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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Expanding Capabilities and Efficiencies by Implementing Change  
within Prior Service Recruiting**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


**AUTHOR:**  
**Major Timothy Dempsey**

AY 20-21

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Date: April 27, 2021

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## *Acronyms*

AR: Active Reserve  
ASR: Authorized Strength Report  
C2: Command and Control  
CCMD: Combatant Command  
CAN: Center for Naval Analyses  
CO: Commanding Officer  
COMREL: Command Relationship  
DAP: Direct Affiliation Program  
EAS: End of Active Service  
ERR: Eastern Recruiting Region  
FY: Fiscal Year  
GCC: Geographic Combatant Commander  
HQ: Headquarters  
IDMS: Inventory Development and Management System  
IRR: Individual Ready Reserve  
JFC: Joint Forces Commander  
JP: Joint Publication  
MARFORRES: Marine Forces Reserve  
MCDP: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication  
MCRC: Marine Corps Recruiting Command  
MCRISS: Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System  
MOS: Military Occupational Specialty  
MPP: Manpower Plan  
MSC: Major Subordinate Command  
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act  
NPS: Non-prior Service  
OIC: Officer in Charge  
OPCON: Operational Control  
PSR: Prior Service Recruiting  
RA: Reserve Affairs  
RFI: Request for Information  
SMCR: Selected Marine Corps Reserve  
SNCOIC: Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge  
TACON: Tactical Control  
WRR: Western Recruiting Region

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Evolution to Success: *Expanding Capabilities and Efficiencies by Implementing Change within Prior Service Recruiting*

**Author:** Major Timothy Dempsey

**Thesis:** Marine Corps Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) is an organization that lacks the ability to promote unity of command, uses metrics that do not measure their institutional requirement, and is unable to adapt to changes. These issues are symptomatic of a structural problem that violates all Department of Defense doctrinal command and control tenets which led to a misalignment between the mission and incentives and an organization that is unable to efficiently function. For PSR to repair the damage within the organization, the institution must be rebuilt using accepted organization practices and adopt recruiting practices that target the most qualified Marines for the Total Force.

**Discussion:** PSR is a stagnant organization that is struggling to keep pace with the requirements placed upon it. The organizational structure prevents it from being able to promote unity of effort across the organization or effectively adapt to necessary changes because PSR lacks a centralized commander with the authorities to centralize planning and direction of the force. The root of the problem stems from the internal structure which prevents basic command and control tasks from being effectively implemented and is compounded by PSR's inability to change internal processes. The problem is so foundational to the institution that the only solution is to rebuild PSR from the ground up in a manner that reinforces the basic command and control requirements found across doctrine.

**Conclusion:** PSR is a small organization that fulfills an important role in the overall operational readiness of the Marine Corps. As an organization it is hidden underneath the size and

importance of the Non-Prior Service (NPS) recruiting mission. Due to its location, PSR's problems only garner attention when the completion of the annual mission is at risk. It should not take a risk to the readiness of the Marine Corps to identify and fix a small structural problem. By employing the overarching tenets and best practices within recruiting, command and control, and organizational effectiveness, Prior Service Recruiting will be able to adapt and expand their capability to meet the future requirements of the Marine Corps.

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

**What is the problem?** Prior Service Recruiting (PSR) is a small subcomponent under Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), aimed at recruiting Marine Corps veterans back into active service. Active-duty veterans makes up the majority of the reserve population and is a key demographic required to maintain the readiness of the reserve component. Each of the six recruiting districts across the United States has a PSR station that recruits prior service Marines to continue their service in the drilling reserve. Each PSR station operates under the operational and administrative control of their respective district yet has minimal interaction or interoperability with the non-prior service (NPS) recruiting functions of MCRC. The separation of the six PSR stations under district commanders who have limited to no knowledge of the reserves has led to six vastly different PSR stations with different internal policies, processes, and cultures. The segregation of PSR under the umbrella of the NPS recruiting districts has also distorted the metrics used to determine success and has prevented PSR from being able to adequately adapt to new requirements. PSR is an organization with no unity of command, uses metrics that do not measure their institutional requirement, and is unable to adapt to changes.

