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## **FUTURE WAR PAPER**


*How the Human Domain Shapes Information Operations: Bridging the Gap  
between Information Operations and Cultural Expertise in the Army and the  
Marine Corps*

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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*“The most hateful human misfortune is for a wise man to have no influence.”*

Greek Historian Herodotus, 484-425 BC

## **Introduction**

It is essential that decision makers understand culture, Information Operations (IO) officers, and regional experts to excel in cross cultural environments, build alliances and collaborative networks, and understand how joint, coalition, and non-state actors interact and change over time.<sup>1</sup> Leveraging this knowledge requires expertise beyond a single Military Occupational Specialty (MOS); IO officers are not equipped to execute their mission without cultural input.

IO officers are not trained and do not possess the cultural expertise required to navigate through the complicated human domain terrain. To fight effectively in the information environment (IE) domain, the Army and Marine Corps must be able to understand and influence the narrative landscape that shapes and informs population groups, design a process to manage, make sense of and synthesize the volumes of information that inundates our communication channels,<sup>2</sup> and understand what defines a culture. In order to execute this, the Army and the Marine Corps have assigned IO officers the responsibility to advise and assist the commander with a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment within the battlespace to set the conditions for mission accomplishment.

The relationship between IO officers, cultural and regional experts such as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) or Regional Area Officers (RAO), Regional Area Strategists (RAS), and intelligence officers, is complementary since IO officers usually lack depth in cultural understanding.<sup>3</sup> The Army and the Marine Corps have not developed IO into an effective

functional area due to the lack of understanding of the IO officer's proper responsibilities and the lack of institutionalized relationships needed to execute meaningful IO.<sup>4</sup>

The ability to influence a population group, or target audience, depends on how well the services understand this audience, how adept the services are at using tools such as target-audience analysis, and how literate the services are in areas such as cross-cultural competence.<sup>5</sup> There is an endemic misunderstanding and general confusion about IO officers' tasks and responsibilities. This lack of clarity has created a systemic distrust in the abilities and contribution of the IO community since the IO professionals are uncertain about what their job and responsibilities are and often fail to meet expectations. This hinders the commander's ability to trust and leverage the skills of the IO officer.

The Army's IO program has matured and improved steadily but more work should be done to ensure that IO officers are better trained, equipped, promoted, and retained. The Marine Corps continues to develop its IO officers, particularly as the new joint function of information is tried and tested, it would be beneficial to study the Army's IO design model and adopt best practices while avoiding costly pitfalls. For example, FAOs go through 36 months of professional training and RAOs go through 18 months of professional training, either of these specialties could be better suited to advise the IO officer on how best to influence a target audience thereby maximizing the employment of Information Related Capabilities (IRC). Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps has made any formal effort to coordinate the employment of IOs and cultural experts; this is a missed opportunity because the two functions are interdependent but, based on the current model, not linked in any meaningful way.

## Current State of IO and Cultural Experts

The lack of institutionalized relationships hinders IO because there is a lack of coordination between cultural experts and the IO planner, overall lack of design regarding the utilization of potential cultural experts, and lack of a joint (Army/Marine Corps) cultural program. The role of the IO officer is crucial to ensure commanders understand how to influence relevant threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities across the IE.<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication 3-13 defines IO as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”<sup>7</sup>

IO officers are responsible for the convergence of information, application of capabilities and techniques, and integration of proper employment and synchronization of all IRCs. However, the overall employment and responsibilities of the IO officer are not well understood. Commanders are often confused about how best to employ IO officers or what IO officers’ skills bring to the non-kinetic fight. There is also confusion among the staff and the IO officers themselves.<sup>8</sup> This lack of understanding between staffs and the IO community has hindered the ability to integrate IO officers in the planning and execution of operations. Additionally, the gap between IO officers and cultural experts does not provide the proper support network needed to execute IO shaping operations to accomplish the mission.

