REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
07-05-2020	Master of Military Studies (MMS) thesis	AY 2019-2020

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Modern European Nationalism: A Tale of Two Crises

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
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5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

There is evidence to suggest that the current reemergence of nationalism in Europe is a result of political application of strategic communication to amplify or create a sense of trauma that resulted from global crises. AfD and Fidesz used their narratives to successfully craft a shared national perception of victimization, which aligned with Dr. Sztompka's theory of traumatogenic social change, and assigned the responsibility for that victimization in a manner that generated political power. Both parties' narratives benefited from either relative or outright control of specific forms of media. AfD's exerts an overwhelming social presence, while Fidesz enjoys relationships with media outlets such as KEMSA that allow the party to broadcast messages relatively unopposed.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
AfD; Alternative fur Deutschland; Fidesz; Germany; Hungary; Nationalism

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	24	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

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Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MODERN EUROPEAN NATIONALISM: A TALE OF TWO CRISES

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 2019-20

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Date: 7 May 2020

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Introduction

Beginning in the early 2000s, several countries in Europe have experienced popular political movements espousing nationalism. For the majority of these countries, nationalism is not an original ideology, but rather a familiar political movement that reemerges periodically throughout the countries' histories. This paper seeks to analyze the most recent nationalist trends in two of these countries: Germany and Hungary. In particular, the analysis will center on the successes of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany from 2013 to the present, and the Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Fidesz) party in Hungary from 2006 to the present.

The scenarios surrounding both political parties' surge in popularity share general similarities in that they both involve international economic insecurity and aversions to immigration. Both AfD and Fidesz leveraged economic crises to gain influence, and both have transitioned to anti-immigration rhetoric as major policy platforms now. There are nuances of party origin, political personalities, national history, and political competition between the two parties, but each party has converted real or perceived economic and immigration-based social *traumas* into votes.

The use of the term trauma references Dr. Piotr Sztompka's theory of traumatogenic social change[1], which is used in this paper to model the both the circumstances surrounding the two parties' ascendance and the narrative created by the parties. Sztompka's theory claims that certain types of social change result in trauma. The changes that cause trauma are defined by the four tenets of suddenness, comprehensiveness, fundamentality, and unexpectedness. To some extent, the specific economic and immigration crises that politically benefited AfD and Fidesz conveyed suddenness and unexpectedness by sheer rapidness of onset. AfD and Fidesz were

only left with the task of amplifying those tenets and convincing their respective populations that the traumas were also comprehensive and fundamental.

One facet not explicitly mentioned in Sztompka's tenets but integral to its applicability for AfD and Fidesz is responsibility. Both parties rely on a scapegoat for the trauma described in their messages. For AfD the economic crisis was the European Union's (EU) fault, and Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel was responsible for the immigration crisis. For Fidesz, the incumbent socialist party was responsible for the economic crisis, and the EU was at fault for the immigration crisis.

This paper begins with brief discussion on the concept of nationalism. It then details the tenets of Sztompka's theory that are used to analyze the two parties' narratives. Next, the paper gives background information on AfD and Fidesz as political parties and then analyzes their responses to economic crises and the 2015 immigration crisis. Lastly, the paper assesses the two parties' use of media to convey and amplify their messages.

In addressing the narratives used by the two parties to emphasize Sztompka's tenets, this paper will also examine the varying degrees to which the AfD and Fidesz parties used media to influence their respective countries' populations. In Germany, the AfD has become the most prolific political party in terms of social media use and benefits from a very active and responsive constituency. In Hungary, Fidesz controls mainstream media outlets and exerts a relative monopoly on social media use as well. These communication advantages enjoyed by the two parties are integral in their recent political successes as methods of reinforcing their narratives with their political bases and extending their frames to new constituents.

Both Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and Fidesz in Hungary leveraged trauma as an opportunity structure to gain political support. Those traumas stemmed from the recent global

economic crisis and immigration crisis. AfD and Fidesz narratives explained to the people in their countries that those crises were traumatic, that a specific actor was responsible, and that support for their parties could rectify those traumas.

What is Nationalism?