**Why is this relevant?** The mission of PSR has become increasingly difficult. The current recruiting output of PSR has surpassed the theoretical maximum for the past three years. Reserve Affairs and MCRC have assisted to ensure mission attainment through overstaffing production recruiters but will not solve the root issues behind PSR's struggles. The Marine Corps missing their approved reserve end strength listed in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would have dramatic negative impact to the operational readiness of the Marine Corps. The struggle across PSR to make their assigned mission has secondary effects that impact the Active Reserve (AR) community. The top Marines in the AR are selected to attend recruiting school and

serve three years recruiting. Successful tours on recruiting are highly regarded on promotion boards. Unfortunately, Prior Service Recruiting is unable to provide a climate that reinforces basic tenets such as unity of command and unity of effort, leading to a frustrating and difficult environment. This climate is a disservice for the top tier Marines recruiting in PSR and does not assist in retaining the top talent.

**How should these problems be addressed?** These problems should be addressed by reducing the structure and mission essential tasks of PSR down to the absolute basics and rebuild PSR using reliable command and control tenets along with creating metrics that align with the mission essential tasks. An efficient command structure and proper metrics will allow PSR to effectively employ to new recruiting methods as well as correct internal policies, processes, and culture. The rest of this paper is organized into several chapters. Chapter Two is a literature review that discusses the current knowledge on organizational structure and recruiting metrics. Chapter Three discusses solutions to realign the structure and update the mission to allow Prior Service Recruiting efficiently meet the needs of the Marine Corps. Chapter Four discusses some in-depth data relating to efficiencies Prior Service Recruiting should take advantage of. Chapter Five addresses the way forward for Prior Service Recruiting to implement the recommended changes.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

The literature review chapter is organized into two sections that each discuss two foundational issues with the current Prior Service Recruiting organization. The first section focuses on analyzing Department of Defense publications that address accepted theories of

Command and Control (C2) systems. The second part will explore literature relating to efficient recruiting practices and means to measure effectiveness to ensure success.

## **Section I: Structure**

Section I outlines the current doctrine that describes the fundamental tenets of command-and-control systems within the DoD and Joint Force. The C2 system within an organization is the foundational requirement for the institution to function properly. If the C2 system is incorrect, the organization will be inflexible, inefficient, and possibly unable to complete their assigned mission essential tasks. Organizations with a thoughtfully designed C2 system will be responsive to change, create efficiency, and operate with higher potential.


The Department of Defense has a myriad of doctrine and guidance concerning C2 systems. The capstone document is Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (JP-1). It provides “fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.”<sup>1</sup> Chapter five specifically discusses the principles of Command and Control. Supplementary information that expands information in JP-1 are found within Insights and Best Practices papers released by the Joint Staff’s Joint Force Development (J7). These papers describe the C2 lessons learned from creating and running Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Joint Task Forces (JTF). C2 insight specifically designed for the Marine Corps is located within Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP-6).

The C2 metrics that will be used to measure the effectiveness of the PSR structure are the four core C2 principles listed in JP-1; Simplicity, Span of Control, Unit Integrity, and

Interoperability. Aspects of these principles are expanded upon within the Insights and Best Practices papers and MCDP-6.

**Simplicity.** “Unity of command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.”<sup>2</sup> The concept of ‘unit of command’ is a basic requirement for the success of any command-and-control system. Structure drives the ability to provide successful unity of command which leads to the ability to conduct centralized planning, direction, and decentralized execution. In addition, unity of command drives the organization’s unity of effort.<sup>3</sup> This concept coordinates the actions of a unit to achieve the commander’s intent, in this specific case it would be achieving the assigned mission essential tasks of PSR.

**Span of Control.** “Organization should ensure a reasonable span of control which refers to the number of subordinates or activities under a single commander... the more layers of command an organization has, the longer it takes for information to move up or down. Consequently, the organization becomes slower and less responsive.”<sup>4</sup> Span of control across the Marine Corps remains fairly standard. One fireteam leader for every three Marines, three fireteam leaders for every squad leader, three platoons in a company. An accepted number of subordinates to leader can vary between three and six.<sup>5</sup> Organizations with a higher ratio of leader to subordinate can have a flatter structure and will increase the speed of communication up and down the chain of command but risk overloading leaders with excessive responsibilities. Reducing the ratio between leaders and subordinate will increase the layers within an



organization, reducing communication effectiveness and creates excessive bureaucracy.

