REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
27-04-2020	Master of Military Studies (MMS) thesis	AY 2019-2020

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
An Adapted Organski Transition Model for the Twenty-First Century

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Schulter, Joseph A.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Lon Strauss, PhD

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

The Organski Transition Model, originally articulated in the late 1950's, describes the linear evolution of states through three main stages of development, and identifies the highest level of development as most ripe for intrastate conflict. Data from the Human Development Reports and the Maddison Project Database provides evidence for an adapted, less linear model that accounts for the developmental regression of states from any stage of the model, and the recovery of some of these states. This paper illustrates five conclusions supporting the adapted model, namely (1) states regress developmentally; (2) real GDP per capita is tied closely to the state's level of development; (3) regression may occur at any stage of the Model; (4) conflict is overwhelmingly related to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita; and (5) contrary to Organski's theory, states in the highest stage of development do not have a monopoly on conflict. An adapted Organski Transition Model will better reflect the current trend of states regressing in absolute power while retaining their sovereignty.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Organski Transition Model, Organski; State

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	66	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps
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Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
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Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

An Adapted Organski Transition Model for the Twenty-First Century

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 2019-20

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Date: _April 27, 2020_____

Executive Summary

Title: An Adapted Organski Transition Model for the Twenty-First Century

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Thesis: The Organiski Transition Model must be updated to account for the large number of states that decline in absolute power yet retain their sovereignty, regress to a previous stage of development, and sometimes recover. An adapted Organski Transition Model will better reflect twenty-first century trends of states regressing in absolute power.

Discussion: The Organski Transition Model, originally articulated in the late 1950's, describes the linear evolution of states through three main stages of development, and identifies the highest level of development as most ripe for intrastate conflict. Data from the *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project Database* provides evidence for an adapted, less linear model that accounts for the developmental regression of states from any stage of the model, and the recovery of some of these states. This paper illustrates five conclusions supporting the adapted model, namely (1) states regress developmentally; (2) real GDP per capita is tied closely to the state's level of development; (3) regression may occur at any stage of the Model; (4) conflict is overwhelmingly related to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita; and (5) contrary to Organski's theory, states in the highest stage of development do not have a monopoly on conflict. An adapted Organski Transition Model will better reflect the current trend of states regressing in absolute power while retaining their sovereignty.

Conclusion: The evidence presented in this paper argues in favor of an adapted Organski Transition Model, one that is more cyclical than linear, allowing a state to regress in absolute power and then rebound. By applying the adapted model and the findings detailed in this paper, strategists will be able to create development and security policies to deal with states at risk of regression in the twenty-first century, such as Venezuela, which may become a risk to international stability.

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The modern state construct that Europeans developed as a political and international entity after the Thirty Years War provides the world's citizens with the greatest amount of individual freedoms and the highest personal standards of living ever recorded. In the last two hundred years alone, the number of people living in extreme poverty has dropped by 79 percent; literacy has increased by 73 percent; child mortality has declined by 39 percent.[1] Despite competition from a growing field of non-state participants, the state maintains a dominate role in international relations. To protect the state's survival, international development and security strategists must understand the evolution of the modern state and the implications of political and economic regression.

In 1958, A. F. Organski hypothesized that traditional states progressed through a three-stage, linear power transition process (hereafter referred to as the "Organski Transition Model"). According to Organski's theory, the chance of international instability and conflict increase as states exhibit sophisticated levels of technological advancement and economic efficiency while at the same time their power relative to other states at the same level of sophistication decreases.[2] Henry Kissinger, in his seminal work of the 1990's, *Diplomacy,* broadened our understanding of the types of states that might move through the Organski Transition Model. Together, these two works outline the evolutionary progress of states through the twentieth century and reinforces conventional wisdom that policy makers should focus their security strategies on near-peer competitors who are gaining strength in the final stage of development.

The analysis in this paper argues that the Organski Transition Model must be updated to account for the large number of states that decline in absolute power, yet retain their sovereignty in the face of non-state actors. An adapted Organski Transition Model will better reflect this current trend of states regressing in absolute power. Using data from the United Nations' *Human*

Development Reports and the *Maddison Project Database*, this paper illustrates five conclusions supporting the adapted model, namely (1) states regress developmentally and an adapted Organski model is necessary; (2) real GDP per capita is tied closely to the state's level of development; (3) regression may occur at any stage of the Model; (4) conflict is overwhelmingly related to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita; and (5) contrary to Organski's theory, states in the third stage of development do not have a monopoly on conflict. With these tenets in mind, strategists will be able to create development and security policies to deal with states at risk of regression in the twenty-first century.

Background

Evolution of the State

By the 1600s, a majority of Europeans were religiously divided between Catholicism and Protestantism.[3] The Holy Roman Empire, under the rule of the Hapsburg dynasty, aspired to re-unite the continent under a universal Catholic church. A Hapsburg attempt to suppress a Protestant minority in their realm in 1618 ignited a greater continental war, which divided the belligerents along religious lines, and earned the moniker the *Thirty Years War*. The French Bourbon rulers, allied both by blood and religious affiliation with the Hapsburgs, simultaneously suppressed their own Protestant uprising. Yet, paradoxically, the French entered the conflict on the side of the Protestants in the early 1630's.[4] The decision to abandon traditional religious affiliations and instead prioritize national, political considerations, gave rise to the modern state that would become the most dominant political entity in the international landscape.

The state, however, has evolved dramatically since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which effectively concluded the war. Once understood as people united by common bonds of language

and culture after the French Revolution, the meaning of a state has matured to include heterogeneous bodies like the United States. To limit the complexity of the narrative, this analysis restricts the definition of the modern state to that outlined in Article I from the Organization of American States' 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which codifies statehood as an accepted component of international law. This convention defines the "state" as a body possessing "(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."[5] According to this rubric, a state may not be a sovereign entity until it is recognized by other "approved" states; furthermore, a state body ceases to exist only when the other states withdraw their recognition.[6]

The Organski Transition Model

In 1958, A. F. Organski, a political scientist from the University of Michigan, presented a theory of international power transition that described the traditional states' linear-growth



Figure 1: Organski Transition Model

through stages of development (hereafter referred to as "the Organski Transition Model"). The three stages of Professor Organski's linear model included: (1) *Potential Power*, (2) *Transitional Growth in Power*, and (3) *Power Maturity* (See Figure 1).[7]

The first phase of the Organski Transition Model, the *Stage of Potential Power*, occurs when newly unified political entities with strong agricultural bases form into states, like those of the seventeenth-century Europe.[8] Aristocracies or other autocratic governments with weak bureaucracies control the state and severely limit the potential growth of the population's

standards of living, technical skills, and education.[9] Towards the end of this phase, however, a sense of nationalism develops and the population begins to grow.[10]

In the second phase of the Organski Transition Model – the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* – the state matures and enters the industrial age.[11] The population, which begins to move from rural areas to the cities, takes on a greater role in society, the bureaucracy expands, and social classes often coalesce.[12] As productivity and nationalism increase, so too does the threat of external aggression.[13] Overall, changes to the standards of living and the economy are dramatic as trade and industry increase wealth, and sanitation and medical services improve qualitatively and quantitatively, slashing death rates.[14] The implementation and level of qualitative industrial changes dictate the power of the state in this stage, and the speed at which it is propelled to the next level.[15]

The third and final stage of the Organski Transition Model is *Power Maturity*.[16] In this phase, the state has a modern economy and changes – social, economic, and political – continue, but at a much slower rate.[17] States in this stage exhibit sophisticated levels of technological advancement and economic efficiency. However, despite enormous social and political growth, the state continues to face race, education, and wealth inequality.[18] Power, Organski explains, is not absolute.[19] As each state matures in accordance with its own unique timeline and reaches the final stage of maturity, the power of states already in the third phase declines relative to rising competitors.[20] Organski posits that as states transition to industrialization and enter the *Stage of Power Maturity*, conflict is possible, if not inevitable. According to Organski, the state's attainment of the third stage of development, which creates additional peer competitors, disrupts the existing hierarchy of states.[21]

This principle is illustrated with the economy of the United States, a country in the third stage of development. In 1960, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the U.S. was $3.26 trillion, and the U.S. controlled forty percent of the world's economy.[22] By 2014, the U.S. economy had grown to $16.912 trillion, but the U.S. contribution to the world economy shrank to twenty-two percent.[23] In fifty-four years, the economy of the United States grew by over $14 trillion, but the size of the economy, relative to the rest of the world, shrank by almost half.

As Organski's model described, the U.S.'s power declined relative to rising competitors.[24] As other states increased in strength, the economic power of the United States declined in relative terms, but it increased absolutely. Figure 2 illustrates the U. S. GDP compared to four global competitors in 1985.[25] Notice how the darkest shaded portion of the graph, which represents the size of the economies of the listed countries, skews in favor of the United States. When the shaded portion is in the shape of a perfect pentagon, the GDP between the states is equal in absolute terms.



Figure 2: Distribution of Power during the Cold War

The one-way, linear progression of the Model, which focused primarily on the raw power of actors, perpetuated the great power narrative of the Cold War. The Organski Transition Model predicted that conflict would ensue as the relative power of the dominant players approached parity (i.e., U.S. economy to the rest of the world).[26] The model was correct: as the United States

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) vied for dominance, the world engaged in an "us" verses "them" narrative in which a loss for one side was a clear gain for the other.[27]

The Cold War paradigm held the distribution of power in binary terms – the U.S. versus the USSR. The traditional instruments of national power – GDP, Correlates of War (COW), and military strength – favored the two, and development and security policies reflected this paradigm (Figure 2).[28] Both the United States and the USSR executed their respective diplomatic and security policies as a means of increasing their own power relative to the other state, with little regard for instability outside of the binary superpower narrative. Figure 2 shows the power of the two countries relative to one another and three other Cold War actors. This diagram illustrates that, although the United States was in the Stage of *Power Maturity* and had not regressed, its power relative to its competitors decreased as they developed.[29] This decline exemplifies third stage states in the Organski Model.

Types of States

Kissinger broadened the types of states that Organski's transition model included and neatly delineated them. In addition to the traditional *Nation-State* (Type 1), which dominated Organski's thinking and appeared in the European continent after the Thirty Years War, Kissinger identified three other forms: *Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires* (Type 2), *Post-Colonial* states (Type 3), and *Continental-Type* states (Type 4).[30] *Ethnic Splinters* (Type 2) are those countries formed from the territory of

Four Types of States
Type 1 Nation-States
Type 2 Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires
Type 3 Post-Colonial States
Type 4 Continental-Type States

Figure 3: Four Types of States

the empire after the collapse of a larger political body, like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (e.g., Slovenia and Ukraine). These countries, like the lesser states of the Thirty Years War, focused primarily on survival.[31] *Post-Colonial* states (Type 3) suffer two-fold: from arbitrary boundaries created by their colonial rulers with little consideration to common culture, religion, or language, and from a dearth of national institutions except for the military (e.g., Angola).[32] Unlike *Ethnic Splinters* (Type 2), *Post-Colonial States* (Type 3), may co-exist simultaneously in the international arena with the state that dominated them politically. *Continental-Type* states (Type 4), on the other hand, comprise a population with different languages, cultures, and religions, but they remain effectively united by a central authority (e.g., China and India).[33]

According to Kissinger, Europe may have become a *Continental-Type* state, if not for the Thirty Years War; it may yet develop into this type through the European Union.[34] The successful integration of the twenty-seven states of the European Union would create a *Continental-Type* actor with twenty-three official languages and an economy larger than the United States. The result, as hypothesized by Organski, would be a peer competitor to the U.S. and an international order ripe for conflict.

