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14. ABSTRACT In 1973, America eliminated compulsory service and established the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) to man its military. Forty-seven years later, quality and education metrics within the military are considerably higher than when the AVF started. However, there is significant evidence that a gap exists between the civilian populace and its military. Nearly 50 years of literature documents the presence of the civil-military gap and address the question of "who serves when not all serve?" There is less documentation regarding the macro-level issues that caused the gap to widen since 1973. This analysis of the AVF studies the history of civil-military relations to determine the viability of reinstituting the draft as a method to repair civil-military relations. Next, it analyzes the macro-level issues impacting the AVF and the military's ability to meet its functional and social requirements to American society. Ultimately, the problem facing the AVF in 2020 is that fewer 18-24 year-old Americans are interested in military service because the current labor force requires a better educated worker. At the same time, enlistment standards increased resulting in fewer youth who are mentally, morally, and physically qualified for service.						
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TITLE:

FORTY-SEVEN YEARS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE:
Mitigating Future Risks Associated With The Civil-Military Gap

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Forty-Seven Years of the All-Volunteer Force: Mitigating Future Risks Associated with the Civil-Military Gap

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Thesis: The long-term efficacy of America's All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is in jeopardy due to increased enlistment standards, and greater competition with America's service-based economy to attract and retain talented personnel. Economic shifts and American educational policy have driven the youth's propensity for service down to a point that the military's ability to secure national interests in future conflict is at risk. Mitigating this risk requires accountability within the American education system and changes to the Department of Defense's (DOD) marketing efforts to incentivize a more diverse cross-section of citizens to participate in the enlistment process and provide for the common defense against future peer competitors.

Discussion: In 1973, America eliminated compulsory service and established the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) to man its military. Forty-seven years later, quality and education metrics within the military are considerably higher than when the AVF started. However, there is significant evidence that a gap exists between the civilian populace and its military. Nearly 50 years of literature documents the presence of the civil-military gap and address the question of "who serves when not all serve?" There is less documentation regarding the macro-level issues that caused the gap to widen since 1973. This analysis of the AVF studies the history of civil-military relations to determine the viability of reinstituting the draft as a method to repair civil-military relations. Next, it analyzes the macro-level issues impacting the AVF and the military's ability to meet its functional and social requirements to American society. Ultimately, the problem facing the AVF in 2020 is that fewer 18-24 year-old Americans are interested in military service because the current labor force requires a better educated worker. At the same time, enlistment standards increased resulting in fewer youth who are mentally, morally, and physically qualified for service.

Conclusion: Future conflict will require the best and brightest within American society to serve their country. However, reinstating the selective service is not the solution to coerce individuals into service and will not improve civil-military relations. America must recognize that the technical demands of the AVF in 2020 are rendering the American education system insufficient for national defense and demand accountability for student performance. The Department of Defense must also modify its marketing efforts to improve perceptions of the military amongst adult influencers. These changes, over time, can improve youth propensity and mental aptitude for service in the AVF.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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PREFACE

Service as the Commanding Officer of a Marine Corps Recruiting Station introduced me to the realities of the civil-military gap; Command and Staff College helped me comprehend the threat it poses to future national security. Three years of watching hard-charging Marines take on this issue head on made me want to understand why fewer young Americans knew or understood the military. Coming from a military family, I never knew any other pathway and couldn't understand why others didn't want to serve. Now, I believe I do. I also believe that the nation will be better when we find a way to improve civil-military relations. I hope this paper illuminates a path to that objective.

First and foremost, infinite thanks are due to my wife, Jennifer, for supporting me along this journey for the last 16 years. None of this is possible without you. *Love you Always.*

To my children, Ethan, Eleanor, Abigail and Ashton, you motivate and encourage me every day to be better. Thank you for teaching me what unconditional love looks like.

To the faculty at Marine Corps Command and Staff College, I appreciate all of you for providing me with an appreciation for the complexity of "simple" problems. Many thanks to my mentor, Dr. Wineman, for pushing me beyond my initial assumptions and indulging my recruiting war stories. I hope you enjoyed the discussion as much as I have.

Finally, to the Marines of Recruiting Station Nashville, nothing contained in these pages provides justification not to "Make Mission." Without that said up front, you might want to stop reading and make some phone calls. *Viam Inveniam Aut Faciam.*

INTRODUCTION

In March 1969, President Richard M. Nixon established a commission to “develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving towards an all-volunteer force.”¹ The Gates Commission determined establishing the US military as an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) provided the “system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his values.”² This finding echoed societal sentiment during the Vietnam War where many protesters and citizens expressed concerns regarding the equality of compulsory service under the previous selective service, commonly referred to as “the draft.” The primary finding within the Gates Commission was that the majority of servicemembers already volunteered and the remaining number of required enlistments could be achieved by eliminating the pay gap between the civilian sector and military pay for first term servicemembers.

Opponents of the Gates Commission feared eliminating the draft could create a gap between the civilian populace and its military. The Gates Commission noted proponents of the draft feared the AVF would spur “the growth of a separate military ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions.”³ Over time, these leaders believed that a volunteer military that did not reflect its society, or conversely, a society that did not support its military would place national security at risk. Other criticisms of the Gates Commission report included the AVF’s ability to sustain numerical strength, quality and overall war efficiency.⁴ The interdependence of these criticisms is relevant to understanding how a liberal society interacts with its conservative military. The Gates Commission specifically addressed all these concerns and determined that competitive pay for entry-level servicemembers would continue to attract the same, if not higher, level of talented individuals already serving in the military.

Fortunately, 47 years of the AVF has produced a military with quality and education metrics that are much higher than when it was instituted in 1973.⁵ However, changes to the United States job market and public perceptions regarding who does or should serve in the military have widened the gap between the civilian populace and its military. The Gates Commission's findings were deeply rooted in economic theory and assumed that the pool of individuals willing to serve would remain sufficiently large so long as military wages were commensurate with civilian pay. Since 1973, economic conditions and societal changes, have challenged the Gates Commission's assumption that the pool of available manpower would always be available. Currently, the long-term efficacy of the AVF is in jeopardy due to increased enlistment standards, and greater competition with America's service-based economy to attract and retain talented personnel.