Organizations must strike a balance between communication effectiveness and the amount of responsibility of the leaders.

**Unit Integrity.** “An organization operates most effectively when its members think of themselves as belonging to one or more groups characterized by high levels of loyalty, cooperation, morale, and commitment to the group mission.”<sup>6</sup> Organizational C2 systems should promote an innate sense of unity across the command. Unit integrity provides a sense of shared responsibility for the success of the mission and bonds individual members of an organization into a cohesive entity. Organizations without unit integrity will become fractured, have unproductive competition, infighting, and division.

**Interoperability.** “Effective organizations are characterized by intense, unconstrained communications— that is, the free and enthusiastic sharing of meaningful information throughout the organization.”<sup>7</sup> The structure of C2 systems must be designed with an understanding of external and internal relationships and how these relationships drive mission success. Horizontal relationships that link one organization to another should strive to be the same rank. For example, the majority Battalion and Squadron Commanders across the services are O-6s. Billets within these units are also the same rank as their peers in similar units. This promotes horizontal communication between units which increases the agility and speed of operations across the service.<sup>8</sup> Internal relationships within the units performs a similar function. Leaders must have the appropriate rank and authorities to execute their position in an efficient manner. Ensuring the right rank is assigned to the right position is an important device to build trust, foster cooperation, and build a team.<sup>9</sup>

The publications from the Joint Staff and Marine Corps contain the most practical experiences that the military has to offer about creating efficient C2 structures. The Joint Staff creates and rebuilds Joint Commands rather frequently compared to the Fleet Marine Force. This experience provides multiple iterations to learn and identify the best practices of building and implementing C2 structures. A shortfall of these documents are the size and scope of the C2 structures they create. While PSR is a small unit and will only require a small C2 structure, the Joint Force creates C2 structures for Geographic Combatant Commands and other Joint Forces. Thankfully the overarching insights from the J7 translate across the spectrum of scale.

## **Section II: Metrics & Efficiency**

This section discusses the current metrics PSR uses to determine success along with how PSR targets and retains eligible Marines. It will conclude by offering an optimal allocation of PSR manpower across recruitment programs to efficiently target all eligible Marines as well as a new metrics to measure success in Chapter Three.

**Metrics:** Volume XIII and Volume IX of the PSR guidebooks currently instruct how PSR should operate on a daily basis to include how mission success is determined. These publications also outline the process of identifying potential applicants, means of contacting them, the needs-based selling process, completing the join process, techniques for service after the sale and the measures of effectiveness. I will outline the current metrics used to quantify success from these sources to act as a baseline for the reader.

PSR uses metrics based off the NPS recruiting model. Each fiscal year, Reserve Affairs calculates the required number of Marines that must be recruited by PSR for the selected reserve component to remain at the prescribed NDAA end-strength limit by the end of September. The number of Marines necessary each fiscal year is separated into officer and enlisted requirements

as well as component (Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentee, and Active Reserve). MCRC PSR distributes these requirements down the chain of command in the form of a monthly mission to the regions, stations, substations, and to the recruiters. Success is considered making the aggregate monthly mission and the trimester mission by category (officer/enlisted, and component). Other metrics are tracked that are not included in the success or failure of the annual mission such as attrition and manpower plan completion. An attrition is when a Marine joins a unit and decides to leave within 60 days. Attrition does not directly indicate any single specific issue but can be an indicator of units with unsupportive command climates, recruiters 'soft selling' Marines to units, or a change in the personal situation of the Marine. The Manpower plan is a goal released by Reserve Affairs that list how many joins each unit should get during the FY. This list is not specific to MOS or rank.

From the perspective of MCRC, a successful fiscal year for PSR would be defined as meeting the aggregate and categorical (Officer/Enlisted) personnel requirements across all components (SMCR/IMA/AR) from Reserve Affairs.

**Efficiency:** Prior Service Recruiting has recruited Marines to serve in the Selected Reserve in the same manner since joining MCRC. Individual recruiters are assigned a geographical region for which they are responsible. They are tasked with contacting Marines who are part of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a component of the reserves that is composed of former active-duty and reserve personnel who have contractual time remaining, with the purpose to have them voluntarily actively participate in the selected reserve (SMCR/IMA/AR). In other words, recruiters cold-call Marines in the IRR to determine if they are eligible and sell them on joining a reserve unit.

