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# **FUTURE WAR PAPER**

**TOWARD A EUROPEAN DEFENSE SYSTEM: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD  
IMPROVE ITS PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPACITY FOR THE PREVENTION AND  
MANAGEMENT OF CRISES**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** Toward a European defense system: how the European Union should improve its planning and conduct capacity for the prevention and management of crises.

**Author:** Lt. Col. Ivan Falasca, Italian Army Marine

**Thesis:** The EU needs to improve its capability to plan and conduct comprehensive civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crisis. The aim of this paper is to propose one possible solution that sees the creation of an integrated structure consisting of two directorates. This new structure would optimize the planning and conduct of EU interventions at the strategic level and support the introduction of a new type of integrated mission, which is a mission where the civil, police, and military components are combined into a single structure. The proposed solutions will form the foundation of a European defense system together with the improvement of the EU's rapid reaction intervention capability

**Discussion:** The added value that the EU can bring to the defense and security sector in comparison to a military alliance such as NATO lies in its capability to deliver a comprehensive action on behalf of twenty-seven European States. This is achieved by combining in a synergistic manner the full spectrum of political, economic, and military instruments. In this context it is important that the policies of the Commission, the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are fully coherent. This cohesion requires CSDP interventions to be characterized by an internal high degree of integration between civilian and military components in order to be easily inserted into a broader framework that would include the in-Theatre activities of EU Special Representatives, the Directorates General of the Commission, and other organizations and international agencies. This is even more important bearing in mind that the EU is currently conducting civil missions and military operations that are poorly coordinated and sometimes with different chains of command within the same theatre of operations. Furthermore, the integration between civilian and military components is a necessary step toward a comprehensive approach in crisis management. At the present, there are three significant shortfalls in the existing CSDP architecture for interventions. First, the discontinuity in the command and control structure between the politico-strategic level and the military-strategic level (being the Operation HQs, following an *ad hoc* activation). Second, a poor integration between the civilian and military component in the political - strategic and strategic structures in Brussels. Third, a strong partitioning between civilian missions and military operations, even though operating in the same geographical area, both from a point of view of command and control, and of the financial mechanisms. These shortfalls weaken considerably the EU's capability to plan and conduct comprehensive civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crisis.

**Conclusion:** The proposed organizational changes to improve the planning and conduct of CSDP interventions will allow the EU to better manage its commitment in crisis prevention and management, thus increasing its role as a global security actor.

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## Introduction

The added value that the EU can bring to the defense and security sector in comparison to a military alliance such as NATO lies in its capability to deliver a comprehensive action on behalf of twenty-seven European States. This is achieved by combining in a synergistic manner the full spectrum of political, economic, and military instruments. In this context, it is important that the policies of the Commission, the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are fully coherent. This cohesion requires CSDP interventions to be characterized by an internal high degree of integration between civilian and military components, in order to be easily inserted into a broader framework that would include the in-Theatre activities of EU Special Representatives, the Directorates General of the Commission, and other organizations and international agencies. This is even more important bearing in mind that the EU is currently conducting civil missions and military operations that are poorly coordinated and sometimes with different chains of command within the same theatre of operations. Furthermore, the integration between civilian and military components is a necessary step toward a comprehensive approach in crisis management.

At the present, there are three significant shortfalls in the existing CSDP architecture for interventions. First, the discontinuity in the command and control structure between the politico-strategic level and the military-strategic level (being the Operation HQs, following an *ad hoc* activation). Second, a poor integration between the civilian and military component in the political - strategic and strategic structures in Brussels. Third, a strong partitioning between civilian missions and military operations, even though operating in the same geographical area, both from a point of view of command and control, and of the financial mechanisms. These shortfalls weaken considerably the EU's capability to plan and conduct comprehensive civil-

military measures for the prevention and management of crisis. There are already ongoing debates and initiatives on how to overcome these shortfalls. To this aim, a great opportunity comes from the recently approved security strategy document, *Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*.<sup>1</sup>

Within the context of these shortfalls, initiatives, and opportunities, the aim of this paper is to propose one possible solution that sees the creation of an integrated structure consisting of two directorates. This new structure would optimize the planning and conduct of CSDP interventions at the strategic level and support the introduction of a new type of integrated mission, which is a mission where the civil, police, and military components are combined into a single structure. The proposed solutions will form the foundation of a European defense system together with the improvement of the EU's rapid reaction intervention capability.

