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14. ABSTRACT
During the 2018 BRICS Summit, President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared his intention to join BRICS — a block of multisectoral cooperation composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This paper focuses on the political and security, and economic sectors of cooperation to provide a geopolitical assessment of Turkey's admittance and identify positive and negative implications for BRICS and for Brazil. As geopolitical elements of Turkey — population, geographic position, military power, history — its political and security goals, and its promising economy have the potential to advance BRICS goals the recommendation is that BRICS accepts the admittance and that Brazil encourages it.

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

A GEOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S ADMITTANCE TO BRICS

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: A Geopolitical Assessment of Turkey's Admittance to BRICS

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Thesis: A geopolitical analysis of the political, security, and economic sectors of cooperation reveals that the admittance of Turkey into BRICS would be beneficial to BRICS and Brazil.

Discussion: During the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa, the possibility of a new member arose, when the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared his intention to join the block. BRICS is a block of multisectoral cooperation — political and security, economic, and people-to-people exchange — composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa that lost strength after the decay of commodities' prices and some domestic problems of the country members. Therefore, it is relevant to assess whether or not the admittance of Turkey can benefit BRICS, and particularly Brazil, in achieving their goals. This paper focuses on the political and security, and economic sectors of cooperation to assess Turkey's admittance and identify its positive and negative implications. The 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration was the primary source used to identify BRICS goals. A comparison of these goals with Turkish internal and foreign policy identified alignments and risks involved in the admittance. The admission of South Africa in 2010 and its potential to advance BRICS' goals at that time worked as a baseline to assess Turkish admittance, especially in the economic sector. Likewise, the round table organized by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017 provided an updated portrayal of Brazil's goals as a BRICS member as a base for comparison with Turkish policies.

Conclusion: The geopolitical elements of Turkey — such as the size of its population, its geographic position, its military power, and the history of the Ottoman Empire — its political and security goals, and the promising trajectory of its economy have the potential to advance BRICS goals in the political and security and economic sectors of cooperation. A particular concern is the recent autocratic measures taken by President Erdoğan and a possible concealed intention of using BRICS to strengthen Turkey's relationship with Russia, instead of a real commitment to BRICS values and goals. Overall, the recommendation is that BRICS accepts the admittance and that Brazil encourages it.

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Preface

This dissertation represents a terrific opportunity to write about one of the themes I am passionate about, which is geopolitics and international relations. Furthermore, to be able to conduct research and write about a timely topic such as the admittance of Turkey into BRICS represents an additional motivation for me, especially because it involves my homeland, Brazil. In an interconnected world, it is paramount to acknowledge how to establish profitable partnerships that represent a win-win game, which is exactly what BRICS seeks among its members. Therefore, I hope my paper contributes to expanding our understanding of BRICS and its clamor for a more multilateral world, reform of the key financial institutions, and an increase of cooperation regarding collective security.

In truth, I could not have achieved my current level of success without a strong support group. First of all, I want to express my gratitude to God and Jesus Christ for their endless love for me. I would also like to punctuate the importance of my wife Bruna de Souza in my life. Thanks for your support, understanding, and love. My special thanks to my parents and my sister for every second of your lives dedicated to me. I cannot emphasize enough my gratitude to my mentor, Dr. Christopher Stowe, for joining me in this project and guiding me with wisdom, professionalism, and partnership during the last months. To my military faculty, CDR Stephen Kelley, I thank you for your untiring daily dedication and substantial feedback on my work. To Dr. Linda Di Desidero, Mrs. Stase Wells, and Mrs. Andrea Hamlen-Ridgely from the Leadership Communication Skills Center, thank you for your patience, enthusiasm, and unwavering dedication in each revision of my writing. To the librarians Mrs. Christi Bayha, Mrs. Deborah Rexon, and Mr. Winston Gould, thank you for your friendship, commitment, and meticulous attention throughout the research process. Thank you all for helping me to conclude this project.

Introduction

When BRIC — Brazil, Russia, India, and China — was created in 2009, its members presented consistent economic growth, with the expectation of overtaking the biggest economies of the world around the year 2050. Later, the entrance of South Africa strengthened the block — now called BRICS — and made it more likely to achieve its goals. The initiative, defined as a block of multisectoral cooperation, represented a significant step within the concept of South-South cooperation. With the decay of commodities prices and some domestic problems of the members, however, the block lost strength. In this moment of uncertainty, during the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa, the possibility of a new member arose, when the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared his intention to join BRICS.

Turkey is an important actor in the international system, but aspects of its growing autocracy may complicate its consideration as a member of BRICS. Turkey's relevance is apparent in both its history as the center of the onetime Ottoman Empire and its important geopolitical factors, such as its large population and its geographic position between Europe and Asia.ⁱ Additionally, Turkey's leadership in the Middle East, mainly based on ethnicity and religion, increases the relevance of the country as an agent of stability in a very contested region of the planet.¹ Despite recent economic constraints, Turkey is a wealthy country and a member of the G20.ⁱⁱ Moreover, its army is the second largest among North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] members, signifying Turkey's military power. These factors grant substantial geopolitical weight to Turkey in the international system. Hence, the international community

ⁱTurkey's population exceeds 82 million people, the 19th among countries by population.

ⁱⁱA group composed by the 20 major countries in the global financial system and aimed at promoting cooperation toward achieving stable and sustainable global economic growth for the benefit of all countries. It represents about two-thirds of the world's population, 85% of global gross domestic product, and over 75% of global trade.

worries as Turkey becomes a more autocratic regime. Since the attempted *coup d'état* against the government of President Erdoğan in 2016, he managed to change the legislation and concentrate more power in the President's hands, which weakens the institutions and harms democracy, a principle of BRICS and a core value for Brazil.²

Brazil is a leader in South America with more than 208 million people, the 6th in global rank by population. It also has a privileged geographic position and a vast shore that extends from below the Tropic of Capricorn to above the Equator. The owner of the fifth largest territory in the world is also part of the G20 and figures as the world's 9th largest economy — the 1st within South America. Recently, Brazil has experienced political instability, mainly derived from cases of corruption involving high-level politicians and private companies.

The complexity of the environment results from the geopolitical weight of Turkey, the expectation of growth of BRICS and its role in the international system (IS), as well as the role of Brazil in the IS, its geopolitical factors, and its leadership in South America. This context raises a central question: from a geopolitical perspective, considering the potential outcomes for BRICS and Brazil, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the admittance of Turkey into BRICS? And further, what implications would there be, both positive and negative, if Turkey is admitted? A geopolitical analysis of the political, security and economic sectors of cooperation reveals that the admittance of Turkey into BRICS would be beneficial to BRICS and Brazil.

