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14. ABSTRACT
China's grand strategy has three pillars: to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to develop a strong military, and to develop a strong economy. In terms of China's military strategy, to develop a strong military, the CCP seeks to enhance the political loyalty of the military. The CCP also strengthens the military through reform and technology. How should the U.S. and its regional allies and partners deter Chinese aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region? To address the topic, this paper uses the current U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) deterrence doctrine which is made based on the tailored deterrence concept. And also, this paper sets a scenario of conflict between China and Taiwan. In this scenario, China uses asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic methods to accomplish its goals (medium-range ballistic missiles, Information Operation (IO), and destruction of adversaries' infrastructures and economies). The U.S. and its regional allies and partners should improve critical capabilities to deter China's aggressive action. The critical capabilities are counter missile capabilities and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) against the Chinese kinetic method and improvement of cybersecurity, IO, the protection of infrastructure, and economic cooperation to counter Chinese non-kinetic methods.

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Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

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AUTHOR:

Kuga, Masaki (LtCol)

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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Christopher D. Yung

Approved: Pass

Date: Apr. 30, 2020

Oral Defense Committee Member: LtCol. Paul Armstrong

Approved: Pass

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Executive Summary

Title: How to deter Chinese aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region

Author: LtCol. Masaki Kuga, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

Thesis: The United States and its regional allies and partners should deter Chinese aggressive actions in the Asia-Pacific region by affecting the Chinese decision calculus elements in three ‘ways’: denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging adversary restraint.

Discussion: China’s grand strategy has three pillars: to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to develop a strong military, and to develop a strong economy. China will try to accomplish Chinese objectives without using military force. However, when China thinks diplomacy, information, and economic methods are not effective to protect Chinese Core Interests, China will take aggressive actions. In terms of China’s military strategy, to develop a strong military, the CCP seeks to enhance the political loyalty of the military. The CCP also strengthens the military through reform and technology. How should the U.S. and its regional allies and partners deter Chinese aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region? To address the topic, this paper uses the current U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) deterrence doctrine which is made based on the tailored deterrence concept. And also, this paper sets a scenario of conflict between China and Taiwan. In this scenario, China uses asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic methods to accomplish its goals. As a kinetic method, medium-range ballistic missiles such as DF-21 are effective to destroy the U.S. aircraft carrier groups and key facilities in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. As non-kinetic methods, China can use Information Operation (IO) and destruction of adversaries’ infrastructures and economies to degrade adversaries’ will to fight. The U.S. and its regional allies and partners should improve critical capabilities to deter China’s aggressive action. By considering DOD deterrence doctrine, the key capabilities of the U.S. and its allies and partners are counter missile capabilities such as Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) against the Chinese kinetic method and improvement of cybersecurity, IO, the protection of infrastructure, and economic cooperation to counter Chinese non-kinetic methods. There are some challenges to develop the capabilities due to Chinese opposition and domestic public opposition against the U.S. and allies and partner’s enhancement of the BMD and IRBM capabilities, limited military budgets, and economic relationships with China.

Conclusion: From the U.S. military perspective, the most important priority is that the U.S. and its allies and partners should improve counter missile capabilities. Then, they should improve cybersecurity and IO against Chinese IO threats. Finally, they should protect their infrastructure and build economic cooperation with their allies and partners as an entire national effort.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Introduction

The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 insisted on Two Century Goals as “China’s Dream.” One is that China will accomplish a moderate, prosperous society by 2021, which will be the 100th anniversary of the CCP. Another is that China will reach the level of moderately developed countries by 2049, which will be the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To protect its “Core Interests,” the CCP insists upon a Strong Army (military) dream, which is a military building road map related to its Two Century Goals. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) goals are that the PLA will establish a modernized military by 2035 and be a world-class military by the mid-21st century.¹ Thus, China’s national key objectives are to keep the CCP as a strong regime and to protect Chinese Core Interests from internal and external threats.

China’s grand strategy is central to accomplish its key objectives. China’s grand strategy has three pillars: to strengthen the CCP, to develop a strong military, and to develop a strong economy. To strengthen the CCP’s authority, the CCP aims to build centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee, to commit to a people-centered approach, and to continue to deepen reform. To develop a strong military, the CCP aims to enhance the political loyalty of the military and strengthen the military through reform and technology. To develop a strong economy, the CCP aims to further supply-side structural reform.