The current dynamics of the competition to attract talent presents several modern problems for the US military recruitment effort. The key demographic for military service is youth between the ages of 18-24. A major component to maintaining America's position as a global superpower is ensuring that enough members of this demographic consider military service as a potential option following secondary education. However, recent data shows that American society is inadvertently placing the AVF in a tenuous position in terms of numerical strength and representativeness of society. Polling data indicates that youth interest in serving their country has consistently declined since 1973 with more high school seniors expressing a desire to obtain a college degree rather than serve in the military. This decreased interest in service also raises concerns about maintaining the numerical strength of the military in future conflict. Senior leaders have noted that "this complacency about military requirements could lead to terrible outcomes for our country."⁶ This paper will investigate the underlying culture and reasons causing fewer Americans to serve and the impact on the future of the AVF. In order

to meet the demands of the future operating environment and counter peer competition, American society will need to counter-balance any negative effects of the current civilian-military gap without infringing upon the civil liberties American society has developed over the 240 years since the Founding Fathers created American democracy.

Reviewing the underlying ideology and history of conscription in America shows that the AVF is the most ideal method for the American democracy to fill the military ranks. The draft experience in Vietnam highlighted two norms within American society, namely that citizens view military service as a working-class job and society prioritizes higher education over service. As a result, the American military is demographically less representative of overall society today than it was in 1916 when the military implemented the modern draft system. Although representativeness is not a specific goal of the AVF, excluding certain socio-economic classes, purposefully or unintentionally, decreases the pool of available manpower and makes it more difficult to meet the numerical strength requirements of the modern military and wartime efficiency needed in future conflict. America's shift to a service-based economy and educational policies that prioritize college enrollment has driven the youth's propensity for service down to a point that the military's ability to secure national interests in future conflict is at risk. Mitigating this risk requires accountability within the American education system and changes to the Department of Defense's (DOD) marketing efforts to incentivize a more diverse cross-section of citizens to participate in the enlistment process and provide for the common defense against a peer competitor.

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AMERICA

To understand the current civil-military relationship in America, one must understand the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism and egalitarianism. Both these concepts provide insights into why the US established the AVF and why current young Americans are less

inclined to pursue a military career than their predecessors. Tracing the history of the US military from the colonial era to today and examining the findings in the Gates Commission will also explain why the AVF is consistent with American values.

A central tenet of liberalism is that the rights of the individual are more important than the rights of the state.⁷ Liberalism also proposes that “man’s chief goal is the preservation of life” and advocates for smaller government that cannot raise large armies capable of imposing their will on the citizenry.⁸ Liberalism is skeptical of large peacetime military forces and views them as threats to liberty, economic prosperity and peace writ large. Recognizing conscription as “morally appropriate only when it...is necessary to the safety of, society, as a whole,” liberalism advocates that militias serve as the backbone of national defense.⁹ Militia obligation possesses four traits, “universality, limited active service, local recruiting and service, and limited obligation to fight.”¹⁰ While militia service was mandatory, it is morally acceptable because the militia fights only to protect the commonwealth that supports man’s individual rights. Liberalism assumes that, in a free state, men will willingly choose to serve their country during times of need or peace and lauds the spirit of volunteerism.

Egalitarian philosophy argues that the populace should equally share the burden of any compulsory service. Egalitarians suggest that universal military training (UMT) for all citizens is the fairest way to raise a standing army because “eventually all eligible men must pass through it.”¹¹ Lottery draft systems, where each individual shares the same risk of compulsory service, are not considered completely fair because the burden placed on the conscripted is much higher than those not selected. Egalitarianism respects the concept of volunteerism because it does not force an individual to serve, and all citizens have an equal ability to volunteer. In practice though, volunteerism places the burden of service on a select few individuals. This is inherently unworthy of a republic form of government which believes that “as soon as public service ceases

to be the main business of its citizens ...the State is close to ruin.”¹²

According to Samuel Huntington, the objective of civil-military relations is to “maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other societal values.”¹³ To maintain proper civil-military relations, the nation must balance between its ability to fight and win wars, termed the functional imperative, and to advance desirable social conditions, the social imperative. The functional imperative has remained relatively constant - a nation must be able to secure its national interests against other states that oppose those interests. George Washington firmly believed that only a disciplined professional force could fight the offensive nature of war needed to defeat the British in 1775 and consistently beseeched Congress to provide the means for a standing army, one whose soldiers were accustomed to “harsh discipline and deference to authority.”¹⁴ During peace time, the more liberal social imperative of maintaining or advancing individual freedoms takes a higher priority for many Americans. At times, this functional component of maintaining a standing army capable of winning wars stands in opposition to the desired social liberties envisioned for Americans under republican ideology.

Determining how to meet the military’s functional requirements within the constraints of social values is one source of tension within civil-military relations. These differences in the liberal and egalitarian forms of republicanism form the crux of the argument between using the draft or an AVF to fill the ranks of America’s military. Egalitarians consider UMT, in essence a universal vice selective draft, as the best way to ensure fairness and equal burden to all members of the society. However, they would concede that the AVF is morally acceptable because it provides all citizens an equal opportunity to serve. Liberalism would argue that the AVF is the moral way to promote service because individuals freely choose to subjugate their individualism to the state. Liberalism celebrates that choice with their large appreciation for volunteerism, even if they themselves do not choose to serve. For these reasons, the AVF serves as the most

natural way for America to staff its professional standing army. As the Gates Commission reported, “When not all our citizens can serve, and when only a small minority are needed, a voluntary decision to serve is the best answer, morally and practically, to the question of who should serve.”¹⁵ As long as current and future security needs are met, the AVF, in theory, meets both the functional and social requirements of American society.

HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The history of conscription within the United States helps illuminate social norms that have developed regarding America’s military. Prior to the Civil War, conscription to field local armies or militias was much different than in the modern era. The federal government would assign each state a quota that the townships divided amongst themselves. Local officials would then call for volunteers and if that did not meet the quota, would offer bounties to spur enlistment. Commutation was frequent; individuals could avoid service by paying a fee. The quota system also permitted substitutions, and the militia did not press draftees into service provided they found their own replacement.

