

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

*Form Approved*  
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense, Executive Service Directorate (0704-0188). Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

**PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ORGANIZATION.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 29-04-2018		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> Jul 2017 - Apr 2018	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Diplomatic Enhancement Group: A Way to Enable the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Gordinier, Ryan R., Major, USMC				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting 2076 South St. Quantico, VA 22134				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> N/A	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The United States Department of Defense (DOD) has developed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) to improve the warfighting capability in a contested access environment. The problem that the DOD faces is gaining and maintaining access and support from a host nation that is 'inside' the adversary's antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) protection bubble. The consistent movement of the inside force will create a challenge for the United States Department of State (DOS), which will be required to maintain access to countries where the DOD desires to establish an 'inside' force. The United States Agency for International Development provides an incentive that connects U.S. development funds to markets and if those funds are effective and sustainable, the receiving nation's will be more inclined to allow the presence of that inside force. Thus, the confluence of American security, diplomacy, and development challenges will increase pressure on American leaders to seek American interests overseas. A way to increase access to these contested areas and find efficiencies for the DOS/USAID could be the establishment of a Diplomatic Enhancement Group (DEG), a 30 to 40-person element that could work directly for a United States Ambassador in a country team.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, JAM-GC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, EABO, Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations, Inside Force, Public Diplomacy, Department of State, DOS, Foreign Service Officer, FSO, United States Agency for International Development, USAID, Executive Order 13781-Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch, Efficient Government					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>  UU	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  24	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> MCU, School of Advanced Warfighting
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclass	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclass	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclass			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> (703) 432-5318 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps  
School of Advanced Warfighting  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico VA 22134*

## FUTURE WAR PAPER

### ***Diplomatic Enhancement Group: A Way to Enable the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)***

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

*Major Ryan R. Gordinier*

AY 2017-2018

Mentor: Dr. Gordon Rudd

Approved: *Gordon Rudd*

Date: 9 MAY 2018

## Disclaimer

### DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT

The United States military has an access problem, the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) has a supervision problem, and the Department of State (DOS) has a human resource shortage. In December 2017, President Donald J. Trump published his first National Security Strategy(NSS). That document stated,

China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there.... Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese modernization campaign described by the NSS shows the level of competition around the world. It also explains how the United States' competitors plan on reducing the U.S. access to their allies, partners, and other nations around the globe.

As former Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, assumed his post, he was assigned the task of making his organization more efficient by reducing redundancies in function, which he acted on by initiating a hiring freeze and conducting an organizational review of all processes and functions to include the USAID.<sup>2</sup> He queried both the DOS and USAID for ideas on how to find these inefficiencies. The Secretary of State demonstrated a willingness to restructure the department as long as those changes focused on the work of the DOS and would create a more efficient organization, not just an arbitrary change in structure. The confluence of American security, diplomacy, and development challenges will increase pressure on American leaders to seek American interests overseas. *A way to increase access to contested areas and find efficiencies for the DOS/USAID could be the establishment of a Diplomatic Enhancement Group (DEG), a 30 to 40-person element that could work directly for a United States Ambassador in a designated country team.*

## The Combined Problem

To better understand how the DEG would assist the DOD and DOS/USAID the problems and their current solutions must be explained. The DOD has developed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). This theory is the current United States Joint concept to improve the warfighting capability in a contested access environment. The “JAM-GC is focused on defeating an adversary’s plan and intent, rather than just concentrating on dismantling adversary [antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD)] capabilities.”<sup>3</sup> To deny the A2/AD threat the Navy and Marine Corps have proposed a future naval concept that could “disaggregate, creating temporal sea and air control with small units that can move from the sea to the shore and back again to meet an objective and then move on to the next task.”<sup>4</sup>

The JAM-GC requires Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), a Marine Corps concept where the described disaggregated forces could anchor their operations for a variable period of time depending on the evolving threat.<sup>5</sup> The disaggregated forces could provide an ‘inside’ force, which could be supported by a larger, traditional ‘outside’ force. The relationship between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ force is that the ‘inside’ force provides a foothold that the ‘outside’ force can exploit.

The problem that the DOD faces is gaining and maintaining access and support from a host nation that is ‘inside’ the adversary’s A2/AD protection bubble. Because the ‘inside’ force will be required to be disaggregated, its subordinate elements will be a relatively smaller force. The smaller size of that disaggregated, ‘inside’ force will require agility. It could need to redeploy to other ‘inside’ locations. This increased level of access to multiple ‘inside’ locations could only occur if the host nations see America’s presence as a benefit and the DOS can assist with making that presence beneficial.

