

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
02-05-2016

2. REPORT TYPE
Research

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
August 2015 - May 2016

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Taking Jointness to the Next Level:
The Return of the Soldier-Trader-Diplomat

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Major Raphaël Guay

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
2044 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
N/A

11. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

14. ABSTRACT

Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated shortfalls in wielding harmoniously the Instruments of National Power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. The current imbalance sees the Military component providing only a portion of the solution, but disposing of the vast majority of resources in theatre, thus inducing friction with interagency partners. This study revisits a model from colonial North America: the French/Canadian soldier-trader-diplomat, as a potential way to improve interagency cooperation and coordination in future conflicts. Describing the characteristics of the soldier-trader-diplomat that made it a successful concept, it explores ways to replicate those characteristics and implement them based on the current force structure and future operating environment.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Soldier-Trader-Diplomat, DIME, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Joint, Interagency, Tools, Instruments of National Power, Indigenous Forces, French and Indian War, Colonial North America, Indians, Leadership, Foreign Area Officer, Militia, Other Government Departments, Power Projection, Unity of Purpose, Cultural Awareness, Advisor Corps, Whole-of-Government

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

a. REPORT
Unclassified

b. ABSTRACT
Unclassified

c. THIS PAGE
Unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
UU

18. NUMBER
OF PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Marine Corps University / School of Advanced Warfighting

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(703) 432-5318 (Admin Office)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g., 30-06-1998; xx-08-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATES COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORS AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/ monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

*United States Marine Corps
School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
2044 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico VA 22134-5068*

FUTURE WAR PAPER

Taking Jointness to the Next Level:

The Return of the Soldier-Trader-Diplomat


**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES**

AUTHOR:

Major Raphaël Guay, Canadian Army

AY 2015-2016

Mentor: Dr. Gordon Rudd

Approved: 

Date: 6 MAY 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Disclaimer | 2 |
| Introduction | 3 |
| What is the soldier-trader-diplomat, and how is it applicable today? | 5 |
| What literature exists on the soldier-trader-diplomat? | 10 |
| Has the problem been recognized and what steps have been taken so far? | 11 |
| How to create a modern soldier-trader-diplomat? | 12 |
| Conclusion | 17 |
| Endnotes | 19 |
| Bibliography | 21 |

DISCLAIMER:

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

Introduction

For most of the colonial period in North America until the final chapter of the French and Indian War, the French prevailed against the British for nearly two centuries, despite lesser resources and a population outnumbered ten to one. The key to this military feat resides primarily in one factor: the soldier-trader-diplomat. Whereas the British fought mostly with Regulars, augmented by American militias from the thirteen colonies and a loose alliance of the Iroquois tribes, the French fought with soldier-trader-diplomats: a smaller component of French Regulars, Canadian woodsmen and their Huron allies, seamlessly integrated in a cohesive whole¹, wielding all instruments of national power with a complete mastery of the trade, cultural factors, local dynamics and development initiatives.

Why is this relevant today? It is relevant because these early successes of the French soldier-trader-diplomat are in stark contrast with the recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the four instruments of national power known as the DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic) construct suffered an imbalance, the “M” with most of the heavy lifting², struggling by necessity to emulate the remaining instruments in an ad hoc fashion, but ipso facto alienating its interagency partners and feeding a vicious circle. Indeed, the military, perceiving that other agencies under-delivered, took the matters in its own hands and performed traditionally non-military tasks with varying degrees of success, thus alienating doubly those civilian components. First, for stepping out of its lane and doing it in their stead and second, for either underperforming in doing so or worse, doing it better than the other agencies, cultivating a climate of distrust on both sides.

Large organizations such as the U.S. Government – or even the U.S. Military – struggle to overcome the “stovepipes of excellence”. The evolution from single-service to joint and

combined operations was (and still is in many cases) a difficult transition. Taking jointness to the next level goes through interagency cooperation, a transition that is no less difficult.

The Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) environment of today and tomorrow requires more than ever the harmonious wielding of all the tools of national power. To bring these capabilities to bear in a future theatre, there are essentially two options. The first is *militarizing* civilian components: increasing their resources, improving their autonomy and most importantly, inculcating an expeditionary character: an organization's ability to project its capabilities in a given theatre. On the contrary, the second option is *civilizing* military components: developing capabilities historically reserved to civilian agencies and other government departments (OGDs) within the military. This however is a false dichotomy, for the solution probably resides somewhere in between.

