theorists and campaign studies instead of joint operations. The final course taught during AY 05-06 was C2IM, which taught students how to use command and control or information management systems that were currently available to the Marine Corps and Joint Force. Not part of the core curriculum, but a requirement for every student, was language study. During the first year, the only language offered was Modern Standard Arabic.

As the foundation of the revamped curriculum, Culture and Interagency Operations was the most substantial course of the academic year, consisting of five sub-courses and an “Immersion Week.” The first sub-course was an introduction to America and its origins in the international body up through part of World War II. The module reviewed the founding documents of America and how they impacted its view of foreign affairs. The next time that the US had a significant role in international politics was World War I, so the course then intensely

studied both the events of the war and America's role in the policy conversation the war hoped to achieve. It concluded with analyzing the European Theater during World War II in much the same way. The second component began with operations and international relations in the Pacific Theater during World War II, then switched to its in-depth study of post-World War II insurgencies, rebellions, stability operations, and low-intensity conflicts. The course considered the Indonesian National Revolution, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, and the Suez Crisis. The remainder of the fall semester taught CIAO part three, which covered in-depth Congo, Cuba, Oman Insurgency, and Vietnam. Returning from the holiday break, section four of CIAO looked at more recent limited objective wars like Kosovo, North Korea, and terrorism. The final classroom portion of CIAO identified the immediate and future threats to global security by analyzing Iraq and China.²⁵

The culminating exercise for CIAO was the immersion week. Students would participate in one of two groups: they would visit a governmental, non-governmental, or inter-governmental organization, or they would take a trip to Egypt or Tunisia for cultural immersion. The expectation of the students that the school selected to visit a governmental agency or NGO/IGO was to serve as a military liaison for that organization. The intention of the visit was not to be an orientation or organizational briefing, but students were working side-by-side with the professionals on their daily tasks. For the students taking the trip to Egypt and Tunisia, the expectation was that they operate as a military professional in an Arabic society. The students had to survive every day encounters using the Arabic and cultural understanding they had learned as well as engage senior military and political commanders in their chosen country.²⁶

The Leadership block of instruction taught students covered diverse subjects required of a leader. Beginning with an overview of ethics from a leadership perspective the course then

delved into specific requirements of different leaders within the MAGTF. The school brought in guest speakers to discuss real-world scenarios and skills for leading within the Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element, Logistics Combat Element, Command Element. The school then provided an opportunity for the students to synthesize and demonstrate the moral aspects of leadership and decision-making skills with a case study of Rwanda. The school built upon the moral foundations of leadership by then examining just war theory from a myriad of different cultural viewpoints. To use leadership in a practical form, the students studied types of personalities and motivators for each type. The school then provided the students with classes that covered how to manage stress as a leader and how to lead in crises. The culmination of the Leadership course was how to use the media to successfully present the leader's narrative to the public. The school designed all the tools of the course to allow an officer to immediately be successful in the current low intensity, twenty-four-hour news cycle operating environment.²⁷

The Command and Control and Information Management course was an interesting construct for a school whose mission is to educate for uncertainty rather than instruct in repetitive skills. The course also had the least number of academic hours throughout the year as well. Early in the academic year, the school taught courses about the theory and philosophies of command and control and information management. It was not until later in the second semester that the school come back to the topic and to teach command and control systems used in the Joint Force and the Marine Corps. The last class was hands-on instruction of software used on the battlefield, that students had to use during the final planning exercises.²⁸ The report of General Charles Wilhelm and his team about the *Findings of the Officer Professional Military Education Study* provides the rationale for inclusion of this course. The study concluded that students must be capable of using the different information systems available to commanders and

command and control styles.²⁹ However, for a school that is designed to educate commanders and staff officers on senior level staffs, this topic seems like misappropriated time because the systems will change, nor are the graduates expected to be the experts on operating the systems.