Traditional theories of nationalism describe an idea of unity shared by a group of people. The idea was not imposed on them, but rather a product of shared history, language, beliefs, or simply location that created a sense of community.[2] It was a sort of tribalism defined and empowered by the people within the community. These cultural, social, and geographic continuities serve a purpose in modern nationalism, but the theory of modern nationalism suggests that the national identity is a fabrication of a political nature – a means of consolidating power and making claims.[3] The leaders of the community define what membership looks like, and sway the members to accept that definition. The willingness of the population to subscribe to the national identity gives the leaders or politicians their power.

The underlying motivation for nationalism in politics is often associated with xenophobia, an *auslanderfeindlichkeit* or "hostility towards foreigners". Those who do not fall within the definition provided as the national identity are ostracized, subjugated, or in extreme circumstances, eradicated.[4] The narrative is typically much more innocuous than the underlying motive and generally focused on public grievances and national interests. As this paper will illustrate, the cases of AfD in Germany and Fidesz in Hungary are both similar scenarios in which political parties exploit economic crises as the catalyst for their surge to prominence, and sustain their position through the cultivation of xenophobia in response to the perceived victimization of their citizens by current immigration trends.

Traumatogenic Social Change

How can nationalism effectively generate the collective action necessary to overcome well-established political structure. One theory of traumatogenic social change proposed by Dr. Piotr Sztompka, a professor of sociology at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland potentially accounts for the necessary motivation. Sztompka suggests four tenets necessary for a population to perceive a trauma, and for that trauma to catalyze social change. First, the trauma needs to occur in a sudden or rapid manner. Depending on the type of event, suddenness is relative, and it might take months or years for the trauma to occur. It is also possible for the event to occur slowly, but for the people's awareness of the event to be sudden. Sztompka describes these slow events that generate a sudden awareness as having reached the "threshold of saturation".[5]

The second tenet is comprehensiveness. The event must affect a large portion of the population, or several facets of everyday life. The economic hardships following the Great Recession had far-reaching impacts across the socio-economic status spectrum. The third tenet requires that those effects must not only be widespread, but also fundamental or deep. As an example of depth, Sztompka describes the societal implications of a transfer of power, or the potentially existential nature of crime. The last tenet is unexpectedness. The event must be surprising to the population to achieve trauma. Sztompka specifically uses the "devaluation of currency" in his description of an unexpected event, which is applicable to both Germany and Hungary's economic crises. While the impact of the devalued currency might fall more appropriately under the tenets of comprehensiveness or depth, the idea that currency would lose value, especially to the extent that the forint did in Hungary, is an unexpected event.

Even when meeting these four requirements, not all events are sufficient for traumatogenic social change. The relationship of trauma to scapegoat is intimated in Sztompka's theory, but perhaps better elucidated in an article by David Snow et al. Snow suggests that collective action is unlikely if an event is perceived as just and immutable. Natural disasters might meet Sztompka's criteria, but would not likely prompt social change. The population needs to perceive that event as unjust and mutable to create an opportunity structure for collective action.[6] In the cases of AfD and Fidesz, the parties emphasize the trauma of the economic and immigration crises, give their constituency someone to blame for the trauma, and suggest that political patronage will help rectify an unjust and mutable situation.

This is where successful nationalist political parties excel. They mold the perception of events that might otherwise not drive collective action into narratives of injustice behind which members of the nation can rally. The injustice is attributed to a foreign group of actors or a domestic group that does not share the same national interests as the population. Through various means, the nationalist politicians extend their frame in an attempt to create a political movement supported by diverse segments of the population.

In this paper, Sztompka's model is used to assess both the parties' narratives about the crises, and the underlying crises themselves. Direct quotes from party leadership and press releases during, or immediately following, the crises are used as a representative sample of party messaging at the time of the events. The point of the analysis is to identify the linkages between the parties' narratives and Sztompka's four tenets. By measuring the degree to which the parties' narratives align with Sztompka's theory, the analysis will attempt to illustrate the parties' use of perceived trauma to generate political support.

Who is Alternative für Deutschland?

