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THESIS

**RADICALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE:
THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN CABO DELGADO**

by

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June 2022

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**RADICALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE: THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
IN CABO DELGADO**

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ABSTRACT

In 2017 Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, saw the rapid rise of a violent Islamist movement that would declare its allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) just one year later. This thesis seeks to establish what factors led to the rise of IS-Mozambique to help recommend a balanced U.S. policy to best address the situation. It compiles economic and environmental data and compares the data with public opinions to determine impacts on the population of Cabo Delgado. Additionally, the thesis utilizes literature relating to the political structure of Mozambique and the interactions of its Muslim population. Findings suggest that Mozambique's political structure, not economical or environmental issues, best explains the rise of IS-Mozambique. Autocratization by Mozambique Liberation Front has destabilized democratic institutions, leading to increases in violence. It is recommended that the U.S. not provide military support to counter this insurgency, with Mozambique receiving aid from regional countries and the EU.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
CISLAMO	Islamic Council of Mozambique
CLGRC	Local Risk Management Committees
CRI	Climate Risk Index
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
INGC	National Disaster Management Institute
IS	Islamic State
LNG	liquefied natural gas
MDM	Mozambique Democratic Movement
MRM	Montepuez Ruby Mining
NG	natural gas
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
VE	violent extremists
VEO	violent extremist organizations

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

As the world focused on the actions of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, a violent militant movement called Ansar-al Sunna was taking hold in the northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado. While IS's power has waned in the Middle East, the group now labeled IS-Mozambique gained strength from 2017 until mid-2021. IS-Mozambique has demonstrated its capabilities through public attacks, the ability to successfully engage provincial and federal forces, success in frustrating private military companies, and their occupation of territory in Cabo Delgado. With IS-Mozambique gaining greater international attention and Mozambique receiving increased military support from the United States as well as African and European countries, it is important to understand the factors that led to the growth of IS-Mozambique within the Cabo Delgado province. This thesis will examine the drivers of radicalization by applying grievance-based and political process theories. It will use the findings to make specific policy recommendations and discuss the implications of the insurgency for international security.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

In the 2021 annual address to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, the commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Townsend, identified violent extremist organizations (VEOs) as a unique threat to African partners due to their limited ability to respond effectively and the dangers VEOs present if left unchecked.¹ In the last several years, the capabilities of IS-Mozambique have grown in sophistication, have negatively impacted the economic developments in the region, and displaced large portions of the population.

¹ *United States Africa Command Posture Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services* (United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services: United States Africa Command, 2021), 6–8, <https://www.africom.mil/document/33691/usafricom-statement-for-record-hasc-20-apr-2021-gen-townsendpdf>.

IS-Mozambique poses serious threats because they operate within a littoral region adjacent to a highly trafficked sea line of communication with recently discovered natural gas (NG) reserves; and because the Mozambique government cannot adequately address the current challenge on its own. A stronger understanding of what facilitated the growth of IS-Mozambique will allow the U.S. to decide which measures are most cost-effective. With a U.S. command that is cognizant of its limited resources in Africa, the U.S. must make worthwhile determinations about how to mitigate this threat. Once the relevant factors are identified, a more cohesive policy for disengagement or a strategy of defeating IS-Mozambique in conjunction with partner nations will be possible.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Two theoretical approaches potentially explain the factors of radicalization within Cabo Delgado. Political process theories focus on how political structures and institutions lead to increased incentives toward violence. Grievance-based theories focus on how the grievances of society drive groups or individuals to increased militancy. Radicalization can occur in any country and understanding the importance of political structure or collective grievances better allows governments to diagnose the problem and determine a solution.

1. Political Process Theory

The political process theory, also sometimes called the political opportunities theory, emphasizes the importance of political opportunity, availability of resources, and the idea “that dissidents are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of their action.”² Studies by Goldstone et al. emphasize that factors such as economics or discrimination are weak in predictability; however, when focused on political institutions, the ability to forecast conflict had a significant impact.³ States in a period of transitioning regime types tend to have a higher propensity for conflict. Anocracies, neither democracies

² Mehdi Shadmehr, “Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution: Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics,” *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (June 2014): 621, 624, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000267>.

³ Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 191, 204, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x>.

nor autocracies, are more prone to civil conflict.⁴ Bodea et al. advance this argument by stressing that anocracies with factional politics are most at risk of civil conflict instead of anocracies that are nonfactional.⁵ If a group views its goals as untenable through the political process, it is more likely to resort to conflict.⁶

The general theme among authors is that specific “political environments may be more prone than others to generate violent extremism (VE).”⁷ These political environments generally encompass the denial of political rights, repressive regimes, corruption, poor governance, sponsorship of VE groups, or perceptions of an illegitimate regime.⁸ These political factors are not mutually exclusive and may compound one another.

2. Grievance Theories

Grievance theories seek to explain how collective grievances lead to a group’s political actions. The first objective to understand how grievances translate into violence is “to understand what people’s grievances are and where they come from.”⁹ To best understand a group’s grievances, the group must be viewed within the context of their environment and how they perceive themselves in their environment.¹⁰ Grievances often reflect group identities within the population.¹¹ The “horizontal inequalities” theory argues that dissimilar groups that coexist within the same environment have an increased potential

⁴ Håvard Hegre, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” *American Political Science Association* 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 34, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401000119>.

⁵ Cristina Bodea, Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Christian Houle, “Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants?,” *International Interactions* 43, no. 3 (May 2017): 551, 558, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188093>.

⁶ Cristina Bodea and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, *Riots, Coups And Civil War : Revisiting The Greed And Grievance Debate*, WPS4397 (The World Bank, 2007), 5, <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4397>.

⁷ Guilain Denoëu and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, RAN-M-00-04-00049-A-FY-05-63 (US Agency for International Development, 2009), 27.

⁸ Denoëu and Carter, 27.

⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Political Rebellion: Causes, Outcomes, and Alternatives*, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 245.

¹⁰ Gurr, 15.

¹¹ Gurr, 245.

for violence.¹² The higher propensity for violence is due to a disadvantaged group's increased awareness of inequalities in their environment, leading to grievances among the community. When an advantaged group is unlikely or unwilling to make concessions to a more disadvantaged group, the disadvantaged group will seek to rebalance the environment in their favor through political or violent means.¹³

With increased globalization, a transnational grievance can more easily be adopted by a local group because of the group's greater access to communications and networking. These communications lead to magnified grievances as "skillful leaders can strengthen existing group ties and provide a greater awareness of shared interest."¹⁴ Transnational grievances can relate specifically to repressed Muslim minorities, leading them toward an Islamist movement. With the right messaging, repressed groups risk becoming further marginalized and receptive to the idea of "global jihad" as an outlet for their grievances.¹⁵ Ultimately a small, marginalized group can identify with a transnational grievance unrelated to domestic social or political concerns.¹⁶

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The thesis tests three hypotheses based on the literature to assess the potential factors of radicalization within Cabo Delgado. The hypotheses are as follows.

Beginning with the political process theory, I assess how political changes have shaped opportunities and incentives for Islamists to participate in the political process over the past two decades. In recent years, Mozambique's political space has become more closed as the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party's consolidation of power weakens democratic institutions. Specific to Cabo Delgado, the region may be

¹² Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 478–81, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000207>.

¹³ Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch, 492.

¹⁴ Gurr, *Political Rebellion*, 112.

¹⁵ Gurr, 101.

¹⁶ Gurr, 102–3.

experiencing greater factionalism among its Muslim population.¹⁷ Hypothesis 1 is based on the idea that weakening democratic institutions and an Islamist sect's struggle to gain influence incentivizes violent activities.

Hypothesis 1: Increased factionalism with a weakening democratic system contributes to radicalization in Cabo Delgado

Second, using a grievance-based approach, I investigate two potential explanations for the rise in extremism in Cabo Delgado. First, news reporting and journal articles identify high unemployment, low education rates, and approximately 1000 foreign contractors working on natural gas (NG) projects as the sources of a collective grievance within the population of Cabo Delgado.¹⁸ It is possible that the agrarian-based populations of Cabo Delgado see themselves as being intentionally excluded from the economic windfalls of the energy reserves off their coast in favor of outsiders. The second hypothesis is based on these economic grievances and horizontal inequalities.

Hypothesis 2: A perceived increase in economic disparity in Cabo Delgado contributes to the radicalization of its local population.

The next grievance-based hypothesis relates to a long-standing “historical grievance” between Cabo Delgado and the capital 1500 miles away. Mozambique is often afflicted with environmental problems such as flooding, cyclones, and droughts. There is a potential perception in Cabo Delgado that the national government is deliberately providing less support to the region in the wake of these events because of demographic and political differences.

¹⁷ Eric Morier-Genoud, “The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, Nature and Beginning,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 14, no. 3 (July 2020): 405, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271>.