The different streams of funding within the U.S. Government result in a competition for resources and infighting between its departments, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS) and to a lesser extent, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). All three are paramount in power projection and safeguarding U.S. interests abroad. Unless a major government overhaul occurs, the current imbalance in the DIME construct – as widely documented by the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan – is likely to remain. Consequently, the U.S. military will have to fill the gap for the foreseeable future. If the U.S. military ends up performing part or most of the DIME in a future conflict as it has done in recent experiences – but in an improvised, *ad hoc* fashion – then it should prepare for and set itself up for success by proper organization and training, in order to perform in a *deliberate* fashion the next time around.

Without falling into the proverbial trap of “preparing for the last war”, it is only logical to seek better ways of wielding all the instruments of national power in future wars, as it should logically result in a better outcome.

“If you want a new idea, read an old book”... The U.S. military would be better prepared for future conflicts by reviving a prevailing force from the past: the *soldier-trader-diplomat*. In other words, by making the modern American service member expand his skillset to include other aspects of the DIME and embrace capabilities historically reserved for civilian components, making them legitimate, integral parts of his arsenal³. As the old adage from Abraham Maslow says: “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail”. The old hammer needs to be turned into a “multi-tool”, akin to a modern-day soldier-trader-diplomat, encompassing all the tools of national power in a view to modernize the existing interagency construct, in a spirit of increased cooperation and integration rather than competition. This is certainly a complex endeavor, and should be considered a preliminary concept: a starting base for further research.

What is the soldier-trader-diplomat, and how is it applicable today?

The soldier-trader-diplomat is definitely not a new concept. On the contrary, it is thousands of years old. The greatest military leaders of all time have one thing in common: their indissociable pursue of military, economic and political goals, tightly integrated at each level of war. Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar, Napoléon: each coupled military success with sound policy, diplomatic engagements and economic initiatives, implemented by the military as well as civilian components. They were soldier-trader-diplomats.

Eliot A. Cohen in his 2011 book, “*Conquered into Liberty*” revived the term, referring to the French/Canadian officer of the colonial period in North America. It is the model used here.

First; because it is a more recent example of the concept, and second, because the research is intended for North American defense institutions, with forgotten roots directly linked to this concept. This section will explore the defining characteristics of the soldier-trader-diplomat, how it was manifested during the colonial era, and the degree of their applicability or adaptation required to the current operating environment and future conflicts.

Characteristic #1 - Cohesive force structure. This was manifested by the French regular cadre (Marines), working hand-in-hand with Canadian woodsmen, integrated in the leadership structure both within French formations and in leading Huron natives into battle. This mix provided the optimal use of each component: French regular discipline, marksmanship and ability to plan and conduct large-scale operations, with Canadian fighting abilities in rugged, wooded areas, coupled with Huron mobility, survival skills and wide intelligence network. Of note, this cohesive force was highly customizable and merit-based, putting the best-suited man in charge for each mission, irrespective of rank or origin. This characteristic could be applicable today, for the most part with the “total force” concept, albeit with some exceptions. Indeed, it is now nearly impossible to be in a theatre of operations long enough to have our own people “born in country” as in the colonial era (other than long-term shaping). Merit-based promotions are in effect, but under a mostly rigid rank structure, except in highly-specialized, small-scale capabilities such as Special Operations Forces (SOF) or Field HUMINT Teams. However, the critical aspect here is the ability to train and lead indigenous forces (the “ticket home” or exit strategy), which should be the primary task in most future conflicts, recognized nowadays not only as a SOF capability but rather a “big army” responsibility⁴.

Characteristic #2 - Unity of Command. During the French period, the Governor of Canada was both the political ruler and military commander. With clear strategic directives from

Paris and empowerment of this Military Governor (operational-level commander), the French, despite limited resources and competing priorities in other theatres, were able to develop a sound strategy and implement it successfully down to the local level, both civilian and military, across the whole of French North America.

