

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 20-04-2021	2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies (MMS) thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AY 2020-2021
--	--	---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Organizational Change and the Marine Corps Infantry: Adapting to Force Design 2030	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A
	5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A

6. AUTHOR(S) Conover, Kenneth A., Major, USMC	5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A
	5e. TASK NUMBER N/A
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A
--	--

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
To manage the changes required by Force Design 2030 (FD2030) the Marine Corps' infantry community should use an evolutionary and teleological change models derived from organizational change literature. While the Marine Corps faces unique challenges, using a model backed by research provides an informed starting position and common methodology across the force for this significant change effort.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Force Design 2030, Commandants Planning Guidance, Infantry, Organizational Change

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	38	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Organizational Change and the Marine Corps Infantry: Adapting to Force Design 2030

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: MAJOR KENNETH A. CONOVER

AY 2020-21

MMS Mentor Team and Oral Defense Committee Member:

CDR STEPHEN KELLY, USMC
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 4/6/21

MMS Mentor Team and Oral Defense Committee Member:

LTCOL ANTHONY JOHNSTON
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 20 APR 2021

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Organizational Change and the Marine Corps Infantry: Adapting to Force Design 2030

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: MAJOR KENNETH A. CONOVER

AY 2020-21

MMS Mentor Team and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved: _____

Date: _____

MMS Mentor Team and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved: _____

Date: _____

Executive Summary

Title: Organizational Change and the Marine Corps' Base Unit

Author: Major Kenneth A. Conover, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: To manage the changes required by Force Design 2030 (FD2030) the Marine Corps' infantry community should use an evolutionary and teleological change models derived from organizational change literature. Using the strategic end state described by Commandant Berger the infantry should regularly experiment with new employment and support concepts to identify new methods of accomplishing littoral combat tasks.

Discussion: In 2019 Commandant Berger argued that the Marine Corps outdated force design is not optimized to meet the challenges of the future operating environment and must change. The following year he provided additional direction on changes to core activities that together form an end state, or future state, that the Marine Corps must work towards. While his vision effects the Corps as a whole, the Corps' fundamental close combat unit, its naval infantry, must sustain and grow its asymmetric advantage in littoral combat. To ensure the infantry can manage this change effort, a change architecture should be created and implemented. Using research and models produced by academics who have studied change in large organizations this paper proposes a change architecture that will assist infantry leaders as they seek to prioritize and execute essential change tasks in line with Commandant Berger's direction.

Conclusion: While the Marine Corps faces unique challenges, using a model backed by research provides an informed starting position and methodology for this significant change effort. The complex problems of the future operating environment require organizational level solutions that feed an evolutionary based change architecture to meet the demands of FD2030.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

List of Figures

	Page
Figure 1. <i>Pettigrew's Triangle</i>	9
Figure 2. <i>Evolutionary Motor</i>	24
Figure 3. <i>Teleological Motor</i>	25

Table of Contents

	Page
Executive Summary	i
Disclaimer	ii
List of Figures	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Preface	v
Introduction/Thesis	1
Literature Review.....	3
Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Force Design 2030	3
Change in Organizations.....	5
Technical, Political, and Cultural Problems Hindering Change	6
Driving Change.....	8
Change Context, Content, and Process	9
Change Models (Motors)	10
Organizational Leaders	13
Culture.....	14
Requirements of Future Littoral Combat.....	16
Tasks Inherent to Naval Infantry in Littoral Combat.....	17
Empowering Operational Level Commanders.....	19
Instituting Change.....	21
The Change Process.....	22
Conclusion	28
Bibliography	30

Preface

The Commandant's call for change and actions already taken have caused a great deal of controversy and criticism across the force. The Corps' significant role in conflict over the past two decades, its defense budgets and manpower models, societal changes, and other equally important factors, have played a role in building the Marine Corps of today. While opinions vary greatly on how to build the future force, decisions must be made and actions taken, now. Leading an organization through change is exceedingly difficult. Leaders are required to understand the complex environment the organization operates in, generate buy-in, and communicate a clear vision and subsequent path to success. The change model I propose in this paper is grounded in research and accounts for many of the difficulties the Marine Corps will face while it undergoes transformational change.

I would like to thank Commander Stephen Kelley, United States Navy, for his candid comments and constant challenging of my ideas. I am a better student and officer because of the time and effort he put into improving me as a critical thinker, for which I am indebted.

Introduction

In 2019, General David H. Berger, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, issued his *Commandant's Planning Guidance* (CPG), which asserted that significant change in the Marine Corps was necessary to meet the demands of the future operating environment.¹ In March 2020 Commandant Berger released a second, and more directive document, *Force Design 2030* (FD2030). FD2030 built upon the 2019 CPG and provided specific guidance on future Marine Corps force design topics, to include his vision and expectations for the Corps' base unit, its infantry forces.² FD2030 demands change in many of the Marine Corps' functional areas, one of which will be examined through this project's research question: how can the Marine Corps' infantry community manage the changes required by FD2030?

The purpose of this study is to identify essential elements of the future force and assist organizational leaders in successfully implementing the changes necessary to meet the demands of Commandant Berger's guidance. This paper will offer a simple framework, based on the study of organizational change, to serve as an initial guide to building the future force. The infantry battalion is the Marine Corps' principal operational combat element and will be the focus of this study.³ Informed by planning teams and operational experience, FD2030 identifies capabilities that enable asymmetric advantages in littoral combat through purpose-built and distributed formations as fundamental requirements of the future Marine Corps, generally, and the USMC infantry battalion, specifically.⁴

¹ David H. Berger, *Commandant's Planning Guidance 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2019), 1.

² David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2020).

³ Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Infantry Battalion. MCTP 3-10A*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps (2016), 6.

⁴ Ibid. 11-12.

FD2030 outlines the capabilities required of the future force, many of which target the infantry. Commandant Berger defined a strategic end state that envisions Marine Corps combat units as elite forces that can maneuver across sea and land portions of complex littoral regions and are capable of concealed distributed operations within the range of adversary weapons while remaining connected through resilient communications networks while being able to sustain themselves without the logistical demands of large operating bases.⁵ While the Commandant's guidance shapes the conceptual requirements of the future force, infantry leaders and staffs must understand what must be done to build the envisioned force.