Background of BRICS

BRICS started in 2001 and popularized in 2003 when Jim O'Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs, published an article in which he foresaw that in 2050 Brazil, Russia, India, and China's economies together could surpass the G6 in US dollar terms.³ These countries entertained the idea, and in 2006 diplomatic coordination among their chancellors took place

outside the United Nations General Assembly. In 2009, the first summit occurred in Yekaterinburg, Russia, with the presence of their heads of state and government. In 2011, the admittance of South Africa strengthened the block and granted it more depth and comprehensiveness. Over the years, the agenda of the annual summits transcended the initial financial framework and BRICS became a promising political-diplomatic entity, encompassing themes related “to global governance, such as development, peace and security, energy and climate change, and social issues” throughout the world.⁴

Whereas in the first summit, the Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders presented fifteen official commitments, in 2018, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declarationⁱⁱⁱ stated 101 paragraphs of pledges, covering a variety of economic, security, and social issues.⁵ Although not all the promises were fulfilled, according to *The Economist*, between 2011 and 2017 BRICS performed a surprising average rate of compliance of 77%, which is very much like the G6 rate.⁶ The broad agenda covered more than thirty areas of cooperation, such as finance, agriculture, economics and trade, fight against transnational crime, science and technology, health, education, and energy, as well as corporate, academic, and security cooperation.⁷ This expansion revealed that BRICS countries have made significant progress in strengthening their ties and expanding their commitment in several areas since the block's creation. Nevertheless, many of the paragraphs of pledges are just statements of cooperation and do not represent tangible actions^{iv} to help each other to achieve individual and collective goals in

ⁱⁱⁱThe document is Organized in Six Sections and One Annex: Section I – Preamble; Section II - Strengthening Multilateralism, Reforming Global Governance and Addressing Common Challenge; Section III - Strengthening and Consolidating Brics Cooperation in International Peace and Security; Section IV - Brics Partnership for Global Economic Recovery, Reform of Financial and Economic Global Governance Institutions, and The Fourth Industrial Revolution; Section V - People-to-People Cooperation; and Annex 1: Johannesburg Plan of Action.

^{iv}The Annex 1 of the document presents a plan of action composed by ministerial meetings, senior official and sectoral meetings.

the three big sectors of cooperation: people-to-people exchange sector, political and security sector, and economic sector.⁸

People-to-people exchange refers to cooperation in areas such as culture, sport, education, film, and youth. Political and security cooperation among BRICS members aims “at achieving peace, security, development and cooperation for a more equitable and fairer world.”⁹ Although the expansion of areas of cooperation is admirable, the projection of economic growth until 2050 sparked BRICS’ conception. Therefore, if a successful partnership in the economic area is not the most important goal, it is certainly the foundation to build a successful mutual effort in the other sectors. Without disregarding the relevance of people-to-people exchange, taking into account a geopolitical perspective, further analysis will focus on the political, security, and economic sectors of cooperation.

Political Cooperation

A comparison of Turkey’s political position with BRICS’ goals reveals an alignment that could benefit the block, as Turkey is one of the emerging countries seeking to have an active voice in the international system and also advocates for a more multilateral order. Regarding political cooperation, BRICS aims at “advancing the restructuring of the global political architecture so that it is more balanced, resting on the pillar of multilateralism.”¹⁰ Moreover, early in its Preamble, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration reaffirms the United Nations (UN) as the proper universal intergovernmental entity to lead cooperation and resolve disputes among states, whereas “promoting democracy and the rule of law in international relations.”¹¹ It also reiterates BRICS’ commitment to the necessary cooperative efforts to shape “a more fair, just and representative multipolar international order.”¹² Thus, despite its support of

the UN, the document also recalls the 2005 World Summit Outcome^v to defend a comprehensive reform of the UN, including the Security Council (UNSC), to make it more representative, effective, and efficient, particularly regarding the participation of Brazil, India, and South Africa.¹³ BRICS' political cooperation agenda emphasizes the urgent need of an effective multilateral system wherein the international community is more important than any single state. To achieve it, BRICS clamors for reform of the UN and other multilateral institutions of global and regional governance, which would result in benefits beyond the political perspective.

Turkey is a UN founding member; hence, it agrees with the role of the UN as the proper forum to solve disputes and promote democracy.^{vi} Despite evidence and worries of the international community about Turkey becoming a more autocratic regime, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey affirms that the country is committed to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.¹⁴ Even President Erdoğan's speech at the UN's 73rd General Assembly meeting defended multilateralism, the international liberal order, and the reform of the UN Security Council.¹⁵ Nevertheless, recent events indicate Turkey is becoming more autocratic, which contradicts Erdoğan's speech and raise questions about how Turkey would fit in BRICS.

Since the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan took controversial measures to protect the government that harmed political rights, civil liberties, and free expression. Moreover, through a suspicious constitutional referendum, the President managed to change the constitution, thus

^vA Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005 which stresses the importance of early reforming the UN, including the Security Council (UNSC), to guarantee an adequate participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making and norm-setting, as well as to make the UNSC more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. The whole document can be found at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf.

^{vi}Founding Members of the United Nations are the countries that signed the United Nations Convention of January 1, 1942 or that took part in the San Francisco Conference, having signed and ratified a Charter.

concentrating more power in his own hands. He replaced elected mayors by selected ones and persecuted those considered enemies of the state. As a result, according to the Freedom House's Freedom Status, Turkey became a 'Not Free' country.¹⁶ Apparently, these facts depict a clash of values between Turkey and BRICS. However, according to the same classification, China and Russia are 'Not Free' countries too, and their performance is inferior to Turkey's. Still, as the Democracy Index 2017 reports, while Turkey occupies position 100 among the democracies in the world, Russia and India are number 135 and 139, respectively.¹⁷ Thus, although the international community's concern about recent devolution of democracy in Turkey is legitimate, and that contradicts some of the principles BRICS defends, this would not be a good argument to stop Turkey from joining the block. In fact, the negotiations of Turkey's admittance could address some of the problems Turkey faced in recent years and might initiate cooperation measures to solve them. Furthermore, the speech of President Erdoğan at the UN's 73rd General Assembly meeting shows that Turkey could be a valuable ally in the campaign to reform the UN and establish a multilateral international order, a primary claim in BRICS' political agenda.

The political agenda of the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration also corroborates the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development

Goals (SDGs),^{vii} the Paris agreement,^{viii} and cooperation in energy (aiming at universal energy access, energy security, energy affordability, reduced pollution, and environmental conservation).¹⁸ It also acknowledges a plethora of cooperation and research agreements within BRICS in the following areas:

- Energy — BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform
- Agriculture — BRICS Agricultural Research Platform (ARP)
- Environment — Environmentally Friendly Technology Platform, Clean Rivers Umbrella Programme, Partnership for Urban Environment Sustainability Initiative, and BRICS Environmentally Sound Technology (BEST) Cooperation Platform
- Disaster management — BRICS Meeting of Heads of Disaster Management in Buffalo City
- Biodiversity
- Oceans Economy^{ix}

^{vii}The UN defines the Sustainable Development Goals as the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. The 17 goals address the main global challenges, including those related to poverty, inequality, climate, environmental degradation, prosperity, and peace and justice. They were designed to leave no one behind and to be achieved by 2030. More information can be found at <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>.

^{viii}The Paris Agreement builds upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. The Paris Agreement central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. The whole document can be found at <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/109r01.pdf>.

^{ix}According to the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration Oceans Economy encompasses multiple sectors, including the strategic areas of maritime transport, shipbuilding, offshore oil and exploration, aquaculture, port development, research and technology, conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, marine and coastal tourism, financial and insurance services, as well as coastal industrial zone development.

- Population issues — age structure changes, gender inequality, women’s rights, youth development, unemployment, urbanization, and migration.

