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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**The Army National Guard's Role as the Strategic Reserve:
*A Need to Reassess the ARNG Mission against the End Strength Mission and
Resources Allocation.***

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJ Brian Foster, United States Army National Guard

AY 2020-2021

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

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

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Executive Summary

Title: The Army National Guard's Role as the Strategic Reserve: A Need to Reassess the ARNG Mission against the End Strength Mission and Resources Allocation.

Author: Major Brian Foster, United States Army National Guard

Thesis: The Army National Guard (ARNG) as the Strategic Reserve of the Army conflicts with its ability to support Defense Support Civil Authorities (DSCA) and maintain an increase in end strength in light of cultural, social and demographic impacts and political budget constraints.

Discussion: What does the Army need the ARNG role to be with regards to force structure? Is the ARNG structured and equipped properly to meet the demands of the strategic reserve and support domestic operations. If the ARNG maintains its current operational commitment what will the new recruiting and retention mission consist of?

The ARNG current recruiting missions against the ARNG projected force structure increase. What factors will impact ARNG from reaching its end strength mission. Based on historical data, what will the political budget impacts have on the ARNG recruiting mission? The strategic role of the ARNG and the resourcing of the ARNG.

The ARNG strategy to make its intended mission with recruiting initiatives not captivating the future population. The budget priorities for recruiting are lower than other ARNG priorities. In order for the ARNG to make its mission the ARNG needs to increase resources for recruitment through personnel and incentives.

The ARNG has to approach this effort in two concurrent phases. Phase one is correcting the force structure to meet the demands of the current operations tempo within the ARNG. This will require assessing units that can not support all of the missions of the ARNG, domestically and foreign affairs. Phase two is to change the recruiting strategy to attract the individuals that are capable of meeting the demands of the 2021 ARNG and incentive the high performers to remain in the ARNG considering the stress that the ARNG commitment may cause individuals personal lives.

Conclusion: The ARNG can maintain the role of Strategic Reserve, if attention is given to units that support Large Scale Ground Combat Operations and domestic operations. The divestiture of expensive formations such as armor units that does not support domestic operations but drains manpower due to high technical skills needs to be re-invested into units that can support Strategic Reserve and domestic operations simultaneously.

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Preface

The subject for my Master of Military Science thesis stems from an Army War College MMS list of topics: Environment and changing the character of warfare. My intent is to assess the Army National Guard (ARNG) ability to maintain its current operational commitment as the Strategic Reserve with its current force structure design and end strength mission in light of future social, cultural, political, demographic, and economic changes. This is important as the Director of the Army National Guard number one priority is maintaining end strength and competing for more Force Structure. As the ARNG continues to gain Force Structure, I want to assess that the Force Structure is aligned with the ARNG current operational commitments and research the ability to recruit and retain Soldiers to ensure that ARNG continues to meet its end strength numbers and maintain readiness for the Nation's strategic reserves.

Before attending Marine Corp Command and Staff College I served at the Army National Guard Readiness Center. I worked in the ARNG G3 Force Development division as the Field Artillery Systems Integrator and also in the ARNG G3 Force Management division the Field Artillery Organization Integrator. As the System Integrator, I assisted units in fielding new equipment and coordinating new equipment training. As the Organization Integrator, I managed the Field Artillery units in the Total Army Analysis and made recommendations on activating, converting, or divesting Field Artillery force structure. Within the four years I performed these duties within the ARNG G3, Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) became a priority for the Army. I witness the ARNG Field Artillery enterprise expand and activate formations. Maintaining the strength of these units was important to me and therefore I wanted to ensure any obstacle that will prevent these units from meeting their readiness goals I strived to identify and

mitigate. One of the biggest accomplishments was my contribution to bringing Division Artillery (DIVARTY) back to the ARNG. The DIVARTY is an example of the ARNG modifying its force structure to enable Large Scale Ground Combat Operations (LSGCO).

My approach in this study is to identify obstacles that will impact the ARNG from meeting its congressional Title 10 and 32, Federal and State missions. This means an assessment of the ARNG ability to maintain its role of the Strategic Reserve under the current configuration. This assessment will be further supported by analysis of recruiting and retention trends from the past five years. I plan to utilize the ARNG G1 databases to compare states to identify recruiting numbers by regions. Compare the G1 data to the G3 Force Management data for changes in Force Structure that impact the data. Once this data is conceptualized, I want to add the additional lens of social, cultural, political, demographic and economic changes to determine their impact. Once this data is analyzed conclusions have been derived, eventually I want to make a formal recommendation to the ARNG G3 Chief of Force Management as a strategy or plan to implement future force structure that can be made. Due to the complexity of the topic I acknowledge that retention is a major driving factor, but this paper does not address that issue.

I would like to thank my co-workers and staff from the ARNG G1 and G3 for their time and products. I would also like to thank Dr. Donald Bittner, a Professor Emeritus of the Marine Corp Command and Staff College, who took me on as a mentee to answer this ARNG problem. I want to thank COL John Hollar, the ARNG G3 Chief Force Management for the interviews and the Force Structure guidance. Lastly, I want to thank my wife, Jennifer, for managing our busy household while I work on my MMS.

Prologue

The ARNG historical commitment is one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. This commitment is structured in the current role for the ARNG as the Army's strategic response role. This research paper will focus on assessing the ARNG role and ability to maintain the congressional mandated force structure in light of the current operational environment and related commitments. To understand the ARNG mission in the current environment I will highlight an ARNG unit from Georgia from 2019 to 2021. The timeline below is from an interview with the Battalion Command Sergeant Major, Ryan Peterson.