To manage the changes required by FD2030, the Marine Corps' infantry community should use an *evolutionary change model* derived from the organizational change literature to establish a common change framework. Guided by the future state described by Commandant Berger, the infantry should regularly experiment with new employment and support concepts and identify new methods of accomplishing the tasks required of the future infantry force. As many experiments will be happening at once, individual infantry battalions should use a *teleological model* to continually assess their actions and make necessary changes in pursuit of their assigned experimentation goals. In addition to applying the evolutionary change model, infantry leaders must understand the adversary and environmental factors the Commandant described which are driving this change initiative. Those factors will be described in terms of internal and external contexts and their relation to the culture of the organization. Lastly, the structure of this study should be familiar across the force as it relies heavily on the fundamentals of Marine Corps design methodology. Just as there are four distinct actions in the design methodology, this study will define current and desired states, define the problem set, produce an operational approach, and provide a mechanism to reframe throughout planning and execution.

⁵ David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2020), 11-12.

Literature Review

This literature focuses on important works on organizational change, with a particular focus on the guidance they offer leaders of changing organizations. The works selected were used to understand foundational definitions, drivers, and motors for change. Additional research was conducted into the impacts of leadership on organizational culture, with specific emphasis on understanding which parts of the culture must be preserved and which parts must change.

Theorists and researchers have been studying organizational change, specifically what drives it and how to best navigate it, for over 50 years. Much of the writing and research surrounding organizational change focuses on businesses and corporations that are managing growth and pursuing further business goals. While the goals themselves may differ, for example, between a chemical firm and the United States military, the principles of goal formulation and achievement are consistent in both. Therefore, this study will rely on scholarly work in business management to propose how the Marine Corps infantry community can manage changes directed by Commandant Berger's 2019 Planning Guidance and FD2030. This study will also rely on Tom Galvin's *Leading Change*, which was written to assist military officers implement change in the unique contexts of their organizations.⁶

Commandant's Planning Guidance and Force Design 2030

Commandant Berger's 2019 Planning Guidance (CPG) was written to provide strategic direction to the Marine Corps as a whole. Based on his predecessor's, General Robert B. Neller, observation that "the Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment," Commandant Berger argues for

⁶ Tom Galvin, *Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders*. 1st ed. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, (2018), v. Dr. Tom Galvin is a professor at the U.S. Army War College's Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, School of Strategic Landpower.

significant organizational change.⁷ The CPG highlights five focus areas wherein change is required to prepare the Marine Corps for the future strategic environment: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership.⁸

In *Force Design 2030*, Commandant Berger begins with a quote from John Kotter, professor of leadership at Harvard Business School, who has devoted decades of research and writing to organizational change. Commandant Berger repeats his predecessors warning that the Marine Corps is not currently organized, trained, or equipped to meet the demands of the Indo-Pacific and similar littoral regions and thus requires substantial institutional change. FD2030 assumes that the Marine Corps will not receive additional funding during its transformation process and, to assure that funding is available for new programs, directs the Corps to divest of one regimental headquarters and three infantry battalions as well as those organizations dedicated to their support. Similarly, FD2030 directs the total divestment of tanks, mandates a significant reduction in cannon artillery, and directs a reduction in both rotary and fixed wing aircraft in the air combat element. These reductions will free resources required to grow new capabilities and make vast changes to current training and education systems.⁹

This force design will require changes not just in the way the infantry, the Corps “base unit,” is organized and equipped, but, more importantly, it necessitates changes to the infantry community's current operational norms.¹⁰ Future Marine infantry units must be preeminent littoral warfare and expeditionary forces capable of distributed operations while simultaneously minimizing their physical and electromagnetic signature and overall logistical demands.¹¹

⁷ David H. Berger, *Commandant's Planning Guidance 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2019), 1.

⁸ Ibid, 1.

⁹ David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2020), 2-7.

¹⁰ Ibid, 8.

¹¹ Ibid, 3-12.

Marine infantry formations will be smaller, purpose built, and lessen reliance on attached units.¹² To meet these requirements, individual infantry Marines will need to be highly intelligent, trained in multiple military disciplines and technical fields, capable of sustainment without reliance on large bases, while maintaining their capability to prevail in close combat.¹³ Current infantry formations are more of a force basically trained in the fundamentals of offensive and defensive combat and are not trained or organized as this kind of light, agile, and multi-disciplinary littoral force.

Change in Organizations

In *The Challenge of Organizational Change*, Rosabeth Kanter, Barry Stein, and Todd Jick explain that change in an organization is a transformation from “state 1 at time 1” to “state 2 at time 2.”¹⁴ Organizations change throughout time in order to keep up with large scale shifts in the world. Globalization, technological innovation, and economic instabilities drive organizations to increased competitiveness and near constant structural and operational adjustment.¹⁵ The 2018 National Defense Strategy requires a military force capable of deterring and protecting the security of our nation in an environment defined by increasingly complex global security, strategic competition, and rapidly emerging technologies.¹⁶ The defining factors facing the military nearly mirror those discussed by organizational change experts who focus on business enterprises across the world. Noel Tichy asserts that organizations are often required to “undergo major strategic reorientations” in the wake of changes in the world to maintain relevance and ensure the right decisions are made in the current environment of increasing

¹² Ibid, 12.

¹³ Ibid, 4.

¹⁴ Rosabeth Kanter, Barry Stein, and Todd Jick. *The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience it and Leaders Guide It*. New York: Free Press, (1992),

¹⁵ Bernard Burnes, "Kurt Lewin and Complexity Theories: Back to the Future?" *Journal of Change Management* 4, no. 4 (2004), 309-310.

¹⁶ Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, (2018), 1-3.

organizational complexity.¹⁷ Change is a constant in modern organizational lifecycles and successful organizations possess the ability to manage it.¹⁸ When organizations induct new patterns of action, belief, and attitude they are making substantive change.¹⁹ Substantive organizational change can alter the overall orientation of the organization as well as significant components of the organization.

Technical, Political, and Cultural Problems Hindering Change

Noel Tichy defined the three dominant problems most organizations face when dealing with change. The first is the technical, or production problem, which simply put, describes how the organization provides value through what it produces.²⁰ To overcome technical problems, management normally sets goals, forms strategies, and redesigns occupational systems to reach their desired outcomes; however, psychological and sociological factors are often ignored in this technical approach which leads to a work environment that is based on technical efficiency and disregards workplace culture, which will be discussed further. The second is the political problem wherein one dominant group has power over other weaker groups.²¹ Organizations must allocate their power resources (i.e., organizational structures reflected in career tracks, internal promotion, and retention structures) and budgetary allocations across the organization.²² The third problem relates to changes in the organizations culture, which is defined by the values,

¹⁷ Noel Tichy "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983), 55-56.

