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Creating US Space Command: A New Proposal for National Command and Control

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After nearly 50 years of dominance in space,¹ the United States faces new military and commercial competitors in the space arena. The rise of peer competitors with military space capabilities, and the wildcard of private sector space development, has created enough concern in the US Congress that the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (FY18 NDAA) mandated the creation of a Space Corps and the establishment of a US Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a sub-unified combatant command under US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).² The creation of USSPACECOM presents significant policy challenges for the Joint Force which this essay will explore in detail. The problem is twofold: creating a new command and control organization for command of space and funding that organization. Despite these challenges, the creation of USSPACECOM presents significant opportunity to combine a disjointed space defense architecture into a coherent military entity focused on strategic operations in the space domain. In order to effectively coordinate US space defense policy and execution, elements of USAF Space Command, NASA, NRO, and NGA must be merged together under a military commander.³

Command of space is and has always been about defending the United States. The space program originated as defense policy. The possibility of a sky full of Soviet satellites prompted President Eisenhower and Congress to challenge the Soviets and exceed the achievement of launching Sputnik into orbit.⁴ Explosive growth, coupled with growing awareness of the military and intelligence potential provided by space access, resulted in a situation today where several disparate government agencies have equities involving space and space technology. America's competitors have also noted the potential that space provides for their own national interests.

Additionally, the technology and research enabled by the space program enabled a surge in the civilian sector, exploiting space for commercial aspects previously unimagined. As competition develops, the United States no longer enjoys supremacy in space, creating an exposed flank in national defense.

The exposed flank of space developed slowly until it has now reached critical mass. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a *Pax Americana* made years of international commercial growth possible, providing stability for free markets and international trade. However, the absence of a competitor in space drained American motivation to aggressively pursue space development resulting in a condition where the cancellation of the Space Shuttle program, without a replacement, seemed like sound fiscal policy. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation invested in space access as their national economy slowly recovered. Having divested manned space vehicles and outsourced manned space access to Russia, the US now pays the Russians to transport American astronauts to work on US satellites. Reliance on the Russian launch vehicle demonstrates America's fundamental vulnerability to a rival power, and paradoxically leaves the United States at the mercy of that rival power for our own defense.

The American military relies on satellite technology for navigation, communications, intelligence, and imagery. An enemy actor who can destroy or jam our satellites will enjoy freedom of maneuver in the battlespace, a capability that the US cannot mitigate given the lack of coordination between federal space agencies. American satellites and satellite monitoring provide capabilities that national reconnaissance, intelligence, defense, communication, navigation, and transportation networks all depend upon. Enemy actors are certainly aware of the

advantages these satellites provide to the United States. Economic competitors are also aware of the economic advantages these satellites provide to their bottom line. Adversary plans are based on exploiting or mitigating the American satellite advantage. Corporate plans are based on expanding access and market share through telecommunications and information technology, with profit instead of public service as a motive. Damaging or destroying the capabilities of American satellites not only creates tactical opportunities for enemy actors, it creates gaps and weaknesses in American capabilities that are expensive and time consuming to repair.

US policy makers are slowly gaining awareness of American weakness and vulnerabilities in space policy and activities. In 2017, the House Armed Services Committee inserted language into the FY18 NDAA mandating the creation of a sub-unified combatant command for space under USSTRATCOM, and a separate Space Corps under the Department of the Air Force.⁵ The language required the Executive Branch to recognize political concerns about integration of space defense policy. The language also reestablished military control to protect this undefended flank and maintain American dominance over our adversaries and competitors. That said, the policy problem is twofold: creating a new organization to direct space defense policy and creating authorities that fund the new organization. The new policy reflects a change in the American government's understanding of space and defines space as a maneuver area in American law. By militarizing US space policy, the US government declares the use of and access to space to be a critical function of American defense.