Operational Art represented the most growth in the curriculum from previous material. With the topic having matured over the past decade and a half, the school was now able to provide richer resources to the students from previous iterations. The course began with an overview of the operational level of war and using the Yorktown Campaign from the Revolutionary War to demonstrate the points. The early 19th-century European theorists offered context to how warfare and campaigning evolved throughout the century. Focusing on the American Civil War, the school conducted campaign analysis and staff rides using the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini. The curriculum then progressed to studying the naval theorists at the end of the 19th century/early 20th century, using their ideas to analyze the Philippine War. After a course to wrap up all the 19th-century theorists, the school spent three classes assessing campaigns from World War I. With a brief survey of the interwar theories, the students studied two campaigns in-depth from World War II that highlighted the interwar theories with their successes and shortcomings. Before adjourning for the holiday break, the school presented a class on the eastern philosophy of small wars. The school did not resume the Operational Art course until March when it then spent considerable amounts of time looking at campaigns of small wars post-World War II, and campaigns studies of wars with American involvement. The students learned about the Malayan guerrilla war, the Korean War, the Algerian revolution, and the French and American involvement in Vietnam. The school then considered Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, Somalia, and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan before concluding with the study of Operation Iraqi Freedom.³⁰

Warfighting from the Sea is the oldest course concept at CSC, teaching the tools needed to fight and win wars. The first group of classes discussed the MAGTF, its components and how it functions. They are foundational classes for every Marine officer to know, as well as to teach the joint, interagency, and international students the basic construct of the military force they will be using throughout the school year. After the students learned the elements of the MAGTF and how the Marine Corps fights, the school provided in-depth instruction on the Marine Corps Planning Process. This in-depth instruction was a re-leveling tool for all Marine officers as well as to ensure all the non-Marine officers have a common understanding of the process that the school used for the year, as well as provided an illustrative model of how all services conduct planning. Following the classes on the planning process, the school taught about the Joint Force, ensuring that the students understood all the assets and resources available on the modern battlefield. To wrap-up the fall semester, the students conducted their first planning exercise, Exercise BARBARY COAST. The exercise covered almost three weeks for the students to plan an operation from the Marine Expeditionary Force level. Returning for the spring semester, the students began by looking at the current battlefield with an emphasis on security cooperation and counterinsurgencies.³¹

The school then moved into a new direction by looking at crisis action planning in scenarios that involved defense support to civilian authority. That section concluded with a planning exercise for a national response to a disaster.³² Exercise NINE INNINGS was the capstone exercise of the year that combined all warfighting elements taught throughout the year into one event; major combat operations, stability operations, defense support to civil authorities, media operations, to name a few. With comparatively few exercises compared to previous

iterations, the school sought to prepare students for the environment they could expect to meet as soon as they graduated.³³

The last part of the curriculum that was not part of the core was the language program. Piloted in AY 05-06, the school offered only Modern Standard Arabic to start. The design of the program was that each US student attended two 90-minute classes per week that covered both language and culture. Additionally, students had to complete assignments in the language lab the school built. The program recognized the value of culture and language skills to small wars and populist wars. However, the singularly focused nature of a war in Iraq minimized the potential for a diverse student body outcome.³⁴

The new curriculum of AY 05-06 recognized the value of student's Professional Study and Preparation Time. The schedule for this curriculum consisted of five days of classes over two weeks (classes alternated between two and three days a week); except for exercises. Each class day include two through five classes from all the different courses. Although the school tried to maximize the student's time by using a full day of classes every time they had to come in, it challenged the students in that they may have five different classes to prepare for, with a possibility of eighty pages of reading for each.

The school's singular focus in preparing officers for immediate service in Iraq was also evident in the elimination of almost every social aspect of the course. The course would no longer create a register so students could get to know one another outside of their conference group. There were no more intramural sports programs and almost no family social events. The school's focus was entirely about preparing officers for Iraq. However, in doing so it lost out on a critical element of leadership: relationships.

IV. Academic Year 2013-2014

The University reinvigorated the curriculum in the summer of 2012. University President William Mullen directed a review of all the schools' curriculum to assess the, "underlying logic of our schools' existence...to establish the focus of our curriculum to serve the needs of the Marine Corps in the future."³⁵ The logic behind the guidance was a recognition that the US had exited combat operations in Iraq and were drawing down its combat operations in Afghanistan; thus the security environment was looking more uncertain again. The rationale for creating the curriculum in the mid-2000s of preparing students for immediate service in Iraq or Afghanistan no longer remained valid. The curriculum had to once again educate students for a complex and uncertain world.

