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14. ABSTRACT This paper discusses the possibility of using a fund similar to the Global Security Contingency Fund to force a top down whole of government approach to Phase 0 and Phase 4/5 (Shaping and Stability) operations in unstable countries. This approach, called mission-based budgeting, sets funds aside for a specific mission and assigns a lead agent with the authority to task other departments and agencies in order to craft a governmental wide solution to bolster unstable countries or assist with post-conflict reconstruction. Currently both the Department of Defense and the State Department are unable to individually conduct this mission, and due to current restrictions on funding and authorities, neither department is able to effectively lead a whole of government response.					
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FUTURE WAR PAPER


***Whole of Government Approach to Global Response:
Streamlining Contingency Response Via Mission-based Budgeting***

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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Introduction

Throughout history the United States Military has taken the lead in nation building efforts after kinetic operations have ended. In the past decade, the United States has led two separate nation building events led by the United States Military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 there has been a concomitant rise in non-state actors, and a corresponding rise in the threat of a catastrophic kinetic event on United States soil. Going forward one can expect a continuation in security threats from non-state actors which threaten both the United States homeland as well as threaten to topple sovereign states across the globe which runs counter to the national security interest of the United States.

To that end, in 2009 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton discussed a unified security budget that would allocate funding across the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, which gave rise to a number of Task Forces on a unified security budget¹. In 2012 the Center for American Progress issued a study on the rebalancing of United States national security which outlined the benefit of a unified security budget². In the 12 years since the unified security budget came to the level of national conscious the United States has maintained forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as operating in a number of countries in the Middle East and Africa. A more fluid security budget would allow the President and the National Security Council to weight the security effort against different types of conflict across the range of military operations and lead to a more stable security environment for the United States specifically and the world at large.

The discussions of a Unified Security Budget began in the post September 11, 2001 era, with the creation of a Task Force on a Unified Security Budget for the United States led by the

Institute for Policy Studies but staffed by a number of leading national security experts such as Lawrence Kolb and Lawrence Wilkerson³. This and other think tank reports were published periodically from 2004 onward, however, the movement for a Unified Security Budget gained traction in 2009 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton jointly discussed the concept, which would allocate funding across the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security. In 2012 the Center for American Progress issued a study on the rebalancing of our National Security which outlined the benefits of a unified security budget.

Two Approaches:

There are two main courses of action to move towards a unified security budget. The first is a joint budget across State Department, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security as the lead non-intelligence element for national security. Proponents of this approach argue a joint budget ensures a more holistic look at the national security of the United States through a joint strategy and budgeting process⁴. The second main course of action has been described as mission-based budgeting, which allocates funds for a whole of government effort towards a single mission. In this scenario the U.S. government sets aside funding for a mission that can be used by the all arms of the federal government under an executive agent. As global conflict ebbs and flows resources for missions across the globe can be allocated across departments based on the current situation, which allows for the inclusion of all aspects of the government from the Department of the Treasury, Agriculture, Federal Law Enforcement, etc. Mission-based budgeting will be examined in detail as a more practical and realistic solution.

Global Security Contingency Fund

As a response to the joint initiative between Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates in 2009 Congress created a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), which authorizes DOD and DOS to jointly deposit money into this fund for joint operations. This fund was first created to be used in Fiscal Year 2012 and was initially authorized for four years, and then extended for 12 months to the end of FY17. According to the Department of State website, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is a pilot program, currently authorized through September 30, 2017, that permits the Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DoD) to pool money and expertise to address emergent challenges and opportunities to a partner countries' security and (in some instances) justice sectors important to U.S. national security and foreign policy. It is a bridging mechanism to provide assistance in the near- to mid-term.⁵ This fund is an excellent example of how mission-based budgeting could function. Furthermore, the GSCF is designed for two specific purposes in mind:

1. To enhance the capabilities of national military and other national -level security forces (and government oversight agencies) that conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, counter-terrorism operations to:
 - a. conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, counter-terrorism operations;
 - b. participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests;
2. For justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country when the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a country or region challenges the existing capacity of civilian providers to deliver such assistance⁶

Since the creation of this fund for FY12, seven different programs have been funded using this vehicle for a total of 108 million dollars in joint funding obligated between the Department of State and Department of Defense⁷. By the National Defense Authorization Act for FY14, the split of money between DOD and DoS must be no more than 80% DoD and no less than 20% DoS.⁸ Considering that the defense budget reaches nearly \$600 billion, an obligation of just over \$100 million over four years suggests that this program is not being heavily used to date.

