REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
01-05-2017	Research	01-10-2016 - 01-05-2017

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Marine-SOF Synergy:
A Multi-Service Functional Concept for Crisis and Contingency Response

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Maj Jason C Armas
Maj Stephen E. DeTrinis

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
2044 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
N/A

11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

14. ABSTRACT
A Multi-Service Functional Concept for Crisis and Contingency Respons between Marine Corps units and Special Operations Forces. This paper outlines six command and control models for the inegration of general purpose forces and special operations forces in a crisis response or in contigency operations. The models cover the full spectrum of operations from limited objective through escelation to theater level conflict.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces, intergration, interoperability, command and control architecture, command and control models.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
			UU	15	Marine Corps University / School of Advanced Warfighting
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* (703) 432-5318 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps
School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

FUTURE WAR PAPER

Marine-SOF Synergy:
A Multi-Service Functional Concept for Crisis and Contingency Response

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

Major Jason C. Armas
Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

AY 2016-2017

Mentor: **Dr. Gordon Rudd**
Approved: _____
Date: 10 MAY 2017

Introduction

CR Operations: The Time is Now!

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) normally task-organizes for operations by forming Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), which are expeditionary, balanced, air-ground, combined arms formations under a single commander available to the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC).[1] The standard forward deployed MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).[2] In response to the attacks on the American Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, the Marine Corps established standing Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTF) to respond to crises in high risk, high threat areas within Geographic Combatant Commander (CCDR) Areas of Responsibility (AOR). As the expansion of forward deployed Marine Crisis Response forces has coincided with the expansion of United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) global footprint, it has created potentially duplicative crisis and contingency response (CR) formations without adding intermediate command structures to synchronize, coordinate, and deconflict efforts.

In April 2013, the United States Marine Corps and USSOCOM conducted a joint wargame to explore options in which USSOCOM would provide SOF capabilities to a maritime expeditionary force and ways in which SOF could in turn leverage the deployed ARG/MEUs.[3] In order to create synergy between the Marine Corps and SOF, USSOCOM established a standing four-to-six man Special Operations Force Liaison Element (SOFLE) that integrates into the MEU command element to leverage complementary capabilities and share information and intelligence while serving GCC priorities. It is comprised of an experienced Special Operations Officer (Lieutenant Colonel or US Navy Commander), seasoned Special Operators (Senior Staff

Non-Commissioned Officer or Navy Chief Petty Officer Class), and Communications Specialists.

As an additional measure to create synergy and synchronize efforts, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have drafted a concept that engenders collaboration while conducting Phase 0 and Phase 1 theater security cooperation (TSC) activities. Neither the creation of a SOFLE or a concept for TSC account for all of the situations in which Marines and SOF will collaborate and conduct operations. The 2015 National Defense Strategy highlights Crisis and Contingency Response (CR) operations because they remain one of the most probable and most dangerous missions deployed forces might execute. To preserve life and deescalate a crisis the joint force must be trained and able to rapidly organize under a single headquarters. A functional concept for Command and Control of Crisis Response operations provides the CCDRs Joint Force Headquarters models that maximize integration and interoperability and reduce friction and response time.

The Problem

CR Coverage: Redundancy or Duplication of Effort?

The 2016 *Marine Corps Operating Concept* (MOC) opens with a future scenario in which a panel discusses a combined-joint crisis response operation in which a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) assisted a key ally "in repelling an aggressive neighbor and quelling a proxy-force insurgency."[4] The scenario suggests how the Marine Corps may fight in one type of operation in the future. It does not provide an example for circumstances that require force structures smaller than a MEF, where the immediacy of a crisis excludes a long build-up stage, or the responses are from more than one service. The scenario begins with landing force littoral

operations to explain how the Marines desire to conduct high-intensity distributed operations but it neglects to cover actions that take place prior to Phases 2 and 3.[5] Marines and SOF will be conducting shaping and deterrence actions "as part of robust theater security cooperation (TSC) and military engagement, which is *fertile ground for Marine and SOF integrated operations*."[6] These operations will continue to take place in areas that are characterized by dense populations, fragile governments, volatile social structures, and uncertain/unstable controls on violence. Demographic and population shifts will increasingly move towards coastal and littoral areas often in megacities, frequently with fertile populations of disenfranchised and disgruntled groups that are disposed to radicalization and criminality.