Each of the BRICS countries supports the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDG, as does Turkey.¹⁹ Nonetheless, although BRICS has declared its support for the Paris Agreement, Russia did not ratify it, and Turkey did not either.^x When it comes to international agreements, there are some inconsistencies between the official viewpoint of BRICS and its members individually. Thus, the lack of adherence from Turkey to these treaties cannot compose a barrier to its admittance, although any alignment of Turkey and BRICS’s policies would smooth consensus within the block in future negotiations. The analysis, however, portrays a different scenario when it comes to agreements among BRICS countries and Turkey.

A target area of cooperation within BRICS is agriculture, and Turkey has a large agricultural sector — the agricultural area comprises more than 49% of its territory — that represents 6.8% of Turkish Gross Domestic Product (GDP).²⁰ Turkey is also one of the few self-sufficient countries in food production and one of the leaders in the world in agriculture and related industries.²¹ Since 2006, Turkey has established the FAO-Turkey Partnership Programme with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The partnership, whose main goal is to enact food security and poverty alleviation, benefits six other countries in Central Asia. The focus areas are Food Security, Animal and Plant Genetic Resources, Agricultural Policies, Agricultural and Rural Development, Food Safety, and Natural Resources Management.²² Thus, Turkey’s expertise in this field has the potential to advance the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform and to contribute to achieving the goals of the program. As the

^xAs the official position of the two countries in January 10, 2019. <https://climateactiontracker.org/>.

majority of energy to sustain the sector comes from imported fossil fuels, Turkey has decided to invest in the energy sector to diversify domestic supply.

The economic growth that Turkey experimented with in recent decades has increased the demand for energy both in the industrial and residential sectors, and Turkey expects this demand will grow by 75.4% between 2012 and 2023.²³ Turkey's primary energy sources are natural gas, oil, and coal, and the largest part of those are imported. In order to meet the demand, reduce fossil fuel imports, and improve energy security, the Turkish government decided to launch the National Renewable Energy Action Plan for Turkey. Among several ambitious goals, the plan aims at changing the power matrix so that 30% of the total demand is based on renewable sources by 2023. The program includes investments in Hydropower, Geothermal power, Solar power, Wind power, Biomass power, and other target areas to improve efficiency. All of them point to “sustainable industrial development under environmental considerations” and are based on some core principles such as cooperation.²⁴

For instance, in September of 2018, Turkey's Environment and Urbanization Minister Murat Kurum declared that Ankara and Moscow need to strengthen their bilateral relations even more — in fields such as energy, construction, tourism, and others — as soon as possible.^{xi} In October of 2018, Turkey and Germany signed an agreement to develop energy projects that will likely expand the €25 billion German companies have invested in Turkey during the last fifteen years.²⁵ The potential for growth is clear, the principle of cooperation is declared, and both countries have already signed some agreements. It is evident that there are opportunities to progress the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform, the Environmentally Friendly

^{xi}On September 19, 2018 in a joint news conference with Russia's Construction, Housing, and Utilities Minister Vladimir Yakushev at the 12th International Real Estate Investment Forum PROESTATE in Moscow.

Technology Platform, the Clean Rivers Umbrella Programme, the Partnership for Urban Environment Sustainability Initiative, and the BRICS Environmentally Sound Technology (BEST) Cooperation Platform, with multiple mutual benefits.

Likewise, there is a promising field of cooperation in disaster management given the experience of Turkey in this subject, which could enhance the agenda of the BRICS Meeting of Heads of Disaster Management in Buffalo City, in South Africa.^{xii} Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is already used to cooperate with several countries, such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Philippines, and Pakistan, that recently sent experts to Turkey to learn about its emergency-management system. They intend to work with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Disaster Management Implementation and Research Center of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara.²⁶ One of the pillars of the Turkish Disaster Management System is preparedness, which includes campaigns of education to raise awareness, improve the Disaster Volunteering System, and integrate NGOs to the system. Currently, the infrastructure of disaster management provides essential assistance to the more than 2.9 million registered Syrian refugees that Turkey hosts.²⁷

The 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration urges the international community to build up a counter-terrorism coalition under the aegis of the United Nations, stressing that the fight must respect “international refugee and humanitarian law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”²⁸ BRICS calls on the UN, the international community, and the parties directly involved in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria to find a

^{xii}96% of our country is under the danger of earthquake hazard, 66% of seismic belt is right on active Faultline, and 72% of the population and 75% of industrial plants are under the Earthquake Risk. Turkey faced 12 significant disasters since 1980s.
http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/HLRF_2013_Plenary_3_Tetik.pdf.

solution through dialogue.²⁹ When addressing Syria's conflict, BRICS condemns terrorism and the use of chemical weapons. Particularly about the situation in Syria, BRICS emphasizes its commitment to finding a peaceful settlement, under the authority and mediation of the UN and complemented by the Astana initiative, which is an endeavor of Russia, Iran, and Turkey held in the city of Astana, Kazakhstan, to discuss and negotiate the monitoring of the ceasefire agreed in 2016, and hopefully the end of the conflict in Syria and a transition to a political process.³⁰ The block pressures the UN General Assembly to approve the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), underscoring the necessity of multilateral negotiations to conceive a strategy to inhibit chemical and biological terrorism, as well as those derived from Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The document cites the advancement made with the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs and calls for BRICS member States to work out a BRICS intergovernmental agreement addressing this subject.

Terrorism and refugees are two serious themes for Turkey, especially since the conflict in Syria initiated in March of 2011 for two key reasons. First, Turkey shares 511 miles of frontier with Syria and the civil war has severe impacts inside Turkish territory and population.³¹ For instance, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Turkey hosts 3.3 million Syrian refugees, out of 5.6 million that fled from Syria.³² As a result, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) of Turkey took actions to enroll Syrian children in school, to provide health care, to provide professional training, and to guarantee access to public services for Syrian refugees. The Turkish expenses with humanitarian assistance reached \$3.2 billion in 2015 and jumped to \$6 billion in 2016, almost 22% of total international humanitarian assistance expenses.³³ As an additional attempt to solve the problem, Turkey, Russia, and Iran launched the

Astana initiative, which BRICS considers to be complementary to the UN efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Syria.

Second, the government considers Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is a terrorist group according to Turkey and the United States.^{xiii} Thus, Turkey shares with BRICS an interest in combating terrorism as well as addressing the refugee matter, which enhances its potential to join the block to pressure the UN General Assembly to approve the CCIT. Also relevant are the 106 attacks with chemical weapons in Syria since September of 2013.³⁴ The words of Ibrahim Kalin, President Erdoğan's spokesman, after a chemical attack in Syria in April of 2018 make Turkey's posture clear: "The entire international community, primarily countries that have an influence on the Syrian regime, has a responsibility to take the necessary steps in order to prevent similar war crimes and crimes against humanity."³⁵ Once again, Turkey's policy towards the use of chemical and biological weapons aligns with that of BRICS.

The Preamble and Section II of the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration depict well how the goals of the block transcended the economic framework initially devised. All the political topics regarding ongoing cooperation or potential collaborationism represent a more comprehensive view of the responsibilities of BRICS, as well as its firmness of purpose towards becoming a key player in the decision-making process within the international system.

