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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Times of Radical Discord: A Study of the American and French Revolutions in Search of
Lessons for Contemporary Civil-Military Relations

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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Executive Summary

Title: Times of Radical Discord: A Study of the American and French Revolutions in a Search for Lessons in Contemporary Civil-Military Relations

Author: Major Justin A. Frickie, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Comparison of the American and French Revolutions demonstrates that the less radical the characteristics of revolution, the easier it is to maintain the civil-military bond, which prevents tyranny and leads to representative government.

Discussion: The American Revolution demonstrated varying levels of radicalism, but is no match compared to the radicalism demonstrated in the French Revolution. The unique colonial and early national bond between the American founding generation and the continental army, shaped by the colonial experience, appears to have a buffering affect on the radical ideas, methods, and violence expressed in this example of revolution. The French experience, on the other hand, appears to repeatedly lack buffers or pressure valves to limit expressions of radicalism and maintain reigning stability. Once they take the plunge, it is too late. The resulting radicalism of the ideas, methods, and nightmarish levels of violence in the French Revolution propels the restructured nation into a tyrannical government, which seems the only way to regain stability. There are many possible factors which contribute to the variation between these two revolutions. Personalities of leadership, expression of radical ideas, the buffers of time and space each influence the trajectory of these two examples of revolution, but the greatest impact on radicalism comes from a strong civil-military bond that recognizes the military as the official expression of violence in the society that it defends.

Conclusion: Comparison of the American and French Revolutions' ideals, methods, and use of violence as well as their impact on the civil-military relationships demonstrates that the more radical the elements of revolution, the more likely a society is to turn to tyranny to break free from revolutionary fervor in an effort to achieve stability.

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Preface

My inspiration for this project comes from an observation of the apparent growing dissension and division in American society today. As I have dedicated my adult life to the service of others and matured in the Marine Corps profession as an expression of that service, it is concerning to see this country weakened and exposed to real threats, seemingly from within. What can we as military leaders do to hold this country together, to maintain our position in defense of the nation? As the model for my approach, I recognize that people are still people, and that “What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done, and there is nothing new under the sun” Ecclesiastes 1:9

There are many that deserve my heart-felt thanks. First and foremost, my thanks go to my God for the inspiration and wisdom to do all of this; to God be the glory! Also to my family, who have listened patiently to the countless variations of this thesis as it has developed. To my wonderful wife, teammate, and chief editor, Jenny Frickie, my thanks do not express my full gratitude. Especially also to my father, Brian Frickie; to my father-in-law, LTC Bill Delaney; and my godfather, Ed Knippers. Most of all, to my mother, Mary Frickie. This week, on the one year anniversary of her passing, I am ever-grateful for her steadfast example of patient kindness and forbearance in my life.

At the Marine Corps Command and Staff College there are many more whom I owe much. Especially to Dr. Matthew Flynn, Dr. John Gordon, and LtCol Zachariah Anthony, who each in their own way encouraged and propelled me to hone and refine this inspiration, argument, and delivery to what it is now – and to finish it. Wherever this project is successful or provides helpful insight to others, the work is surely not just my own. Wherever it comes short, the failings are only mine

Introduction

The first decades of the twenty-first century demonstrate a significant shift from the trends of the twentieth century. Changes in the competitive expression of warfare, national economies, technology, culture, and society have propelled the world towards a modern uncharted horizon at an ever increasing pace. Nearly a century of modern warfare, limited only by the tremendous weight of assured nuclear destruction, has produced a homogenous “grey-zone” or “hybrid warfare” character of conflict leaving the world perpetually on the brink of escalating strife.¹ This new form of competition, shaped and fomented by the total war practice growing out of two world wars, contained by the threat of complete annihilation in the Cold War, and fueled by simmering rivalries, demands the expression of force in new ways. In the same timeframe, the competition of economies between national communist mobilization, competitive capitalism, and everything in between, has resulted in the exaggerated efficiencies in an interconnected world economy that has brought both unheard of wealth on an international scale and the delicate balance of increasingly competitive symbiotic economies and markets. Likewise, warfare and economic competition have propelled the brisk development of groundbreaking, seemingly science fiction-like, technologies in transportation, communication, and information which serve to shrink the world around us, even as the global population reaches new heights, estimated at 7.7 billion people in the year 2019.² Changes in warfare, technology, and global economy have accompanied changes in social and cultural ideas, but dramatic change can also be accompanied by dramatic and undesirable consequences.

Changes in the twentieth century accompanied some of the best and worst in humanity from expanding prosperity, universal suffrage, and the civil rights movement, to totalitarian governments, holocaust, and genocide. The current heightened state of political discord in the

United States is no different, presenting opportunity for both the good and bad in humanity to prevail.³ The growing economy and expansion of beneficial international agreements may also be accompanied by the oppression of alienated groups and adversary strategies that benefit from a divided American domestic population. The strength of the important American civil-military relationship may be threatened by political polarization, emphasis of conflict on divisive issues, and divergent visions for the future of America.⁴ People throughout the world use technologies and sources of information unheard of twenty years ago to express divisive polarizing arguments to a broad audience that would not have been possible at the same scale or efficiency before. Slowly at first, words translate to action, individuals build into groups, and ideas become principles. Opposition toughens resistance and entrenches rivalries. Without a relief for the pressure, disagreement can pour into the street and calls for change can become change imposed by force.

In many ways, however, America apprehension in the twenty-first century is not unique. Observations of extreme social divisiveness, imminent radical change, and adversaries posturing to opportunistic advantage are patterns repeated throughout history. Similar sentiments held by a British subject in the American Colonies in the 1770s could be shared by a Parisian baker a decade later in the 1780s. Both may desire reform, greater representation of their beliefs, or reduction in their perceived oppression. These similar experiences may not share the same means or the same specific ideas, but they easily share the same level of conviction. Both may hold dissatisfaction with the current state of their governments, both with hope and likely apprehension for what may come from future turmoil. One enjoys the example provided by the other, but neither embark with any assurance of the final outcome. Both would likely agree that there is a limit to what they would be willing to sacrifice in terms of property, violence, or future

freedom to achieve the change that they desire. Rather than a focus on the contentious topics or divisive issues themselves, this paper aims to identify lessons that may be learned to limit undesirable consequences of division and to ensure that the US military maintains the strong relationship that it currently enjoys with the American society it defends.