The Human Development Report and the Maddison Project Database

While numerous metrics can be used to assess the Organski Transition Model, the Human Development Index (HDI) in the UNDP's *Human Development Report* represents the most comprehensive and aligns best with the stages of the Model. The UNDP HDI measures industrial maturity, the primary indicator for the Organski Transition Model, and numerically ranks individual states based on their average achievement in three broad categories – health,

knowledge, and standard of living – all of which correspond to the economic growth of the state in the final stage of development.[35] Life expectancy, level of education, and gross national income per capita factor into the final numerical score .[36] Accordingly, a country with a population that has a longer life span, higher education, higher standard of living, and more advanced economy receives a greater UNDP HDI score than one that lags in these categories; this alignment corresponds to a primary component in the Organski Transition Model. Refer to Attachment B: Human Development Index Ranking for a list of the countries in the *Human Development Report 2019*.

The *Maddison Project Database*, on the other hand, remains a scholarly and comprehensive source of current and historic economic data. The *Database* was started by Angus Maddison, emeritus professor at the University of Groningen, and co-founder of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Maddison first published his quantitative economic data as part of his written work, *Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP 1-2008 AD*; the Groningen Growth and Development Centre expanded the dataset after his death.[37] Today, a board of scholars at the University of Groningen "with expertise in long-run economic development and cross-country comparisons of income and living standards"[38] manages the *Database*. The ever-expanding database remains a comprehensive source for historic economic data.

Until 2009, the UNDP categorized HDI into three levels of development – *Low Human Development, Medium Human Development, and High Human Development* – which paralleled the three phases of the Organski Transition Model – *Stage of Potential Power*, *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, and *Stage of Power Maturity*. The *Human Development Index 2019* uses four categories – *High Human Development* was expanded to include *Very High*

Human Development; both align with states in the *Stage of Power Maturity*. For the purposes of this analysis, *High Human Development* and *Very High Human Development* remain synonymous. While the raw numeric value that categorizes countries into a specific level of development changes from year to year, the annual, weighted value reflects the current global trends.

For the purpose of this analysis, states with a Human Development Index in the top stage of growth – *High (or Very High) Human Development* –align with the *Stage of Power Maturity* in Organski's model and are shaded with green. States with Human Development Indices in the middle stage of growth – *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power/Medium Human Development* – and the bottom stage of growth – *Stage of Potential Power/Low Human Development* – are shaded in yellow and red, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates this alignment by displaying the first five states in each stage of development from the *Human Development Report 2019*; the state's Human Development Index value is shaded with the corresponding color (i.e., green, yellow, or red). The *Human Development Index Report 2019* suggests that fifty-nine countries are in the *Stage of Potential Power*, forty-two are in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, and eighty-eight are in the *Stage of Power Maturity*.[39] See Attachment B to review the 189 states listed and ranked in the *Human Development Report* for 2019.

HDI Rank	Country	HDI Score 2017	HDI Score 2018
Stage of Power Maturity/High Human Development			
1	Norway	0.953	0.954
2	Switzerland	0.943	0.946
3	Ireland	0.939	0.942
4	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.936	0.939
4	Germany	0.938	0.939
e of Transitional Growth in Power/Medium Human Develop			
89	Saint Lucia	0.744	0.745
89	Dominican Republic	0.741	0.745
91	Tunisia	0.738	0.739
92	Mongolia	0.729	0.735
93	Lebanon	0.732	0.730
Stage of Potential Power/Low Human Development			
131	Timor-Leste	0.624	0.626
132	Kiribati	0.623	0.623
132	Honduras	0.621	0.623
134	Bhutan	0.615	0.617
135	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.612	0.614

HDI score from United Nations Development Program, *Human Developmen*
Report 2019 (New York, New York: AGS, 2019), 303-303.

Figure 4: Example of Color-Coded Human Development Index

Updating the Organski Transition Model

Combined, the Organski Transition Model (Figure 1) and Kissinger's types of states (Figure 3), successfully diagram the linear-growth of the above mentioned four types of states through the three stages of political evolution from the Peace of Westphalia through the Cold War. The linear 1958 model, however, does not allow or account for the regression of states that decline to a previous stage of the Model. In the next section, an analysis of the data from the *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project Database* illustrate that the linear model is insufficient and that real per capita GDP is tied closely to a country's level of development.



Figure 5: Adapted Organski Transition Model

An adapted Model, more cyclical than linear, allows for regression and growth. The following sections of this paper show that *Ethnic Splinters* (Type 2) and *Post-Colonial* (Type 3) states decline in absolute power, regress, and exhibit varying degrees of (1) instability, (2) ineffective governance, (3) a lack of territorial integrity/porous borders, and

(4) economic unsustainability. The adapted Organski Transition Model illustrated in Figure 4 better aligns with the data and accounts for regression and growth. States that are unable to recover after a regression remain in the lower stage of the model.

Regression of Ethnic Splinters – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The countries that succeeded the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after its collapse in 1991 illustrate the process of regression in the adapted Organski Transition Model in which states become unstable, central governments less effective, territorial integrity compromised, and economies erratic. The dissolution of the USSR shocked the members of the Union and the world. Since 1648, no Great Power had ever collapsed without a great power conflict, as Organski hypothesized.[40] Yet, with the stroke of a pen, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned, Russian President Boris Yeltsin peacefully replaced him, and years later in retirement, President Yeltsin quipped, "[the USSR] . . . was gone in a day."[41]

With the USSR dissolved peacefully, the territory of the former empire splintered into fifteen new states, including: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.[42] Had these states developed on their own without Soviet domination, natural evolutionary process may have yielded Type 1 states – *Nation-States* – like Western Europe. Before their inclusion into the USSR, the populations of these territories, unless forced by conquering powers to do otherwise, mostly aligned themselves in groups with common characteristics including tribe, religion, and ancestry.[43]

In many cases, the post-Soviet, Type 2 states – *Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires* – had been dominated for a generation or more by an outside authority; their populations were sometimes subjected to forced re-locations between regions of the USSR from its inception in 1922 until its collapse.[44] Unlike Type 1 states, which were created as a result of a shared language, culture, or identity in Europe, these Type 2 states inherited arbitrary boundaries and a weak sense of unity. During the Soviet era, populations consistently bemoaned the establishment of boundaries that aligned the population to political territories in which they did not feel connected.[45] Because the national identities preceded, and did not uniquely align with, the successor states, these fledgling governments became obsessed with "historic grievances and . . . quests for identity."[46]

In these states, which according to the *Human Development Report* in the late 1980's had been in the third stage of development under the USSR– the *Stage of Power Maturity*, the new authorities inherited the institutions of the USSR to some degree, but did not acquire the enforcement mechanisms to prevent decline.[47] Inevitably, many successor states regressed. The instability and violence that accompanied this "dual transition" to democracy and free markets challenged the new central authorities.[48] As the bureaucracies endeavored to bolster, and if necessary transform their political and economic systems, they struggled to control their territories, severely limiting the populations' standard of living, technical skills, and education.

An analysis of the Human Development Index level from 1993 through 2018 along with the *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016 shows evidence of: (1) the regression of the USSR's successor states; (2) a correlation between the economy and the states' development; and (3) and the regression of states even in the highest level of development. Until its collapse, the USSR ranked 33rd out of 204 states, and had attained *High Human Development*,

according to the Human Development Report.[49] However, as the successor states were constituted, they quickly regressed to a previous stage in the adapted Organski Transition Model (Figure 3). Points of regression are illustrated in Figure 6 with an arrow.[50] (See also Attachment C for additional information and sources.) As states regress from *Stage of Power Maturity* (green) to the *Stage of Potential Power* (yellow), the column changes from "green" to "yellow." Ten of the fifteen successor states regressed from the *Stage of Power Maturity* to the *Stage of Potential Power*. Of the ten states that regressed, eight saw a decline in the real GDP per capita of their population – evidence of a correlation between the economy and the states development.

	USSR	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Estonia	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Russian Federation	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Ukraine	Uzbekistan
1989		6954	10505	13334	11103	13562	11584	6562	13643	12603	4469	18867	5240	6061	11165	4642
1990		6389	[illegible]	12857	10198	11626	11331	6588	13769	11845	4273	18323	5071	5938	10638	4444
1991		5684	[illegible]	12658	10385	[illegible]	[illegible]	6417	11735	10137	4104	17468	4831	5487	9798	4118
1992		[illegible]	[illegible]	10875	8791	[illegible]	[illegible]	5034	8789	[illegible]	2451	16771	2324	4615	9076	3305
1993		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4445	7978	[illegible]	2490	14117	2142	5074	[illegible]	3839
1994		[illegible]	4014	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3407	[illegible]	[illegible]	2260	[illegible]	1427	3509	[illegible]	3201
1995		[illegible]	2427	[illegible]	[illegible]	2931	5699	2893	[illegible]	[illegible]	2350	[illegible]	1406	3024	[illegible]	3132
1996		3155	2322	[illegible]	[illegible]	3332	5603	2831	[illegible]	8142	2293	[illegible]	1303	2859	[illegible]	3258
1997		3303	2243	7994	9075	3597	5325	2350	[illegible]	8999	2166	[illegible]	1603	2985	4592	3306
1998		2961	2170	7902	10144	3455	5079	2124	9607	9718	1983	[illegible]	1408	3186	4457	3319
1999		3276	2389	7828	10749	3434	4943	2048	10162	10249	1647	7421	1251	3332	4386	3517
2000		3324	2576	8587	11903	3429	5704	2012	10654	11112	1801	8604	1273	4089	4448	3378
2001		3509	2770	8345	12534	3619	6417	1968	11407	11968	1892	8892	1391	4457	4798	3557
2002		3803	2906	8543	13529	3865	6803	1958	12325	12456	2104	9248	1462	5363	5053	3745
2003		4347	3084	9041	14221	4396	7600	2109	12818	13628	2368	10121	1738	6408	5663	3960
2004		4633	3305	9760	15070	4780	8687	2203	13412	13928	2504	11526	1965	7368	6285	4125
2005		5172	4806	10303	16870	5242	10331	2228	14485	15036	2816	13406	2064	8840	7364	4360
2006		5925	6827	11593	18829	6105	12372	2562	16244	16357	3114	15409	2282	9423	8256	4193
2007		6751	9354	12775	21139	7004	14209	2899	17941	18024	3259	17799	2359	10069	9452	4944
2008		7360	10216	14781	20883	7458	16214	3354	18225	18693	3503	20022	2759	10487	10258	5679
2009		6906	10804	14573	19387	7867	15395	3384	16439	17132	3568	17864	2594	15900	8766	6344
2010		7642	12866	16016	19917	8305	17738	3381	16847	18340	4180	20255	2893	16391	9250	6812
2011		8465	16176	17918	21997	8946	21302	4142	18428	20243	4892	23130	3111	16518	10333	7396
2012		8827	16407	18564	23756	9241	21947	3959	19812	22259	4938	23827	3212	17120	10744	7929
2013		9006	15841	19536	24710	9540	23365	4360	20765	23389	5256	23881	3297	18918	10993	8641
2014		9260	16025	20037	25424	9903	23398	5773	21944	24604	5534	23798	3226	20203	10331	8511
2015		9552	16045	19306	25790	10198	23408	5910	22724	25279	5569	23118	3365	21262	9429	9107
2016		9588	15296	18766	26173	10483	23399	6065	23362	26182	5851	23064	3544	22328	9694	9726
2017																
2018																
GDP Change - 1990 and 199		-49%	-74%	-39%	5%	-70%	-56%	-69%	-26%	-13%	-61%	-59%	-75%	-44%	-59%	-21%
GDP Change - 1990 and 201		69%	16%	48%	152%	6%	114%	-5%	99%	158%	43%	32%	-27%	307%	-1%	136%

Stage of Power Maturity/High Human Development (green)
Stage of Transitional Growth in Power/Medium Human Development (yellow)

Figure 6: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the USSR

The states' regression and the corresponding decline in real GDP per capita illustrates the shock these countries experienced and shows that states ranked in the highest level of development are susceptible to regression. It must be noted that while the Human Development Index information existed prior to 1992, the USSR's successor states



Figure 7: Average Per Capita GDP for the Successor States of the USSR

did not. The Human Development Index level indicated in Figure 6 has been retroactively assessed by the author using supporting data from the respective report year; these values appear as gray-shaded cells, in the font that reflects the corresponding UNDP Human Development Index level color.