The 118th Field Artillery Regiment from the 48th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Savannah, GA deployed to Fort Polk, Louisiana for a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation in April of 2019. The 118th deployed to Afghanistan for a nine month rotation after the JRTC rotation. The 48th IBCT returned home from deployment in January of 2020. March 2020 the nation experienced the COVID pandemic and the national crisis caused the nation to shut down non essential services. The 118th FA Reg was activated to support nursing home staff and food banks in the southern cities of GA to assist in the COVID pandemic relief. Then the May 25, 2020 the death of George Floyd triggered the Black Lives Matter protests. These protests created civil unrest in many major cities to include Atlanta, GA. The 118th FA Reg thus again was activated to provide additional security to the local law enforcement.

In addition to post deployment events from the Afghanistan deployment and the activation to support COVID and civil unrest the 118th FA Reg was still conducting training to support its primary Field Artillery tasks. The ARNG has State Partnership Programs (SPP) whereby each state is partnered with an allied country to develop a training relationship. The

Georgia ARNG is partnered with the country of Georgia. In August 2020, the 118th FA Reg went to the country of Georgia to conduct a high visibility SPP training exercise. The Soldiers who were not in support of the Republic of Georgia training exercise completed the unit's annual training for three weeks certifying on their Field Artillery Battalion tasks at Fort Stewart, GA. Lastly, the 118th FA Reg was activated to support the Presidential Inauguration on January 20, 2021 to support local law enforcement after the capitol riots on 6 January 2021.

The 118th FA Regiment of the 48th IBCB is one of many units that have similar stories and mission sets over the course of 18 months. The purpose of highlighting this unit is to demonstrate that the "one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer" argument is no longer valid. ARNG units can not complete all of their essential mission tasks per the type of unit and be able to react to their Governor request when needed for natural disaster or civil unrest support. The 118th FA Reg demonstrates that units are making their missions and answering the Governor's request but at what cause to their enlistment and retention. This research paper will address the missions of the ARNG and what roles the ARNG are currently filling and recommendations so that the ARNG is postured to best meet the demands the Army will encounter.

History

Professor Alan Millett and Peter Maslowski “*For the Common Defense*” highlights the key historical events of the Army National Guard (Millett and Maslowski 2012)¹. The Army National Guard traces its history to the colonial militias formed in 1636. The Militia Act of 1792, was the first official formation of state militia under the United States. The Militia Act of 1903, was the first official formation of the National Guard. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1947 established the Air National Guard under the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NDAA of 2008, redefined the authority of NGB state and federal authorities, making the Chief of NGB a four star billet and a principal advisor to the secretary of defense through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ARNG has been involved in every United States conflict or war since World War I (Smith, n.d.)². Finally, the NDAA of 2012 elevated the CNGB to a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Smith captures the uniqueness of the ARNG by saying

“The National Guard is a federally funded reserve force of the U.S. Army or Air Force based in states. These part-time citizen soldiers typically hold civilian jobs but can be activated by state governors or the president to respond to natural disasters, health emergencies or violent protests, or to support military operations overseas. Although many Americans are skeptical of any military response to civilian unrest, the National Guard is widely seen as a reliable peacekeeping force.” (Smith, n.d.)³

Missions

¹ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States*. Highlights the key historical events that have shaped the ARNG over the years to the force of 2021.

² Shannon Smith *How the National Guard became the go-to Military Force for riots and civil disturbances*. Provides examples of the recent conflict that the ARNG has been involved in and addresses the Congressional changes that support the ARNG.

³ Idib.

The mission of the Army National Guard is “to maintain properly trained and equipped units, available for prompt mobilization of war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed.”

The Army National Guard has units in all 54 states and territories and each state has a mixture of the Joint Warfighting Functions. Each State has The Army National Guard essential 10 list. The essential 10 is a list used for critical dual-use items to support all operations of the ARNG. The essential 10 list consist of: command and control, communications, aviation, force protection (including civil support teams), engineering, logistics, maintenance, medical, security, and transportation (Carpenter 2010)⁴. Postured and equipped through the essential 10 list, the Army National Guard can fulfill the overall mission using their three different titles, Title 10, Title 32 and State Activation (Carpenter 2010)⁵.

The first title under the U.S. Law that the Army National Guard uses to fulfill its mission is Title 10, also known as the federal mission. The federal mission of the Army National Guard is to “provide trained units available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require” (Carpenter 2010)⁶. Title 10 is at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense or the President, is federally funded for wartime activities, and the military command of any ARNG unit activated belongs to the respective designated Combatant Commander. Examples of Title 10 missions include the reserve forces augmenting Combatant Commands during wartime, such as *Operation Iraq Freedom* (2003), *Operation Enduring Freedom* (2001) (Afghanistan), and *Operation Inherent Resolve* (2014) (Iraq).

⁴ Raymond Carpenter *The Army National Guard Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2010*. Major General Carpenter was the acting Director of the Army National Guard at the date of this report. MG Carpenter highlights the mission and roles of the ARNG and the supporting titles and missions.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

The second title is title 32, also known as the national title. The Army National Guard state mission is “provide military support to civil authorities; respond to state emergencies (natural disasters, civil disturbance, terrorism, other threats to life/property); and support law enforcements in counternarcotics.” (Carpenter 2010)⁷. Title 32 is at the direction of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Title 32 is federally funded for national interests. Examples of Title 32 include Hurricane Katrina (2005) (New Orleans, LA) and U.S. Southern Border (2019) (Texas) to support the migrant crisis.