FAOs, RAOs, and RAS are, “considered regional/cultural experts with skills that enable them to adapt and function effectively in any culture to achieve mission success.”<sup>9</sup> DoD Directive 5160.41E defines regional experts as individuals having knowledge about a specific region of the world that focuses on but is not limited to the political, historical, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of that region.<sup>10</sup> None of the IRCs outlined in

FM 3-13 include a subject matter expert on region, culture, or language even though these experts are inherent to IO officers' successful execution of their job.<sup>11</sup> Currently, there is no formal relationship between cultural experts and the IO field at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. IO doctrine does not mention the use of cultural experts to assist with IO planning or execution but instead references the intelligence section as responsible for cultural information in support of IO.<sup>12</sup>

Although IO officers across the Army and the Marine Corps receive general cultural education during their formal training, the two-hour block of instruction is insufficient know how to properly analyze the target-audience, to have command of narrative-led operations, or to be cross-cultural experts<sup>13</sup> - all necessary tools to succeed in the human dimension domain. This problem is accentuated in the Marine Corps since IO officers are trained for only three weeks and the billet is often assigned to any available officer or non-commissioned officer due to lack of trained IO personnel. By not adequately training or equipping Army and Marine IO officers with the experts they require to make informed assessments about the target audience the Army and the Marine Corps are failing IO.

Despite the advantages regional experts with cultural capabilities could offer the Army and Marine Corps, military tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) currently do not include cultural experts on regimental, brigade, or division level staffs. The informal relationship between cultural experts and IO planners at the strategic level does not enable the Army or the Marine Corps to maximize IRCs or IO shaping operations. To exacerbate this non-existent relationship, the Marine Corps' newest information organization, MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Information Group (MIG), does not have any cultural experts on the task organization. Absence of cultural experts within the organization may hinder the MIG's ability

to produce effective IO<sup>14</sup> and force operational and tactical units to leverage contractors and/or military personnel that are not organic to the organization for cultural support.<sup>15</sup> These individuals are often not well equipped or prepared with the level of information needed to adequately understand and support the force.<sup>16</sup>

The last problem is the lack of joint cultural training and education. Unlike IO, cultural programs are not formally integrated into warfighting functions. This is an issue because the Army and the Marine Corps both have independent cultural programs that are not governed by doctrine and are not coordinated or synchronized. All cultural programs are coordinated under Department of Defense (DOD) Directives which is broad and all-encompassing but there is not an intermediate layer of instruction that provides the services a formal coordination line with one another. With the exception of the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNASO); joint cultural resources are not synchronized with any frequency.

Progress across all services is measured through bi-annual capabilities-based reviews based on national security requirements.<sup>17</sup> The reviews capabilities-based reviews are conceptual but do not lay out metrics for the services. Under the current cultural program construct each service has a dedicated cultural center that works on service specific programs and is separate from the FAO training. Separating the FAO community from the cultural community does not enable shared learning between cultural experts and the greater service populations. Under the current construct, cultural expert training and talent management are not a priority for the cultural program or the FAO/RAO community.

Unlike the Marine Corps program, the Army cultural program focuses on cultural awareness but does not assign regions to Soldiers or officers.<sup>18</sup> The Marine Corps cultural program provides Marines a baseline familiarization with regions assigned to these Marines.<sup>19</sup>

The training does not provide meaningful language courses for either service or maintenance of skills cannot be verified by either service. Cultural program directors participate in the Culture Coordinating Committee meeting it is unclear whether or not the programs are linked in a meaningful way. All of the programs are not linked and difficult to enforce, track, and maintain. Lack of synchronization across IO and cultural planning is inefficient, costly, and could lead to possible information fratricide in a joint environment - where one IO planner trained in the Army, for example, may understand his/her job differently than an IO planner trained in the Marine Corps.

The lack of a joint program hinders the Army and the Marine Corps' ability to capitalize on the learning experiences of one another. The programs often execute the same cultural learning objectives with different training courses. Each military branch spends time and money to design and execute different programs that aim to achieve similar results - cultural experts. As the evolution of IO on the battlefield becomes increasingly relevant, a common cultural understanding and expertise across the two land forces, the Army and the Marine Corps, should be executed to enable joint missions across the globe.

### **Proposed Solutions and Way Ahead**

The Army and the Marine Corps could do a better job in educating commanders, staffs, and IO officers regarding roles, responsibilities, and proper utilization of IO professionals. To bridge the gap between IO officers and their lack of cross-cultural competence, cultural experts should be included at tactical, operational, and strategic command level. The Army and the Marine Corps should start by providing one clear definition of IO and explain what the IO officer is responsible for and how best to equip, employ, support, and leverage the IO officers' skills.

Making sense of the complicated terrain that makes up the human dimension should not be the responsibility of one individual.