Especially, in terms of military strategy, China’s Military Strategy 2015 followed Mao’s “active defense”² as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic guideline. And also China’s Military Strategy 2015 professed adherence to the guideline that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”³ China doesn’t want to take aggressive action initially. However, when China believes diplomacy, information, and

economic methods are not effective to protect Chinese Core Interests, China will take aggressive actions in response to territorial issues and maritime security through active defense.⁴ Under the active defense concept, the CCP plans to reform the leadership and command system and compose an ideal modern force structure for protecting national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. With regard to China's current military reforms, Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow conclude that "China's military reforms are driven by Xi Jinping's ambition to reshape the PLA to improve its ability to win informationized wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the CCP."⁵ Thus, the CCP is modernizing the PLA for the purpose of protecting national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

China has already shown its will against adjacent countries. After China fought Vietnam over the Spratly Islands in 1988, China has made artificial islands with ports, runways, aircraft hangars, communication facilities, and administration offices. CNBC, a U.S. broadcast network, reported on May 2, 2018, that China deployed Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles and Surface-to-Air missiles at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. China intrudes frequently into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which Japan and China each claim as their own territory. Unification of Taiwan is another one of the "Core Interests"⁶ for China. President Tsai, who strongly opposed unification, was re-elected in the Taiwanese President election in January 2020. Tension between Beijing and Taipei will increase under Taiwanese strong opposition to "One-Country Two-Systems."ⁱ

These conflicts could lead to a big war between China and the U.S. About this rational

ⁱ "One-Country-Two-Systems" is China's policy toward Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. For example, *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC* states that "the socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years." The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China*, last modified in April 2017, 2, https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf.

reason, Graham Allison explains the “Thucydides Trap.” He introduces the Thucydides Trap Project conducted by Harvard University. This study shows that out of sixteen cases, only four cases avoided wars when a current ruling state and a rising state existed.⁷ Based on the theory of the Thucydides Trap, China, an emergent state, has a high possibility to go to war against the U.S. as a current hegemonic state. Conflicts between an ally and its adversary could trigger a major war between two competing great powers. Graham Allison explains it with the example of the Peloponnesian War. Conflict between an important Spartan ally—Corinth—and a neutral power—Corcyra—caused the Peloponnesian War.⁸ When conflicts happen, China will try to accomplish Chinese objectives without using military force. China will most likely use diplomacy and economic power to accomplish its objectives while trying to avert the conflict. However, when China believes diplomacy, information, and economic methods are not effective to protect Chinese Core Interests, China will take aggressive actions. To make matters worse, small conflicts could lead to a major war between China and the U.S. by falling into a Thucydides Trap.

This paper clarifies what capabilities the U.S. and its regional allies and partners should improve for deterrence against Chinese aggressive actions in the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. First, this paper explains China’s grand strategy. Second, this paper explains China’s military strategy. Third, this paper explains the traditional deterrence definition, which is advocated by Thomas Schelling; tailored deterrence, which the U.S. adopted for adjusting to the changing security situation after the Cold War; and the current U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) deterrence doctrine. Fourth, this paper sets a scenario of conflict between China and Taiwan because national reunification is a fundamental interest of China, and it will also be a significant event in the security environment for the U.S. and countries in East Asia. Fifth, this

paper clarifies China's asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic methods to accomplish its goals. Sixth, this paper describes the U.S. and its regional allies and partners' critical capabilities to deter China's aggressive action in this scenario. Finally, this paper insists upon some challenges to development capabilities of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners to deter Chinese future aggressive action.

Chinese Grand Strategy

Colin Gray defines the grand strategy as “the direction and use made of any or all of the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.”⁹ In short, the grand strategy is the highest strategy for the national security. Geography, strategic culture, and ideology are basic factors for a grand strategy. First, one of the key characteristics of China's geography is its long border. China is located in the east of Eurasia and faces the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The flat areas along the Yellow River and Changjiang (Yangzi) River have been civilized since ancient times. Historically, Chinese dynasties have felt threatened by internal parties. In terms of external threats, the threats had come not by the maritime border but from land. Three Chinese dynasties used military force to acquire territories that have served as buffer zones to the heart of Chinese civilization.ⁱⁱ In accordance with growth of its national power, China also seeks to establish a strong presence in its maritime domain. Next, in terms of its strategic culture, China was the central power in Asia throughout nearly its entire history. Periphery countries such as countries

ⁱⁱ The authors explain, “Historically, the defense of Chinese heartland required efforts by the Chinese state to directly or indirectly control, influence, or neutralize a very large periphery surrounding it.” First, Qin and Sui dynasties “persisted in the use of force against the peripheries” (ex. Qin Shi Huang sent military to conquer the Yue kingdoms). Second, about Qing dynasties, “In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, most of the northern and western parts of China's long-standing strategic periphery were directly and formally incorporated into the Chinese heartland by military force and occupation.” Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, “The Historical Context,” in *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2000), 37-39, 58.

on the Korean peninsula and Japan brought a tribute to the Chinese court. This long historic experience brings Sino-centric thought to Chinese elites. China also experienced two big humiliations brought about by the U.K. in the nineteenth century and the Japanese from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century. Finally, great modern Chinese leaders had a significant effect on its strategic outlook. Mao Zedong established the Chinese communist regime in 1949. Deng Xiaoping discarded significant communist doctrines and promoted market-economy reforms in 1978. Thanks to these economic reforms, Chinese economic growth now gives the CCP its legitimacy.