The school implemented the new curriculum a phased approach over two academic years to produce a markedly different course. With the complexity and amount of time needed to generate and implement a new curriculum, the CSC director decided to make a phased revision in the academic year 2013-2014 with the full revision realized in academic year 2014-2015. While both academic years resemble that of the previous year, the final curriculum bared little resemblance to the one created by Director Toolan.

The first year of changes winnowed the main themes of the curriculum into four core courses: War Studies, Security Studies, Warfighting, and Leadership. There was an additional Foundations course that was not part of the core curriculum as well as the electives program remained. The four core courses would run concurrently throughout the entire academic year, with the only exceptions being the first week dedicated to the Foundations course and a month in the middle of the academic year devoted to electives.

The theme of War Studies was from the military history courses of curriculum past. However, whereas the AY 05-06 curriculum military history focused on the studying operational art, especially within the context of small wars, the revised curriculum would assess military history with an emphasis on the nature and theory of war. The curriculum would now review significant theorists from ancient times to the modern era. The course would chronologically examine a war theory then provide examples of the theory in practice. The first class discussed ancient eastern war theories from Sun Tzu before moving to Thucydides and the Roman states. The rest of the semester continued with examinations of the following theories: limited wars, national wars, European theorists, Industrial wars, naval power, amphibious warfare, combined arms, and air power. Chronologically the semester concluded with World War II and all the innovative theories it presented. The course resumed in the second semester with an overview of the nuclear age and the Cold War before moving into more modern concepts of revolution, insurgency and counterinsurgency, combined arms, and maneuver warfare. The course concludes with an examination of modern war with examples from the 1990 peacekeeping operations to even more contemporary examples such as the Arab-Israel Conflicts in 2006 and 2009. The concept of the course would remain as it transitioned into two separate courses in AY 2014-2015. The names of the new courses were plainly Evolution of Warfare to 1945 and Evolution of Warfare Since 1945, respectively. The major change from the AY2013-2014 to AY 2014-2015 military history was the analysis began with the rise of the nation-state vice ancient history.³⁶

The newly minted Security Studies course was the successor to the Culture and Interagency Operations course taught previously. Designed to teach culture, the national security enterprise, and international relations, Security Studies sought to educate students for a more

dynamic and complex world than the previous design of a known battlefield curriculum. The fall semester began with a look at the foundations of the US government and its guiding documents and philosophies. The class then examined the theoretical approach to international relations and the history of the theories from their outset of post-World War I. The course then spent several classes analyzing the national security process and development of strategy. The semester ended with a study of relations with key competitors such as China, India, and North Korea. The spring semester continued with a study of different country or regions relations. Beginning with a few classes that covered various aspects of Latin America, the course then moved to the Arab world for a discussion on Arab-Israeli affairs, terrorism and terrorist groups, then assessing relations with Pakistan and Iran. The course then surveyed issues within the African continent before concluding with a look at the problems in Eastern Europe. As the curriculum completed its transformation in AY 14-15, the first semester remained mostly the same in the course now titled National Security Affairs and the International System. However, the school revamped the second semester for the new course Evolving National Security Concepts and Operations. This course ended the practice of reviewing different regions and countries around the world and took a more comprehensive approach to instability around the world. The course now studies challenges to sovereignty and how to analyze conflict in a more complex and interconnected world. The course addressed the requirements for building partner capacity and how to deal with transnational issues such as crime and nefarious political entities. This new course ends with a study of humanitarian assistance operations and defense support to civil authority. Additionally, both the military and civilian faculty member of each conference group were the primary instructors for this course.³⁷

The Leadership course was like the previous iteration, but it expanded upon several of the topics. The first part of the course contained many of the command climate and mental health issues that were afflicting the military at the time such as sexual assault prevention, operational stress, traumatic brain injury, and health screening. The course also discussed personalities and how they influence leadership before delving into media relations. The course once again presented ethics in a culturally relative conversation, before finishing with a discourse on organizational culture and change. As the course grew into the AY 14-15 calendar, much of the course content remained the same, however, the school separate the course into two titled Leadership in the Profession of Arms I and II. The most notable variation in the new schedule was the addition of persuasion and negotiation classes to augment the fall semester.³⁸