In his unpublished essay “Making sense,” Colonel Todd Lyons (who currently serves as the Senior Marine at the Naval Post Graduate School) explains the IO officer “require[s] a combination of skills, education, and abilities that extends beyond a single MOS.”<sup>20</sup> While the commander should look to the IO officer for all information regarding the environment, the IO officer must be equipped with the right tools and supported by the right people with the appropriate expertise. Cultural experts could provide the in depth cultural insight needed to execute shaping and combat operations. Some of the literature reviewed suggests sensible solutions in the application of cultural experts such as FAOs, RAOs, RAS, and several others, as they highlight the importance of cultural and linguistic expertise within IO.<sup>21</sup>

The relationship between IO and cultural planners should be solidified into future task organizations across the Army and the Marine Corps to ensure the two functions provide mutual support. Cultural experts should be assigned wherever an IO planner is assigned. Starting at the brigade level, cultural experts should be added to the task organization to complement the Army IO planner within an operations section. IO planners are found at almost all operational and strategic level staffs, cultural experts should also be included at these levels.

The relationship at the tactical, operational, and strategic level between cultural experts and IO planners should be strengthened because they are codependent. Cultural experts and IO planners working within the same section could ensure unity of effort and efficiency in planning. Deliberate efforts should be made to partner cultural experts and IO officers starting at the brigade/MEF level. This partnership could alleviate some of the issues the Marine Corps has with proper FAO utilization tours; also, FAOs could be used for more than one obligatory

position.<sup>22</sup> These formal relationships would ensure the IO officer is able to produce IO campaigns that account for cultural considerations.

Marine Corps FAOs could execute multiple FAO utilization tours working as a part of a staff and integrating with IO planning and assisting with the command's cross-cultural competency program. The Army and Marine Corps both have cultural experts that are assigned at the strategic level and above. By changing task organizations to include cultural experts working in a brigade or MEF they could build credibility for their functional area and form relationships. A formal relationship between cultural experts and IO planners would enable IO plans to incorporate detailed cultural aspects during the planning process. An in-depth understanding of the target audience would give the commander options on how to blend IO into current and future operations. Cultural experts could inform IO planners how target audiences could react to kinetic and non-kinetic operations which could guide the planning process. By integrating cultural experts in a brigade/MEF as well as higher task organizations, efforts can be streamlined across the force to provide more credibility in IO efforts. In order for this to be accomplished, Marine IO officers and FAOs, for example, could be housed and managed under the new Deputy Commandant for Information (DCI) construct. Designating one office to track and manage IO officers and FAOs could facilitate proper utilization of these officers.

The Marine Corps' newest information organization, the MIG, could be an excellent place to task organize IOs and FAOs as it will be important to adequately staff this command with experts in cognitive competencies as well as language, region, and culture.<sup>23</sup> Employing IOs and FAOs in this capacity would not only clarify the role of the former but it would also ensure that the latter are properly employed as full time FAOs during their utilization tours.<sup>24</sup> The proposed partnership outlined would yield a more complete and informed product for the

commander at little or no cost to either the Army or Marine Corps since IOs and FAOs already exist in the inventory.

The Marine Corps' MIG is the logical place to insert cultural experts because the organization encompasses all IO functions and the Expeditionary Operations Training Group.<sup>25</sup> The MIG commander has command relationships with all the Major Subordinate Commands and the cultural expert could orchestrate information and cultural education for the IO planners and across the entire unit.<sup>26</sup> All of the current IO doctrine (Army, Marine Corps, and Joint) should solidify the IO/cultural expert formalized relationship by writing about the relationship and how culture could support IO. IO and culture should always be interconnected and senior leaders should ensure IO practitioners understand its importance.

Leveraging established relationships brings chemistry and potentially more effective planning to tactical commands. The fusion of IO planners and cultural experts may enable commanders to exploit IO in a meaningful way to shape operations. The cultural expert could also be tasked to train the unit on cultural factors that are not found through generic online training. In order for this relationship to work, the commander must support the cultural expert in this configuration and empower them to assist IO planning and further cultural training across the unit.

If the Marine Corps is serious about the importance of IO and about developing its IO professional program it should look to the Army to adopt some of its best practices while avoiding costly or time-consuming mistakes. First, the Marine Corps should review a few of the terms introduced in the MAGTF Information Environment Operation Concept of Employment (COE) to align with the JP 3-13. For example, the COE uses the term Information Environment Operations (IEO) instead of IO. The justification provided in the COE for the adoption of a

different term should be reviewed to ensure that the claims made are sound and worth the challenges that different definitions and terms could present to the Joint Force.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, the COE uses the term “inform operations” to describe a capability under IEO, however, inform operations is not and should not be confused with information operations. The employment of common terms, definitions, and concepts is important particularly when functioning in a joint environment.