^{xiii}The participation of Turkey in the conflict is a very complex theme because, despite condemning the Bashar al-Assad regime, since the beginning of the 2018 Turkey has been fighting the Kurds of YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces, enemies of Bashar al-Assad. All this, with the help of the Free Syrian Army, which Turkey helped to reorganize in 2017. Hence, the Free Syrian Army is now more dedicated to fighting against the Kurds in northern Syria than against the Syrian army. Turkey's most recent movements and military actions against the Kurds YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces are particularly sensitive because these two armed groups are US allies in Syria and Turkey is a US ally in NATO. The conflict also involves other countries such as France, Iran, Israel, Russia, United Kingdom, the UN, and other international organizations. Also present in the region are the Hezbollah and the Islamic State. Consequently, Turkey's decisions and actions result in implications to Turkish foreign policy.

Considering that the block shares 41.1% of the world population and 29.6% of the world territory, it is natural and understandable that its members pursue the right to be heard in order to protect their assets and interests.³⁶ In this context, the posture of Turkey before these political subjects is in line with BRICS goals, which indicates that Turkey could become a strategic ally to achieve a multilateral international order where developing countries have more influence in the decision towards common issues. BRICS and Turkey uphold multilateralism as the best way to achieve peace and stability, and the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration expands its pledges and concerns into security issues.

Security Cooperation

In terms of security cooperation, BRICS advocates for a “universal collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter,” enhancing the prohibition of “the imposition of unilateral coercive measures outside the framework of the UN Charter.”³⁷ It also calls for the use of force as a last resort and only after the political and diplomatic means fail to guarantee a peaceful resolution of disagreements.³⁸ This posture is coherent with the political claim for a multilateral order in the international system centered in the UN and based on collective efforts. Turkish concerns about security in the Middle East combined with Turkish influence in the region could be an advantage to BRICS in order to perform some of the block’s goals regarding global security. For instance, while reinforcing some international agreements aiming at peaceful settlements of crisis and conflicts, BRICS manifests preoccupation about North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs and considers a resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian impasse as vital to achieving peace and security in the Middle East.³⁹

The geopolitical weight of Turkey and its leadership in the Middle East, primarily based on ethnicity and religion, could open a window for BRICS to advance peace and security for the

region.⁴⁰ Arguably, this is not an easy task, considering the volatile relationship among some countries in a highly contested area. However, since peace and security in the Middle East is part of BRICS' concerns, Turkish leadership represents an asset that, if used wisely and strategically, could contribute to increasing BRICS' influence in the region. As a result, success in the negotiations to achieve peace and security would boost the credibility of the block within the international community and benefit its claim for a collective security system in which developing countries are heard, except for the unilateral actions of Turkey in Syria.

In December of 2018, the United States warned Turkey not to attack the Kurdish forces in Northern Syria, as Turkey threatened to invade the city of Manbij. The Pentagon accused Turkey of trying to take unilateral military action, and the US militaries promised to respond aggressively to any attempt of attack.⁴¹ However, Turkey also accused the United States of unilateral actions in Syria. Thus, the episode marked one more chapter in the turbulent relationship between the United States and Turkey, rather than a concern of the international community.^{xiv} Nevertheless, as the UNSC had not authorized any action, it is correct to affirm that it would constitute a unilateral action. Given that Turkey shares borders with Syria and is directly affected by the conflict, it is a challenge for Turkey to abide by the UN and the BRICS conception of collective security; hence it may represent a challenge to its admittance to BRICS.

^{xiv}Some other problems that harmed the relationship between the United States and Turkey were: In 2003, Turkey did not allow the United States to use Incirlik Air Base for the invasion of Iraq; Since 2016, President Erdoğan has encouraged a growing aggressive nationalism that includes an anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric; Turkey demands the end of US support for the YPG, particularly in Manbij, which the United States alleges to be important to prevent the return of the Islamic State. However, Turkey considers the YPG an extension of the PKK from Southeast Turkey, a group classified as terrorists by Turkey and the United States; the purchase of a Russian S-400s air-defense missile system; the cooperation between Turkey and Russia in Syria's issues; the imprisonment of the American Pastor, Andrew Brunson, accused of involvement with terrorist groups in Turkey; the demand for extradition of the exiled Turkish cleric, Fethullah Gulen, leader of the popular movement Hizmet — Turkey considers it a terrorist organization — and accused of participation in the 2016 coup attempt.

Nonetheless, this issue does not look like enough to preclude Turkey from joining BRICS, since Russia, another BRICS member, has also faced accusations of war crimes in Syria.⁴²

Confirming the wider BRICS' approach to global collective security, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration evinces the severe threat that an arms race in outer space would represent. In this regard, BRICS enhances the Conference on Disarmament as the proper forum to discuss the subject in a multilateral perspective and appeals every country to comply with the current international norms in order to guarantee the peaceful use of outer space.⁴³ All BRICS countries are State Members of the Conference on Disarmament, and so is Turkey.⁴⁴

Still regarding security, it is noteworthy that Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a political and military alliance that was created to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the World War II. Although NATO has expanded its conception of what represents a threat to its members, the alliance still considers Russia as one of the primary menaces, especially after the annexation of Crimea and Russian actions in Ukraine.⁴⁵ From Deputy Director of the Russian Research Institute of Cultural and Natural Heritage Evgeniy Bakhrevskiy's perspective, Erdoğan is disappointed with the European Union (EU), and for this reason, he is looking for other alliances. Bakhrevskiy also states that BRICS is more democratic and requires fewer sacrifices than the EU and NATO. For Stevan Gajic, a researcher at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, there is a dispute between the United States and Russia over Turkey.⁴⁶ And when it comes to global security, the opinion of the strongest military power exerts much influence and can be decisive.

With this in mind, it is worth noting that there has been much friction in the relationship between the United States and Turkey recently, especially since the attempted *coup d'état* against the government of President Erdoğan in 2016. Although the relations between the two

States have always been turbulent, many newspapers, websites, and specialists' blogs have manifested concern about the tension and its possible outcomes and impacts on the United States, Turkey, and the international community. Among the reasons for this tension are the fact that Turkey has sought to strengthen its relationship with Russia by cooperating with it in Syria's issues,⁴⁷ and purchasing the Russian S-400s air-defense missile system.⁴⁸ While the United States defends that the system would harm the interoperability among NATO members, Erdoğan affirms that he is taking precautions regarding the security of Turkey.⁴⁹ According to the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, NATO wants to preclude Russia from becoming a geopolitical competitor.⁵⁰

Adding these facts to the declaration of Minister Murat Kurum,^{xv} there is enough evidence of an approximation between Ankara and Moscow, which could indicate an attempt at geopolitical hedging with Russia. In this context, the following questions come to surface: Is it incompatible for Turkey to be part of NATO and BRICS? What would President Erdoğan do if NATO told Turkey to choose between one of them? How does Russia see having a NATO member inside BRICS? Although the answers for these questions are out of the scope of this paper, based on the goals that the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration makes explicit on the three sectors of cooperation of BRICS — people-to-people exchange, political and security, and economic — Turkey's membership in NATO is no plausible reason to prevent it from joining BRICS. According to Boris Dolgov, a specialist from the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, there is no incompatibility because BRICS does not oppose any other political or economic alliance.⁵¹

^{xv}He declared that Ankara and Moscow need to strengthen their bilateral relations even more as soon as possible.