AfD is a right-wing national populist party that has received increasing numbers of popular support over its first eight years of existence. The party was founded in 2012 and experienced modest success in federal elections the following year, garnering just below five percent of the vote, below the required amount to earn seats in parliament. Four years later, the party received the third highest share of votes in the 2017 federal election, securing 12.6% of votes, passing the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Left Party, and the Green Party, and earning seats in parliament.[7] In state elections in 2019, AfD earned as high as 23.5% in some regions.[8]

The primary platform for the AfD was initially one that opposed Germany's participation in the Euro Area, the territory that comprises countries in the EU that use the Euro as their currency. After the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis subsided, and as asylum seekers flocked to Europe in record numbers, AfD shifted from an economic-based platform to one centered around immigration policy.

In 2012 the AfD established itself in the middle of the Eurozone debt crisis, a period of financial instability in Europe during which five of the 17 Eurozone countries were unable to manage their government debt and were forced to rely on bail out money from other Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Germany, as one of the strongest economies in the Eurozone, was one of the countries responsible for bailing out the five faltering member states. AfD used this crisis as evidence that Germany was being put at a disadvantage by adopting the euro and had called for reinstatement of national currencies as part of its platform.

Even before the Eurozone debt crisis, Germany recognized itself as the financial leader of the Eurozone. Of the 17 Eurozone countries, Germany has the greatest GDP by almost one

trillion dollars. In 2009 though, as a result of the debt crisis, Germany's strong economy contracted by 5.6%, more than most of the other Eurozone countries. It also saw unemployment rise to 7.7% in the same year. Germany recovered quickly, posting strong economic growth numbers of 3.9% and 3.7% in the following two years, and a drop in unemployment back to 4.6%, but the shock of the crisis lingered.[9]

In line with Sztompka's first tenet, the impact on Germany was relatively sudden. The triggering events of the subprime mortgage loan crisis, the Great Recession, and the debt crisis were only a few years in the making. AfD and its supporters pointed towards unemployment as both comprehensive and fundamental. The idea that Germany, Europe's strongest economy, could be so drastically affected by other countries' financial misfortunes or mismanagements was an unpleasant surprise to the German people, and AfD capitalized on this traumatic event to effect change in the social and political landscape of Germany.

AfD participated in its first state and federal elections in 2012, receiving just under five percent of the vote; not enough to earn any seats in parliament. Five percent was still a respectable number for a relatively new party, especially one that espoused a nationalist ideology which had been taboo in German politics since the end of World War II. From 2012 to 2017, AfD grew its base of support steadily and was expected to clear the five percent barrier for representation in parliament, but wavering poll numbers indicated that the party would likely plateau in the middle to high single digit range. Not only did AfD surpass those expectations easily, but the major parties of CDU, CSU, and SPD all lost large numbers of supporters in the process, tightening the gap between the new AfD party and the traditional parties.

Table 1: Change in Voter Support from 2013 to 2017



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While economic crisis established AfD on the political stage, controversial immigration policies from Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel's CDU-led coalition government in the midst of an influx of refugees sustained it. The Europe-wide immigration crisis in 2015 and subsequent years created significant tension between countries like Germany that supported the massive influx of asylum seekers, viewing it as a humanitarian responsibility, and countries like Poland and Hungary, who refused to accept the EU's quotas for immigration. It also created tensions within countries, as the AfD attacked Angela Merkel's open-door policy as harmful to German identity and potentially dangerous. AfD's arguments were supported by a spate of immigrant related attacks throughout Europe, and more popular support shifted from Merkel's CDU party to Frauke Petry's AfD.

Who is Fidesz?

Fidesz has been around much longer than AfD as a political party; however, it underwent a significant transformation leading up to Hungary's 2010 federal election. Much like AfD, Fidesz gained traction as a result of economic turmoil starting in 2006. Unlike AfD, the target of Fidesz's criticism was predominantly domestic in the form of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party. Over two terms, from 2002 to 2008, the Hungarian Socialist Party reversed positive

economic trends and created a debt vulnerability that was exposed in the global economic crisis of 2008. The European CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research published a report in January, 2009 that stated, "Hungary already had a large government debt under the communist regime. The ratio of debt to GDP was reduced from its peak of around 90% to around 50% in 2001. Irresponsible policies from 2002 onwards led to a 15% increase from 2001 levels which rose to around 65% of GDP".[11]