Figure 7 illustrates the correlation between a state's level of development and the health of its economy. As shown, the real GDP per capita declined an average of forty-seven percent within the Type 2 – *Ethnic Splinter* states – from the former USSR between 1990 and 1999. This decline in the real GDP per capita correlates with the regression of the ten successor states. Of the fifteen ethnic splinters, Estonia best limited its real GDP per capita decline. Uniquely, Estonia increased its real GDP per capita by five percent. It should come as no surprise that Estonia transitioned fastest after regression and returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity* in four years.

As the adapted Organski Transition Model predicted (see also Attachment C for additional information and sources), all ten of the former Soviet states that experienced regression subsequently recovered economically, and transitioned back to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. While the case study of the successor states of the USSR demonstrate the validity of the adapted Organski Transition Model and that real GDP per capita is tied closely to the development of the state, the case study does not confirm whether the post-Soviet states are a model or an irregularity.

Regression of Ethnic Splinters – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The countries that succeeded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) also offer evidence of: (1) the need for an adapted Organski Transition Model; (2) an economic

correlation with the stage of development; and (3) the regression of states even in the highest level of development. These Type 2 states – *Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires* – were once members of a state in the third stage of development – the *Stage of Power Maturity*, but regressed upon dissolution of the SFRY.

In October 1990, the U.S. national intelligence community warned: "Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup . . . . The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity."[51] The assessment was accurate. By January 1992 the SFRY no longer existed and had, or would soon, splintered into six constituent states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

Created at the end of World War II under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia split from its political ally, the USSR, in 1948.[52] Following Tito's death in 1980, ethnic tensions flared in the country; nationalism grew in the constituent republics following a constitutional crisis in

HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the SFRY

Year	Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Her	Croatia	Montenegro	Serbia	Slovenia	Macedonia	TFYR of
1989		2248	16012	12953	8228	18282	8829	
1990		1974	14853	11755				
1991*		2119		10558				
1992**		1306						
1993		1369			3198	15402		
1994		1892	10960		3298	16925	6605	
1995***		$2,605	$11,054	$5,188	$3,638	$18,710	$6,721	
1996		$5,009	$11,665	$6,500	$6,041	$19,280	$6,701	
1997		$5,634	$13,090	$6,949	$6,968	$19,941	$6,919	
1998		$5,788	$13,501	$7,492	$7,917	$20,192	$7,249	
1999		$6,471	$13,781	$6,823	$6,825	$20,854	$7,806	
2000		$5,874	$14,326	$7,182	$7,622	$21,555	$8,183	
2001		$5,882	$14,402	$7,743	$7,392	$21,845	$8,124	
2002		$6,147	$14,892	$7,614	$7,771	$22,665	$7,866	
2003		$6,013	$15,515	$7,885	$8,199	$22,656	$7,684	
2004		$5,812	$16,009	$8,368	$8,422	$23,639	$7,917	
2005		$6,480	$16,654	$8,951	$9,583	$24,405	$8,724	
2006		$7,038	$17,434	$11,725	$10,238	$24,833	$9,142	
2007		$7,747	$19,299	$13,656	$10,543	$25,897	$9,797	
2008		$8,228	$20,406	$15,054	$11,719	$27,380	$10,750	
2009		$8,624	$19,645	$14,296	$11,828	$25,973	$11,415	
2010		$8,646	$18,987	$14,536	$11,872	$25,660	$11,625	
2011		$8,961	$19,813	$15,747	$12,463	$26,004	$11,321	
2012		$9,388	$20,523	$15,709	$13,085	$26,022	$11,748	
2013		$9,689	$20,130	$16,357	$13,347	$26,062	$12,421	
2014		$9,986	$20,466	$16,903	$13,387	$27,462	$13,110	
2015		$10,305	$20,905	$17,738	$13,556	$28,077	$13,586	
2016		$10,576	$21,625	$18,244	$14,001	$28,761	$13,887	
2017								
2018								
GDP Change - 1987 and 1995		13%	-33%	-62%	-56%	-3%	-25%	
GDP Change - 1987 and 2016		358%	31%	35%	70%	50%	55%	

Figure 7: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the SFRY

1990.[53] Following a bloody civil war, the former states of the SFRY declared independence in 1991 and 1992. Until 1992, the *Human Develop Report* ranked the SFRY 37th out of 204 states, and identified it as having *High Human Development*.[54]

As Figures 8 and 9 show, the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index data from 1989 to 2018, coupled with the *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016, illustrate successor states' regression from the highest level of development and a correlation with the economy. As illustrated in Figure 8 (see also Attachment E for additional information and sources), five of the six former SFRY states regressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* after the dissolution of the SFRY; all five rebounded to the Stage of Power Maturity by 2007.[55] The five states that regressed also saw a decline in the real GDP per capita as they slid back into a *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*. Like the successor states of the USSR, these countries illustrate the validity of the adapted Organski Transition Model and the potential for regression of states in the highest level of development.

While the UNDP HDI analysis did not individually assess SFRY successor states prior to 1991, the available real GDP per capita data illustrate the decline the states suffered as far back as 1989 (See Figure 9 and Attachment F).[56]



Figure 8: Average Per Capita GDP for the Successor States of SFRY

Figure 9 illustrates the correlation between a state's level of development and the health of its economy. Between 1989 and 1995, when the SFRY successor states signed the Dayton Agreement,[57] the real

GDP per capita declined an average of 28 percent within the Type 2 – *Ethnic Splinter* states – from the former SFRY.[58] This eight-year decline correlates with the regression of the successor states, and is evidence of the link between a state's economy and its level of development. Notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a thirteen percent real GDP per capita gain during the same period and remained in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*.

By 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina had returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. Correspondingly, the real GDP per capita grew by 358 percent during this time.[59] Across all six successor states, real GDP per capita grew by 100 percent from 1987 to 2016.[60] As predicted by the adapted Organski Transition Model, the successor states of the SFRY experienced regression, recovered economically, and transitioned back to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. Moreover, the real GDP per capita for both the SFRY and USSR declined with this regression, and increased as the states returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. The case studies for the successor states of the USSR and SFRY demonstrate the validity of the adapted Organski Transition Model and that real GDP per capita is tied closely to the development of the state. Together, they show that the experiences of the successor states of the USSR were not unique.

Regression of Post-Colonial States – Namibia

Using *Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires* as examples, the paper has highlighted: (1) the need for an adapted Organski Transition Model; (2) an economic correlation with the stage of development; and (3) the regression of states even in the highest level of development. However, these examples do not address whether these three tenets hold true for *Post-Colonial* – Type 3- states. Type 3 states are more difficult to assess using the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index and *Maddison Project* economic

data. Most *Post-Colonial* states received their independence before the introduction of the Human Development Index. The exception is Namibia, which gained independence from the Republic of South Africa in 1990.[61] While Namibia does not show developmental regression, it does validate the close correlation of real GDP per capita and a state's stage of development.

Following the First World War, the United Nations granted the Republic of South Africa (then called the Union of South Africa) administrative authority over the German colonial territory that would later become present-day Namibia.[62] In 1990, the Republic of South Africa, which was in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, formally granted Namibia its independence. Economic decline followed. Prior to 1990, big business investment in mining, fishing, and tourism drove the economy; however, capital and brain drain accompanied their South African administrators in the post-colonial exodus.[63] The scarcity of mining resources only exacerbated the existing economic decline.[64] Namibia's was already in the lowest level of the Organski Model and had no way of regressing lower. However, the GDP decline showed economic regression that in the other case studies corresponded with regression to a lower level of the Model.

Year	Namibia	South Africa
1989	$4,919	$8,000
1990*	$4,787	$7,866
1991	$4,647	$7,599
1992	$4,801	$7,473
1993	$4,298	$7,434
1994**	$4,418	$7,468
1995	$4,775	$7,773
1996	$4,898	$8,004
1997	$4,964	$8,128
1998	$5,125	$8,136
1999	$5,155	$8,142
2000	$5,204	$8,478
2001	$5,260	$8,678
2002	$5,377	$9,147
2003	$5,331	$9,250
2004	$5,719	$9,628
2005	$6,171	$10,241
2006	$6,725	$10,861
2007	$6,878	$11,347
2008	$7,499	$11,435
2009	$7,311	$11,001
2010	$7,440	$11,288
2011	$8,203	$11,838
2012	$9,181	$11,880
2013	$9,512	$11,993
2014	$11,484	$12,050
2015	$11,850	$12,054
2016	$11,741	$11,949
2017		
2018		

Figure 9: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Namibia and South Africa

For three years, Namibia remained in this stage. During this time, Namibia spent resources on education, capitalized on existing infrastructure, and focused on the traditional trading culture of the small business community.[65] As illustrated in Figure 10, the effort paid off. Namibia recovered economically and progressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*. Since independence, Namibia's real GDP per capita had increased by 145 percent.[66]

Superimposing both HDI levels from 1989 through 2018 and *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016 in Figure 10 diagrams the economic decline in Namibia prior to and immediately after independence. As real GDP per capita increased between 1993 and 1994, Namibia progressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* and became a developmental peer with the Republic of South Africa.[67] (See also Attachment G for additional information and sources.) While this example of a *Post-Colonial* state does not provide additional evidence for regression, it corroborates an economic correlation with the stage of development.

Evidence for an Adapted Model, an Economic Correlation, and Regression at any Level of Development

In the above listed examples of *Ethnic Splinters*, a preponderance of the data from *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project Database* conclusively support: (1) an adapted Organski Transition Model; (2) an economic correlation with the stage of development; and (3) regression of states even in the highest level of development. Of the twenty-one successor states from the USSR and SFRY, fifteen regressed developmentally from the *Stage of Power Maturity* (the highest level of development) to the *Stage of Potential Power*, and all fifteen states rebounded to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. As hypothesized, fourteen of the fifteen states experienced a decline in their real GDP per capita as they regressed, and all fourteen steadily increased their real per capita GDP before they transitioned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*.