The last mission for the Army National Guard is State activation. State Activation is at the discretion of the individual State Governor. State activation is in Continental United States (CONUS) and funded by each individual state. State activation is for disaster relief, state security and civil unrest. The California wildfire (2020) is an example of a state activation.

The three Congressional missions of the ARNG do not always coincide with each other. Title 10 mission is to go support a Combatant Commander while Title 32 and State Activation requires support to domestic operations. Unless the ARNG unit is structured to support domestic operations, most ARNG units train using their Title 10 basic functions and harness those skills to support Title 32 and State Activations. The increase in tempo of the Title 32 and State Activations are the driving factors that caused the ARNG not to meet or maintain its Congressional mandated end strength numbers.

Recruiting Initiative

In 2018, the ARNG along with the Active Component and the Reserve Component did not make it’s Congressional mandated end strength mission. According to NGAUS, the ARNG

⁷ Ibid.

missed its 2018 end strength mission by 8,000 soldiers this induced an inquiry from Congress as to why the ARNG was not able to meet the nation's demand. The below congressional inquiry addresses the ARNG plan to address the recruiting and retention shortfall for the ARNG.

116th Congressional Inquiry of ARNG End Strength

The 116th Congressional Armed Service Committees directed the Army National Guard to study the impact of Army National Guard End Strength based on population impact, demographic, economic trends and the Army National Guard ability to recruit and retain qualified individuals (Felker 2020, 2)⁸. The Army National Guard assigned members from the National Guard Bureau (NGB) G1 (Personnel Directorate), specifically the G1 Strength Maintenance Division, with support from the G3 (Operations Division) and the G35 (Force Management), to consolidate the data. The data that members from NGB presented represents the current state of the population that ARNG is recruiting from and also addresses the reasons why units are not able to retain their Soldiers.

The report from NGB to the 116th Congressional Armed Service Committee makes three recommendations: (Felker 2020, 3)⁹ The Army National Guard recommends **(1)** maintaining the correct full time support authorizations for Recruiters, **(2)** increasing the associated fiscal resources to provide additional Active Duty Operational Support Recruiters (ADOS) in order to maintain momentum to reach additional qualified candidates, **(3)** increasing the fiscal resources available for re-enlistment incentive programs. All three recommendations from Congress recommend more fiscal resourcing to combat this issue. The additional funding would allow the

⁸Jason Felker. *Impact of Population, Demographic and Economic Trends on the Ability of the Army National Guard to Recruit and Retain Qualified Individuals Army National Guard G1 & G3/5/7*. MAJ Felker is a Personnel Strength manager in the ARNG G1, who was the lead action officer that coordinated the response to the 116th Congressional inquiry.

⁹ Ibid.

ARNG to further drive first-term re-enlistments and increase unit readiness by maintaining more fully qualified Soldiers. These recommendations will address the ARNG ability to attract qualified Soldiers to meet the Congressional approved end strength mission. Additionally the congressional report was divided into population and demographic trends and economic trends. The population and demographic trends factored population growth and military age population growth, child and eldercare, households with children under 18 or adults over 65, literacy and numeracy, and educational attainment. The economic trends factored median income and poverty, and labor force participation rate and unemployment.

Population and Demographic Trends

Population Growth and Military Age Population Growth

The population story overall is one of slow growth and an aging population. Over the period between 2017 and 2019, the US population grew by about 0.8% or about 0.4% annually. The 15 to 34 population (traditional military age) declined by -0.1% or -0.05% annually. This indicates that the overall US population is aging. This aging population phenomenon is also seen in the number of households with children under age 18, which decreased by -0.4% while the number of households with adults aged 65-years or older increased by 8.0%. The Midwest (1.6%) and the South (0.95%) Regions experienced the fastest overall population, while the Northeast Region experienced a slight decline (-0.18%). The implications are of a population that's moving westward and southward from the Northeast and Midwest.

The Northeast (-0.2%), South (-0.23%) and Midwest (-0.2%) experienced a slow decline in the 15 to 34-year-old population in the period between 2017 and 2019. This suggests that although the overall population was growing, this segment declined slightly and was leaving the

Northeast and Midwest regions at a more rapid rate. The West (0.86%) experienced modest increases in the 15-34-year-old population. The implications is that the overall US population is getting older. Recruiting older initial recruits requires different incentive tactics than younger recruits.

Table 4 Population growth, Calendar years 2017-2019

Percentage Change in:	Overall Population	15-34 Age Group
Northeast	-0.18%	-0.93
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	0.29%	-0.20
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	-1.13%	-2.37
South	0.95%	-0.23
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	1.22%	0.06
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	0.58%	-0.27
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	0.70%	-0.84
Midwest	0.51%	-0.27
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	0.19%	-0.26
West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	0.74%	-0.28
West	1.64%	0.86
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	2.34%	1.90
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	0.53%	-0.82

Overall	0.82%	-0.09%
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Child and Eldercare: Households with children under 18 or adults over 65

The number of households with children under the age of eighteen has decreased -1.1% overall between 2017 and 2019, while the number of households with adults aged 65 years of age or older increased by 8.0%; further highlighting an aging population. The aging population trend is most pronounced in the South Atlantic (8.2%), Mountain (10.3%) and New England (8.1%) divisions which saw substantial increases in the number of households with one or more adults aged 65 years or older.