The *Multi-Service Concept for Marine and SOF* should create synergy between the two organizations during TSC operations and the MOC scenario suggests that Marine and SOF operations will become increasingly interdependent. The Multi-Service Concept explains that the Marine Corps's MAGTFs should have relevant access to SOF-produced information prior to crisis.[7] Both concepts fail to address the most probable operations that Marines and SOF will conduct together - CR operations - which can range from humanitarian and foreign disaster relief to hostage rescue and limited-duration kinetic operations in the littorals.

Current State

TSC and CR: Inseparably Linked

The National Military Strategy (NMS) directs the United States Military to "Respond to Crisis and Conduct Limited Contingency Operations." It explains, "another form of power projection is teaming with partners to conduct limited contingency operations. Such operations may involve flowing additional U.S. forces and capabilities to a given region to strengthen

deterrence, prevent escalation, and reassure allies."[8] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has designated CR operations as one of ten priority missions for the Joint Force, prioritizing it above *Conduct military engagement and security cooperation.* Despite the sequence, both CR and TSC missions are inextricably linked.

USSOCOM is the designated proponent for Security Forces Assistance (SFA), "with responsibility to lead the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the SFA capability across the DOD."[9] The GCC plans SFA operations as part of the Theater Campaign Plan to deter aggression and build partnerships. SFA is a key component of the CR task because it gives U.S. forces placement and access and fosters the relationships necessary to accomplish missions that fall within the CR umbrella. The TSOC retains many of the necessary authorities and relationships required to conduct shaping activities in support of GCC priorities. SOF accomplishes these requirements with rotational and permanently assigned forces, whereas the GPF supports TSC with shorter-duration missions.

Following the drawdown of large formations in Iraq and Afghanistan and with increasing uncertainty in high-risk/high-threat locations across the globe, the Joint Force – and specifically the Marine Corps - has been researching methods to improve CR coverage, timeliness, and overall effectiveness. The Marine Corps has made a concerted effort to improve CR coverage with the establishment of SPMAGTF-CR formations while SOF has contributed to the shaping and deterrence efforts through its *Global SOF Network.*[10] Despite these efforts there has been little of consequence contributed to the conceptual or doctrinal development of a CR formation that integrates the most probable response forces to a degree that provides CCDRs a reliable capability.

Recommendation

A Functional Concept for Command and Control of Joint CR Operations

The United States and the GCCs require a wide range of "flexible, scalable, and tailored force options to create enduring effects congruent with national security objectives" that include crisis and contingency response.[11] As stated in the 2015 NMS, CR operations are executed to "strengthen deterrence, prevent escalation, and reassure allies."[12] Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* explains, "the United States will continue to respond to a variety of civil crises by acting to relieve human suffering and restoring civil functioning, most often in support of civil authorities" and that "a limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which a JFC must develop an OPLAN or OPORD."[13] Currently, there is no doctrine that provides a framework for a joint headquarters that can be wargamed, exercised, or rehearsed.

Establishing CR Command Relationships is not as simple as transitioning this concept to doctrine because there exist command relationships that must be modified and there are policies and procedures that must be developed or adapted. The FY2013 *Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum* gave combatant command authority (COCOM) to CDR USSOCOM to globally coordinate SOF activities.[14] CDR USSOCOM typically delegates operational control (OPCON) of deployed SOF to the geographic CCDRs who then delegate OPCON to the theater special operations command (TSOC) CDR.[15] The MEUs are typically OPCON to the GCC's Navy Forces, while the SPMAGTFs are OPCON to the GCC. This means deployed Marines and SOF conducting operations in the same AOR do not share a common commander below the CCDR.

During Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM the SOF and GPF exercised separate chains of command that joined at the Theater Commander Level. In later operations, SOF required concurrence from Regional Commanders for specific operations, but not approval from the battle space owner. The formations involved in such operations relied on battle space deconfliction through the use of temporary special operations areas of operation or restricted operations zones. These temporary boundaries were established only for the duration of the action and gave the executing unit control of the area from the ground to a defined altitude, but overall command relationships remained inconsistent and/or undefined.[16]

The GCCs establish Joint Force Commands (HQs) along Operational Control and Tactical Control command relationships. Since the TSOC exercises OPCON of SOF, there are few examples in which GPF JFHQs exercise OPCON or TACON of SOF (see Figure 4). During the same period, there are a few examples in which GPF are OPCON or TACON to SOF HQs. However, there are no established protocols for sharing data and intelligence on proprietary networks. Since there is no concept for the integration of SOF and GPF into a single JFHQ there has been little reason for SOF/GPF forces to train and coordinate with each other prior to deployment.

The following six models that GCCs should use during crisis and contingency operations propose Joint Task Force Headquarters that maximize tempo and the participating forces' contributions while minimizing friction and exploitable gaps. The models are designed to provide C2 of operational forces as they respond to the most likely CR scenarios. The models are described in order of the size of the CR force and its associated Joint Headquarters. The first model is the Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is the most agile and most available for rapid deployment via the GCC's Naval Service Component. The second model is the Special Forces

Brigade, which deploys from CONUS in response to burgeoning crisis. The third headquarters is developed from the GCC's Theater Special Operations Command. The fourth and fifth models are the largest; they are the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the Theater Army Brigade, respectively.

Marine Expeditionary Unit Model

The Colonel-led MEU model provides the GCC with a CR force that can become a Joint Force Headquarters with the appropriate augmentation. The MEU has the internal capability to conduct limited raid, HA/DR, and Military Assisted Departure operations. When it is reinforced with a SOF component, this formation can expand its limited CR capability.

The MEU is best positioned to be the lead agency when the Marine Corps either has the preponderance of available forces or when the task falls within the littoral areas. The MEU provides a trained, resourced, and rehearsed CR-capable MAGTF that theater SOF can enhance with intelligence networks and enduring partnered relationships among other SOF-peculiar activities.

In a crisis, the MEU would leverage the habitual relationships with the SOFLE to make contact with and gain theater SOF. A Marine Raider Company is best suited for this role with its interservice relationship, although a SEAL Detachment or a Special Forces Company (ODB) could fulfill the requirement (Figure 1). As the smallest model it has limitations, specifically with regard to the duration of the CR operation; however, being part of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), the MEU has the flexibility to conduct disaggregated operations with scalable, task-organized forces throughout the GCC's AOR.

The flexibility of being a sea-based formation may negate the requirements for a Status of Forces Agreement, specifically with basing and over flight, and it can leverage theater SOF that is already within the crisis area. This model would be beneficial for use within the Pacific Command Theater of operations, specifically in the South China Sea. The ability to use the sea as maneuver space exploits the flexibility of this force to react to multiple CR events near simultaneously within one AOR.



Figure 1: MEU Model

"Figure 1 demonstrates the standard MEU with attached SOF. The SEAL Task Unit and Special Forces Company diagrams represent standard formations that could replace or be in addition to the Raider Company (also known as an MSOC)."

Special Forces Group Model

The Special Forces Group model is a middleweight, CONUS-based CR force that is deployable for specific CR events that have the potential to increase in scale and scope beyond limited-duration operations. A Colonel leads the Special Forces Group, which could assume

operational control of elements from the Marine Corps. This force could deploy from CONUS to a specific GCC's AOR for an operation and would fall within the span of control of the GCC.

This Special Forces Group is independent of the forces allocated or assigned to a specific GCC. It is a contingency force that would alleviate forward deployed forces from having to commit to the emerging crisis. The Marine Corps could augment this force with a rifle battalion to reinforce security or provide a quick reaction force. This force is designed to use Marine-supporting capabilities to increase the operational reach and lethality of the Special Forces Group. The addition of a Marine Aviation Combat Element composite squadron, Marine artillery battalion, or a Marine combat logistics battalion would greatly enhance the Group's maneuverability, sustainment, and fires capability. These relationships could be trained to prior to deployment and exercised during GCC wargames. Habitual relationships and standing operating procedures could be created and nurtured throughout a training cycle to ensure the seamless integration of Marine formations into the Special Forces Group.