### **At the Root of the Problem**

Multiple emergencies and rapidly evolving global trends have undermined EU's role as a security actor with threefold implications: instability surrounding the EU; financial crisis and austerity measures that weakened military capabilities and resources; and the rise of new economic and demographic realities that switched the world's economic center of gravity away from Europe.

Despite the fact that the European continent has enjoyed a long period of peace, instability has spread along its neighborhood, from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, through the Caucasus, and up to the Eastern boundaries of Europe. Moreover, the evolution in the post bipolar security environment has led to the development in those areas of varicolored threats that spread across political, social, and economic dimensions, and are increasingly interconnected. In particular, these threats range from

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cyber-attacks, piracy, the actions of ethno-nationalist groups with subversive intentions, and threats to energy and environmental security. Globalization acts as an ideal vehicle for their spreading across state borders, blurring the line between internal and external threats. Hybrid warfare also represents a common threat and a source of instability to all European Member States.

The first blow to the European peace balance came from the 2014 Russia aggression in Ukraine and its indirect threat to EU territorial water and air space. This act has also reminded Europeans of the specter of a military attack and occupation in European soil. Even if the Ukraine crisis affected in different ways all Member States, as it exposed the fragility of the gas supplies,<sup>2</sup> the reactions were single and uncoordinated, some of which seemed to suggest that it was a problem only for Eastern and Central Europe. In the same way, the implosion of the situation in the MENA region and the resulting migration flow appears to be a problem only for the Member States in the South, while the threat of terrorist group infiltration within migrants should be a concern for all Member States. Consequently, the difference in threat perception and security concerns among Member States is preventing the emerging of a common strategic culture and the creation of joint procedures and assets for all Member States to face crises.

The second implication of the current global scenario that undermined the EU's role as security actor is the financial crisis and the resulting austerity measures that heavily affected the defense budget in EU member states. The trend of downsizing the military budget started after the fall of the Soviet Union system in 1989. Indeed, the rising costs of new technological weapons and an increased skepticism of public opinion about the role of the military both made it difficult for European governments to justify high levels of defense expenditure.<sup>3</sup> However, the recent increasing of the level of threat and public concerns allowed the States to increase the

defense budgets, even if in a very modest amount, in line with the austerity measures still governing the economic policy of the EU States. However, these efforts resulted in a series of duplication of capacities, platforms, and systems that are not interoperable. Despite the fact that EU member States have increased modestly their defense budgets, they are investing in military equipment in a fruitless way instead of spending better and together.

To make matters worse, the rising powers in the eastern part of the world, especially China, have caused a shift of the world's economic center of gravity away from Europe. Consequently, the percentages of defense expenditure have changed all around the world. The emerging economies in the East are closing the gap and will soon outdo the Western countries in defense expenditure. China has increased its budget by 150% over the past decade, with a further rise of 7% expected in 2017, while Russia invested 5.4% of its GDP on defense last year.<sup>4</sup> The main consequence of this new assertiveness of the emerging powers will be in terms of more tensions and insecurity. In an increasingly threatening world, it is evident that the EU should enhance its ability to act as a security provider to regain its influence on the world stage. The only way to become a security provider is to act with a unified will and not through the initiative of single Member States.

The rise of EU defense capability will also benefit NATO, considering that of the twenty-eight EU member states, twenty-two are NATO allies. Indeed, the Transatlantic Alliance needs the EU to increase its military capability and its will to invest in defense matters. Otherwise, the risk for NATO is to become an alliance of "collective military irrelevance," as pointed out by the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.<sup>5</sup>

Numerous emergencies in the EU's strategic neighborhood, hybrid security threats, years of uncoordinated cuts in defense spending, and rapidly evolving global trends have all eroded the

EU's role as a security actor in a multipolar world. The EU is facing the problem of not having its own military instrument, which would enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act as a security provider on the international stage. The need for a defense system is more evident considering the increasingly tense global context, characterized by the build-up of troops on EU's eastern borders, war and terrorism in the MENA region, and the increasing militarization around the world.