Table 5 Percentage change in households with children under 18 or Adults over 65, Calendar years 2017-2019

Percentage Change in Households:	With children under 18	With Adults over 65
Northeast	-0.91%	7.60%
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	-0.63%	8.06%
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	-1.48%	6.69%
South	-0.37%	7.63%
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	-0.64%	8.23%
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	-0.17%	6.83%
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	0.04%	7.09%

Midwest	-0.17%	7.61%
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	-2.60%	7.20%
West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	1.56%	7.90%
West	-0.28%	9.24%
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	1.97%	10.28%
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	-3.88%	7.58%
Overall	-0.40%	8.03%

Literacy and Numeracy

The Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies measures literacy and numeracy competency on five levels with level one being the easiest to comprehend and level five being the hardest. Adults at or below level one are likely to have significant issues understanding printed material. The US Department of Education conducted the study in 2017 and reported the findings in 2020. The percentage of population at or below level 1 for literacy scores was highest in the South (34.8%) and West (27.4%) and lowest in the Midwest (25.6%) and Northeast (26.4%). The implications of the literacy rates will impact the recruiters missions with regards to the military job skills that they are able to find qualified recruits to fulfill in highly illiterate areas. This issue can potentially be overcome through stationing of force structure. For example, station a unit that requires low literacy and education rates in the south and west, while more technical units in the northeast and midwest.

Table 6 Percentage of population with numeracy ability rating 1 or below, measured Calendar year 2017

Percentage of population with:	Numeracy ability rating 1 or below	Literacy ability rating 1 or below
Northeast	26.36%	17.31%
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	23.95%	15.43%
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	31.17%	21.07%
South	34.77%	22.78%
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	32.87%	21.48%
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	37.13%	23.88%
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	36.70%	24.63%
Midwest	25.59%	16.52%
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	28.12%	17.94%
West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	23.79%	15.50%
West	27.35%	18.61%
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	28.40%	19.00%
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	25.68%	17.98%
Overall	29.24%	19.28%

Educational Attainment

The US continues to develop and implement innovative ways for people to gain higher education. The number of adults aged 25 years or older with at least a bachelor's degree increased by 12% in the period from 2017 to 2019. The increase was fastest in the West (14.4%) and South (12.2%) and slowest in the Northeast (9.4%). The educational attainment increase is promising for recruiters as this demonstrates an increase in aptitude, although a Bachelor degree is not currently required to enlist into the ARNG.

Table 7 Percentage change in population aged 25 years or older with a bachelor's degree or higher, Calendar years 2017-2019

	Percentage change in population age 25 or older with bachelor's degree or higher
Northeast	9.38%
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	9.30%
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	9.52%
South	12.23%
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	12.94%
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	11.75%
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	11.10%
Midwest	11.09%
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	11.13%

West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	11.05%
West	14.41%
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	16.40%
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	11.23%
Overall	12.01%

Economic Trends

Median income and Poverty

The overall economic picture is one of growth and recovery. Median household income (inflation adjusted) grew by 4.4% overall in the period between 2017 and 2019, with the West (5.4%) and South (4.9%) experiencing the fastest income growths. The Midwest (3.0%) and Northeast (3.9%) also experienced slower but substantial income growth in this period. At the division level, the South Atlantic (MD, DE, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA), South Atlantic (MD, DE, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL) and Mountain (ID, MT, WY, NV, UT, CO, AZ, NM) states experienced the fastest income growths.

A recovering economy is also apparent when looking at poverty rates. The overall poverty rate declined by -0.9% in this period. The fastest decreases were in the South (-1.2%) and West (-1.1%). At the division level, the South Atlantic (-1.5%), Pacific (-1.1%) and East North Central (-1.1%) experienced the fastest decline in poverty.

Table 8 Median Income and Poverty growth, Calendar years 2017-2019

Percentage Change in:	Median Income	People living below poverty line
Northeast	3.90%	-0.62%
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	3.77%	-0.53%
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	4.14%	-0.80%
South	4.86%	-1.16%
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	5.88%	-1.51%
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	3.10%	-0.90%
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	4.31%	-0.65%
Midwest	2.99%	-0.70%
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	3.90%	-1.14%
West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	2.34%	-0.39%
West	5.39%	-1.05%
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	5.97%	-0.99%
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	4.46%	-1.14%
Overall	4.38%	-0.93%

Labor Force Participation Rate and Unemployment

The increasing labor force participation and decreasing unemployment rates reflects a positive economic picture (pre-COVID-19 Pandemic). The unemployment rate, which reflects the number of people actively looking for work, decreased by -1.5%. The pace of reduction in the unemployment rate was about the same in each region, except for the Midwest, which experienced a slower reduction in the rate (-1.1%). The Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) reflects the number of non-institutionalized adults in the civilian labor force (whether employed or not). As an economy declines workers might leave the workforce (discouraged workers) to go back to school (retrain) or take care of family. As the economy improves, these workers are brought back into the workforce, which is reflected in a higher LFPR. The US experienced a modest increase in the LFPR (0.17%). The Midwest (0.0%) hardly experienced any LFPR growth at all. This is consistent with slow unemployment reduction in the Midwest.