Revolution

History provides many examples of divisiveness and radical change in societies, but the best two examples to use for the scope of this examination are the American Revolution and French Revolution of the late eighteenth century. First, for the purposes of this evaluation, genuine revolutions with associated armed conflict and transition of government provide clear indisputable examples of discordant ideas which lead to violent conflict and an outcome that is different than the original state.⁵ By contrast, an event which does not accomplish a changed outcome might be deemed merely a period of unrest, rebellion, internal conflict, or at most a civil war. It could be argued that any lesser division which does not result in a thorough revolutionary transition of government may not be divisive enough for comparison. Second, the American and French Revolutions have particular significance to the current problem of American civil-military relations because of our European legal, government, military, and cultural heritage. One might argue that there are more recent and, therefore, more relevant examples available, such as the twentieth century revolutions in Iran or Chile. Although the melting pot of American heritage is not European alone, these more recent examples, and others, neglect the significance of European influence on early American thought and government structure due to the close proximity of the American and French Revolutions in time, along with their apparent shared distaste for authoritarianism. Because these two revolutions nearly

overlapped at the end of the eighteenth century, have similar origins in the enlightenment, and possess similar overarching goals of eliminating the tyranny inherent in a monarchy while increasing individual representation, they provide an ideal opportunity to compare and contrast radicalism and the consequences for civil-military relations. For these reasons, this paper will use the American and French Revolutions to demonstrate that the less radical the characteristics of revolution, the easier it is to maintain the civil-military bond, which prevents tyranny and leads to representative government. The American experience managed to achieve this moderation while the French example did not. These measures of radicalism go a long way to explain why the American Revolution ended with a republic, whereas the French ended with a dictatorship, in this search for relevant lessons to the modern day.

All revolutions have their own unique characteristics and expressions, but many tend to have recognizable similarities. Revolutions invariably call for a significant change to government or social structure. Without a call for change, the revolution has no purpose or spark to energize the required support and action for change. The original spark or early goals do not always survive unchanged at the conclusion of the revolution, but are required at a minimum to get things started. Most revolutions are also optimistic that they will eventually bring positive change, creating a situation where things will be better than they were. A revolution intended to achieve complete destruction or anarchy of an existing organization is counter to our purposes of making positive change. For a revolution to be distinguishable from other levels of conflict, it must also be opposed. Without opposition to changes proposed in a revolution, the event becomes something else. Some changes in government or social structure can occur rapidly, while others may occur more gradually, but without internal opposition to change, the event does not fit our standard for a genuine revolution. Finally, and particularly important for the civil-

military practitioner, a traditional revolution typically includes an organized military expression on behalf of the opposition, a counter-revolution. Sometimes this revolutionary warfare is between competing factions within an existing government, in other instances a separate group of people forms outside of the existing government military force to separate from or replace the existing government. For the purposes of this examination, we will use these parameters to distinguish the American and French Revolutions from other tempting comparisons for discord such as the American Civil War or Civil Rights Movement. Ideally, to prevent loss of life, loss of treasure, and to prevent our adversaries from taking advantage of a weakened America, this evaluation assumes that revolutionary warfare is not desirable, that peaceful means of change are preferable. In some instances, revolutionary warfare may be inevitable or unavoidable. In either case, we will look at these two examples to see what wisdom may be learned to preserve freedom and avoid tyranny in our present day. In other words, how may the US military maintain its position to defend the Constitution and protect the American people through periods of radical discord?

At its outset this question presents a considerable challenge because both the American and French Revolutions began, ostensibly, to increase individual rights and freedoms for the citizens of each country while also minimizing tyranny. The American Revolution sought to achieve this goal through the establishment of a new and independent nation. The Continental Congress aimed to separate itself from the perceived tyranny imposed by the British monarchy and form a new government founded on individual rights, rule of law, and representative democracy. The French, on the other hand, initially sought to reform the existing government, to reduce perceived tyranny and social wrongs, while maintaining the French national identity and sovereignty. One revolution does appear to increase individual liberties for many of its citizens,

while the other responds to a period of revolutionary chaos by later embracing the national pride and predictable control offered by a military dictator. For the purposes of this evaluation, we will also assume that the protection of individual rights and liberties is preferred; Americans prefer to avoid tyranny, or the oppression of some portion of a population for the benefit of a select group or individual. Our desired outcome from a period of dissension and conflict would be an agreeable outcome which increases freedom, encourages peace, and reduces the need or opportunity for oppression to take root. An impulse which must be maintained today.

Coming to Terms with Radical Revolution

The American and French Revolutions are two topics that enjoy a tremendous depth of valuable scholarly reflection. Countless works in both English and French address these events from a broad range of structured approaches, analytical goals, and comparative examples. This study examines works originating in or translated into English to identify the consequences of radicalism in revolution, especially as it pertains to the ideology, method, and violence expressed in these revolutions and their resultant impact on civil-military relations.

This focus rests on a great number of important scholarly works. On the subject of radicalism in the American Revolution, the two works which command the discussion are Gordon Wood's aptly titled, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, and John Shy's, *A People Numerous and Armed*. Both address the inherent radical nature of the American Revolution in their own terms, aware of the comparative pressure of more indisputable examples of radicalism. Both approach the conditions before, during, and after the revolution in sociological terms and in Shy's case, both social and military history. Shy's approach in particular was rewarding to the fundamentals of this analysis. He asserts that warfare changes

society, and that the military factor is present throughout the outset and conclusion of the American Revolution. On the topics of ideology and method, Bernard Bailyn's, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, and Charles Royster's, *A Revolutionary People at War*, are prominent guides. Bailyn examines hundreds of source documents to follow the origin and transformation of ideas throughout the Revolution, and Royster analyzes a rewarding story-telling approach to establish the relationship between the Continental Army and American character.