The Marine Corps could invite the Army IO School and Training cadre to assist with establishing the Marine Corps’ IO program. The COE states that IO is “crucial for shaping the operational environment” and emphasizes the importance of proper integration of IO capabilities in order to “shape the battlespace and set the conditions for mission accomplishment.”<sup>28</sup> The importance of IO (or IEO) is highlighted throughout this COE. The COE also highlights the Marine Corps’ willingness to invest and participate in the IO arena. The Marine Corps should consider doing two things to professionalize and further develop its IO professionals. First, it should consider making IO a primary MOS. Second, it should either leverage the Army’s IO training course or send future IO officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO) to be trained by the Army, or develop a more comprehensive curriculum through the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC).

The Marine Corps does not have full time, dedicated IO professionals. This minimizes the value and importance placed in the IO program. Trained Marine IO specialists who earn the 0520 (NCO) or the 0521 (officer) secondary MOS by attending MCIOC’s course are expected to execute a utilization tour upon graduation. The 0520 course is three weeks and the 0521 course is five weeks long which is not enough time to become a part time specialist expected to be an effective member of an IO team. Immediate practice of the newly learned skills is useful but it

could be argued that these IO specialists will most likely be learning their trade on the job. In essence, the Marine Corps has zero percent retention rate of their IO professionals since all individuals return to their primary MOS after one utilization tour.<sup>29</sup> The Marine Corps does not currently have a cadre of professionals to fill IO billets on a full-time basis. Standardized training of Army and Marine IO professionals would enhance overall understanding and make IO a true competency of the Joint Force.<sup>30</sup>

Formal cooperation between cultural experts and IO officers is needed to effectively influence target audiences, establish a working relationship, and provide commanders with the expertise needed to navigate IO shaping operations. Establishing cultural experts at the brigade/MEF level and above to mirror IO planner billets is the first step in the formal cooperation between the two skills. The IO planners have the technical and tactical means of conveying narratives to target audiences but they lack the cultural understanding of how the narrative is interpreted and understood. Cultural experts bridge the cultural gap because they understand how target audiences process information and through IO can present narratives to affect them as mission dictates.<sup>31</sup> Cultural experts provide the human domain aspects needed to decisively plan and execute IO at all three levels of command.

The Army and the Marine Corps should have a joint cultural program to align with the IO construct, streamline the training program, and potentially design a joint talent management system. A joint cultural program could bridge the gap between culture and IO because it may enable established headquarters to use a formalized working relationship. Establishing a joint cultural headquarters organization would provide structure and be seen as a credible place under which all cultural experts could be assigned. The military has begun to stand up units with IO

capabilities across the services, if cultural programs are to be taken seriously the Army and Marine Corps should make room for cultural commands to integrate into task organizations.

The Army and the Marine Corps are the military's two land forces; they share similar objectives and would benefit from aligning their cultural programs. Aligning the cultural programs could validate cultural competency training and fuse culture experts into IO planning sections. The Army and the Marines Corps could potentially start a cultural pilot program to merge their training resources and personnel for a streamlined program. Under this proposed joint construct, there is potential to use the cultural experts at the tactical and operational level and in a teaching capacity. The program could be comprised of all online training programs as a base of knowledge for the greater force and incorporate FAOs and graduates from advanced degree programs; this would enable one headquarters for all levels of cultural experts. Seasoned FAOs and RAOs could assist newly trained cultural experts by helping prepare them for cultural positions or work in IO planning sections.

The Army and the Marine Corps could expand the program to include Olmsted scholars, individuals that have participated in Personnel Exchange Programs (PEP), and NCOs that go through FAO training. DOD Directive 1315.17 specifies that FAOs will be officers but in order for the program to grow, qualified NCOs should be allowed to compete for this functional area. The Army does not have a FAO equivalent program for NCOs. The Marine Corps has the Foreign Area SNCO (FAS) program that operates similarly to the FAO program.<sup>32</sup> The FAS program was established in 2013 and continues to produce qualified cultural experts.<sup>33</sup> A greater pool of trained cultural experts could mean more capability across brigades or MEFs to expand shaping operations and unit cultural programs.