### **How the EU Can Optimize the Planning and Conduct of CSDP Interventions**

Within the ongoing debate to overcome the already cited shortfalls in the CSDP architecture for interventions and reinforcing the European External Action Service's (EEAS) capability to plan and conduct civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crises, Member States are discussing some possible options such as the establishment of a permanent Operation HQ (OHQ) at Brussels and the optimization of the already existing CSDP structures. Meanwhile, the EU has introduced an unprecedented multidimensional approach in the Horn of Africa, through a series of measures including:

- The activation of the Operations Center (OPSCEN) with the task of coordinating and supporting the three CSDP interventions in the area;
- The nomination of a Special Representative;
- The Development of a Regional Strategy (i.e. *Horn of Africa Strategic Framework*);
- The establishment of numerous coordination mechanisms including, for example, the "Capacity Building Coordination Platform", and the "Shared Awareness and Deconfliction" (SHADE).

### *Assumptions and Constraints*

For the purpose of the present paper, it is important to formulate assumptions that are at the base of the proposed solution to optimize the CSDP conduct and planning capabilities for crisis prevention and management. Furthermore, assumptions in this case are necessary considering the political nature of the EU, and in particular the fact that in the defense field EU cannot adopt resolutions which are binding for the Member States. Therefore, for the aim of the paper it is assumed that:

1. Member States would not be able to commit additional significant financial and personnel resources in the EEAS' Planning and Conduct capability.
2. EU common security and defense management operations will be of a civil-military nature and will adopt a holistic approach.
3. The current organizational structure of the CSDP can be changed.

Other than these assumptions, the paper considers also the following constraints to make the proposed solution as concrete and feasible as possible:

1. The EEAS' planning and conduct capability must not duplicate NATO's capability.
2. The structure for the planning and direction of operations must be able to meet the EU's level of ambition.
3. The new structure shall not include any additional personnel, except a possible contribution of a maximum of two personnel made by each Member State.

### *Proposal*

The current EU's architecture at the strategic level for crisis management encompasses three main bodies, namely the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), and EU Military Staff (EUMS). Furthermore,

the EU has at its disposal, in the case of military operations, the decentralized Operation Headquarters (OHQ)<sup>6</sup> that the EU can activate for a particular intervention (i.e. OHQ ROME is activated for Operation EUNAVFORMED).

In order to optimize its planning and conduct capabilities, the EU should establish a single integrated civil-military structure at the political-strategic level called the Integrated Civilian - Military Directorate (ICM D) and a single integrated civil-military structure at the strategic level called the Missions and Operations Directorate (M&O D). These two structures could be created by utilizing the resources readily available in the existing CMPD, CPCC, and EUMS. In case, they could be augmented by other personnel drawn from the five-national framework OHQs, together with a minimum contribution (one / two people) from the Member States. The functions performed by the existing structures (CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, OPCEN, and OHQ) should be re-allocated to the two new directorates according to criteria that optimize output rather than the retention of current competencies. Indeed, the EU needs integrated structures able to develop comprehensive plans for crisis prevention and management, rather than multiple entities, each of which in charge of a single aspect uncoordinated with others. These resulting structures, physically located in Brussels, would facilitate every possible interaction and synergy among themselves and with other EU bodies. The strictly functional support to the EU Military Committee<sup>7</sup> (EUMC) would continue to be guaranteed by a Military Committee Staff (MCS) of about twenty personnel.

At the political-strategic level, the ICMD (Appendix A) would be responsible for the management and the planning of the interventions in crisis areas. Therefore, the conduct of the advance and crisis response planning would fall under the responsibility of the ICMD. This would include the development of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the Military/Civilian

Strategic Options (MSO/CSO) and the Initial Military Directive. This new integrated structure would be able to improve relationships and synergies with other EEAS bodies (geographic desks, delegations around the world, etc.), relevant Directorates General (DG) of the European Commission, and the Member States (through the Political and Security Committee (PSC)) to implement effective coordination and coherence of all available instruments.

At the civil-military strategic level, the M&OD (Appendix B) would exercise command and control of military operations and civilian missions. Strategic planning and conduct would fall, therefore, within the M&OD's remit (development of CONOPS and OPLAN – Appendix C). The M&OD Director would, therefore, be the "Commander" of the all the EU's CSDP interventions under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the authority of the High Representative. The Directorate would use Integrated Planning and Conduct Teams, drawing on the resources of all three of its divisions, in order to meet the demands of each individual mission/operation.