¹⁸ Yonas Dembele, *Mozambique: Islamic Insurgency – In-Depth Analysis of Ahl al- Sunnah Wa al- Jama'ah (ASWJ)* (World Watch Research, 2020), 301–24; Makaita Noel Mutasa and Cyprian Muchemwa, “Ansar Al-Sunna Mozambique: Is It the Boko Haram of Southern Africa?,” *Journal of Applied Security Research*, February 2021, 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2021.1882281>; “Total Pulls Staff From Mozambique Gas Site Over Jihadist Threat,” *Barron's*, January 2, 2021, sec. AFP News, <https://www.barrons.com/news/total-pulls-staff-from-mozambique-gas-site-over-jihadist-threat-01609603805>; “Mozambique Palma Attack: Why IS Involvement Is Exaggerated,” *BBC News*, Last modified April 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56773012>.

Hypothesis 3: Environmental crises in Cabo Delgado coupled with an inequitable government response have increased grievances among the population in Cabo Delgado, leading to radicalization.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis conducted a qualitative analysis using the process tracing methodology to identify the factors of radicalization in Cabo Delgado that accounted for the growth of IS-Mozambique. Using process tracing allowed for a theory-centric approach where each theory had at least one hypothesis presented. Further, it allowed the hypotheses to be tested in a manner that determined their strengths or weaknesses relative to one another.¹⁹

The thesis focuses on the timeframe between 1992 and 2021, which covered the ceasefire that ended the Mozambique civil war to the current day. This thesis utilized multiple sources to investigate each hypothesis, including government documents, interviews, news reports, academic articles, environmental impact studies, economic reports, and statistical data on acts of violence.

Hypothesis 1 focuses predominantly on the impacts of weakening democratic institutions and increasing factionalism. By evaluating the historical interactions of various segments of society concurrent to the strength of the government, it provides insight into whether those associated with IS-Mozambique are making a rational choice to resort to violence to achieve political goals otherwise untenable. Sources specific to this section will be academic articles and political reports.

Hypothesis 2 examines the demographics of Cabo Delgado, identifies the background of the developmental projects, the perceptions of the local population, and government actions on the development of the economy in Cabo Delgado. Sources specific to this hypothesis are Afrobarometer and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

¹⁹ David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 04 (October 2011): 824, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>.

When assessing Hypothesis 3, I investigate environmental crises, government response, and the regional and demographic breakdowns of those affected by these events. Sources will include the climate and environmental impact data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Climate Change Knowledge Portal, and Afrobarometer. I then investigate government responses and the overall likelihood of whether this hypothesis is supported in the context of Cabo Delgado.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter I consists of the research question, associated literature review, overview of the three hypotheses, and the research design. Chapter II addresses the hypothesis related to the political process theory. Chapters III and IV focus on the two hypotheses developed under the grievance-based theory. The final chapter provides an assessment of the hypotheses along with policy recommendations. Ultimately, this thesis assesses Hypothesis 1 to be the strongest hypothesis of the three tested. In light of this finding, additional research into how best to incorporate foreign assistance into to improving governance would be pertinent to the development of U.S. policy towards Mozambique.

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II. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND VIOLENCE

This chapter covers Hypothesis 1, *“Increased factionalism with a weakening democratic system contributes to radicalization in Cabo Delgado.”* It examines the political system of Mozambique to determine how changes in its political structure provided incentives for an Islamist sect in Cabo Delgado to become violent. This chapter focuses on three factors to investigate Hypothesis 1. First, the ruling party’s, FRELIMO, consolidation of power reduced political opportunities for other national parties. This consolidation of power coincided with significant resource discoveries, which raised the stakes of holding power and generated incentives for violence. Second, the opposition Mozambican National Resistance’s (RENAMO) declining ability to compete in national and provincial elections led them to use violence against FRELIMO to achieve political gains. RENAMO’s violence against the state provided the opportunity for third parties to also use violence to achieve their aims. Third, a group of Islamists within Cabo Delgado were facing exclusion from mainstream Muslims within the region, and state-sanctioned repression provided them the incentive for violence to achieve their goals of establishing a sharia state.

The findings of this chapter support Hypothesis 1. First, as FRELIMO consolidated its grip on power, RENAMO would use violence or threat thereof to achieve political concessions. The violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO created the framework of an unstable political environment. Second, after facing exclusion and repression, the Islamist group attempted to capitalize on the opportunity presented by the fighting between RENAMO and FRELIMO to use violence to advance their goal of implementing a sharia state.

The first section provides an account of the origins of IS-Mozambique. The second section offers background on Mozambique’s political development from the end of colonialism to the present, including FRELIMO’s consolidation of power since 1994. The third section covers RENAMO’s normalization of violence to achieve political concessions. The fourth section covers how Islamists’ exclusion from fellow Muslims within Cabo Delgado and the state’s repression of them provided the incentive for the

Islamists to resort to violence in an attempt to achieve their goals. The conclusion will further discuss the rationality of the Islamists.

A. THE RISE OF IS-MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique is a predominantly Christian state with a Muslim minority that makes up approximately 18% of the overall population.²⁰ The majority of Muslims live in Mozambique's northern provinces.²¹ Cabo Delgado is one of two provinces in Mozambique with a majority Muslim population, with approximately 59% of its population being Muslims.²²

One of the potential origins of IS-Mozambique revolves around an Islamist movement that began in Cabo Delgado in 2007. This group rejected the government's legitimacy, tried to operate in a parallel society, and clashed with the majority Muslim population in Cabo Delgado.²³ The group was led by Sualehe Rafayel, a Mozambican who returned to Mozambique after traveling abroad in Tanzania.²⁴ He brought a strict interpretation of Islam not familiar to the region of Cabo Delgado, which placed him at odds with the majority Sufi population in the region. Sualehe instructed his followers not to clean before and after prayer, to wear a cloth around their head as opposed to a *cofió*, and to have men dress in short pants, cut their hair, and grow beards.²⁵ Sualehe followers' understanding of Islam also saw other Muslims in Cabo Delgado and the government as *kaffir*, or *infidels*, and therefore illegitimate, thus setting the framework for future confrontations.²⁶ The main goal of the Islamist group was to establish a sharia state and denounce the secular government.

²⁰ "Mozambique - Religion | Britannica," *Britannica*, accessed May 2, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/Religion>.

²¹ Britannica.

²² "Cabo Delgado Província - Mozambique | Data and Statistics" (Knoema), accessed December 24, 2021, <https://knoema.com//atlas/Mozambique/Cabo-Delgado-provincia?compareTo=MZ-S,MZ-N>.

²³ Morier-Genoud, "The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique," 397.

²⁴ Morier-Genoud, 401.

²⁵ Morier-Genoud, 401.

²⁶ Morier-Genoud, 399.

While the Islamists taught a strict form of Islam and viewed the government as corrupt, the majority Muslim group was both more moderate and routinely worked with the government of Mozambique through the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO). As the Islamists tried to recruit members from the majority Muslim group, it placed them further at odds with the CISLAMO and set the framework for further conflict between the two groups. With irreconcilable views between the two Muslim communities, the Islamist group set up a parallel system to the government that operated outside the normal framework of the Mozambican government.²⁷

CISLAMO identified the Islamist movement as a threat and petitioned the government of Mozambique to identify them as a dangerous sect.²⁸ In 2010, at the request of CISLAMO, a local administrator imprisoned Sualehe and several of his followers. In 2011, local authorities released Sualehe and his followers under the conditions that they would change their teachings to coincide with mainstream Muslim views; ultimately, they were suspected of having fled to Tanzania upon release.²⁹

In 2014, Abdul Carimo, an Islamist leader thought to have been influenced by Sualehe, set up his mosque and established a group of followers in Chiure, a district in Cabo Delgado.³⁰ Between 2014 and 2016, Carimo's group would clash with the majority Muslim population on several occasions, with the first intra-Muslim deaths occurring in November 2016.³¹

As the Islamist movement gained momentum, its members' preestablished networks likely assisted with funding and arming. One example is Abusuracca, otherwise known as Nuro, a former shop owner who was one of the leaders in the attack on Mocimboa de Praia in 2020.³² Islamists also likely had access to illicit trade routes, giving them

²⁷ Morier-Genoud, 400.

²⁸ Morier-Genoud, 400.

²⁹ Morier-Genoud, 402.

³⁰ Morier-Genoud, 402.

³¹ Morier-Genoud, 402.