Exploring the DOD, USAID, and DOS strategic guidance will explain the United States' development and diplomatic struggle. The United States' NSS stated, "Our diplomats must be able to build and sustain relationships where U.S. interests are at stake. Face-to-face diplomacy cannot be replaced by technology.... We must enable forward-deployed field work beyond the confines of diplomatic facilities."<sup>6</sup> This statement is found under the "Diplomacy and Statecraft heading of Pillar III: Preserve Peace Through Strength." The focus that the president has for diplomacy is to be forward staged and actively engaged. The DOS and USAID have focused on engagement and development for security enhancement in their strategic guidance and the DOD has been directed to expect a forward deployed diplomatic effort. The essence of the interaction between these two agencies is that there has to be an element that interacts at a 'face-to-face' level to identify 'free-market' and non-corrupt businesses to partner with American businesses, which is the role of the DOS. These interactions could increase prosperity for the village, district, or provincial governments and the host nation at large, while enhancing the awareness of the DOS. The United States can assist in producing stable, partnered governments, because their 'free markets' are producing an increased standard of living. The people of those nations see the business interaction as the reason for their increased prosperity and the United States can reduce the chances of transnational crime and terrorism taking hold in that country.

In December of 2017 former Secretary Tillerson briefed the DOS and the USAID on the vision and mission of their organizations:

What's the [State Department] vision?...we promote and demonstrate democratic values and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world....That's our vision....How do we do that? We do it with the mission. For the State Department, we advance the interests of the American people, their safety, and economic prosperity by leading America's foreign policy through diplomacy, through advocacy, and where needed, through assistance....And USAID,... supports America's foreign policy by leading the...international development...and help[s] people progress beyond assistance. They support our

foreign policy objectives through...projection of America's values, through working with others, [and] by investing in lives to reduce poverty....<sup>7</sup>

The essence of his message is that the United States wants a free, peaceful, and prosperous world through its leadership, aided by America's ability to provide humanitarian aid and stimulate partner development. Thus, the supported country can sustain their own economic development because of the American support.

The FY2018-2022 DOS and USAID Strategic Plan declared that the diplomatic and development effort must "counter models promoted by other nations by offering a clear choice: The American approach is to help our partners prosper."<sup>8</sup> In 2013, then General Mattis stated, "So I think it's a cost-benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget...."<sup>9</sup> The nations where the aforementioned competition could be the stiffest is where our competitors are exerting influence themselves. So, the challenge for the DOS and USAID is how to increase diplomacy when the President's directive is to get more efficient, or reduce redundancies. The answer to their problem could be counter-intuitive. The DOS could increase effective development, stabilize our partners, reduce the need for DOD to deploy, and become more effective.

In becoming more efficient, the DOS and USAID could look at ways to ensure their work affects the mission sustainably. An example of where there could be improvement is USAID's support for microenterprise and microfinance development, the most disaggregated form of the United States Government's (USG's) financial support. This program awards contracts and grants to small businesses across dozens of countries and links financial institutions to those same individuals to raise the poor out of poverty, stabilize economies at their source, and thus create beneficial partners for the United States. For the FY2015 and FY2016 aid years this program of grants demonstrated a lack of sustainability reporting on a majority of its projects. In

FY2015 across 35 countries and 136 projects USAID could only report sustainability on 15 projects, or 11%.<sup>10</sup> In FY2016 the same program, which invested \$260 million across 31 countries could only report that 33 of 93 projects were sustainable, or 35%.<sup>11</sup> Now the overall 'sustainability' percentages were 67% and 73% respectively, but the low return on the projects' reporting means that either the projects were not sustainable or there were not enough USAID employees to properly inspect the sustainability of these projects. Now there are many ways that USAID implements development into a country, but this program allows the American values to widely disperse among the partnered nation. In 2016 this program, which connected 370,000 Kenyan small-land owning farmers to markets improved their maize production and increased their income.<sup>12</sup> These types of programs can have an impact, but to have more of an impact they need to be capable of reporting on their sustainability more efficiently.

To summarize the problem, the DOD needs to gain access to areas that could enable a nimble 'inside' force and set the conditions for EABO. The DOS needs to find a way to become more efficient and should enable USAID development that is efficient and sustainable to increase the welfare of the nations that share U.S. interests. USAID employees cannot be associated with DOD members for fear that they could appear to be an extension of the military. So, how does the DOD use USAID's access and how can the DOD's entry point to USAID's networks provide a permeable membrane that will not taint USAID to a nation's populace?

#### The Solution: The Diplomatic Enhancement Group

A way to solve the problems of the DOD, USAID, and DOS could be to establish a Diplomatic Enhancement Group to provide a 30 to 40-person element working directly for the Embassy's Chief of Mission that would have access to USAID's activities through accountability reporting and could give access to the country for DOD elements. The DEG could establish a

relationship to USAID that mimics the U.S. DOD's Tactical Control (TACON) command relationship, where the USAID could task the DEG, but could not breakup the DEG or reassign it to another project.<sup>13</sup> When a USAID project requires an enhanced footprint to enable the proper dissemination of development support, the DEG would increase USAID's operational reach. Other portions of the DEG could maintain its direct relationship with DOS, but could be supporting the USAID by evaluating the sustainability and effectiveness of the project directly for the ambassador. Most Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) rightfully focus on the decision makers in the countries and regions where they are assigned to appropriately implement the Regional Strategies and the Integrated Country Strategies (ICS). This task drives them to focus on decision makers. As they seek to implement diplomatic, informational, military, and economic national powers, there is little time to achieve a deep understanding of how their decisions and actions affect the people of the country. In general, when USAID projects do not require support, the DEG could be charged with seeking a better understanding of the reality of the people in the country to ensure that nation's ICS is appropriately applied to that country, accountability is ensured, and a connecting file for any shaping military operations is provided.