Following the global economic crisis, Hungary's currency, the forint, weakened significantly, the interest rates on their foreign-held government debt increased as the international community reassessed investment risks, and Hungary only narrowly averted total disaster when they received a $15 billion loan from the IMF. As part of the recovery plan, Hungary implemented significant fiscal austerity policies, creating even more unrest among the populace. In the subsequent 2010 elections, Fidesz not only won the election, but earned a supermajority (over 2/3 of the seats in parliament) while riding the wave of public discontent.[12]

Owning the supermajority afforded the party the opportunity to completely change the constitution, creating significant barriers to opposition parties for future elections. Many of the changes that Fidesz made early in its administration fed into the nationalist narrative supported by the party. Fidesz passed a law automatically granting Hungarian citizenship to any ethnic Hungarians external to the country. It also oversaw the emplacement of two statues in one of the squares in Budapest that are central to the Fidesz narrative of national identity. The first, a bust of Miklos Horthy, celebrates the controversial former Hungarian leader who allied with German and Italy in the 1920s and 1930s as a victim of German aggression. The second depicts a German eagle attacking a symbol of Hungary. This narrative of victimhood provides another

rallying point for European nationalists, a social trauma from the early 1900s revisited by Fidesz to garner support.[13]

The Economic Crises

In 2006, after four years of socialist rule and following an election which guaranteed four more years under the same administration, a national radio station aired a recorded conversation of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany in which the Prime Minister admitted that his party had lied about the country's economic situation.[14] In terms of Sztompka's traumatogenic criteria, this news instantly met three of the four tenets. It was sudden, fundamental, and unexpected. Arguably, it was also comprehensive, but that may not have been readily apparent to the general Hungarian population. Hungary's annual GDP growth remained relatively healthy until 2008, when it plummeted sharply. The hidden indicator that gradually eroded Hungary's economic façade was that government debt represented a large share of GDP. Since 2001, government debt as a percentage of GDP climbed rapidly from around 50% to nearly 80% in the middle of the global economic crisis. If the comprehensiveness of Hungary's economic woes was not already perceived by the public, it would be by 2009, when the country's recession exceeded a growth rate of -6%, and the IMF took action.





Following the global financial crisis in 2008, Hungary was one of several countries that required a bailout from the IMF. With that bailout came required austerity measures which greatly impacted the lives of the vast majority of the Hungarian population. The Hungarian congress held a vote of no confidence for Prime Minister Gyurcsany, who subsequently resigned in March, 2009. In accordance with the required austerity measures, the interim government, still under the control of the socialist party now led by Gordon Banjai, passed legislation to raise taxes, increase the age of retirement, and revoke the 13th month salary pension bonus. All of these policies were and Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party would ensure that it remained at the forefront of the people's minds until the next election.

The economic Crisis in Germany was a markedly different experience from that of Hungary. Germany, like most of the world experienced a contraction in GDP in 2009, but was able to absorb the recession through the stability of its economy. By 2010, the northern European countries of Germany, Finland, Austria, and the Netherlands actually enjoyed positive GDP growth, while southern European countries still averaged negative growth and were trending negatively.[15] To prevent Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland from potentially defaulting on their sovereign debt, Germany and France led the Eurozone's effort to bail out the struggling countries and emphasized the strict enforcement of new austerity measures and existing Maastricht Criteria.

From these economic policies came the Alternative fur Deutschland. The party was founded in 2013 and led initially by Bernd Lucke, an economics professor from Hamburg. The major platform for the party was one of Euroskepticism, advocating for one of two possible options: Germany's withdrawal from the Eurozone and the EU on the more extreme end, or a delineation between southern European countries and northern European countries with separate currencies. Another professor of economics and supporter of AfD, Joachim Starbatty, echoed those exact sentiments at AfD's founding conference, stating, "A currency which is supposed to have united a continent is doing precisely the opposite. And it is weak and ailing largely due to the fact that individual members are no longer in the position to be able to sustain it. Therefore, it would be better if these countries that are not competitive, like Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, etc, were to leave."[16]