A number of hurdles currently exist for the GSCF. First, Congress has not appropriated any money to this fund over its nearly five year lifespan. While the Fund was authorized by Congress, no money was obligated to it. As a result there has to be a joint decision between DOD and DoS in order to fund a project. Normally this is a long process and the National Security Council (NSC) has only used this vehicle once to push a whole of government approach to an operation. Operations in the Ukraine were partially funded by the GSCF for FY2014 and FY2015. In this case a clear mandate for action was pushed by the Deputies Committee of the NSC which provided the inertia to move the process forward and have both DOD and DoS authorize funds for the operation⁹. However, this is the only firm example where a top down emphasis has led to a joint project.

The second hurdle for the GSCF is the timeline in funding a program. Since the Fund is jointly administered by DOD and DoS it requires the two bureaucracies to come to an agreement on how to support a given operation. Both departments must jointly decide the funding level and resources to apply to the situation, which is a time consuming process. The relatively small scope of the GSCF it has not been exercised enough to fully embrace a whole of government

approach. Based upon the charter of the GSCF, the creators clearly envisioned the State Department working as the executive agent for a stabilization project but to date the efforts have been minimal in comparison to the overall global stabilization efforts the United States undertakes annually. However, the onerous approval process and long lead times generally force one party to back out before the operation is funded. Finally, anecdotal evidence exists that the Combatant Commanders, although aware of the Fund, have decided to use other funding avenues due to the hurdles the GSCF faces.

Two Case Studies

Nearly 15 years have passed since the United State of America started planning its 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the lead up to the invasion a number of governmental agencies and departments conducted planning exercises to identify the best means to transfer the Iraqi state from a Saddam Hussein control dictatorship to a more representational form of government¹⁰. Despite these planning efforts the United States was unable to successfully stabilize Iraq after Saddam Hussein's government fell. A RAND study in June 2007 highlighted a number of shortfalls that led to the destabilization of Iraq:

1. Ineffective civil and military plans for stability operations;
2. The provision of inadequate forces to occupy and secure Iraq, which encouraged the initiation of an insurgency
3. Problematical funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed services and basic reconstruction, both of which were a partial antidote to insurgency
4. Failure to make effective use of former Iraqi military forces, which, when coupled with deep de-Ba'athification, further alienated the Sunni minority and deprived the government of skilled technocrats

5. Slow and, at first, ineffective development of new Iraqi security forces
6. Inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction activities
7. Slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.¹¹

These shortfalls, only some of the shortfalls highlighted in the report, highlight a major seam in current United States policy. For post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, no lead agency was identified nor was that agency given the authority, responsibility and funding stream to make the required decisions to avoid Iraq's destabilization. An ambassador or general officer could have been empowered to enact a whole of government approach to stabilize the country while developing good governance, reforming the judiciary system and bringing about economic development (both petroleum and non-petroleum sectors of the economy). A whole of government approach, lacking in the years immediately following the invasion of Iraq, was outside the expertise of any one United States agency or department.

November 2009: Helmand Province, Afghanistan is in the midst of a United States military troop "surge" sending an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to combat the increasing effects of Al Qaeda¹². An engineer company from Combat Logistics Battalion-1, deployed to Camp Dwyer Afghanistan is conducting a road improvement project between Marjah and Garmsir with the dual purpose of helping military and civilian vehicles traffic the route. The engineer team encounters Afghan civilians with armed Afghan security guards on the same road and a tense standoff occurs. After a few long minutes with many Marines poised over the sights of M-16s, the platoon commander realizes that these Afghans have received funding from USAID to improve and eventually pave the same road he is tasked with improving as part

of a greater governance and infrastructure program in the region. Over the next few weeks the platoon commander's company commander attempts to deconflict the tasks on the Engineer's Prioritized Engineer Project List (PEPL) and the USAID construction tasks in the same zone. After walls are put up by both the single USAID point of contact in Kabul and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade staff in Camp Leatherneck; the Engineer Company Commander pulls his troops off the road project and moves onto other tasks without a clear timetable to the civilian companies' work or an understanding of what other duplicate tasks exist¹³.

These two vignettes, a tactical example from seven years ago and a strategic example nearly 15 years old, have occurred innumerable times in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries and show two sides of the same coin. At the strategic level, there is a major difference between the capabilities available to a country team and a Geographic Combatant Command, although each works for the national command authority. In the current construct, no single U.S. agency has the manpower or budget to allow the creation and deployment of a task organized whole of government force required for stability immediately after the fall of the Iraqi government. In both cases the budgeting process and legal hurdles prevented cooperation which led to duplication of effort and could have led to a tragic outcome. One of the main themes of the 2015 National Security Strategy is to use all instruments of national power to defeat terrorism and prevent conflict¹⁴. Functionally, however, the United States Military carries a disproportionate share of the load.