In an environment where the DOS is looking to reduce redundant functions, this group could be created over the next 10-15 years. At the end of this period the DEG could be thriving as an integral part of selected embassies. A closer look at a proposed structure and capability could assist to determine how these elements could help merge diplomacy, development, and defense. The DOS could hire Americans for two to three years. As when an armed service member entering military service has active and inactive time on their contract, so too the contract of a DEG member would be divided between active and inactive time. They would

serve for a total of six years with three to four years being inactive service. If required, the United States could recall inactive employees and deploy them to surge capability and capacity.

Those that recruit the DEG could find spirited, resourceful Americans to populate the country teams. Even though there is no degree requirement for an FSO,<sup>14</sup> it is understood that only a college graduate would be competitive to make it through the FSO hiring process. Thus, so to for the DEG, the target group should be college graduates with bachelor of science or arts degrees that would facilitate interacting with the populace of foreign nations and evaluating certain functions of USAID. The degrees that would best support employment as a DEG member would be international studies, political science, business administration, journalism, economics, anthropology, statistics, sociology, or a foreign language. In this design, a DEG member qualifications would be less than an FSO, because the DEG would be subordinate to an FSO in the embassy hierarchy. With these potential backgrounds and in this capacity, a DEG member's task could be to build relationships, deliver public diplomacy, and facilitate development. The pool of applicants that apply for FSO could be given the option to interview for DEG, if they do not make the FSO interview cutoff.

The DEG career progression could be determined on their follow-on assignment as it could be an entry-level diplomat position. As members of this element finish their first tour, they will have a decision. If they already have a college degree (again, most would), they could realistically enter the FSO hiring process. Based on their previous experience, a DEG member could have a significant advantage over other applicants. From their previous experience DEG members could be suited for any of the FSO career tracks: consular, economic, management, political, and public diplomacy. For those without degrees (very rare), the USG could work with institutions of higher learning to convert the experience of a DEG member into college credit to

establish another incentive for volunteering for this program. A very select few could be asked to stay on for one more tour, where they could fill the role of first line supervisors for the DEG in the Country Team. The most competitive members, those who have finished four to six years, would also be very competitive to apply for an FSO position in either DOS or USAID.

The other advantage for a DEG member transitioning to an FSO is they can pick a career track from a position of experience, because FSOs are not allowed to change their career track. Being a DEG member would allow a person to experience many career tracks without being assigned an FSO track. If a former DEG member applied for employment as an FSO, he or she could make a fully informed choice about the appropriate career track and what their profession would be like, because they would have witnessed the FSOs in action.

Another incentive for DEG members could be competitiveness in seeking a military enlistment or commission. Applications to reserve officer training corps, service academies, and other commissioning programs could provide competitive incentives to seek this profession. As an enlisted military member their experiences could benefit both the service and the individual. Over time these connections between the departments would serve to make DOS and DOD interaction more effective as familiarity with the other organization's task is understood.

The management of the DEG could be the ultimate responsibility of the Ambassador. He or she could be responsible for integrating this group into the action plan set forth to accomplish their mission. The first line supervisor could be a member of the DEG. The source of that supervisor could be from DEG itself, as previously mentioned. Another option for middle management could be Diplomatic Security Special Agents. These men and women could already have an overall idea of the mission set and could employ the DEG in a way to ensure security. Another ideal person to manage a DEG could either be a public diplomacy FSO or a USAID

employee. Both of these individual types could have experience interacting with the public and could orient the group on the Ambassador's intent. If a USAID employee managed the DEG, conflicts of interest in accountability of projects would have to be managed. As the DEG could be an entry-level position for a future FSO, there could be many Public Diplomacy and USAID FSOs that could have received their start in the DEG. Finally, to get the program started there would have to be an increase in promotions for middle management or there could be side entry for DEG management hires. These positions could be filled by FSOs that have recently left the service or non-commissioned officers of the military service, specifically from civil affairs.