³² "Sons of Mocimboa: Mozambique's Terrorism Crisis" October 3, 2021–BBC Africa Eye Documentary, video, 26:54, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1892pnDC7I>.

further access to finances and resources. Abul Dardai Jongo, an identified member of IS-Mozambique, was known to have been a human trafficker along the Tanzania and Mozambique border.³³ Another factor that likely allowed for the increased armament of the Islamists was the availability of weapons left over from the Mozambican Civil War. Small arms are still readily available within Mozambique due to incomplete disarmaments and unaccounted-for caches.³⁴ An estimate from 2017 places the number of illicit firearms at 1.3 million, with a high volume of firearm and ammunition smuggling within Mozambique.³⁵ With access to funding, illicit trade networks, and weapons, the Islamists had the means to transition from knives in 2016 to firearms in 2017 to more aggressively mount attacks and confront government forces.

On October 5, 2017, the Islamists attacked three police stations in Mocimboa da Praia, killing 17, marking the official start of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado.³⁶ In May 2018, via the communications application Telegram, the Islamists pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS); IS did not officially recognize the Islamist group until June 2019.³⁷ While local law enforcement was able to repulse the initial Islamists' attacks, the group known as IS-Mozambique would return in 2020 and occupy Mocimboa da Praia.

³³ BBC News Africa, "Sons of Mocímboa: Mozambique's Terrorism Crisis" .

³⁴ Ana Leão, *Weapons in Mozambique: Reducing Availability and Demand* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 15.

³⁵ "Guns in Mozambique — Firearms, Gun Law and Gun Control," GunPolicy.org, accessed February 24, 2022, <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/mozambique>.

³⁶ Chrispin Mwakideu, "Mozambique's Extremist Violence Poses Threat for Neighbors | DW | 29.03.2021," DW.COM, March 29, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/mozambiques-extremist-violence-poses-threat-for-neighbors/a-57043563>; Clionadh Raleigh et al., *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique*, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); acleddata.com (Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique), accessed November 1, 2021, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/>.

³⁷ Tore Refslund Hamming, "The Islamic State in Mozambique," Lawfare, January 24, 2021, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/islamic-state-mozambique>.

B. CLOSING SPACE FOR POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The modern state of Mozambique has its roots as a former Portuguese colony that focused on maximizing resources and labor to profit Portugal.³⁸ Portugal's focus on resource extraction led to the development of semi-isolated regions and intra-regional networks in Mozambique. Portugal's division of the country is evident in the lack of widespread north-south transportation networks, whereas east-west networks are more prevalent.³⁹ As a result, Mozambique lacked sufficient infrastructure to build a cohesive state upon its independence in 1975.⁴⁰

Following independence, FRELIMO took power, as they had positioned themselves through a guerilla effort against the Portuguese to best take advantage of the Portuguese decolonization efforts.⁴¹ Following Mozambique's independence from Portugal, the FRELIMO extended support to the anti-government groups of the ZANU in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and ANC in South Africa, both of which remained under white rule.⁴² In retaliation, the Rhodesian and later the South African governments supported the insurgent group RENAMO in their actions against FRELIMO. After South Africa became the primary patron of RENAMO, their activities did not appear to have had the intent to overthrow the FRELIMO government; instead, operating as a destabilizing force. The insurgency grew into a 15-year civil war that ended with no clear winner.⁴³

After being exhausted from fighting, FRELIMO and RENAMO reached a peace agreement in 1992. One of the terms of the 1992 agreement was to hold elections in 1994 for the president and national assembly, with subsequent elections taking place every five years.⁴⁴ In 1994, Mozambique held its first nationwide elections, incorporating the

³⁸ Malyn Newitt, *A Short History of Mozambique* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 106,109-112.

³⁹ Newitt, 127-28.

⁴⁰ Newitt, 152.

⁴¹ Newitt, 153-54.

⁴² Newitt, 161.

⁴³ Newitt, 162.

⁴⁴ Newitt, 167-69.

FRELIMO and RENAMO parties. The resulting FRELIMO-led government in 1994 was very centralized, with most of the formal power concentrated at the national executive and legislative levels.⁴⁵ The 1994 elections did not mark the start of strong democratic consolidation in Mozambique, as the two major parties remained deeply divided and harbored strong animosities towards one another.⁴⁶ As Anne Pitcher states, “The conflict ended with no clear winner and was not followed by any kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, thereby foreclosing opportunities to expose wrongdoing, to resolve grievances that had contributed to polarization, and to achieve psychological and political closure.”⁴⁷

Until 2009, provincial assemblies were nonexistent.⁴⁸ Until 2019, the president appointed provincial governors. The centralized structure of national politics limited the government’s accountability to populations in the provinces, except perhaps around elections. Additionally, the Mozambique model of government favored the ruling party, FRELIMO, providing them with access to both party and government resources to help them maintain their grip on power.

1. FRELIMO’s Consolidation of Power

FRELIMO has demonstrated itself to be a highly adaptable political party that ensures its survival and maximizes its access to power.⁴⁹ FRELIMO’s efforts to entrench its power have led to a democratic weakening within Mozambique, which in turn has reduced opportunities for groups to participate in the political system, including groups that formed the precursors of IS-Mozambique. Following electoral setbacks against RENAMO in 2014, in which RENAMO gained control of three provincial assemblies and 38 additional seats in the national assembly, FRELIMO also appeared to have redoubled

⁴⁵ Newitt, 179–83.

⁴⁶ M. Anne Pitcher, “Mozambique Elections 2019: Pernicious Polarization, Democratic Decline, and Rising Authoritarianism,” *African Affairs* 119, no. 476 (July 2020): 470, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa012>.

⁴⁷ Pitcher, 472.

⁴⁸ Pitcher, 479–80.

⁴⁹ Newitt, *A Short History of Mozambique*, 184.

its efforts at maintaining cohesiveness within the party.⁵⁰ As of 2017, FRELIMO is believed to have held competitive, closed inner-party elections to determine the party's course, which appears to have helped with party unity.⁵¹ The results of FRELIMO party discipline were evident in their rebound during the 2019 elections when they won the presidency, greater control of the national assembly, and all provincial assemblies.⁵² This level of cohesion in competition against RENAMO makes it clear that FRELIMO will maintain a firm grip on Mozambique. FRELIMO's consolidation also closes out other national parties from gaining access to political office. This closing of the political space generates incentives for other parties to use violence to achieve their goals.

FRELIMO has also consolidated its power by using its position in government to secure business opportunities, which has helped build the party. FRELIMO's early hold on the government following the 1992 ceasefire coincided with the privatization of the formerly government-controlled economy in Mozambique. By nature of their positions in power, FRELIMO party members took advantage of this timeframe to secure business opportunities, especially since "RENAMO members were still in the bush when assets and opportunities began to be privatized."⁵³ A 2021 study illustrates the importance of political-business connectedness in Mozambique, finding "consistent evidence of large positive [financial] effects of holding political office."⁵⁴ Furthermore, officeholders' benefits have likely "extend [ed] to family groups more broadly."⁵⁵ Evidence shows that those in political office and their extended networks benefit financially from their positions. This interconnectedness between political office and wealth underscores RENAMO's

⁵⁰ Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019," 477; EISA Election Observer Mission, *Presidential, Legislative and Provincial Assembly Elections 15 October 2014*, EISA Election Observer Mission Report No 49 (Johannesburg, South Africa: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2016), 49–51.

⁵¹ Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019," 477.

⁵² Pitcher, 468.

⁵³ Finn Tarp, Sam Jones, and Finn Schilling, *Doing Business While Holding Public Office: Evidence from Mozambique's Firm Registry*, World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Paper Series (University of Copenhagen, 2021), 8, <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3811698>.

⁵⁴ Tarp, Jones, and Schilling, 51.

⁵⁵ Tarp, Jones, and Schilling, 52.

concerns—discussed in the next section—about access to resource wealth and their willingness to resort to violence.

2. Weakening Institutions and Resource Discoveries

Despite the shaky foundations on which Mozambique’s political system was built, the roles of FRELIMO and RENAMO did provide a reasonable degree of stability until the early 2000s. Adriano Nuvunga and Mohamed Salih argue that post-civil war, one party has become the “perpetual government (FRELIMO), the other a perpetual opposition (RENAMO)” and that this situation has prevented stable democratic development.⁵⁶ However, alongside the consolidation of power by FRELIMO, the discovery of large deposits of natural resources in Mozambique during the early 2000s and declining RENAMO party cohesion brought instability to Mozambique’s nascent democratic institutions.

The discovery of large natural resource reserves in the 2000s within Mozambique raised the stakes of holding power, as whichever party controls the government could likely benefit financially from the resources.⁵⁷ Resource discoveries and developments in the 2000s centered on more extensive coal mining operations, gold and ruby mines, and NG deposits discovered off the northern coast.⁵⁸ In theory, whichever party held greater control at the national or regional levels of government would be able to position itself better to receive the financial benefits of resource development. Benefits would potentially include kickbacks from companies, preferential licensing for constituent companies, and placement of party members in positions of power in newly formed companies.⁵⁹ This concern over control of natural resources is likely why RENAMO favored increased

⁵⁶ Adriano Nuvunga and M A Mohamed Salih, “Mozambique’s 2009 Elections: Framing Democratic Consolidation in Context,” *Journal of African Elections* 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2010): 36, <https://doi.org/10.20940/JAE/2010/v9i1a3>.