In the *Post-Colonial* example, the results were less conclusive. With the data from *Human Development Reports* limited to dates after 1989, the only available example was Namibia. Based on the available evidence, Namibia never transitioned beyond the first level of

development prior to its independence. The data, however, does support an economic correlation with the stage of development. As real per capita GDP increased between 1993 and 1994 by three percent (Figure 10), Namibia transitioned between developmental stages.

The three above listed case studies illustrate that states experience setbacks and then recovery. But what happens to developmentally stagnant states? How do they fit into this framework?

Weak and Failing States

Weak or Failing States are the fifth type of state (Figure 11); one that has recently been introduced in the lexicon of international relations. Scholars, however, cannot agree on the criteria to identify these actors, or even on a shared definition. A review of the definition of a weak and/or failing state from nine authorities on the subject, including the National Security Council and the U.S. Agency for International Development, however, shows consensus that *Weak and Failing States* exhibit extreme degrees of (1) instability, (2) ineffective governance, (3) a lack of territorial integrity/porous borders, and (4) economic unsustainability.[68] Many scholars also agree that *Weak and Failing* states describe countries wherein the administrative effectiveness of the central authority has eroded to the point where it has collapsed, or will collapse; and as the central authority dissolves, non-state actors proliferate and replace the bureaucratic functions of

Five Types of States
Type 1 Nation-States
Type 2 Ethnic Splinters from Disintegrating Empires
Type 3 Post-Colonial States
Type 4 Continental-Type States
Type 5 Weak and Failing States

Figure 10: Five Types of States

the central authority.[69] The conflict that ensues leads to (1) terrorism, (2) international crime, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) regional instability.[70]

According to the Congressional Research Service, many countries in the developing world exhibit many of the above listed characteristics, but only a select few are *Weak and Failing* states.[71] To limit the scope of contenders fitting the *Weak and Failing* narrative, U.S. government authorities recognize four international indices on the subject, including: (1) the World Bank's *Harmonized List of Fragile Situations*, (2) The Fund for Peace's *Fragile State Index*, (3) the Center for Systemic Peace's *Failed States Index*, and (4) the Brooking Institution's *Index of States Weakness in the Developing World*. Indicative of the debate that surrounds the definition of these actors, each index compiles its own list of candidates and limited overlap exists between the indices. Attachment H reviews the different indices independently instability, ineffective governance, lack of territorial integrity, and economic sustainability.

Attachment I lists the fifty states identified by at least one of the four indices as *Weak and Failing*. All four methodologies agree that nine states – Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia – are *Weak and Failing*. Three indices agree that another sixteen states are *Weak and Failing*; and two list nine more. Only one index identifies the remaining sixteen states. The next section will analyze data from these thirty-two states and how they fit into the framework outlined in this paper.

Identifying Weak and Failing States

First, may *Weak and Failing* states be identified with only the data from the United Nations Development Program's *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project*?[72] Figure 12 illustrates the thirty-two *Weak and Failing* states identified by at least two of the four indices (Refer to Attachment J to review the data for this figure). The reader should immediately

note several of the columns wherein the contrasting colors illustrate repeating cycles of regression, growth, and regression again (i.e., Myanmar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Libya, Pakistan, and Togo). These cycles provide additional evidence for an adapted Organski Transition Model, but are not a unique indicator of a *Weak and Failing* state. Some states are trapped in these cycles, while others (e.g., Afghanistan, Burundi, etc.) remain developmentally static.

Persistence in the lowest level of development – *Potential Power* – is also not a unique indicator of a *Weak and Failing* state. The *Human Development Report* in 2019 identifies ten states in the Stage of *Potential Power* that are not listed in the *Weak and Failing* state list (Figure 12).[73] Thus, the *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project* data cannot provide a single, clear indicator to identify *Weak and Failing* states. These types of states can be identified only with the additional information from the four indices.

Collectively, the data from the four indices, shown in Figure 12, substantiates (1) the integrity of the adapted Organski Transition Model, (2) the correlation of real GDP per capita (increase and decrease) to the levels of development, and (3) the potential for regression at any



Figure 11: List of Thirty-Two Failed States

stage of the development cycle. Of the thirty-two listed states in Figure 12, eleven cycled back and forth between stages of development; ten of these regressed, rebounded, and then regressed again, providing clear evidence in favor of the adapted Organski Transition Model. A correlation between real GDP per capita and the level of the development of the state remains distinct, but provides a less absolute indicator in this review. For example, Myanmar regressed and rebounded four times in less than thirty years. In two of the four rebounds, the real GDP per capita increased instead of decreasing. The 1998 and 2016 rebounds, on the other hand, saw real GDP per capita increase as predicted.

Overall, these eleven states experienced thirty-eight transitions, and the forecasted correlation between real GDP per capita and development was accurate sixty-three percent of the time. Surprisingly, the real GDP per capita responded as predicted eight-five percent of the time when a state rebounded. Notably, the correlation could not be calculated for five percent of the transitions because of insufficient data.

Finally, a combined review of *Ethnic Splinters* and *Weak and Failing* states shows that regression may occur at any stage of the development cycle. Despite the high level of development necessary to perform at the *Stage of Power Maturity*, sixteen states regressed from this level, including Libya, a state listed in Figure 12 as *Weak and Failing*. The implication for this evidence is reviewed in the next section using Libya as an example.

Libya: Regression, Economic Decline, and the Implications

Libya is a former Type 3 *Post-Colonial* state that became independent in 1951. Muammar Gaddafi ruled the country until his death during the 2011 Libyan civil war. In 1992 and 1993, the United Nations imposed a series of sanctions on Libya for its role in sponsoring

worldwide terrorism, including the downing of civilian Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.[74] Today, Libya has *High Human Development* according to the UNDP HDI, which places it in the *Stage of Power Maturity* in the adapted Organski Transition Model. According to the four indices used to compile the list of *Weak and Failing* states, Libya exhibits all four indicators of a weak and failing state: (1) instability (i.e., conflict since 2011);[75] (2) ineffective governance (i.e., a rank of 9.7 in "State Legitimacy);[76] (3) lack of territorial integrity/porous borders (i.e., a rank of 9 in "Security Apparatus");[77] and (4) failing economic sustainability (i.e., a rank of 7.7. in "Economic Decline" and an eighty-one percent decline in real GDP per capita since 1980).[78]

Year	Libya
1980	$41,973
1981	$32,460
1982	$31,986
1983	$29,948
1984	$27,347
1985	$29,251
1986	$25,783
1987	$21,440
1988	$22,427
1989	$23,392
1990	$23,626
1991	$26,632
1992	$25,276
1993	$23,754
1994	$23,662
1995	$22,799
1996	$23,136
1997	$2 070
1998	$2 571
1999	$2 215
2000	$22,225
2001	$21,856
2002	$21,133
2003	$23,398
2004	$23,943
2005	$25,893
2006	$27,106
2007	$27,953
2008	$31,457
2009	$30,659
2010	$31,419
2011	$12,893
2012	$29,766
2013	$13,326
2014	$9,736
2015	$8,514
2016	$8,096
2017	
2018	

Figure 12: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for Libya

Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the evidence for (1) an adapted Organski Transition Model; (2) a correlation between the economy and the level of development; (3) the potential for regression at any stage of the model; (4) conflict overwhelmingly relates to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita; and (5) conflict occurs outside the third stage of development.

Figures 13 and 14 depict Libya's regression, the decline of the real GDP per capita in the wake of the 1992/93 sanctions, and the recovery of Libya both economically and developmentally after the sanctions are lifted. After Libya transitioned to the *Stage of Power Maturity* around 1996 (Figure 13), it quickly regressed back to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* three years later as the sanctions took effect. During this same period, the real GDP per capita remained relatively static (Figures 13 and 14), but responded as predicted by increasing as Libya transitioned to the next level of development.[79]

After Libya agreed to renounce terrorism and compensate the families of the victims of Flight 103, the United Nations lifted the remaining sanctions in 2003.[80] Libya's real GDP per capita increased steadily after this time, and by 2007 Libya returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. In early 2011, Libya experienced a revolt that toppled Muammar Gaddafi. According to the *Human Development Report* data (Figure 13), Libya remained in the *Stage of Power Maturity* despite a seventy-three percent drop in real GDP per capita.[81] If the real GPD per capita continues to decline, the model presented in this paper predicts that Libya will again regress to



Figure 15: Per Capita GDP for Libya

Libya		
Year	Real GDP Per Capita	Deaths Related to Conflict
2008	$31,457	6
2009	$30,659	0
2010	$31,419	0
2011	$12,893	3914
2012	$29,766	378
2013	$13,326	36
2014	$9,736	1455
2015	$8,514	1594
2016	$8,096	2349
2017		1096
2018		670

Figure 14: Libya-Deaths Related to Conflict



Figure 14: Libya-Per Capita GDP and Deaths Related to Conflict

the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*.

Finally, this review of Libya shows that conflict is not monopolized in the third stage of development, and conflict corelates to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita. Figures 15 and 16 diagram this relationship. In Figure 15, the real GDP per capita of Libya is highlighted in grey and conflict deaths are overlaid in red (Refer to Attachment K to review the data and sourcing information for this graph). As Libya experienced significant conflict and related deaths (Figure 16 and 17), the real GDP per capita decreased.[82] Note the spikes in deaths related to conflict in 2011 and 2016 and the corresponding decline in real GPD per capita for the same time period. This illustration suggests a correlation between the economy and the intensity of conflict. Is this phenomenon unique to Libya, or does the correlation exist in other countries?

A Correlation Between Fluctuations in Real GDP Per Capita and the Number of Conflict Deaths

In the original Organski Transition Model, the propensity for instability and conflict occurred in the final level of development – *Power Maturity*. However, conflict does not appear to be monopolized by states in this third stage. Each of the thirty-two *Weak and Failing* states, previously identified in Figure 12 experienced conflict since 2018, and only Libya is in the *Stage of Power Maturity*.[83] The thirty-one remaining states are either in the *Stage of Potential Power* or *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, not the *Stage of Power Maturity* as predicted by Organski. Moreover, a careful review of the conflict-related deaths in these countries reveals a strong correlation with real GDP per capita.

Ordinarily, as the number of deaths related to conflict increase, the real GDP per capita decreases. For example, between 2012 and 2014, the number of conflict deaths in the Central African Republic spiked by 184 percent; real GDP per capita dropped by forty-four percent; in the same period.[84] Figure 17 illustrates this relationship. The per capita GDP of the Central Africa Republic is highlighted in grey and conflict deaths are overlaid in red (Refer to Attachment K to review the data and sourcing information for this graph). Note that as the number of conflict deaths increase, the real GDP per capita tends to decrease.



Figure 16:Central African Republic-Per Capita GDP and Death Related to Conflict

Liberia (Figure 18) experienced two GDP drops that correlate with spikes in conflict deaths: first in the early 1990's, then again in 2003.[85] Between 1989 and 1990, GDP in the Liberia dropped by more than fifty-three percent; in the same period, the number of conflict deaths spiked by 195 percent.[86] Again, note as deaths from



Figure 17: Liberia-Per Capita GDP and Death Related to Conflict

conflict (red) increase, real GDP per capita decreases (grey) in Figure 18, (refer to Attachment K to review the data and sourcing information for this graph).