The implications of transitioning American space policy to a coordinated military function means that the US government must also develop coordinated strategy to compete with adversary nations and private businesses which it cannot oversee. Competitors will use the lack of a coordinated government space policy to achieve their own ends. Like the advent of sail and powered flight, space travel opened a new dimension which must now be defended in order to secure American national interests. Like sail, both adversaries and commercial actors see opportunities to generate economic and political power around the globe using space. The militarization of space policy reflects an indication of Congressional concern that reliance on private industry is as risky a policy as reliance on a foreign power. Congressional concern regarding the rise of corporate control of space and space-based technology is a public policy reaction to the increase in private sector space development.

In fifteen years' time, the United States will either completely change its approach to space policy or it will become strategically non-competitive and left behind. In a domain where expensive scientific technology is the price of entry, government funding can no longer keep pace with the private sector or with rival governments that are not restricted to annual budget requests. That said, a reactive strategy ensures that the United States will always be chasing competitors that can afford to coordinate strategically in a way we cannot. Rising and resurgent world powers will exploit this vulnerability in the marketplace as well as in war. As our competitors continue to develop space capability, America must regain a competitive edge by merging the current disjointed space agency architecture into a coherent military entity focused on strategic operations to ensure freedom of space access in the future. By merging USAF Space

Command, NASA, NRO, and NGA together, a military commander can effectively coordinate US space defense policy.

Current public policy divides space into two distinct spheres: science and defense. The current national space policy is dated, reflecting the difficulty in keeping pace with evolving technology. The most recent National Space Strategy was published in 2011, stating that, “active U.S. leadership in space requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power, from technological prowess and industrial capacity to alliance building and diplomatic engagement.”⁶ But the FY18 NDAA did not require a whole-of-government approach to space security. Even so, the 2015 National Security Strategy called for “technologies and tactics to deter and defeat efforts to attack our space systems; enable indications, warning, and attributions of such attacks; and enhance the resiliency of critical U.S. space capabilities.”⁷ Such technologies and tactics are best coordinated by a centralized command structure under military leadership. Centralizing America’s space agencies under a defense umbrella is a dramatic shift, but one that unites a split defense policy.

NASA and the US Air Force are two of several government agencies that provide satellite-based support to defense and intelligence activities. The USAF Space Command is part a component of USSTRATCOM, a Functional Combatant Command. USSTRATCOM’s stated mission is to “provide Resilient and Affordable Space and Cyberspace Capabilities for the Joint Force and the Nation.”⁸ By comparison, NASA is a civilian run science agency, whose public image is based on the concept of the betterment of mankind through science.⁹

Run by the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is both a DOD Combat Support Agency (CSA) and an element of the Intelligence Community (IC).¹⁰ [See Appendix C.] Using satellite based technology, the NGA provides geographic intelligence (GEOINT) “in support of the combat objectives of the Armed Forces of the United States.”¹¹ NGA is run by a civilian director but has a military director of operations. The NGA publicly recognizes private sector advances but keeps their activities away from public view due to operational security requirements.

Like the NGA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a Defense intelligence organization that supports both the IC and DOD.¹² More secretive than the NGA, the NRO also has a military deputy as well as a military support staff. Because of their integral role in national defense, and their reliance on space for their mission, NASA, NGA, and NRO must be moved into a military-led USSPACECOM.¹³ Central direction and coordination is the most logical approach to solving the problem of coordinated space policy. While the creation of USSPACECOM requires assuming most of their roles, missions, facilities, and resources, there is value in maintaining aspects of the traditional roles of NASA, NRO, and NGA.

The FY18 NDAA elevates USSPACECOM to a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM. The language also directed the creation of a Space Corps within the Department of the Air Force, similar to the relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. The NDAA language required elevation of “national security space operations within the combatant command structure by creating a sub-unified combatant command for space within U.S. Strategic Command to strengthen operational leadership of space

in the Department.”¹⁴ However, the language did not go far enough in consolidating national defense space activities. Creating a functional sub-unified combatant command for space operations requires merging all of the agencies that contribute to national defense in space operations.