This formation would take time to aggregate in CONUS prior to deployment, but it could be incrementally deployed, and it has the depth of command structure to forward deploy a Fly-In Command Element (FiCE) as the forces build to full strength. The major limitation of this type formation is the size, external lift, and airfields/ports that would be required for the deployment, which places a significant strain on the current force rotations for Transit Command and requires a permissive environment for disembarkation. The Special Forces Group is not a self-sustaining formation; it would have to be sustained by the Theater Sustainment Brigade placing the burden on the GCC sustainment apparatus. Once the force is established and its sustainment is coordinated, the Group's duration of operations is only limited by the support it requires. This formation could be the foundation for a Theater Army Model as the size and scope of the

operation increases. This model is ideal for areas where SOF is already conducting operations and the CR event is expected to increase in size, scope, and duration, potentially resulting in the creation of a Special Operations Task Force. This model is ideal in situations that are similar to those on-going in Iraq and Syria wherein Marine Corps artillery and other fire support formations are supporting host-nation forces that are advised by US SOF. Enduring SOF requirements in these volatile and ambiguous areas require a force that does not impact enduring requirements within the GCC AOR. Figure 2 illustrates the mission-dependent, SOF-centric nature of the Special Forces Group Model, which has inherent operational flexibility.



Figure 2: Special Forces Group Model[1]

"Figure 2 demonstrates the organic capabilities of a Special Forces Group and the type forces the Group is most likely to require from the Marine Corps."

TSOC MODEL

[1] Special Forces Groups typically deploy as task organized Joint Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) Headquarters with subordinate formations from across USSOCOM, with units from coalition partners. Conventional formations have been assigned to SOTFs as recently as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

The TSOC is well equipped to provide a limited-duration Joint Force Headquarters for CR operations that is led by a one or two-star General/Flag Officer from USSOCOM. Joint by its nature, it is best suited to be the lead agency for the JFHQ when the TSOC is the supported command, SOF are the primary contributors and make up the preponderance of the Task Force, or the GCC's CR element is the main effort. As one of the sub-unified components of the GCC, the TSOC maintains a deep understanding of the GCC's AOR, the operational area, and possesses a habitual relationship with the CCDR.

The U.S. Army Special Forces Company serving as the GCC's CR element has six Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) that are permanently assigned within the AOR (except in the cases of USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM) and they have the primary responsibility of being the CCDR's crisis response force. These ODAs participate in TSC, but the missions are typically CR-focused and conducted with partners and allies that can be reasonably expected to assist CR forces on operations. The Special Forces Company in this model could be increased to a battalion-sized element to fulfill the emerging mission requirements. The TSOC headquarters would require additional support to increase its C2 capability. A Marine Raider Battalion and a Navy Special Warfare SEAL Team possess the necessary command and control to serve as a CR JFHQ at the discretion of the TSOC commander in coordination with USSOCOM.

Having a standing TSOC JFHQ that can command and control, deconflict, and synchronize efforts provides the CCDR a known entity that he can train and prepare to execute "rapidly developing" CR operations. By the fact that the TSOC is an organic component of the GCC, the TSOC commander and his staff would be aware of the developing situation and the pathology of the crisis. Figure 3 provides examples of conventional formations that can be

attached to the TSOC. Conventional formations can be attached in total or by task-organized components to meet mission requirements. This model can be exercised in the AOR with assigned SOF as well as rotational GPF and SOF. The MEU's subordinate commands complement this formation and provide tailor made forces that can fulfill the fast and dynamic requirements of CR. The MEU provides a rotational force that is fully trained and resourced for CR type operations; the SOFLE provides a critical link that has a habitual relationship with the TSOC. The battalion landing team, air combat element, logistic combat element or a combination of the three are inherently independent and can plug into a joint formation with ease. This model is the quickest to activate with the most seamless transition of authority from the GCC to the JFHQ. Of the five models, the TSOC will probably be the one model with an expiration date because it is the only one with standing theater requirements that it cannot obviate. Therefore, the TSOC model is for limited duration CR missions that are small in scale and scope.

TSOC Model



Figure 3: Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Model

"Figure 3 demonstrates the capacity of the TSOC model. The SEAL and Raider Battalion diagrams (lower) represent forces that can be in place of or in addition to the SF Battalions. The Mission Dependent box represents an aviation group, which is just one type of Marine Corps formation that could be assigned to a TSOC for CR Operations."