This analysis holds true for countries that experienced Western military intervention, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya (refer to Attachment K to review the corresponding graphs for these countries).[87] Anomalies that do not fit this pattern exist, including Myanmar, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Each of these states experience isolated instances of rising real GDP per capita and an increase in deaths related to conflict.[88] Additional research is needed to understand why. Except in these isolated instances, the evidence exists for a correlation between the economy and conflict, which as the deaths related to conflict increase, real GPD per capita declines. Refer to Attachment K to review the graphs and data for the other thirty-two *Weak and Failing* states.

A Theory in Practice

Colonized by Spain, Venezuela is a Type 3 – *Post-Colonial* – state that gained independence in the early part of the nineteenth century. After a period of unrest, the country experienced developmental regression in 1998. Over the ensuing decade, the economy grew until Venezuela returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity* in 2008. The *2019 Fragile States Index* reported, however, that Venezuela experienced six consecutive years of decline, which have resulted in an increase in disease and infant mortality rates.[89] The declining real GDP per capita recorded in Figure 19 illustrates a return to a 2009 economy.

Year	Venezuela
1989	$7,363
1990	$7,690
1991	$7,647
1992	$8,460
1993	$7,643
1994	$7,067
1995	$7,243
1996	$6,951
1997	$7,108
1998	$6,731
1999	$6,554
2000	$7,927
2001	$7,500
2002	$7,122
2003	$6,740
2004	$8,580
2005	$10,725
2006	$12,307
2007	$13,677
2008	$15,661
2009	$13,508
2010	$16,161
2011	$17,746
2012	$17,752
2013	$18,795
2014	$17,568
2015	$16,257
2016	$13,159
2017	
2018	

Figure 19: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for Venezuela

If the trend continues, Venezuela, "once the envy of the region," will reverse progress and again regress to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*.[90] It should then come as no surprise that as GPD per capita declined in 2016, the deaths related to conflict increased.[91] As evidenced by the experience of USSR and SFRY successor states, and even Venezuela, a country in the *Stage of Power Maturity* can regress; like Libya, the transition to a *Weak and Failing* state is not improbable. Now may be the time for policy makers to act.



Figure 19: Venezuela-Per Capita GDP and Deaths Related to Conflict

Conclusion

To ensure the state continues to provide the world's citizens with the greatest amount of individual freedoms and the highest personal standards of living ever recorded, international development and security strategists must understand how the modern state evolves and the negative implications of regression. A historic framework, introduced in 1958 by A. F. Organski, hypothesized traditional states' progress through a three-stage, linear, power transition process, wherein the chance of international instability and conflict increases as states transition from the second to the third, and final, stage of his model.[92] This Model reinforced the conventional

wisdom that policy makers should focus their security strategies at near-peer competitors in the final stage of development, namely states that are gaining in relative strength.

The evidence presented in this paper argues in favor of an adapted Organski Transition Model, one that is more cyclical than linear, allowing a state to regress in absolute power and then rebound. The data from the *Human Development Reports* and the *Maddison Project Database* used in this analysis illustrate that (1) regression occurs; (2) real GDP per capita is tied closely to the development of the state (i.e., GDP declines when a state regresses and an increases when a state progresses in development); (3) regression may occur at any stage of the model; (4) conflict is overwhelmingly related to a decline in a state's real GDP per capita; and (5) conflict is not monopolized in the third stage of development, as posited under the original Organski Model. With these tenets in mind, strategists will be able to create development and security policies to deal with states at risk of regression in the twenty-first century, such as Venezuela, which may become a risk to international stability.

Attachment A: Power Distribution 1985[93]

The chart and diagram below illustrate the traditional instruments of national power – GDP, Correlates of War (COW), and the military strength for five countries in 1985. The COW assigns a quantifiable number to a state representing their power potential by using traditional indicators of strength – population, per capita GDP, production capability, energy use, military expenditures, and military personnel. Problematically, the COW index favors countries with large populations and enormous military expenditures, like China or the former Soviet Union.

When the shaded portion is in the shape of a perfect pentagon, the GDP between the states is equal in absolute terms.

Power Distribution: 1985			
Country	**GDP**	**Military**	**COW**
U.S.	33	40	18
Japan	13	2	10
USSR	13	44	30
China	15	4	28
Britain	6	4	4







Attachment B: Human Development Index Ranking[94]

The UNDP HDI not only measures industrial maturity, which is the primary indicator for the Organski Transition Model, it also numerically ranks individual states based on their average achievement in three broad categories – health, knowledge, and standard of living – all of which are corelated to the economic growth of the state in the final stage of development.[95] Factored into the final numerical score are life expectancy, level of education, and gross national income per capita.[96] Accordingly, a country with a population that has a longer life span, higher education, higher standard of living, and more advanced economy will receive a greater UNDP HDI score than one that lags in these categories; this is also a primary component in the Organski Transition Model.

Human Development Index Ranking 2019

Rank	Country	Rank	Country
Very High Human Development		96	Jamaica
1	Norway	96	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
2	Switzerland	98	Dominica
3	Ireland	98	Fiji
4	Germany	98	Paraguay
4	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	98	Suriname
6	Australia	102	Jordan
6	Iceland	103	Belize
8	Sweden	104	Maldives
9	Singapore	105	Tonga
10	Netherlands	106	Philippines
11	Denmark	107	Moldova (Republic of)
12	Finland	108	Turkmenistan
13	Canada	108	Uzbekistan
14	New Zealand	110	Libya
15	United Kingdom	111	Indonesia
15	United States	111	Samoa
17	Belgium	113	South Africa
18	Liechtenstein	114	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
19	Japan	115	Gabon
20	Austria	116	Egypt
21	Luxembourg	Medium Human Development	
22	Israel	117	Marshall Islands
22	Korea (Republic of)	118	Viet Nam
24	Slovenia	119	Palestine, State of

25	Spain	120	Iraq
26	Czechia	121	Morocco
26	France	122	Kyrgyzstan
28	Malta	123	Guyana
29	Italy	124	El Salvador
30	Estonia	125	Tajikistan
31	Cyprus	126	Cabo Verde
32	Greece	126	Guatemala
32	Poland	126	Nicaragua
34	Lithuania	129	India
35	United Arab Emirates	130	Namibia
36	Andorra	131	Timor-Leste
36	Saudi Arabia	132	Honduras
36	Slovakia	132	Kiribati
39	Latvia	134	Bhutan
40	Portugal	135	Bangladesh
41	Qatar	135	Micronesia (Federated States of)
42	Chile	137	Sao Tome and Principe
43	Brunei Darussalam	138	Congo
43	Hungary	138	Eswatini (Kingdom of)
45	Bahrain	140	Lao People's Democratic Republic
46	Croatia	141	Vanuatu
47	Oman	142	Ghana
48	Argentina	143	Zambia
49	Russian Federation	144	Equatorial Guinea
50	Belarus	145	Myanmar
50	Kazakhstan	146	Cambodia
52	Bulgaria	147	Kenya
52	Montenegro	147	Nepal
52	Romania	149	Angola
55	Palau	150	Cameroon
56	Barbados	150	Zimbabwe
57	Kuwait	152	Pakistan
57	Uruguay	153	Solomon Islands
59	Turkey	Low Human Development	
60	Bahamas	154	Syrian Arab Republic
61	Malaysia	155	Papua New Guinea
62	Seychelles	156	Comoros
High Human Development		157	Rwanda
63	Serbia	158	Nigeria

63	Trinidad and Tobago	159	Tanzania (United Republic of)
65	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	159	Uganda
66	Mauritius	161	Mauritania
67	Panama	162	Madagascar
68	Costa Rica	163	Benin
69	Albania	164	Lesotho
70	Georgia	165	Côte d'Ivoire
71	Sri Lanka	166	Senegal
72	Cuba	167	Togo
73	Saint Kitts and Nevis	168	Sudan
74	Antigua and Barbuda	169	Haiti
75	Bosnia and Herzegovina	170	Afghanistan
76	Mexico	171	Djibouti
77	Thailand	172	Malawi
78	Grenada	173	Ethiopia
79	Brazil	174	Gambia
79	Colombia	174	Guinea
81	Armenia	176	Liberia
82	Algeria	177	Yemen
82	North Macedonia	178	Guinea-Bissau
82	Peru	179	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
85	China	180	Mozambique
85	Ecuador	181	Sierra Leone
87	Azerbaijan	182	Burkina Faso
88	Ukraine	182	Eritrea
89	Dominican Republic	184	Mali
89	Saint Lucia	185	Burundi
91	Tunisia	186	South Sudan
92	Mongolia	187	Chad
93	Lebanon	188	Central African Republic
94	Botswana	189	Niger
94	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		

The below listed chart from the *Human Development Report 2019* is shaded with the color that reflects their stage of growth for each state. States with a Human Development Index in the top stage of growth –*High (or Very High) Human Development* –align with the *Stage of Power Maturity* in Organski's model and are shaded with green. States with Human Development Indices in the middle stage of growth – *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power/Medium Human Development* – and the bottom stage of growth – *Stage of Potential Power/Low Human Development* – are shaded in yellow and red, respectively. The *Human Development Index Report 2019* suggests that fifty-nine countries are in the *Stage of Potential Power*, forty-two are in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, and eighty-eight are in the *Stage of Power Maturity*.[97]

Human Development Index Ranking 2019

Rank	Country	Rank	Country
Very High Human Development		96	Jamaica
1	Norway	96	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
2	Switzerland	98	Dominica
3	Ireland	98	Fiji
4	Germany	98	Paraguay
4	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	98	Suriname
6	Australia	102	Jordan
6	Iceland	103	Belize
8	Sweden	104	Maldives
9	Singapore	105	Tonga
10	Netherlands	106	Philippines
11	Denmark	107	Moldova (Republic of)
12	Finland	108	Turkmenistan
13	Canada	108	Uzbekistan
14	New Zealand	110	Libya
15	United Kingdom	111	Indonesia
15	United States	111	Samoa
17	Belgium	113	South Africa
18	Liechtenstein	114	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
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22	Israel	117	Marshall Islands
22	Korea (Republic of)	118	Viet Nam
24	Slovenia	119	Palestine, State of
25	Spain	120	Iraq

26	Czechia	121	Morocco
26	France	122	Kyrgyzstan
28	Malta	123	Guyana
29	Italy	124	El Salvador
30	Estonia	125	Tajikistan
31	Cyprus	126	Cabo Verde
32	Greece	126	Guatemala
32	Poland	126	Nicaragua
34	Lithuania	129	India
35	United Arab Emirates	130	Namibia
36	Andorra	131	Timor-Leste
36	Saudi Arabia	132	Honduras
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39	Latvia	134	Bhutan
40	Portugal	135	Bangladesh
41	Qatar	135	Micronesia (Federated States of)
42	Chile	137	Sao Tome and Principe
43	Brunei Darussalam	138	Congo
43	Hungary	138	Eswatini (Kingdom of)
45	Bahrain	140	Lao People's Democratic Republic
46	Croatia	141	Vanuatu
47	Oman	142	Ghana
48	Argentina	143	Zambia
49	Russian Federation	144	Equatorial Guinea
50	Belarus	145	Myanmar
50	Kazakhstan	146	Cambodia
52	Bulgaria	147	Kenya
52	Montenegro	147	Nepal
52	Romania	149	Angola
55	Palau	150	Cameroon
56	Barbados	150	Zimbabwe
57	Kuwait	152	Pakistan
57	Uruguay	153	Solomon Islands
59	Turkey	Low Human Development	
60	Bahamas	154	Syrian Arab Republic
61	Malaysia	155	Papua New Guinea
62	Seychelles	156	Comoros
High Human Development		157	Rwanda
63	Serbia	158	Nigeria
63	Trinidad and Tobago	159	Tanzania (United Republic of)