At the operational level, the new structure introduces the possibility of undertaking a new type of CSDP intervention to be financed with a single funding stream. Consequently, all components (civilian and military) operating in a defined area are placed under the command of a single Head of Mission. In the initial phase of planning and initiating a mission/operation, the Head of Mission / Force Commander would be supported by a team of planners, both civilian and military. The M&OD would temporarily detach this team, thus allowing the Head of Mission / Force Commander to develop his/her own planning documents in full compliance with the CONOPS and the OPLAN produced at the strategic level.

### *Consequences*

It should be noted that one of the consequences of this reorganization is that the standby EU Battlegroups (EUBG) would be under the direct control of the M&O Directorate. This would generate substantial savings by avoiding the activation of two different OHQs every six months and the related agreements that currently have to be developed for each successive EUBG. Furthermore, it would markedly increase the degree of EUBG standardization in the preparation and validation phases. Another consequence would be to eliminate the need for ad-hoc organizations in Brussels (such as the current OPSCEN) to support planning and coordination. These tasks would be fulfilled by the M&OD with its Integrated Planning and Conduct Teams.

Finally, the need to have, for solely military interventions, an OHQ as a command and control structure at the strategic level would be greatly reduced. In particular, the EU would limit the activation of an OHQ to those type of very complex and/or high-intensity interventions for which the European countries would opt for an application of the *Berlin Plus* agreements and would use SHAPE as OHQ (as for the most recent case for the operation ALTHEA).

Financially, it is assessed that the implementation of the proposal would present limited transitional costs, regarding primarily the expansion of the M&O Directorate Communication and Information System (CIS) component (by utilizing facilities already available at the CPCC and the EUMS Operations Centre/Watch Keeping Capability). Thus, it is fundamental to understand that the M&O Directorate would be configured as a civil-military integrated Centre for the direction of military operations/civil missions/integrated missions. Therefore, at least initially, it would need CIS capabilities only in order to be able to perform the above-mentioned function. In evaluating the cost-effectiveness of this proposal, all those costs related to initiatives that would be carried out in any case to fill the EEAS's current capability gaps should not be

included (for example the enhancing of mission planning capabilities and the creation of a protected computer network).

### *Intermediate Steps*

The CSDP has demonstrated a lack of some of the necessary capabilities in terms of planning and conducting interventions especially for non-executive military missions (training, advising, monitoring, mentoring, etc...). Indeed, the Mission Commander (MCdr) lacks the necessary support for the conduct of military planning at the strategic level, that normally is carried out by the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for executive military operations. Therefore, he/she must assume all responsibilities at both strategic and operational levels. This forces the MCdr to go back and forth between the Theatre and Brussels, whilst his physical presence is crucial to exercising command and to providing the necessary coordination and interaction with third parties within the Theatre of Operations - not to mention, the increased workload. The EU, in order to develop its ambition of a wider comprehensive approach, should progress toward an increased synergy among civilian activities and military operations. This could be delivered by a higher civilian-military cooperation and synchronization at the strategic level in terms of CSDP structures.

In the short to medium term (two/five years), with the aim of optimizing the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions and taking into account the ongoing discussion on the future of the activated OPSCEN, a possible avenue to overcome the CSDP's shortfalls could be strengthening the role of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). In particular, the EUMS could take over the responsibilities of the MCdr for the conduct of military planning of non-executive missions at the strategic level and the functions of the activated OPSCEN, whilst retaining its current tasks. In this perspective, the resources of the activated OPSCEN would be

absorbed by the EUMS. In such an approach, the EUMS (whose title could be “EUMS plus”) would be capable of planning and conducting non-executive military missions and would continue to provide added value to existing CSDP activities in the Horn of Africa<sup>8</sup> in terms of coordination support.

In the long term (five/ten years), we could envisage bringing together homogeneous EU interventions to external conflicts and crisis (in the field of Security Sector Reform) in one single C2 structure (that we could call “Civ-Mil Missions Directorate (CMMD)”) for the planning and conduct of both non-executive military and civilian missions. The aim would be to deliver the vision of a greater synergy between civilian and military activities and to take into account the likelihood of a growing trend towards capacity building activities. In such a view, the new structure would absorb the functions and recourses of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and a portion of the so-called EUMS plus, in order to be capable of planning and conducting all CSDP missions (civilian and non-executive military). In this perspective, the EUMS would resume current duties and would provide the coordination among CSDP activities, existing in the same geographical area.

### *Considerations*

The so-called EUMS Plus would constitute a permanent structure in Brussels, for the planning and conduct of an increasing number of military missions with non-executive mandates. This includes the early stage of the planning, pending the nomination of the MCdr, as well as the Force Generation process. In addition, it preserves the added-value functions currently provided by the activated OPCEN.