In terms of ideology, the socialist ideology, which adapts Marxism-Leninism to China's conditions, has been a key ideology for China from Mao to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has assessed that "core socialist values and fine traditional Chinese culture are alive in the people's hearts."¹⁰ People's trust is an essential element of the CCP's existence, so the socialist ideology is a core element for China's grand strategy. The CCP advocates democracy under socialism ("China's socialist democracy"). The CCP fears that if the liberal democracy takes hold in China, it will jolt CCP legitimacy, so the CCP is sensitive to foreign influences, which disseminate the liberal democracy and the germ of a liberal democracy in China.ⁱⁱⁱ

After the 18th National Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping directed two foreign policies to accomplish China's Dream. First, China establishes a favorable international environment to develop China through promoting cooperative relationships with other countries. In 2013, Xi talked about China's policy for Peripheral Diplomacy in "Important Speech of Xi Jinping at

ⁱⁱⁱ Deng Xiaoping writes/talks about socialist democracy in the *Uphold The Four Cardinal Principles*. He says that "we must strictly distinguish between socialist democracy on the one hand and bourgeois, individualist democracy on the other. We must link democracy for the people with dictatorship over the enemy, and with centralism, legality, discipline and the leadership by the Communist Party." He clearly states that Chinese people must strictly distinguish socialist democracy from liberal democracy. Deng Xiaoping, *Uphold The Four Cardinal Principles* (excerpts), March 30, 1979, <http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/China/Deng/principles.htm>.

Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference.” According to his speech, he emphasizes “Friendliness and cooperation are the mainstream policies of peripheral countries for China.”¹¹ Thus, China insists that China pursues building relationships peacefully with its peripheral countries.

Second, China protects Chinese Core Interests, even if it leads to a deteriorating relationship between China and other countries. Beijing defines China’s Core Interests as (1) state sovereignty; (2) national security; (3) territorial integrity; (4) national reunification; (5) the general stability of China’s political system established by the constitution, all social stability of China’s political system established by the constitution, and overall social stability; and (6) the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.¹²

In conclusion, China’s grand strategy is to protect Chinese Core Interests from internal and external threats under the CCP’s strong leadership. To do this, China needs to strengthen the CCP’s authority, to build a strong military, and to accomplish a strong economy within the timeframes mentioned earlier.

China’s Military Strategy

In terms of China’s military strategy, Sun Tzu says in *The Art of War*, “Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.”¹³ Based on Sun Tzu’s words, China will try to accomplish Chinese objectives without using military force. However, when China thinks diplomacy, information, and economic methods are not effective to protect Chinese Core Interests, China will take aggressive actions. China’s Military Strategy 2015 followed Mao’s ‘active defense’ as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic guideline. It professed adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense, and retaliatory strike; and adherence to the stance that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”¹⁴ To

develop a strong military, first, the CCP seeks to enhance the political loyalty of the military because the biggest threat for the CCP is an internal threat. So, the CCP needs strong authority to control its military. Second, the CCP strengthens the military through reform and technology. Sun Tzu says, “That the army is certain to sustain the enemy’s attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces.”¹⁵ Samuel B. Griffith explains extraordinary forces that “The force which confronts the enemy is the normal (正); the extraordinary (奇) forces act when and where the force’s blows are not anticipated.”¹⁶ As the U.S. has developed a modernized conventional force after the Vietnam War, it is not easy for China to win against the U.S. modernized conventional force with the Chinese conventional force. Moreover, if the CCP pursues the development, it costs a lot of resources. This course of action contradicts China’s strategic culture. On the other hand, China has an advantage of intermediate range missiles in the South China Sea because the U.S. couldn’t have such range of missiles due to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. And also, by improving information, cyber, and space capabilities, China tries to avoid the strength of the U.S. conventional force. Thus, the CCP focuses on improving the capabilities of missiles, information, cyber, and space as extraordinary forces.

Deterrence theory and concept

Before analysing how to deter Chinese aggressive action, this section explains deterrence theory and concept. As a traditional deterrence definition, Thomas Schelling insists that the purpose of deterrence is not to allow adversaries to change the current situation. He distinguishes deterrence from compellence.¹⁷ He explains “the deterrent threat only changes the consequences if the act in question- the one to be deterred- is then taken. Compellence, in

contrast, usually involves initiating action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.”¹⁸ However, China includes compellence in its concept of deterrence.

From the psychological viewpoint, perceptions are the dominant variable in deterrence success or failure.¹⁹ Michael J. Mazarr, a senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, notes “the importance of perception also illustrates the importance of developing deterrence strategies custom-made for the interests, preferences, and perceptions of a specific adversary. The notion of ‘tailored deterrence’ has gained renewed attention in recent years.”²⁰ This thought about deterrence can be seen in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). According to the NSS in 2006, “The new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes. Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force.”²¹ This tailored deterrence thinks of deterrence as a broader approach involving elements of national power such as diplomacy, information, military, and economy. And also the approach needs more specific ways against specific potential aggressors.

The U.S. DOD published Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) doctrine in 2006 to accomplish Tailored Deterrence. As one aspect of the traditional deterrence category, Glenn Snyder distinguishes between two fundamental approaches to deterrence: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.²² DO JOC says “an adversary’s deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements as the benefits of a course of action (COA), the costs of a COA and the consequences of restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the COA seek to deter).”²³ DO JOC also explains “Joint military operations and activities contribute to the ‘end’ of deterrence by affecting the adversary’s

decision calculus elements in three ‘ways’: deny benefits (deterrence by denial), impose costs (deterrence by punishment), and encourage adversary restraint.”²⁴ This paper uses this DO JOC concept to analyse China and the U.S.-led coalitions’ actions for deterrence.