¹⁸ Bernard Burnes, "Kurt Lewin and Complexity Theories: Back to the Future?" *Journal of Change Management* 4, no. 4 (2004), 309.

¹⁹ Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 5th edition. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, (2017).

²⁰ Noel Tichy "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983), 59.

²¹ Noel Tichy "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983), 59.

²² *Ibid*, 59.

objectives, beliefs, and understandings shared by organizational members.²³ Decisions about culture, specifically which values should be retained, and which should be changed, are one of top management's most difficult tasks. Cultural change may require altering norms and requires leaders to communicate the reasons why in a sincere and believable fashion, so they are not easily forgotten or dismissed as corporate propaganda.²⁴

Tichy's description of the three type of problems organizations face is by no means exhaustive but it does ensure that those involved in change processes do not fall into the trap of focusing solely on one problem while discounting others. When thinking about the technical problem, making a task simpler and structured may not necessarily increase organizational effectiveness if the workforce has been trained to critically think and solve problems. Tichy provides an example of a Volvo plant in Sweden, comprised of technically trained skilled workers who regularly complete challenging tasks that often-exceeded managements' expectations in production and quality control while exhibiting very little absenteeism.²⁵ Tichy contrasts the Volvo plant with a U.S. General Motors plant where management greatly simplified the tasks of its technically skilled workers in an effort to increase efficiency. This oversimplification however, led to appreciably lower production rates, poor quality control, high absenteeism, and ultimately a strike.²⁶ This example highlights a technical solution that was at odds with the organizations culture. This point is especially germane when thinking about how future infantry Marines should be trained, employed, and retained as well as what values and ideas must be kept, and which should be let go.

Driving Change

²³ Ibid, 59.

²⁴ Ibid, 57-59

²⁵ Noel Tichy "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983), 58.

²⁶ Ibid, 58.

John Kotter, the same leadership professor quoted in FD2030, noted in 1995 that few large organizational change efforts have been very successful, few have been absolute failures, and most fall somewhere in between and generally closer to the failure end of the scale.²⁷ Kotter's study of large corporations (e.g., Ford, General Motors, British Airways, Eastern Airlines, and Bristol-Meyers Squibb) led him to the conclusion that there is a clear link between successful change efforts and influential and persistent leaders.²⁸ Peter Poole supports Kotter's argument in his own literature review by adding "imbedded in the change literature is the implication that managers must be able to clearly and effectively communicate a new vision to organization participants."²⁹ Both Kotter and Poole reinforce the need for top level leaders to communicate with consistency and clarity throughout the change process. Additionally, Kotter offers an eight-step model for transforming large organizations.³⁰ Kotter's model is worth understanding and referring to when designing change as it was created after years of studying large organizational change. Commandant Berger's guidance, vision, creation of planning teams, and follow-on force design document have accomplished much of the first four steps. When addressing the final steps, taking action while building new systems, structures, and policies will require a great deal of continued leadership. While the Marine Corps does not necessarily need to develop an eight-step model for change, the eight-step process should be used much like Tichy's change problems in order to reduce the chance of this change residing closer to the failure end of the scale. Kotter and Poole make it clear that to drive change, senior leaders across the force must speak, regularly and consistently, about the future changes and ensure subordinate leaders understand why it is necessary.

²⁷ John Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (1995), 59.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 59-60.


²⁹ Peter P. Poole, "Words and Deeds of Organizational Change." *Journal of Managerial Issues* 10, no. 1 (1998), 47.

³⁰ John Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (1995), 61.

Change Context, Content, and Process

In 1987 Andrew Pettigrew argued in the *Journal of Management Science* a long-held belief that successful organizational change was not just process oriented; the internal and external contexts the organization operated in were key to the change process. Pettigrew argued that “formulating the *content* of any new strategy inevitably entails managing its *context* and *process*,” which he captured in what is now known as Pettigrew’s Triangle.³¹

Figure 1. Pettigrew’s Triangle ³²



The outer context is comprised of the social, economic, political, and competitive environment surrounding an organization. The inner context consists of the structure, culture, and political systems within an organization. Content refers to the particular areas in the organization targeted to be changed, which may include products, manpower, geographic location, and culture. The process of change is defined by the actions, reactions, and interactions of the various stakeholders as they seek to transform the organization. Pettigrew’s triangle aids in

³¹ Andrew M. Pettigrew, "Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm." *Journal of Management Studies* 24, no. 6 (Nov, 1987): 657.

³² Andrew M. Pettigrew, Figure 1. Pettigrew’s Triangle, "Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm." *Journal of Management Studies* 24, no. 6 (1987), 657.

understanding the complexity of ‘why’ organizations change by analyzing their inner and outer contexts. From there the ‘what,’ or change content, is decided on and the ‘how,’ or change process, is constructed. Much in the way military planning places a heavy focus on problem framing to more fully understand and appreciate the current environment,³³ understanding organizational contexts reveal the elements that are driving change.³⁴ These contexts are what make up future operating environment that the Commandant and his planning teams have defined in the CPG and FD2030.

As continued research and planning teams work to identify the content the Marine Corps, and specifically the infantry, must change to move from the current state the envisioned future state, a framework must be used to ensure senior leaders maintain consistency and unity of effort across the force. This framework used to guide the process is often described as a model or motor.

Change Models (Motors)

Andrew Van de Ven and Marshall Poole analyzed years of research and theories of change to create four basic motors to describe how organizations have, and can implement change.³⁵ Large organizations, with complex structures or complex change goals often implement a mixture of the following motors.

1. Life-Cycle motor: The simplest and most straight forward. This motor describes a process of change which progresses through a sequence of stages. Based on the need for change, a leader

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning* [Joint Pub 5-0]. Washington, DC. (2017), IV-14.

³⁴ Andrew M. Pettigrew, Figure 1. Pettigrew’s Triangle, "Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm." *Journal of Management Studies* 24, no. 6 (1987), 658.