⁵⁷ Pitcher, “Mozambique Elections 2019,” 477.

⁵⁸ Cayley Green and Lisa Otto, *Resource Abundance in Mozambique: Avoiding Conflict, Ensuring Prosperity*, Occasional Paper No 173 (South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014), 7–9, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_sop_173_GARP__green__otto_20140219.pdf.

⁵⁹ Pitcher, “Mozambique Elections 2019,” 476.

decentralization of authority down to the provincial level.⁶⁰ With coal, gold, and gas resources concentrated in the country's center, a traditional RENAMO stronghold, they believed they could win provincial elections and gain access to resources through decentralization, even without winning national offices.⁶¹

C. RENAMO'S USE OF VIOLENCE

While resource discoveries generated pressure on RENAMO to gain some power, its military-style organization prevented it from embracing popular members and gaining credibility among the Mozambican population. RENAMO knew it was losing ground in legitimate democratic contests, and it would eventually circumvent them by reverting to militant tactics.

While pushing for the decentralization of political authority, RENAMO began to show problems with its internal cohesion. During the civil war, RENAMO never structured itself to rule as a political party, limiting its effectiveness as a national party.⁶² RENAMO's lack of party strength is due to its military structure and concern that a popular political personality within the party would usurp power from the party leader, Afonso Dlhakama.⁶³ Dlhakama admittedly still ran his party in a military manner and limited dissent.⁶⁴ From the time of the civil war, Dlhakama had believed he was the only one who could effectively lead the fight against FRELIMO.⁶⁵ Dlhakama's concern over maintaining control of RENAMO was likely why the party never developed a national structure and preferred to remain regionally dispersed with little coordination.⁶⁶ A further obstacle to RENAMO's political success happened in 2009, when Daviz Simango, the

⁶⁰ Adriano Nuvunga, "Mozambique's 2014 Elections: A Repeat of Misconduct, Political Tension and Frelimo Dominance," *Journal of African Elections* 16, no. 2 (October 1, 2017): 91, <https://doi.org/10.20940/JAE/2017/v16i2a4>.

⁶¹ Green and Lisa Otto, *Resource Abundance in Mozambique: Avoiding Conflict, Ensuring Prosperity*, 7–9, 13.

⁶² Newitt, *A Short History of Mozambique*, 164.

⁶³ Nuvunga and Salih, "Mozambique's 2009 Elections," 35.

⁶⁴ Nuvunga and Salih, 35.

⁶⁵ Nuvunga and Salih, 35.

⁶⁶ Nuvunga and Salih, 35.

Mayor of Beira and former RENAMO member, formed the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM).⁶⁷ RENAMO leadership considered Simango's rising popularity a threat and expelled him from RENAMO in 2008.⁶⁸ RENAMO's expulsion of Simango shows the extent to which the party will go to limit internal upstarts.

In 2013, RENAMO turned to violence to address its legitimacy problem and counter FRELIMO's growing consolidation of political power. In August 2013, RENAMO forces attacked and killed 36 members of Mozambique's security forces in Sofala, signifying the first significant resumption of hostilities since the 1992 peace treaty.⁶⁹ The exact reasons why RENAMO initiated the attacks are unknown, but the effects proved beneficial for RENAMO.⁷⁰ Dhlakama's popularity in the 2014 national elections rose during this timeframe due to the perception among his followers that he would stand up against the government.⁷¹ RENAMO's base of support was revitalized and became more active in politics.⁷² Ultimately, RENAMO was able to gain concessions from the government by agreeing to a ceasefire in 2013.⁷³ The 2014 election had Dhlakama receive 36.6% of the presidential vote; RENAMO increased its 51 seats in the National Assembly in 2009 to 89 seats in 2014 and gained a majority in three provincial assemblies.⁷⁴ This election set the precedent that standing up to the government through violence could lead to political concessions.

⁶⁷ Nuvunga and Salih, 38.

⁶⁸ Nuvunga and Salih, 35.

⁶⁹ SAPA-AFP, "36 Mozambique Soldiers, Police Killed: Renamo," *TimesLIVE*, August 13, 2013, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2013-08-13-36-mozambique-soldiers-police-killed-renamo/>.

⁷⁰ SAPA-AFP.

⁷¹ Nuvunga, "Mozambique's 2014 Elections," 75.

⁷² Nuvunga, 75.

⁷³ Nuvunga, 72.

⁷⁴ EISA Election Observer Mission, *Presidential, Legislative and Provincial Assembly Elections 15 October 2014.*, 3,49-51.

Following the 2014 election, RENAMO resumed hostilities from 2015 until 2018, when it would again begin ceasefire talks with the government.⁷⁵ The timing of the ceasefire talks again coincided with the lead-up to elections in 2019. This second cycle of violence and negotiation further reinforced the idea that it is better to be a disruptive force than a cooperative force to achieve concessions in Mozambican politics. RENAMO's violence against the FRELIMO-led government would also act as a destabilizing force providing other groups within Mozambique a potential opportunity to use violence and achieve their aims.

D. EXCLUSION AND REPRESSION

In the context of closing political space and increased political violence, there was a series of tense interactions between the state and Islamists that further drove the rising Islamist group toward violence. Beginning in 2010, CISLAMO's actions in identifying the Islamists as a threat established a firmly divided position that would limit future interactions between CISLAMO and the Islamists.⁷⁶ Between 2014 and 2016, CISLAMO, illustrating its connection to the state, petitioned the government to act on its behalf to deal with the Islamists within Cabo Delgado.⁷⁷ Concurrent to CISLAMO's petitioning of the FRELIMO-led government, the government was dealing with the RENAMO insurgency in the central region of Mozambique. The conflict with RENAMO effectively cut the country in half, limiting government forces' access to the northern provinces.⁷⁸ Additionally, with only 11,000 members in the army, the state's security forces were likely unable to conduct multiple counter-insurgency operations against RENAMO and IS-

⁷⁵ Stephanie Regalia, *The Resurgence Of Conflict In Mozambique: Ghost From The Past And Brakes To Peaceful Democracy*, Note N° 14 2017 (South Africa and Great Lakes Observatory, 2017), 7–8.

⁷⁶ Morier-Genoud, "The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique," 402.

⁷⁷ Morier-Genoud, 402.

⁷⁸ Regalia, *The Resurgence Of Conflict In Mozambique: Ghost From The Past And Brakes To Peaceful Democracy*, 10–12.

Mozambique.⁷⁹ In November 2016, FRELIMO, to address CISLAMO's concerns, imprisoned the Islamists deemed a threat to peace in the province.⁸⁰

Between 2016 and 2017, the Islamists, therefore, had an increased incentive for violent action. Continually excluded from political participation and facing increased repression, the Islamists exploited the disruption that the RENAMO insurgency was causing. With the government focused on RENAMO in the central provinces, the Islamist attacks in 2017 could have been based on a calculation that the government response would be limited, affording the Islamists time and space to pursue their goals of a sharia state.

E. CONCLUSION

As the political process theory suggests, Islamists within Cabo Delgado were closed out of the political system. CISLAMO, representing the majority of Muslims in the region, labeled the Islamists a threat and effectively cut them out of any dialogue with the state. As the Islamists continued with their teachings, CISLAMO requested the FRELIMO-led government to take action against the Islamists. The state's actions resulted in the imprisonment of Islamist members and the burning down of their Mosques, feeding into the Islamist's narrative against the state. With a narrative against the state and fellow Muslims, the Islamists likely relied on members' networks to access funds, illicit trade networks, and weapons caches to equip themselves.

Ultimately the cost vs. benefit favored Islamist actions toward violence. With support and resources in place, infighting between RENAMO and FRELIMO occurring since 2013 created a window of opportunity for the Islamists to act. If the Islamists acted when they did and could achieve some territorial gains, they could potentially occupy enough territory to establish their sharia state or receive concessions from the FRELIMO-led government.

⁷⁹ "2022 Mozambique Military Strength," GlobalFirePower.com, accessed February 24, 2022, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=mozambique.

⁸⁰ Morier-Genoud, "The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique," 402.

III. ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES IN CABO DELGADO

This chapter investigates whether NG developments in Cabo Delgado led to increased grievances among the population of Cabo Delgado, eventually leading the group that would become IS-Mozambique to use violent tactics against the government and the population. As such, this chapter focuses on Hypothesis 2: “*A perceived increase in economic disparity in Cabo Delgado contributes to the radicalization of its local population.*” To test this hypothesis, I examine NG and ruby development cases due to the similarities in the timing, sizes, and locations of their discoveries while addressing the different effects these discoveries had on the population. These findings suggest that the development of NG deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado by foreign companies led to the enrichment of those outside the region and did not benefit the local population, leading to local grievances and possible motivations for conflict. These findings imply that economic grievances may have been a contributing factor in the conflict. However, due to the magnitude of the population affected by economic disparities in the region and yet, the limited numbers actively participating with IS-Mozambique, economic grievances are not likely to have been the principal driver of violence within Cabo Delgado.