65	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	159	Uganda
66	Mauritius	161	Mauritania
67	Panama	162	Madagascar
68	Costa Rica	163	Benin
69	Albania	164	Lesotho
70	Georgia	165	Côte d'Ivoire
71	Sri Lanka	166	Senegal
72	Cuba	167	Togo
73	Saint Kitts and Nevis	168	Sudan
74	Antigua and Barbuda	169	Haiti
75	Bosnia and Herzegovina	170	Afghanistan
76	Mexico	171	Djibouti
77	Thailand	172	Malawi
78	Grenada	173	Ethiopia
79	Brazil	174	Gambia
79	Colombia	174	Guinea
81	Armenia	176	Liberia
82	Algeria	177	Yemen
82	North Macedonia	178	Guinea-Bissau
82	Peru	179	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
85	China	180	Mozambique
85	Ecuador	181	Sierra Leone
87	Azerbaijan	182	Burkina Faso
88	Ukraine	182	Eritrea
89	Dominican Republic	184	Mali
89	Saint Lucia	185	Burundi
91	Tunisia	186	South Sudan
92	Mongolia	187	Chad
93	Lebanon	188	Central African Republic
94	Botswana	189	Niger
94	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		

Attachment C: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the USSR[98]

An analysis of the Human Development Index level from 1993 through 2018 along with the *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016 shows evidence of: (1) the regression of the USSR's successor states; (2) a correlation between the economy and the states' development; and (3) and the regression of states even in the highest level of development. Until its collapse, the USSR was ranked thirty-third out of 204 states by the *Human Develop Report,* and was assessed as having *High Human Development*.[99]

However, as the successor states were constituted, they quickly regressed to a previous stage in the adapted Organski Transition Model (Figure 3). Points of regression are illustrated in diagram below as the color in the column changes.[100] As states regress from *Stage of Power Maturity* (green) to the *Stage of Potential Power* (yellow), the column changes from "green" to "yellow." Ten of the fifteen successor states regressed from the *Stage of Power Maturity* to the *Stage of Potential Power*. Of the ten states that regressed, eight saw a decline in the real GDP per capita of their population – evidence of a correlation between the economy and the states development.

The regression of the states and the corresponding decline in real GDP per capita illustrates the shock these countries experienced and show that states ranked in the highest level of development are susceptible to regression. It is to be noted that while the Human Development Index information exists prior to 1992, the USSR's successor states did not. The Human Development Index level indicated below has been identified by the author using supporting data from the respective report year. The United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index levels that were not determined by the *Human Development Report* are shaded in gray. The available economic data is colored in the font that reflects the corresponding United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index level.

HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the USSR

Year	USSR	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Estonia	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Russian Federation	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Ukraine	Uzbekistan
1989		$6,954	$10,505	$13,334	$11,103	$13,562	$11,584	$6,562	$13,643	$12,603	$4,469	$18,867	$5,240	$6,061	$11,165	$4,642
1990		$6,389	$9,224	$12,857	$10,198	$11,626	$11,331	$6,588	$13,769	$11,845	$4,272	$18,323	$5,074	$5,938	$10,638	$4,444
1991		$5,684	$13,196	$12,658	$10,385	$9,890	$10,955	$6,417	$11,735	$10,137	$4,104	$17,468	$4,831	$5,497	$9,798	$4,118
1992		$3,346	$9,160	$10,875	$8,791	$4,636	$11,165	$5,034	$8,789	$8,868	$2,451	$16,771	$2,324	$4,615	$9,076	$3,305
1993		$3,186	$5,163	$11,506	$8,258	$2,843	$8,218	$4,445	$7,978	$8,069	$2,490	$14,117	$2,142	$5,074	$7,223	$3,839
1994		$2,704	$4,014	$7,491	$8,299	$2,603	$6,622	$3,407	$8,098	$7,253	$2,260	$11,938	$1,427	$3,509	$5,895	$3,201
1995		$2,891	$2,427	$7,142	$9,238	$2,931	$5,699	$2,893	$7,926	$7,788	$2,350	$11,133	$1,406	$3,024	$5,157	$3,132
1996		$3,155	$2,322	$7,433	$8,468	$3,332	$5,603	$2,831	$8,082	$8,142	$2,293	$8,541	$1,303	$2,859	$4,957	$3,258
1997		$3,303	$2,243	$7,994	$9,075	$3,597	$5,325	$2,350	$8,739	$8,999	$2,166	$8,320	$1,603	$2,985	$4,592	$3,306
1998		$2,961	$2,170	$7,902	$10,144	$3,455	$5,079	$2,124	$9,607	$9,718	$1,983	$7,616	$1,403	$3,186	$4,457	$3,319
1999		$3,276	$2,389	$7,828	$10,749	$3,434	$4,943	$2,048	$10,162	$10,249	$1,647	$7,421	$1,251	$3,332	$4,386	$3,517
2000		$3,324	$2,576	$8,587	$11,903	$3,429	$5,704	$2,012	$10,654	$11,112	$1,801	$8,604	$1,273	$4,089	$4,448	$3,378
2001		$3,509	$2,770	$8,345	$12,534	$3,619	$6,417	$1,968	$11,407	$11,968	$1,892	$8,892	$1,391	$4,457	$4,798	$3,557
2002		$3,803	$2,906	$8,543	$13,529	$3,865	$6,803	$1,958	$12,325	$12,456	$2,104	$9,248	$1,462	$5,363	$5,053	$3,745
2003		$4,347	$3,084	$9,041	$14,221	$4,396	$7,600	$2,109	$12,818	$13,628	$2,368	$10,121	$1,738	$6,408	$5,663	$3,960
2004		$4,633	$3,305	$9,760	$15,070	$4,780	$8,687	$2,203	$13,412	$13,928	$2,504	$11,526	$1,965	$7,368	$6,285	$4,125
2005		$5,172	$4,806	$10,303	$16,870	$5,242	$10,331	$2,228	$14,485	$15,036	$2,816	$13,406	$2,064	$8,840	$7,364	$4,360
2006		$5,925	$6,827	$11,593	$18,829	$6,105	$12,372	$2,562	$16,244	$16,357	$3,114	$15,409	$2,282	$9,423	$8,256	$4,193
2007		$6,751	$9,354	$12,775	$21,139	$7,004	$14,209	$2,899	$17,941	$18,024	$3,259	$17,799	$2,359	$10,069	$9,452	$4,944
2008		$7,360	$10,216	$14,781	$20,883	$7,458	$16,214	$3,354	$18,225	$18,693	$3,503	$20,022	$2,759	$10,487	$10,258	$5,679
2009		$6,906	$10,804	$14,573	$19,387	$7,867	$15,395	$3,384	$16,439	$17,132	$3,568	$17,864	$2,594	$15,900	$8,766	$6,344
2010		$7,642	$12,866	$16,016	$19,917	$8,305	$17,738	$3,381	$16,847	$18,340	$4,180	$20,255	$2,893	$16,391	$9,250	$6,812
2011		$8,465	$16,176	$17,918	$21,997	$8,946	$21,302	$4,142	$18,428	$20,243	$4,892	$23,130	$3,111	$16,510	$10,333	$7,399
2012		$8,827	$16,407	$18,564	$23,756	$9,241	$21,947	$3,959	$19,812	$22,259	$4,938	$23,827	$3,212	$17,120	$10,744	$7,929
2013		$9,006	$15,841	$19,536	$24,710	$9,540	$23,365	$4,360	$20,765	$23,389	$5,256	$23,881	$3,297	$18,918	$10,993	$8,641
2014		$9,260	$16,025	$20,037	$25,424	$9,903	$23,398	$5,773	$21,944	$24,604	$5,534	$23,798	$3,226	$20,203	$10,331	$8,511
2015		$9,552	$16,045	$19,306	$25,790	$10,198	$23,408	$5,910	$22,724	$25,279	$5,569	$23,118	$3,365	$21,262	$9,429	$9,107
2016		$9,588	$15,296	$18,766	$26,173	$10,483	$23,399	$6,065	$23,362	$26,182	$5,851	$23,064	$3,544	$22,328	$9,694	$9,726
2017																
2018																
GDP Change - 1990 and 1999		-49%	-74%	-39%	5%	-70%	-56%	-69%	-26%	-13%	-61%	-59%	-75%	-44%	-59%	-21%
GDP Change - 1990 and 2016		69%	16%	48%	152%	6%	114%	-5%	99%	158%	43%	32%	-27%	307%	-1%	136%

Stage of Power Maturity/High Human Development

Stage of Transitional Growth in Power/Medium Human Development

Attachment D: Average Per Capita GDP for the Successor States of the USSR[101]

Year	Average Per capita GDP
1989	$10,020
1990	$9,501
1991	$9,124
1992	$7,280
1993	$6,303
1994	$5,248
1995	$5,009
1996	$4,839
1997	$4,973
1998	$5,009
1999	$5,109
2000	$5,526
2001	$5,835
2002	$6,211
2003	$6,767
2004	$7,303
2005	$8,222
2006	$9,299
2007	$10,532
2008	$11,326
2009	$11,128
2010	$12,056
2011	$13,533
2012	$14,169
2013	$14,767
2014	$15,198
2015	$15,337
2016	$15,568

The diagram below illustrates the correlation between a state's level of development and the health of their economy. As is diagramed, the real GDP per capita declined an average of forty-seven percent within the Type 2 – *Ethnic Splinter* states – from the former USSR between 1990 and 1999. This decline in the real GDP per capita correlates with the regression of the ten successor states. Of the fifteen ethnic splinters, Estonia best limited their real per capita GDP decline. Uniquely, Estonia increased their real GDP per capita by five percent. It should come as no surprise that Estonia transitioned fastest after regression and returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity* in four years.

As predicted by the adapted Organski Transition Model, all ten of the former states from the USSR that experienced regression, recovered economically, and transitioned back to the *Stage of Power Maturity*.

Attachment E: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the SFRY[102]

Diagramed below, the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index data from 1989 to 2018 coupled with the *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016 illustrate the regression of the successor states from the highest level of development and the correlation with the economy. As these countries transitioned through the adapted Organski Transition Model, the color representing the stage of each state in a given year is reflected in the corresponding cell.

Five of the six former SFRY states regressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* after the dissolution of the SFRY but rebounded to the Stage of Power Maturity by 2007.[103] All five states that regressed also saw a decline in the real GDP per capita of their population as they slid back into a *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*. Like the successor states of the USSR, these countries illustrate the validity of the adapted Organski Transition Model and that states even in the highest level of development regress.

HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Successor States of the SFRY

Year	Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Her	Croatia	Montenegro	Serbia	Slovenia	TFYR of Macedonia
1989		2248	16012	12953	8228	18282	8829
1990		1974	14853	11755	7320	16675	7936
1991*		2119	11744	10558	6597	15353	7512
1992**		1306	10337	7500	4720	14697	7018
1993		1369	9712	4659	3198	15802	6535
1994		1892	10260	4632	3298	16925	6605
1995***		$2,605	$11,054	$5,188	$3,638	$18,710	$6,721
1996		$5,009	$11,665	$6,500	$6,041	$19,280	$6,701
1997		$5,634	$13,090	$6,949	$6,968	$19,941	$6,919
1998		$5,788	$13,501	$7,492	$7,917	$20,192	$7,249
1999		$6,471	$13,781	$6,823	$6,825	$20,854	$7,806
2000		$5,874	$14,326	$7,182	$7,622	$21,555	$8,183
2001		$5,882	$14,402	$7,743	$7,392	$21,845	$8,124
2002		$6,147	$14,892	$7,614	$7,771	$22,665	$7,866
2003		$6,013	$15,515	$7,885	$8,199	$22,656	$7,684
2004		$5,812	$16,009	$8,368	$8,422	$23,639	$7,917
2005		$6,480	$16,654	$8,951	$9,583	$24,405	$8,724
2006		$7,038	$17,434	$11,725	$10,238	$24,833	$9,142
2007		$7,747	$19,299	$13,656	$10,543	$25,897	$9,797
2008		$8,228	$20,406	$15,054	$11,719	$27,380	$10,750
2009		$8,624	$19,645	$14,296	$11,828	$25,973	$11,415
2010		$8,646	$18,987	$14,536	$11,872	$25,660	$11,625
2011		$8,961	$19,813	$15,747	$12,463	$26,004	$11,321
2012		$9,388	$20,523	$15,709	$13,085	$26,022	$11,748
2013		$9,689	$20,130	$16,357	$13,347	$26,062	$12,421
2014		$9,986	$20,466	$16,903	$13,387	$27,462	$13,110
2015		$10,305	$20,905	$17,738	$13,556	$28,077	$13,586
2016		$10,576	$21,625	$18,244	$14,001	$28,761	$13,887
2017							
2018							
GDP Change - 1987 and 1995		13%	-33%	-62%	-56%	-3%	-25%
GDP Change - 1987 and 2016		358%	31%	35%	70%	50%	55%

*Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia declared independence.

**Serbia and Montenegro create the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

***The Dayton Agreement is signed by the successor states.

Attachment F: Average Per Capita GDP for the Successor States of SFRY[104]

This diagram illustrates the correlation between a state's level of development and the health of their economy. Between 1987 and 1995, when the Dayton Agreement was signed by the SFRY successor states,[105] the real GDP per capita declined an average of twenty-eight percent within the Type 2 – *Ethnic Splinter* states – from the former SFRY.[106] This eight-year decline correlates with the regression of the successor states, and is evidence of the link between a state's economy and level of development. It is to be noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina retained a thirteen percent real GDP per capita gain during the same period and remained in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*.

By 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina had returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. Correspondingly, the real GDP per capita had grown by an astounding three hundred fifty-eight percent during this time.[107] Across all six successor states, the real GDP per capita had grown by 100 percent from 1987 to 2016.[108] As predicted by the adapted Organski Transition Model, the successor states of the SFRY experienced regression, recovered economically, and transitioned back to the *Stage of Power Maturity*. Moreover, the real GDP per capita declined with regression and increased as the states returned to the *Stage of Power Maturity*.



Year	Average Per capita GDP
1989	$11,092
1990	$10,086
1991*	$8,981
1992**	$7,596
1993	$6,879
1994	$7,269
1995***	$7,986
1996	$9,199
1997	$9,917
1998	$10,357
1999	$10,427
2000	$10,790
2001	$10,898
2002	$11,159
2003	$11,325
2004	$11,695
2005	$12,466
2006	$13,402
2007	$14,490
2008	$15,590
2009	$15,297
2010	$15,221
2011	$15,718
2012	$16,079
2013	$16,334
2014	$16,886
2015	$17,361
2016	$17,849

*Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia declared independence.

**Serbia and Montenegro created the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
***The Dayton Agreement is signed by the successor states.

Attachment G: HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Namibia and South Africa[109]

HDI and Real GDP Per Capita for the Namibia and South Africa

Year	Namibia	South Africa
1989	$4,919	$8,000
1990*	$4,787	$7,866
1991	$4,647	$7,599
1992	$4,801	$7,473
1993	$4,298	$7,434
1994**	$4,418	$7,468
1995	$4,775	$7,773
1996	$4,898	$8,004
1997	$4,964	$8,128
1998	$5,125	$8,136
1999	$5,155	$8,142
2000	$5,204	$8,478
2001	$5,260	$8,678
2002	$5,377	$9,147
2003	$5,331	$9,250
2004	$5,719	$9,628
2005	$6,171	$10,241
2006	$6,725	$10,861
2007	$6,878	$11,347
2008	$7,499	$11,435
2009	$7,311	$11,001
2010	$7,440	$11,288
2011	$8,203	$11,838
2012	$9,181	$11,880
2013	$9,512	$11,993
2014	$11,484	$12,050
2015	$11,850	$12,054
2016	$11,741	$11,949
2017		
2018		
GDP Change - 1990 and 2016	145%	52%

Power Maturity/High HD
Transitional Growth/Medium HD
Potential Power/Low HD

In 1990, the Republic of South Africa, which was in the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, formally granted Namibia its independence. Economic decline followed. Prior to 1990, big business investment in mining, fishing, and tourism drove the economy; however, capital and brain drain accompanied their South African administrators.[110] The scarcity of mining resources only compounded the already exacerbated economic decline.[111] Without investment, knowledge, or materials to mine, Namibia entered a period of economic regression but remained static in the lowest level of development – the *Stage of Potential Power*.

For three years, Namibia remained in this stage. During this time, Namibia spent resources on education, capitalized on existing infrastructure, and focused on the traditional trading culture of the small business community.[112] As illustrated in the diagram to the right, the effort paid off. Namibia recovered economically and progressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*. Since independence, Namibia's real GDP per capita had increased by 145 percent.[113]



Superimposing both HDI levels from 1989 through 2018 and *Maddison Project* economic data from 1989 through 2016 diagrams the economic decline in Namibia prior to and immediately after independence. As real GDP per capita increased between 1993 and 1994, Namibia progressed to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* and became a developmental peer with the Republic of South Africa, a feat which shows their level of progress.[114] This example of a *Post-Colonial* state corroborates an economic correlation with the stage of development.

*Namibia gains independence. **South Africa gives Namibia control of Walvis Bay and Penguin Islands.

Attachment H: Characteristics of Weak and Failing States

The characteristics of *Weak or Failing States* are instability, ineffective governance, lack of territorial integrity, and economic sustainability. Not all of the states exhibit these characteristics to the same degree. Data from the *Harmonized list of Fragile Situations* and the *Fragile States* index are used to illustrate this point.

1. Instability: The World Bank reviews stability in terms of conflict and stability operations and places a large emphasis on states that have exhibited both. According to their reporting from the *Harmonized List of Fragile Situations,* twenty-eight states have experienced major conflict since 1992.[115] Mauritania, North Korea, Togo and Zimbabwe have not. Thirteen states received a UN or regional peace-building and political mission within the last eight years; twenty have not.[116] Refer to Figure 12 and Attachment J.

2. Ineffective governance: The *Fragile States Index* assesses the legitimacy of a state's central authority by reviewing several factors, including demonstrations, civil disobedience, armed insurgencies, confidence in the central authority, and effectiveness.[117] Each state is then graded and ranked on a scale from ten to one, with one signifying the most effective government.[118] The "State Legitimacy" average for the thirty-two *Weak and Failing States* is 8.7, well below the 5.9 world average.[119] The grade for Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Uganda, is better than 8.7, the overall average for the thirty-three weak and failing states. Refer to Figure 12 and Attachment J.

3. Lack of territorial integrity/porous borders: Control of borders can indicate the effectiveness of a state's security apparatus– both law enforcement and military. The "Security Apparatus" indicator from the *Fragile States Index* measures the professionalism of, and the control the state has over, these forces.[120] Each state is then graded and ranked on a scale from ten to one, with one signifying the most effective government.[121] The "Security Apparatus" average for the thirty-two is 8.4.[122] This is well below the 5.6 world average.[123] The grade for Angola, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Uganda is better than 8.4, the overall average for the thirty-three weak and failing states. Refer to Figure 12 and Attachment J.

4. Economic sustainability: The "Economy" indicator in the *Fragile States Index* uses real GDP per capita, unemployment, poverty, business failures, and several other variables to assess economic stability. Each state is then graded and ranked on a scale from ten to one, with one signifying the most effective government.[124] The world average is 5.5;[125] the average for the weak and failing states is 7.[126] The grade for Angola, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Uganda, is better than 7, the overall average for the thirty-three weak and failing states. Refer to Figure 12 and Attachment J.

Attachment I: List of Weak and Failing States Identified by Four Indices [127]

A review of the definition of a weak and/or failing state from nine authorities on the subject, including the National Security Council and the U.S. Agency for International Development, shows consensus that *Weak and Failing States* exhibit extreme degrees of (1) instability, (2) ineffective governance, (3) a lack of territorial integrity/porous borders, and (4) economic unsustainability.[128] Scholars also agree that *Weak and Failing* states may be described as countries wherein the administrative effectiveness of the central authority is eroded to the point where it has collapsed, or will collapse; and as the central authority dissolves, non-state actors proliferate and replace the bureaucratic functions of the central authority.[129]

Listed to the right are the fifty states identified by at least one of the four indices as *Weak and Failing*. All four methodologies agree that ten states – Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia – are *Weak and Failing*. Three indices agree that an additional sixteen states are *Weak and Failing*; and two indices lists nine more. Only one index identifies the remaining sixteen states.