Attempts to contact Marines before they leave active duty started in 2012 when the Direct Affiliation Program (DAP) was created by Reserve Affairs. The DAP gave the ability for active-duty Marines to select an open reserve billet before their end of active service (EAS). Once their EAS passed, they were automatically transferred into the drilling reserve and joined their selected unit. The DAP grew until the end of 2017, when it was passed from Reserve Affairs to MCRC PSR.<sup>10</sup> Reserve Affairs did not have the ability to effectively manage the administrative burden due to the growth of the program. PSR agreed to take the program as this opened up a new eligible population of about 20,000 Marines to recruit from. PSR had difficulty incorporating the DAP into the established join process, because it could not determine how to assign recruiters credit for DAP joins, did not dedicate recruiters to the program due to fear of mission failure, and lacked a strong push from MCRC PSR and the Districts with the active-duty populations.

### **Chapter 3: Methodology**


This chapter evaluates how the current structure of PSR causes the systematic issues afflicting the organization along with how updating their outdated metrics will increase their efficiency of completing their real mission. This chapter is organized in two sections. The first discusses the proposed structure change through the lens of the four fundamental principles outlined in JP-1. The second examines the proposed changes to current metrics of success along with recommending expanding recruiting efforts into the active-duty component with the intent of increasing recruiting efficiency.

#### **Section I: Structure**

The current Prior Service Recruiting structure is a byproduct from MCRC absorbing PSR over a decade ago. When PSR was absorbed, MCRC considered PSR another recruiting program just like their Officer recruiting program and inserted PSR into existing structure to mirror what they already knew worked. By dividing PSR across the six Districts, MCRC unknowingly removed PSR’s unity, created an unnecessarily tall chain of command, divided the unit integrity along with the capability to operate as a single entity.

**Simplicity:** The current structure for MCRC is reasonable for the size and scope of the non-prior service recruiting mission, but PSR is a very different type of recruiting organization given its much smaller (81 recruiters and 40 career recruiters) and more niche-oriented target population. PSR previously operated under the Marine Forces Reserve Mobilization Command but transferred to MCRC with the intent of expanding a professionalized force of prior service recruiters that can maintain the personnel requirements of the drilling reserve component.

MCRC integrated PSR under the existing O-6 District recruiting commands—the same locations that other specialized recruiting programs are located (figure 2). This decision appeared to be the logical location with the contemporary understanding of prior service recruiting. JP-1 recommends that a C2 structure must enforce unity of command



through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.<sup>11</sup> These objectives could be achieved if PSR could incorporate itself into the NPS Districts, but this proved unmanageable in practice; PSR is separated from NPS counterparts by target population, computer networks, physical location, processes, component, and mission. The resulting separation fails to promote unity of command and, even more inefficiently, creates alternate means of conducting business. The majority of daily communication leaving a PSR station command group is to their corresponding region PSR staff, who then relays the message to MCRC PSR. The PSR's district is regularly bypassed on operational topics and is mostly used for administrative items. The administrative support from the district is the main benefit for being located under their scope of control. Under the current organization, PSR does not have the ability to employ the concept of 'unity of command' because there is no PSR commander with the authorities to direct centralized planning and direction.

Since PSR does not receive mission essential recruiting support from the districts or regions, PSR is free to rebuild itself as a separate entity in accordance with doctrine and best practices. The proposed structure removes PSR from the NPS districts and places PSR under the command of an Active Reserve O-6 commander. This organizational structure provides the opportunity to




Fig 3. Flow of current PSR operations (top), flow of proposed PSR operations (bottom)

develop a unity of command across all PSR stations, removes the unnecessary regional chain of command that provides little value. PSR would benefit from a flatter organizational model because it would reduce the unnecessary administrative workload outside of PSR, streamline PSR’s ability to adapt to a dynamic recruiting environment, and make the organization more efficient. The PSR CO would have an appropriately sized staff to conduct the basic operational, training, and administrative requirements for a force of 81recruiters, 40 career recruiters, 7 officers, and a mix of 15 support personnel.