The Militia Act of 1862 began the transition of recruitment from the local level to the national level. The act authorized a draft to meet quotas but still allowed for substitutions and commutation. The thought of a draft sparked riots in many cities and bounties effectively filled the remaining quotas with able-bodied men.¹⁶ The subsequent Enrollment Act of 1863 essentially eliminated commutation, but allowed substitutions provided the replacement had not been subject to that particular draft. This method effectively spurred volunteerism in local units, “only 2 percent of those who served in the Union army were draftees, and of those who were called in a draft, only 6 percent were forced to enter service.”¹⁷

The National Defense Act of 1916 introduced the term “selective service” and set the basic framework of the draft that would be followed into Vietnam. Ideally, selective service

provided the military the opportunity to choose the individuals it wanted in the ranks. It authorized a draft of all able-bodied male aged 18-45 to meet any military requirement not met by volunteer units. It also provided, but did not demand, local draft boards the authority to provide deferments for skilled workers and used a lottery system to “draft those deemed least essential for the civilian war effort.”¹⁸ This process generally continued during World War II but eliminated volunteer units after 1942. The Korean War introduced educational deferments to the draft process to maintain “the flow of workers into scientific and professional jobs.”¹⁹ One key benefit of the draft during this period was its ability to drive volunteerism. During the Korean War, an estimated 40 percent of all volunteers signed a 36-month enlistment contract to avoid the draft and the 5-year reserve requirement associated with being a draftee.²⁰

Resentment toward the draft process during the Vietnam War would ultimately usher in the AVF. During Vietnam, local draft boards continued issuing educational and occupational draft deferments. Although only 16.7 percent of all servicemembers during Vietnam were drafted, 88 percent of all draftees served as infantrymen and were subjected to the most risk.²¹ Most draft-eligible citizens were children of the “Greatest Generation” and these parents, who had fought so valiantly to secure freedom on a world stage, “wanted their children to know nothing but peace and prosperity.”²² Many did not understand the national objectives of the Vietnam War or the threat it posed to American way of life. As a result, the war effort became unpopular with parents and that resentment trickled into their draft-eligible children’s worldview. America’s youth viewed service in Vietnam as a “penalty for those who lacked the wherewithal to avoid it.”²³ Approximately 60 percent of all draft-eligible men actively attempted to avoid service through medical disqualification, college enrollment, marriage or fatherhood resulting in “a cynical avoidance of service, a corruption of the aims of education, a tarnishing of the national

spirit.”²⁴ The liberal concept of volunteerism diminished significantly within this segment of the population and a new method of raising an army needed to be devised.

This history of conscription illuminates several norms regarding the way America views its military. Liberalism is apparent as the draft processes throughout the Civil War allowed for commutation and substitution. Any man who did not want to serve or subjugate himself to the discipline of the military had an option to avoid his commitment if he could gather the funds for commutation or find a substitute. The modern draft period from 1916-1972 also offers insights as to who society views as most important to maintaining prosperity and least important to society. Skilled workers and farmers received deferments from service to maintain the economy while manual laborers were drafted at a significantly higher rate.²⁵ Draft deferments for college-bound students increased. Individuals who volunteered for service usually received their choice of occupational specialty. The combined result of these practices placed a disproportionate percentage of draftees into the most dangerous roles and ignored egalitarian principles of ensuring equal risk and burden amongst those serving in the military. The fact that the volunteers, who normally had high school diplomas or limited college education, were able to choose less hazardous assignments for their service suggests that American society viewed education as more important than service. Two societal norms became readily apparent throughout the Vietnam conflict - 1) that military service was for the working class and 2) higher education was more important than service- and have shaped America's perception of the AVF ever since. While these norms always existed to a certain degree in the American military, societal norms now clearly reflected King Frederick the Great's concepts from the 18th Century Prussian system. After Vietnam, Americans viewed military service as the business of those most expendable to society.²⁶

ALMOST 50 YEARS LATER: HOW CHANGES TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM IMPACTED THE AVF

After 47 years of the AVF, there is growing evidence that the civil-military gap is widening as fewer Americans report having immediate family members with prior service and enlistment in the military becomes an increasingly hereditary decision.²⁷ In a speech to Duke University in 2010, former Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged this trend stating, “For a growing number of Americans, service in the military, no matter how laudable, has become something for other people to do.”²⁸ By placing military recruitment in direct competition with the labor force, the AVF gave American youth three primary options for success after high school: attend college, join the military, or start working. Two major factors, America’s shift away from manufacturing into a service-based economy and educational reforms that prioritized college enrollment as the measure of the secondary education system’s success, have established and reinforced the American norm that higher education is a prerequisite to gainful employment and therefore, is more important than military service.

While several developments in American society contributed to the belief that achieving success or quality of life requires a college education, America’s economic transformation from manufacturing to a service-based industry is chief among them. This transition changed entry level work requirements for many positions and increased accessibility to college. Concurrently, the US Congress inadvertently created a negative perception of military wages at the outset of the AVF by capping wage levels well below comparable civilian employment. All these changes signaled to students, parents, and educators that some form of credentialed learning is a must-have resume item in the current work force and negatively affected propensity for military service.

In 1970, the United States labor force comprised 91 million workers, 32 percent of which held jobs suitable for high school dropouts. High school graduates held another 40 percent of

those jobs and just 28 percent required an associates' degree or higher. By 2016, the labor force had grown to 166 million workers of which only 38 percent of all jobs were suitable for those with a high school diploma or less (See [Appendix A, Figure 1](#)).²⁹ Manufacturing employees hit a high of 19.6 million workers in 1979, approximately 22 percent of the total workforce, and steadily declined to 12.6 million workers in 2018, a share of just 9 percent.³⁰ Technological advancements drove changes within the workforce as well. Between 1991 and 2016 the “number of production workers with associates' degrees more than doubled... rising by more than 300,000 workers” while those with bachelor's degrees increased by an additional 200,000, or 67 percent.³¹ With fewer jobs available to unskilled workers, post-secondary education became a requirement for one to be a productive member of American society.