The French Revolution, as to be expected, also earns a lot of attention from scholars. Timothy Tackett in, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution*, is distinctly worthwhile for his personal, approachable, and pragmatic style about the French trend toward political violence in the late eighteenth century. Peter McPhee, on the other hand, reminds us in, *Liberty or Death*, of the varying perspectives and even the global context of the people who did not live in Paris, or even in France for that matter, and with an approachable story-telling method. Particularly rewarding for the military perspective is John Lynn's, *Bayonets of the Republic*. Lynn's work is especially beneficial to gain an understanding of the French military's rapid and dramatic change from 1791 to 1794. Finally, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, by Noah Shusterman, and *Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship, and Authenticity in the French Revolution*, by Marisa Linton, provide illuminating perspectives on the trajectories and motivations of some of the more prominent ideas and methods of the French Revolution, again with a focus on capturing the individual experiences of the participants.

For further context on revolutions in general and of contemporary context for America today, *Democracies Divided*, edited by Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue, and *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050*, edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson

Murray, provide a variety of thoughtful essays and considerations, including another contribution from John A. Lynn. Similarly, Jon Meacham's recent work, *The Soul of America*, does much to address the perceived current state of division in America today and to recognize at the same time its appropriate context in American history. These studies and other like them reveal the depth of scholarship available addressing the consequences of radicalism in revolution. This paper offers a starting point to this important topic. Further research will build on the works cited in this analysis. The need to tame radicalism and thwart the empowerment of unnecessary violence will remain a priority to restore social norms following revolution. In this way, the American Revolution, particularly when compared to the French Revolution unfolding in its wake, will continue to demonstrate the better path; one shaping reason rather than unleashing the chaos concealed in radicalism.

Radicalism

Change, or resistance to change, is not necessarily radical in itself. Noah Webster's 1828 *American Dictionary of the English Language* identifies the word 'radical' as coming from the Latin base word *radix*, for 'root'.⁶ In this context, the notion of radicalism refers to a motivation to change something at its root. By this definition true radicalism is more than an adjustment to an existing system to improve a situation; it is one that seeks foundational change. This concept has some shortcomings though, because complete destruction is not always the goal of a revolution. Nor should it be a goal for our evaluation if we desire to identify lessons which will help to maintain our Constitution and our military means to defend it.

Gordon Wood advances one key concept of radicalism as it pertains to the American Revolution in his book, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*. He opens with a

comparison to other notable revolutions, including the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and the Chinese Communist Revolution. Wood states that, “Americans like to think of our revolution as not being radical...There were no peasant uprisings, no jacqueries, no burning of chateaux, no storming of prisons.”⁷ This question offers a purposeful allusion to the French experience, and indirectly chides the American version as too tame. But he argues that, while the radicalism of the American Revolution is less evident in what conditions the colonists rejected, it is more than apparent in the transformed social relationships, new distinctly American culture, and remodeled economic environment the revolutionaries created. Through a comparison of the before and after effects of the American Revolution involving detailed discussion of monarchy, republicanism, and democracy, he convincingly demonstrates his concept of radicalism as a key defining element of the American Revolution.

Conflicting perspectives of what constitutes radicalism itself makes radicalism in a revolutionary context harder to identify. There can be distinctions between initial ideas, later compromises, and final conclusions. One example comes in the form of strategic adjustments to broaden a base of support. In other instances, it can be difficult to distinguish between hardline extremists, regional compatriots, or external participants in a group of revolutionaries joined to a cause from various ideological or personal motivations. While this categorization can help to identify some of the more nebulous elements of radicalism in the American Revolution, radicalism in the French Revolution becomes clear due to conditions directly contrary to the existing government conditions. In examination of both revolutions there are identifiable factions that desire an extreme foundational reconstruction as well as some damage done to the roots. We may also observe some dramatic pruning within society that has the propensity to both damage a nation and allow it to grow back healthier.

If all revolutions seek change and all revolutions demonstrate some level of radicalism, we must define the extent of radicalism that we hope to identify for our evaluation. We will focus on the elements that directly affect the civil-military bond. It is somewhat expected that a state military will be involved in warfare if a revolutionary war begins, but we will distinguish this from military activity defending a state from a foreign foe. Items key to this evaluation are those that impact or erode the civil-military bond, elements of a revolutionary ideology that a military force may be required to implement, or instances where the military may be asked to maintain or restore civil-order beyond revolutionary warfare. For the further consideration of radicalism, we will identify change that is conspicuous for its relative extremity or unrecognizable nature from its original condition in the three areas of ideas, method, and violence.

The American Revolution

There are many contributing factors which lead to the initiation of the American Revolution. Many scholars point to the British financial crisis resulting from the French and Indian War in North America from 1754-1763, as the trigger which brought growing differences to the surface.⁸ The beginning stages of the French and Indian War were fought largely in the North American Colonies, far from the British homeland, and seen by many as protecting the British subjects there. After the British victory, and seeking a means to pay for the costly nine years of war with France, the British parliament resolved to raise taxes in the colonies to pay war debts. Three events over the next decade signaled the growing divide and rising tension between Britain and her North American Colonists. The Stamp Act in 1765, the Boston Massacre in 1770, and the Boston Tea Party in 1773, clearly demonstrate the growing opposition. But Fred

Anderson argues in *Crucible of War* that the American Revolution began in earnest the day that George Washington took command of the Continental Army on behalf of the Continental Congress in July 1775, “...the physical embodiment of a political union.”⁹ A year later, almost to the day, the Second Continental Congress formally published the ideas of the revolution, the Declaration of Independence.¹⁰ But the reality is that many of the republican ideals evidenced by these actions and other similar pronouncements were not new and, therefore, not radical in the American colonies, or even to the British homeland in the eighteenth century.