**Span of Control:** Span of control refers to the number of subordinates or activities under a single commander.<sup>12</sup> The current span of control across PSR has a three to one or four to one ratio of subordinates to supervisor. Using a four to one ratio from the PSR OICs down to the

recruiters allows all 81 recruiters to fit under the span of control of 20 SNCOICs who report to five OICs (one remainder). These changes remove the personnel requirements from staffing the east and western regions (4 personnel each) and removes one command group's worth of staff personnel requirements which can be realigned under the PSR District HQ support staff and training team.

This four to one span of control ratio strikes a balance between the depth of the organization and being able for the OICs and CO to effectively manage the requirements. Reducing the OICs even more would increase the size of their territory, personnel, and travel requirements to a point that would either unsustainable or negligent. Starting with this ratio also gives the CO the flexibility to shift the recruiting locations without detrimental impact to SNCOICs and OICs. Shifting a couple sectors from a four to one into a five to one in response to changing demands will be a necessity over time.

**Unit Integrity:** The current PSR structure has six individual PSR stations that do not share the same group identity or have a cohesive identity of cooperation, loyalty, or commitment across stations. Each PSR station is absorbed within their own world and focused on their own issues. There is no higher authority present to unify the group into an integrated team who is committed to accomplishing the mission (MCDP-6). The PSR mission crosses all artificial recruiting boundaries. Prospective applicants may live in one recruiter's territory and join a unit in another recruiter's territory. A reserve unit may have a vacant billet but no eligible Marines within a reasonable commuting distance. PSR must be able to remove the regional and district boundaries and join the stations together under one identity and purpose.

**Interoperability:** The current processes and communication channels across PSR are inefficient and create increased stress and completion timelines. Flattening the organization will

inherently provide the means to communicate, build trust, cooperation, cohesion and mutual understanding across the PSR force.<sup>13</sup> The big changes to the PSR structure promote interoperability with the customers of PSR and develop the horizontal command relationships that improve the agility and speed required to expand the effective capabilities of PSR.

The changes for PSR go beyond the O-6 commander. This paper proposes to remove PSR from MCRC and assign the responsibilities of PSR to Reserve Affairs, the organizational entity responsible for the higher-level functions of the reserve component to include incentives, end strength, and retention. The PSR commander would report directly to the Reserve Affairs director. This relationship would remove the us-versus-them attitude between MCRC PSR and Reserve Affairs and would create one cohesive group that is aligned to meet the same goals. The PSR commander would not be co-located with Reserve Affairs in Quantico, Virginia, but would be located at Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) headquarters in New Orleans. Locating the PSR commander with MARFORRES will allow the CO to coordinate horizontally with other O-6 commanders of the MARFORRES major subordinate commands (MSC). This horizontal networking will assist in promoting crosstalk at the higher levels of MARFORRES and will ensure PSR is meeting the customer's personnel readiness requirements.

This paper also proposes to increase the rank of the PSR OICs that will be responsible for recruiting within areas that cover the major Marine Corps active-duty installations on the east and west coasts. Having O-5 PSR OICs on the coasts will assist in horizontal coordination with active-duty squadron and battalion commanders located on base. The PSR force is currently developing their ability to recruit from the active-duty population who will be ending their active service. The other three OICs will remain majors. The majority of their horizontal command

relationships are with other majors located at reserve squadrons and battalions as their Inspector Instructor (I&I) site commanders.

The current PSR structure has each PSR OIC alone in their district with minimal support from above. The proposed PSR command structure increases the horizontal networking capability at all levels. Every reference concerning command and control stress the importance of internal and external relationships. This ability to align the command relationships will greatly assist PSR in communicating outside of their organization to their customers and those responsible for the NDAA end-strength limits.

## **Section II: Metrics & Efficiency**

This section expands on the information in Chapter Two and describes the shortfall of PSR's current metrics. It will conclude with recommended means to measure success based on an updated PSR mission that reflects the requirements of Reserve Affairs and MARFORRES.

**Metrics:** According to the Official Recruiting Volume IX, the current mission of PSR is to “attain all assigned quotas, by category and on a monthly and yearly basis.”<sup>14</sup> This mission, along with the guidance provided in the PSR Recruiting Volumes, only focuses on making quotas. The revised metrics and mission proposed here will assist PSR in achieving its mission more effectively at less effort and cost.