The need for post-secondary education created a demand for colleges to increase their accessibility. From 1975 to 2016, post-secondary degree granting institutions grew from 3,026 to 4,360, a 44 percent increase. Undergraduate post-secondary enrollment grew from 9.67 million to 16.88 million, a 74 percent increase since implementing the AVF.³² As a sector in the US jobs market, education services employment grew by 105 percent between 1990 and 2015 (See [Appendix A, Figure 2](#)).³³ The rapid expansion in the number of postsecondary education institutions and post-secondary student enrollment continuously reinforced the requirement for students to attend college to be successful. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of high school students who reported that their guidance counselors recommended they attend college increased by 103 percent from 32 percent to 66 percent.³⁴ One may argue that this increase would only apply to the highest performers in a school, but the trend continues even amongst the lowest quartile of student performance. According to societal norms, these students should generally comprise the working class and considered best suited for service. Yet, the frequency with which guidance counselors advised lower performing students to pursue additional education

increased 115 percent. While one can, and should, conclude that guidance counselors are not consciously against military service, the data suggests guidance counselors believed there was some type of benefit, either to themselves or their students, gained by directing their students toward immediate college enrollment.

Anchored in economic thought, the Gates Commission's findings "implied that purely financial motivations could – and ought to – direct an individual's choice of service."³⁵ In essence, for the military to compete with the labor force, military wages needed to be on par with civilian wages for comparable work. However, in the late 1970s, wage "raises for military personnel were capped at levels below what wage surveys indicated were comparable to increases in the private sector."³⁶ Almost immediately, quality enlistments began to decrease as more citizens sought employment elsewhere. In 1981, Congress raised military pay across the board by 19 percent to get recruiting efforts back on track. In 1983, Congress authorized an additional 4 percent pay increase for the military.³⁷ However, this initial pay scale created lasting damage to the perception of earning power for military members. This pay scale also reinforced the view of the military man as working-class citizen. In its Spring 2017 Youth Propensity poll, the Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies (JAMRS) program reported that 35 percent of American youth believed it was more likely to have a good-paying job in the civilian market. Only 13 percent believed it was more likely to have a high-paying job in the military ([See Appendix A, Figure 3](#)).³⁸ In reality, veteran households have consistently out earned their civilian counterparts by a minimum of \$12,000 annually since the 1980s.³⁹ Within the Hispanic community, which remains underrepresented in the military, the difference between veteran and non-veteran household earnings is closer to \$20,000 a year. Amongst those Americans who only possess a high school diploma, veteran households earn approximately \$20,000 more per year than non-veterans with the same education level.

The changing labor market certainly provided sufficient cause for parents, educators, and students to agree on the value of a college education. However, federal educational reforms unintentionally disincentivized military service as a means to obtain that education by using immediate college enrollment rates as a measure of secondary education's success. Federal law leaves the development of educational standards to the state-level education agency (SEA) or local education agency (LEA). The result of this process is that poorer communities, who cannot fund their schools to the same level as wealthier communities, are underrepresented in the military partly due to failure to perform well enough on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to qualify for military service.⁴⁰ Until 2010, few, if any, federal or state educational policies incorporated student academic growth as a metric of success when evaluating educators so there was no incentive, good or bad, for teachers to enable a students' post high school success. The combined result of these policies is an education system that graduates a significant portion of its students who are not prepared for the rigors of postsecondary education and may be better suited for military service immediately following high school.

The 2009 Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative allowed every state to compete for \$4.5 billion dollars of education assistance provided it demonstrated its educational policy would advance student performance. One measure of student success contained in this bill was "increasing college enrollment (as defined in this notice) and increasing the number of students who complete at least a year's worth of college credit that is applicable to a degree within two years of enrollment in an institution of higher education."⁴¹ The bill provided funds in the course of three installments all of which occurred within two years after the bill's passage. This short timeline incentivized schools to create programs that forecasted or called for increasing college enrollment rates without evaluating the efficacy of the program. The timeline did not, and could

not include, the number of students from a given state who completed an enlistment in the military and then enrolled in college full time. For example, the federal government issued Tennessee, one of the first two states to receive RTTT funds, \$501.8 million dollars in March 2010. Among the achievement goals listed was to increase public post-secondary enrollment from 40,000 to 48,000 students over four years, a 20 percent increase. Concurrently, the plan called to increase enrollment in community college programs from 20,000 to 28,000 students, a 40 percent increase.⁴² The key provisions of Tennessee's plan focused on improving academic performance for 8th graders without mentioning improving academic standards for 12th graders. However, increasing the high school graduation rate to 90 percent was a specific goal of the program. Delaware, the other state to receive RTTT funds in the initial fund disbursements, provided similar assessment metrics calling for an 11 percent increase in college enrollment and 8 percent increase in high school graduation.⁴³ Viewed collectively, one can argue that the federal government provided educators a financial incentive to direct their students towards college, and away from military service, to meet the target goals.

State and local governments provide the vast majority of funding for public education with federal funding designed to target the lowest performing sectors of American society.⁴⁴ The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), enacted in 2015, provides SEAs great flexibility regarding the distribution of federal funds, the development of state-level educational standards, and accountability measures associated with determining student improvement.⁴⁵ Since educational standards vary by state, it is difficult to determine exactly how federal funds specifically impact the lowest-performing students. However, reviewing scores on the American Collegiate Test (ACT) against state-level Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures suggests a link between economic achievement and military enlistment. For example, 18-24-year-olds from Mississippi are under-represented in the military and have been since 2008.⁴⁶ In 2016, Mississippi

possessed the lowest state GDP and its students achieved the second lowest composite ACT score in the nation. Of the ten states with the lowest military representation per capita, seven had GDPs outside of the top ten in the United States. Five of these ten states also had average ACT scores outside of the top ten. While many factors determine whether an individual chooses to enlist, the data suggests some linkage between a states' GDP and the students' average ACT score. The lower representativeness within the military in these states may be attributional to the average students' inability to qualify on the ASVAB.⁴⁷ States with larger GDPs, i.e. wealthier states, are able to spend more per student on education and improve their test scores. SEAs and LEAs in less wealthy areas could benefit from federal funding allocated directly to their programs and, in turn, improve their states' representativeness in the military.