Scenarios involving China’s use of force

China has a grand strategy, which involves attaining objectives without the use of force. Based on the perspective of China’s grand strategy and military strategy, China doesn’t want to take aggressive action as its first course of action. Even if China uses its military, China will attempt to avoid a head-on collision against the strong U.S. forces to win with the asymmetric warfare. Related to China’s asymmetric warfare, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argue there are certain essential principles for warfare against the U.S. in their book *Unrestricted Warfare*. They say that “the main fighting elements of some poor countries, weak countries, and non-state entities have all used asymmetric combat methods against much more powerful adversaries.”²⁵ This thought matches China’s military strategic thought. China will be likely to use asymmetric combat methods against the powerful U.S. military when China uses its military.

More specifically, for China, periphery areas such as North Korea and Cambodia are important as buffer zones for its national security. For example, Godwin and Miller say in *China’s forbearance has limits*, “Beijing’s calculus of warnings was deployed during many of the crises it faced since 1949. It was deployed in rudimentary form in the summer and early fall months of 1950, preceding China’s intervention in the Korean War after U.S. and UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and moved up to the PRC-Korean frontier on the Yalu River.”²⁶ But China couldn’t stop the U.S. and South Korean action, so China decided to send troops to the Korean peninsula. Other examples are China using a calculus warning in the Sino-Soviet border crash of 1969 and the contest over perceived Vietnamese regional ambitions in 1978.²⁷ Thus,

historically, when China took these military actions, China prudently calculated and assumed the attack was not to cause total war between China and its adversaries.

Moreover, Shinji Yamaguchi explains the Chinese perspective about the international order. First, the international order is based on big countries' power and profit. China insists that the current international order is based on the U.S. hegemony after the World War Two. So, China claims that China has developed and the world power balance has changed. Then, China claims that countries should revise the international order based on the current world power balance. "The Nine-Dash Line," which China claims in the South China Sea, is an example of this perspective. Second, the current international order has a part that is unfair and unreasonable because developed countries tend to neglect developing countries' benefits. Moreover, the U.S. may, using rules and regulations, restrain China's rise because U.S. ideology is different from the Chinese one. Thus, the Chinese perspective about the international order is different from the other major powers who are major beneficiaries of the system.

Therefore, when China judges its aggressive actions are preferable and it limits its actions to local battle, China will take aggressive actions about territorial issues and maritime security to protect its Core Interests based on China's perspective and calculation, even if other countries criticize the Chinese actions violating the security of the international order.

It is the position of this paper that only certain types of scenarios would prompt China to be aggressive and use force. This section explores one such scenario to determine how China might use force, then how the U.S. and its allies could deter Chinese use of force capabilities. This paper sets the scenario as the movement in Taiwan toward greater independence and possibly an actual declaration of independence and China's inevitable aggressive and violent reaction to such a move, in order to think about how to deter Chinese aggressive actions in the

Taiwan crisis scenario. This scenario refers to the past Chinese action in the 1996 Taiwan crisis and O'Hanlon's book, *The Senkaku Paradox*.

In 2035, before the Taiwanese President Election in 2036, the pro-Taiwanese independence movement increases in Taiwan. Chinese people criticize the movement. China pressures Taiwan--by using diplomacy, information, military, and economy--to give up the movements. First big cyberattacks occur in Taiwan, which are suspected to come from the Chinese. Second, China restrains trades and immigrations between China and Taiwan to put pressure on Taipei. Third, China does military demonstrations with fighter aircrafts, air carrier ships, battleships, and launching missiles in the Taiwan Strait. Fourth, China imposes the blockade of the Taiwan Strait with China's Coast Guard and the PLA Navy as a pretext for the Chinese national security. These Chinese actions boost Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan accuses China of these aggressive actions. Taiwan tries to figure out the cyberattack. After Chinese military demonstrations, Taiwan demonstrates military actions with fighter aircraft, cruise ships, and cruise missiles too. Taiwan resists the Chinese blockade. Finally, Taiwan requests help from the U.S. and its regional allies and partners to stop Chinese aggressive actions.