The proposed avenues draw upon existing resources – in relation to the desired output – and does not change the way EU develop executive military operations, nor duplicate existing

international organizations in the area of security, such as NATO. As far as the human resources is concerned – if deemed necessary – manpower could be strengthened by Seconded National Experts (SNEs) provided on a voluntary basis by the Member States. In addition, the long-term vision would improve the civilian-military cooperation and interaction. Indeed, the new structure (the CMMD) would optimize the planning and conduct of civilian missions that include military components, promoting the pursuit of a wider comprehensive approach. Lastly, as added value in such an approach – since homogeneous EU crisis responses, in the field of the SSR (both civilian and non-executive military missions), would be brought together under a single structure – it would be possible to finance those military missions with non-executive mandates and all civilian missions through the same funding mechanism, scaled accordingly.

### **Improvement of the CSDP Rapid Reaction Intervention Capacity**

During the last three years the EU's institutions have been trying to find and propose potential solutions aimed at improving the EUBG institution. Among recent proposals, for example, there was the possibility for Member States to contribute at the EUBG's forces list with niche capabilities, or by a modular approach (organic units, even small ones), or by a proportional number of units depending on being framework nation (responsible for the command of the EUBG) or only contributing nations. However, all these proposals are not in themselves capable of resolving the current constraints that impact on the use of the EUBG and the member States contributions to it. These shortfalls were recently demonstrated at the outbreaking of the crisis in Sahel, which culminated with the launch of the military operation "EUTM Mali", where the EUBG was not/could not be used. For this reason, it is believed that it is necessary to improve the current rapid reaction intervention capacity to increase flexibility and effectiveness.

The reason for the lack of political will that affects the usability of the EUBG has to be identified in the planning horizon of the EUBG which is of about five years<sup>9</sup>, in accordance with the current Concept. This means that Member States who commit today could not be so eager to deploy their forces within five years to address a situation of crisis, especially if they do not have specific concerns over that crisis. For these reasons, it is necessary to seek a solution aimed at complementing the current planning horizon framework with other options and, to do this, it is necessary to amend the EUBG Concept.

A potential solution consists in differentiating the nature of the European rapid reaction formations and amending, accordingly, the EUBG Concept, transforming it into a wider rapid reaction intervention capability concept. To this end, on one hand the current EUBG must evolve into a joint military rapid reaction formation, which has the necessary capabilities to establish efficient and reliable links with civilian actors in the field and that can be used effectively across the whole spectrum of its potential tasks in order to increase its deployability. On the other hand, there should be introduced, under the same (but expanded) concept, Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Forces (JEUTFs) shaped to react to specific threats and potential emergencies.

At any time at least one EUBG should be kept in stand-by status under the protocols of the current EUBG Concept, i.e. as a rapid reaction force to deal with immediate and unpredictable crises whilst promoting military transformation and integration among all Member States. The effectiveness of this EUBG could be improved by leveraging the concepts of framework nation and modular employment, and also through the inclusion of military niche capabilities and a civil outreach capacity. A JEUTF on the other hand could be swiftly created and tailored to the specific requirements of an emerging crisis (Appendix D). This JEUTF will

not be generated in line with the existing force generation process planning horizon for the EUBG but would be established when necessary even with a short notice and its stand by period would be determined by Contributing Nations, up to twelve months.

Such a JEUTF could be formed, on a volunteer basis, by groups of Member States with shared concerns over a developing crisis when the EU deems it necessary to be prepared to address a specific potential crisis. The establishment of a JEUTF could positively influence the situation in the field well in advance of the actual development of the crisis by highlighting the concrete commitment of the EU to a rapid intervention if needed. In addition, these JEUTFs could be used, with a pre-defined set of assumptions, as an "entry force" or as an "over the horizon force" or for humanitarian assistance missions or for training and advisory missions. Accordingly, JEUTFs would provide an immediate intervention capability for specific threats or emergencies, which would take longer to obtain through the standard force generation process and is not guaranteed by a "traditional" EUBG in standby.