The militarization of space policy has evolved as Congressional interest has evolved. The leading proponent has been Alabama Congressman Mike Rogers, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.¹⁵ This congressional subcommittee provides oversight on “nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defense, national security space programs, and Department of Energy national security programs.”¹⁶ Congressional interest indicates concern regarding the increase in private sector space development by wealthy corporations¹⁷ and the rise of adversary capabilities in space. Representative Rogers’ direction to establish military control maintains American dominance in space and protects an undefended flank.

The above said, the new policy reflects a change in the American government’s understanding of space. By defining space as a military maneuver area in American law, the emphasis is comparable to sea and air. The merging of agencies presents an opportunity to efficiently coordinate disparate elements of national policy in an effective manner. Combining the unique capabilities of NASA for research, technology, and transportation with the intelligence collection capabilities of the NRO and NGA, under the defense oriented command architecture of USSPACECOM, enables the effective coordination of national defense efforts.

The NDAA defined the missions of USSPACECOM as to “Deter aggression in, from, and through space; provide combat-ready space forces that enable combatant commanders to fight and win wars.”¹⁸ The mission to deter aggression in space requires identifying two types of space threats: threat to Space systems, and threats from Space systems. USSPACECOM will be required not only to defeat adversary attacks, but also to identify attacks on the Joint Force in order to increase awareness and develop counter-tactics.¹⁹

An implied mission of USSPACECOM will be to ensure American freedom of maneuver in space. This requires global monitoring, as access to orbit is as important as activity there. It will also require battlefield management as the effects of space debris are difficult to predict and mitigate. This battlefield management role will be unique among the combatant commands, but will be required to safeguard USSPACECOM forces and satellites.

USSPACECOM must be organized to detect attacks, provide Flexible Deterrence Options, and counterstrike capability. The requirement to provide a “Combat Ready Space Force”²⁰ conjures images of astronauts shooting laser guns, but in reality will require very different capabilities. Aggression in space will come in many forms, rarely approaching physical violence. Adversaries will use space attacks to demonstrate capability, conduct strategic interference, and to steal intellectual property pertaining to national defense and security. The majority of these missions will not require manned missions to ensure maintenance of US satellite capabilities or response to enemy anti-satellite attacks.²¹ Aggression will also take the form of manipulation or tacit support by civilian corporate actors. Commercial satellites can be

used by an adversary or competitor both as a primary means of attacking the US or as a counter-tactical move to defend against American efforts to ensure freedom of maneuver in space.

Initially, USSPACECOM will be an *ad hoc* merger of the different agencies, as depicted in Appendix B. This paper proposes how the organization can be deliberately structured for maximum utility and efficiency, as depicted in Appendix E. Funding will be the biggest immediate driver of efficiency in the Joint Force creation of USSPACECOM. While Congress demonstrates an interest in changing national policy towards space, Congress also steadfastly refuses to increase revenue while maintaining a substantial deficit. Combining the budgets of USAF Space Command, NASA, NRO, and NGA works because, instead of creating a duplicative new bureaucracy, existing capabilities are combined and amplified.²² The unification of space defense capabilities under a military commander fulfills the intent of USSPACECOM as a sub-unified combatant command and expands defense capabilities by providing unity of effort and command to US activities in space. By combining existing organizational infrastructure, hierarchy, and capability, the Joint Force will create a capability much faster and more economically than creating a command from the ground up.

As a sub-unified combatant command, USSPACECOM will be commanded by a 4-star military commander. That officer will command the four current space agencies under an evolving organizational construct to efficiently coordinate US defense activities in space. Like USSOCOM, USSPACECOM will have both operational and training responsibilities. The most logical organization is divided between operations and training, all under command of the

USSPACECOM commander. (See Appendix E.) This meets congressional intent for a space training command without the expense of a fifth military branch of service.

USSPACECOM will be divided between the Space Operations Headquarters hierarchy and the Space Corps Training and Education hierarchy. Within Space Operations Headquarters, the current US Space agencies will be reorganized under the Joint Force Space Doctrine missions: Space Situational Awareness, Space Force Enhancement, Space Support, Space Control, and Space Force Application.²³ As the command evolves to full capability, existing organizational structures will be reorganized into functional mission components and force contributors.