Today's "Unity of Purpose" superseded this "Unity of Command", in the form of the normal theory of supreme command⁵, in which there is a division of labor between the soldier and statesman. This normal theory prescribes that the political level provides guidance and then steps back. Needless to say, many failures in history have resulted from such wisdom, such as the American involvement in Vietnam. Interestingly, the French colonial governance model very much applied the alternate supreme command model, the "unequal dialogue"⁶, in which despite the latitude given to the military commander, the political leader gets involved and keeps probing, inducing a healthy feedback loop and dialogue. Modern examples of successful unequal dialogues by "hands on" political leaders include Abraham Lincoln and his civil war generals, and Winston Churchill and his generals during World War II. Today's geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) control military forces at the operational level of war, but have no political role or control over civilian authorities.

Characteristic #3 - Acute Cultural Awareness. In this model, it was drawn from both years of living in the theatre (which is now hard to replicate), and by the active teaching of the native people by the Jesuit catholic priests, who "plunged fearlessly into the forests [...], establishing a centrally coordinated influence on the Indians"⁷. Religious Conversion of the Indians taken aside, this is relevant today as the U.S. Government was much involved in building schools and setting up education opportunities for Afghans and Iraqis in recent conflicts. Moreover, the latest National Security Strategy emphasizes the paramount importance of

American values (such as the rule of law, universal rights, equality, freedom of speech, etc.) in promoting international stability⁸, which transmission is greatly facilitated by a school system.

Today, acute cultural awareness and language skills are replicated to a certain extent by Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) from the different services. However, despite high-quality training, graduate education and a managed career path, FAO employment is most often limited to headquarters, embassies or intelligence organizations, and they are rarely deployed in such a deep fashion. Moreover, their employment in and out of their regional expertise likely results in skill erosion, in comparison to the extended (if not permanent) service of the Jesuits⁹.

Characteristic #4 - Actively engaged in diplomatic activities. The French/Canadian soldier-trader-diplomats were at the heart of the political and diplomatic life of the New World, industriously applying themselves to find common ground and promote mutual interest among disparate stakeholders (numerous native tribes, local communities and settlements), thus achieving their national interests while preventing their adversaries (the English/Americans) from achieving theirs. One such feat includes the Peace of Montreal in 1701, the “greatest diplomatic event in North America until that point, and for many decades thereafter”, which brought peace between the Indian tribes from what is now the Canadian Maritime provinces to Illinois, allowing agriculture and commerce to flourish¹⁰. This characteristic remains entirely applicable as today’s military men are also actively engaged in diplomatic activity: from the company commander in Afghanistan who attends a local *shura*, to the liaison officer seeking the armed groups to reconcile or demobilize them, to the joint task force commander providing assistance to the provincial government, to the CCDR, all are intensively performing diplomatic tasks at various levels. However, unlike the French/Canadian counterpart lifelong learning, today’s “military does not groom soldier-diplomats; soldier-diplomats emerge despite a lack of

training.”¹¹ Many who emerge are quite successful at it, such as Colin Powell who became Secretary of State, and several flag officers who acceded to important diplomatic posts.

Characteristic #5 - At the heart of local commerce and development activities. In addition to their military and diplomatic duties listed above, the French/Canadian soldier-trader-diplomat was deeply involved in commerce - such as the fur trade - leveraging economic interests and contesting the trade routes with the Iroquois, by guile or by force. This is applicable today to the extent that a prosperous economy is often the best safeguard of security, and our forces abroad are affecting the host nation’s economy in several ways, purposefully or indirectly.

Characteristic #6 - Empowered by a wide and reliable intelligence network. This was enabled mostly through the Canadians who were born in the New World, and complete cooperation with the vastly more numerous and widespread native tribes. The U.S. military today relies on an intelligence apparatus of unprecedented scale and capability, but could still use more regional, long-term expertise, such as offered by the FAOs.

Characteristic #7 - Master of Information Operations. Louis de Buade de Frontenac, Governor of New France (1689-1698), used a strategy of frontier terror, waging raids on British/American settlements and combining terror and clemency to demoralize and divide¹². Combined with the Jesuit’s effort (a type of FAO) at influencing the Indians, this strategy was successful in pinning down a disproportionate amount of British forces, brought “unbearable pressure on the Iroquois”¹³ and bought New France nearly half a century during its fragile nascency.