The Warfighting course would experience tremendous change from the beginning of the AY 13-14 year through the end of the AY 14-15. While the concept of educating in warfare remained the same at the school as it had for generations, the way in which the school taught it would vary considerably. During AY 13-14, the school began teaching Warfighting with the introduction to the Joint Force and elements of joint operations. Following the discussion of joint operations, the school then taught the students about the MAGTF, but not to the same level the school had previously covered it. The previous curriculum spent six classes discussing the MAGTF and its elements before it began to talk about the planning process; the current curriculum would cover it in two. Although the school would no longer spend as much classroom time talking about the construct of the MAGTF, there were significantly more planning exercises for the students to familiarize themselves with it. Of note, the school omitted a formal class on the Marine Corps Planning Process, opting instead to cover the subject through other means. The new curriculum would contain three planning exercises in the first semester

compared to just one from the previous schedule. The spring semester introduced students to more current warfighting issues such as transnational crime (which the school will move to the Evolving National Security Concepts and Operations the following year), insurgencies, and defense support to civil authorities. The culminating exercise remained NINE INNINGS, which combined all warfighting elements taught throughout the year. The setting for this exercise was a Phase 0 campaign plan at a combatant command. The school separated the fall semester of Warfighting into two separate courses for AY 14-15: Joint and Marine Corps Operations and the Marine Corps Planning Process. The Joint and Marine Corps Operations class retained many of the classes from the previous year's fall semester but increased the number of Marine Corps' operations classes to four. The Marine Corps Planning Process course resumed the practice of delivering a class on the planning process, albeit only for one hour. The preponderance of the course consisted of two planning exercises to gain repetitions in the process.

The school again completely modified the spring semester during the AY 14-15. Removed were the courses on counterinsurgency and transnational crime, in their place two new courses titled Complex Operational Problem Solving and Design and Theater Campaign Planning. Complex Operational Problem Solving and Design was an in-depth look at information operations, systems thinking, and operational design. The curriculum reinforced these advanced planning techniques with three planning exercises (simply named Exercise III and IV) and the defense support to civil authority exercise from years past. Theater Campaign Planning was precisely as the course title described: how a combatant commander manages his theater. The AY 14-15 capped the year with an exercise that combined all the year's education into one event; however, it was no longer NINE INNINGS. Now just dubbed Theater Campaign

Planning Exercise, the students had to analyze and generate a theater campaign plan for a Unified Combatant Commander.³⁹

While many of the concepts the school created for the AY 13-14 remained consistent, the increase in the total number of courses for AY 14-15 allowed CSC to generate more observation grades for the students. Increased contact time and observation time allowed for a more robust assessment of the students and provide more valuable feedback and performance assessments to the individual student.

Still absent from the curriculum was the deliberate socialization of students. There was still no register or significant social events for the students to create and develop relationships with other students outside of their conference group. The curriculum still represented an academic approach to increasing knowledge while missing the networking aspect of leadership development resulting from social interactions limited to small conference groups.

The design of the calendar was also different from previous iterations of the course. The school designed most of the class time around the first few hours of the day, four days a week. This calendar provided the students with Professional Study and Preparation Time nearly every afternoon and one day a week. Although this provides the necessary preparation time for the coursework, it creates inefficiencies with only using a few hours a day for classes.

Command and Staff College was prescient in recognizing the changing world required a changed curriculum to prepare its students for service in a complex and unknown world. The curriculum that the school designed, beginning in AY 13-14 and finishing in AY 14-15, ably recognized those changes and marked a dramatic departure from the curriculum that prepared students for immediate service in Iraq.