Therefore, there is no incompatibility between BRIC and Turkey regarding their security concerns and policy and any disagreement or difference in interpretation is not more severe than those existing among BRICS countries. However, the leadership and influence of Turkey could be an advantage to BRICS in order to increase its influence and advance the block's goals regarding global security, mainly in the Middle East.

Economic Cooperation

Regarding economic issues, Turkey is one of the best candidates to join BRICS, especially because of the projections of its economy to the future, with more potential than the current member South Africa. However, the crises the country faces currently could harm its trajectory to become as powerful as specialists expect. In Jim O'Neill's view, except for Russia, the position of the members in 2018 is close to what he envisioned in 2001. However, he recognizes that the block has not developed all its potential and needs to review its *modus operandi*. He underscores the decay of commodities' prices after the global financial crisis in 2008 as one of the principal hampers to the prosperity of the block.⁵² BRICS also recognizes the volatility of commodities' impact in its members' economy. However, the block states that some decisions of major advanced economies are also responsible for the growth decrease. Thus, BRICS claims for reform of financial and economic global governance institutions, not only as a means to guarantee the development of BRICS' countries but also to foster global economic recovery.⁵³ This open-world economy based on a multilateral trading system would bring prosperity to all countries and peoples and for that reason BRICS calls on "all WTO members to abide by WTO rules and honor their commitments in the multilateral trading system."⁵⁴

The debate about the reform of the financial and economic global structure occurs in the political forum. As stated earlier, Turkey supports the idea of multilateral international order

which includes increasing the weight of other countries in the decision-making process regarding the economic sphere, especially those with emerging and expanding economies. BRICS country members are part of this group and so is Turkey. Thus, Turkey is already an ally of BRICS for the achievement of this common goal, especially in platforms such as the WTO and G20, and its admittance to BRICS would increase the power of this claim. The ambition of BRICS in the political and security sector for a multilateral international system replicates in the economic sector. However, for BRICS countries to gain more power of influence, it is also necessary to strengthen their economies. With this in mind, the five countries proposed a plan of action aiming at increasing industrial cooperation among themselves.

The plan was formulated in 2017 “under the principle of complementary advantages, mutual benefits and win-win cooperation,” and defines multiple key areas of cooperation^{xvi} as targets for companies.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the country members created the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR), aiming at “BRICS cooperation in digitalisation, industrialisation, innovation, inclusiveness and investment, to maximise the opportunities and address the challenges arising from the 4th Industrial Revolution,”^{xvii} along with other initiatives.⁵⁶ Taking into consideration BRICS’s economic goals and areas of cooperation, the question that arises is ‘could Turkey advance them?’ Analysis of Turkey’s economic fundamentals reveals that the answer is ‘yes.’ However, to fully answer this question, it is essential to grasp some aspects of Turkey’s economy.

^{xvi}Mining, oil and gas, steel, aluminum, advanced manufacturing, shipbuilding, railway equipment and infrastructure, automobile, pharmacy, metallurgy and aircraft manufacturing, and deepen cooperation in emerging industries such as new generation information technology, biology, medical apparatus and instruments, new energy and new materials, industrial investment, engineering construction, technological cooperation and technical assistance.

^{xvii}The theme of the 10th BRICS summit was “BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution.”

After the domestic financial crisis in 2001, Turkey carried out a series of reforms to improve its economic ties with Europe and Asia, taking advantage of its privileged geographic position. These successful measures granted to Turkey a growth average of 5.1% between 2002 and 2011. In 2015, Turkey managed to attract \$16.5 billion in foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, the attempted coup interrupted the golden years of prosperity and the first industry affected was tourism.⁵⁷ Public debts, low-interest rates, and questionable choices in the economic policy worsened Turkey's economic situation. The last straw was a market confidence crisis, as a result of the concentration of power in Erdoğan's hands and the deterioration of the US-Turkey relations. On August 10, 2018, President Donald Trump raised tariffs on imports of steel from Turkey in 50% and of aluminum in 20%. As a result, in 24 hours, the Lira lost around 20% of its value in comparison to the dollar.⁵⁸ On August 13, the Lira accumulated more than 80% of devaluation against the US dollar over the year.⁵⁹ In the middle of the economic slowdown and the rise in inflation, the fear of a profound recession increased after the threats of President Trump against Turkey's economy.⁶⁰ Looking at the future, Turkey has many challenges to overcome in order to keep the pace of economic growth with the population's growth, which is expected to jump from the current 81 million to 104 million by 2050.⁶¹ An evaluation of Turkey's Readiness for the Future of Production and competitiveness revealed that the country's sound economic fundamentals could help Turkey to overcome its challenges and perform well in the future.




Figure 1: Global Map of Readiness Assessment Results 2018

Source: Readiness for Future of Production Report 2018, World Economic Forum, A.T. Kearney.




Figure 2: Country Archetypes

Source: Readiness for Future of Production Report 2018, World Economic Forum, A.T. Kearney.

Country Readiness for the Future of Production Report 2018 focuses on inclusive transformation and growth in the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution, which was the core of the theme of 10th BRICS Summit. Figures 1 and 2 show a comparison among countries regarding their Readiness for the Future of Production. The Structure of Production axis represents the country's current baseline of production and assesses complexity and scale of the structure by evaluating the economic complexity and the Manufacturing Value Added, both in absolute terms and relative to the GDP. The Drives of Production axis depicts “the key enablers that position a country to capitalize on the Fourth Industrial Revolution to transform production systems” and comprises evaluations on Technology & Innovation, Human Capital, Global Trade & Investment, Institutional Framework, Sustainable Resources, and Demand Environment.⁶² The deep analysis provides a sound evaluation of countries economic foundations and their readiness^{xviii} to face future challenges and crises.

Moreover, the methodology of analysis covers vital elements for the 4th Industrial Revolution, which match with those BRICS listed as key areas of cooperation. As illustrated, except for China, there is not much difference among BRICS countries and Turkey, despite its current crises, which qualifies Turkey as an emerging country with economic fundamentals as good as or in some cases even better than BRICS countries. Through the viewpoint of South-South cooperation,^{xix} this partial conclusion indicates that Turkey can be beneficial to BRICS as

^{xviii}For the purposes of the Country Readiness Project, “readiness” is the ability to capitalize on future production opportunities, mitigate risks and challenges, and be resilient and agile in responding to unknown future shocks.

^{xix}According to the United Nations, South-South cooperation is bold, innovative, and growing means to strengthen cooperation for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, the global plan of action for people, planet and prosperity to eradicate poverty. There is substantive evidence showing that South–South trade and investments have the potential to accelerate improvements in health, education, social welfare, in harnessing knowledge and experience, and in establishing critical partnerships which is instrumental to fast tracking the Sustainable Development Goals. South-South cooperation involves the kind of cooperation that creates jobs,

much as BRICS can be beneficial to Turkey, in order to achieve their common goals. Pule Malefane, Ambassador of South Africa to Ankara, confirms this vision: "It is not by accident that President Erdoğan was invited to the BRICS Summit. Turkey is being regarded as a strategic ally in strengthening South-to-South relations."⁶³

Another useful tool to check over country's drivers of growth is *The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018*, which provides an impartial Global Competitiveness Index of 137 countries based on twelve pillars: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The report defines competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of an economy, which in turn sets the level of prosperity that the economy can achieve.”⁶⁴ Table 1 shows two different versions of the rank in 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 without significant changes, except for South Africa, which places Turkey ahead of South Africa and Brazil and behind the others.