All of the above characteristics fall under one overarching theme: unity of purpose and comprehensive approach in wielding the instruments of national power. In modern terms, these

centuries-old characteristics master every aspect of the DIME. Success would revolve around interagency cooperation.

What literature exists on the soldier-trader-diplomat?

This amazing but archaic concept is not very trendy, therefore, other than Cohen's book "*Conquered into Liberty*" (which is not about the concept itself but about how the American way of war was engendered by fighting against its "most durable, effective [...] and important enemy of all. Canada."¹⁴), there is not much literature on the topic. In "*Building a Better Soldier-Diplomat*", Sam Brannen highlights the importance of military diplomacy, the pivotal role of the Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that regard and the potential rift between actions at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Level and Washington. In "*The Importance of the Soldier-Diplomat in the 21st Century*", Greg Kaufmann recognizes the need for soldiers of all ranks to engage in diplomatic activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, not only the officers, but also the troops who, by their behavior, are crucial components of the Information campaign ("I" of the DIME) by reassuring the host nation that the U.S. military is a force for good.¹⁵ Kaufmann also observes that the U.S. Department of State (DoS) is "not in the business of sending Foreign Service Officers (FSO) regularly to isolated areas downrange."¹⁶, negating the requirements for civilian diplomats in the warzone, a role that the soldier-diplomats can fill. Soldier-trader-diplomats could fill the gap, but if and only if they have been properly groomed and work hand in glove with their civilian counterparts.

Holistically, there is an immense amount of literature on the topic, when considering the history of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar or Napoléon: all soldier-trader-diplomats.

Has the problem been recognized and what steps have been taken so far?

The American failure in Iraq has been widely reported, notably by Thomas Ricks in his crudely-titled book "*Fiasco*", in which he criticizes the "derelict occupation", infighting between the DoS and the DoD and even inside the latter, the lack of planning and unsound strategy adopted in violation of practically all of the soldier-trader-diplomat characteristics listed above¹⁷. Within DoD, the *Quadriennial Defense Review (QDR)* recognized many of the flaws as soon as 2006, recognizing the need for the total force to include civilians, to reward performance instead of longevity, the urgent need for joint training and the next steps past joint training: multinational, interagency, and finally, multinational *and* interagency¹⁸. In addition, the QDR highlighted the need for language training and better cultural awareness. Finally, it stressed the required unity of effort and "the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad" to meet the demands of the current operating environment in a unified strategy¹⁹. The better coordination of DoD with interagency partners was further emphasized by the Chairman's assessment adjoining the record. In sum, the QDR 2006 was very accurate and thorough in identifying the problems, which is the first step towards any resolution.

Unfortunately, very few of those problems have been solved. In the latest QDR published nearly a decade later (2014), many of the same goals are re-emphasized, such as pursuing national interests "through diplomacy, economic development, cooperation and engagement, and through the power of our ideas"²⁰ and promoting military-to-military engagements. However, there is no clear solution, but instead an intriguing contradiction of rebalancing "toward greater emphasis on full-spectrum operations"²¹ while turning its back on large-scale stability operations (which is implicitly included in "full-spectrum"²²), but retaining the expertise for future needs.

The QDR promotes innovation within DoD and “in our interagency and international partnerships” as a central line of effort²³. On stability operations, there is a contradiction when stating that “the future U.S. Army will need to be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale, multi-phase joint and multilateral operations, including post-conflict stability operations that transform battlefield victories into enduring security and prosperity”²⁴, which it will achieve by... reducing all of its components.

At the whole-of-government (WoG) level and within DoD, the fact remains that despite an accurate and early diagnosis of the problem (difficulty in balancing and orchestrating the tools of national power included in the DIME, mainly by lack of a comprehensive approach and interagency cooperation), no *major* step has been taken in reforming the national security apparatus to empower it with anything close to the unity of purpose and efficiency achieved by the soldier-trader-diplomat concept of long ago. The “stovepipes of excellence” remain and the friction and inefficiency observed in recent conflicts will indubitably be detrimental to U.S. interests and success in any type of future war.

How to create a modern soldier-trader-diplomat?