China's asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic methods

In this scenario, China tries to impose a significant cost on the U.S. and its regional allies and partners with asymmetric warfare. China doesn't want to directly use military force against the U.S. When China takes military actions, China prudently calculates and assumes the attack is not to cause total war between China and adverse countries—especially the United States. Therefore, China will not use nuclear weapons (even the use of an Electromagnetic Pulse) in this situation. To ensure effectiveness of these aggressive actions to stop Taiwanese independence, China focuses on improving asymmetric methods. This paper distinguishes Chinese critical

capabilities in kinetic (which give physical damages directly such as fire power) and non-kinetic methods (which don't give physical damages directly but give damages indirectly such as Information Operations).^{iv}

As a kinetic method, medium-range ballistic missiles such as DF-21 are effective to destroy the U.S. aircraft carrier groups and key facilities in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.²⁸ Until DF-21C and DH-10 emerged, there were no effective Chinese missiles to attack the U.S. bases in Japan.²⁹ However, in 2017, thousands of missiles could reach almost all of Japan and the Philippines, and hundreds of missiles could reach Guam. For example, the DF-21D has a range of 2,000km. Its costs are unknown but thought to be significantly cheaper than a U.S. aircraft carrier, which costs several billion dollars to build. Moreover, thousands of sailors work on the ship. According to Jacob Stokes, who is one of the policy analysts of the U.S.-China Economy and Security Review Commission, Chinese precision strike capabilities prevent "U.S. intervention in two ways: (1) by physically preventing forces from reaching the battlespace, and (2) by creating so much damage that U.S. policymakers become reluctant to keep fighting or sustain additional losses."³⁰ The U.S. will hesitate to deploy air carrier groups in these regions due to the cost gap. Moreover, this missile capability can also be used to attack facilities and cities in Taiwan and the U.S. regional allies and partners. Since the effectiveness of Chinese missile capability boosts its denial capability, the U.S. carrier is less of a threat for China unless the U.S. can break Chinese missile threats. Chinese missile capabilities also threaten adversary satellite systems. In fact, China destroyed its own satellite as an experiment of anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) in 2007.³¹ The worldwide threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence

^{iv} This assessment doesn't categorize kinetic and non-kinetic methods, but it explains threats to US national security. This report evaluates China's threats in cyber, information, missiles, and economies. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT of the US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2019), 5,7,9,13-26.

community assessed in February 2018, “Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years.”³² The U.S. and its regional allies and partners heavily rely on satellites, digital systems, and communication systems. If China succeeds in destroying and degrading U.S. and its regional allies and partners’ satellite systems, this will significantly affect the ways the U.S. and regional allies and partners conduct missions.

As non-kinetic methods, China has a long history of Information Operations (IO). Sun Tzu argues in *The Art of War*, “Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”³³ Chapter four in China’s defense strategy 2015 clearly refers to the willingness to aim at building an informationized military and winning informationized wars to build the strong military. Cyberattack is the most likely course of action for IO. In fact, Unit 78020, which is a Chinese cyberwarfare unit, was suspected of conducting cyberattacks against computer networks in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2010.³⁴

John Costello and Joe McReynolds explain the Chinese perspective for strategic information warfare in their paper ‘China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era.’ They say “*The Science of Military Strategy* and other authoritative sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyber, and electronic warfare as strategic weapons to achieve these ends, arguing that the PLA must ‘paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems’ and ‘sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems’ in the initial stages of a conflict while protecting its own.”³⁵ China conducts cyberattacks against Taiwan, the U.S., and its regional allies and partners’ information collecting systems and transmission systems such as GPS, Spy Satellite, Communication Satellite, and Reconnaissance plane to paralyze effective

missile defense systems. The U.S., Taiwan, Japan, and Korea heavily rely on information systems to fight; especially, reliable and timely information are key to missile defense systems. If the U.S., Taiwan, Japan, and Korea commanders in these front lines can't have enough reliable information due to Chinese cyberattacks, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners are exposed to risks of losing missile defense capabilities.

In terms of command systems, China conducts IO against adversaries' Command and Control (C2) systems in order to disturb the decision-making process. Chinese cyberattacks can directly disturb Taiwan, U.S., and its regional allies and partners' C2 systems. These attacks hamper transmission of information between key decision makers such as the President, combatant commanders, and commanders on the front line. These decision-makers worry about the lack of information and the spread of disinformation. Besides cyberattacks, psychological operation (PSYOPS) is also effective in the human domain in the C2 structure. Chinese PSYOPS could infiltrate adversaries' key decision makers in a peace time. According to Larry M. Wortzel, who is a senior fellow in Asian security at the American Foreign Policy Council, China's use public or private diplomacy, media, and non-military actions such as restrictions on travel or trade in its PSYOPS affects Taiwan, U.S., and its regional allies and partners' citizens and its leaders as well as military personnel's will to fight.³⁶

China's other important IO target is the adversary's public. China sends disinformation to the public in adversary countries such as Taiwan, the U.S., and its regional allies and partners to ruin their public support to their government and deprive the people's will to fight. The fifth generation (5G) network will boost Chinese disinformation capability. The fifth generation network will connect many IoT such as phones, PCs, games, home appliances, and personal data. China can collect big data through these IoT, and then China can use this data for

disinformation campaigns. Transformation from 3G to 4G occurred in 2009-2010, and 4G is totally disseminated now. If 5G systems prevail in a similar time schedule of 4G, these will prevail sufficiently in most people's daily life by 2030. Though 5G will change human life comprehensively and make communicating much more convenient, it will spread disinformation easily and effectively. China is aware of adversaries' IO methods and is able to counter these methods given its skill in monitoring its own people. In fact, the CCP monitors its people by digital and human monitor systems. China's Golden Shield Project, which started in 1999, is a significant example. The project is supposed to "construct databases of criminal records, fugitives, stolen vehicles, driver's licenses, human migration data, and a database of every adult in China."³⁷ This authority is an asymmetric advantage for China to conduct IO campaigns.