The DOD Directive does not address warrant officers, but the Army and the Marine Corps could incorporate such a population into the FAO community. In line with the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, the Army has "cross cultural capabilities" and leveraging all ranks as cultural experts could bring this capability to a higher level of implementation across the service. If warrant officers were incorporated, they could be a continuity link in an area of responsibility (AOR).

The warrant officer program could mirror the officer program. Potential warrant officer FAOs could specialize in one AOR much like officers but could execute positions in country and back in the proposed cultural expert school. The Army and Marine Corps warrant officers are selected to be a part of the warrant officer corps because they possess a technical skill.<sup>34</sup> Including warrant officers in the FAO community would assimilate the branch into the Army and the Marine Corps. Although the FAO warrant officer program does not exist, a potential pilot program could be tried in the Army model. If the Army decides to incorporate warrant officers into the FAO branch, Special Forces warrant officers could initially fill the gap as the program is built. The Army's Special Forces Warrant Officers (180A) have language skills and are mostly regionally aligned with a military AOR.<sup>35</sup> There is potential for a lateral move into the FAO program as a pilot program, the SF warrant officers in a strictly cultural capacity could test this concept. As officers and NCOs could potentially be taken out of their regions for service selected jobs, the warrant officers would be able to provide continuity and act in the place of officers when needed. The Marine Corps does not have SF warrant officers but their linguist and intelligence analysts could be a good possibility to fill in the FAO community.

A unit's cultural program could reach the tactical level, be less dependent on non-organic assistance, and integrate cultural experts into daily operations. Introducing NCOs and warrant

officers into both the Army and Marine Corps culture programs would enable both services to develop solid cultural competency programs at the unit level.<sup>36</sup> This could ensure continuity across the tactical and operational level and enable IO officers and cultural experts to work together for all information campaigns from start to finish. Building strong relationships from daily interaction allows the IO officer and cultural expert to converge ideas across their spectrum of operations efficiently. In working together, the IO officer and the cultural expert would add credibility to their work and establish a strong relationship with the rest of the staff.

The joint program could foster better cross-cultural competence and connect all levels of cultural learning across the Army and the Marines Corps. It could also provide a larger funding line and make better use of integrated training and enable a cross-cultural competency class as a baseline for cultural experts and IO officers. A baseline in cross-cultural competency could enable better understanding of how to think about influencing cultures through narrative. This could be added to the Joint FAO Course since this is the first course most FAOs attend while at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).<sup>37</sup> Education devoted to cross-cultural competence could also be added to the Marine Corps' IO course. Cross-cultural competency is key for IO and cultural experts and should be included in both fields of study. If the pilot program proves to be useful for the Army and the Marine Corps, other services should be brought into the fold soon after.

### **Conclusion**

The term information operations was coined in 1996 but military leaders have been interested in influencing and affecting their adversary since the beginning of time.<sup>38</sup> The concept of integrating cultural expertise with information operations is not new. Lack of clarity about what IO is and how IO officers are supposed to execute sound information campaigns for target

audiences they might not fully understand has created systemic distrust in the abilities and worth of IO and the IO community. In addition to clarifying what IO is and what IO officers do, it is important to acknowledge the use of cultural experts and other staff sections working together to build a cohesive information product for the commander. If the Army and the Marine Corps IO planners are expected to “affect decision making and behaviors of adversaries,” cultural experts should be integrated to exploit this symbiotic relationship.<sup>39</sup> Establishing a formal link between IO and culture ensures information as a part of the battlespace. Additionally, for the Marine Corps, connecting information and culture is in line with the single battle concept as both are critical to the mission success of any operation.

To further the Army’s concept of “Winning in a Complex Environment” and the new “Multi-Domain Battle”, the integration of IO and culture should be specifically addressed instead of ignoring the important link between the two branches. Cultural operations are crucial to IO; the intelligence section should not be credited as the only section conducting cultural analysis because the Army and Marine Corps have trained personnel for this work. Both services should capitalize on cultural experts within the ranks soon to ensure successful IO operations.

As the Army and the Marine Corps move forward, more emphasis on the power of both cultural experts and IO will be needed. Before this can be accomplished, the Army and Marine Corps must educate leaders and staffs at all levels to ensure that they not only understand what the roles and responsibilities of the cultural expert and the IO officer are but also how best to equip, employ, support, and leverage the skills of these talented professionals. Proper training and the right support network with the appropriate tools and expertise are invaluable to ensure that the IO professional is equipped with what is needed to meet his/her objectives. A properly trained and employed IO officer could prove to be a force multiplier and a valuable asset.