The first portion of the chapter covers the background of the NG discovery off the coast of Cabo Delgado. I then cover the potential causal mechanisms that begin with the discovery of NG off the coast of Cabo Delgado, its impact on fishing communities, the failure of the government to incorporate locals into the economic development, the relocation of locals to allow for NG development, and the lead-up to the first attacks by IS-Mozambique. I then use the ruby deposits discovered near the interior town of Montepuez as a counterpoint to explore how another extracted resource in the same province has been handled differently and did not lead to the same level of violence as occurred in the coastal region.

A. NATURAL GAS BACKGROUND

Formal employment is nearly nonexistent in Cabo Delgado, with approximately 85% of the population being self-employed.⁸¹ The majority of self-employed people in Cabo Delgado are dependent on agriculture and fishing for their livelihood.⁸² It looked as though this economic situation might change when, around 2009–2011, two significant natural resource deposits were discovered in Cabo Delgado: NG and rubies. This section, however, focuses on NG.

In 2010, Cabo Delgado became the location of one of the most significant recent offshore natural gas deposit discoveries in the world. Anadarko discovered the NG deposits by using seismic mapping.⁸³ When the initial seismic surveys began, 57% of the population within Cabo Delgado was living in poverty, with more than 80% of the population dependent on subsistence farming or fishing.⁸⁴ From the time of the discovery, however, economic conditions worsened. Local fishermen claimed fishing output dramatically decreased, negatively impacting the livelihoods of coastal communities.⁸⁵ Field research from 2009 provides evidence that the early seismic mapping methods were likely responsible for killing off local sea life along the coast.⁸⁶ In addition, the seismic

⁸¹ African Development Bank Group, *Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) Summary - Mozambique*, P-MZ-FD0-003 (African Development Bank, 2019), 19, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-Assessments/Mozambique_LNG_ESIA_Summary.pdf.

⁸² African Development Bank Group, 19.

⁸³ Instituto Nacional De Petroleo, “Celebrating 10 Years of the Discovery of Natural Gas in the Rovuma Basin / News / Home - INP,” Instituto Nacional De Petroleo, accessed December 30, 2021, <http://www.inp.gov.mz/pt/Noticias/Celebrando-os-10-Anos-da-Descoberta-de-Gas-Natural-na-Bacia-do-Rovuma>; Ichumile Gqada, *A Boom for Whom? Mozambique’s Natural Gas and the New Development Opportunity*, Occasional Paper No 151 (South Africa: South African Institute of International Affaris, 2013), 7.

⁸⁴ World Bank Group, “*Strong but Not Broadly Shared Growth*” *Mozambique Poverty Assessment* (The World Bank, 2018), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/248561541165040969/pdf/Mozambique-Poverty-Assessment-Strong-But-Not-Broadly-Shared-Growth.pdf>.

⁸⁵ Daniel Ribeiro and Joshua Dimon, *Oil or Development: Results from a Field Study on the Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Exploration along the Northern Coast* (Justica Ambiental, 2011), 13, <https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/oil-or-development.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Gqada, *A Boom for Whom? Mozambique’s Natural Gas and the New Development Opportunity*, 7.

mapping study prevented artisanal fishermen along the coast from accessing their historical fisheries and forced them to find new locations.⁸⁷

In 2012, Anadarko conducted studies to determine the best place to establish the Mozambique Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Park and transportation infrastructure for the processing and shipping of LNG.⁸⁸ In November 2016, the Mozambican government approved a relocation plan for locals on the Afungi Peninsula to facilitate the new construction; the government initiated the relocation plan in November 2017.⁸⁹ The LNG development thus threatened local communities' livelihoods, and good jobs and training in the new LNG industry failed to materialize. Few of the estimated 15,000 job opportunities that the LNG projects have brought to the region have gone to locals.⁹⁰

B. NATURAL GAS, ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE, AND VIOLENCE

In recent years the NG development in Cabo Delgado has received considerable news coverage due to the proximity of IS-Mozambique's attacks in relation to the location of the NG project in addition to the canceling of the project by the company Total in early 2021.⁹¹ To illustrate the potential role of NG-related economic grievances in propelling violence, I examine five factors: the impacts of the NG discovery on the population of Cabo Delgado, local fishermen's perceptions, continued poverty for locals, relocation of coastal villages, and the timing of the rise in violence.

⁸⁷ Daniel Ribeiro and Joshua Dimon, *Oil or Development: Results from a Field Study on the Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Exploration along the Northern Coast*, 13.

⁸⁸ "Anadarko's Rovuma Basin Plans Take Shape," *Offshore*, April 11, 2013, <https://www.offshore-mag.com/geosciences/article/16761427/anadarkos-rovuma-basin-plans-take-shape>.

⁸⁹ "Resettlement Plan," Total-led Mozambique LNG Project, May 11, 2020, <https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/sustainability/resettlement/resettlement-plan>.

⁹⁰ "Mozambique LNG Park, Cabo Delgado Province - Hydrocarbons Technology," *Hydrocarbons Technology*, accessed November 9, 2021, <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/mozambique-lng-park-cabo-delgado-province/>.

⁹¹ "Total Declares Force Majeure on Mozambique LNG Project," *Total Energies*, April 26, 2021, <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project>.

1. The Discovery of Natural Gas off the Coast

The first significant factor was in 2009–2010, when NG was discovered using seismic survey methods off the coast in a highly impoverished region largely dependent upon subsistence farming and artisanal fishing. During this timeframe, violence within Cabo Delgado was low. According to ACLED data, Cabo Delgado had eight reportable violent events resulting in seven fatalities.⁹² The violence that did occur was not Islamist-based and mostly revolved around dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of cholera outbreaks.⁹³ These isolated events of violence were focused on local government officials and took the form of mob violence.⁹⁴

While violence was not prevalent during this timeframe, a significant portion of the population expressed dissatisfaction in Afrobarometer surveys with their current living conditions, including living conditions in relation to others and the government’s handling of creating jobs.⁹⁵ Surveys of Cabo Delgado residents conducted by Afrobarometer show that approximately one-third of the population felt that their living conditions were “fairly bad” or “worse than others of other regions.”⁹⁶ In response to questions about job creation, 31% of respondents believed the government was doing a “fairly bad job of creating jobs,” with an additional 11% responding with “very badly.”⁹⁷ The overall response of the Mozambican population was 37% and 27%, respectively, to the same questions. These indicators show that the population of Cabo Delgado was experiencing discontent; however, they offer no discernable reasons why Cabo Delgado would be more likely to experience an insurgency than other provinces or timeframes (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).⁹⁸

⁹² Clionadh Raleign et al., “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique.”

⁹³ Clionadh Raleign et al.


⁹⁴ Clionadh Raleign et al.

⁹⁵ Afrobarometer data (Mozambique Round 2, Round 3, Round 4, Round 5, Round 6, Round 7 accessed November 1, 2021), <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

⁹⁶ Afrobarometer data.

⁹⁷ Afrobarometer data.

⁹⁸ Afrobarometer data.




R5 2011/2012: 186 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2395 participants in Mozambique.

R6 2014/2015: 179 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2400 participants in Mozambique.

R7 2017/2018: 193 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2381 participants in Mozambique.

Figure 1. Handling Job Creation—Cabo Delgado (Solid) and Mozambique (Dashed) ⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Figure 1 adapted from Afrobarometer data.



R5 2011/2012: 186 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2395 participants in Mozambique.

R6 2014/2015: 179 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2400 participants in Mozambique.

R7 2017/2018: 193 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2381 participants in Mozambique.

Figure 2. Your present living conditions—Cabo Delgado (Solid) and Mozambique (Dashed)¹⁰⁰

2. Impacted Fishermen

The second factor was the disruption of artisanal fishing and the failure to compensate fishing communities for their loss. Complaints from artisanal fishermen in 2014 suggested that NG activities led to reduced catches in fishing.¹⁰¹ To compensate for their reduced catches, fishermen began to travel to other fisheries.¹⁰² However, relocating to different fisheries brought other issues, as fishermen were unfamiliar with the most productive areas to fish. The presence of more fishermen in fewer fisheries led to increased pressure on available areas. In a 2016 survey of artisanal fishermen conducted by Mozambique’s National Institute of Fisheries Research, as many as “80% of inquired

¹⁰⁰ Figure 2 adapted from Afrobarometer data.

¹⁰¹ Ilham Rawoot, “Mozambique Fishermen Decry Gas Drilling,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/1/22/mozambique-fishermen-decry-gas-drilling>.