China also can destroy adversaries' infrastructures and economy. Attacks on adversaries' key infrastructures can inflict significant damage upon civilian life. For example, CNN news reported in 2019 that "the Philippines' power grid is under the full control of the Chinese government and could be shut off in time of conflict according to an internal report prepared for lawmakers seen by CNN."³⁸ This internal report concerned China's influence on the Philippines' key infrastructure, based on the fact that China's State Grid Corporation has a forty percent share of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, which operates the country's power line. Chinese workers also control key parts of the system. Thus, China can easily destroy the country's infrastructure in which it has already infiltrated in peace time.

China can use its big economy power to damage the adversary's economy. In 2017, China had already become the No.1 Trade partner for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Australia.³⁹ Although the China-United States trade war will give both countries

economic damages, the U.S. has still an advantage over China now because the U.S. economy power surpasses the Chinese one so far. But if China commences a trade war against Taiwan as a sanction, the damage will become much more severe for Taiwan. Moreover, in 2035, even the U.S. will have a significant damage in the trade war with China because China will surpass the U.S. economy by this time. CEBR, a research company in London, estimated the future world GDP; according to the research, the Chinese GDP will become the largest in the world by 2029.⁴⁰

China can use its big economy power to increase its support from other countries. Chinese domestic consumption will increase in accordance with its economic growth. Chinese trade with Asia, Europe, and Africa will balloon in the next few decades in accordance with promoting the One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In fact, China uses its economy power to make overseas ports, to invest in overseas facilities, and to increase Chinese supporters directly. Actually, China invests huge amounts of money to build ports, railways, roads, and pipelines. China made seaports in Djibouti, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. China also uses its economy power to build relationships with these countries politically. For example, China tries to seclude Taiwan politically from other countries. As of December 2019, countries that recognize Taiwan as a nation state have decreased to just fifteen countries. Most recently, in September 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati broke off the diplomatic recognition with Taiwan. As these countries strengthen economic ties with China, they disregard Taiwan's diplomatic recognition. Moreover, when China uses economic power, China keeps current on countries' political and economic issues to manipulate other countries into building a relationship that benefits China. For example, the international public accused the Myanmar government of persecuting the Rohingya people. The United Nations General

Assembly has approved a resolution condemning human rights abuses against Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims in 2017. One hundred and thirty five countries such as the U.S. and Europe countries voted for the resolution, nine such as China voted against it, and twenty-nine countries such as Japan abstained.⁴¹ In the midst of this Myanmar public relations nightmare, on January 17, 2020, Xi Jinping officially visited Myanmar to celebrate the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar. During his visit, he signed 33 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements, protocols, and exchanges such as the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and Deep-Sea port Project and new urban development of Yangon city.⁴² Beijing takes advantage of Myanmar's inferior position in the international society.

Although China will continue economic growth over the next decade, China has a critical vulnerability due to its geographical location. The Strait of Malacca is a choke point for China. The OBOR initiative and relationship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are methods for China to overcome this vulnerability. China leads the SCO, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan as signatories. Russia is the most important country for China in the SCO because, first, Russia produces a huge amount of natural gases. Siberian power, which is a natural gas pipeline between Russia and China, started to operate in December 2019. China estimates that the quantities of transportation will be 38 billion cubic meters per a year, which accounted for 13% of Chinese national gas consumption in 2018.⁴³ Second, Russia still has a strong influence in the Central Asia region on countries such as Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The stability in this region is important for China to maintain the OBOR initiative. Kazakhstan is also an important country in terms of natural gas pipelines and physical distributions. The rail route from Europe to China, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, will expand transportation between the

EU and China. Kazakhstan will be a key station for the route. Other countries such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan are also important partners to build robust physical distributions along the OBOR. These Chinese efforts will reduce its geographical vulnerability.

Critical capabilities of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners

This paper has explained Chinese capabilities, which China can use to break interference of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners in a Taiwan scenario. How can the U.S. and its regional allies and partners deter Chinese aggressive action?

To deny a Chinese missile method, which is a kinetic method, such as deny benefits (deterrence by denial), first of all, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability is critical for the U.S. and its regional allies and partners. If BMD capability can break Chinese missiles effectively, the missiles reduce the benefit of their use. For building BMD capability, Aegis system, THAAD, and PAC-3 are all usable equipment. The U.S. and its allies should enhance its BMD capabilities as the first priority. Second, missile systems to deny Chinese force projection are important to deny benefits. Long-range surface-to-air missiles and disposition anti-ship cruise missiles along the first island chain against Chinese assets and platforms are effective against Chinese air and maritime projection capability.