Better talent management is pertinent for crisis operations and could easily facilitate better IO around the globe. Managing Army and Marine Corps cultural experts would enable commands to pinpoint cultural experts for immediate engagement. The joint program could enable units to identify cultural experts of specific regions to assist with planning and in-country operations. The joint program could also enable the Army and the Marine Corps to use their cultural experts interchangeably as missions dictate. Joint structure for culture programs enable higher headquarters the ability to forecast the need for cultural experts across the globe based on current and future operations.

The key to formalized relationships between cultural experts and IO officers at the tactical and operational level units is command buy in and support. Commanders should understand the enhanced value that coordination and close working relationship between IO officers and cultural experts bring to the fight. The benefit would be twofold for units: cultural experts could bring cross cultural competency and in-depth knowledge to shaping operations. Commands could use cultural experts to augment the IO planning team with detailed insight needed to employ shaping operations. The cultural experts could also act as cultural advisors to command teams and could enable unit level cultural training. The Army's Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and the Marine Corps' MIG are places where cultural experts and IO officer teams could prove most efficient.

FM 3-13 states that, "IO is essential to operational success at all levels, whether or not the unit has an assigned IO officer."<sup>40</sup> Both services have the ability to modify task organizations to include IO officers and cultural experts, and they should strive to do so. IO doctrine establishes IO as an important factor to operational success and now more units have organic IO assets. To build on the task organization structure, cultural experts are needed to ensure successful IO.

Army and Marine Corps units are aligned to regions for mission sets; a potential solution is to align cultural experts with these commands to assist with IO planning and cultural understanding. IO and cultural programs should be paired in order to execute successful narratives that shape and influence a target audience. Institutionally the IO/cultural expert relationship has never been formalized but this could be the start to a new way of approaching IO at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. Convergence of intangible shaping effects could greatly assist maneuver warfare in the future of war.

## Definitions

### Culture

a: the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; also: the characteristic features of everyday existence (such as diversions or a way of life) shared by people in a place or time

b: the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization

c: the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal characteristic

d: the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations (Merriam Webster's Dictionary - <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture>)

Cultural Expert\*: Army or Marine Corps officers that are trained as FAOs, RAOs, or have completed graduate degrees with a focus on language and schooling in a foreign country (ex: Olmsted Scholars).

### Foreign Area Officer (FAO):

FAOs, who shall be commissioned officers with a broad range of military skills and experiences; have knowledge of political-military affairs; have familiarity with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of the countries and regions in which they are stationed; and have professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant languages in their regions of expertise. (DoDD 1315.17)

Information Operations: The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

Information Related Capability (IRC): The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying the adversary's ability to do the same. (JP 3-13)

Regional Area Officer (RAO): RAOs develop specialized regional expertise through graduate education or significant time abroad. RAOs are qualified to serve in billets where foreign language skills are not required. (US Marine Corps International Affairs Program - <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/ppo/Units/Strategy-and-Plans-Division-PL/International-Affairs-Branch-PLU/International-Affairs-Programs/>)

Target Audience (TA): An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 3-13)

\*Authors' proposed definition

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification Planning and Sourcing*, Instruction 3126.01A, January 13, 2013, H-1.

<sup>2</sup> Todd Lyons, “Making Sense,” (unpublished paper, 2017) PDF.

<sup>3</sup> Todd Lyons, “Making Sense,” (unpublished paper, 2017) PDF.

<sup>4</sup> Anna Sackett, *Technical Report 1354: Army Information Operations Officer Needs Analysis Report* (Ft. Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, March 2016), 4, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1006854.pdf>. And Todd Lyons, “Making Sense,” (unpublished paper, 2017) PDF.

<sup>5</sup> Brian R. Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual development*, AFCLC Contact Report 2007-01 (Ontario, Canada: Royal Military College of Canada Centre for Security, Armed Forces, & Society, May 16, 2007), 1.

<sup>6</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration, July 6, 2017), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-13 Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2014), GL-3.