Figure 1. Summary Timeline of the American Revolution¹¹

In *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, Wood further argues that the ideas of the American Revolution were not radical, nor even a rejection of the prevailing ideas of the British government in the time leading up to the American revolution. Nearly a century of reforms since Rights and a representative parliament. As republican ideas born of enlightenment philosophers swept through Europe, reforms of representation and individual rights naturally began to permeate the European governments of the time. Describing the period, Wood declares that, “Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic bragged of their independence.”¹² And later, “The English thought they lived in a republicanized monarchy, and they were right.”¹³ In fact, the rejection of the perceived tyranny imposed by the monarchy was more realistically a rejection of the aristocratic patronage and resulting societal and economic structures exemplified by the patriarchal and feudal subjection to a king that was not economically sustainable in the colonies.¹⁴ Wood convincingly identifies the social structure changes brought about by the American Revolution as the key evidence of radicalism, but even by Wood’s description, this significant social and economic restructuring was not radical enough to change the society at its root. After all, there was no class change; the same prominent founding fathers and their colonial families that were in charge prior to the revolution are still in charge afterward.¹⁵ In the hindsight provided by the later conflict of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the claims of social change and enhancement of individual rights fall short, especially for women, slaves, and other marginalized minorities. The reality of the ideas of the American Revolution is that they were incomplete, but still radical.

For the evaluation of its impact on the civil-military bond, however, the ideas and social structural change of the American Revolution as demonstrated by Wood may signal radical foundational change. These changes can be seen in the ways that the transfigured American

societal structure were expressed in the burgeoning US military, especially in the areas of its composition, structure, and authority. Many of these adjustment were evident earlier in the colonial military forces rallied for the French and Indian war twenty-five years before, then fully realized later in the revolution. To summarize John Shy's assertion in, *A People Numerous and Armed*, the colonial military forces in the form of militias were not new, but the evolution to something larger was significant. These were not the conscripted regulars or mercenaries of European armies, but also not local militia. The use of volunteers to raise a larger force, for a longer period of time, provisioned and paid by the government, and mobilized over greater distances was something new.¹⁶ After the conclusion of the French and Indian War, this colonial flavor returned to the various provinces and left the mark of a homogenizing shared experience.¹⁷ At the same time, it also provided the model, practical knowledge, and even some of the veterans who directly translated into the Continental Army of the Revolution. They became one in the same. In fact, as the colonial rebellion fomented in Boston in response to the Stamp Act in 1765, the British governor found that he could not raise the militia to enforce the law because, "the mobs were made up of militiamen..."¹⁸ In this way, the changes to societal structure exemplified by the American Revolution bled over into the military at the same time that the changes in the military structure and composition bled back over into the society, each bolstering the other toward a united colonial identity. Shy's form of radicalism looks to the means of action as both radical and not; a perfect ambiguity if one wished to be revolutionary, but not so much as to destroy the society one wished to liberate.

The method of the American Revolution in this way demonstrated that it holds both radical and non-radical elements, but stabilized by strategic consistency. Within and outside of the colonial governmental framework the ideas of the revolution synthesized into a central

coherent strategy of independence, homogenized by the Deceleration of Independence. Shy underscores this sentiment when he states that, “People innocent of political theory, mystified by arguments for and against bicameral legislatures, readily comprehended the brief, appealing message of the declaration of independence and its direct relevance to their own lives.”¹⁹ The revolutionary military strategy may have shifted at times back and forth between conventional design and militia needling, but the central strategy of independence provided a desired outcome at the center.²⁰ On the British side, however, shifting strategy prevented a sustained initiative. Shy summarizes the three phases of British strategy as evolving, “From a police operation, and then a classical military confrontation, British strategy had become a comprehensive plan of pacification directed against a revolutionary war.”²¹ This inconsistency had its affects, but Shy also points out that when it comes to the shifting British method, many scholars unfairly ask why Britain lost, rather than giving credit to, “American marksmanship, Indian fighting tactics, or massive popular resistance as major factors.”²² Even with these credits, it is important not to forget the significant power of a singular strategy and at the same time, that the success of the revolution was not inevitable; singular strategy was not always easy to maintain. Finally with Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown, this method of consistency proved its efficiency. Despite the saturation of myth and lore of British failures and American luck, this America consistency still stands out for its seemingly tempered and rational approach. The inclusion of likeminded rational allies with a pragmatic approach, while they faced the reality that they might not win, stands out today as a strong example of how to ‘revolution’ well. These examples appear to us in the twenty-first century as pragmatic and exemplary, but not radical. Realistically, they garner greater attention for what they accomplished, for their inspiration to the Western world, and for

the change from the chaos of other failed rebellions. Progress and consistency, however rare, are not radical.

Nor is the expression of violence in the American Revolution inherently radical. Violence in warfare can be difficult to measure because it reaches further than simple battlefield casualty statistics. In this manner, the statistics of the American Revolution may appear minimal, especially when compared to later conflicts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Instead it is important, especially to the military purveyor of violence, to look to the purpose, intent, and targets of violence. The clash of organized formations on the battlefield operating under justifiable authority with tactical or strategic goals cannot be compared equally to extrajudicial or terroristic violence. Examples of each of these types of violence are available, on both sides, during the American Revolution, but these examples do not demonstrate a radical change.²³ In fact, the American Revolution in some ways demonstrates how the British worked to limit their methods of violence by the end of the eighteenth century, especially when compared to their famously brutal methods for quashing rebellions at home in Scotland and Ireland during the preceding century. This can be partly accounted for by the delayed and shifting British strategy from policing, to military conflict, and then to the people.²⁴ The character of the fighting in North America was also unique compared to the traditional European methods of formation and drill. The example of the Revolutionary War in America demonstrates how the character and expression of violence does vary, as in most conflicts, from time to time and place to place. There are ferocious engagements, there is anger, but the revolutionary war appears to remain squarely within the confines of limited war. It is possible that this limitation on the expression of violence is radical, but it does not demonstrate a lasting foundational change. Both Britain and the youthful United States go on to future conflicts that increase

radical expression of violence toward total war. It does not change revolutionary violence at its root so much as it provides an inspiration to other likeminded societies. At any rate, it is difficult to describe the violence of the American Revolution as radical when compared to our next case, the French Revolution.