ESSA provided a significant step forward in the American education system by calling for detailed accountability measures in each state, key among them teacher evaluations and removal of ineffective teachers. Quality of instruction is the number one most important metric for determining student performance. In fact, "a student assigned to a very good teacher for a single school year may gain up to a full year's worth of additional academic growth compared to a student assigned to a very poor teacher."⁴⁸ A study by The New Teacher Project (TNTP) in 2010, showed principals and administrators rated less than 1 percent of their teachers as unsatisfactory despite a survey of teachers stating that 8 percent of their peers delivered poor instruction.⁴⁹ Without accountability measures in place "there is no consequence for mediocre or below average teaching, as long as a teacher is not one of the unlucky few to be rated unsatisfactory and face remediation."⁵⁰ Further research is required to determine ESSA's effect on teacher performance and student testing results. However, prior to implementing these reforms, there was little to no institutional incentive for teachers to provide quality instruction outside of an individuals' intrinsic motivation for their students to succeed. The American

education system treated both good and bad teacher performance equally until the most recent RTTT and ESSA reforms in 2009 and 2015.

The combined result of American education policies is a majority of students are not college-ready after completing high school. Determining if curriculum changes made to increase college enrollment or graduation rates created more students who are not college-ready would require detailed analysis of every state and county education agency's individual standards. However, nationally in 2013, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) administered by the College Board showed that only 43 percent of students were college ready; in the same year The National Assessment of Educational Progress, which brands itself as "America's Report Card," reported just only 38 percent of 12th graders as college-ready.⁵¹ Results did not improve in 2015 when the American College Testing (ACT) program reported just 28 percent of testers were college ready.⁵² Many students, upon enrolling at both 4-year and 2-year colleges, are required to conduct remedial courses their first year prior to beginning their degree programs. As a result of this fact and other circumstances, only 40.6 percent of students completed a 4-year degree within 4 years of enrollment and just 59.8 percent completed their degree within 6 years of enrollment.⁵³ While the current US labor market requires additional education for initial hiring, it appears that using the immediate college enrollment rate as a benchmark for success unintentionally created negative consequences for America's youth.

Further evidence that the American education system is not effectively preparing students for college is the rise of non-traditional students in post-secondary education. Non-traditional students are generally defined as someone who meets one of three criteria: 1) enrollment patterns, i.e. the student did not enroll immediately following high school, 2) financial and family status, i.e. the student has dependent children or is a single parent, and 3) high school graduation status, i.e. the student did not receive a standard high school diploma.⁵⁴ Using annual

fall enrollment age as a proxy for total nontraditional student enrollment, the number of nontraditional students increased 210 percent between 1970 and 2015. Comparatively, traditional student enrollment increased 70 percent in the same time.⁵⁵ The rise in nontraditional student enrollment is partially attributable to increased accessibility of college education. With increased access comes more enrollment. However, only 43 percent of nontraditional students earn their degree as compared to 64 percent of traditional students. Any student who becomes a nontraditional student, i.e. joins the work force, starts college late or disenrolls for any reason, faces disadvantages in the current educational system.

IS THE AVF CAPABLE OF MEETING ITS FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVE BEYOND 2020?

In 1973, the requirements for joining the AVF were much lower than they are in the present. Category IV Applicants, those scoring less than 30 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), made up approximately 12 percent of the DOD and only 72 percent of all servicemembers were high school graduates.⁵⁶ The notion that any able-bodied youth could learn to shoot a rifle or drive a truck was evidenced by Project 100,000 where the DOD “qualified 100,000 men per year by lowering the minimum test scores and reducing educational standards” to meet overall end-strength goals.⁵⁷ Known as “New Standards Men,” these soldiers were more difficult to train, promoted more slowly due to lower aptitude and re-enlisted less frequently than an enlistee who met the original standards. In 2019, the DOD mandates that 90 percent of all accessions be high school graduates and 60 percent must score above 50 on the AFQT.⁵⁸ This increase in quality reflects the demands of “an increasingly complex global security environment” complicated by “rapid technological advancements” in specialized domains, like cyber, or space, that require warfighters to “integrate new capabilities and business practices” to succeed.⁵⁹ As previously noted, high school seniors graduating in 1973 had three options for success after high school: attend college, join the military, or start working. In this

market, the AVF competed directly with the labor force for volunteers. With the increased enlistment standards and labor market qualifications needed in 2020, a student's options effectively dropped to two: go to college or join the military. Placed in direct competition with colleges to recruit its forces, the AVF risks implosion under the strain to maintain high-quality enlistments needed to operate more technical equipment and execute distributed operations in future conflict. Youth polling, declines in the military qualification rate, and socio-economic data indicate that the civil-military gap is growing and that military recruiting may continue to struggle in its mission to recruit a force capable of meeting the functional and social imperatives expected from American society.

Meeting the functional imperative of winning wars requires the military to recruit servicemembers in sufficient quantity and quality to maintain a standing professional military. The ability to conduct that recruiting effort rests largely on whether high school seniors desire to and are eligible to serve. Beginning in 1976, The University of Michigan Monitoring The Future (MTF) Project surveyed each class of graduating seniors regarding their values and beliefs. Amongst the data, several trends demonstrate American youth's general desire to attend college. Between 1976 and 2010, when asked about the likelihood of joining the military after high school, responses that they "definitely won't" join the military increased 21 percent while those who said they "definitely will" only increased by 10.5 percent (See [Appendix A, Figure 4](#)).⁶⁰ Conversely, those who responded that they "definitely will" graduate from a 4-year college increased 123 percent from 27.4 percent in 1973 to 61.3 percent in 2010. Question C22 in the study asked "Suppose you could do just what you'd like, and nothing stood in your way. How many of the following things would you WANT to do?" Responses that expressed the desire to attend a two-year college increased 13 percent, attending 4-year college increased 52 percent, and the desire to attend graduate school increased by 70 percent. Responses showing interest in

vocational trades decreased 46 percent and joining the military decreased by 4.5 percent. The correlation between a decreased interest in vocational schools and military service reinforces the societal norm of the military being a working-class job. The dramatic increases in pursuit of higher education also reinforces the norm that American society places more value on higher education than it does military service.