¹⁰² Ilham Rawoot, “Gas-Rich Mozambique May Be Headed for a Disaster,” accessed October 25, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/2/24/gas-rich-mozambique-may-be-headed-for-a-disaster>.

fishermen mentioned that there was a reduction [in catch] over the years.”¹⁰³ The ecological damage from NG activities affected more than offshore fishing operations, due to changes in the ecology of Cabo Delgado’s coastline. A concurrent reduction in intertidal fishing, historically conducted by women, took place along the shoreline.¹⁰⁴

These developmental impacts were not unknown to the Mozambican government or the companies conducting the surveys, as a 2014 Environmental Impact Assessment identified.¹⁰⁵ The report indicated moderate impacts on local communities due to noise pollution, implementation of a security zone, the introduction of invasive species, and loss of estuary and mangroves.¹⁰⁶ The assessment recommended mitigation measures to reduce the impact of noise and discharge; however, neither the Mozambican government nor the companies involved appear to have implemented any mitigation measures.¹⁰⁷

3. Failure to Include Local Communities in Economic Opportunities

The third factor relates to the failure to include local communities in NG-related economic activities. As the NG project progressed, the government advertised employment and development opportunities as a positive element for the local population.¹⁰⁸ Locals were initially aggrieved over the disturbance to the fisheries; however, the prospects of jobs appear to have offset some of the angst.¹⁰⁹ The optimism among locals was not unwarranted, as the government of Mozambique conveyed an optimistic view of the NG project and the guarantee of jobs for locals of Cabo Delgado, along with other positive

¹⁰³ Av Mao Tsé Tung, *Instituto Nacional de Investigação Pesqueira*, IOTC-2017-WPDCS13-16 (Republica De Mocambique: Ministerio Do Mar, Aguas Interiores and Pescas, 2017), 13.

¹⁰⁴ African Development Bank Group, *Mozambique Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Summary*, P-MZ-FD0-003 (Mozambique: African Development Bank, 2019), 12.

¹⁰⁵ Anadarko, *Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report for the Liquefied Natural Gas Project in Cabo Delgado*, Final EIA Report - Volume 1 Project Ref: 0133576, 2014, 16, https://www.banktrack.org/download/environmental_impact_assessment_1/180823_nts_lng_final_eia_sept_2014_eng_1.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Anadarko, 16.

¹⁰⁷ Anadarko, 15.

¹⁰⁸ Ashoka Mukpo, “Gas Fields and Jihad: Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Becomes a Resource-Rich War Zone,” *Mongabay Environmental News*, April 26, 2021, <https://news.mongabay.com/2021/04/gas-fields-and-jihad-mozambiques-cabo-delgado-becomes-a-resource-rich-war-zone/>.

¹⁰⁹ Ashoka Mukpo.

impacts that the project was expected to have on the local economy.¹¹⁰ Residents of Cabo Delgado appear to have believed that NG would be a positive influence within their province. In a 2014–2015 Afrobarometer survey, 17% of Cabo Delgado’s participants responded that the government was handling job creation “very well,” and another 44% responded, “fairly well.” These responses had increased substantially from the preceding survey, in which 6% and 33% answered “very well” and “fairly well,” respectively (Figure 1).¹¹¹ Additionally, the average responses to these questions in Cabo Delgado for 2014–2015 saw a double-digit increase over the rest of the country for the same time frame.

While optimism among the population appears to have increased with the prospects of employment, there were few realistic chances of many locals gaining direct employment in the NG industry.¹¹² The population did not have the education to perform many of the jobs required in the NG projects due to “88% of the economically active population having no level of education.”¹¹³ Locals sought out training at their own expense to secure employment, with many falling victim to scams that left them in debt. Locals interviewed indicated that even when they did gain employment in the NG industry, they often perceived the work as meaningless and felt as if they were filling a quota to allow the company to report they were employing locals. Locals working with the NG companies would also complain of unequal pay for the same work compared to their peers from outside the region.¹¹⁴

4. The Relocation of Locals

The fourth factor relates to the relocation of coastal communities, the construction of a replacement village, and an increase in apprehension among locals about the future of

¹¹⁰ Ashoka Mukpo.

¹¹¹ Afrobarometer data.

¹¹² African Development Bank Group, *Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Summary*, 19.

¹¹³ African Development Bank Group, 19.

¹¹⁴ Kate DeAngelis, *Report from the Field: Perspectives and Experiences of Mozambican Communities and Civil Society on Liquefied Natural Gas Exploitation* (Friends of the Earth Issue Brief, 2016), 3–4.

their livelihoods.¹¹⁵ On November 8, 2016, the Government of Mozambique approved the resettlement of villagers from the Afungi Peninsula, where the government had approved the location of the onshore LNG processing plant.¹¹⁶ The relocation caused a significant disruption in the villagers' daily lives by forcing many to travel significantly greater distances to get to fishing operations and restricting intertidal fishing.¹¹⁷ These new challenges motivated many to move to villages elsewhere along the coast.¹¹⁸ The influx of additional artisanal fishermen in these finite number of villages would increase the pressure on local fisheries that were still accessible.

In addition to the resettlement, the local population expressed dismay over the government never implementing programs to train them to be employed in the LNG industry.¹¹⁹ Their frustration was directed specifically at the fact that in 2018 an estimated 2000 foreign workers would be arriving to work the NG development in the area, along with confirmation that thousands more would be coming over the coming years.

Surveys conducted during this timeframe seem to convey a sentiment of discouragement throughout Cabo Delgado, as the responses on “job creation” went from 3% saying it was “very bad” in the 2014–2015 survey to 38.5% in 2017–2018. A similar change can be seen in response to “present living conditions,” going from 1% to 16.8% of those surveyed responding “very bad” (Figure 2).¹²⁰ Anadarko also conducted interviews with locals between 2014 and 2015 and found growing frustration among the local

¹¹⁵ Annie Wu Wu Chris Zheng, Ting Zhang, Zhou, “Extractive Urbanism: Social and Territorial Fragmentation in Mozambique’s Energy Extraction Landscape,” *Conflict Urbanism*, Spring 2020, April 20, 2020, https://centerforspatialresearch.github.io/conflict_urbanism_sp2020/2020/04/30/Wu-Annie-Wu-Zhou-Zhang-Ting-Zheng-Chris.html.

¹¹⁶ Mozambique LNG, “Resettlement,” Mozambique LNG, accessed November 3, 2021, <https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/sustainability/resettlement>.

¹¹⁷ Wu, “Extractive Urbanism: Social and Territorial Fragmentation in Mozambique’s Energy Extraction Landscape.”

¹¹⁸ Wu.

¹¹⁹ Dorina A Bekoe, Stephanie M Burchard, and Sarah A Daly, *Extremism in Mozambique: Interpreting Group Tactics and the Role of the Government’s Response in the Crisis in Cabo Delgado*, IDA Document NS D-13156 (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2020), 18–19.

¹²⁰ Afrobarometer data.

population.¹²¹ Their complaints focused on a lack of compensation for reduced access to fisheries and farming land. During that time, the locals' concerns appear to have a sense of urgency due to their fear of starvation.¹²² Concerns of the people within the area began shifting from the water supply and health as their two primary concerns to unemployment and the economy.¹²³

5. Locations of Attacks

The final factor is the initial location of violence with Cabo Delgado. On October 5, 2017, the first attack attributed to IS-Mozambique took place in the port town of Mocimboa da Praia (Figure 3).¹²⁴ The attack was directed at police stations in the town.¹²⁵ Located approximately 35 miles south of the Afungi peninsula, Mocimboa da Praia is the primary port for shipping regional supplies, including those used to build up the onshore NG infrastructure.¹²⁶ Local law enforcement repulsed these initial attacks. In 2020, IS-Mozambique came back and occupied Mocimboa da Praia.¹²⁷

¹²¹ Bekoe, Stephanie M Burchard, and Sarah A Daly, *Extremism in Mozambique: Interpreting Group Tactics and the Role of the Government's Response in the Crisis in Cabo Delgado*, 18.

¹²² Bekoe, Stephanie M Burchard, and Sarah A Daly, 18.

¹²³ Afrobarometer data.

¹²⁴ Adapted from Clionadh Raleigh et al., *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique*.

¹²⁵ Clionadh Raleigh et al.

¹²⁶ Emilia Columbo, "Insurgency Marks New Milestone in Coastal Attack in Northern Mozambique," Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 14, 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/insurgency-marks-new-milestone-coastal-attack-northern-mozambique>.

¹²⁷ "Mocimboa Da Praia: Mozambican Ghost Town after Jihadists Ejected," France 24, August 13, 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210813-mocimboa-da-praia-mozambican-ghost-town-after-jihadists-ejected>.