USAF Space Command will provide the backbone for US space operations command and control structure, expanding to provide command and control over all of the different activities of US space policy towards a unified strategic defense objective. Although divided between Space Operations and Space Corps training responsibilities, NASA will retain its role as the primary manned and unmanned space exploration and scientific research agency, a secondary role to their support to USSPACECOM. NASA will also maintain primary responsibility for astronaut training. The NRO will be assigned primary responsibility for Space Situational Awareness, dividing its activities between support and operations. The NGA will be assigned primary responsibility for Space Support, maintaining its primary imagery intelligence mission while increasing coordination to support USSPACECOM's operational mission. NASA, NGA, and NRO will retain civilian leadership, but will be integrated into the defense hierarchy by reporting to a military chain of command. Under Space Control, the Joint Space Operations

Center will create a National Space Intelligence Fusion Cell providing support to the military and intelligence communities. In this cell, NRO and NGA will continue their direct liaison and support to the Intelligence Community. Traffic management and orbital debris deconfliction will be also be a function of the Space Control department.

The establishment of a Space Corps as a separate branch of service under the Department of the Air Force has been widely ridiculed in the press, but it presents an opportunity.²⁴ As a training headquarters rather than a separate branch of service, Space Corps can perform vital Title 10 (US Code) “organize, train, and equip” functions common to the military service chiefs. Space Corps will provide a consolidated headquarters, subordinate to USSPACECOM, to manage and coordinate training and education for the space force. Each force provider under USSPACECOM will have entry-level training and education components. Combining the existing strengths of NASA, NRO, NGA, and USAF Space Command creates special capabilities for the Joint Force. Space Corps will be responsible for advanced Astronaut and Mission Controller Training and Education, as well as Space Policy support to technology development.

Space Corps will be a service-like force provider and training command, but not a separate branch of military service.²⁵ The efficient operation of USSPACECOM does not require a separate branch of service, but rather the combination of existing manpower capabilities from USAF, and the civilians in NASA, NRO, and NGA. The role of Space Corps will be a subordinate command to coordinate Training and Education under the Title 10 responsibilities of the USSPACECOM commander. USSPACECOM will fill force employer (Combatant Command)

roles and force provider roles (Space Corps training and education), and also require Title 50 authorities to provide support to the Intelligence Community and Special Operations.²⁶

The combination of a military and civilian workforce at a sub-unified combatant command is not new and meets congressional intent for the new command. Existing military pipelines for enlisted technicians and officer specialists (astronauts) are effective and do not need alteration to provide the forces for a sub-unified combatant command. Actual manpower requirements of military personnel requiring earth orbit are minimal. NASA has traditionally recruited astronauts from military test pilots and will continue to do so. Both military and civilian astronauts will continue to use the astronaut candidate process for training, with the recognition that scientific spaceflight under NASA is now subordinate to the mission of USSPACECOM.

The bulk of manpower requirements for Space Corps are the ground support force, the technical workers and intelligence analysts who launch, control, and coordinate satellite and counter-satellite technologies. The ground support force can be recruited as defense civilians from the NASA, NGA, and NRO workforces or active duty personnel transferred from the Air Force and Joint Force in accordance with the existing Joint Staffing constructs. A Joint Force Headquarters to coordinate the training and education of military and civilian personnel supporting the space mission will quickly prove to be a force multiplier. In its final version, the US Space Command organizational construct will most resemble a functional combatant command with responsibilities resembling a geographic combatant command. This combination of agencies will allow the flexible and efficient response to space-based threats, enabling the US to act strategically to coordinate national defense effectively.

To conclude, this is a major policy step for the United States. The change indicates public policy discomfort with rising foreign power and growth of private interest in space. This is a big change for the DOD, but one that will prove beneficial in the long term. In order to effectively coordinate US space defense policy and execution, elements of USAF Space Command, NASA, NRO, and NGA must be merged together under a military commander. If USAF Space Command, NASA, the NRO, and the NGA are not merged together under a military commander, US military and civilian operations will continue to be vulnerable on a domain where the US no longer enjoys a strategic asymmetry, leaving the US significantly vulnerable to attack and exploitation. If this reorganization does not take place, the US will cede dominance of the space domain to adversary civilian and competing nations.