While it is not possible to bring back to life a soldier-trader-diplomat from the Colonial era such as Frontenac or Louis-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire to solve our DIME and interagency problems, with some critical thinking and creativity, it is possible to replicate the *capabilities* such an individual would bring to the fight, and add them one by one into a cohesive whole²⁵. Those capabilities encompass the seven characteristics described above, contributing to one or several aspects of the DIME.

One of the key successes of the soldier-trader-diplomat was making the best possible use of indigenous forces. In that regard, John A. Nagl advocates the creation within the U.S. Army of

“a permanent standing Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisors — men and women organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad”²⁶. This signature contribution of the U.S. Army would see embedded advisor teams “coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat.”²⁷ This last point is particularly important. Indeed, for similar martial qualities between the Indian tribes, effective French leadership of the Indians into battle and closer integration provided a decisive advantage during colonial wars. Further, as Nagl accurately observes, host nation forces “offer significant cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces, and more probable to be more acceptable to the local public²⁸”, reinforcing another desired characteristic of the soldier-trader-diplomat. However, Nagl’s proposal came at a time (2006) when there was a large increase in the size of the U.S. Army, while the current reality is the opposite. In any case, such an advisory corps would make a better contribution to U.S. military success than its equivalent number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), although the desired number of 20,000 advisors seems overly ambitious in the present context.

In modern conflicts, another key aspect of providing security is enforcing the rule of law, for which there may be a need to train and/or augment the indigenous police force, in a similar way to what is done for the military force. However, unlike many of its allies, the U.S. does not have a large-scale federal police force from which it can deploy expeditionary components in a given theatre as part of the WoG team. Nor can the relatively small Military Police (of any service) take this mandate on with its regular duties. Consequently, to benefit from such a capability in a future war, the U.S. Government would best rely on its coalition partners to take this mandate as part of a coalition. Indeed, despite its vast number of law enforcement professionals in local, State and Federal agencies, the Department of Justice under which they

fall is not organized to centrally man, train and equip components from that pool of resources for expeditionary use. However, creating such a mobilization body at the national level, paired with incentives and policies similar to the Army Reserves and National Guard, would be a more cost-effective option than simply raising the number of Military Police for covering that role. Further, it would provide some flexibility, should a Coalition contribution be difficult to obtain for a specific theatre.

In the Diplomatic sphere, the very existence of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), which have no DoS counterpart, “gives the military component of American power an unduly high profile on the world stage [...], making American foreign policy appear overtly militaristic in nature”²⁹. Addressing this disparity may help in the informational aspect of the DIME by “placing a diplomatic face on regional diplomacy instead of a domineering military one”³⁰. No Ambassador comes close to having the resources of a CCDR, although they are the civilian leaders ultimately responsible for what happens in their mission area. If the U.S. is to divide the World in slices, perhaps a more logical approach, consistent with the western model of civil-military relations, would be to make the existing GCCs “Geographical Regions”, under the responsibility of a supra-ambassador, for which the CCDR would work, as a local extension of the Washington dynamic. Diplomacy must be backed by credible use of force, and having both the political leader (showing political will) and the CCDR (showing military means) present in a region would convey a convincing message. Such a leadership team of a civilian leader and military deputy, or vice-versa, is already common in several federal agencies, from the top of the organization to its directorates³¹. This practice could also be easily widened in scope.

In addition, diplomatic activities are critical for success in modern conflicts not only at the top, but also at every level from junior leader to senior policymaker. Generalist traits must be

broadly present in the force, but specialized skills are required in governance areas such as rule of law, public administration, etc. To be treated as credible and reliable partners, the education, cultural awareness and political acumen of military leaders must reach a level close to that a diplomat or regional analyst would reach.

With regards to the Informational dimension, information operations should not be restricted to the military, but rather concerted with the rest of the DIME³². Success resides in central coordination and decentralized execution. Despite modern, near instantaneous communication means, rigid approval cycles and oversight mechanisms slow down response time compared to adversaries, who can dominate the narrative. To alleviate this shortfall, approval responsibility should be delegated to the operational and tactical-level commanders, who can be accountable for any unintended effect exceeding their area of responsibility. This would entail a certain level of risk acceptance. In addition, all personnel – irrespective of rank, service or MOS - should be trained and familiar with the conduct of influence activities.