As a result of Germany's strong economy, the recessions impacts were felt less by the German public, reducing the likelihood of traumatogenic social change, but the AfD emphasized the crisis's effects through its narrative. One of the party's early leaders and a Minister of European Parliament (MEP), Ulrike Trebesius, explained the party's stance in an interview with a reporter from the online news source, Europe's Cafe.[17] She argues the comprehensiveness of EU decision-making saying, "many people don't know how much impact the EU really has on their daily lives. Also, national parliaments use the trick to delegate unpopular issues to Brussels which they can't get through at home. These issues then return through the backdoor to citizens in the member states and are just rubber-stamped by national parliaments." Trebesius speaks to the fundamental effects of the EU on the German economy, calling the euro currency, "the 'teuro,'" a play on the German word "teuer", meaning expensive.

The party's leader, Bernd Lucke opened the inaugural convention in late 2013 by asking rhetorically, ""Does anyone believe that the people accepted the idea of paying for mismanagement in other euro-countries with hundreds of billions of euros?"[18] While the impact to the individual German was arguably nominal, the cumulative value of "billions of euros" makes the issue fundamental for the average German. Lucke also assigns responsibility in the statement. It was not a German problem. Germany was losing "billions of euros" to bail out other countries that had mismanaged their economies. The suddenness and unexpectedness tenets are intrinsic to the actual economic crisis and less represented in AfD's narratives, but nonetheless, the four tenets are present. The German population saw a sudden an unexpected debt crisis, they were told by AfD that it impacted their life significantly through unemployment and misappropriated tax money, and it was the European Union's fault.

The Immigration Crisis

There is a clear inflection point between the economically-driven rise to power of AfD and Fidesz and their transition to anti-immigration platforms. In 2015, the instability created by the Eurozone crisis had waned, and Europe experienced an overwhelming surge in immigration. This sudden increase in migration became the next focal point for AfD and Fidesz, and the communication strategies used by the two parties reflected the need for crises to garner support for their nationalist platforms.

In 2015, Europe experienced the largest single-year influx of immigrants in history, many of whom were refugees of conflict-wracked countries in the Middle East and South Central Asia such as Syria and Afghanistan. The graph below from the Pew Research Center depicts the sharp spike in asylum seekers in Europe in 2015. The accompanying BBC report claims that

2015's surge in asylum seekers accounted for ten percent of all asylum applications in Europe since 1985.[19] While there are nuanced differences between the definitions of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, one can infer a proportional rise in overall immigration as well.



The influx affected countries throughout Europe differently, but two of the greatest impacts were felt in Germany and Hungary. Germany received the largest total number of asylum seekers, absorbing about one third of the 1.3 million. Hungary received the second largest number of asylum applications, but when viewed as a percentage of the population, Hungary's asylum influx was the highest in Europe. Although Fidesz already held the super majority by 2015, both parties leveraged the perceived trauma caused by the massive immigration surge to generate more popular support within their respective countries.[20]



In Germany, the AfD departed from its liberal economic policies to focus on immigration, where it exaggerated the negative impacts of migrants and placed the blame on Angela Merkel's shoulders. As party leaders like Bernd Lucke parted ways over the ideological shift, Frauke Petry took over as the head of the party. Petry described the fundamental and comprehensive nature of the immigration crisis in an interview with the German news source, Der Spiegel, saying, "The immigration of so many Muslims will change our culture. If this change is desired, it must be the product of a democratic decision supported by a broad majority. But Ms. Merkel simply opened the borders and invited everybody in, without consulting the

parliament or the people."[21] Nobody in Germany questioned the suddenness or unexpectedness of the situation. Even Angela Merkel described the surge as, "an extraordinary situation".[22]

The crisis was further aggravated with events like the Berlin truck attack by a Pakistani asylum seeker in 2016. Shortly after the attack, Petry made allusions to other attacks throughout Europe, stating that, "this case is not an isolated incident," and concluded by saying that, "The terror will unite us."[23]