¹ While the term “space” applies to the entire universe outside of the earth’s atmosphere, this paper limits the discussion of space to any activity involving the orbit of the earth, or activity affecting anything manmade that is freely orbiting the earth. A 1998 RAND Study defined spacepower as, “the pursuit of national objectives through the medium of space and the use of space capabilities.” The same study placed space use in four categories: “military, intelligence, civil (including scientific activities), and commercial.” An actor is a non-US governmental organization or activity that is pursuing activities in space for their own ends. An adversary actor, whether they fall into any of these categories, or into all of them, is an organization that uses space capabilities to pursue objectives that either harm or neutralize American space capabilities for their own ends. A private actor is a non-governmental agency that pursues activities in space for their own civil or commercial interests.

Dana Johnson, Scott Pace, C. Bryan Gabbard, and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). *Space: Emerging Options for National Power*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 8-17.

² U.S. House of Representatives. “H.R. 2810: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services.” Washington, DC, 6 July 2017.

The NDAA language text states in full, “Create a Space Corps within the United States Air Force to posture and properly focus the preponderance of our military services to protect U.S. interests in space; Deter aggression in, from, and through space; Provide combat-ready space forces that enable combatant commanders to fight and win wars; Elevate national security space operations within the combatant command structure by creating a sub-unified combatant command for space within USSTRATCOM and strengthen operational leadership of space in the Department; Eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy by terminating the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor office and function, as well as the Defense Space Council construct.”

³ Abbreviations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), Intelligence Community (IC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are used throughout this essay.

⁴ Walter A. McDougall. *The Heavens and the Earth: A political History of the Space Age*. (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

⁵ U.S. House of Representatives. “H.R. 2810: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services.” 6 July 2017.

⁶ Robert M Gates and James R. Clapper. “National Security Space Strategy 2011.” (Washington, DC, 2011), 13.

⁷ Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy.” (Washington, DC: The White House, February, 2015), 13.

⁸ USAF space command webpage. <http://www.afspc.af.mil/> [Accessed August 2017.]

⁹ “We reach for new heights and reveal the unknown for the benefit of humankind.” NASA Webpage. <https://www.nasa.gov/about/index.html> [Accessed August 2017.]

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “*Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations.*” (Washington, DC, 29 May 2013), IV-9.

¹¹ *Joint Publication 3-14, IV-9.*

The full quote describes providing GEOINT to “DOD, Intelligence Community (IC), and other USG depts. And agencies; conducting other intelligence-related activities essential for US national security; providing GEOINT for safety of navigation information; preparing and distributing maps, charts, books and geodetic products... and providing GEOINT in support of the combat objectives of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

¹² *Ibid.*, IV-11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, IV-9.

There are several space-related agencies that provide support to the joint force based on space-related capabilities. Because of their support nature, they should not be integrated into USSPACECOM, but should maintain their current, independent support status. These include the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Air Force Weather Agency. These are depicted in Appendix C.

This list also include the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) which Provides Military SATCOM support and ensures US Capability to operate in space is maintained. While a direct space related agency, DISA is not included in this model because of its reliance on the Space construct and its support to the entire Joint force.

¹⁴ U.S. House of Representatives. “H.R. 2810: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services.” 6 July 2017.

¹⁵ Surprisingly, the Huntsville Air and Space Center is not in Congressman Rogers’ congressional district. This is an issue that he is passionate about and dedicated time to research and understand as part of his membership on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

¹⁶ <https://armedservices.house.gov/subcommittees/strategic-forces-115th-congress> Accessed 12 December 2017

¹⁷ Examples are Elon Musk (SpaceX) and Richard Branson (Virgin Galactic).

¹⁸ “H.R. 2810: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services.” US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 6 July 2017.