³⁵ Andres H. Van De Ven and Marshall Scott Poole. "Explaining Development and Change in Organizations." *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995), 519-524.

defines an end state and creates coordinated lines of effort and phases which are centrally managed in order to reach the desired state.³⁶

2. Teleological motor: This model is best described as a cycle of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation, and modification based on what was learned by the organization at each step in the change effort. A leader may envision a desired state and allow sub-elements of the organization to take semi-autonomous action toward that state. Dissatisfaction, failure, or negative feedback, drives continuous reassessment of processes to reach the desired state.³⁷

3. Dialectic motor: This motor is representative of confrontation and conflict between opposing entities that espouse contrasting ideas which interact to form new or unique outcomes, driving the next cycle of progression. The dialectic motor operates nearly opposite the life-cycle motor. This motor is often seen when it is difficult for leaders to pin down a specific future state and instead have some vague idea in mind which is surrounded by limited agreement from the organization's major subordinate elements.³⁸

4. Evolutionary motor: This motor is a repetitive sequence, driven by competition for scarce resources, of variation, selection, and retention of the best methods discovered by those in chosen population. Organizational sub-elements drive toward the future state through experimentation in multiple ways, adopting best practices and discarding others. Each change initiative and best practice only affects the sub-element driving the change, so communication and feedback is imperative.³⁹

These motors are often combined or selected to best meet organizationally-specific change goals. Tom Galvin gives an example of the dialectic and life-cycle motors being used in

³⁶ Andres H. Van De Ven and Marshall Scott Poole. "Explaining Development and Change in Organizations." *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995), 520.

³⁷ Ibid, 520.

³⁸ Ibid, 520.

³⁹ Ibid, 521.

combination when competing concepts, such as the military's use of conventional versus counter-insurgency models to drive change in recent conflict, might overlap in certain areas and have different processes but ultimately seek a similar desired state.⁴⁰ Through the combined use of the evolutionary and teleological motors, the infantry community can discover new techniques and procedures for operating in the future environment. This combined approach will be driven by multiple simultaneous experiments that are informed and guided by Commandant Berger's envisioned future state. These experiments do not need to be conducted by the entire force at once to allow the Marine Corps to meet the demands of ongoing operations.

The existing organizational change literature does an exceptional job of explaining the reasons why organizations change, the environmental factors both driving and inhibiting change, and methods to institute change. Additionally, researchers have written volumes about the importance of people and leaders who drive organizations to institute change, all the while accounting for the culture of the organizations they lead. The Marine Corps leaders that should drive change are the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Deputy Commandants for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) and for Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), the Commanding General of Training and Education Command (TECOM), all three Commanding Generals of the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), and all three Division Commanding Generals. These officers, usually infantry officers, have spent decades immersed in the unique infantry culture as they ascended the rank structure, leading combat units, and assuming greater responsibility. To better understand the people, it is important to understand how the organization stratifies its leaders as well as how culture is defined and its importance in the infantry.

⁴⁰ Tom Galvin, *Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders*. 1st ed. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, (2018), 85.

Organizational Leaders

The Army, structured similarly to the Marine Corps, best captured the stratification of leaders in Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, by grouping them into three main categories.⁴¹ The first, direct leaders, are front-line leaders who lead individuals or relatively small groups normally at the team, squad, platoon, and company level. Direct leaders focus on tactical responsibilities, completing assigned missions, and the care of the troops in they lead. The second, organizational leaders, influence much larger elements, normally at the battalion through corps level. These leaders are lieutenant colonels or higher who work with their associated senior enlisted leaders.⁴² Organizational leaders must divide their time between the concerns of the enterprise as a whole and that of their unit. These leaders must understand the strategic direction and implications of the enterprise as well as clarify and communicate it to their subordinates while supervising its implementation. The third, strategic leaders, operate at the highest level and are responsible for providing a strategic vision within the confines of resource allocation and congressional direction.⁴³

Current Marine Corps studies rely on the infantry battalion for experimentation as it is the basic tactical unit of ground combat power and is capable of integrating attached and supporting units to perform a variety of missions.⁴⁴ As defined in Field Manual 22-100, the battalion is commanded by an organizational leader, a lieutenant colonel. Thus, this study will focus on the infantry battalion, the Marine Corps organizational base-unit, for recommendations and future experimentation.

Culture

⁴¹ Department of the Army. *The US Army Leadership Field Manual: Be, Know, Do* [FM 22-100] (1999): 1-10.

⁴² Brian E Russell. "Organizational-Level Leadership." *Marine Corps Gazette* 98, no. 7 (2014), 10.

⁴³ Department of the Army. *The US Army Leadership Field Manual: Be, Know, Do* [FM 22-100] (1999): 1-12.

⁴⁴ Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Infantry Battalion. MCTP 3-10A*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps (2016), 1.

Culture and Military Organizations defines culture as “the sum collection of beliefs, values, attitudes, and learned behavior of a group of people.”⁴⁵ In complex organizations like the Marine Corps, many subcultures exist, the infantry being one of them. Assessing culture is very difficult because it is normally done through surveys and studies conducted by third party consultants who lack contexts. In large organizations individuals tend to gravitate towards the groups they most identify with through similarities in experience, which creates cultures that may have their own sub-cultures.⁴⁶ Edgar Schein defines culture using three levels.⁴⁷ The first, artifacts, are the observable facets that reflect culture, but not necessarily define it, and may include the design of organizational spaces, habitual routines, relationships between seniors and subordinates, language, technology, and dress. The second, beliefs and values, are the ideas, goals, values, and creeds that provide the motivation and rationale to the culture. The third, underlying basic assumptions, are the unconscious beliefs and values that determine perception, thought, and feelings and define the way the organization sees the world. Combining these levels creates a culture that helps individuals understand what to pay attention to, what things mean, how act emotionally, and what actions to take in specific situations.⁴⁸

A 2019 RAND study of culture in the U.S. military services captures the infantry-centric culture of the Marine Corps.⁴⁹ Even as an egalitarian attitude has permeated the force in the last two decades of conflict, as Marines in supporting roles have been exposed to the risk of enemy attack with roadside improvised explosive devices and small arms fire, the infantry-centric

⁴⁵ Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras. "Culture and Military Organizations." In *The Culture of Military Organizations* (2019), 17.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 18.

⁴⁷ Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 5th ed. (2017) 17-18.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 22.

