



# Assuring Allies by effectively deterring hybrid threats

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## De-Mystifying

### What's different ?

- Concept, principles not new – NATO worked on HW since 2009
- New dimensions, means
  - Nationalism, populism, internal fragmentation
  - Complex and increasingly fragile geostrategic environment
  - Advanced technologies
  - Information demand and dependency
- Manipulation and exploitation of peoples fears and insecurities

*“The USSR makes use of carefully harmonized political, economic, financial, ideological and military actions...  
the enemy attacks incessantly in all fields which are of vital importance to the peoples and at all weak points offered by the free world...  
The enemy aim is to undermine the mutual confidence of the NATO countries and to dissolve NATO from within...”*

*FRG working paper C-M(60)22, 1960*

## “What is it...?”

*overt and COVERT activities*

highly integrated combination of  
conventional and unconventional  
means

across the full DIMEFIL

applied by both state  
and non-state actors

military,  
paramilitary,  
irregular and  
civilian actors

**significantly vary in sophistication and complexity**

**directed at an adversary's  
vulnerabilities**

creating ambiguity and denial

**complicating decision making**

# Why is 'hybrid' considered a type of warfare?

### Goals

- Ambiguity
- Coercion and control

### Battlefields

- Perceptions, beliefs, values
- Data

### Weapons

- Information, influence
- Corruption

**Avoid direct military confrontation, but remain capable to do so**

**Threat broader than just military, challenging NATO's ability to respond**

# Example: RUSSIA

Concept → Policy → Action

2013 Value of Science in  
Orediction, V. Garasimov

2014 Military Doctrine

2015 National Security Strategy


2016 National Plan for Defense of  
Russian Federation



2015 Syrian Intervention

Non-kinetic levers of pressure:

- ✓ *Economic and political coercion and subversion*
- ✓ *Cyberattacks*
- ✓ *Information warfare and STRATCOM manipulation*
- ✓ *Targeted use of corruption*



# Example: China

1999 “Unrestricted Warfare”

2003 “Three Warfares” doctrine


- ✓ *Legal warfare*
- ✓ *Media Warfare*
- ✓ *Psychological warfare*

2010 Economic Blackmail of Japan over maritime collision

2013 Air Defense Identification Zone in the East Chin Sea

2016 New ‘Asymmetric’ National Security Strategy





## EXAMPLE:

# Hybrid model applied by a non-state actors

**Vertical escalation**  
(military sophistication)




**Unconventional use of military tools**



**Horizontal escalation**  
(use of non-military tools)

*Centralized, simultaneous and in the same battlefield*



## NATO's RESPONSE



# COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

Nations as first targets and first responders  
NATO supports, assures and reinforces



- Early identification
- Strengthen relationships and building resilience
- Advance planning
- Education, Training and Exercises

- Horizontal and vertical escalation
- Enabling disruption of the adversaries momentum

## THE STRATEGY ON NATO'S ROLE IN COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

### Internal Focus


- NATO HQ and NCS to continuously analyse the security environment.
- Inform and enable rapid, timely political decision making.
- Robust strategic communications.
- Integrated civil-military analysis and planning activities
- NCS/NFS to assist Allies in building resilience, and to counter attacks.
- A demanding education, training and exercise program.

### External Focus

- No one nation or organization can deal with the totality of HW alone.
- Effective cooperation with partners and international organizations.
- Particularly with EU to further strengthen strategic partnership, reinforcing joint efforts and a common message of NATO and the EU.

# IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

## Deterrence and Defense functions



All maps are based on continental data. Digital Map Data (© Collins Bartholomew LTD 2013). The boundaries and names shown and the designations used do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by NATO. Use to 500:1000000. Some areas may have been added to the map to include other geographical areas. Final boundary between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abkhaz area is not yet determined.

## Preparedness function



Recognizing  
and attributing  
hybrid actions



Supporting  
rapid  
assessment  
and effective  
decision  
making



Building  
resilience and  
the readiness  
to resist and  
respond to  
hybrid  
campaigns

# NATO Counter Hybrid Support Teams

## Identify – Recognize – Attribute

- Tool for improving active management of the response to hybrid threats
- Building on existing mechanism and teams
  - Resilience Advisory Support Teams, Civil Emergency Planning Rapid Reaction teams, Cyber Defense Rapid Response Teams, SOF Liaison Teams
- Main characteristics:
  - Upon request, on case by case basis
  - Assist, advise and support national efforts
  - Civil-military composition

### *Expertise to be provided in:*

- Civil preparedness
- CBRN preparedness
- CI projection
- Tackling propaganda and disinformation campaigns
- Protection of civilians
- Cyber defense
- Energy security
- CT
- (Counter) Intelligence
- Strategic analysis
- Legal aspects
- CIVMIL interactions

**NEW  
TOOL**



**MISSING PIECE**



## Effects based and behavior approach to countering hybrid actors

Adversaries actions below the threshold of military response

Knowledge, ability and willingness to respond horizontally

Same level of 'pain' but in different domain

***What do we want to do?***

vs.

***What effect do we need to achieve?***

Deterrence objectives

Deliberate, tailored, focused and systematic effects

*“It’s an intellectual construct enabled by technological infrastructure.”*

*LtGen David Deptula*

# Increasing effectiveness of political and military deterrence tools