The current process discussed in Chapter Two is consistently able to reach the NDAA end-strength limits required by Reserve Affairs but does not specifically measure effects on MARFORRES' unit readiness. Unit readiness within MARFORRES is only a byproduct of maintaining end-strength. The metrics and mission could be reconfigured to align the two. This could drastically change the way PSR does business and greatly improve the personnel readiness across MARFORRES.

Instead of Reserve Affairs issuing a requirement of officer and enlisted joins required per component in each fiscal year, they could express this number as a fill rate percentage across the reserve. Using a macro view of the SMCR component as an example, there are 30,964 billets available in the SMCR according to the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). The end-strength of the SMCR desired by Reserve Affairs according to the 2021 recruiting mission is 29,287 and there are 28,347 Marines on-hand (Staffing Report Jan 13, 2021). Using the current billet list, this would come out to be a staffing goal of ~94% for each unit. The January 2021 staffing report has 150 of the 243 reserve units between 70 and 90%. This shows that the current process does not distribute the required personnel equally across SMCR units and a new metric of success would greatly assist MARFORRES equal out the personnel across their units and increases their personnel readiness.

>=	<	# Units
95%	100%	21
90%	95%	36
85%	90%	57
80%	85%	40
75%	80%	27
70%	75%	26
65%	70%	8
60%	65%	8
55%	60%	4
50%	55%	2
0%	50%	5

The metric should be updated from a monthly assigned mission to a personnel fill percentage based on each unit. This would ensure the reserve end-strength requirements are met and that MARFORRES units will receive the personnel needed to maintain readiness.

PSR would change their internal workings from a monthly grind to make mission, irrespective of what unit they were sending Marines, and would transition to a strategically targeted goal that remains consistent. Secondary effects from this would come from the recruiters. The current metrics and processes allow recruiters to join Marines to units when they know they will not stick around and be a productive member. The recruiter will still get their join credit, and an attrition when the Marine leaves within 90 days, but they will have made their monthly mission. With the new metric, it would not be in the interest of the recruiter to join

Marines to reserve units if they are not confident that they will be a good asset and try to stick around in the unit. When reserve Marines drop from their assigned unit, the recruiter will have to prospect to locate another.

The current mission should be updated to reflect the change from making quota to maintaining readiness across MARFORRES. An example of an updated mission is “to support and maintain the operational readiness the Marine Corps by retaining the highest quality Marines within the Selected Reserve Component of the Marine Corps.”

**Efficiency:** The current method of recruiting Marines from the IRR by calling each one individually is a necessity but is not the only method available. The Direct Affiliation Program (DAP) introduced in Chapter 2 has the capability of providing great efficiency to the recruiting process. This section on efficiency will introduce the concept of expanding the capability of the DAP by properly staffing the recruiting effort, updating recruiter incentives, and guided by a unified command.

Inside of the proposed restructure, PSR would dedicate recruiters to prospect from the eligible active-duty population. Reports are currently available that list all Marines who will be transitioning and are eligible to directly affiliate to the reserves.

These lists, along with the development of horizontal relationships will lead to a new effective and efficient recruiting process. The DAP program has the potential to surpass the

FY Average from FY 14-16				
Grade	Available BICs	# of Officers Eligible to Transfer to the Reserves from Active Duty	Number of Officers who used the DAP	Percent Retained
O1	0	2	0	16.67%
O2	160	221	36	16.31%
O3	162	560	101	18.04%
O4	90	89	26	29.70%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>871</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>18.78%</b>

Grade	Available BICs	# of Marines Eligible to Transfer to the Reserves from Active Duty	Number of Marines who used the DAP	Percent Retained
E3	1329	2143	1	0.06%
E4	1324	12316	64	0.52%
E5	1119	4386	97	2.21%
E6	463	443	40	9.04%
E7	297	32	5	14.58%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>4531</b>	<b>19319</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>1.07%</b>

effectiveness of recruiting from the IRR. During the period the DAP was with Reserve Affairs, they were able to transition 18% of the EASing officer population and only 1% of the enlisted population. This significant disparity between the officer and enlisted percentages was due to propensity and knowledge. Research conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis determined that the closer a Marine is to their EAS, the more likely they are to consider and join the reserves, and another study showed that the DAP program has the potential to a valuable asset to PSR if managed correctly.<sup>15</sup> Reserve Affairs was able to reach out and personally contact each of the transitioning officers (about 900 officers) each year. Reserve Affairs did not have the capability to personally reach out to each eligible enlisted Marine (about 19,000). If PSR is able to use their manpower assets to leverage the DAP and retain 7% of the transitioning enlisted population each year, they could have about a third (1352) Marines of their mission be completed by the Direct Affiliation Program.