The training of the DEG could be essential to their employment and effectiveness. After their screening, evaluation, and selection, DEG members could attend an entry level course, similar to FSOs' A-100, but focused on their role in the country team, and they could receive general cultural awareness training. Next, their training could focus on public diplomacy and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (formerly the Fragile States Assessment Framework). This training would enable the primary skills used by the DEG in their daily tasks, improving or enhancing stability. Finally, the DEG member could be trained in audit fieldwork, where he or she could "collect[sic] and verif[y] data relative to financial transactions, programming and planning, procurement practices, inventory controls, project implementation and monitoring, and other aspects of the entity's organization and operations."<sup>15</sup> As this training could be entry level, the focus could be data collection, data organization, and report building to facilitate the integration of the reports into the country team's requirements. The public diplomacy training is where the country team has the ability to impact the populace, and this training could focus on interpersonal skills, written communication, and public speaking.

Integrating Diplomacy, Development, and Defense

The DEG, the lowest level of diplomacy, could assist with establishing trust between the host nation and America's development of their country. The Ambassador and the FSOs could focus on the larger development action plan, but the DEG could assist with implementing and evaluating the micro-development actions. USAID members have traditionally been specialists that provide a service or make connections between Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the host-nation populace. A DEG subordinate team could be assigned a sector or profession where they focus on building a network that enables the USAID employee/contractor to quickly find expertise in the populace. Then after the contracts are assigned and the USAID auditor arrives, the DEG could connect the auditor with those contractors to ensure that development investment is functioning, effective, and sustainable. This process could provide continuity in the development process, ensure like-minded nation entities receive contracts, and build trust in the development catalyzing capability of the USG. This process could build trust in the USG and the Ambassador's mission. More importantly, this task could establish the DEG members as the ones from the USG that facilitate development. They could be the connection through the entire process and extend the Ambassador's diplomatic actions in all they do.

For the military the DEG could provide another service by being the primary liaison for any DOD action taking place inside a friendly nation. In the past the DOD has struggled with affecting public diplomacy during full spectrum operations, thus the DOD has treated most problems as a security problem. And even when the correct problem has been identified, a DOD agent has been ill-equipped to solve a non-security problem, regardless of how much training or good-will the DOD agent has demonstrated. Just being in the United States military has put him or her at a disadvantage in solving non-security problems. It is difficult for many people to trust a foreigner with a rifle in their country.

The United States military has usually executed three types of activities at the lower end of the range of military operations. The three types of activities are military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. Military engagement is defined as,

a wider category of activities that includes all routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.<sup>16</sup>

As prevention activities, military engagement is guided by the Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC's) Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and the Ambassador's ICS. Military engagement is usually where military action and diplomatic action overlap and fuse. Regularly, in military engagements, the interaction is a military to military exercise or even a military student exchange. In this instance, the Ambassador's negotiated Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)<sup>17</sup> is the crux of the DOS's responsibility with regard to the military. Occasionally, the U.S. military interacts with civilian entities, especially when a host nation military is responsible for internal security and/or defeating transnational crime organizations. In these situations, the DEG could be crucial to liaison between host nation entities and the DOD. Here the DEG's interaction with the populace could inform the DOD on impressions of the host nation's military, and their work in building stability assessments could assist the DOD in determining any sources of instability.

The DEG's support of the DOD could help to increase security as increased standards of living increase stability, but the DEG could be seen as an intelligence collecting agency. This assumption could be the default of anti-American agents, which are bound to be present in any partnered country. The counter to these charges could be the steady, supervised support for legitimate development. The other counter could be the DEG's training in public diplomacy

where they could communicate their legitimate agenda of assisting with development and minimize any appearance of intelligence collecting.

So how could the DEG assist the military with establishing an inside force? The DEG could not be expected to arrive and negotiate the long term establishment of an 'inside' position for the DOD. Their task would be to legitimize the USG's development efforts, so they are efficient and effective at solving the host nation's development needs. This legitimate development focus could foster trust with the host national decision makers, but more importantly, it could foster the trust of the people of that country. Their networks and the increased reliance on the other nation, and vice versa, could enable the higher-level negotiations for forward staging 'inside' forces.

The best location for this type of force is countries where there is not a current conflict and where an embassy is already established. Another important factor for DEG employment could be where the United States is in competition to gain influence. As has been noted in the NSS, "As the United States designs its efforts, inputs from local actors improve the likelihood of enduring solutions, reduce[d] costs, and increase[d] accountability to the American taxpayer."<sup>18</sup> China and Russia have increased their capability to provide influence below the legal threshold of conflict and war, thus the United States should have the same ability to counter these two states in the countries where they are attempting to gain influence. The DEG could provide the inputs and execute actions to fulfill the declarations mentioned in the NSS above. Through finding nations that are seeking partnerships in free, market-driven economies, which are also located in strategic locations, the United States could continue to become the partner of choice and build a balance of power and counter others that look to become regional hegemony.

Overall, the USG could facilitate 20 to 40 DEGs to be stationed throughout the globe. The priority, as mentioned earlier, could be where competition is high with China and Russia, but in locations that are stable and could facilitate a growth in the economy with the infusion of American resources, both public and private. A region in which the DEG could be implemented could be the Indo-Pacific. The NSS mentioned India as a regional democratic partner and states that the United States will “[w]elcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner.”<sup>19</sup> The DEG in India could solidify the American people’s commitment as young Americans interact on an increased scale. The embassy and consulates in one of the DOS’s largest missions supports approximately 55 key officers.<sup>20</sup> An infusion of 40 people could almost double their American human resource.