⁴⁹ Zimmerman, Rebecca, et al. *Movement and Maneuver Culture and the Competition for Influence among the U. S. Military Services*. Rand Corporation (2019).

culture continues.⁵⁰ This infantry-centric culture can be seen through artifacts like the use of infantry-specific task organizations and roles in entry-level training, the Corps' continued focus on all Marines receiving basic infantry training regardless of occupational specialty, and the annual requirement for all Marines to qualify with a service rifle. The Marine Corps' beliefs and values are infantry-based in that they assert that "every Marine is a rifleman," the Corps is an expeditionary naval force capable of embarking and deploying from naval warships, and that the Corps inherently leverages its combined arms nature to solve problems.⁵¹

While many of these key pieces of Marine Corps culture make the organization what it is and must be preserved, a few minor changes should be made. First, the basic structures of front-line infantry formations will need to change to meet the challenges of distributed operations in contested regions, and those structures used at entry level schools should change with them. Additionally, the rifleman, or any other infantry Marine, must be trained in additional support functions beyond the scope they currently possess. For example, infantry Marines can no longer depend on traditional supply chains and logistics networks. While the functions of supply and logistics are necessary to any military operation, infantry Marines can no longer depend that their reach will extend to the front lines as it has in the past. Similarly, infantry Marines at all levels must understand the need for rigorous experimentation and candid feedback to senior leaders about the results of their experiments. In the same way that the Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEX) conducted from 1935 to 1941 helped the Marine Corps and the Navy identify significant issues with experimental landing operations, experiments must be done to identify issues with current

⁵⁰ Ibid, 99.

⁵¹ Zimmerman, Rebecca, et al. *Movement and Maneuver Culture and the Competition for Influence among the U. S. Military Services*. Rand Corporation (2019), 102.

and proposed amphibious operations.⁵² Many experiments will fail to meet prescribed goals, but the lessons learned in the field must be promulgated throughout the force. Failing to meet prescribed goals does not necessarily mean individuals or battalions are failures, so long as they provide value through feedback and lessons learned to other battalions.

Much of the organizational change literature is focused on private sector enterprises and their work to maintain relevance in their fields. Many of these organizations have a detailed understanding with regard to what they produce and how they provide unique value in their sector. The most glaring gap in the literature is a detailed understanding of how Marine infantry units provide value. In other words, what do Marine infantry units do that Army infantry units do not do? In order to understand the future state of the force, we must be able to define the current state.

Requirements of Future Littoral Combat

Following the release of the Commandant Berger's guidance, multiple infantry battalions have conducted exercises focused on assessing current capabilities required to operate in littoral regions. Second Battalion, Fourth Marines and First Battalion, Second Marines were organized into Battalion Landing Teams (BLT)⁵³ and were tasked to "assess a current BLT's capability to support Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Distributed Maritime Operations against a pacing threat" during the execution of III MEF and 7th Fleet joint integrated training exercises.⁵⁴ These exercises focused on distributed command and control and expeditionary warfighting with a specific focus on

⁵² Isely, Jeter A. and Philip Axtell Crowl. *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*. Princeton Univ. Press, (1951), 45-60.

⁵³ Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Infantry Battalion. MCTP 3-10A*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps (2016), 28.

⁵⁴ Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan (2020), 4. And III Marine Expeditionary Force Public Affairs. "III MEF, 7th Fleet Kick Off Joint Training Exercise NOBLE FURY." *Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet*, (2020).

informing future force design decisions.⁵⁵ Following these exercises, each unit produced an after action report capturing their overall assessment of unit capability shortfalls and recommendations for future actions. These recommendations were used to reinforce the two primary lines of effort that Marine infantry leaders must focus on in order to build a force capable of conducting sustained distributed operations: tasks inherent to naval infantry in distributed littoral combat and empowering organizational level commanders with the authority to employ forces offensively to create an asymmetrical advantage in future combat.

Assuming the infantry will remain the Marine Corps' base unit, infantry formations will be required to possess new technical and sustainment skills while also maintaining an aggressive culture and measured set of values. The Commandant has made it clear that Marines must be capable of land operations in support of naval campaigns; he was not prescriptive about the specific tasks the Corps must master, however basic skills must be common throughout the force. Continued assessments and experimentation will be required to understand those specific tasks and skills that must be common throughout the force.

Tasks Inherent to Naval Infantry in Littoral Combat

The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, or equipped to fight in sustained combat operations in the same way the U.S. Army is.⁵⁶ Therefore, the foundational close combat organizations in each service should be organized, trained, and equipped for the accomplishment of their respective missions. By law the Marine Corps is required to be organized, trained, and equipped for “the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ US Public Law describes the roles of the Marine Corps and the Army and can be found at: *United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions*, Public Law, Title 10 § 8063, Statute 1834, (2018). And *U.S. Army Policy; Composition; Organized Peace Establishment*, Public Law Title 10, § 7062, Statute 1838, (2018).

operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”⁵⁷ Consequently, the tasks assigned to the infantry must tie directly to the accomplishment of these missions. It is critical that the Marine Corps define the role that infantry forces play in the greater naval campaign. To meet the demands of the future operating environment, support the overall naval campaign, and to win in combat against a pacing threat,⁵⁸ next generation Marine infantry forces must be mature, specially trained, light infantry formations capable of amphibious insertion and extraction, maneuver in compartmentalized terrain, organic life-support sustainment, and capable of conducting distributed command and control.⁵⁹

The Marine Corps has already started making significant changes to entry-level infantry training to produce better-trained infantry Marines in an effort to meet the demands of future complex battlefields, like the one described by the Commandant.⁶⁰ Recent after-action reports reinforce the requirement for additional training in those areas listed above. The reports detail gaps in small unit training where there is little-to-no mutual support and reliable ground lines of communication are non-existent, requiring small units to perform critical sustainment and force protection tasks.⁶¹ The infantry force is largely untrained in these kind of sustainment actions. Limited ability to resupply also comes with limited ability to evacuate sick or wounded Marines from multiple independent expeditionary bases. Marines and Sailors operating in small units will require additional intermediate-level medical training, beyond the basic lifesaving courses currently taught. In order to conduct the type of distributed operations called for in future

⁵⁷ *United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions*, Public Law, Title 10 § 8063, Statute 1834, Aug 13, 2018.

⁵⁸ Esper, Dr Mark T. *Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Message to the Force on Accomplishments in Implementation of the National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Federal Information & News Dispatch, LLC, 2020.

⁵⁹ Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan (2020).

⁶⁰ Fuentes, Gidget. "Marine Infantry Training Shifts from 'Automaton' to Thinkers." *USNI News*, (2020).

⁶¹ Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan (2020), 20.

employment concepts, infantry Marines must master methods of water purification and collection, food procurement, and possess a more robust medical capability just to survive in challenging littoral regions.