In the end, the lack of prominent displays of radicalism in the ideology, methodology, or application of violence in the American revolution support the argument that the lack of radicalism provided for a more smooth and predictable transition to representative government. Some of the revolutionary ideas were novel, and the later ramifications may have had radical implications on the society, but these same ideas proved to fall short a century later. The American revolutionary consistency was a unique expression of the experiences and evolving relationship between Britain and her North American colonies, but the consistent strategy of the American revolutionaries irrefutably succeeded in the end and proved to be more stable than radical. Like all warfare, the application of violence was fierce, varied, and exemplified the worst of humanity in some instances, on both sides of the conflict, but never consumed the nation that it hoped to birth. All of these limitations to radicalism provided the opportunity and stability necessary to focus on the real challenges still to come. Added pressure from radical instability may have catastrophically swayed the debate and later ratification of the American constitution. A similarly unstable environment may have forced General George Washington to maintain his command of the Continental Army further than was necessary as a tool to maintain order, or even prevented him from peacefully giving up the presidency a few short years later. While Washington's example is famous today for his rejection of tyranny, a different set of circumstances could have ended another way.

This definitive singular example in the first president also displays the significance of the stabilizing national civil-military relationship and the support that it provided to the fledging government and society. Regardless of the prominent dates on the timeline of the American Revolution, it began, as with all revolutions, at different times, at different places, and for different reasons in the individual hearts of each participant. National cohesion came later, modeled after the template of the colonial experience. The military was at once born from the society it served, while the society was also formed by the experiences of its military. If any element of the American Revolution is radical, it is this one — that the almost complete integration of the military and its civil society, not divided by military or aristocratic social classes, enabled the successful synthesis of matching military and civil strategies, resulting in a free and representative government.

The French Revolution

The French Revolution shares a number of contributing factors with the American Revolution, but the radical trajectory that the French Revolution took was, on the face of things, unparalleled in the American experience. The examples of radicalism in the categories of ideas, method, and violence, as well as its implications on civil-military relations are legendary. Many point to the storming of the Bastille as the start of the revolution. This castle prison in Paris synonymous with the modern holiday celebrating the French republic may be well known, but it is like many other milestones of revolution in that it does not accomplish significant changes on its own. In reality, the milestones of the French Revolution began well before July 14, 1789. The storming of the Bastille provides a model for the chaos, uncertainty, and radicalism of the French revolution to come.




Figure 2. Summary Timeline of the French Revolution ²⁵

Like the American example, a revolution in France was not predestined or foreknown, but the nation was under significant pressure. Many of the same social and economic pressures present in Britain and the American colonies after the Seven Years War also burdened France. The French were saddled with significant war debt after the French and Indian War (known as the Seven Years War in Europe). As the losers in the conflict, the French faced a far greater hill to climb after significant loss of holdings in North America, the Caribbean, and in Asia. ²⁶ On top of this, France had also added new debts in their support of the colonists in waging the American Revolution. ²⁷ In contrast though, the French monarchy had not gone through a

century of limited reforms prior to the conflict in the same way as Britain, which only added to the pressure. Ever looming war debts with a reduced means to cover them, confounded by an aristocratic elite who lived at the epitome of luxury and grandeur steadily marched France towards an inevitable confrontation between the three prominent social classes, or the three estates.²⁸ When King Louis XVI decided to raise taxes in 1788, the parliament of Paris refused, unless the king agreed to convene the Estates-General, a national gathering of representatives from the three estates of the nobility, clergy, and common people of France.

Originally, the ideas of the French Revolution were not that radical, but as the ruling aristocracy resisted and revolutionary fervor mounted, the ideas became increasingly radical. When the Estates-General convened, Louis XVI called for the people of France to tell him and the Estates-General what they wanted. Noah Shusterman, in his book, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, states that, "...the complaints tended to be relatively minor. No one called for a republic, or the end of the monarchy...But in a kingdom as large as France, it was not expected that reforms that pleased one group would please others...and from each corner the expectations were different — but from every corner the expectations were high." The reorganization of society, exclusion of groups and ideas from discourse, and pre-existent economic pressure were too much to handle. In the resulting turmoil the nation once on its way from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy began to unravel. The storming of the Bastille in Paris occurred not to free the prisoners there, but to seize weapons and ammunition for the citizens of Paris who felt they were unprotected in the increasingly unruly city.²⁹ The passing of the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the National Assembly a month later did not correct the trend.³⁰ Strikingly similar to the enlightenment ideas expressed in the American Bill of Rights, the Declaration called for equality, freedom of speech, and rule of law.³¹ While these

ideas were not radical across the channel in Britain or in America, they were very radical in France where they quickly motivated a counter-revolution. As revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries clashed over the next five years, the ideas implemented by the revolution became more and more extreme, demonstrating the true depth of the radicalism that was present.³² Changes started gradually as dictatorial counsels reversed once progressive reforms, like freedom of speech, to reign in the populace.³³ But these changes eventually go beyond the pale of comparison. The French created their own calendar, their own religion, and they killed their king for treason against the nation.³⁴ These actions represent the depth of the revolutionary desire for true foundational, unrecognizable change. They are the embodiment this unique example of radicalism.