#### **Chapter 4: Findings**

Personal experience and daily interactions with MARFORRES I&I Staffs, PSR OICs, Career Recruiters, and Recruiters as the HQMC Reserve Affairs Transition Officer and as a PSR Officer in Charge have revealed endemic issues across PSR; issues such as low morale, lack of transparency, and futility of the mission. These issues span across PSR and may be prematurely be attributed to poor small level leadership or undisciplined recruiters, but this would be a mistake. These issues are symptomatic of a larger problem which lies at the structure of PSR. The broken structure and lack of unified command across PSR has allowed an environment of mistrust to thrive. If PSR adopted the proposed structure, it would have a commander that would be able to direct and influence the trust and climate of PSR instead of the organization being pulled six different ways by six different commanders. “Building and maintaining trust is

possibly a commander's most important action.”<sup>16</sup> The myriad of issues across PSR are directly related to the lack unified command which has led to the mistrust between each tier of leaders.

## **Chapter 5: Discussion**

**So What?** PSR is a stagnant organization that is struggling to keep pace with the requirements placed upon it. The organizational structure prevents it from being able to promote unity of effort across the organization or effectively adapt to necessary changes because PSR lacks a centralized commander with the authorities to centralize planning and direction of the force. The root of the problem stems from the internal structure which prevents basic command and control tasks from being effectively implemented and is compounded by PSR's inability to change internal processes. The problem is so foundational to the institution, the only solution is to rebuild PSR from the ground up in a manner that reinforces the basic command and control requirements found across doctrine.

**Limitations:** PSR is a unique organization and is not mirrored across any of the services. Existing studies must be drawn from similar but not exact situations such as non-prior service military recruiting, sales prospecting in the civilian markets, and non-recruiting-based command and control structure.

**Conclusion:** PSR is a small organization that fulfills an important role in the overall operational readiness of the Marine Corps. As an organization it is hidden underneath the size and importance of the NPS recruiting mission. Due to this location, PSR's problems only garner attention when the completion of the annual mission is at risk. It should not take a risk to the readiness of the Marine Corps to identify and fix a small structural problem. By employing the overarching tenants and best practices within recruiting, command and control, and

organizational effectiveness, Prior Service Recruiting will be able to retain the top tier talent across the force and will be able to adapt and expand their capability to meet the future personnel and readiness requirements of the Total Force.

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States." *Joint Publications Capstone Series*. July 12. <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/Capstone-Series/>.
- <sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 2.
- <sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, IV-2.
- <sup>4</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. 1996. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy. 92.
- <sup>5</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 91.
- <sup>6</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 88.
- <sup>7</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 94.
- <sup>8</sup> Training Division Joint Staff J7. 2017. "JTF C2 and Organization." *Insights and Best Practices*. April. [https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus\\_papers/](https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers/). 14.
- <sup>9</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 89.
- <sup>10</sup> Reserve Affairs Division. 2017. "Marine Corps MARADMINS." *The Active Component (AC) to Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Direct Affiliation Program (DAP)*. August. <https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MARADMINS/Article/1275551/the-active-component-ac-to-selected-marine-corps-reserve-smcr-direct-affiliatio/>.
- <sup>11</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, V-18.
- <sup>12</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 90.
- <sup>13</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps. *MCDP 6 Command and Control*. 92.
- <sup>14</sup> Marine Corps Recruiting Command. 2011. *Volume IX Guidebook for Prior Service Recruiting Operations*. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Recruiting Command. 1-1.
- <sup>15</sup> Center for Naval Analyses. 2016. "PSR Affiliation and Continuation Report."
- <sup>16</sup> Training Division Joint Staff J7. 2020. "Mission Command." *Insights and Best Practices*. January. [https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus\\_papers/](https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers/). 2.

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