V. Implications

There are many ways to assess what should be the best curriculum for the resident Command and Staff College. Some assert that the best curriculum is one that is comparable to the best civilian institutions and the evaluation of the school should be the same as that of its civilian counterpart.⁴⁰ Others think that CSC should be a training school for preparation on senior-level staffs. The entire focus of the school should be preparation for service as an action officer and the school should refine all those skill sets.⁴¹ Compromises in the curriculum demonstrate this conflict in the school's character with some classes and assignments having a robustly academic quality while others represent a much more practitioner nature. However, a compromised approach does not necessarily fulfill the mission of CSC: "The Marine Corps Command and Staff College provides graduate level education and training in order to develop critical thinkers, innovative problem solvers, and ethical leaders who will serve as commanders and staff officers in service, joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations confronting complex and uncertain security environments."⁴²

The first part of the mission statement that one must address is what role does the school need to prepare the students to fill: that of commander and staff officers. This precludes creating academic work for the sake of educational advancement. The school must prepare students for filling the role of both military decision-maker and staff officer. The next part that one should address is what are the skills that the commander and staff officer need: critical thinking, innovative problem solving, and ethical leaders. The mission then states where the commanders and staff officers will operate: in service, joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations in complex and uncertain security environments. The last part that one must address is that the school belongs to the Marine Corps. While the students come from

every service, government department, and internationally, the school must direct the education to Marine officers and the unique skills that the Marine Corps brings to the national security enterprise. The three curriculums analyzed in this paper all fulfilled this mission statement, with varying degrees of success.

Prospective commanders and staff officers must possess a deep, but liberal, education to create innovative solutions in a complex environment to the correct problem. In addition to a liberal education, students must maintain an operating knowledge of ethical leadership, operational art, Marine Corps operations, and joint operations. Although these four topics are the outcomes, they require a foundation of military history, culture, and international relations to achieve these skills. Therefore, regardless of shifts in world politics and new warfighting techniques, these overarching themes must remain the underpinnings of the curriculum. Additionally, the requirement of a liberal education precludes the use of an entrance exam as that limits the prospective student to studying only the subjects it will test.

Understanding the mission statement requires an analysis of both the content taught in the resident program as well as the pedagogy used. As previously mentioned, the overarching content remains despite changes in the strategic environment, however, pedagogy should be consistently reassessed. The school uses the Social Constructivist Pedagogy (SCP) as its principle method of education. SCP uses social interactions among students as the foundation of learning instead of the instructor-led lecture. The social nature of the learning provides motivation for the student learning, while the group enriches the meaning of the subject simultaneously. The primary responsibility of the instructor is to deliver the content in a manner that facilitates the social interaction. Although SCP provides the analytical framework necessary for problem-solving, it lacks the elements of Liberal Learning (LL) necessary to

decide when to use each analytical framework. LL provides the analytic framework that is SCP teaches, but it additionally offers the learner the ability to apply nonlinear thinking through its multiple perspectives. This skill allows for creative problem solving in a complex and nonlinear situation.⁴³ CSC should integrate these methods into a comprehensive approach vice selecting one over the other to enable critical thinking from a broad perspective.⁴⁴

The need to balance the curriculum between defining the environment conducting operations has fluctuated from one extreme to the other. The AY 05-06 curriculum is a good example of teaching how to conduct operations in a defined environment (even if much of the military community struggled to understand that environment). The AY 12-14 curriculums shifted much more to defining the environment and only paid cursory acknowledgement to conducting operations. The AY 90-91 provided a good balance between understanding the environment and conducting operations.

The most comprehensive and encapsulating method of teaching Marine Corps operations and joint operations (and the sub-categories of military history, culture, and international relations) was from the AY 90-91. This method was a good example of the liberal learning method, but it lacked significant elements of the current SCP. Using an approach that identified a combatant command and then breaking it down into the components represented a way to educate a complex topic by breaking it down into its components. The foundation of the Unified Combatant Commands as a framework for teaching culture, historical military operations in the region, international relations demonstrates the relationship those topics have with Marine Corps and joint operations. This also provides a venue for introducing Marine Corps and joint tactical and operational approaches to warfighting with a logical planning exercise. One of the unique details that the AY 90-91 curriculum provided about the MAGTF, joint operations, and even

planning was the amount of depth and detail the instruction provided. Later iterations expected students to know MAGTF operations and planning or learn it through planning exercises without much instructional lead-in. The instructional preparation is crucial to ensure an even starting point for all the students.