Much like the category of ideas, the method of the French Revolution does not start out radical but transforms over time. In many ways the shifting unpredictable and unmanageable method of the French Revolution took over the original rational approach to the inclusion of new ideas. In fact, the calling and establishment of assemblies, open debate and discussion of ideas, and enforcement of laws are examples of how many of today's nations choose to evolve in response to internal pressures. Once threatened internally by civil war and externally from pro-monarchy neighbors, the inclusive egalitarian method is replaced by a method of force.³⁵ As the egalitarian ideas and freedoms are eroded in order to retain control of the revolution, the method becomes increasingly radical.³⁶ At some point the radical method becomes so intertwined with radical ideas that the casual observer can no longer discern which is in the lead. Such is the case with the best example of radical, foundational change. The French method of revolution is best epitomized in August of 1792 with the abolishment of the monarchy. The monarchy is not replaced or modified as was typical of this time in Europe, but eradicated, up to and including

the execution of the king the following January. To the twenty-first century observer, this method may not hold the same significance that it did at the time, but one must not forget the implications that this single change has had on European monarchies for the next two centuries. The impact of the French revolutionary method spread throughout Europe and can be cited as a major contributing factor in subsequent revolutions, world wars, and a radically different European landscape.

Confounded by ideological and methodological radicalism and further inflamed by the internal and external military threats to the new government, the violence of the French Revolution sets the modern western standard for radical expression of revolution. Many theories seek to explain the shocking dichotomy of the French Revolution's relentless pursuit of civic morality contrasted with the depths of violent depravity. Some may argue that the constant presence of death and violence in late eighteenth century France made the spectacle more commonplace and therefore lessened the impact.³⁷ Timothy Tackett's book, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution*, argues that violence synonymous with the French Revolution, especially with the Reign of Terror from 1793-1794, originated largely out of the response to fear.³⁸ Despite providing some compelling perspectives, these theories do little to convince us that the violence of the French revolution was not radical. Tackett recounts a single day in Paris in July 1794, following Maximilian Robespierre's execution during the aptly named Reign of Terror, where over fifty percent of the Paris Commune was executed. "Shopkeepers — shoemakers, cabinet makers, wig makers — but also merchants, manufacturers, and lawyers...All were said to have supported insurrection against the Convention and were thus...subject to death after a mere confirmation of identity."³⁹ Only a year prior, Robespierre himself was elected from the political Jacobin Club, as a representative in the Committee of

Public Safety and “voice of authentic virtue.”⁴⁰ This legendary use of violence as both a public spectacle and a tool of political force against the opposition and population alike, however terrorizing, is also not new or alien to human history.⁴¹ But again, the impact of the exhaustive use of the guillotine in France continued to spread throughout European monarchies and peoples for at least the next two centuries. To explain this radical application of violence too quickly takes the risk of excusing it. This was out of control, the worst of how humanity chooses to solve its problems. It backfired on its proponents and took years to reign in, only then by the efforts of a military dictator who redirected much of the violence externally to conquer Europe.

The French military also fell victim to many of the internal and external circumstances of the French Revolution, which further eroded the civil-military relationship. Early in the revolution the military in particular faced the brunt of the growing divide between the social classes. National security threats then drew military forces geographically away from their social base. Later, tasks to restore order by force further divided the military from its society. The growth of the schisms between the three estates of French society impacted the relationship within the military because of the divide between the predominantly aristocratic officers and the commoners who filled the ranks. In his book, *The Bayonets of the Republic*, John A. Lynn details the changes within the French military in the five years from 1789 to 1794. As loyalties, legislation, and oaths changed, the demographics, leadership, training, and tactics also shifted. Lynn states that, “Eighty-seven percent of the officers who were on active duty in the summer of 1789 had left the service in one way or another by April of 1794.”⁴² Later, as anti-revolutionists rose up in western provinces and neighboring monarchies raised forces to support King Louis XVI, French military forces were sent to fight battles on the frontier, largely separated from the social bases that they protected.⁴³ In the final example on July 17, 1791, as unrest grew in Paris

after the king's failed escape attempt, the mayor of Paris declared marshal law and asked French military forces under the Marquis de Lafayette to disperse petitioners. Although politically charged narratives differed in the aftermath as to who instigated the massacre, somewhere between dozens and hundreds of men, women, and children were fired upon and killed by French soldiers at the Champs de Mars.⁴⁴ Lafayette was no pro — the very same veteran of the American Revolution, a true revolutionary patriot who loved his country, who wanted to both sustain the monarchy and protect his people was responsible for the soldiers who fired into a crowd of their own countrymen to enforce the law. Lynn accounts that only two years before, "When called upon to suppress revolutionary crowds in 1789, regiments were more likely to resist than to obey."⁴⁵ In the end, the strained civil-military relationship during the French Revolution is not radical. It is clearly pressed to its limit, and may even play a part in what many of the revolutionaries wished to reject. At some key cross road on the timeline of the revolution there appear to be no less than four distinct French military organizations: the Royal Army of the Ancien Regime that eventually became the Revolutionary Line Army, the Sans-Culottes National Guard, the town and village militia, and the loyal counter-revolutionary army — clear indications of insurmountable division. For the military leader of today, this scenario creates more questions than answers.

That the collision of the three estates ended in a revolution in France such as it did is in large part a result of the success of the revolutionary spark initiated in North America a decade before. But many of the ideas and inspiration of the time notably originated during the enlightenment period years earlier in France. Early in the French Revolution the ideals of equality and individual liberties demonstrated marked similarity to those in America. At some point though, the comparative radicalism of the revolutionary ideas within French society,

combined with the radical methods employed, and the application of radical violence eluded restraint and propelled the French Revolution into tyrannical government. To be sure, overbearing dictatorial government was established in Paris well before Napoleon Bonaparte surfaced from the military maelstrom to seize the moment, but we know how that ends for France and for the rest of Europe.

Theories and Lessons

The examination of the radicalism of the American and French Revolutions speaks to some key lessons and conclusions that may be applied to the present day.

One lesson that stands out from the comparison of the two sets of ideas is that the more extreme the ideas — too much change, too fast — the more tumultuous and uncontrollable the situation. Potentially as the result of prolonged, unfair oppression, increased rate of change leads to more radicalism when it finally arrives. The more out of control the revolution becomes, the more likely it is to trend toward tyranny in order to regain some semblance of order. As it turns out, most successful change may actually be gradual after all, slowly permeating in a society until it is ubiquitous below the surface and requires a change in name or legislation only. Comparison of the American and French Revolutions demonstrate this theory in that both revolutions largely started out with the same enlightenment ideas at their foundation. In the America example, the ideas had already permeated the society, whereas in France the achievement of the ideas required more change. Gradual change may be more manageable.