The Economic dimension is where the most progress can be made. In many instances, the contribution of an agriculture, energy, civil engineering, project management or environment specialist can affect positively the battlespace in a way no conventional force could, directly contributing to restoring security by addressing basic grievances. Whether by choice or necessity, junior military members have an impact on the economy around them, by the sheer local sustainment of the force or through development projects, where a twenty-year old soldier or marine can be managing or directly involved in six-figure projects. It is a big responsibility to bear, especially if the individual lacks proper training. A very interesting approach for economic development includes “Expeditionary Economics” (EE), in which “economic development must be fully integrated into military operations”³³, however limited by the lack of specialized

knowledge within DoD to undertake advanced entrepreneurial development. To be successful, interagency cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and OGDs is key. There is a symbiotic relationship to be achieved, these organizations being limited by resources and unable to function without a basic layer of security³⁴. Conversely, the U.S. military cannot become a development agency, but can bridge the gap by setting conditions for entrepreneurial development while simultaneously conducting combat operations³⁵.

These improvements to individual aspects of the DIME do not improve the desired synergy between the agencies managing singular aspects of the national power. One important aspect of interagency cooperation is breaking the stovepipes through cross-employment of personnel. “Knowledge dispels fear”³⁶. Indeed, being familiar with the capabilities, the organizational structure, culture and knowing actual people in partner organizations provides huge benefits. There is already participation from OGDs at field-grade and senior levels of Professional Military Education (PME), notably at the Command and Staff College (CSC) and War College, but it is not enough and this participation is marginal. In the U.S., the National Defense University (NDU) champions interagency training at senior level. It is a good starting point, but the idea can be pushed further. For instance, Canada does not have a War College; it has a National Security Programme (NSP). It may be only a name, but it already conveys a more comprehensive approach. Moreover, it includes a relatively higher proportion of participants from OGDs and the private sector. Taking the idea further would imply the creation of a National Security Academy, of which the various Schools would serve the needs of individual departments, where mixed participation is facilitated. Such an institution could also include an “Expeditionary Police Academy”, aiming at standardizing tools, techniques and training of law

enforcement members from various sources (local police, state police, etc.) in preparation for deployment overseas as part of the whole-of-government team.

Another great contributor to breaking the stovepipes so far has been the Joint Duty Assignments (JDA), required for progression at senior levels. Such assignments between the services and federal agencies should be expanded in numbers, and also extended to lower levels. For instance, there is a low correlation between a junior officer's military occupational specialty (MOS) and undergraduate degree. Hence, a junior captain in the infantry could be perfectly suited for employment in a completely different federal department such as State, Justice or USAID. Proper incentives for such assignments would imply modifications to the career system to value and encourage cross-pollination, which in the long-term would result in a more cohesive WoG team. Short of having permanent rotating members from OGDs, the minimum requirement would be to embed staffers in planning cells at the executing headquarters, to integrate interagency considerations in the plan from the start³⁷.

Conclusion

"Success will be hinged upon an enhanced capacity to shape behavior of all groups and stakeholders in modern conflict – including adversaries, allies, indigenous populations, undecided neutrals and the citizens of those countries with deployed forces."³⁸

Secretary Robert Gates

Secretary Gates, by advocating an emphasis on capacity for soft power rather than hard power alone, highlights that the threats and challenges we face will extend "*well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency*"³⁹. This sounds exactly like the type of work for a soldier-trader-diplomat.

Reinventing the soldier-trader-diplomat and implementing it to the full extent of its historical qualities within the U.S. Government apparatus involves not only a higher level of interagency cooperation and coordination, but also professional courage and departure from the

rigid, large and competing bureaucracies of today. In a future conflict, the paradigm change would mean that "team USA" rather than "team DoD and lesser partners" may answer the challenge. However, such reorientation must not be at the expense of the military's core mandate: security. Within the DIME construct, it means first and foremost prevailing over the "M" of opposing nations or non-state actors. Thus, integrating new capabilities should be mainly in addition to and not at the expense of hard military power.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 transformed DoD and induced it to embrace jointness. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 induced the U.S. intelligence community to embrace information sharing, de-confliction and teamwork. It will most likely require a reform of such magnitude to solve the interagency problem, re-balance the DIME and achieve harmonious wielding of all the tools of national power, as gracefully as our soldier-trader-diplomat forefathers did three hundred years ago.