Marine (MEB) Model

The Marine Model is based on a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) that provides the CCDR a middleweight CR force able to self-sustain operations for up to 30-days and is capable of conducting operations in multiple domains across the range of military operations (ROMO).[17] In this construct the MEB is a Brigadier General led MAGTF that is reinforced with SOF elements and other service components (Figure 4). This model provides the CCDR the foundation to scale up or scale down resources depending on the CR situation. It is best used when the mission requires a CR force that includes a MEU or SPMAGTF plus additional formations such as SOF.

The MEB as a self-sustaining force uses its organic assets - LCE and ACE - to provide life support and air requirements throughout the CR event. SOF elements would typically be TACON to the MEB Commanding General and be supported by the enhanced combat service support and service support assigned to the MEB. As a JFHQ, the MEB would retain tasking authority over all assigned forces. The MEB FiCE could deploy and be fully operational capable within 24 hours of notification, which would provide the MEB time to assemble the force as the full JFHQ structure arrives. Unlike the TSOC model, the MEB has no standing requirements to the GCC and could commit all of its resources to the CR event with the ability to command and control multiple regimental-sized formations.

The MEB model provides a robust command and control element that is fully capable of assuming operational control of a Raider Battalion, SEAL Team, Special Forces Battalion, or a Ranger Battalion. These additional formations within the MEB structure increase their lethality and operational reach with the inherent capabilities provided by the combat logistics regiment or the composite squadron. Having these capabilities nested under the MEB structure ensures a scalable, flexible, and lethal CR force for the GCC.

The MEU or SPMAGTF HQs can temporarily serve as the MEB HQ with the MEB CG flown in to command, with or without the MEB FiCE, until the MEB staff can be forward deployed. Availability of forces limits the speed at which the MEB can react to a CR event. Geographic locations of the MEU, SPMAGTF, and the SOF elements can delay the MEB's CR response time. The size of the MEB formations could be a limitation as well, specifically if access to the affected area is limited. Since the MEB is self-sustaining, it does require access across a beach or via a port or airfield as well as an area for a lodgment. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, then Brigadier General Mattis exercised this model with Task Force 58 in Afghanistan.



Figure 4: Task Force 58 Model

"Figure 4 demonstrates the Task Force 58 Model that conducted limited objective operations from 1 November, 2001 to 26 February, 2002 in the US CENTCOM AOR. The Task Force aggregated two MEU's supported by USN carriers, the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the USS John C. Stenis, and Combined Joint Task Force Mountain."



Figure 5: Marine (MEB) Model

"Figure 5 demonstrates the breadth and span of control that a MEB offers a GCC. It can C2 regimental-sized formations or multiple MAGTFs and large SOF formations for extended periods."

Theater Army Model

The Army model is the largest CR formation with the capability and capacity to sustain operations beyond the crisis as military escalation increases. This model has the capacity to C2 Army, Marine Corps, and SOF formations up to brigade size, culminating in a JTF that is led by a Major General. This formation has the internal structure to grow beyond a JTF to a Combined

Joint Task Force with the incorporation of multi-national forces. This force serves as the CCDR's strategic CR force capable of controlling up to seven (joint/combined) subordinate battalions with SOF elements in direct support.

This model provides the CCDR greater flexibility when responding to CR events across the ROMO. The Army Brigade headquarters in theater would become the JFHQ, leveraging the habitual relationships that exist within the GCC AOR. SOF and Army elements in the GCC's AOR have pre-established relationships and an understanding of each other's capabilities. Figure 5 illustrates that attaching Marine formations to an Army headquarters increases depth, improves lethality, and extends operational reach by adding organic MAGTFs or other Marine components from the Ground Combat, Aviation Combat, or Logistics Combat Elements. The flexible and scalable nature of the SPMAGTF makes it a natural fit for such a dynamic formation.