This solution would be even more effective if, during their stand-by period, the BGs/TFs were to be placed directly under the control of an CSDP structure in Brussels with strategic responsibility for the planning and conduct of preparation and employment. To facilitate a more equal burden share between the Member States it would also be necessary to identify new funding mechanisms for EUBG/JEUTF, foreseeing reimbursement broader than that currently provided by the ATHENA mechanism.<sup>10</sup>

### **Pooling and Sharing for Operations: a Pragmatic CSDP Approach**

Future CSDP operations should be approached in a more pragmatic way in order to maximize operational results, to reduce the burden, and to share responsibilities among those member States who are willing to take part in the operation.

Upon the out-breaking of a crisis, a Multinational EU Force could be swiftly created and tailored to the specific requirements of the emerging crisis itself. This Multinational Force would be established when necessary, even on short notice, following a specific initiative of a framework nation when the EU deems it necessary to be prepared to address the crisis. Such a Force could be formed, on a volunteer basis, by groups of other member States with shared concerns over the developing crisis. The prompt establishment of this Force could positively influence the situation in the field by highlighting the concrete commitment of the EU to a rapid intervention. The framework nation could volunteer to address a specific crisis on the basis of the will and the capacity to act, in relation to the proximity of the crisis area (thus reducing deployment/redeployment related costs), and specific knowledge of the region/environment. Other Nations could join the operation by offering specific package of Forces or Capacities (for instance ISTAR<sup>11</sup> assets, logistics, strategic airlift/AAR, Intelligence, Staff Personnel, C4I) in a sort of pooling and sharing procedure tailored to operations. In shaping the Command and Control structure the particular interest of the framework nation should be addressed as a main factor. The strategic direction and political control of this type of operation would be exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

In this contest, it would be effective to make a better use of existing multinational initiatives at European level such as the Multinational Land Force<sup>12</sup>, the *Weimar* Battlegroup<sup>13</sup>, the *Visegrad* Battlegroup<sup>14</sup>, and the Nordic Battlegroup<sup>15</sup>, just to mention the main ones. De facto, member States involved in these initiatives could act as “framework nation” – actually a group of Nations – able to pool military assets and share responsibilities, being ready to address a specific crisis on behalf of the European Union. This includes also, in a comprehensive way,

more politically oriented initiatives, like the “5+5,<sup>16</sup>” for the enhancing of the military/civilian coordination within the Mediterranean Theatre.

The overall objective of this approach is to promote the execution of military operations in a sustainable, prompt, and effective way, enabling European nations to substantially contribute to international security and thereby to the EU’s role as a global security actor. The underlying idea of this paper is that those Nations that have broad capability spectrum and have specific concerns over a given crisis could act as Framework Nations and provide an operational framework for cooperation with other concerned EU partners.

### **Conclusions**


The President of the European Commission, Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, has recently stressed in his 2017 State of the Union Speech the need for “a Europe that protects, a Europe that empowers, a Europe that defends.”<sup>17</sup> The President is definitely calling for the EU Member States to take greater responsibility for the security of European citizens. The security and protection from internal and external threats will be possible through the development of key defense capabilities able to deter, respond, and protect. The acquisition of such capabilities, and more generally of a defense system, will require an adequate superstructure able to employ them.

The proposed organizational changes to improve the planning and conduct of CSDP interventions will allow the EU to better manage its commitment in crisis prevention and management, thus increasing its role as a global security actor. Furthermore, the proposed changes are optimized for the conduct of missions in which the military component is integrated with civil and police components into a single mission. The new organization will still retain an ability to separate the management of civilian missions and military operations whilst also providing an integrated component for managing aspects that are common to both types of


intervention. Furthermore, it is optimized for the type of military operations provided by the Lisbon Treaty. In respect of the direction of missions and operations (M&O Directorate), it combines civilian capabilities with an appropriate structure to ensure delivery of all the functions needed to plan and conduct military operations (J1-J9). In addition, this will facilitate linkages between all EU organizations involved in crisis prevention and management to achieve a fully multidimensional response capability.

Together with the improvement of the EU's rapid reaction capability, the proposed reorganization would allow for better sharing of resources and for fairer burden sharing between EU countries, requiring the participation of all countries in the direction of operations/missions. Both proposals would also avoid any duplication of already existing international structure in the area of security, providing the EU with an efficient structure that complements both NATO and UN in the sectors of peace and security.


**ICM D ORGANISATION**



**M&O D ORGANISATION**




# PLANNING FLOW




**EUBG – JEUTF PLANNING HORIZON**

- Current EUBG Planning Horizon



- EUBG - JEUTF Planning Horizon



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> European External Action Service (EEAS). *Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, ed. EEAS (Bruxelles, 27 June 2016).