A Way Ahead

The Global Security Contingency Fund has been a great test bed for a mission-based budgeting approach to security and stability operations. However, in order to take full advantage

of mission-based budgeting the GSCF must be adjusted to fully embrace a whole of government approach with the following four modifications:

1. Assign priorities to security and stabilization operations through the National Security Council via the National Security Strategy
2. Assign a lead or Executive Agent for each operation (I.E. DOD, DoS, DHS, etc.)
3. Task the corresponding Combatant Command (COCOM) or Country Team with oversight of the operation based upon the Executive Agent assigned.
4. Funnel all DOD overseas contingency operations and near to mid-term security operations funding (a subset of O&M funds) into the GSCF via the NDAA

The next sections will discuss these four modifications in detail.

Top down Planning

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the senior guiding document that sets grand strategy and direction for the United States. The latest National Security Strategy, published in 2015 makes a clear reference to leading with all instruments of national power¹⁵ while advancing the United States' national interests. The NSS is the only document produced by the United States Government that addresses United States' security from a whole of government perspective. After the NSS is published each department generates their own documents and executes operations to advance America's National Security interests without full coordination among other governmental agencies. The United States military generates a National Military Strategy and the Geographic Combatant Commanders generate a Theater Campaign Plan for each region based on the NSS. Similarly the State Department generates a four-year Joint Strategic Plan, followed by a three-year Joint Regional Plan and finally a three-year Integrated

Country Strategy (ICS) to map the United States strategy for every country in the world. These two sets of documents from the DOD and the State Department reflect the inherent biases of each department and while coordination between the two departments occurs, there is a very clear break between them with respect to budgeting, priorities and allocation of resources. This seam can cause a disconnect with respect to actions taken by each department in support of the NSS.

At the strategic level, the State Department's ICS and the Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) may have different foci based upon the strengths and weaknesses of each department. Under the new construct DOD and the State Department identify regions and countries in one of three categories: decisive, shaping or sustaining. Countries categorized as decisive are either currently in conflict or at high risk for conflict. Countries in the shaping category are at risk of destabilization and entering into conflict or may already be in a post conflict phase. These countries are a prime target for mission-based budgeting as the crisis is not acute but a real danger exists. Finally, countries in the sustaining category are labeled safe and not at risk for destabilization. Once DOD and the State Department have labeled these countries the categories and lists are passed to the National Security Council for adjudication. The NSC, in conjunction with its own estimates and priorities from the Presidents staff, certifies each country in the decisive, shaping or sustaining category. During planning for a response in Haiti in 1994 the NSC developed an executive committee to develop an interagency political military plan. A body such as this one could assist in staffing and assigning priorities to each country¹⁶. However, in the case of Haiti the committee was created for the single contingency, while a committee for this purpose would be a standing entity with the National Security Advisor providing oversight and assisting in implementation.

Countries in the decisive and shaping categories would be assigned priorities based upon the stability of the country and the impact to the United States' national interest. These countries will become the target area for a whole of government approach made possible by mission-based budgeting. In the Haitian example above, Haiti would be assigned to the shaping category and given a priority in the top third based on 'strategic oil reserves, desire of the government for American assistance and geographic location.

Unity of Command

After all countries have been assigned priorities and categories, those in the shaping categories would be assessed as possible targets for a mission-based budgeting approach. Countries fitting this description must not be in active widespread conflict and stand a good chance of accepting a coordinated American presence in order to improve the stability of the nation. Selected nations that meet these criteria will be assigned executive agents, or lead coordinators. In most cases either the Department of State or Department of Defense would be assigned as the executive agent. In that capacity, that department would be responsible for coordinating a whole of government approach in that country. Functionally, the executive agent would assign either the respective Geographic Combatant Commander or the respective Ambassador as the lead agent on behalf of the executive agent in charge of developing the American response in that country. The response would have to be created in accordance with the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) developed for that area by DOD and the State Department (respectively). At this point the lead agent would assemble an interagency planning team to develop a coherent whole of government approach. This interagency planning team is the critical link in the chain to develop a successful mission-based

budgeting approach. The planning team, with access to funds outside of the DOD or State Department traditional hierarchy, is not constrained to options from a single department.