Overlaying the MTF Findings with population data and qualification rates between the two eras shows an even more concerning view regarding the ability for the AVF to meet its force requirements. Using data from 1976, which is the first cohort of high school seniors who were not subject to the draft for the entirety of their high school career and the first year of available data from the MTF project, provides a baseline for analysis. In 1976, the active component of the US military stood at 2.06 million active duty service members and required 362,658 new male enlisted accessions to maintain that force.⁶¹ At that time, the 18-24 male population consisted of approximately 14.18 million citizens, with 18 year-old seniors comprising a 2.13 million subset of that population.⁶² In 1971, approximately 55 percent of all eligible personnel met the mental, moral, and physical requirements for military service which means that a total of 7.8 million males, including 1.2 million high school seniors, were eligible for service.⁶³ Factoring in 14.5 percent of high school students replied that they “probably would” or “definitely would” serve in the armed forces following high school means there were 170,000 high school seniors qualified for and interested in military service.⁶⁴

Between 1976 and 2016, the rate at which youth qualified for military service dropped from 55 percent to just 29 percent of the American population (See [Appendix A, Figure 5](#)).⁶⁵ It is difficult to specifically ascertain the exact reason why this occurred due to the different methodologies used to collect the data in the two eras and because any individual may have more than one disqualifying condition. However, rises in obesity and mental health concerns appear to

be significant factors. In 1973, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) considered 5.2 percent of all children aged 2-19 obese and another 10.2 percent were overweight. By 2014, childhood obesity had increased to 17.2 percent, a 244 percent increase, and another 16.2 percent were overweight, a 58 percent rise.⁶⁶ These numbers loosely correlate to data collected by JAMRS in 2016 which showed 10 percent of the population was overweight.⁶⁷ Data regarding mental health is not readily available from 1973 but more recent studies from the mid-1990s show a dramatic increase in mental health concerns amongst America's youth. Since 1996, the number of youths reporting the use of outpatient mental health service increased 44 percent and the use of psychotropic medications increased 62 percent. Antidepressant use amongst those aged 6 to 17 increased 116 percent from 6.2 to 13.4 percent.⁶⁸ Taken together, these two issues appear to be the driving factors behind the drop in military qualification rate.

In 2016, the total force requirement decreased to approximately 1.288 million, a 42 percent reduction in overall force size compared to 1976.⁶⁹ DOD accessions in that year were 172,508.⁷⁰ There were approximately 2.1 million 18 year-old males in America, a reduction of 1.8 percent compared to 1976.⁷¹ Conversely, the 18-24 male demographic grew by 8.2 percent and totaled 15.34 million males.⁷² However, because the military qualification rate dropped so significantly between 1976 and 2016, the number of males eligible for service was just 4.4 million, a 48 percent drop since founding the AVF. The smaller 18-year-old high school senior cohort experienced a similar 48 percent drop with only 607,260 male seniors eligible for service. The issue compounds itself when factoring in high school seniors decreased desire to pursue military service. Only 11.4 percent of 2016 high school seniors expressed interest in service leaving just 69,000 qualified and interested students to fill the military ranks, a 59 percent decline since the creation of the AVF.⁷³ Given the decline in the quantity of qualified military aged men, it is fair to state that the AVF is in danger of imploding should higher education

continue to be the primary path of high school students. In 2018, a foreshadowing of this eventuality arrived when the US Army failed to meet its recruiting mission by 6,528 recruits, or 8.53 percent of its mission.⁷⁴

IS THE AVF MEETING ITS SOCIAL IMPERATIVE IN 2020?

In 1973, General Westmoreland was quoted saying “The social composition . . . (of the all-volunteer Army) bothers me. I deplore the prospect of our military forces not representing a cross-section of our society.”⁷⁵ This statement regarding creation of the AVF from a former Army Chief of Staff supports Huntington’s claim that the military must meet the social imperatives of the nation, in this case American egalitarianism. After 47 years, socio-economic data suggests that the AVF lacks the complete representativeness sought by its inventors. Demographically, the military is predominately “more southern, less urban, and more politically conservative” than most of American society.⁷⁶ Children of servicemembers are more likely to join, along with other children who grew up near military installations.⁷⁷ The African-American and Pacific Islander communities are slightly overrepresented while the Hispanic community is underrepresented.⁷⁸ Although the AVF is more representative of society now than it was in 1973, it still does not represent an accurate cross-section of America.

While the AVF has improved the overall educational quality of the military, it excludes the uppermost and lowermost socioeconomic classes of society. Economically, the middle class populates the majority of the military. The wealthiest fifth of American society sources 25 percent of all enlistments while only 10.5 percent come from the poorest quintile.⁷⁹ Approximately 23 percent of Americans cannot achieve the required mental aptitude score for enlistment on the ASVAB. Minority groups tend to fail the test at rates significantly higher than their Caucasian peers.⁸⁰ These statistics matter in the civil-military relations discussion because there is a social expectation that the military will improve the lives of those who serve. A

majority of respondents to the 2018 YouGov survey of civil-military affairs stated that one reason they hold the military in such high regard is because the military is “one of the few remaining reliable means of economic advancement, especially for minorities and the poor.”⁸¹ Yet, only 29 percent of Hispanics and 33 percent of African-Americans within the 18-24 year-old demographic achieve a qualifying score on the ASVAB.⁸² The modern standards of the AVF deny many minorities and poorer citizens the ability to serve rendering the military incapable of providing this upward mobility for all citizens. As a result, the military is not meeting one of its social imperatives and will remain a mostly middle-class organization. Meanwhile, citizens attending elite Ivy League institutions feel intense pressure to avoid service from teachers, classmates, and their families. Top universities like Harvard, Yale and Stanford will not allow Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus due to their “anti-military” bias.⁸³ Without meaningful changes, the divergence between upper- and lower-income households could continue to grow. Even those members of low-income families and minority groups who do qualify for service may be increasingly unable, or worse unwilling, to take advantage of the opportunities the military provides if they do not believe the organization represents society.