ENDNOTES

¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Conquered Into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 27.

² Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington: The Pentagon, 2006), 86.

³ The masculine form used in this document designates without discrimination both women and men. The masculine form is used throughout for the sake of readability.

⁴ John A. Nagl, *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps* (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2007), 4.

⁵ E. A. Cohen, "Supreme Command in the 21st Century", *Joint Forces Quarterly* 31, Summer 2002: 49.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷ Cohen, *Conquered Into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, 27.

⁸ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2015* (Washington, U.S. Government Press, 2015), 3.

⁹ Daniel E. Mouton, "The Army's Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve?", *Army Magazine*, March 2011: 22.

¹⁰ Cohen, *Conquered Into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, 31.

¹¹ Sam Brannen, "Building a Better Soldier-Diplomat", Defense One website, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/07/unveiling-military-diplomacy/66677/> [accessed Dec 23, 2015].

¹² Cohen, *Conquered Into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, XVII.

¹⁵ Greg Kauffmann, "The Importance of the Soldier-Diplomat in the 21st Century", *Journal of Diplomacy*, 20 Dec 2014: 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006).

¹⁸ Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington: The Pentagon, 2006), 77.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

²⁰ Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2014* (Washington: The Pentagon, 2014), 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 19

²² As per U.S. Army Capstone Doctrine, Stability Operations are a component of full-spectrum operations along with offense, defense and civil support

²³ Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2014*, 22

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁵ In Michael Lewis' "*Moneyball*", a similar approach was taken in American professional baseball when the Oakland Athletics lost their star player Jason Giambi at the end of the 2001

season, and replaced him not by a single player, but with several overlooked underdogs who, combined, more than compensated for the loss of Giambi and brought the team to new heights.

²⁶ Nagl, *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*, 3

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁹ Shannon Caudill, *Saving America From Itself: Avoiding the Fallen Empire Syndrome* (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2005), 8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 8

³¹ For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is lead by a military Director with a civilian deputy. Conversely, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is lead by a civilian Director with a military deputy.

³² Daniel Schehadey, "Putting the "D" and "I" back in DIME", In Homeland Security website, <http://inlandsecurity.com/putting-the-d-and-i-back-in-dime/> [accessed Sep 12, 2015]

³³ Roberto Scribner, *Bridging the Economic Development Gap: Establishing a Practical Expeditionary Economics Continuum* (Quantico, Marine Corps University, 2013).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Motto of the former Canadian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical School, now the Canadian Forces Fire and CBRN Academy

³⁷ James Royse, *Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions* (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command & Staff College: 2004).

³⁸ Robert Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power", *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2008: 6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brannen, Sam. "Building a Better Soldier-Diplomat", Defense One website, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/07/unveiling-military-diplomacy/66677/> [accessed Dec 23, 2015].

Caudill, Shannon. *Saving America From Itself: Avoiding the Fallen Empire Syndrome*. Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2005.

Cohen, Eliot A. *Conquered Into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*. New York: Free Press, 2011.

Cohen, Eliot A. "Supreme Command in the 21st Century", *Joint Forces Quarterly* 31, Summer 2002.

Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, *PAM 525-3-0: The US Army Capstone Concept*. Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, 2012.

Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2006*. Washington: The Pentagon, 6 February 2006.

Department of Defense. *Quadriennial Defense Review Report 2014*. Washington: The Pentagon, 4 March 2014.

Gates, Robert. "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power", *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2008.

Kauffmann, Greg. "The Importance of the Soldier-Diplomat in the 21st Century", *Journal of Diplomacy*, 20 Dec 2014.

Mouton, Daniel E. "The Army's Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve?", *Army Magazine*, March 2011.

Nagl, John A. *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*. Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2007.

Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.

Royse, James. *Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions*. Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command & Staff College: 2004.

Schehadey, Daniel. "Putting the "D" and "I" back in DIME", In Homeland Security website, <http://inhomeandsecurity.com/putting-the-d-and-i-back-in-dime/> [accessed Sep 12, 2015]

Scribner, Roberto. *Bridging the Economic Development Gap: Establishing a Practical Expeditionary Economics Continuum*. Quantico, Marine Corps University, 2013.

The White House, *National Security Strategy 2015*. Washington, U.S. Government Press, 2015.