Table 9 Percent change in Labor Force Participation Rate, Calendar years 2017-2019

Percentage Change in:	Labor Force Participation Rate	Unemployment Rate
Northeast	0.21%	-1.64%
New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)	0.08%	-1.50%
Mid-Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)	0.47%	-1.93%
South	0.36%	-1.68%
South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	0.47%	-1.74%
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)	0.50%	-2.00%
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)	0.00%	-1.20%

Midwest	-0.01%	-1.13%
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)	0.10%	-1.76%
West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	-0.09%	-0.69%
West	0.05%	-1.62%
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY)	0.29%	-1.56%
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	-0.34%	-1.70%
Overall	0.17%	-1.53%

The 116th Congressional oversight committees tasked the ARNG to provide information with regards to the role of the ARNG, end strength mission, budget appropriation, recruiting and retention trends. These reports display the status of the ARNG and highlight means on how the ARNG can make the required end strength mission. The report does a great job identifying the population and the economic trends that will impact the pool where ARNG can gain recruits. This report indicates that if properly resourced that the ARNG can meet and maintain its mission. The ARNG have done well and should focus its effort on the South and MidWest as these areas have a younger population. The South and Midwest are having economic success, monetary incentive may not be the solution to better recruit. The ARNG needs to prioritize its limited resources to recruit the best individual that can endure the tempo of the 21st century ARNG. This prioritization is employed through the strategic placement of ARNG recruiters. Additionally adding ADOS support to the recruiters in the most fertile areas that align with the ARNG population mission sets. The final commitment is rewarding the first time re-enlistment soldiers

with fiscal compensation for their efforts to support the ARNG tempo thus far in their career. Lastly, retention and COVID-19 implications to the economy has had major impacts to the overall end strength mission of the ARNG. Unfortunately, this report does not allow for the in depth analysis needed to properly address each implication.

The supporting population demographics and economic impacts supports the ARNG recommendation to require more recruiters to recruit in fertile areas, and to incentive high performers to continue their enlistments in poor economic areas, the report does not answer the role that the ARNG needs to fulfill as the Army's strategic reserve. If the recommendations from NGB are approved by congress, the issue of the role of ARNG will still not be addressed. The ARNG needs to conduct the analysis of their current force structure compared to their mission and resourcing to determine if their mission is aligned with their resourcing. While the congressional report does an excellent job of identifying areas to maintain end strength, more needs to be done to make the ARNG postured to meet a mission that the ARNG can successfully achieve. Even if the ARNG can recruit the correct Soldier if the role of the Strategic Reserve and DSCA support does not have units constructed to meet their demands, the ARNG will continually have to prioritize recruiting resources.

ARNG Force Structure

The Force Management System Website (FMSWEB)¹⁰ is the repository database that the Army uses to depict formations requirement and or the authorization of personnel and equipment. The units listed below are the major Modified Table of Organization and Equipment

¹⁰ Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and the G8 Force Development. Force Management System Website (FMSWEB) is the database that captures the equipment and force structure changes as a result of the Total Army Analysis or the equipment changes from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

(MTOE) units within the ARNG¹¹ that will be used at the federal level to support the Strategic Reserve or a Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) mission. These are the main units at the state level to support a state mission.

Division Headquarters

ARNG Division Headquarters serve as the command and control center for the ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The BCT is the basic unit that is deployed by the Army and the ARNG, each ARNG DIV has three to four BCTs. The BCTs that support the Division Headquarter are aligned for training and employment. (Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and G8 Force Development 2020).

Division Headquarters	State(s)
28th	PA
29th	VA
34th	MN
35th	KS
36th	TX
38th	IN
40th	CA
42nd	NY

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)

IBCTs are the basic formation that the army and the ARNG uses to deploy to support any mission that the Army enco. The IBCT is a light infantry unit that can be designated light, airborne or air assault. The primary means of maneuver is the HMMWV and the IBCT has seven

¹¹ MTOE units are the units in the Active Component and the Army National Guard that have the same personnel and equipment requirements and authorization.

Battalions: one Cavalry Battalion, one Brigade Support Battalion, one Engineer Battalion, three Infantry Battalions, and one Field Artillery Battalion. FMSWEB 2022 estimates the strength of an IBCT to be approximately 4,500 soldiers. (Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and G8 Force Development 2020).

IBCT	State(s)
2/34th	IA and MN
32nd	WI and MI
37th	OH and MI
27th	NY, MA and RI
86th	VT, CT, CO, ME, NH, and MA
44th	NJ and MA
2/28th	PA and MD
33rd	IL and PR
76th	IN
116th	VA and KY
53rd	FL and AL
48th	GA
256th	LA and AL
56/36th	TX and RI
72/36th	TX and IN
39th	AR, MO, NE
45th	OK and NE
41st	OR, NM and WA
79th	CA and PR
29th	HI, AZ, GU, AK and WY

Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)

The ARNG has two SBCTs with their location listed below. The SBCT has a similar mission to the IBCT with the exception the SBCT have the Stryker family of vehicles organically assigned. The Stryker platform is the main platform used to maneuver within the SBCT. FMSWEB 2022 estimates the personnel strength of an SBCT to be approximately 4,500 soldiers, similar to an IBCT. (Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and G8 Force Development 2020).

SBCT	State(s)
81st	WA, CA and OR
56/28th	PA

Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)

The ARNG has five ABCTs with their locations listed below. The ABCT is similar to the mission of the IBCT with the exception that the ABCT utilizes Tanks and Bradleys as their primary piece of equipment. FMSWEB 2022 estimates the personnel strength of an ABCT to be approximately 4,500 soldiers similar to an IBCT and ABCT. (Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and G8 Force Development 2020).

ABCT	State(s)
116th	ID, MT, OR and NV
1/34th	MN, and OH
155th	MS, KS
30th	NC, SC and WV

Total Army Analysis for COMPO 2

Every year the senior leaders of the Army assemble to discuss the design of the force given the limited resources available to give the Army the best opportunity to meet the demand of achieving the nation's military interests. The Army releases the Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC), which is the Army's request for its future force structure design giving the current configuration, accounting for technological advancements, and modeled and simulated against peer competitors (Lewis, n.d.)¹². The ARSTRUC is used to solidify the request of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to congress with regards to the size and type of force the Army will have and the equipment procurement. This is the initial step of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) process for the Army.