In order to impose costs (deterrence by punishment), the United States and its regional allies and partners need the capabilities to destroy Chinese missile launch sites and other key military facilities. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., who was the President Emeritus at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) states, “Long-range strike operations can impose substantial costs on China by reducing the value of its strategic depth.”⁴⁴ Long-range precision strike capability is one of the most effective assets to Impose Costs. There are several platforms for launching long-range precision missiles. Land-based missiles have the advantage in rapidity.

Long-range UAVs have the advantage in reducing the risk to personnel. Submarine-based missiles have the advantage in stealth and survivability. The U.S. had been a signatory to the INF Treaty until August 2019 as an arms control treaty. Therefore, the U.S. must develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to impose costs.

For the deterrence strategy of Encourage Adversary Restraint, forward presence of BMD units contributes to this approach. DO JOC states it as “Without forward presence, a U.S. decision to deploy major combat forces to a region in anticipation of (or in response to) adversary coercion or aggression could be seen as a more threatening American response than the alert or reinforcement of forward-based forces.”⁴⁵ The forward presence could lead to Chinese strong objections; nevertheless, the U.S. and its allies and partners should keep forward presence of BMD units in a peace time to avoid escalation in harsh situations.

To deny a Chinese IO, which is a non-kinetic method, in order to deny benefits to China, first of all, cyber security of the U.S. and its allies and partners is the most important for IO by deactivating a Chinese cyberattack. To strengthen cyber security, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners should improve security of C2 systems and also should alert people using the systems to the importance of proper cyber security measures. Second, monitoring and resisting Chinese PSYOPS is important to restrain Chinese IO. Even if cyber security systems improve, users could still be manipulated by Chinese PSYOPS, so the system improvement would have been in vain.

As part of an impose cost deterrence strategy, first, the U.S. and its allies and partners’ ability to detect and to collect Chinese information of cyberattack is a crucial capability, though detecting a cyberattack is difficult because the attacker conducts its attack through proxy domains in the network. After detecting the attacker, the counter-attack capability needs to

impose costs. The attacker will not easily be able to conduct a cyberattack if the defender has a capability to detect the attacker and counter-attack.

The U.S. and its allies and partners won't be able to implement an approach to encourage adversary restraint in order to deter Chinese IO because there are no benefits for China to restrain its IO. Even if China agrees to restrain itself during some kind of negotiation, China can still covertly continue IO to take advantage of the benefits of IO.

To deny Chinese attacks against key infrastructures, which is a non-kinetic method, as part of a deny benefits deterrence approach, first of all, cyber security of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners is the most important for protecting key infrastructure because a cyberattack is the most likely course of action to sabotage an adversary's key infrastructures without escalation. Second, reducing Chinese influence on key infrastructures is important to protect key infrastructures. For example, the U.S. feared the effect of Chinese influence on the U.S. key infrastructures, so President Trump signed the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act banning government use of Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications companies for use in functions related to the national security, because to have the U.S. signal infrastructure rely on China is a huge risk for the U.S. national security. In contrast to the U.S. decision, on January 28, 2020, the U.K. decided to allow the use of Huawei products for 5G network in the U.K. For the U.K., the 5G technology is important for national growth. In terms of establishing 5G technology, Huawei is the most powerful partner for the U.K. Not only the U.S. but also the U.S. regional allies and partners should be sensitive to Chinese influence on its key infrastructures. Third, resilience and recovering capabilities are effective for the attack. Back-up systems and recovery systems are effective to improve the reliability of key infrastructures, which increases the deny benefits approach to deterrence strategy.

As part of the impose cost strategy, the information collecting capability of the U.S. and its allies and partners is important to prove the evidence of Chinese attacks. To do that, monitoring systems for cyberattack and irregular activities are required. After detecting the attack from China, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners can bring a case to the UN to make a preferable situation. International accusations will impose huge costs on China in this situation.

As an encourage adversary restraint approach, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners won't be able to convince encourage adversary restraint approach to deter Chinese attacks against key infrastructures, which are non-kinetic methods. Similar to IO, the attacks with non-kinetic methods are difficult to track evidences which prove China's involvement in the attacks. Hence, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners won't have the approaches which are able to restrain China's attacks.

To deny a Chinese economy warfare approach, which is a non-kinetic method, as part of a deny benefits approach, first, cooperation of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners is important in order to reduce the effects of Chinese economic warfare. For example, in 2010, China criticised Japan for capturing a Chinese boat near Senkaku Island. China banned its exports of rare earth to Japan, which are necessary for high technology industry. The U.S. and its regional allies and partners should have multiple sources for its import; especially for countries that rely on import from China, international cooperation is really important.

As an impose cost approach, cooperation of the U.S. and its regional allies and partners to increase damage to the Chinese economy is an important factor. In 2036, the U.S. alone will not be able to impose a unilateral economy cost on China. So, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners should win over the international public to enable to conduct economic warfare as collective efforts. By increasing international pressure against Chinese economic warfare, if

international pressure increases against Chinese economic warfare, then China may fear the repercussions of its economic warfare methods.

As an encourage adversary restraint approach, similar to the impose cost approach, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners should gain support from the international public. By gaining more countries' cooperation, the U.S. and its regional allies and partners are able to use more resources such as currency, natural resources, and other trades. It helps the U.S. and its regional allies and partners to offer China more acceptable choices instead of economy warfare.