Additionally, the after action reports noted significant gaps in the ability of platoons and companies to command and control distributed forces. The infantry's current ratio of leaders to those being led, placing a junior Lieutenant and a single Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in charge of a platoon of 40 Marines, works well in the greater scheme of company and battalion operations in a relatively contiguous battlespace. However, when these formations are separated by miles of ocean with limited reliable communication networks, decision makers must be placed throughout friendly locations to execute actions in support of the greater naval campaign. In the future battlefield described by the CPG and FD2030, a new model will need to be developed if platoon-sized elements are to be distributed across a wide battlespace with weapons designed to sink adversary ships and quickly impact the operational environment.

Empowering Organizational Level Commanders

Future operating concepts envision Marine infantry formations deployed to advanced bases in littoral regions and operating weapons that far exceed the range and impact of current infantry weapons systems. To employ these weapons, the force must develop new organizations or structures that place experienced Marines that understand the operational and strategic implications associated with targeting key adversary infrastructure or vessels in charge of these units. The Marine Corps' focus on conducting sustained and distributed operations that create an asymmetric advantage will require the organization to empower organizational level leaders with the authorities to effectively employ the individuals and weapons under their control.⁶² The Marine Corps must understand the critical command and control functions that are required to

⁶² Ibid, 12.

operate a ground-based anti-ship missile from a remote location to truly increase combat effectiveness in these future operating concepts.⁶³ Given adversary abilities to locate friendly units through the use of radios and across the electromagnetic spectrum, current communications methods that require Marines to seek approval for the employment of this kind of weapon could result in the loss of tactical surprise, a missed opportunity, or detection and destruction of friendly forces. Solving this issue may require the Marine Corps to reevaluate concepts that distribute small units with highly capable weapons or to reassess the trust and authorities that reside with leaders placed in isolated positions.

Future employment concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) are intended to deny the enemy freedom of movement through sea lanes by creating an environment where only an irrational enemy leader would engage Marines because the situation would be too costly for the enemy.⁶⁴ However, the enemy leader must believe the threat imposed by the Marines to be credible, meaning the leader believes that the Marines are not only capable, but empowered, to impose costly destruction on the enemy force. For these concepts to place future adversaries in such a dilemma, the Marine Corps must empower its organizational level commanders with the trust and authorities to impose destructive costs on the enemy. This may involve new structures, placing operational level leaders with distributed small units to make such calls.

Instituting Change

⁶³ Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan (2020), 12.

⁶⁴ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*. Washington, DC, (2018).

Experimenting with new concepts for the employment of future infantry forces is an essential part of increasing organizational effectiveness and FD2030 requires the infantry to further evaluate and prioritize tasks to create a purpose-built force capable of prevailing in a distributed maritime environment.⁶⁵ Doing this will require infantry leaders to define and focus on tasks that are inherent to distributed naval infantry operations and empower operational level commanders with trust and authority. Seizing advanced naval bases and supporting naval campaigns require individuals and units to be uniquely trained in amphibious operations with a focus on combat and sustainment in littoral regions.⁶⁶ Commandant Berger has started the change effort by defining the changes to the adversary, friendly, and technical environments in which the Corps must operate. Marine Corps leaders must design and implement internal systems capable of producing Marines who can fight and win in these future environments. Potential adversaries and the growing complexities of future conflict require that the Marine Corps make substantial change now.

This change should be conducted at the battalion level.⁶⁷ With many battalions struggling to meet current training requirements within finite time constraints, assigning more tasks to battalion commanders is unreasonable. As noted by John Kotter, the majority of change efforts fail to deliver the outcomes and results senior leaders are looking for because the organization is often overburdened and the leadership exhausted.⁶⁸ The Marine Corps must ensure it does not overburden battalion staffs. Instituting battalion-level change requires a phased approach that will have its own set of difficulties as regiments and divisions will have legacy battalions and

⁶⁵ David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2020), 4.

⁶⁶ Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan, 2020.

⁶⁷ As noted earlier, many infantry commanders simply do not have the time to spend planning and documenting changes along their own unique path while maintaining the readiness required by numerous competing interests; the enterprise must find a way to prioritize and achieve those tasks before burdening battalion and regimental commanders with more.

⁶⁸ John Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (1995): 59.

new battalions with potentially much different training programs and requirements. However, the Marine Corps must make change despite this turbulent environment. Commanders and Staffs at all levels must be involved in change planning and cannot wait for detailed instructions from senior leadership.⁶⁹ This change process should follow a simple framework, based on the study of organizational change, to serve as an initial guide to building the future force.

The Change Process

Any change plan developed by the infantry community should include a *change architecture*, a type of roadmap informed by both the current state and the desired future state that includes initiatives, assessments, and decision points along the route. Van de Ven's and Poole's evolutionary and teleological change motors should be used to manage the sequence of change events and communicate a shared organizational change methodology to the force. The *evolutionary* and *teleological* motors are best employed when an organization is working to resolve a complex problem that requires a local, organizational level, solution from which best practices may arise that benefit the enterprise as a whole while still driving toward a strategic, or service-level, change effort.⁷⁰ The evolutionary motor will provide an overall change framework for the Marine Corps. Reinforcing the evolutionary motor with the teleological at the battalion level will inform the change effort required to build the force capable of achieving Commandant Berger's vision. The evolutionary motor will provide the overall general architecture and change process across the enterprise. Because a clear distribution of labor at each battalion does not exist with regard to assigned experiments, the teleological motor should be used at the battalion level to allow those units to continually reassess and make necessary changes along the way.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 62.

⁷⁰ Tom Galvin, *Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders*. 1st ed. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, (2018), 85.

The evolutionary motor draws its strength from its reliance on experimentation.⁷¹ For the evolutionary motor to work, Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and Division Commanders must define the overall end state for units participating in experiments. Additionally, intermediate goals that define specific experiments should be issued to battalions to keep organizational level units on track and working towards the shared future state, a better littoral combat force. As each battalion works through experimentation, they will discover the most useful methods and best practices for accomplishing the tasks required of the future littoral combat force. The best practices must then be collected and promulgated to the force as a whole.⁷² Failed experiments or less efficient practices must also be understood and circulated throughout the force to ensure leaders at all levels understand the outcomes of the experimentation across the Corps. Leaders must understand that each experiment and its results will only affect their battalion, so this communication is paramount. Marines thrive on competition and, when given the opportunity, will work tirelessly to experiment with new tools, concepts, and manpower which to inform new best practices and tactics.