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) FY22-26 requested the correct mix of force structure between the reserve component (ARNG and Reserves) and the Active component. Based on the research the Army needs the ARNG to identify force structure recommendations that will impact the RC end-strength, as well as capabilities that could be appropriately realigned between the AC and RC to achieve future force demands while optimizing the structure and priorities of each component (Lewis, n.d.)¹³. The latest ARSTRUC states that by the year 2028 the Army intends for the ARNG to be a fully structured, manned, trained and equipped strategic reserves (Lewis, n.d)¹⁴. A reserve capable of performing on pace equally to that of its full time counterpart.

¹²Lewis George *Army Force Management School Newsletter*. Army COL George Lewis maintains the Army Force Management information database and information that is released to the Army community. The information on the Force Management website captures all of the processes of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) process. The outputs include the Total Army Analysis and Army Structure Memorandum that supports the Program Objective Memorandum.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

The major growth opportunities for the ARNG from TAA FY22-26 were an increase in the eight ARNG Divisions and Division Headquarters units, each Division Headquarter would grow a Division Artillery (DIVARTY) unit. The Army's goal for the ARNG was the reduction of the Army's risk in large scale ground combat operations (LSGCO). This reduction in risk was by the ARNG having units that can fulfill a role to compete with a peer competitor (Lewis, n.d.)¹⁵. The peer fight for the Army moves away from the modular BCT and more Division Headquarters commanding and controlling multiple BCTs and supporting them with organic assets within the Division Headquarters.

ARNG Strategic Roles

Daniel Goure stated " During the decade-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the Guard morphed into that of an operational reserve. As an operational reserve, Guard forces participated routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions. Entire Guard brigade combat teams (BCTs) were deployed to both conflicts, Guard officers commanded the entire multi-national Corps in Iraq " (Goure 2013, 2)¹⁶. Through these exemplary acts during Iraq and Afghanistan the ARNG demonstrated that it was capable of being an effective unit in combat similar to the Active Duty units. Goure states:

"The strategic case for maintaining the Guard as an operational reserve has changed. The new defense strategy explicitly states that the military will not plan for a long-term, large scale stability operation – that is another Iraq or Afghanistan. So it makes little sense to go to the expense involved in keeping Guard formations at a relatively high state of readiness and providing them with heavy combat equipment, if they are not likely to be employed early in a future conflict." (Goure)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Daniel Goure. *The National Guard must again become a Strategic Reserve*. Describes the roles that the ARNG have evolved into over time as the Strategic Reserve. Goure highlights the environment that the ARNG is working in with regards to what that environment drives the tempo of the operations. Goure makes a recommendation that the ARNG can sustain the current tempo if the unit converts its heavy units into lighter units that can be dual purpose for Title 10, 32 and State activations.

The ARNG is cheaper to maintain as the traditional members of the ARNG are only allocated 39 training days a year. Within the 39 training days the ARNG soldiers complete the annual requirements similar to an Active Duty Soldier. However, when the ARNG is asked to rapidly deploy or maintain a higher state of readiness than the ARNG Soldiers are allocated more training days. Lastly, Goure recommends that the ARNG should “shed its heavy combat equipment, some of which requires more than 39 days a year training in order for crews and maintainers to remain proficient. Instead, heavy combat formations should be converted into lighter capabilities such as engineers, military police, transportation and intelligence formations which would make them more useful also to the states in the event of a domestic emergency.” (Goure) Currently, the ARNG has five Armored Brigade Combat teams, (a brigade combat team composed of tanks and bradleys) and 10 Echelon Above Brigade 155 self propelled Howitzers Battalions and two Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Battalions. These are the units that Goure refers to as heavy units. These heavy units cannot be used for a domestic emergency with the exception of an invasion of the United States. Goure's recommendation is to transfer these units into lighter units that can be dual purpose to support homeland defense.

In order for the ARNG to implement these changes, the ARNG should divest its heavy formations. The ARNG has five ABCTs, with each ABCT having approximately 4,500 soldiers for a total of 22,500 (Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and G8 Force Development 2020) Soldiers that can be repurposed. These formations have little impact with regards to homeland defense and essential 10 utilization. Furthermore, FMSWEB documents that the ARNG ABCT (116th (ID), 34th (MN) and 30th (NC)) have the older version of the M1A1 Abrams and Bradley M2 variants. The ten active duty ABCTs and the two other ARNG variants of the M1A2 Tanks and M3 Bradley. These versions of the platforms will not be

deployed to theater operations except in case of total war. The three older variant ARNG ABCTs receive modernized variant training prior to mobilizing and when these units are in theater they are provided a set of platforms of the latest variant. Once mobilized these units operate on Theater Provided Equipment (TPE).

ARNG Force Structure Recommendation

According to Shannon Smith, *How the National Guard became the go-to Military Force for Riots and Civil Disturbance* “The Pentagon has approved leaving 5,000 troops deployed indefinitely to protect the U.S. Capitol from domestic extremists threats, down from about 26,000 deployed after the Jan. 6 insurrection. Although many Americans are skeptical of any military response to civilian unrest, the ARNG is widely seen as a reliable peacekeeping force.” (Smith, n.d. The same article later states “It wasn’t always this way. The modern National Guard evolved from colonial-era militias and has a complicated history of responding to civil disturbances. Over the years, the ARNG has grown into a more diverse force and is now viewed by government leaders and civilians as a reliable force for emergency response of all kinds – from disaster relief to delivering COVID-19 vaccinations.” The need for the ARNG to support domestic operations in support of disaster and humanitarian relief is increasing each year.