As another element of the same theory, methods and institutions designed to reach compromise via gradual change are also better equipped to resist tyranny. In the American example, they do not achieve the completion of their enlightenment ideals, most notably in the

shortfalls for women and slavery. As Wood shares, while quoting Thomas Jefferson, “Thus many Republicans concluded that all political opinions, even those opinions that were ‘false, scandalous and malicious,’ ought to be allowed, as Jefferson put it, ‘to stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.’”⁴⁶ They did not seek to achieve perfection, and therefore, they did not go off the deep end. In the French example, some of the more extreme revolutionaries sought a utopian republic. As Dan Edelstein concludes in his book, *The Terror of Natural Law*, the double-edged and unattainable standard of Natural Right never allowed the revolutionaries to reach a stable goal.⁴⁷ Anything short of perfection became opposition and therefore, an enemy of the republic. Because of their idealized view, or maybe because the people had been oppressed for too long, they tried to accomplish too much, too fast, and the end result was tyranny.

Another contributing factor that appears to affect the expression of the two revolutions is their proximity to threat. Time and space proximity, especially, and the delays in communication between rival factions, may have impacted the radical expression of revolution. In Paris, as tempers flared, there was no where to go. That is, after all, why the monarchy moved their palace out of Paris to Versailles.⁴⁸ For many others there was no escape, for those who were angry only had to walk to the target of their anger and frustration with whatever weapon of opportunity they could muster. The time and space between London and the colonies provided by the Atlantic Ocean in the American example likely had both positive and negative affects, but forced deliberate communication and took some of the heat out of the interaction.⁴⁹ Additional threats to the French revolution also manifested internally to France with organized counter-revolutions, as well as from neighboring monarchies that supported the continued reign of the Bourbons.⁵⁰ The presence or quality of a geographic buffer may not always be controllable,

especially for an internal conflict. In our current day, the availability of a buffer is limited even more by the increased rate of travel and communication enabled by modern technology and the twenty-four hour news cycle. This examination demonstrates that it may be beneficial to implement some form of buffer where possible which may not look the same as it did in the eighteenth century. Edelstein would likely agree, stating that “The best defense of civil liberty may thus be the engineering of ‘escape valves,’...which can ensure that the fabric of constitutional law and jurisprudence does not get ripped apart.”⁵¹ A buffer could also be similar to something we already see in American government with the delays caused by balance of power between the branches of government. It is important to remember that the buffer is not a mere efficiency, but a protection from the efficient alternative of tyranny.

At some level, unique historical individuals can also play a part in determining the radicalism or outcome of revolution. Whether it be personalities, big names, or even fame, many revolutions incorporate, or even create in some ways, the notoriety of some of these individuals. In this respect, the American and French Revolutions are not different. As with many historic figures though, considerable challenges exist in separating fact from fiction. Many of the American ‘founding fathers’ have unique stories of ideology, virtue, and sacrifice. George Washington is one of the most famous for his celebrated selfless acts to give up command of the Continental Army once the objectives of the Revolutionary War were complete, and then to peacefully decamp the presidency once his term had expired. Equally renowned names in the French example demonstrate the power of words and actions to energize a population, even to their own detriment. Maximilian Robespierre is an example of one such individual who took on the mantle of morality and virtue and became the face of The Terror as a political tool of power, only to fall prey to it.⁵² Another example, like that of the Marquis de Lafayette, demonstrates the

bolstering force that a leader can provide in one situation, then, despite sustained clout and reason, unable to sway the masses away from radicalism in another.⁵³

Of course, it is nearly impossible to identify, before the reordering of society, who will rise to prominence, who will become famous, who will survive, or who will reveal a darker side under pressure? Marisa Linton, in her book, *Choosing Terror*, also warns of the prominent emotional toll of genuine fear on decision-making.⁵⁴ As positive or negative as the effects of individual players may be, the implication on a democracy implores a voting society to take this particularly seriously. Jon Meacham further outlines this critical necessity when he concludes that as Americans, we must “Enter the Arena” and engage—something he advanced in his book, *The Soul of America*.⁵⁵ Questions of how leadership is selected, who gets to vote, and how to maintain fairness in a divided society are truly challenges of democracy that are debated today as they were by the founding fathers.⁵⁶ In the end, while personalities can clearly impact onsets and outcomes for good and bad, examples of opportunists from the French Revolution demonstrate that while human relationships often serve as a “tipping point,” that the realities of real people are that they are often selfish, temporary, and prone to mistakes.⁵⁷ As the founding fathers of the American Revolution warned, resting on personality alone to avoid radicalism and tyranny is never enough.⁵⁸

Some might say that the increase in volatile discourse in our present day is a byproduct of the internet and social media. While the rate, reach, and permeation of communication today may have increased with the arrival of the internet, in reality, the use of new means, anonymous pseudonyms, or disinformation to share or debate new ideas, is not a new phenomenon. These two revolutions demonstrate that the expression and ideas of the revolution, the self-control of its leaders and participants throughout, and the way that the conclusions are handled are important

and interconnected. The way in which the American leaders demonstrate dignity and respect between the victors and the defeated determines, or at least guides, the future discourse in the American example. Discourse is indeed a normal and necessary part of a democracy. To further summarize Meacham's conclusion, we must not only engage, but avoid political warfare in order to more effectively "mediate difference," and break down barriers to discourse.⁵⁹ Meacham further states, "It also entails being humble enough to recognize that only on the rarest of occasions does any single camp have a monopoly on virtue or on wisdom."⁶⁰ This is where the consistent individual opportunity exists to release the pressure valve, to prevent radical methods and radical violence leading to chaotic overthrow wherever possible. Discourse is a natural and necessary by-product of democracy. Discourse can provide a pressure release, but can also lead to the gradual necessary change in a liberal democracy.