The AY 05-06 curriculum provides the best example for the study of operational art. The school presented every class that had a historical connection as a campaign study. Military history for history's sake does not provide the operational artist with the tools needed to win future campaigns. The study of campaigns allows a student to identify historical examples of campaigns that worked or failed and what were the relevant circumstances in which they occurred. While the curriculum had a distinct small wars theme for the campaign studies, a broadened evaluation of military history's campaigns provides the future commander or staff officer with the historical perspective to make future decisions. The current argument against teaching campaign analysis was a result of student's lacking political and strategic context of the campaign. The student must possess an understanding of the political and strategic context in which a campaign took place, but the focus of the school should be on the operational level of war, thus the campaign.

The current curriculum derived from AY 14-15 provides most of the material needed for educating an ethical leader. The courses offer a robust assortment of academic and practitioner skills in ethics. It additionally incorporates practitioner leader skills such as effective communication, organizational design, and organizational change. The classes on media relations provide a solid foundation for the future commander or staff officer, but the school could expound on this with emerging topics in the information environment operations. A key element that is missing from the current curriculum that is essential for any leadership role is the

social aspect. As seen in the AY 90-91, the school needs to resume the social elements of the course that make leaders effective or ineffective. Simple features such as the register that allowed students to view the backgrounds of their peers and generating interactions. Modern technology allows the school to produce the register electronically, thus, saving time and money in its production. However, technology does not negate the need that the school maintain social aspects as a fundamental element of the course.

The construct of the calendar remains a challenge. Although the last two variations of the curriculum provided for enough time to complete the required coursework during the Professional Study and Preparation Time, there is still a lack of reflection time that academics have shown as invaluable to higher education. Whether the course should meet only a few days a week for a full day or nearly every day for just a few hours has not provided the opportunity to balance these requirements. A schedule that accommodated meeting only a few days per week, but every class on that day were related, that would provide the opportunity to complete the coursework and reflect on the concepts presented from a multitude of perspectives.

VI. Conclusion

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College has been educating field grade officers in warfare for nearly one hundred years. That time has seen significant changes in the philosophy of professional military education with the latest philosophy stemming from the 1980s with the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Skelton Report. Beginning in 1990, the Marine Corps has amplified its view of officer education by creating the Marine Corps University for a world-class education. For the next quarter century, CSC would continue that tradition by updating its curriculum on three occasions to ensure that it was providing the most appropriate education for the time. The school shifted its focus a bit with each subsequent rewrite of the curriculum.

Using history to guide best practices as an approach to future instruction allows the school to present the most valuable material in a method that accomplishes its mission.

Analyzing the curriculum from AY 90-91, AY05-06, and AY13-14/14-15, there has been considerable change in the course with the foundational elements remaining the same. These seminal years at CSC represent opportunities for the school to reflect on previous ideas for improving the current course. As the world evolves and warfighting capabilities change, history has shown that the overall theme of Command and Staff College have remained consistent. The core curriculum must consist of ethical leadership, operational art, Marine Corps operations, and joint operations. Military history, culture, and international relations provide the scaffolding to make meaning of the four foundational topics. Within each of these primary or subcategories, the shifting landscape will alter the specific courses, but the theme will remain the same. The current environment provides for a newfound emphasis in Marine Corps and joint operations in the information environment, but it still supports the foundational topic. The curriculum experienced a shift in cultural studies during the mid-2000s to accommodate for an increased need in understanding counterinsurgency and the Arab world, while a decade later it has shifted back to great power competition and a Eurasian focus. Although the courses may change, the subcategory of culture and international relations remains.

As stated in Marine Corps University's Strategic Plan, one of the goals is to "develop and maintain an effective, transparent, collaborative, and responsive organizational structure in order to foster a culture of continuous learning and improvement."⁴⁵ This goal requires the continuous reassessment of the curriculum to ensure that it is meeting the needs of the student body. History provides a means for that assessment.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ James C. Breckinridge Correspondence, 1933, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Coll JCB, Box 3, Folder 8.

² General Charles E. Wilhelm, et al., *Findings of the Officer Professional Military Education Study*, (Marine Corps University: Quantico, VA, 2006).

³ Wilhelm, *Findings of the Officer Professional Military Education Study*, 2.

⁴ James N. Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).; Thomas B. Modley, *Department of the Navy Education for Seapower (E4S) Study*, (Arlington, VA: Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy, 2018).