After the 2021 Presidential inauguration 5,000 ARNG Soldiers will remain in Washington D.C. to support the local law enforcement (Oately). The addition of these ARNG troops will cause the American taxpayer extra funding in addition to the ARNG 2021 budget as this support was not initially budgeted. If the ARNG had more units that are designed to support these domestic missions than the ARNG could better budget for DSCA missions. Unfortunately under the Congressional mandated ARNG strength of 335,000 Soldiers, the ARNG can not add

more force structure. Therefore, the only viable solution for the ARNG is to reconfigure the current force structure.

This ARNG dilemma makes Goure's recommendation of converting ABCTs to IBCTs a more attractive solution. The ABCTs cost more to maintain than the 39 days that are allowed for ARNG annually to complete their tasks. There is also an additional cost of maintenance, and fuel. There is additional funding needed for infrastructure of ranges, roads, maintenance bays and storage facilities. The ARNG can benefit from several different revenue cost savings by divesting these heavy formations and building up their support to LGSCO formations of Division Command and Control support or more IBCTs.

The Army will inherit some risks to the National Security Strategy (NSS) as they will lose mechanized forces from their strategic reserve. This may be offset by the use of simulators and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). The ARNG can have these converted light units trained on simulators of mechanized equipment for Infantry, Armor and Field Artillery. If needed to mobilize, these converted units can fall in on APS or theater provided mechanized equipment for theater operations. This will allow the converted units to deploy to support domestic operations without their mechanized equipment destroying domestic infrastructure and other collateral damage of essential services.

Additionally, prior to ARNG units mobilizing the unit attends pre-mobilization training. According to Aberle on 19 January 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed Reserve components to serve a maximum of 12 months on active duty for each deployment. This decision created a need for ARNG units to conduct pre mobilization training during their 12 months activation prior to deploying. Pre mobilization training is where ARNG units update their

medical and administration requirements prior to mobilization as well as focus on the tasks that support the mission of which the ARNG unit is being activated to support.

Lastly, even with the correct force structure mix the ARNG still has to address the recruiting and retention issues. The missions and the tempo of being the Strategic Reserve and the Defense Support to Civilian Authority support will stress the M-day force with balancing a civilian career and family. Additionally an increased operational tempo may repeal the attraction to new recruits who view ARNG as a part time commitment. The ARNG needs to assess the manner in which it recruits Soldiers into their formations. This assessment of recruiting and retaining Soldiers must be in coordination with correcting the force structure mixture for the ARNG. Once the ARNG has designed the formations that can support the demands of the ARNG of the 21st century, the next step is to recruit the Soldiers that can meet this new demand.

Future ARNG Recommendation

The ARNG can maintain the role of Strategic Reserve, if attention is given to Division Headquarters and enabler units to support Large Scale Ground Combat Operations and the divestiture of expensive formations. The divsture of expensive formations needs to be invested into units that can support Strategic Reserve and support domestic operations. Currently the recommendation is divest of the armored units that are more expensive to convert to lighter units that support domestic operations. To mitigate the risk to the NSS, the recommendation is to have those units form a hybrid model and maintain their armored skills through simulators. When a Combatant Commander needs an armored capability from the ARNG these hybrid units can deploy utilizing equipment that has been placed in APS or provided by the theater.

The ARNG will not make their intended mission due to the recruiting initiatives not being captivating to the future population, and budget prioritizing of recruiting being lower than

other ARNG priorities. In order for the ARNG to make their mission the ARNG needs to increase resources for recruitment through personnel and incentives. Similar to the Congressional request, the ARNG needs to increase the funding to recruiters, place them in the correct location and increase the fiscal support to first time re-enlistments.

The ARNG has to approach this effort in two concurrent phases. Phase one is changing the recruiting strategy to attract the individuals that are capable of meeting the demands of the 2021 ARNG and incentive the high performers to remain in the ARNG considering the stress that the ARNG commitment may cause individuals personal lives. Phase two is correcting the force structure to meet the demands of the current operations tempo within the ARNG.

Appendix A

Acronyms

- ABCT - Armored Brigade Combat Team
- AC - Active Component
- ADOS - Additional Duty Operational Support
- APS - Army Prepositioned Stock
- ARNG - Army National Guard
- ARSTRUC - Army Structure Memorandum
- BCT - Brigade Combat Team
- DIVARTY - Division Artillery
- DSCA - Defense Support Civil Authority
- EAB - Echelons Above Brigade
- FMSWEB - Force Management System Website
- HMMWV - High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

- IBCT - Infantry Brigade Combat Team
- JRTC - Joint Readiness Training Center
- LGSCO - Large Ground Scale Combat Operations
- LFPR - Labor Force Participation Rate
- LRPF - Long Range Precision Fires
- MLRS - Multiple Launch Rocket System
- MTOE - Modified Table of Organizations
- NGUAS - National Guard Association of the United States
- NGB - National Guard Bureau
- NDAA - National Defense Authorization Act
- NGAUS - National Guard Association of the United States
- NSS - National Security Strategy
- PPB&E - Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution
- POM - Program Objective Memorandum
- SBCT - Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- RC - Reserve Component
- TAA - Total Army Analysis
- TPE - Theater Provided Equipment

Appendix B

Definitions

Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) Army Reserve Soldiers of all ranks can support units and local recruiters through the Active Duty Operational Support, Reserve Component (ADOS-RC) program to help that unit complete a mission beyond normal drilling time or recruiters that will result in Army Reserve enlistments.

Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) - are strategically-placed caches of warfighting equipment afloat and ashore that provide speed of response for geographic combatant commanders to execute operation plans and conduct contingency operations. Army Materiel Command is the executive agent for the APS program.

FMSWEB - Army repository database that supports Total Army Analysis decisions and documents all of the Army units and their required and authorized personnel and equipment allocations. This database personnel is managed by Headquarters Department of the Army

(HQDA) G3 Force Management and the equipment is managed by HQDA G8 Force Development.

HMMWV - The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is a lightweight, highly mobile, high-performance, diesel-powered four-wheel drive, air-transportable and air-droppable family of tactical vehicles. The HMMWV supports combat and combat service support units with a versatile, mission-configurable, tactical wheeled vehicle.

M-Day refers to the traditional ARNG that performs duties on the one weekend a month and two weeks over the summer unless activated to support a title 10, 32 or state activation.

MTOE - modified table of organization and equipment is the authorization that an Army refers to document their personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations.

NSS - The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy.


Stryker Family of Vehicles is built on a common chassis, with some variants having different Mission Equipment Packages. There are 18 variants; 10 flat-bottom variants that include the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Mobile Gun System (MGS), Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Mortar Carrier (MC), Commander's Vehicle (CV), Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Vehicle and Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV); seven Double-V-Hull (DVH) variants for the following; ICV, CV, MEV, MC,

ATGM, FSV and ESV, and an additional configuration of a modified ICV platform integrating a 30 mm cannon.

Appendix C

INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

(2020 MTOE)
SRC 77200K000



Picture depicts the makeup of an Infantry Brigade Combat team that is light with a standard MTOE. The primary platform for the IBCT is the HUMVEE which is a wheel based light vehicle that can deploy CONUS and OCONUS with minimum damage to infrastructure. The IBCT authorized 4,229 Soldiers to fulfill its mission.


Appendix D

ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

(2021 Objective TOE)


SRC

87310K000



The picture depicts an Armored Brigade Combat Team. The ABCT is authorized for 4,189 Soldiers. The main platforms for the ABCT are Tanks, Bradleys and Paladins which are all tracked based vehicles. Track vehicles historically have a larger logistical demand than wheel vehicles and track platforms create more infrastructure damage.


Appendix E



The Stryker Brigade Combat Team has 4,394 authorized Soldiers and has a similar mission to the IBCT with the exception that the SBCT has medium vehicles as their main platforms. These medium wheel vehicles create little damage to infrastructure but have slightly more logistical demand than a light IBCT.


Appendix F

ARNG Brigade Combat Team by Type and Location for 2021



Appendix G

ARNG Division



**Blue Italics represent ARNG units located outside of State owning the flag*

The picture depicts the placement of the ARNG Division Headquarters locations and their state. Each Division is commanded by a Major General and each division has three to four BCTs that are aligned for training under the Division.

Endnotes

1. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012*. New York: The Free Press. Highlights the key historical events that have shaped the ARNG over the years to the force of 2021.
2. Shannon Smith *How the National Guard became the go-to Military Force for riots and civil disturbances*. <https://theconversation.com/how-the-national-guard-became-the-go-to-military-force-for-riots-and-civil-disturbances-15397>. Provides examples of the recent conflict that the ARNG has been involved in and addresses the Congressional changes that support the ARNG.
3. Ibid.
4. Raymond Carpenter *The Army National Guard Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2010*. <https://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Army-National-Guard/About-Us/State-Mission/FileId/134383/#:~:text=This%20funding%20has%20been%20used,medical%2C%20security%2C%20and%20transportation>. Major General Carpenter was the acting Director of the Army National Guard at the date of this report. MG Carpenter highlights the mission and roles of the ARNG and the supporting titles and missions.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Jason Felker. *Impact of Population, Demographic and Economic Trends on the Ability of the Army National Guard to Recruit and Retain Qualified Individuals Army National Guard G1 & G3/5/7. Congressional Inquiry*, (November). December 15, 2020. MAJ Felker is a Personnel Strength manager in the ARNG G1, who was the lead action officer that coordinated the response to the 116th Congressional inquiry.
9. Ibid.
10. Headquarters Department of the Army G3 Force Management and the G8 Force Development. <https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil/protected/secure/tools.asp>. Force Management System Website (FMSWEB) is the database that captures the equipment and force structure changes as a result of the Total Army Analysis or the equipment changes from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.
11. MTOE units are the units in the Active Component and the Army National Guard that have the same personnel and equipment requirements and authorization.
12. Lewis George *Army Force Management School Newsletter*. https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/newsletters/AFMS_Newsletter_2Q19.pdf. Army COL George Lewis maintains the Army Force Management information database and information that is released to the Army community. The information on the Force Management website captures all of the processes of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) process. The outputs include the Total Army Analysis and Army Structure Memorandum that supports the Program Objective Memorandum.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Daniel Goure. *The National Guard must again become a Strategic Reserve*. <https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-national-guard-must-again-become-a-strategic-reserve/>. Describes the roles that the ARNG have evolved into over time as the Strategic Reserve. Goure highlights the environment that the ARNG is working in with regards to what that environment drives the tempo of the operations. Goure makes a recommendation that the ARNG can sustain the current tempo if the unit converts its heavy units into lighter units that can be dual purpose for Title 10, 32 and State activations.

17. Smith, Shannon *How the National Guard became the go-to Military force for riots and civil disturbance*. <https://theconversation.com/how-the-national-guard-became-the-go-to-military-force-for-riots-and-civil-disturbances-15397>. Smith highlights how the ARNG roles have evolved and the natural disaster and civil unrest conflicts have increased and ARNG has become the reliable force to support these operations.

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