A Future Example: The situation in Arcadia

The fictional country of Arcadia is a coastal, rentier state with tribal, ethnic and religious tensions much like those witnessed across the globe in the late 20th and early 21st century. The Arcadian President has requested assistance in increasing governance in the inland region as well as stabilizing the economy by diversifying away from reliance on oil profits. In a traditional construct, the Ambassador would rely on USAID for development assistance, with possible assistance from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, to develop long lead time economic programs using funds from many different Congressional authorizations. At the same time the GCC may use a SPMAGTF or Special Operations Command (SOCOM) asset to conduct limited duration foreign military training or a joint exercise. These efforts under a traditional construct are neither tightly coordinated nor integrated and each arm of the disparate response reports back to a separate lead agency.

Under the new executive agent construct, the Ambassador is assigned as the lead agent on behalf of executive agent (the State Department in the Arcadian example). The interagency planning team assembled on behalf of the Ambassador identifies a SP-MAGTF, a Governance Advisory Team (GAT) from the State Department, a Law Enforcement Advisory Program (LEAP) led by the Department of Homeland Security and an economic development team from the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture. Arcadia, as a nation in the shaping category, has been prioritized by the NSC as a country well suited for this kind of approach. This prioritization gives weight behind the Ambassador's integrated planning team as

well as a source of funding for the various personnel and operations required to enact this approach. The various civilian employees required from government agencies all work under the operational control of the State Department which has the administrative ability to support these individuals, which is an ability that the Department of Defense lacks.

As the teams from the different government agencies assemble the Ambassador assumes operational control of all the teams, including the Special Purpose MAGTF assigned to the region. Using the staff already assembled in the United States Embassy in Arcadia in addition to subject matter experts in the GCC and other involved agencies, the Ambassador reports on progress and challenges back through the State Department to the standing committee of the NSC assigned to monitor whole of government approaches in countries assigned to the shaping category. This feedback loop provides an azimuth check for the NSC as well as prepares the committee for the placement of Arcadia in the next fiscal year. This approach, coming from across the government, is made feasible due to mission-based budgeting.

Mission-based Budgeting

The FY16 Department of Defense (DOD) base budget totaled \$521.7 billion with an overseas contingency operation fund of \$58.6 billion¹⁷. Of the nearly \$600 billion total budget approximately \$244.4 billion was enacted for operations and maintenance (O&M), which excludes procurement, military personnel compensation, research and development and military construction. By comparison, the State Department budget for FY16, including net revenues, was \$69.3 Billion¹⁸ with less than \$10 billion for overseas contingency operations. Building on the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) concept, this new approach would funnel a significant portion of the DOD's O&M funding with a proportional amount of funding from the

State Department into a revamped GSCF. The Current GSCF construct provides for an 80% and 20% split between DOD and the State Department, whereby no more than 80% of the funding for an operation can come from DOD and no less than 20% can come from the State Department. Based upon the decisions reached at the NSC countries with the highest priority in the shaping category would be assigned an outline budget based on the initial proposals from State Department and DOD submissions to the standing committee of the NSC. Funding in this vehicle could be spent on any aspect of the mission, including additional expenses for civilian governmental personnel required for the response and contracts required across the spectrum of the governance and economic domain. Furthermore, this budget would pay for the routine operations and maintenance costs incurred by DOD personnel and equipment used in support of the mission.

The new GSCF would be allocated funds directly from the DOD O&M budget as well as portions of the State Department budget. DOD allocates O&M funding across services and also to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). In FY2016 DOD allocated \$1.8 billion to the GCCs for operations and maintenance funding, in addition to \$5.1 billion to SOCOM. From the State department budget, funds would be available from Foreign Assistance (which totaled \$17.9 billion in FY 2016) and Diplomatic Engagement (which totaled \$15.5 billion in FY 2016)¹⁹ DOS. The specifics of exactly where to decrement the DOD and State Department budgets are outside the scope of this research and the previous examples are authorizations in the budget which already pay for similar operations that take place without the coordination discussed above.

Competing Views

The Congressional Research Service published a report highlighting some of the concerns of the workability of the GSCF. Specific criticisms include long lead times to authorize funds via the GSCF exacerbated by the extensive interagency cooperation required to proceed with authorization²⁰. The top down NSC led approach for prioritizing countries to receive funding will alleviate this criticism. Another concern is the fact that in its five year history the GSCF has never been allocated funds by Congress is a good example of the challenges of transferring funds from the State Department and DOD into another appropriation. The main challenge to this approach is the longevity required to show progress with programs such as these and the temporal nature of the Fiscal Year budgeting process used by the United States. To counter this valid criticism funds allocated to the GSCF should have an extended time horizon for allocation²¹ in order to provide a more measured and reasoned response in target countries.