Table 1: BRICS Countries and Turkey's Competitiveness Ranks

Country	Rank 2017-2018	Rank 2016-2017
China	27	28
Russia	38	43
India	40	39
Turkey	53	55
South Africa	61	47
Brazil	80	81

Source (adapted from): World Economic Forum, *The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018*, 13.

strengthens trade, improves infrastructure, transfers technology, promotes regional integration and benefits all countries involved. It looks like a perfect match with BRICS goals.
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/development-impact/south-south-cooperation.html>.

Overall, Turkey's competitiveness score is on par with BRICS countries and, based on elements analyzed in the report, Turkey qualifies as an emerging country with features that differ from BRICS countries but with a similar general performance. Thus, although Turkey has economic challenges to overcome, its geopolitical factors and solid economic fundamentals project a growth trajectory similar to that of BRICS countries, and a partnership could be mutually beneficial.

Some of the economic challenges Ankara must overrun will be the legacies of the political phase it is going through, such as the caveats the United States imposed over it, a consequence of the deterioration of their relationship. Additionally, Turkey's relations with the EU, which gets nearly 45% of Turkey's exports and is responsible for 38% of Turkey's imports, has also devolved lately, even though Turkey is still a candidate to the block.⁶⁵ Therefore, considering the trade between Turkey and BRIC countries in 2017 reached about \$ 60 billion, joining BRICS could be an alternative to increase the health of Turkey's economy, while advancing the idea of building a multilateral international economic order. Despite Turkey's internal problems — as well the BRICS countries' problems — one of the main purposes of the block is to cooperate and help each other to improve their fundamentals and solve overcome their barriers while claiming for a reform of the economic and financial institutions. So, Turkey seems to be a promising candidate which is very much aligned with BRICS goals. However, with this in mind, one question comes to surface: is Turkey the best candidate to help BRICS to advance its goals? The answer to this question is out of the scope of this dissertation, but a comparison with the admittance of South Africa into BRICS can bring some enlightenment over this issue.

Although Turkey formalized its request to join BRICS, other emerging countries with solid partnerships with BRICS such as Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan also constitute auspicious candidates. Since 2009, an admittance happened only once, in 2011, when South Africa joined the block and gave rise to BRICS. Nevertheless, Jim O’Neil is still skeptical about the value of this decision, for two main reasons. First, the economic weight of South Africa does not justify its presence in the block, as “China creates another South Africa every three or four months.”⁶⁶ Second, although South Africa is a legitimate democratic representative of the African Continent, it does not stand for African countries.⁶⁷ In fact, although O’Neil argues that South Africa does not represent African countries, which is partially true because not all African countries consider themselves represented by South Africa, the presence of South Africa advances the political and economic ties between BRICS and African countries.⁶⁸ Even though after South Africa joined the block BRICS countries made much progress, the block is still far from achieving the reform that leads to the multilateral order. However, compared to South Africa in economic terms, Turkey looks like a much stronger country.




Figure 3: Rise of MINTs (US\$ trillion)

Source: World Bank, Goldman Sachs

In 2014, O’Neil conceived a new group of the “next economic giants” named *MINT*, which comprised Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. Differently from O’Neil’s assessment for BRIC that did not include South Africa, Turkey already symbolized a future economic power, as Figure 3 illustrates.⁶⁹ Either in 2018 or 2050, South Africa does not figure among the largest economies, while Turkey rises from the 17a to the 14a world economy. As Table 2 confirms, both the immediate and future impact of Turkey’s admittance is more significant than that of South Africa’s. In 2011, BRIC’s GDP represented 19.12% of the global GDP. After South Africa joined the block, BRICS GDP jumped to 19.69%. If Turkey were admitted in 2018, BRICS’s GDP would jump from 23.58% to 24.42% of the global GDP, even though Turkey’s

GDP retracted in 2018. However, the projection of Turkey's growth is much more optimistic than South Africa's, as Table 2 and Figure 4 show.

Table 2: 2018 Countries' GDP and projection for 2050

Countries or Blocks' GDPs	2011*		2018*		2050**	
	GDP (billions of US\$)	Rank	GDP (billions of US\$)	Rank	GDP (billions of US\$)	Rank
World	73,230.00	-	84,840.00	-	-	-
United States	15,540.00	1	20,510.00	1	34,102.00	2
China	7,520.00	2	13,460.00	2	49,853.00	1
India	1,820.00	10	2,690.00	7	28,021.00	3
Brazil	2,610.00	7	1,910.00	9	6,532.00	6
Russia	2,050.00	9	1,580.00	12	5,127.00	10
South Africa	416.88	29	366.68	32	1,939.00	28
BRICS	14,416.88	2***	20,006.68	2***	91,472.00	1***
Turkey	832.50	18	713.51	19	4,087.00	12
BRICST	15,249.38	2***	20720.19	1***	95,559.00	1***

Source (adapted from): *International Monetary Fund (IMF), <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD>.
 ** www.pwc.com.
 ***Theoretical.

Figure 4 presents the evolution of countries economies considering the GDP (which can be interpreted as the total income of the country) Purchase Power Parity (PPP), which is not converted to US dollars to perform the comparison, but relative to the cost of living in each country. Even in this method, the performance of Turkey's economy is still by far better than South Africa's, in the present and the future.




Figure 4: Projected GDP Rankings (at PPPs)

Source: The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050?, PWC.

Regarding the economic sector of cooperation, despite the current crises Turkey is going through, its fundamentals reveal a high potential to benefit BRICS countries and advance BRICS's goals. Particularly in comparison to South Africa's association to BRICS in 2011, Turkey presents both better current fundamentals and more optimistic projections for the future. By strengthening each countries' economy and increasing the relevance of the block *vis a vis* the current financial and economic institutions and developed countries, Turkey's admittance could also contribute to the achievement of a more multilateral order in the current international financial and economic governance system.

Despite all the indications that Turkey's admittance would benefit BRICS, there are some suspicions about the true intention of the country in requesting to join the block because of two key reasons. First, whereas President Erdoğan's speech defends free trade, multilateralism, and the international liberal order, his actions contradict his words. He centralized more power in his hands, established more control over the press, and moved away from Western partners like the EU and the United States. As a result, Turkey experienced a decline in its economic and political institutions, which clashes with the democratic values of BRICS. However the democracy in other BRICS countries is also questionable; its country members have been working together for many years to develop agreements and find common goals. The possibility that Erdoğan is using a rhetorical speech, which lacks real commitment, as an attempt to take Turkey out of the economic crisis causes apprehension.