Another country in this region that could benefit from DEG members could be Vietnam. Vietnam has a long coast with several harbors and ports, and if the United States made a consistent presence there it could significantly reduce or negate A2/AD measures established to deny freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. One port in particular is Cam Ranh Bay, which was a significant United States base during the Vietnam War. In the current political environment, Vietnam would not give exclusive rights to this strategic port on the western edge of the South China Sea. The Vietnamese have authorized multiple different countries to use the port because exclusive rights to base there could alienate many countries, including China. Alienation of China from Cam Ranh Bay could drive added pressure toward Vietnam. Thus, Vietnam chooses to provide the same level of access to all countries.<sup>21</sup>

The DEG could allow for increased access to Cam Ranh Bay by building and maintaining relationships with the state-owned, Vinashin Shipbuilding Company, Ltd, the company responsible for expanding the facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.<sup>22</sup> Establishing a close relationship

with this business could then establish a more broad development support approach where USAID could fuse with all sectors in the area. These relationships could influence the locals to see the USG presence as a positive effect of the growing relationship between the United States and Vietnam. This positive impact could then facilitate a growth in the use of the Cam Ranh Bay naval facilities, which is run by that same Vinashin Company.

In 1995 Vietnam entered the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN way is known to discourage outside influence in an Asian nation.<sup>23</sup> So, American influence would need to initiate from the local level and expand through the existing Vietnamese political processes, which takes a sustained presence and is built one relationship at a time. Civilian-focused initiatives could provide points of contact to assess the impacts of U.S. military presence in Cam Ranh Bay and could allow the DEG to shape the opinions of locals to increase the United States' presence there. The establishment of multiple military engagements, especially exercises based in Cam Ranh Bay, could allow the DOD to establish the 'inside' force that could be used for access to critical points on the mainland through the shared China-Vietnam border or to critical strategic points inside the South China Sea A2/AD protective bubble. Country team or DOD strategic communication initiatives could look to overcome the appearance of outsiders taking over. To summarize, the DEG wins influence through tying USG development efforts to the larger USG presence. In this environment the DEG bridges the gaps from development to diplomacy to military actions through local influence.


#### Counterpoint

Though the DEG could gain local access through trust, adding a new element to the DOS is counter to the direction given to, then Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson. The executive order signed by the president meant to reduce redundancies and identify entities or agencies that could

be eliminated. The best response to this contradiction of increasing capacity is that the DEG is a preventative measure that could enable stability prior to conflict, which is an expensive form of foreign policy and the overall cost of conducting operations could be reduced because trusted partners could provide access that would usually have to be fought for by the DOD. Also, the DEG's focus on development could enable the opening of markets to U.S. business, assisting with growing the American economy. This increase in economy could be hard to credit directly to the DEG, but savings associated with accountability for sustainability reports could be easier to supervise. Next, the DEG could focus on building such a high level of trust that a military member would not be needed. Finally, the last counter to this rebuttal could be that the DEG does not replace the military national power, but enhances its access and capability.

To better see how the cost of the DEG could reduce the overall cost of government, a cost comparison could be made between a generic deployed soldier and a generic diplomat. The comparison will analyze the cost to deploy one soldier and one diplomat to a contested area. To analyze the costs when adding contingency funding is at play, the funding for Operation Inherent Resolve was analyzed. Understanding the interconnectedness of the military branches, a generic military member was examined against a generic diplomat by dividing the base cost of each agency by the total number of members in that service, regardless of type. For the actions in Iraq, the cost of the contingency funding divided by the dollars planned by each agency on that contingency (OIR/Iraq) will be divided by the number of participants from that agency. The standing cost and the contingency cost will be added and then compared. It is understood that the military budget will have all programs included, but that is part of the military overhead that must be maintained to have the current required global reach.

A diplomat is cheaper to deploy than a military member (see table below). The annual cost for a military member (\$258,814) plus the cost to deploy in support of OIR (\$1,942,758) is \$2,201,572.<sup>24</sup> When taking the costs for one DOS/USAID employee (\$361,995) and the cost for the contingency in Iraq (\$15,418) the total cost for a DOS employee supporting the United States mission in Iraq against ISIS is \$377,413 a year.<sup>25</sup> The diplomat costs \$1,824,159 less than a DOD member to execute his or her task in Iraq. This difference in cost could provide for almost five more diplomats.<sup>26</sup>



Note: See Endnotes 24 and 25 for references and methodology.