⁵ The Command and Staff resident program is subject to external input from Marine Corps University, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Joint Staff J-7, the Secretary of the Navy, and with the conclusion of the E4S study, potentially a Naval University.

ACADEMIC YEAR 1990-1991

⁶ *Command and Staff College Catalog*, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 1, page 1.

⁷ *CSC Catalog*, 1991, 2.

⁸ *CSC Catalog*, 1991, 45-49.

⁹ Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was a British geographer that coined the terms and concepts of geopolitics and geostrategy. Geopolitics is how geography influences politics and geostrategy is how geography influences strategy.

¹⁰ *Recommendations of the Course Content Review Board (CCRB) on Theory and Nature of War (22 Aug – 17 Sep 1990)*, November, 9, 1990, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 11, Folder 7.

¹¹ *Command and Staff College Roster of Guest Speakers*, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 7.

¹² *Recommendations of the Course Content Review Board (CCRB) on Strategic Thought (19 Sept – 19 Oct 1990)*, January 14, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 2, Folder 7.

¹³ *Command and Staff College Roster of Guest Speakers*, August 29, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 7.

¹⁴ *Operational Art Course Materials*, 1990, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 15.

¹⁵ *Command and Staff College Mid-Course Critique AY1990-91 Summary*, January 22, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 2, Folder 8, pg 4.

¹⁶ *Recommendations of the Course Content Review Board (CCRB) on MAGTF Education for AY 1991-1992*, March 21, 1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 4, Folder 14.

¹⁷ *CINCEUR Materials*, 1990-1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 7.

¹⁸ *Class Composition*, 1990-1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 8.

¹⁹ *CINCPAC Materials*, 1990-1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 8.

²⁰ *CINCSOUTH Materials*, 1990-1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 9.

²¹ *Mid-Course Critique*, January 22, 1991, page 1.

²² *Command and Staff College Register*, 1990-1991, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 2.

²³ *Mid-Course Critique*, January 22, 1991, page 2-3.

²⁴ *Command and Staff College Roster of Students*, August 17, 1990, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY90-91, Box 1, Folder 3.

ACADEMIC YEAR 2005-2006

- ²⁵ *Culture and Interagency Operations*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 1, Folder 2, page 5-7.
- ²⁶ *Culture and Interagency Operations Immersion Week*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 2, Folder 5, page 9-13.
- ²⁷ *The Leadership Program*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 6, Folder 10, page 5-7.
- ²⁸ *Command and Control and Information Management*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 6, Folder 1, page 5-6.
- ²⁹ Wilhelm, *Findings of the Officer Professional Military Education Study*, 33.
- ³⁰ *Operational Art*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 7, Folder 9, page 5-9.
- ³¹ *Warfighting...From the Sea*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 10, Folder 2, page 5-7.
- ³² *Warfighting...From the Sea*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 11, Folder 3, page 5-8.
- ³³ *Warfighting...From the Sea*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 12, Folder 3, page 5-7.
- ³⁴ *The Language Program*, 2005, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Collection 4238, AY05-06, Box 7, Folder 2, page 5-7.

ACADEMIC YEAR 2013-2014

- ³⁵ USMC Command and Staff College, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, September 2014), 20.
- ³⁶ USMC CSC, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program*, 22; E-2 through E-14.
- ³⁷ USMC CSC, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program*, 22; E-1 through E-13.
- ³⁸ USMC CSC, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program*, 23; E-3 through E-15.
- ³⁹ USMC CSC, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program*, 23; E-4 through E-16.

IMPLICATIONS

- ⁴⁰ Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin P. Kelley, "Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 84 (1st Quarter 2017): 65-71. Ebscohost: 10700692.
- ⁴¹ Paula Thornhill, "To Produce Strategists, Focus on Staffing Senior Leaders," *War on the Rocks* (blog), July 20, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/to-produce-strategists-focus-on-staffing-senior-leaders/>.
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- ⁴³ Jennifer D. Chandler, and Atul Teckchandani, "Using Social Constructivist Pedagogy to Implement Liberal Learning in Business Education," *Decision Sciences Journal of Innovative Education* 13, no. 3 (July 2015): 330-334. EBSCOhost: 1540-4595.
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CONCLUSION

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