Second, the populist measures of President Erdoğan have not worked so far, and the crisis in Turkey is not over. O'Neil argues that the solution for Turkey's crisis lies on two pillars: internal changes in the monetary and fiscal-policies and a reapproximation of its Western allies.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Erdoğan has already proven to the world that he is not afraid of defying his allies

and Turkey's relations with the EU are still difficult and Washington and Ankara are still exchanging threats.⁷¹ President Erdoğan still has to deal with this crisis and find a way to shift the economy's course back to the thriving path the economists projected. Thus, the request to join BRICS could be interpreted as one more attempt to fortify Turkey's relation with Russia, and not really with BRICS. In this case, Turkey's admittance would not advance BRICS goals and could harm the harmonious relationship the country members built together, which would not be in the best interests of India, China, South Africa, and Brazil.^{xx}

Benefits for Brazil

Brazil and Turkey established diplomatic relations in 1858, by the signature of the *Tratado Bilateral de Amizade e Comércio*,^{xxi} and have strengthened their ties since then, especially in the first decade of the 21st century. During the 2006 War in Lebanon, Turkey helped Brazil in the evacuation of Brazilian citizens and in 2010 both countries and Iran signed the Tehran Declaration.^{xxii} Despite of the friendship and collaboration, it was only in 2011, when the countries signed the *Plano de Ação para a Parceria Estratégica*,^{xxiii} that they deepened their dialogue and cooperation in areas such as international politics, agriculture, science and technology, external trade and energy, tourism, literature, teledramaturgy, and so forth. After that, Brazil and Turkey signed other agreements and their bilateral trade increased 900% between 2011 and 2012, reaching US\$ 2.1 billion.⁷² In 2018, the countries organized a series of events to celebrate 160 years of their diplomatic relations, while planning to deepen cooperation in

^{xx}Maybe it would still be interesting for Russia as long as Moscow could weaken the ties between Turkey and NATO.

^{xxi}Bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.

^{xxii}The Tehran Declaration was an agreement Brazil, Turkey, and Iran signed in order to figure out a solution for the threat that the Iranian nuclear program represented to the international community. Although the document solved all the impasses of the previous attempt of negotiation involving the uranium enrichment, the UN rejected it.

^{xxiii}Plan of Action for the Strategic Partnership.

construction and defense industries.⁷³ As a founder country of BRICS, Brazil must assess the admittance of Turkey into the block carefully, in order to preserve their relations and identify how it advances or harms Brazilian interests within each of the BRICS sectors of cooperation.

As previously mentioned, the admittance of Turkey into BRICS could benefit the political goals of the block, especially its claim for a multilateral international and a reform of the vital global institutions such as the UN, which is also an ambition of Brazil. Since 2011, both countries decided to intensify the political dialogue and cooperation in multilateral forums, such as the UN and G20. In the same year, Brazil supported Turkey's candidacy to become a non-permanent member of the UNSC during 2015-2016, and Turkey supported Brazil's request to be an observer in the *Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)*.^{xxiv} Since the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, Brazil has always sought to participate in international forums in order to promote multilateralism and a more multipolar international order, and BRICS has become a vital platform to carry out its intention.⁷⁴ Turkey has a similar policy regarding international forums, as a founding member of the Council of Europe, a member of NATO and OECD, G20, and a candidate for EU. The admittance of Turkey into BRICS would approximate both countries even more, with the potential to strengthen the partnership in demanding more prominence in international institutions such as the WTO, the G20, and the UNSC.

As the political and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Brazil are mature and successful, the integration of Turkey into BRICS does not constitute a political risk for the South American country. However, the recent approximation between President Erdoğan and the President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro could re-create a new version of the diplomatic problem

^{xxiv}Despite the mutual support, neither Brazil nor Turkey succeeded in their pleas. Currently, among BRICS countries, China and Russia are permanent members and South Africa is a non-permanent member of the UNSC.

between Brazil and Turkey in 2015^{xxv}, as the current government considers Maduro's mandate illegitimate.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, it is just a possibility, not a fact, and the opportunities for cooperation between the countries are more promising than the possible political problems. In fact, Turkey's expertise in dealing with refugees could be an asset to Brazil, as many Venezuelans have fled to Brazil recently.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 3.3 million refugees have already fled from Venezuela to many countries in South America and other regions and the number will reach almost 5.4 million until the end of 2019. By then, more than 190 thousand refugees will be in Brazil and the country has committed to providing all the assistance to relieve their suffering.⁷⁶ However noble the cause may be, it is not an easy task to absorb all these people and create conditions for them to settle down with dignity. In this regard, Turkey has proved to be very successful in dealing with the exodus of millions of Refugees from Syria and could share its expertise with Brazil. Arguably Turkey does not need to be part of BRICS to cooperate with Brazil in this issue, but as the countries would be closer and working to strengthening their relations even more, the cooperation would be optimized.

Nonetheless, the concerns of Brazil regarding security issues are not limited to the Brazilian borders and territory, and the union of Brazilian diplomacy with Turkish leadership in the Middle East has already achieved significant results in advancing security in the region through the 2010 Tehran Declaration on Iran's nuclear program. Between 2003 and 2009,

^{xxv}In 2015, Brazilian Senate voted and approved a Motion of Solidarity with the Armenian people during the course of the centenary of the campaign of extermination of its population. Turkish government called its ambassador in Brazil back to Ankara for consultations and condemned the initiative, even though it came from the Brazilian Senate and not the government. After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the political bodies in Brazil were independent and there was little it could do about, the relations normalized.

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, the United States, and the United Nations led the negotiations with Iran regarding its program of enrichment of uranium without attaining satisfactory results. Even resolutions of the UNSC and sanctions against Iran did not manage to force it to negotiate. In this context, a delegation composed of Brazilian and Turkish diplomats traveled to Iran to open a new round of negotiation and after some months the three countries agreed to the final text of the Declaration, which presented an alternative for the sanctions the United States, the EU, and the UNSC had imposed on Iran so far. In the end, the UN rejected the document and there is much discussion about the real reasons behind this turndown.^{xxvi} However, the nonacceptance of the United Nations does not invalidate the success that the diplomatic partnership between Brazil and Turkey obtained in bringing Iran to the table of negotiations and, furthermore, culminating at a signed agreement where Iran abided to every requirement proposed by the United States.⁷⁷ An approximation between the two countries could foster other successful initiatives similar to that, especially in the Middle East.^{xxvii}

Furthermore, it is significant to mention that Turkey's geographic position does not imply any interference with the 'Brazilian strategic environment' the National Defense Policy defines.⁷⁸ Thus, regarding South America, joint initiatives to foster collective security are more

^{xxvi} Apparently, the rejection was influenced by the United States, which since the beginning did not believe that Brazil and Turkey would obtain success in the negotiations. Washington was focused in carrying out its particular campaign against the "axis of evil" and not to force Iran to comply to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which would indeed have been achieved if the Declaration had been accepted.

^{xxvii} Nevertheless, the recent indications that Brazil will change its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem caused a reaction in the Arab League, which could harm the trust of those countries in the Brazilian external policy, hence its capacity to negotiate with them. On the other hand, Turkey has reiterated its support to Palestine and its critics to Israel. As the government has not made the decision yet, it is difficult to speculate over the hypothetical results. However, given the previous diplomatic problem between Brazil and Turkey and the sensitivity of the theme, both countries could have to work on an agreement on this issue, as the BRICS members do when they disagree.

likely to happen in the global sphere than in the regional. Therefore, in terms of security, through the Brazilian perspective, there is no hinderance or reservation on the admittance of Turkey into BRICS, but opportunities exist to further advance the synergy of the combination of their singular expertise, in order to achieve individual and collective goals.