### Conclusion

To summarize, the United States Military has an access problem, the USAID has a supervision problem, and the DOS has a human resource shortage. The DEG could be the capability that could facilitate the solving of all three problems and enable the JAM-GC concept. The DOS could get an increased human resource base that could facilitate an increase in entry-level diplomats that are capable of executing public diplomacy, facilitating access to development needs, supervising sustainability reporting, and establishing trust that could indirectly enable creating an ‘inside’ force. The costs to deploy a fully trained generic military force in support of major operations is more expensive than maintaining a significantly smaller diplomatic force in that same area. Finally, because the advantage of access and the avoidance of conflict cannot directly translate to dollars, the monetary comparison is difficult. Therefore, if

“[t]rust is the coin of the realm,”<sup>27</sup> the DEG could be worth it and both Secretaries should consider it.

---

<sup>1</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, Dec 2017), 46, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, *Executive Order 13781—Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch of March 13, 2017*, (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, March 16, 2017), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-16/pdf/2017-05399.pdf>. This document reads, “Purpose. This order is intended to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch by directing the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Director) to propose a plan to reorganize governmental functions and eliminate unnecessary agencies (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code), components of agencies, and agency programs.”

<sup>3</sup> Michael E. Hutchens, William D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores, "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons: A New Joint Operational Concept," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 84, no. 1 (1st Quarter 2017): 135-136, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-84/Article/1038867/joint-concept-for-access-and-maneuver-in-the-global-commons-a-new-joint-operati/>.

<sup>4</sup> Megan Eckstein, “Marine Aviation, Weapons Upgrades Would Support Advance Base Operations,” *News.USNI.org*, News & Analysis, January 30, 2017, <https://news.usni.org/2017/01/30/marine-aviation-weapons-upgrades-would-support-advance-base-operations>.

<sup>5</sup> Shawn Snow, “Marine Corps’ fears about enemy missiles prompts top secret meeting at Quantico,” *MarineCorpsTimes.com*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/02/09/marine-corps-fears-about-enemy-missiles-prompts-top-secret-meeting-at-quantico/>. The article claimed that, “Advance Base Operations ‘calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires,’ according to a Marine Corps’ official request for information.” and Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, *The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*, (Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, September 2016), 13, <http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Images/MarineCorpsOperatingConceptSept2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-02-073359-207>.

<sup>6</sup> *The National Security Strategy*, 33.

<sup>7</sup> Rex W. Tillerson, US Secretary of State, “Remarks at Town Hall,” United States Department of State (Washington, DC, December 12, 2017), <https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/12/276563.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> Rex W. Tillerson, US Secretary of State, and Mark Green, USAID Administrator, *United States Department of State & United States Agency International Development Strategic Plan FY 2018 – 2022* (Washington, DC, Feb 12, 2018): 35, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277156.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Alex Lockie, “Mattis once said if State Department funding gets cut ‘then I need to buy more ammunition,’” *BusinessInsider.com*, February 27, 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/mattis-state-department-funding-need-to-buy-more-ammunition-2017-2>.

<sup>10</sup> United States Agency for International Development, “2015 Microenterprise Results Report,” (Washington DC: USAID, July 22, 2016, updated September 12, 2017): 1-3, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/MicroenterpriseResultsReportingFY2015\\_0.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/MicroenterpriseResultsReportingFY2015_0.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> United States Agency for International Development, “2016 Microenterprise Results Report,” (Washington DC: USAID, September 12, 2017), 1, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FY\\_2016\\_MRR.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FY_2016_MRR.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> United States Agency for International Development, “Microenterprise Development,” USAID.gov, last updated November 02, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/economic-growth-and-trade/microenterprise-development>.

<sup>13</sup> The DOD Military Dictionary defines Tactical Control (TACON) as “The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON.” See United States Joint Staff, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” United States Department of Defense, (March 2018): 226, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> “How to Become a Foreign Service Officer,” *Study.com*, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://study.com/articles/How-to-Become-a-Foreign-Service-Officer.html>.

---

<sup>15</sup> United States Agency for International Development, "Solicitation for a Cooperating Country Personal Service Contractor," *USAID.gov*, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1861/USAID-2018-02\\_Auditor-FSN\\_11.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1861/USAID-2018-02_Auditor-FSN_11.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07: Stability*, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, United States Department of Defense, August 3, 2016), V-3, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_07.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> A Visiting Forces Agreement is like a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but it is to dictate temporary visiting arrangements instead of permanently stationed foreign militaries.

<sup>18</sup> *National Security Strategy*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 46.

<sup>20</sup> United States Department of State Mission to India, "U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India," *IN.USEMBASSY.gov*, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://in.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/>.

<sup>21</sup> Jane Perlez, "Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China," *NewYorkTimes.com*, May 19, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/asia/access-to-bay-adds-enticement-as-us-weighs-lifting-vietnam-embargo.html>.

<sup>22</sup> Maritime Activity Reports, Inc., "Vinashin Plans Investment," *MarineLink.com*, September 11, 2007, <https://www.marinelink.com/news/investment-vinashin-plans314914>.