A third criticism of mission-based budgeting is the additional administrative requirement to identify, categorize and prioritize countries across the world as potential targets for a whole of government approach. Having DOD and the State Department submit recommendations to a standing committee of the NSC which vets, categorizes and prioritizes the target countries for the principals committee is an additional administrative burden. However, as noted previously in the 1994 Haitian example, committees are occasionally formed in the NSC in order to draft an interagency response to a contingency. Furthermore, the requirement for increased coordination outside of established channels between government agencies working in target countries already levies an administrative burden on the government agencies working in a given country. Under this approach, a government agency would be given a clear mandate as the executive agent and

given the authority (and access to the funding) required to craft a realistic and executable whole of government response.

Conclusion

The Defense Department budget is nearly ten times the budget of the State Department. Therefore, when a response is required by the United States in support of Phase 0 (shaping) or Phase IV/V (stability and enable civil authority) of the Joint Phasing Model the military bears the brunt of the burden. Even though security is a prerequisite for governance and economic interests to flourish, a solely security based response often neglects importance prerequisites for a stable nation, such as good governance, rule of law and a functioning economy. These important prerequisites fall outside of the expertise of the Department of Defense. Case studies and experience from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the military is ill-suited to direct missions that center on good governance, rule of law and a functioning economy without the integrated planning and execution model made possible by mission-based budgeting.

The GSCF was created to last for five years as an experiment in mission-based budgeting. As the GSCF closes out in FY17, there is an opportunity for a reshaping of how operations are conducted abroad using a whole of government approach. A top down program would allow for the President and the National Security Council to weight the security effort against different types of conflict across the range of military operations and could lead to a more stable security environment for the United States. Authorizing mission-based budgeting gives the President and NSC, in coordination with Congress, to the ability to target specific countries in need of stabilization before open conflict breaks out. A mission-based budget would be well used by the executive agent assigned. The executive agent, such as the Department of State,

delegates authority to the country team, and the country team works in conjunction with the COCOM to design an operation allowing all parts of the United States government to participate. Since the funding already exists under a separate authority, no strings are attached to the funds and the lead agent should be able to assign funds to any agency or project identified by the integrated planning team. This whole of government approach, using a fund or appropriation similar to the GSCF in the future security environment could allow for a more balanced and comprehensive response to conflict and potential hotspots.

¹ Conyers, J. (2006, Feb 6, 2006). a unified security budget. *The Nation*, 282, 21-22.

² Unified security budget task force recommends spending reforms to strengthen national security, reduce the deficit. (2012, Oct 31, 2012). *Targeted News Service*.

³ Korb, L., & Pemberton, M. (2006). *Report of the task force on a unified security budget for the United States, 2007*. Project on Defense Alternatives. These reports were published yearly by the Institute for Policy Studies from 2006 until 2012.

⁴ For more specific details see the Report on the task for on a unified security budget; Institute for Policy Studies, FY 2007

⁵ Department of State, Office of Security Assistance. Accessed 1 January 2017:
<https://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/gscf/>

⁶ Department of State, Office of Security Assistance. Accessed 1 January 2017:
<https://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/gscf/>

⁷ These figures are current as of FY2016, the most recent data available.

⁸ NDAA, FY2014. GSCF language section

⁹ Phone interview with John Raffier, Global Security Contingency Fund Coordinate, Department of State.

¹⁰ For more information on the planning efforts undertaken by the United States see Rudd, G. (2011). *Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner and the ORHA Story*. University Press of Kansas.

¹¹ Collins, J. (2007). *The Perils of Planning: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq*. In *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles*, Cerami, J and Boggs, J (Editors). Strategic Studies Institute. Accessed 27 April 2017: <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB828.pdf>

¹² CNN.com news story; <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html?eref>. Accessed 10 Jan 2017

¹³ This is a summary of one of author's experiences as a company commander in Afghanistan.

¹⁴ 2015 National Security Strategy.

¹⁵ 2015 National Security Strategy Factsheet. White House. Accessed 1 March 2017: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy>

¹⁶ Flournoy, M. (2004). *Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ed: Robert C. Orr. CSIC, Washington, D.C.

¹⁷ FY17 Budget Request Overview Book, Department of Defense. Accessed 1 March 2017: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/FY2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf

¹⁸ United States Department of State FY 2016 Agency Financial Report. Accessed 1 March 2017. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/264495.pdf>

¹⁹ *IBID*

²⁰ Serafino, N. (2014). *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview*. Congressional Research Service. Accessed 28 April 2017: <http://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/R42641.pdf>

²¹ For more information on allocation of funding in contingency operations, see Orr and Mendelson (2004), *Funding Post Conflict Reconstruction*. In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ed: Robert C. Orr. CSIC, Washington, D.C.