Although BRICS expanded its areas of cooperation beyond the economic sector of cooperation, it is not possible to disconnect the block from the economic goals, as they provide a foundation – or, from a realistic viewpoint, power – to its member to increase their influence in the international system. Therefore, invigorating the members’ economy must be a permanent objective to pursue. Sunil Lal, the Indian Ambassador in Brazil, argues that just being part of BRICS will not increase any country’s influence in the international system unless its economy becomes powerful.⁷⁹ Thus, in order to defend its interests, Brazil must grasp how the admittance of Turkey could boost or hamper the Brazilian economy and take advantage of the opportunities and manage the risks that the accession creates.

In terms of commercial relations, although BRICS can foster trade among its members, they are free to develop bilateral trade with other countries. For instance, Brazil and Turkey have already significant trade and the presence of Turkey could intensify this commerce. Therefore, the admittance of Turkey into BRICS would cause little impact initially, with the potential to increase commercial relations as a result of the approximation. However, even among current BRICS countries, the bilateral trade is not the main focus, as the block aims at advancing the development of emerging countries and not only their own. From the perspective of Ambassador Sergio Florêncio,^{xxviii} trade among BRICS countries is not as promising as the flow of

^{xxviii}He served as a diplomat in Ottawa, Tehran, Paris (at UNESCO) and New York (at the UN). He was ambassador to Quito, Geneva and Mexico and consul-general in Vancouver. He is currently a researcher at the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA).

investments. Additionally, Brazil's Deputy Secretary for Economic and Financial Institutions and International Cooperation of the Secretariat for International Affairs, Erivaldo Gomes, affirms that, from a Brazilian perspective, a new member from South America would be more attractive for the Brazilian private sector.⁸⁰ Thus, Turkey's admittance into BRICS would not make much difference to the trade balance of Brazil. Consequently, through the economic lens, there is not a great contribution to Brazil in Turkey's admittance, and not relevant harm either.

From a broader perspective, one more member could make agreements among the BRICS countries even more difficult.^{xxix} However, BRICS is the result of extraordinary collective diplomatic effort, and the differences of interests and intentions depict more of a challenge than an obstruction to BRICS goals. As professor Paulo Esteves, Director-General for the Rio-based *BRICS Policy Center*, contends, although BRICS countries are completely different, they are able to find common points of cooperation that enhance their individual development and their collective aspirations in the international system.⁸¹ Therefore, the common ground between Brazil and Turkey that stands out is the desire for reform in the economic and financial institutions of governance.

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Suggestions

The purpose of this paper was to identify advantages and disadvantages of the admittance of Turkey into BRICS after President Erdoğan requested to join the block, as well as the implications, both positive and negative, to BRICS and Brazil if Turkey joins the block. After analyzing two of BRICS's three sectors of cooperation, it is clear that Turkey qualifies as an emerging country with several political, security, and economic goals that align with BRICS. For

^{xxix}For instance, although all BRICS countries agree about the need of a reform in the UNSC, China and Russia have a different understanding from the other members about how it should be done. Clearly, because of their position as a permanent member of the UNSC.

example, President Erdoğan's discourse at the UN advocates for a more multilateral international order, a primary political goal BRICS aims at achieving. The geopolitical weight of Turkey, exemplified in its privileged geographical position and its leadership in the Middle East, opens to BRICS a new door in order to expand its influence on the reform of the global institutions of governance, particularly the UNSC. Additionally, it helps BRICS to advance its claim for the development of universal collective security, wherein the United Nations is the adequate forum to discuss and authorize military interventions in defense of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

Regarding the economic sector, there are many opportunities for cooperation in areas such as energy, agriculture, tourism, disaster management, environment, biodiversity, oceans economy, population issues, counter-terrorism, refugees, and so forth. In spite of some economic constraints Turkey faces currently, the country has potential to surpass the crisis and contribute to strengthening BRICS even more than its current member South Africa, hence contributing to advance BRICS's goal of becoming a key player in the decision-making process within the international system. The consequent approximation of the countries, if BRICS admits Turkey, would foster bilateral trade, mitigating Turkey's dependence on the EU and facilitating the access of the other BRICS members to the large Turkish internal market.

There are not many disadvantages of admitting Turkey into BRICS, but some aspects of Turkey's growing autocracy could complicate its consideration as a member of the block. However, they do not represent a definitive hinderance, as there are many questions about the way China and Russia define their democracy. Nonetheless, BRICS members developed and increased the common points of cooperation since its creation by focusing on common goals and respecting different interpretations regarding internal and external policy. Furthermore, the

admission of Turkey into BRICS could instill the country to commit itself to solve the internal problems that concern the international community, hence improving the diplomatic reputation of BRICS.

Another apparent obstacle is the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, which indeed does not cause any interference with BRICS, as the block does not constitute a military alliance. Even though there have been many difficulties in the US-Turkey relationship recently, the United States did not object the admittance. However, the possibility that Turkey's intention not to be legitimate but a means to reinforce its ties with Russia constitutes a point of preoccupation with serious implications to BRICS countries, because it is vital to preserve and protect the good relationship BRICS countries have built along its existence. If Turkey's commitment to BRICS is not legitimate, it could harm this harmony. Before deciding to accept Turkey into BRICS, the country members should demand guarantees of Turkey's commitment to BRICS goals.

Turkey and Brazil share sound diplomatic relations, and the admission has the potential to increase political cooperation in order to advance global security, especially in the Middle East, where the partnership between Brazilian Diplomacy and Turkey leadership proved to be successful in the negotiation with Iran. In addition, Turkey's geographic and strategic position does not imply any interference with the 'Brazilian strategic environment'. On the other hand, Brazil could take advantage of the expertise Turkey developed in helping refugees from Syria to address the problem of Venezuelan refugees. Although President Erdoğan supports Maduro's regime in Venezuela, it does not constitute a barrier, considering the opportunities of increasing cooperation in many sectors with the potential to benefit both countries. The common ground between Brazil and Turkey that stands out is the desire for reform in the economic and financial institutions of governance, particularly the UNSC.

Therefore, considering the aforementioned elements of conviction, this paper recommends the admittance of Turkey as a member of the block, upon guarantees of Turkey's commitment with BRICS goals and values, because Turkey's admission would benefit the block and would contribute to advance its political, security, and economic goals.^{xxx} Furthermore, this paper encourages Brazil to support the admission of Turkey, due to the fact that it would promote the standing of both nations, and, in particular, offer Brazil potential political, security, and economic benefits.

In order to expand the knowledge around the subject of this paper, the author suggests the following research questions for future studies:

- What would President Erdoğan do if NATO countries told Turkey to choose between NATO or BRICS?
- How does Russia, as an enemy of NATO, view having a NATO member inside BRICS? Is it an opportunity or a threat to Russia?
- Is Turkey the best candidate to help BRICS to advance its goals?
- What are the implications, both positive and negative, for Russia, India, China, and South Africa if Turkey is admitted into BRICS?
- What are the prospective scenarios for BRICS, if Turkey is admitted, in a time frame of 10, 20, 30, and 40 years?

^{xxx}Although these guarantees are difficult to build, this should constitute a key factor and demand a diplomatic effort from BRICS country members.

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