<sup>23</sup> Rodion Ebbighausen, "The ASEAN way: Where is it leading?" *Deutsche Welle online*, August 7, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/the-asean-way-where-is-it-leading/a-39998187>, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat, *The ASEAN Charter* (first published December 2007, 18th reprint, February 2015, updated April, 2016) 6, <file:///C:/Users/ryang/Desktop/Command%20&%20Control/4.%20SAW/3.%20Assignments/Future%20War%20Paper/11.-October-2015-The-ASEAN-Charter-18th-Reprint-Amended-updated-on-05-April-2016-IJP.pdf>.

<sup>24</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Chief Financial Officer, *Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request*, (Washington DC: US DOD, May 2017), 5-2, 6-2 to 6-5, A-2, [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018\\_Budget\\_Request\\_Overview\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf). Using the FY18 budget, the figure was acquired by taking the total number of active (1,314,000) and reservists (815,900), which totaled 2,219,900 and dividing it by the requested \$574.5 billion (\$574,541,000,000). This means an individual military member costs \$258,814, a year. This individual cost could sustain a trained and deployed force. In FY18 for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) in Syria and Iraq the DOD requested \$13 billion. The approved military member troop strength for FY18 is 5,765 for OIR (Iraq/Syria) and 56,310 (In-Theater Support, which also supports operations in Afghanistan). Out of the \$13 billion, \$1.8 billion was requested for the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). Removing the direct-support CTEF funds leaves \$11.2 billion to run OIR. This means that the strike capability and the train, advise, and assist mission costs \$1,942,758 per United States military member per year or \$161,897 a month. The combined annual cost for a military member (\$258,814 from above) to deploy in support of OIR (\$1,942,758) is \$2,201,572 a year.

<sup>25</sup> Tillerson, *Congressional Budget Justification*, 84-85 and John F. Kerry, United States Secretary of State and Rajiv Shah, USAID Administrator, *FY2014-2017 Strategic Plan*, (Washington, DC: United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, March 17, 2014), 6, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf>. Using the FY18 budget, the DOS requested \$25.6 billion (\$25,593,061,000) for the DOS operating costs to keep its diplomatic and development missions in 270 embassies, consulates, and other posts. In these posts the DOS and USAID have approximately 13,700 Foreign Service Employees, 46,000 Foreign Service Nationals, and 11,000 Civil Service Corps employees (70,700 total). This means a DOS employee costs \$361,995 per year. In FY18 the OCO request for DOS in Iraq is \$84.8 million. This contingency funding supports 5,500 employees in four locations, or \$15,418 per employee for this diplomatic mission. The combined annual cost for a DOS employee (\$361,995 from above) to operate in Iraq (\$15,418) is \$377,413 a year.

<sup>26</sup> This comparison has many variables that could change the comparison. First, the cost for an enduring member was found by dividing the number of members by the total cost, which includes all infrastructure and program costs. The second variable that was omitted was that each member in both departments do not cost the same amount (rank, seniority, qualification, etc.). These two variables were neglected because adding them would not allow a like comparison, because of the drastic difference in the departments.

<sup>27</sup> Secretary George Schultz quoting Bryce Harper, *Learning from Experience*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), 37.

## Bibliography

- Advocacy Program Services. "A Guide to the Foreign Service: For Those new to the Foreign Service." US Department of State, Family Liaison Office. accessed July 22, 2017. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101170.pdf>.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat. *The ASEAN Charter*. first published December 2007, 18th reprint, February 2015, updated April, 2016. <file:///C:/Users/ryang/Desktop/Command%20&%20Control/4.%20SAW/3.%20Assignments/Future%20War%20Paper/11.-October-2015-The-ASEAN-Charter-18th-Reprint-Amended-updated-on-05-April-2016-IJP.pdf>.
- Baer, Drake. "Gen. Stanley McChrystal Wants Every Young American To Serve Their Country: And He Has A Plan To Make It Happen." BusinessInsider.com (January 20, 2015). <http://www.businessinsider.com/stanley-mcchrystal-national-service-2015-1>.
- Barr, Stephen. "Why You Can't Just Run Off And Join the Foreign Service." WashingtonPost.com (October 24, 2004). <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57574-2004Oct23.html>.
- Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Davis, and Lee Wight. "Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 52, (1st QTR, 2009), 92-96.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-07: Stability*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, United States Department of Defense, August 3, 2016, V-3. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_07.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf).
- Christie, Ryerson. *Peacebuilding and NGOs: State-Civil Society Interactions*. Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations: War and Conflict in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity, 2008.
- Dibbert, Taylor, "Now Isn't The Time To Cut Peace Corps Funding." TheHill.com (July 5, 2017). <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/340695-now-isnt-the-time-to-cut-peace-corps-funding>.
- Ebbighausen, Rodion. "The ASEAN way: Where is it leading?" Deutsche Welle online, August 7, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/the-asean-way-where-is-it-leading/a-39998187>.
- Eckstein, Megan. "Marine Aviation, Weapons Upgrades Would Support Advance Base Operations." *News.USNI.org*, News & Analysis, January 30, 2017, <https://news.usni.org/2017/01/30/marine-aviation-weapons-upgrades-would-support-advance-base-operations>.
- Fallows, James. "How Gary Hart Tried to Change Military History." *TheAtlantic.com*, the (DEC 28, 2014), <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-gary-hart-tried-to-change-military-history/384064/>.