<sup>8</sup> Anna Sackett, *Technical Report 1354: Army Information Operations Officer Needs Analysis Report* (Ft. Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, March 2016), 4, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1006854.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs*, Directive 1315.17, April 28, 2005, 3. Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification Planning and Sourcing*, Instruction 3126.01A, January 13, 2013, D-3., and Authors’ proposed definition can be found on the Definitions page.

<sup>10</sup> US Department of Defense, *Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program*, Directive 5160.41E, February 9, 2016, 15.

<sup>11</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Information Operations*, FM 3-13 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 6, 2016), 1-3.

<sup>12</sup> Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Information Operations*, JP 3-13 (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of Defense, November 20, 2014) II-10.

<sup>13</sup> Brian R. Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual development*. AFCLC Contact Report 2007-01 (Ontario, Canada: Royal Military College of Canada Centre for Security, Armed Forces, & Society, May 16, 2007), 1.

<sup>14</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration July 6, 2017), 4.

<sup>15</sup> Ben Connable, "Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live... What? Building and Sustaining Military Cultural Competence in the Aftermath of the Human Terrain System," *Military Review*, January-February 2018, 25.

<sup>16</sup> Salil Puri and Blake Whitaker, "Army Wrong: The Combined Arms Center's Embarrassing Culture Manual," *SOFREP 05.16.2015#World News* (2015).

<sup>17</sup> US Department of Defense, *Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program*, Directive 5160.41E, February 9, 2016, 14.

<sup>18</sup> Mahir J. Ibrahimov, *Army Culture and Foreign Language Program* (U.S. Army Culture, Regional Expertise, & Language Management Office, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, July 22, 2015), PowerPoint presentation.

<sup>19</sup> Marine Corps University, "How are Marines Assigned to the RCLF Region?" *CAOCL*, last modified on January 8, 2016, <https://www.usmcu.edu/sites/default/files/CAOCL/How-are-Marines-assigned-their-RCLF-region.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> Todd Lyons, "Making Sense," (unpublished paper, 2017) PDF.

<sup>21</sup> Ben Pipes and Clayton Fisher, *Information Brief: International Affairs Programs (PLU-8)* (HQMC, PP&O, International Affairs Branch, Arlington, VA, November 28, 2017). And PLU office, Email message to the author, December 27, 2017.

<sup>22</sup> Ben Pipes and Clayton Fisher, *Information Brief: International Affairs Programs (PLU-8)* (HQMC, PP&O, International Affairs Branch, Arlington, VA, November 28, 2017). And PLU office, Email message to the author, December 27, 2017.

<sup>23</sup> Headquarters, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, *LREC SUPPORT TO USMC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT OPERATIONS*, information paper, 2017, 2.

<sup>24</sup> PLU office, Email message to the author, December 27, 2017 and Marine FAO, telephone conversation with one of the authors, December 23, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration, July 6, 2017), 4.

<sup>26</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration, July 6, 2017), 5.

<sup>27</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration, July 6, 2017), 22.

<sup>28</sup> Combat Development and Integration US Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment* (Washington, DC: Combat Development and Integration, July 6, 2017), 25.

<sup>29</sup> Dion J. Edon, "Succeeding in the Human Domain," *Proceedings* (December 2015): 4, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-12/succeeding-human-domain>.

<sup>30</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Defense, 2016), 10.

<sup>31</sup> Christopher Paul and William Marcellino, *Dominating Duffer's Domain: Lessons for the U.S. Army Information Operation Practitioner* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 5, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1166z1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1166z1.html).

<sup>32</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps, *International Affairs Program*, MCO 1520.11F, March 27, 2013, <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/MCO%201520.11F%20Signed%20Full%20Copy%2027Mar13.pdf>.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Go Army, "What is a Warrant Officer?" <https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/current-and-prior-service/advance-your-career/warrant-officer.html>.  
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<sup>35</sup> U.S. Army Warrant Officer Recruiting, "Warrant Officer Perquisites and Duty Description," <http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/prerequ/WO180A.shtml>.

<sup>36</sup> Ben Connable, "Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live... What? Building and Sustaining Military Cultural Competence in the Aftermath of the Human Terrain System," *Military Review*, January-February 2018, 27.

<sup>37</sup> Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, "Foreign Area Officers Program Office," <http://www.dliflc.edu/about/fao/>.

<sup>38</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Information Operations*, FM 100-6, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 27, 1996), 1.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Defense, *JP 3-13 Information Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 20, 2014), II-11.

<sup>40</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *Information Operations*, FM 3-13 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2016), 3-1.

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