Unlike the TSOC and MEB models, this formation is not forward deployed. It may be required to deploy from CONUS or from its permanent location like the Special Forces Group Model. While the large force enables the CCDR the ability to respond to the full scale of CR events, its footprint and logistic requirements can exceed host nation capacity. This force requires basing and airfields and is dependent on sustainment ports for the duration of the operations. This may require temporary Memorandums of Understanding or a Status of Forces Agreement. This force is best employed when the CCDR expects the CR to be long in duration with the potential for an enduring requirement.



Figure 6: Theater Army Model[2]

"Figure 6 displays the breadth and span of control that the Theater Army Brigade is capable of commanding and controlling. The figure represents a few of the multiple possibilities for subordinate forces."

[2] This model could have countless permutations. This model represents a situation in which the Army Brigade is assigned to the GCC and the SPMAGTF (or MEU) is attached for the duration of the CR operation. The MAGTF could be attached in its entirety or task organized, which provides the CCDR maximum flexibility.

Conclusion

The models suggested in this functional concept do not require significant changes to the ways the Marine Corps, USSOCOM, or GCCs organize, train, or employ their forces. Rather, this concept serves as a companion to existing and draft concepts that will maximize Marine and SOF capabilities for the most likely high-risk scenario a GCC will encounter. The GCCs could implement these models and associate this concept with AOR-specific pre-deployment training, while testing and improving it prior to formalizing it in doctrine. The more rapidly a force can organize under a JHQ that it has trained with the more effectively it can satisfy mission requirements, preserve life, and deter escalation.

The US DoD leadership has determined that joint and combined operations will continue to be preferred over single-service operations. Accordingly, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have developed operational concepts to increase interoperability and interdependence as highlighted in the draft multi-service concept for TSC and the continuation of SOFLEs with MEUs. These concepts are limited in scope as they address a small percentage of the opportunities for Marine-SOF integration. This functional concept for CR C2 provides a foundation for Marines and SOF to enhance a mutual capability beyond the near-term that deploying forces can train to and GCCs can wargame. This concept expands current CR capacity by increasing adaptability, decreasing response time, and enhancing capabilities while laying the foundation for future interoperability and interdependence.

Endnotes

[1] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations,* MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, August 9, 2011), 2-6.

[2] A MEU includes a command element; a reinforced infantry battalion; a composite squadron with vertical envelopment assault support, and fixed wing platforms; and a logistics element. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Operations,* MCDP 3 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, April 16, 1998, 75.

[3] Major Robert S. Bunn, "MAGTF-SOF Integration: Realizing the natural synergy," *Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 1* (January 2015): 79.

[4] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century,* (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, September 2016), 1.

[5] The scenario neglects to explain the time it takes for a MEF to clos with a crisis area and the requirements for Shaping (PHASE 0) and Deterrence (PHASE I) operations prior to MEF-level operations to Seize The Initiative (PHASE II) and Dominate The Adversary (PHASE III). U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations,* JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: August 11, 2011), Figure V-3, page V-6.

[6] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Multi-Service Concept for USMC and USSOCOM Integration, Interdependence, and Interoperability*, draft Version .5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, October 4, 2016), 1.

[7] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Multi-Service Concept*, 4.

[8] Major Robert S. Bunn, "Where Sea Meets Land," *United States Naval Institute, Proceedings,* 140.11 (November 2014), 24.

[9] Bunn, "MAGTF-SOF Integration," 79.

[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015: *The United States Military's Contribution to National Security* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 12.

[11] Admiral McRaven describes the Global SOF Network as SOF being "postured across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations," to counter transnational threats. This posture contributes to SOF's ability to be a considerable contributor to CR operations. *Posture Statement United States Special Operations Command: Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong.* 1 (2013) (Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations Command).

[12] US Department of Defense, *Special Operations,* JP 3-05, (Washington, DC: April 18, 2011), II-12.

[13] Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU),* MCO 3120.13, October 29, 2015, 5, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%203120.13.pdf (accessed December 22, 2016).

[14] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Multi-Service Concept for USMC and USSOCOM,* 2.

[15] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 12.

[16] US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations, JP 3-0,* I-4 and V-19.

[17] US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations, JP 3-0,* V-19.

[18] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Multi-Service Concept for USMC and USSOCOM,* 10.

[19] US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations, JP 3-0,* IV-13.

[20] US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations, JP 3-0,* V-2.