*Figure 2. Evolutionary Motor*⁷³

Multiple service-level experiments conducted simultaneously

⁷¹ Ibid, 82.

⁷² Ibid, 82.

⁷³ The evolutionary motor moves from the current state to the future state through a cycle of experimentation using variation, selection, and retention, which is continually improved through competition for new best practices. As defined by Van de Ven and Poole: variations are the novel forms of organizations that form to accomplish the goal, selection of one or more variations occurs through competition, and retention perpetuates and maintain the selected variations until a new one is selected through competition.



The teleological motor is driven by the top-down strategic direction provided by the CPG and FD2030. Like the evolutionary motor, it requires an understanding of the current and desired future states, as the latter serves as the goal that the individual infantry battalion is driving towards.⁷⁴ Once both are understood by the force, each battalion can drive toward the future state along what they believe to be the best path. What makes this model unique is its appreciation for the difficulty of neatly dividing tasks along existing functional areas or work centers.⁷⁵ As an organization that relies so heavily on the integration of seemingly disparate groups, it would appear impossible for the Marine Corps to align each group’s task along the same timeline.


*Figure 3. Teleological Motor*⁷⁶

Multiple battalions working toward achieving the same goal

⁷⁴ Ibid, 81.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 81.

⁷⁶ The teleological motor figure shows four separate battalion’s experimenting to achieve their goal of sustaining distributed forces through a series of field exercises. Battalion 1 and battalion 3 are successful in sustaining their distributed forces, their techniques and procedures will inform new doctrine for the future force.



The teleological motor is fueled by a cycle of negative feedback, or dissatisfaction, which forces the unit to assess why it failed to meet experimentation goals, make adjustments, and continue towards the end state. This element of the motor is especially useful to the Marine Corps, as its organizational leaders and staffs are formally educated in problem solving methods and processes that are informed by operational design, wargaming, red-teaming, and continuous refinement. Marine Corps field grade officers and senior Staff Non-Commissioned Officers are trained to develop courses of action which are played out against likely adversary actions in an effort to improve plans and operational concepts. When courses of action are met with defeat, or failure, Marines learn valuable lessons about adversary capabilities and friendly shortfalls which are incorporated into new courses of action informed by the invaluable cycle of negative feedback. This is what infantry battalions must be allowed to do in the course of their experimentation to design new techniques and procedures that have been informed by failure and continuous assessment.

Applying these motors to the infantry will require the dissemination of a concise future state informed by Commandant Berger's planning guidance and supported by intermediate goals. MEF and Division Commanders should allow regiments and battalions leeway to experiment with new concepts in order to meet prescribed goals. This type of experimentation is already underway with the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and valuable data has started to inform planning and decision making. Intermediate goals assigned to battalions should be focused on training and exercises that simulate the challenges presented by distributed operations in the future operating environment. Exercises should be designed to evaluate the ability of the infantry battalions' units to operate and sustain themselves in littoral environments for prolonged periods. Additionally, the battalion and regimental staff should be evaluated on their ability to provide logistical life support items as well as their ability to command and control multiple subordinate units. These difficult tasks require myriad solutions that can be identified through experimentation in the form of goal-oriented exercises across the force.

Experimentation goals should focus on specific tasks like seizing littoral footholds, sustaining distributed forces, controlling fires in a degraded environment, signature management, and the recovery of units for retrograde or force protection. In the same way that current mission essential tasks are supported by multiple individual and unit tasks in the infantry training and readiness manual, these new essential tasks must be understood so they can be broken into subordinate elements. These are demanding tasks that can be envisioned along the evolutionary roadmap but require a teleological approach to give battalion commanders greater leeway as they design new concepts informed by failure at exercises and attempted again in future exercises. The new procedures learned through rigorous exercise and experimentation will inform future decisions about force design and employment concepts and could have the added benefit of

bolstering organizational buy-in and retention, as illustrated earlier by Noel Tichy and the Volvo plant example.⁷⁷

Key to both the evolutionary and teleological motors are feedback and promulgation. The Marine Corps must establish processes that ensure best practices and, just as importantly, failures are understood across the force. The creation of a center responsible for managing these practices is only useful if Marines find it useful and prioritize it above other competing interests. In-person professional workshops and seminars that include field experiment planners, executors, and commanders should be emphasized over referencing digital library repositories as much as possible.

As the infantry develops new operational employment models and best practices it must properly capture and organize them to be useful in the development of the future force. To organize its new capability recommendations the Marine Corps should use the familiar Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework to determine and recommend changes across the enterprise in support of building the future force. This framework accounts for the interrelated nature of elements required to grow and sustain military capabilities by organizing them into manageable categories.⁷⁸ Capturing the results of experimentation in the DOTMLPF-P format will drive decisions about which aspects of the enterprise are required to change to institute the findings. For example, units experimenting with new signature management techniques may discover that Marines require additional education and training on the fundamentals of camouflage, new camouflage systems and tools to measure unwanted emissions must be procured, and policies

⁷⁷ Noel Tichy "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983), 58.

⁷⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. *Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts, CJCSI 3010.20E*: Department of Defense, (2016), A-3.

that limit the use of personal electronic devices in training and deployed environments should be implemented.

While the Marine Corps must continue to deploy its infantry forces in support of multiple forecasted missions and be ready to respond to conflict that cannot be forecasted, the organization must experiment along the way.⁷⁹ The opposing forces requiring the Marine Corps to operate with current capabilities while thinking about and employing new capabilities highlights competing interests that require unique processes to address both. Leaders must allow the motors to work even when failure appears more frequent than success because failure in experimentation is better than failure combat. Additionally, leaders must ensure the organization does not lose sight of its unique role “for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”⁸⁰

Conclusion

FD2030 requires the infantry to evaluate and prioritize tasks to create a purpose-built force with a focus on those tasks required to win in the distributed maritime environment.⁸¹ To create and sustain an infantry force capable of winning in future littoral combat, the Marine Corps must define and focus on tasks that are inherent to naval infantry formations and enable distributed operations by empowering organizational level commanders with the trust and authorities required to employ their Marines and weapons systems. The Marine Corps is required to be organized, trained, and equipped for “the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval

⁷⁹ Feickert, Andrew. "New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives." *Congressional Research Service*, (2020), 2.