Fidesz, like AfD, used the surge in immigration to gain popular support, but unlike AfD's criticism of its own country's government, Fidesz aimed its criticism at the EU. Viktor Orban claimed that immigration threatened the identity of Europe, saying, "the survival, disappearance or, more precisely, the transformation beyond recognition of the European citizen's lifestyle, European values and the European nations" might result from the influx of asylum seekers. He made the fundamental nature of threat evident when he said, "We would like for Europe to keep belonging to the Europeans. We want to preserve the Hungarian Hungary." Further playing on the fears of the Hungarian people, Orban accused the leaders of the EU of supporting the immigration crisis, saying "The European left sees the problem of immigration not as a source of danger but as an opportunity. They believe ... that the escalation of immigration can extremely weaken or even eliminate the national structures."[24]

In addition to the cultural dilution implications of an influx of immigrants, Fidesz pointed to immigration as a source of both economic instability and crime in Hungary.[25] The former was still an open wound in the minds of the Hungarian people, as the country had not fully recovered from the economic crisis yet, and the latter was just another facet of immigration that made this crisis traumatogenic.

The Role of Media

Fidesz's use of social media is less significant than AfD, but as the ruling party, Fidesz has taken action to control media in general. Since 2013, Hungary has fallen from 56th to 89th on the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index.[26] Fidesz enjoys support from the dominant national media outlet, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), and rejects any nominations for the country's Media Council that are not members of the Fidesz party.

Fidesz's requirement for mainstream and social media is also arguably less significant than AfD's because of the circumstances through which Fidesz rose to power in 2010. Fidesz had been a political party for 21 years prior to the 2010 elections, and Viktor Orban had already been Prime Minister from 1998 to 2002. The party already had national recognition as one of the country's main political parties, and more importantly, the ruling socialist party self-destructed on their own, without any help from the Fidesz narrative.

In contrast, Germany has ranked among the top 20 countries in the world for press freedom since 2013, so ostensibly, neither the CDU or AfD enjoy any benefit from biased reporting. AfD leverages its own press releases and a ubiquitous social media presence to make up for the lack of media control. One unexplained phenomenon in AfD's media success is the responsiveness of its constituency. When compared to the voters for other parties in Germany, AfD supporters are incredibly more active on social media according to a study done by the Bavarian School of Public Policy.[27] The study suggests that social media benefits politicians in several ways. It provides the politician and his or her constituents to interact directly, it generates rapid feedback about how receptive the public is to specific messages, and it allows for fast dissemination of messages even outside of their constituency. The study also highlights an

interesting dynamic in which German people with populist beliefs tend to place less trust in the media, and are more responsive to social media.[28]

If the social media activity for CDU and its sister party, CSU, are aggregated in the tables below, the data depict that AfD actually trailed CDU/CSU in Facebook posts and only slightly led CDU/CSU in tweets during the period studied. That suggests that the real strength of the party's messaging lies in the responsiveness of the constituency, where AfD received four times the number of shares and five times the number of retweets as CDU/CSU. The study accounts for some of this discrepancy through AfD's use of bots, to retweet messages; however, the total number of retweets and the percentage of those retweets attributed to bots does not fully account for the disparity in retweets between the major parties. AfD's constituency is still more active than the voters representing the other parties.

Party Facebook Activity from January 2015 to May 2018

	posts	comments	likes	shares
AfD	2,363	994,191	4,168,022	2,891,377
CDU	1,690	272,155	483,924	153,131
CSU	2,162	406,804	1,897,622	634,153
Die Grünen	1,127	142,473	625,689	411,073
Die Linke	1,367	140,489	903,629	437,920
FDP	2,211	118,277	755,000	192,974
SPD	1,992	247,095	892,198	421,025

Party Twitter Activity from July 2017 to July 2018

	tweets	original tweets	mentions	likes	retweets
AfD	9,193	2,092	368,005	638,886	269,445
CDU	4,911	3,097	345,192	117,437	39,726
CSU	2,886	1,622	233,012	70,474	14,812
Die Grünen	2,492	1,295	157,213	124,371	42,183
Die Linke	6,809	1,776	208,047	136,440	45,856
FDP	3,149	1,730	189,687	121,220	31,487
SPD	7,480	1,782	260,056	119,507	41,803