[21] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept: Assuring Littoral Access...Proven Crisis Response,* Third Edition, (Washington DC: US Marine Corps, June 2010), 77.

[22] *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,* Public Law 99-433 (October 1, 1986).

[23] US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations,* JP 3-0 (pg IV-13) defines a joint special operations area as an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct SO activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. A JSOA is defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO. The JFSOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.

[24] Leon F. Pannetta, FY2013 *Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum,* (Washington, D.C., Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), Tab B.

[25] Bunn, "MAGTF-SOF Integration," 79.

[26] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations,* MCDP 1-0, 2-11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aspin, Les, *Desert One to Desert Storm: Making Ready for Victory,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC June 20, 1991, 585 - 587.

Bartles, Charles K., *Getting Gerasimov Right*, Military Review January – February 2016, 30-38.

Bunn, Robert S., *MAGTF-SOF Integration: Realizing the natural synergy*, Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 2015, 79-91.

Bunn, Robert S., *Where Sea Meets Land*, United States Institute, Proceedings, Nov 2014, 24.

Bowden, Mark, *The Desert One Debacle,* The Atlantic Monthly, May 2006, 62 - 77.

Carty, William J., *An Unconventional Look Training and Education to Improve Conventional and SOF Integration,* January 15, 2004.

Croom, Paul L., *Lessons Learned: Retrofitting Marine Corps Training for the Modern Battlefield,* Marine Corps Gazette, April 2005; 89, 4, 56 - 58.

Fletcher, Ian C., *Advance Force Operations: The Middleweight Force's Essential Role on Joint Operations*, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: April 2013.

Greeley, Jim, *Desert One,* Airman, April 2001; 45, 4, 2 - 9.

Grey, Colin S, *Handful of Heroes on Desperate Venture: When do Special Operations Succeed,* Parameters, Spring 1999, 2 - 24.

Goodale, Jason R, *Crisis Response Force: Shaping the MAGTF of the "New Normal,* Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: March 2016.

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Expeditionary Force 21, Department of the Navy (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2014).
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/EF21_Capstone_Concept _12_Mar_2014.

Headquarters United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020, Concept, April 28, 2013.https://sof.socom.mil/sites/opt/global/Readingroom/Shared%20Documents/current/2020StratDoc.pdf

Mattis, James N. United States Joint Forces Command, to U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development Vision, Memorandum, (Washington, DC: 28 May) 20095-6.

McRaven, William H. United States Special Operations Command, to 113th Congress, *Posture Statement United States Special Operations Command: Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong.*, 1 (Washington, DC 2013).

Osborne, Joe, *Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations,* Small Wars Journal, May 13, 2016.

Pannetta, Leon F., FY2013 Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: 2013.

Roach, Jason D., *Understanding USSOCOM and US Marine Corps Roles in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations*, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: April 2013.

Schmitt, John F. "A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concept" (working paper, Defense Adaptive Red Team, 2002).

Thompson, John, A. *Training Marines for the Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) Operational Environment: The Model,* January 20, 2013.

United States Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Washington, DC: 1986.

United States Joint Staff. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint force 2020.* Washington, DC: 10 September 2012.

United States Joint Staff. *Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options.* Suffolk, VA: March 2014.

United States Joint Staff. *Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm: Second Edition.* Suffolk, VA: July 2013.

United States Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations,* Washington DC: August 11, 2001.

United States Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations.* Washington DC: July 16, 2014.

United States Joint Staff. *Joint Operational Access (JOAC).* Washington DC: January 17, 2012.

United States Joint Staff. *Mission Command and Cross Domain Synergy.* Suffolk, VA: March 2013.

United States Joint Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America.* Washington, DC: 2015.

United States Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready: Now and In the Future.* Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 4, 2014.

United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0: Marine Corps Operations.* Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 2001.

United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3: Expeditionary Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, April 1998.

United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40.1: Marine Air Ground Task Force Command and Control.* Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 27, 2005.

United States Marine Corps. *Marine Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century.* Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 2016.

United States Marine Corps. *Multi-Service Concept of USMC and USSOCOM Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence.* Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, October 4, 2016.

United States Marine Corps. FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual,* 1940, Reprint. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, December 22, 1990.