Challenges to develop the U.S. and allies and partners' capabilities

When the U.S. and its regional allies and partners plan to enhance their military capabilities, China will oppose and accuse the plan of being militaristic and hegemonic. Especially, the effectiveness of missile capabilities is a crucial element for China to deny its adversaries' interference in the periphery of China. So, the disposition of BMD and IRBM is likely to stimulate strong Chinese oppositions. China uses many methods to stop these efforts, such as intimidation and economic sanction. It also could lead to an arms race among China and the U.S.-led coalition. And even people in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are sensitive to the U.S. proposals to enhance BMD and IRBM capability with fear that they will become the target of attack.

The increasing costs of military equipment are due to the role of high tech in military acquisition. Limited military budgets in peace time restrain the ability of the U.S. and its allies to build effective capabilities. In fact, in Japan the Komatsu Corporation, which supplies key Japanese military equipment such as Light Armored Vehicles, decided to withdraw from developing new military armored vehicles in 2019 due to deficit of military business. The military industry in Japan makes few equipment, and this also has the adverse effect of causing

an increase to production cost. High cost and a small quantity of military equipment production causes militaries (Japan and others) to hesitate to use them; then it becomes a lack of resilience.

Information sharing between allies is needed for multinational operations, but this consequently increases the risk to operational security (OPSEC). For example, in December 2007, a Lieutenant Commander of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was arrested for leaking top secret information related to the Aegis system.⁴⁶ Though the information didn't leak outside the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), the incident threatened the continued effectiveness of the Aegis system. JSDF lost the U.S. trust about information sharing due to this incident.

Balance of free trade's benefits and national security may become a controversial issue. Basically, capitalism promotes free trade. Trading with China provides huge opportunities for some countries.^v But many cases of Chinese economic activities can be traced back and related to the CCP. This poses risks in terms of corporate secrecy, intellectual property protections, and the sudden expropriation of corporate assets by the Chinese government. Even if they are not related with CCP now, given the murky nature of the private sector/public sector divide and the continued role of state-owned enterprises, the CCP will most likely be able to control the company if it is needed in the future.^{vi}

Conclusion

The CCP is trying to peacefully reach its Two Century Goals in the context of China's Dream. China's grand strategy has three pillars: to strengthen the CCP, to develop a strong

^v For example, "71 countries geographically are located along OBOR transport corridors (including China). In 2017, these economies received 35% of global foreign direct investments and accounted for 40% of global merchandise exports." The World Bank, *Belt and Road Initiative*, March 29, 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative>.

^{vi} The 13th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, National Defense Mobilization Law of the People's Republic of China (国防動員法) (Feb. 2010).; The 28th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China (国家情报法) (Jun.27, 2017).

military, and to develop a strong economy. China doesn't want to take aggressive action initially. However, when China believes diplomacy, information, and economic methods are not effective to protect Chinese Core Interests, China will take aggressive actions in response to territorial issues and maritime security through active defense. This paper uses a future Taiwan incident scenario instigated by a rising pro-Taiwanese independence movement in Taiwan. China never will allow Taiwan independence, so China would use force if it thinks other approaches are not working to stop the Taiwanese independence. To make matters worse, conflicts such as a Taiwan incident could lead to a major war between China and the U.S. by falling into the Thucydides Trap.

In terms of deterrence strategy, DO JOC explains Joint military operations and activities contribute to the 'end' of deterrence by affecting the adversary's decision calculus elements in three 'ways': deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage adversary restraint. To argue the U.S. and its regional allies and partners' deterrence approach, this paper sets the Taiwan incident scenario and clarifies China's asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic methods, which affect China's decision calculus.

China can use medium-range ballistic missiles as an asymmetric kinetic method for denying the U.S. and allies and partners force projection. China conducts IO and uses other non-kinetic methods to damage the U.S. and its regional allies and partners' key infrastructure and economy. Based on the DO JOC deterrence guidance, first, to deter China's ballistic missiles as a kinetic method, the U.S. and allies and partners should improve counter missile capabilities such as missile defenses and missiles to retaliate. Also, maintaining forward presence will help deterrence. Second, to deter China's IO, cyber security of the U.S. and its allies and partners is the most important for IO by defeating a Chinese cyberattack. In addition, monitoring systems

for cyberattack and irregular activities are essential. Third, the U.S. and its allies and partners should protect its infrastructure by improving cybersecurity, reducing Chinese influence to key infrastructures, and improving resiliency of infrastructure. Fourth, cooperation of the U.S., its regional allies and partners, and other countries is important for all three denial approaches. By cooperating the U.S. and its regional allies and partners can have effective deterrence economic power.

From the U.S. military perspective, most important is that the U.S. and its allies and partners should improve counter missile capabilities. Then, they should improve cybersecurity. IO, protecting infrastructure, and its economic cooperation are not primary military activities, but the U.S. and allies and partners' militaries should also engage in such kinds of effort along with other agencies.

End Notes

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