While social media activity does not necessarily equate to trauma-focused messaging, the study includes a section of content analysis that highlights a large percentage of AfD's social media posts referring to immigration.[29] Another study describes AfD's social media presence as not overtly xenophobic, an tactic that keeps the party from potentially alienating its more moderate constituents, while still espousing the protection of the "German Family" and "nativity" of the German people.[30]

The differences between Fidesz and AfD's media use might simply be a result of time. In 2006, when Fidesz surged to the forefront of Hungarian politics, Facebook had just begun allowing anyone in the world to create an account. By 2014, when AfD began to compete for votes, over 1.5 billion people had Facebook accounts. Five years later, that number has almost doubled.[31] Fidesz did not rely on social media to rise to power because it was not a viable outlet in 2006. In contrast, AfD needed to use social media because it was one of the most effective outlets by 2014.

Additional Research

There were no readily available quantitative social media studies for Hungary's political parties as there was for Germany's. As a result of the political dominance of Fidesz and the translation of that power into the communication sphere through foundations like KEMSA, that same type of quantitative study may not be fruitful in Hungary, but if a similar study could be found for another economically strong country with a stable democratic government, it might provide some insight by comparison as to why AfD's constituency is so much more active/reactive on social media than the voters of the other parties in Germany. One hypothesis might suggest that the bases of support for nationalist parties are inherently more active communicators on social media or in general, while another might attribute the increase in social media activity to the traumatogenic nature of the party's narrative.

A thorough assessment of AfD's economic policies from 2013 to today might draw a clearer distinction between the principles guiding AfD at its inception and those of the party today. If a significant shift or a reversal of economic policy occurred after Bernd Lucke and his ilk left the party, it might be more accurate to assert that the AfD party that was founded by

professors on economic principles and the xenophobic AfD that used an immigrant crisis to promote anti-immigration policies and seize power were two separate entities, bound by a common name. The exodus of party leadership in 2014 and the coincidental shift in party platforms suggests that the AfD of 2013 and the AfD of today could possibly be considered two different parties. Potentially, the unwarranted labeling of Bernd Lucke's AfD, which was an economically liberal offshoot of CDU, might have attracted the immigration-focused nationalist leaders who wrested control of the party from its original leadership.

Conclusion

Both Germany and Hungary experienced an economic crisis and an immigration crisis which AfD and Fidesz leveraged to gain political power in their respective countries. AfD and Fidesz augmented the inherent trauma resulting from these crises with strategic messaging, specifically amplifying their comprehensiveness and fundamentality as described in Sztompka's Traumatogenic Social Change model. The relative suddenness and unexpectedness of the crises was universally accepted by both countries' populations without the need for additional emphasis from AfD or Fidesz.

AfD was founded on the premise that the single currency in the Eurozone was detrimental to the German economy. The party narrative pointed at both the people of Germany and the people of the countries being bailed out as the victims of poor or potentially corrupt economic policy. In AfD's messaging, the German taxpayers were paying to bailout countries like Greece, but all of the money was ending up back in wealthy German, Dutch, and American investor's pockets. After gaining a foothold in government, AfD shifted platforms towards anti-

immigration policies, exchanged party leadership, and gained enough support to earn representation in both the European Parliament and German Bundestag.

Fidesz benefited from poor economic policy and political corruption within the socialist party that led to unchecked sovereign debt and harsh austerity measures that followed the resultant IMF bailout. Associating the socialist party with soviet interference, Fidesz used a nationalist narrative to win a supermajority in the 2010 elections. After several years of modest economic performance, Fidesz shifted the party narrative to an anti-immigration message, blaming the EU's asylum policy for unemployment, crime, and terrorism.

There is evidence to suggest that the current reemergence of nationalism in Europe is a result of political application of strategic communication to amplify or create a sense of trauma that resulted from global crises. AfD and Fidesz used their narratives to successfully craft a shared national perception of victimization, which aligned with Dr. Sztompka's theory of traumatogenic social change and assigned the responsibility for that victimization in a manner that generated political power. Both parties' narratives benefited from either relative or outright control of specific forms of media. AfD's exerts an overwhelming social presence, while Fidesz enjoys relationships with media outlets such as KEMSA that allow the party to broadcast messages relatively unopposed.

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