¹⁹ One of the challenges to ensuring communication security is that any communication system can be used as a communication jamming device. Space-based anti-communication attacks are divided between anti-satellite (uplink jamming) and anti-system (downlink jamming). Both types of attacks require different kinds of identification and capability to counter.

²⁰ “H.R. 2810: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services.” 6 July 2017.

²¹ It is extremely difficult to defend systems in orbit. These systems are inherently offensive, making the decision to respond or deter far more important than defending the systems. This offensive nature gives space power projection a significant information aspect, in particular communicating the debilitating impact of an attack to an adversary. An adversary who uses commercially purchased GPS navigation devices should hesitate to disable GPS satellites; while this would limit the use of GPS guided weapons and navigation systems, it also limits the capability of the adversary.

²² The combination of authorities from Title 10 support to Military, Title 50 support to Intelligence Community, and Title 51 organization of the National Space Program create a blending of congressional authorities and funding that may be best addressed by rewriting US Code to create new authorities enabling this construct. It will be the responsibilities of the NGA and NRO directors, and the CDR USSPACECOM to ensure adherence to the different authorities granted under Title 10 and Title 50 US Code. This may require the creation of new authorities by Congress, ideally creating an addition to United States Code since the new Space Command will reflect authorities found in Titles 10, 50 and 51 US Code.

²³ On December 1, 2017, USSTRATCOM actually merged the USAF Space Command with USSTRATCOM’S Joint Functional Component Command for Space, creating a Joint Force Space Component Command under exactly this construct. The change was directed to change the attitude of the command to a more offensive posture aligned with USSTRATCOM’S Joint Force Air and Maritime Component Commands, although the press release specifically stated that there was no additional change to mission. The commander will be “responsible for the organizing, training and equipping of Air Force space forces as well as for executing operational command and

control of joint space forces.” USAF Press Release, 1 December 2017. <http://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1386530/afspc-commander-becomes-jfscce-joint-space-forces-restructure/>


²⁴ The 2016 Marine Corps Operating Concept identifies space as one of the five operating domains, identifying a requirement for “The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.” (U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Operating Concept 2016.” (Washington, DC, September 2016), 8.) While it is tempting to make naval and amphibious analogies when writing a paper about a Space Corps, it is neither plausible nor advisable that the Space Corps include Marines in any form other than astronauts (pilots/mission specialists) or ground technical controllers. Science fiction aside, there is no actual role for space Marines conducting assaults from spaceships onto enemy space stations or satellites. Destruction or suppression of enemy satellites can be accomplished with jamming, focused energy, or merely puncturing the surface of the enemy satellite. The vacuum of space does the rest.

If mankind does finally move to the stars, the first colonies will be driven by business exploration opportunities and the lure of blue-collar jobs. Colonies will likely be run by corporations to house their workforce. A demand for a military role will be as a space constabulary, ensuring law and order among colonial civilians, not seizing or defending advanced space bases. The political effects of military action will occur on earth, not on other planets. Colonial security may well be outsourced to private security contractors, but the result is the same; what matters in space is the effect generated on earth. But that is the subject for another paper.

²⁵ The creation of a Space Corps was ultimately removed from the NDAA during conference, however the NDAA requires a federally funded report on the creation of a separate service.

²⁶ This illustrates the legal challenges facing the proper execution of combining these agencies. Ideally, the described creation of USSPACECOM will be combined with the revision of US Code to allow a single military commander to support these separate authorities.


Appendix A: Current USAF Space Command Organization




This is the current USAF Space command hierarchy. The commander of USAF Space Command also doubles as the Joint Force Space Component Commander.

Appendix B: Initial *Ad Hoc* US Space Command Organization


This displays the immediate, and temporary, combination of all four US space agencies underneath a consolidated military headquarters.




Appendix C: Current USSTRATCOM Organization



Per the doctrinal organization of USSTRATCOM, these organizations have interests and activities in space.




Appendix D; Joint Publication 3-14 “Space Operations” Doctrinal Organization



Appendix E: Proposed USSPACECOM Organization

Combination of Force provider and force employed fills similar roles to the Army Air Forces Combat Command and the Air Corps in WW2



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