⁸⁰ *United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions*, Public Law, Title 10 § 8063, Statute 1834, (2018).

⁸¹ David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, (2020), 4.

campaign,” thus the tasks assigned to the infantry must tie directly to the accomplishment of those missions.⁸²

To maintain consistency and unity of effort across the force a *change architecture* must be created and implemented. This architecture must be based on established and respected organizational change research and should focus heavily on experimentation. Applying Van de Ven's and Poole's evolutionary and teleological change motors will manage the sequence of change events and communicate a shared methodology to the force. Battalion-level experimentation will provide the best practices for accomplishing the tasks required of the future littoral combat force. Key to ensuring successful change will be maintaining a common framework, communicating success and failure across the force, and capturing best practices to inform future doctrine. Using an easily understood and logical methodology will foster buy-in and support the process of transformative institutional change required by FD2030.

⁸² *United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions*, Public Law, Title 10 § 8063, Statute 1834, Aug 13, 2018.

Bibliography

- Berger, David H. *Commandant's Planning Guidance 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2019.
- Brian E Russell. "Organizational-Level Leadership." *Marine Corps Gazette* 98, no. 7 (Jul 1, 2014): 10.
- Burnes, Bernard. "Kurt Lewin and Complexity Theories: Back to the Future?" *Journal of Change Management* 4, no. 4 (2004): 309-325.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. *Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts, CJCSI 3010.20E*. Department of Defense, 2016.
- Choi, Myungweon. "Employees' Attitudes Toward Organizational Change: A Literature Review." *Human Resource Management* 50, no. 4 (Jul, 2011): 479-500.
- Esper, Dr Mark T. *Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Message to the Force on Accomplishments in Implementation of the National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Federal Information & News Dispatch, LLC, 2020.
- Fedor, Donald B., Steven Caldwell, and David M. Herold. "The Effects of Organizational Changes on Employee Commitment: A Multilevel Investigation." *Personnel Psychology* 59, no. 1 (2006): 1-29.
- Feickert, Andrew. "New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives." *Congressional Research Service*, (Aug 1, 2020), 6.
- Galvin, Tom. *Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders*. 1st ed. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018.
- Galvin, Thomas,P. and Lance Clark D. *Beyond Kotters Leading Change: A Broad Perspective on Organizational Change for Senior U.S. Military Leaders*, 2015.
- Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman. "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change." *American Sociological Review* 49, no. 2 (1984): 149-164.
- Headquarters Department of the Army. *The US Army Leadership Field Manual: Be, Know, Do* [FM 22-100] Washington, DC, 1999.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Concept for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations in Support of the Navy Concept for Distributed Maritime Operations and the Marine Corps Operating Concept*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2019.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Force Design 2030*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2020.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Infantry Company Operations. MCRP 3-10A.2*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2018.

- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC). How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2016a.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Infantry Battalion. MCTP 3-10A*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2016b.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. MCDP 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1997.
- Hollister, Rose and Michael D. Watkins. "Too Many Projects: How to Deal with Initiative Overload." *Harvard Business Review*, Sep 1, 2018, 64.
- III Marine Expeditionary Force Public Affairs. "III MEF, 7th Fleet Kick Off Joint Training Exercise NOBLE FURY." *Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet*, Oct 6, 2020.
- Isely, Jeter A. and Philip Axtell Crowl. *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning* [Joint Pub 5-0]. Washington, DC: 2017.
- Kanter, Rosabeth, Barry Stein, and Todd Jick. *The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience it and Leaders Guide It*. New York: Free Press, 1992.
- Kotter, John P. "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (1995): 59.
- Kotter, John P. *8 Steps to Accelerate Change in Your Organization*: Kotter Inc., 2018.
- Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
- Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Bluejacket Books. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.
- Masuch, Michael. "Vicious Circles in Organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (1985): 14-33.
- Mattis, Jim. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018.
- Parastuty, Zulaicha, Erich J. Schwarz, Robert J. Breitenacker, and Rainer Harms. "Organizational Change: A Review of Theoretical Conceptions that Explain how and Why Young Firms Change." *Review of Managerial Science* 9, no. 2 (2015): 241-259.
- Pettigrew, A., E. Ferlie, and L. McKee. "Shaping Strategic Change: Making Change in Large Organisations - the Case of the National Health Service." *The Journal of the Operational Research Society* 45, no. 5 (May 1, 1994): 599.
- Pettigrew, Andrew M. "Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm." *Journal of Management Studies* 24, no. 6 (Nov, 1987): 649-670.
- Poole, Peter P. "Words and Deeds of Organizational Change: JMI." *Journal of Managerial Issues* 10, no. 1 (1998): 45-59.

- Rubinstein, Robert A. "Humanitarian-Military Collaboration: Social and Cultural Aspects of Interoperability." In *Cultural Awareness in the Military: Developments and Implications for Future Humanitarian Cooperation*, edited by Albro, R. and B. Ivey, 57-72. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014.
- Russell, Brian E. "Organizational Level Leadership." *The Marine Corps Gazette* 98, no. 7 (July, 2014): 10-13.
- Safferstone, Mark. "Organizational Leadership: Classic Works and Contemporary Perspectives." *CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries* 42, (February 1, 2005): 959 – 975.
- Schein, Edgar H. and Peter Schein. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 5th edition ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017.
- Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, 1st Marine Division. *BLT 2/4, 31st MEU, NOBLE FURY After Action Report*. Okinawa, Japan, 2020.
- Tichy, Noel. "The Essentials of Strategic Change Management." *The Journal of Business Strategy* 3, no. 4 (1983): 55.
- United States Army Policy; Composition; Organized Peace Establishment*, Public Law Title 10, § 7062, Statute 1838, 2018.
- United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions*, Public Law Title 10, § 8063, Statute 1834, 2018.
- Van De Ven, Andrew H. and Marshall Scott Poole. "Explaining Development and Change in Organizations." *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 510-540.
- Wetzel, Ralf and Lore Van Gorp. "Eighteen Shades of Grey?: An Explorative Literature Review into the Theoretical Flavours of Organizational Change Research." *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 27, no. 1 (2014): 115-146.
- Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. Gerras. "Culture and Military Organizations." In *The Culture of Military Organizations*. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray ed., 17-32. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Zimmerman, Rebecca, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Orrie Rebeca. *Movement and Maneuver Culture and the Competition for Influence among the U. S. Military Services*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2019.