[https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> European countries import the bulk of natural gases for their consumption. The main exporter of natural gases in Europe are Norway (29%), Russia (18.3%), and Ukraine (17.1%). It is obvious that a crisis among the second and third major exporter had severe repercussion for European countries, especially in term of cost raising. (Source of data: EUROSTAT, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Percentage\\_of\\_extra-EU\\_imports\\_\(entries\)\\_of\\_natural\\_gas\\_by\\_country\\_of\\_origin.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Percentage_of_extra-EU_imports_(entries)_of_natural_gas_by_country_of_origin.png))

<sup>3</sup> Other than economic reasons, it was a political choice of the EU Member States to turn to the so called “soft power” as the principal mean of EU foreign policy, as explained masterfully in Nick Witney, “How to Stop the Demilitarization of Europe?” ECFR Policy Brief No. 40, European Council on Foreign Relations (London, 2011). [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR40\\_DEMILITARISATION\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR40_DEMILITARISATION_BRIEF_AW.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016 data), Janes, European Political Strategy Centre.

<sup>5</sup> US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)”, Speech in Brussels, 10 June 2011, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>

<sup>6</sup> OHQ: Currently, five OHQs exist, within National frameworks, offered to the EU by France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK (future availability will depend on the agreement about BREXIT), in addition to SHAPE as envisaged with “Berlin Plus” Agreements, and the EU’s *Operation Centre* located in the EUMS at Brussels.

<sup>7</sup> The EUMC is the highest military body within the Council. It provides military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as provides military direction of the EUMS.

<sup>8</sup> And/or other geographical areas where there are more than one CSDP missions or operations active, if so decided following the ongoing discussion about the future of the activated OPCEN.

<sup>9</sup> This time horizon refers to the offer that Member States do for the EUBG, meaning that at each Force Generation Conference they have to establish their own contribution for the next five years.

<sup>10</sup> Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 14 May 2007 established a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defense implications (Athena).

<sup>11</sup> Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance.

<sup>12</sup> The Multinational Land Force (MLF) is a multinational Formation including Hungary and Slovenia. It is constituted on the base of the Italian “Julia” Alpine Brigade, integrated by a battalion for each Nation. It receives orders by a Military-Political Committee of three Nations. The Multinational Land Force can be employed by one of the following International Organizations: NATO, UN, EU and OSCE. Source:

<http://www.esercito.difesa.it/en/organization/The-Chief-of-General-Staff-of-the-Army/Alpine-Troops-Command/Julia-Alpine-Brigade/Multinational-Land-Force/Pagine/default.aspx>

<sup>13</sup> The Weimar Battlegroup is a multinational EU Battlegroup under Polish leadership, in which Germany and France also participate as members of the Weimar Triangle. Cfr. Marcel Dickow, Hilmar Linnenkamp, Jean-Pierre Maulny, Marcin Terlikowski, *Weimar Defence Cooperation – Projects to Respond to the European Imperative*. FG03-WP No 6, Berlin, November 2011.

[http://www.efsp.eu/docs/Weimar\\_DefCoop\\_2011.pdf](http://www.efsp.eu/docs/Weimar_DefCoop_2011.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> The Visegrád Battlegroup or V4 EU Battlegroup is an EU Battlegroup led by Poland, in which the other Visegrád Group Countries –the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – participate. For the Visegrad Group cfr. Lorenz, Wojciech, *EU Battle Group: A Chance for a Breakthrough in Visegrad 4 Cooperation*, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin No. 39 (492), 16 April 2013. [https://www.pism.pl/files/?id\\_plik=13381](https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=13381)

<sup>15</sup> The Nordic Battlegroup is a multinational EU Battlegroup led by Sweden with contingents from Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway. Cfr. Jan Joel, Andersson, *If not now, when? The Nordic EU Battlegroup*, in Issue Alert No. 11, European Institute for Security Studies (Brussels, February 2015).

[https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert\\_11\\_Nordic\\_Battlegroup.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_11_Nordic_Battlegroup.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> The “5+5 Defence Initiative” is the defence part of the “5+5 Dialogue” which brings together five countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and five countries on the northern side (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain).

<sup>17</sup> The State of the Union 2017: “Catching the Wind in Our sails”, Brussels, 13 September 2017.

[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-3165\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm)

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