Figure 3. Attacks in Cabo Delgado by Year¹²⁸

C. RUBY BACKGROUND

Roughly concurrent to the discovery of NG, Cabo Delgado experienced the discovery of the world’s largest ruby deposit in the province’s interior near Montepuez. Yet, from 2017 until the present, nearly all the Islamist-related attacks in Cabo Delgado have occurred along the coast, with little to no incidences inland near the ruby mines.

In early 2008, artisanal miners discovered gem-quality rubies within the Niassa National Reserve in the province of Niassa near the border with Tanzania.¹²⁹ Because of the protected status of the Niassa National Reserve, the mining operations were illegal and were eventually shut down by the government in 2009.¹³⁰ Later in 2009, a local from Namahaca village in Cabo Delgado discovered a ruby while looking for firewood.¹³¹ The advantage of this discovery was that it was located outside of protected lands and near

¹²⁸ Adapted from Clionadh Raleign et al.

¹²⁹ Vincent Pardieu et al., *Expedition Report to the Ruby Mining Sites in Northern Mozambique (Niassa and Cabo Delgado Provinces)* (Bangkok: GIA Laboratory, 2009), 6.

¹³⁰ Pardieu et al., 7.

¹³¹ Pardieu et al., 36.

Montepuez, the second-largest city in Cabo Delgado, approximately 50 miles inland.¹³² The ruby deposits outside Montepuez offered an excellent opportunity for development due to their proximity to an urban center for processing and shipping.¹³³

National elections and lack of technical knowledge delayed the development of the ruby fields.¹³⁴ In 2009, Mozambique conducted its fourth presidential election following its civil war in 1992. This was the first national election in which “elections were also held for newly created and directly elected provincial assemblies developed as part of a general decentralization reform plan.”¹³⁵ The election cycle likely played a significant role in FRELIMO not wanting to disrupt local politics.¹³⁶ The government allowed local artisanal miners to operate unimpeded out of caution toward disrupting the status quo.¹³⁷ Even if the government or domestic corporate entities had wanted to develop the ruby mines, there was not sufficient technical knowledge to initially do so effectively.¹³⁸

Following the 2009 elections, Mwiriti, a local company, acquired the mining rights to the deposits in the area and, in 2011, partnered with the UK-based company Gemfields to form Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM). MRM became the dominant mining company in the region and would take the lead in developing the ruby deposits.¹³⁹ From 2012 to 2016, MRM and two other commercial mining companies, Fura Gems and Mustang Resources, would come to control most mining rights in the area, effectively pushing artisanal miners out of the industry. In 2016, it became a criminal offense for artisanal

¹³² “Montepuez (District, Mozambique) - Population Statistics, Charts, Map and Location,” City Population, August 2017, https://www.citypopulation.de/en/mozambique/admin/cabo_delgado/0211__montepuez/.

¹³³ Wim Vertriest and Sudarat Saeseaw, “A Decade of Ruby from Mozambique: A Review,” *Gems & Gemology* 55, no. 2 (August 1, 2019): 166, <https://doi.org/10.5741/GEMS.55.2.162>.

¹³⁴ Vertriest and Saeseaw, 165.

¹³⁵ Robert LLoyd, *Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Mozambique* (Freedom House, 2011), 2, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/MozambiqueFINAL.pdf.

¹³⁶ LLoyd, 2.

¹³⁷ Vertriest and Saeseaw, “A Decade of Ruby from Mozambique,” 165.

¹³⁸ Merilee Chapin, Vincent Pardieu, and Andrew Lucas, “Mozambique: A Ruby Discovery for the 21st Century,” *Gems & Gemology* 51 (May 1, 2015): 44–54, <https://doi.org/10.5741/GEMS.51.1.44>.

¹³⁹ Vertriest and Saeseaw, “A Decade of Ruby from Mozambique,” 166.

miners who did not have a permit to mine rubies. Violations could lead to severe punishments.¹⁴⁰

D. COUNTERFACTUAL – RUBY MINES

Development of the ruby mines did not create the kinds of economic impacts—and grievances—that are likely to propel violence. Specifically, the ruby development was different from the NG development in its overall size of operations, employment of locals, the continuation of illegal (artisan) mining operations, and a legal settlement resulting in financial compensation for locals. As this section shows, these differences are important for understanding why the NG developments on the coast were more likely to have produced economic grievances.

The first significant difference between the development of rubies and NG in Cabo Delgado is that ruby mining operations are smaller than the NG developments. Most ruby mining operations utilize a limited number of excavation vehicles and equipment and operate in open mining pits with dimensions that measure in the hundreds of meters. The LNG industry impacts an area measured in kilometers along the coastal region. Additionally, once the ruby mining operations are complete, the operators can restore the land to be utilized as plantations.¹⁴¹ Ultimately, the mining operations have less of a lasting impact on the local region due to their limited size and the ability to return the land to its prior use.

The second difference was the hiring of locals for mining operations. For MRM, the largest industrial mining company in the area, it is reported that of the approximately 600 employees, “about 90% of MRM’s employees are local inhabitants.”¹⁴² The fact that

¹⁴⁰ Vertriest and Saeseaw, 166.

¹⁴¹ Wim Vertriest and Pardieu Vincent, *Update on Gemstone Mining in Northern Mozambique* | *Gems & Gemology*, Gems and Geology, Winter 2016, Vol. 52, No. 4 (GIA, 2016), <http://www.gia.edu/sites/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1495237971395&childpagename=GIA/Page/GGArticleDetail&pagename=GIA/Wrapper&WRAPPERPAGE=GIA/Wrapper>.

¹⁴² “Mozambique: A Ruby Discovery for the 21st Century,” accessed November 7, 2021, <http://www.gia.eduhttps://www.gia.edu/gia-news-research-mozambique-expedition-ruby-discovery-new-millennium>.

most of those employed are locals reduces the perception that outsiders benefit disproportionately from the increases in job creation.

A third difference was the continuation of artisanal mining. Artisanal mining has historically taken place in the region, and while there were initially conflicts in 2009 through 2011 between the local miners and companies, these seem to have decreased.¹⁴³ Part of the reason for the decrease in the conflict between the two groups is companies' reduced concern of keeping artisanal miners out of the area and accepting them on the fringes of the large-scale operations. Another critical factor in reducing conflict between mining companies and local miners has been "providing alternative income through clearing roads and building infrastructure."¹⁴⁴ By accommodating the local miners, whose extraction does not significantly impact overall mine revenue, and employing locals directly or indirectly, the ruby mines have alleviated some local communities' concerns.

Lastly, in the one significant relocation in the region to accommodate the mining operations, the people the government moved had their grievances addressed through legal representation. In 2015, journalists reported human rights violations from 2011–2015 around the Montepuez mining operations.¹⁴⁵ Eventually, in 2018, 200 Mozambicans brought a case to the London High Court, which ultimately resulted in an US\$8.3 million-dollar settlement paid out to claimants in 2019.¹⁴⁶ In addition to the final settlement, Gemfields agreed to set up a grievance panel to adjudicate issues between the mining companies and locals.¹⁴⁷ Together, the legal claims, payouts, and grievance panel have

¹⁴³ Vertriest and Vincent, *Update on Gemstone Mining in Northern Mozambique | Gems & Gemology*.

¹⁴⁴ Vertriest and Vincent.

¹⁴⁵ Joseph Hanlon, "Ruby Miner Gemfields to Pay \$8.3 Mn to Settle Montepuez Torture and Murder Claims," *Mozambique News Reports & Clippings*, January 29, 2019, 2, https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_436-29Jan2019_Gemfields_PolComm_Samito.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ Joseph Hanlon, 2; "Gemfields Settles UK Claim over Alleged Human Rights Abuses at Ruby Mine in Mozambique for £5.8 Million; Co. Denies Liability," *Business & Human Rights Resource Centre*, last modified January 27, 2019, <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/gemfields-settles-uk-claim-over-alleged-human-rights-abuses-at-ruby-mine-in-mozambique-for-58-million-co-denies-liability/>.

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Hanlon, "Ruby Miner Gemfields to Pay \$8.3 Mn to Settle Montepuez Torture and Murder Claims," 1.

helped citizens to have their grievances heard and ensure that they will receive additional compensation should future disagreements between locals and the mining firms arise, thus reducing the prospect of violence.