Country	2019 Harmonized List of Fragile Situations	2017 State Fragility Index "Red States"	2019 Failed States Index "Alert States"	2019 Index of State Weakness "Failed and Critically Weak States"
Weak and Failing States Identified by Three Indexes				
Afghanistan	X	X	X	X
Burundi	X	X	X	X
CentralAfrican Repu	X	X	X	X
Chad	X	X	X	X
Cote d'Ivoire	X	X	X	X
Guinea Bissau	X	X	X	X
Iraq	X	X	X	X
Myanmar	X	X	X	X
Somalia	X	X	X	X
Weak and Failing States Identified by Three Indexes				
Congo, Dem.Rep.	X	X	X	
Congo, Rep	X		X	X
Eritrea	X		X	X
Ethiopia		X	X	X
Guinea		X	X	X
Haiti	X		X	X
Liberia	X		X	X
Mali	X	X	X	
Niger		X	X	X
Nigeria		X	X	X
South Sudan	X	X	X	
Sudan		X	X	X
Uganda		X	X	X
Yemen	X	X	X	
Zimbabwe		X	X	X
Weak and Failing States Identified by Two Indexes				
Angola		X		X
Cameroon		X	X	
Libya	X		X	
Mauritania		X	X	
North Korea			X	X
Pakistan		X	X	
Rwanda		X		X
Syria	X		X	
Togo	X			X
Weak and Failing States Identified by One Index				
Burkina Faso		X		
Comoros	X			
Djibouti	X			
Equatorial Guinea				X
Gambia, The	X			
Kenya			X	
Kiribati	X			
Kosovo*	X			
Lebanon	X			
Marshall Islands	X			
Micronesia, Fed, Sts	X			
Mozambique	X			
Nepal				X
Sierra Leone				X
Solomon Islands	X			
Tuvalu*	X			

Attachment J: HDI, Real GDP Per Capita, and Other Indicators for the List of Weak and Failing States[130]

Year	Afghanistan	Burundi	Central African Republic	Chad	Côte d'Ivoire	Guinea-Bissau	Iraq	Myanmar	Somalia	Togo	Syrian Arab Republic	Rwanda	North Korea	Pakistan	Mauritania	Libya	Cameroon	Angola	Zimbabwe	Yemen	Uganda	Sudan (Former)	South Sudan	Nigeria	Niger	Mali	Liberia	Haiti	Guinea	Ethiopia	D.R. of the Congo	Congo
1980	$2,108	$1,157	$1,044	$888	$3,136	$1,267	$17,447	$1,031																								
1981	$2,369	$1,199	$1,173	$793	$3,164	$1,232	$15,815	$1,069																								
1982	$2,628	$1,173	$1,166	$798	$3,148	$1,255	$14,745	$1,125																								
1983	$2,789	$1,180	$1,060	$878	$3,080	$1,184	$12,336	$1,161																								
1984	$2,766	$1,173	$1,103	$913	$3,035	$1,221	$11,673	$1,214																								
1985	$2,700	$1,250	$1,214	$977	$3,315	$1,244	$11,435	$1,221																								
1986	$2,779	$1,298	$1,176	$1,006	$3,317	$1,203	$11,040	$1,201																								
1987	$2,507	$1,267	$1,065	$1,008	$3,077	$1,216	$11,060	$1,144																								
1988	$2,280	$1,346	$1,095	$1,053	$2,949	$1,355	$8,602	$981																								
1989	$2,067	$1,270	$1,129	$1,042	$2,785	$1,319	$7,491	$992																								
1990	$1,992	$1,313	$1,086	$1,053	$2,333	$1,343	$7,205	$999																								
1991	$1,761	$1,352	$1,034	$1,059	$2,276	$1,342	$2,670	$944																								
1992	$1,629	$1,276	$972	$1,043	$2,328	$989	$3,434	$999																								
1993	$1,080	$1,220	$923	$1,006	$2,225	$1,175	$3,379	$1,274																								
1994	$772	$1,293	$1,047	$1,044	$2,074	$1,296	$3,095	$1,211																								
1995	$1,101	$1,141	$1,051	$1,016	$2,276	$1,292	$2,765	$1,331																								
1996	$1,008	$1,011	$888	$996	$2,423	$1,347	$2,985	$1,314																								
1997	$926	$980	$909	$1,022	$2,397	$1,526	$1,926	$1,286																								
1998	$856	$1,050	$933	$1,061	$2,454	$1,258	[illegible]	[illegible]																								
1999	$787	$1,025	$901	$1,024	$2,378	$1,417	$2,337	$1,462																								
2000	$735	$962	$911	$989	$2,127	$1,357	$3,147	$1,427																								
2001	$692	$959	$912	$1,071	$2,302	$1,356	[illegible]	$1,471																								
2002	$1,088	$967	$897	$1,127	$2,251	$1,296	[illegible]	$1,442																								
2003	$1,112	$998	$840	$1,242	$2,147	$1,291	[illegible]	$1,642																								
2004	$1,107	$1,025	$851	$1,596	$2,024	$1,322	[illegible]	$1,754																								
2005	$1,187	$1,006	$864	$1,667	$2,015	$1,318	[illegible]	$2,031																								
2006	$1,257	$936	$869	$1,553	$2,078	$1,286	[illegible]	[illegible]																								
2007	$1,447	$868	$887	$1,593	$2,097	$1,280	[illegible]	[illegible]																								
2008	$1,464	$843	$880	$1,605	$2,215	$1,275	[illegible]	$2,737																								
2009	$1,669	$774	$849	$1,444	$2,400	$1,253	[illegible]	$2,820																								
2010	$1,685	$743	$866	$1,764	$2,608	$1,324	$9,426	$3,384																								
2011	$1,792	$719	$909	$1,661	$2,444	$1,413	[illegible]	$3,804																								
2012	$1,945	$729	$925	$1,806	$2,892	$1,283	$12,408	$4,539																								
2013	$2,025	$763	$581	$1,958	$3,102	$1,281	$13,213	$4,992																								
2014	$2,022	$779	$589	$2,282	$3,250	$1,277	$12,889	$5,493																								
2015	$1,928	$723	$605	$2,387	$3,473	$1,313	$13,087	$5,834																								
2016	$1,929	$692	$619	$2,192	$3,664	$1,354	[illegible]	[illegible]																								
2017																																
2018																																
GDP Change 1980-Present	-8%	-40%	-41%	147%	17%	7%	-20%	495%	-																							
HDI Rank (1-189)*	170	185	188	187	165	178	120	145	-																							
Presence of External Force**	P	-	P	-	PK	P	P	-	P																							
Instability***	War	War	War	War	X War	X War	War	War	War																							
Ineffective Governance****	9	9	9.1	9.6	7.3	8.9	8.9	8.3	9																							
Lack of Territorial Integrity/Porous Borders*****	10	8.6	8.6	9.5	7.4	8.3	8.7	8.7	9.6																							
Economic Sustainability******	8.6	8.4	8.7	9	6.7	7.7	5.9	5.3	8.8																							
States Listed by Four Indexes																																
States Listed by Three Indexes																																
States Listed by Two Indexes																																

Power Maturity/High HD		
Transitional Growth/Medium HD	PK	"Presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping operation in this country in the last three years."
Potential Power/Low HD	P	"Presence of a UN and/or regional peace-building and political mission in this country in the last three years."

War		State is engaged in armed conflict as of mid-2017
X War		State "directly involved in one or more major armed conflicts" between 1992-2011

* United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2019 (New York, New York: AGS, 2019), 303-303.

** The World Bank, *Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY19* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2019), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/892921532523983405l/FCSList-FY19-Final.pdf

*** Monty G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, *Global Report 2017* (Vienna, Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace, 2017), 45-54, http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2017.pdf

**** JJ Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Ignatius Onyekwere, Hanna Blyth, Marcel Maglo, Daniel Moges, Charles Fiertz, Christina Murphy, Wendy Wilson, and Kevin Obike, *Fragile State Index 2019 – Annual Report* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), 42-43, https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf.

Attachment K: GDP to Conflict Deaths [131]

In the original Organski Transition Model, the propensity for instability and conflict occurred in the final level of development – *Power Maturity*. However, conflict does not appear to be monopolized by states in this third stage. Each of the thirty-two *Weak and Failing* states, previously identified in Figure 12 and Attachment J, experienced conflict since 2018, and only Libya is in the *Stage of Power Maturity*.[132] The thirty-one remaining states are either in the *Stage of Potential Power* or *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*, not the *Stage of Power Maturity* as predicted by Organski. Moreover, a careful review of the conflict related deaths in these countries reveal a strong correlation with real GDP per capita.

In twenty-eight graphs below, the real GDP per capita is highlighted in grey and conflict deaths are overlaid in red. Note that in most graphs as the number of conflict deaths increase, the real GDP per capita tends to decrease. This correlation suggests a correlation between the economy and the intensity of conflict.

This analysis holds true for countries that experienced western military intervention, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.[133] There are anomalies that do not fit this pattern, including Myanmar, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Each of these states, experience isolated instances of rising real GDP per capita and an increase in deaths related to conflict.[134] Additional research is needed to understand why.




Central African Republic– Per Capita GDP and Deaths Related to Conflict
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Chad
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Congo
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Democratic Republic of Congo
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Ethopia
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Guinea
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Guinea-Bissau
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Haiti
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Iraq
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Liberia-Central African Republic– Per Capita GDP and Deaths Related to Conflict
$1,000
$900
$800
$700
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Libya – Per Capita GDP and Deaths Related to Conflict
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Mali
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Mauritania
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Myanmar
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Niger
$1,000
$900
$800
$700
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Nigeria
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Pakistan
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Rwanda
$2,000
$1,800
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Sudan
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Syria
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Togo
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Uganda
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Yemen
$5,000
$4,500
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Zimbabwe
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Attachment L: Case Study – Venezuela[135]

Colonized by Spain, Venezuela is a Type 3 – *Post-Colonial* state that received independence in the early part of the nineteenth century. Oil revenues financed the social-welfare state and solidified the central authority until the early 1980s.[136] Following the collapse of its currency in 1983, Venezuela experienced depreciation and stagflation, which lead to riots and a series of coups in the 1990s; inflation peaked in 1996.[137] After a period of unrest, the country experienced developmental regression in 1998. The figure to the right illustrates Venezuela's regression from the *Stage of Power Maturity* to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power* during the economic and political disruption of the 1990s.[138]

Year	Venezuela
1989	$7,363
1990	$7,690
1991	$7,647
1992	$8,460
1993	$7,643
1994	$7,067
1995	$7,243
1996	$6,951
1997	$7,008
1998	$6,431
1999	$6,554
2000	$7,927
2001	$7,500
2002	$7,122
2003	$6,740
2004	$8,580
2005	$10,725
2006	$12,307
2007	$13,677
2008	$15,661
2009	$13,508
2010	$16,161
2011	$17,746
2012	$17,752
2013	$18,795
2014	$17,568
2015	$16,257
2016	$13,159
2017	
2018	

In 1999, Hugo Chávez became president of the country. After his election to power, the price of oil increased dramatically. While oil output fell in real terms between 2002 and 2008, the increasing price of oil was a catalyst of Venezuela's return to the *Stage of Power Maturity* around 2008.[139] Chavez remained president until his death in 2013.

The *2019 Fragile States Index* reported, however, that Venezuela experienced six consecutive years of decline, which have resulted in an increase in disease and infant mortality rates.[140] The declining real GDP per capita recorded in the figure to the right illustrate a return to a 2009 economy. If the trend continues, Venezuela, "once the envy of the region," will reverse progress and again regress to the *Stage of Transitional Growth in Power*.[141]

It should then come as no surprise that as the deaths related to conflict increased in 2016, GPD per capita declined.[142] As evidenced by the experience of USSR and SFRY successor states, and even Venezuela, a country in the *Stage of Power Maturity* can regress; like Libya, the transition to a *Weak and Failing* state is not improbable. Now may be the time for policy makers to act.



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[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 303-304.
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[28] Wohlforth, 282-283.
[29] Ibid.
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[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid, 807-808.
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[49] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1992* (New York, New York: AGS, 1992), 19, 203.
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[54] *Human Development Report 1992*, 19, 203.
[55] GDP data from University of Groningen; Human Development data from *Human Development Reports* 1990-2019. See bibliography for source details.
[56] The extrapolated Human Development Index levels, which are not available in the *Human Development Report*, are shaded in gray. The available economic data for this same period is colored in the font that reflects the Human Development Index level that would have been achieved by the state, had the state been independently assessed in the *Human Development Report*.
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