Caution from extreme ideas, volatile methods of discourse, and the power of personalities; each of these warnings provide robust lessons just as important to today as yesterday. But these lessons may still not be enough. Another lesson stands out to the military professional among the rest. One of the greatest buffers between radicalism and tyranny appears to come from a military that is in-step with the society that it protects. The parallel military force can not only provide military defense to the nation, but also protection from fear as well as a unifying social experience. Echoing similar conclusions of dialogue and individual action as Meacham, Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue further caution in *Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization*, that domestic military intervention is an option, but that "...such interventions rarely temper polarization and may result in enduring military rule."⁶¹ Although Carothers and O'Donohue use twenty-first century examples to make their argument, this cautionary contrast is no less applicable to our eighteenth century comparison. As

divisions grow between a military and society, the examples of the American and French Revolutions demonstrate two potential catastrophic results. In one, that the monopoly on violence can tend to escape from its professional bounds. Second, that the resulting disconnect between military and civil strategy can turn divisions and resulting tensions toward one another and result in military dictatorship. The consequences are disastrous, both for the belligerents, and for future freedoms. This warning demonstrates the worst case scenario for a society that invests in a stronger military as divisions are heightened, a move that must be avoided. It is critically important for both the society and military of a polarized nation to recognize this critical relationship in order to protect and maintain the democracy it defends.

America has a tradition of mostly peaceful transitions of government in conjunction with election cycles in our representative democracy. With the notable exception of the American Civil War, the United States has avoided large scale prolonged internal violence to settle its differences. Unresolved discourse rather than internal dissent is expected in a successful democracy. The foremost noble goal of our founding fathers was to create a government for the people, with the controls in place to be simultaneously strong enough to govern and defend the nation, but weak enough to be “overthrown” by the people via an election process. “A republic, if you can keep it,” Ben Franklin famously quipped when asked what kind of government Americans could expect at the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention. Keep it from what? Keep it from internal and external pressures that tend toward more control, that trend toward tyranny. Keep it from succumbing to internal and external threats, and the trend toward tyranny inherent in the need for stability and control.

As the character of warfare and communication change, the expressions of revolution may continue to change too. Indeed, revolution has already been redefined in subsequent

generations by practitioners like Mao Ze Dong and Che Guevara; future expressions may produce still new expressions of radicalism. As gray-zone conflict evolves to utilize the new technologies and interactions made available by the new norms of international competition, the expression of internal social or government revolutions may also mutate. However disagreement is expressed, it is important to remember the hard learned lessons of the past. When radicalism permeates revolution, when means of peaceful discourse are eroded, when the civil-military bond is weak, the conflict is more likely to result in tyranny.

Postscript

As I conclude the efforts towards this Masters of Military Studies Thesis project the context of the coronavirus pandemic brings the social implications of contemporary radical revolution into a different focus, or maybe into a different context. While the conclusion of this pandemic is still unseen as of this writing, the potential consequences of radical change from a different threat loom large. The chinks in the armor of the modern global environment are beginning to show their critical weaknesses as global interconnectedness causes world economies to shudder and pushes many societies once again to the brink. I am reminded that threats to our critical civil-military relationships do not always come in the form of man-made radical or revolutionary ideas, methods, or violence. And yet, there must also be those who stand to benefit from fleeting targets of opportunity and resultant dynamics. With the consequences and future implications still unknown, it is even harder to say with certainty what the strengths, weaknesses, or neutral results of this world-wide crisis might be. What will we turn to — what will we be willing to give up — in order to retain perceived prosperity and stability through this, or any other crisis?

Notes

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³ Andrew R. Hoehn, Richard H. Solomon, Sonni Efron, Frank Camm, Anita Chandra, Debra Knopman, Burgess Laird, Robert J. Lempert, Howard J. Shatz, and Casimir Yost, *Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), xvii, xxiv, xxx-xxxii, 2, 4-5, 47-48, 75, 204. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1631.html; Jon Meacham, *The Soul of America: The Battle for Our Better Angels*, (New York: Random House, 2018), 4-6; Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue, eds., *Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 1-5.

⁴ Marybeth P. Ulrich, “A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders.” *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, Vol. 5, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2012), 306-316; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 1-5.

⁵ This definition of ‘genuine revolution’ comes less from any synthesis of academic definitions than from a desire to narrow the scope of this evaluation and to distinguish from other rhetorically ‘revolutionary’ topics.

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⁷ Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 3.

⁸ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), xv-xxiii. (dates for the French and Indian War)

⁹ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), xxi.

¹⁰ US Congress, *Declaration of Independence*, July 4, 1776. from the US National Archives, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>.

¹¹ Illustration by the author, with source information from: Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution: a History*, (New York: Modern History, 2002), xii-xvii; Matthew J. Flynn and Stephen E. Griffin. *Washington and Napoleon: Leadership in the Age of Revolution*, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 87.

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- ¹² Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 13-14.
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- ¹⁴ Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 109-124.
- ¹⁵ John W. Gordon, (seminar discussion, Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, February 18, 2020 and February 24, 2020).
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- ¹⁷ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 414.
- ¹⁸ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 677.
- ¹⁹ John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 296.
- ²⁰ John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 221.
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- ²⁴ John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 222-230.
- ²⁵ Illustration by the author, with source information from: Noah Shusterman, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), viii-xiii.
- ²⁶ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), xv, 503-506.
- ²⁷ Noah Shusterman, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 21.
- ²⁸ Noah Shusterman, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 6-19.
- ²⁹ Timothy Tackett, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution*, (MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015), 55-56.
- ³⁰ National Assembly of France, *Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789*, August 26, 1789. from the French Constitutional Council, <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/declaration-of-human-and-civic-rights-of-26-august-1789>.
- ³¹ Noah Shusterman, *The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 4, 45-46.
- ³² Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity*, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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- ³⁴ Dan Edelstein, *The Terror of Natural Rights: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

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