The Gates Commission established the AVF on the assumption that, for the right salary, there would always be a steady stream of young American qualified and willing to serve the country. However, that assessment had a limited time horizon running up to 1980. In 2020, American society is not producing the quantity of qualified young men and women needed to sustain the AVF in the future. Functionally, the number of qualified males in the 18-24-year-old demographic dropped by 42.89 percent since 1973 which places the latent power of America at risk in the event of a large-scale conflict. Socially, over 25 percent of minority youth within the 18-24 year-old target demographic cannot qualify on the AFQT and use military service to

improve their long-term economic standing. Improving economic viability for all Americans, creating opportunities for new families to serve the military and ensuring that more people qualify for service are pathways for the AVF to meet both the functional and social components of positive civil-military relations and reduce the impact of the civil-military gap.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While some of the external factors affecting the AVF are not inherently new challenges, 47 years of incremental change in American society is straining the recruiting services ability to sustain the AVF with high-quality enlistments. From 1985 to 2007, a close correlation existed between the percentage of high-quality enlistments and the youth unemployment rate. However, in 2008, youth unemployment rose and the percentage of high-quality enlistments did not increase to the same degree as in the past (See [Appendix A, Figure 6](#)).⁸⁴ These high-quality enlistments are exactly the young Americans needed to fill the high-demand, low density occupational fields, such as nuclear, cyber specialists, communications and space operations.⁸⁵ The fact that these individuals were less likely to enlist during the economic downturn from 2008-2009 helps illuminate the extent of problem facing the AVF in 2020.

In summary, fewer 18-24 year-old Americans are interested in military service because the current labor force requires a better educated worker. At the same time, enlistment standards have increased resulting in fewer youth who are mentally, morally, and physically qualified for service. Improving civil-military relations in this environment requires the military recruiting service to address the attitudes and beliefs contained amongst high school students, their parents, and educators (principals, guidance counselors, and teachers). First and foremost, this triad of individuals must know and understand that current military requirements include personnel capable of using cutting edge technology in the emerging domains of space and cyber. The military is no longer the area of last resort for high school dropouts. Secondly, American society

must modify what has become a binary conversation where high school seniors must choose between service or college to be successful in life. Acknowledging that the current American educational system places future national security at risk, updating DOD marketing audiences and themes, and partnering with high school guidance counselors to target potential nontraditional students for enlistment can effectively influence the target demographic to consider military service as an option and improve relations between the civilian populace and the American military.

Perhaps for the first time in American history, the technical demands of the AVF are rendering the American education system insufficient for national defense. To address future national defense personnel issues, America must demand more from its public schools and increase accountability, both for the student and educators, within the system. Doing so will improve the military qualification rate by ensuring more high school graduates possess the mental aptitude for service. The federal government should devise a method to fairly and equitably direct Title I funds to states with the greatest need and balance some of the educational disparity between states with high and low GDPs. Federal, state, and local education agencies should work in tandem to develop a definite assessment of a teacher's ability that is transferable between the different SEAs and LEAs. Such an assessment incentivizes student achievement and could provide fair monetary incentives to retain high-performing teachers. Increasing accountability for student performance in the American education system could also improve the military qualification rate by reducing obesity and drug use. A 2013 medical study by the University of California Berkeley School of Public Health, suggested a causal link between a society's education level and obesity. The MTF study also revealed that "adolescents whose parents were least educated tended to have the highest proportion of drug users among 8th and 10th graders."⁸⁶ Improving education levels could alleviate multiple issues facing recruiting

commands and reduce civil-military tensions in American society over the course of a single generation. Determining the most effective methods of implementing these changes warrants future research to determine the full impact of its potential benefit.

The DOD should also tailor its marketing efforts to counter the societal norm that military service is solely for the working class, particularly amongst adults. In the current advertising model, “each component works to develop a unique brand that differentiates the military services in order to compete for potential recruits.”⁸⁷ This method works within the target demographic to attract the individual already interested in service and place them into the military branch that best fits their personality. However, it does not seem to reach the adult influencers in the community who are advising America’s youth. As of January 2018, only 47 percent of influencers would recommend military service to a high school student (See [Appendix A, Figure 7](#)).⁸⁸ Current JAMRS questionnaires do not include the specific underlying reasons why these influencers would not recommend military service; including these questions in future adult polling is required to better tailor future influencer marketing messages. In recent years, limited advertising budgets prevented the DOD from conducting “joint advertising campaigns directed at adults who might influence an individual’s decision to join the military.”⁸⁹ While 47 percent influencer support represents a 10-year high, studies show that adults who viewed recruiting “commercials are more likely to recommend military service and to support a youth interested in joining.”⁹⁰ Therefore, the DOD, through JAMRS, should reinstitute the adult advertising campaign and highlight the current quality of the force created by increased enlistment standards, emerging technology fields under exploration by the DOD, and the long-term earning potential of veteran households. This tactic may produce better results within the Air Force and Navy; parental support for service in these branches is already greater than 50 percent. However, a DOD-wide advertising campaign should prime adult influencers to

understand the benefits of service, regardless of branch, and, over time, mitigate adult disinterest in the military and increase the target demographic's desire to serve.

To best support the recruiter, revised DOD marketing efforts must directly engage educators and clearly demonstrate the success of veterans in society. Through a multimedia campaign of mailouts, commercials, and speaking engagements with teacher and counselor unions, like the American School Counselor Association, the DOD should present all of the statistics regarding the reality of postsecondary education in America. Coordinate with the Department of Education and public universities to show that only 41.2 percent of nontraditional students, as compared to 51.7 percent of veteran students, obtain their postsecondary degree.⁹¹ The veterans student's average time to complete a 4-year bachelor's degree is 75 months, consistent with, and slightly better than, the 81 months required by other nontraditional students.⁹² Perhaps most importantly, highlight that by using GI Bill benefits, the veteran student does not incur the \$28,650 in student loan debt of the average American college graduate.⁹³ The DOD has recently started this effort via the *Today's Military* website and television commercials which demonstrate the importance of parental support for those considering service. Expanding this initiative to include the comparative educational statistics for educators would greatly benefit the recruiting commands access to the target demographic by showing the tangible benefits provided to those citizens who choose service over immediate college enrollment. Educators who better understood that military service does not automatically preclude or delay a student's success can be a powerful tool in easing civil-military tensions. Advocating military service as a viable option after high school introduces students without a familial connection to the military to a potential career path. Over time, this advocacy could create a larger segment of society with direct knowledge of service, which improves the AVF's representativeness and prevents the growth of a distinct warrior caste.