## Bibliography

- Fine, Glenn A., Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations. *Operation Inherent Resolve: Report to the U.S. Congress (July 1, 2017-September 30, 2017)*. Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, November 10, 2017, [https://oig.state.gov/system/files/lig\\_oco\\_oir\\_q4092017\\_0.pdf](https://oig.state.gov/system/files/lig_oco_oir_q4092017_0.pdf).
- Fleck, Dieter, and Stuart Addy. *The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Hoover Commission. *Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1947-1949)*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.
- Hutchens, Michael E., William D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores. "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons: A New Joint Operational Concept." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 84, no. 1 (1st Quarter 2017): 134-139, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-84/Article/1038867/joint-concept-for-access-and-maneuver-in-the-global-commons-a-new-joint-operati/>.
- Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013 Incorporating Change 1 12 July 2017, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_ch1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf).
- Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, January 17, 2017, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_0\\_20170117.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf).
- Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, September 11, 2013, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_57.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf).
- Kerry, John F., United States Secretary of State and Rajiv Shah, USAID Administrator. *FY2014-2017 Strategic Plan*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, March 17, 2014, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf>.
- Lockie, Alex, "Mattis once said if State Department funding gets cut 'then I need to buy more ammunition'" BusinessInsider.com, February 27, 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/mattis-state-department-funding-need-to-buy-more-ammunition-2017-2>.
- McChrystal, Stanley, General. "Every American Should Serve for One Year." Time.com (June 20, 2017). <http://time.com/4824366/year-national-service-amicorps-peace-corps/>.
- McChrystal, Stanley, General. "You Don't Have to Wear a Military Uniform to Serve Your Country." TheAtlantic.com (July 20, 2016). <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/you-dont-have-to-wear-a-military-uniform-to-serve-your-country/491765/>.

## Bibliography

- Neller, Robert M., Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. *The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*. Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, September 2016. <http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Images/MarineCorpsOperatingConceptSept2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-02-073359-207>.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Chief Financial Officer. *Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request*. Washington DC: US DOD, May 2017, 5-2, 6-2 to 6-5, A-2, [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018\\_Budget\\_Request\\_Overview\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf)
- Orakhelashvili, Alexander. "The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2004): 253-255. <https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/236645741?accountid=14746>.
- Perlez, Jane. "Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China." *NewYorkTimes.com*, May 19, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/asia/access-to-bay-adds-enticement-as-us-weighs-lifting-vietnam-embargo.html>.
- Pigman, Geoffrey Allen. *Contemporary Diplomacy: Representation and Communication in a Globalized World*. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010.
- Schirch, Lisa. *Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security*. First edition. Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2013.
- Schultz, George, Secretary quoting Bryce Harper, *Learning from Experience*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2016.
- Sharp, Paul, and Geoffrey Wiseman. *The Diplomatic Corps As an Institution of International Society*. Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations. Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC, Dec 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- Tillerson, Rex W., United States Secretary of State. *Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, October 13, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf>.
- Tillerson, Rex W., United States Secretary of State. "Remarks at Town Hall." Washington, DC, December 12, 2017. <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/12/276563.htm>.

## Bibliography

- Tillerson, Rex W., United States Secretary of State and Mark Green, USAID Administrator. *United States Department of State & United States Agency International Development Strategic Plan FY 2018 – 2022*. Washington, DC, Feb 12, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277156.pdf>.
- Trump, Donald J., President of the United States of America. *Executive Order 13781—Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch of March 13, 2017*. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, March 16, 2017. <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-16/pdf/2017-05399.pdf>.
- United States Agency for International Development. “2015 Microenterprise Results Report.” Washington DC: USAID, July 22, 2016, updated September 12, 2017. [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/MicroenterpriseResultsReportimgFY2015\\_0.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/MicroenterpriseResultsReportimgFY2015_0.pdf).
- United States Agency for International Development. “2016 Microenterprise Results Report.” Washington DC: USAID, September 12, 2017. [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FY\\_2016\\_MRR.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FY_2016_MRR.pdf).
- United States Agency for International Development. “Microenterprise Development.” *USAID.gov*, last updated November 02, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/economic-growth-and-trade/microenterprise-development>.
- Vorndick, Wilson. “Home and Forward Commands Should Replace the Geographic Combatant Commands.” *Warontherocks.com*, (July 12, 2017), <https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/home-and-forward-commands-should-replace-the-geographic-combatant-commands/>.