Finally, the DOD should study the characteristics of nontraditional students and, in conjunction with high school educators, develop a set of conditions that identifies potential nontraditional postsecondary students before they graduate high school. Those students who possess the academic potential to graduate college, but might not have the financial means, personal discipline, or support network to graduate in a traditional manner, are ideal candidates for service in the AVF. However, counselors must identify these students to the recruiters while they still attend high school. Many of the reasons young Americans become nontraditional students, for example, childbirth or failure to earn their high school diploma, are disqualifying to military service. Military recruiters and guidance counselors must attempt to enlist these individuals prior to their graduation before they develop these disqualifying conditions. Within military recruiting commands, this symbiotic relationship between counselor and recruiter is always desired, yet not always achieved. However, it is possible for recruiters and counselors to join forces and provide students in their high schools with a tuition free college education. For many students and families, this education is the vehicle to the upward mobility society expects from its military.

CONCLUSION

The AVF is at a crossroads following the longest continuous war in American history. As a concept, the AVF aligns well with the underlying liberal and egalitarian principles of American democracy. It is fair and individuals are free to choose their own path. However, strong societal norms, shifts in the economy and an education system focused on immediate college enrollment combined to produce a very small pool of Americans qualified for and interested in service. Future conflict will ensure that the AVF's demand for the best and brightest in American society remains constant. Political commentary calling for reinstating the draft or revising the selective service is the solution to this issue is unrealistic. Reinstating the


draft will not solve the manpower problem or ease the civil-military tensions when only 29 percent of the nation qualifies for service. A draft from this small pool would violate both egalitarian and liberal philosophy.

Addressing the potential national security risks caused by current educational policies in America, updating DOD marketing campaigns to target influencers, and identifying nontraditional postsecondary students before graduation can improve the overall military qualification rate and posture the AVF for future success. These recommended proposals address the four criticisms of the AVF – representativeness, numerical strength, quality and overall war efficiency – and balances the functional and social imperatives required to maintain positive civil-military relations. The US government, namely the DOE, should take action to improve education levels in the poorest segments of society. This action can improve the military qualification rate in the short term by ensuring more students mentally qualify for service. In the long term, better education can reduce obesity and drug use. The DOD must take the lead in engaging adult influencers to reduce the negative perception of service, highlight veteran success, and support recruiters in identifying high school students at risk of becoming nontraditional postsecondary education enrollees. These actions have the potential to improve American youth's willingness and ability to serve. Failure to implement change increases the likelihood that the AVF will struggle to meet the demands of modern peer-to-peer competition.

Appendix A, Figure 1

Increasing Demand for Educated Workforce

BY 2018, 30 MILLION NEW AND REPLACEMENT JOBS WILL REQUIRE SOME COLLEGE OR ABOVE



Note: Brown indicates jobs requiring high school or less and Blue indicates jobs requiring some college or more.


Source: Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce

Source: Debra Humphreys and Carnevale, Anthony, *The Economic Value of Liberal Education* (Association of American Colleges and Universities: Washington, DC, 2016), PowerPoint presentation.


Appendix A, Figure 2

Over the past 25 years, employment growth has been most rapid in education and health services


% change in industry employment, 1990-2015



Source: Pew Research Center, “The State of American Jobs: How the shifting economic landscape is reshaping work and society and affecting the way people think about the skills and training they need to get ahead.” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2016), 8, <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/10/06/the-state-of-american-jobs/>

Appendix A, Figure 3


Source: Jonathon T. Frerichs, “Empowering Our Recruiters: Leveraging Narrow Artificial Intelligence and Cloud-based Customer Relationship Management Tools to Enhance Systematic Recruiting,” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Warfighting, 2019), 4.

Appendix A, Figure 4

Source: Jerald G. Bachman, Johnston, Lloyd D., and O'Malley, Patrick M. *Monitoring the Future: A Continuing Study of the Lifestyles and Values of Youth, 1976* (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2007-05-25), Question C21B, <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07927.v4>; Richard A. Miech, Johnston, Lloyd D., Bachman, Jerald G., O'Malley, Patrick M., Schulenberg, John E., and Patrick, Megan E. *Monitoring the Future: A Continuing Study of American Youth, 2010 [Restricted-Use]*, (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], August 19, 2019), Question C21B, <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36942.v2>.

Appendix A, Figure 5

Qualified Military Available (QMA): 2013 Estimates



Note: Percentages may not sum due to rounding.

Source: DoD Qualified Military Available (QMA) Study 2013

JAMRS

5

Source: Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies, *The Target Population for Military Recruitment: Youth Eligible to Enlist Without a Waiver* (Alexandria, VA: Joint Advertising Market Research & Studies, 2016), 5, <https://dacowits.defense.gov/Reports-Meetings/2016-Documents/Sept2016CommitteeMeeting/>

Appendix A, Figure 6





Figure 2. High-Quality Enlistments and Youth Unemployment

Source: Barbara A Bicksler and Lisa G. Nolan, *Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force: The Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting Resources-An Update*, (Arlington, VA: Strategic Analysis, December 2009), 5, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/Bicksler_Recruiting_Paper_2009.pdf?ver=2018-01-30-142602-290.

Appendix A, Figure 7



Source: Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies, *Wave 56 Influencer Poll Update* (Alexandria, VA: Office of People Analytics, January 2018), 3, <https://jamrs.defense.gov/Portals/20/Influencer-Poll-W56.pdf>

Endnotes

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