E. CONCLUSION

There appears to be moderate support for Hypothesis 2, which states that grievances based on economic disparity contribute to the rise of IS-Mozambique; however, it does not conclusively explain the rise of violence in Cabo Delgado. As the NG projects moved into the region, inequalities between foreign workers and locals became more apparent. Public opinion in the area trended negatively on questions relating to the economy, indicating that locals were initially somewhat satisfied but grew more frustrated as the project progressed. Eventually, the arrival of external workers, the displacement of coastal communities, and the increased pressures on fisheries generated grievances that the residents of Cabo Delgado would not be the primary beneficiaries of the NG developments. In addition, the timing and location of attacks on Mocimboa da Praia in 2017 suggest some linkage between NG development and violence. These attacks coincided with the government's final approval of NG operations, and the port that was attacked is vital for bringing in the necessary resources for the NG operations. The investigation into the ruby mines around Montepuez—where economic grievances were not as serious—underscores the potential role of resource-induced economic grievances. The involvement of the local population in the development of the ruby mines, the ability of locals to maintain their livelihoods, and the opportunity for locals to have legal recourse underscore the importance of a more equitable distribution of economic benefits as a mitigating factor to violence.

The evidence for Hypothesis 2 is limited by the fact that the widespread grievances related to NG development did not produce more mobilization or violence on the part of the population of Cabo Delgado. In the next chapter, my analysis of Hypothesis 3 underscores that environmental factors proved even less sufficient in explaining the rise of IS-Mozambique within Cabo Delgado.

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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL GRIEVANCES IN CABO DELGADO

A. INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter, I focused on the possibility that economic grievances have contributed to the rise of IS-Mozambique in Cabo Delgado. This chapter will focus on another set of grievances—those focused on the impacts of environmental crises and inadequate government response to them.¹⁴⁸ Environmental stresses in the region have negatively impacted populations that rely on a subsistence economy. Threats to locals’ livelihoods due to climate change coupled with the perception of inadequate government response can increase the risk of violence.¹⁴⁹ This chapter examines whether environmental factors played a role in the rise of IS-Mozambique in Cabo Delgado. While environmental factors may have increased grievances more recently, this chapter’s analysis argues that no evidence exists that they contributed to the rise of IS-Mozambique in the mid-2010s.

In 2019, Mozambique was the number one country most affected by extreme weather in the world and ranked fifth on “The Long-Term Climate Risk Index (CRI)” of the top 10 countries most affected between 2000 and 2019 per the “Global Climate Risk Index 2021.”¹⁵⁰ Due to the potential severity of environmental impacts on Cabo Delgado, there may be local grievances against the central government for providing inadequate support. To examine Hypothesis 3, “*Environmental crises in Cabo Delgado coupled with an inequitable government response have increased grievances among the population in Cabo Delgado, leading to radicalization,*” I focus on the impacts on Cabo Delgado from

¹⁴⁸ Shannon Brincat, “The Insurgency in Cabo Delgado,” Africa is a Country, April 30, 2022, <https://africasacountry.com/2020/04/the-insurgency-in-cabo-delgado>; Stephanie Meek and Minenhle Nene, *Exploring Resource and Climate Drivers of Conflict in Northern Mozambique*, SAIIA Policy Briefing No 245 (South Africa: SAIIA, 2021), <https://saiia.org.za/research/exploring-resource-and-climate-drivers-of-conflict-in-northern-mozambique/>.

¹⁴⁹ T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, eds., *What Do We Know about Civil Wars?* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 231–32.

¹⁵⁰ David Eckstein, Kunzel, Vera, and Laura Schafer, “Global Climate Risk Index 2021 Who Suffers Most Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000–2019,” *Global Climate Risk Index 2021* (Germanwatch, 2021), 8, 13, <https://www.germanwatch.org/en/19777>.

the four leading natural hazards: cyclones, floods, droughts, and epidemics.¹⁵¹ After discussing the damages from natural hazards, I then assess the central government’s response. I analyze the Cabo Delgado population’s survey responses to questions about trust in the government before and after natural hazards to assess whether there is support for Hypothesis 3. To further assess the potential for environmental grievances in Cabo Delgado, I also assess the provinces of Nampula and Niassa using the same metrics (refer to Figure 4).¹⁵² Nampula and Niassa provide strong test for the hypothesis due to their proximity to Cabo Delgado and similar demographics.



Figure 4. Map of Mozambique¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ “World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal,” World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2021, <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/>.

¹⁵² Adapted from Vasco F. J. Cumbe et al., “Validity and Item Response Theory Properties of the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 for Primary Care Depression Screening in Mozambique (PHQ-9-MZ),” *BMC Psychiatry* 20, no. 1 (December 2020): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-020-02772-0>.

¹⁵³ Adapted from Cumbe et al., 5.

B. BACKGROUND OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique's leading natural disasters are cyclones, floods, droughts, and epidemics.¹⁵⁴ Such natural disasters are often related to one another, with cyclones bringing large amounts of rain after a seasonal drought that leads to flooding.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, local communities are exposed to disease when they cannot adequately address the aftereffects of natural disasters that hit.¹⁵⁶

Historically, the leading natural disaster in Mozambique, as measured by the size of the potential population affected, are cyclones.¹⁵⁷ Approximately 60% of Mozambique's population is based along the coast and is directly exposed to cyclones. Historically, one to two significant cyclones per annum impact Mozambique.¹⁵⁸ Annual damages from cyclones typically range from \$70 million to \$100 million. The coastal provinces of Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, and Inhambane are traditionally the most at-risk portions of Mozambique (refer to Figure 4).¹⁵⁹ The 2019 cyclones of Idai and Kenneth and the 2021 cyclone of Eloise have been among the most devastating in Mozambique's history. Specifically, Cyclone Idai was one of the most catastrophic storms to hit the region.¹⁶⁰ One month later, Cyclone Kenneth would make landfall, making it the first time two "high-intensity" cyclones have impacted Mozambique in one storm season.¹⁶¹ Cyclone Eloise in 2021 affected more than 500,000 people and destroyed upwards of

¹⁵⁴ World Bank Group, "World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal."

¹⁵⁵ Neha Wadekar, "Four Ways Mozambique Is Adapting to the Climate Crisis," *The New Humanitarian*, November 1, 2021, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/11/1/four-ways-mozambique-is-adapting-to-the-climate-crisis>.

¹⁵⁶ Stephanie Meek and Minenhle Nene, *Exploring Resource and Climate Drivers of Conflict in Northern Mozambique*.

¹⁵⁷ Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Staff, *Disaster Risk Profile Mozambique*, The World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2019), 5.

¹⁵⁸ Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Staff, 6, 13.

¹⁵⁹ Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Staff, 7.

¹⁶⁰ Serafino Afonso Rui Mucova et al., "Approaching Sea-Level Rise (SLR) Change: Strengthening Local Responses to Sea-Level Rise and Coping with Climate Change in Northern Mozambique," *Journal of Marine Science and Engineering* 9, no. 2 (February 16, 2021): 3, <https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse9020205>.

¹⁶¹ Mucova et al., 3.

56,000 structures, as many residents were still trying to recover from the cyclones that had hit in 2019.¹⁶²

Floods are the next most common event and predominantly occur in the central part of Mozambique, which typically experiences periods of drought followed by large amounts of rain.¹⁶³ Figure 5 illustrates the 50-year flood risk throughout Mozambique, with the most concentrated risk area in the central region of Mozambique, specifically in the Sofala province. Flood damage “based on the annual average, affect [s] 122,000 inhabitants and inflict [s] (estimated) US\$440 million in damages.”¹⁶⁴



Figure 5. Flood Map of Mozambique¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Neha Wadekar, “Four Ways Mozambique Is Adapting to the Climate Crisis.”

¹⁶³ Alberto F. Mavume et al., “Analysis of Climate Change Projections for Mozambique under the Representative Concentration Pathways,” *Atmosphere* 12, no. 5 (May 1, 2021): 6, <https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos12050588>.

¹⁶⁴ GFDRR, *Financial Protection against Disasters in Mozambique* (The World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Ministerio da Economia e Financas (Mozambique), 2018), 16, <https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/publication/bm-brochura-pfc-en.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Adapted from World Bank Group, “World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal.”

Droughts are the third most significant naturally occurring hazard in Mozambique in occurrence and particularly affect the country's southern regions. The annual cost of droughts is (estimated) US\$20 million in lost crops.¹⁶⁶ While cyclones have the potential to affect 60% of the population annually, historically, droughts occur less frequently but actually affect a much larger portion of the population. Based on 50 years of World Bank Estimates, over 19.7 million individuals have been affected by droughts in Mozambique, compared to 9.5 million for floods and 3.6 million for storms.¹⁶⁷ The provinces most impacted by droughts have been the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane and the central province of Tete (refer to Figure 4).¹⁶⁸ The most recent large-scale drought in Mozambique occurred in 2015–2016. During that drought, the southern portion of Mozambique experienced large-scale crop failure. In contrast, the northern part of the country experienced average to above-average harvest.¹⁶⁹

While natural disasters cause damage to the physical environment, inadequate medical or reconstruction efforts can result in disease outbreaks.¹⁷⁰ Other than HIV/AIDs, cholera is one of the leading diseases in Mozambique and is among the topmost affected countries in the world for cholera outbreaks.¹⁷¹ Historically, Mozambique experiences cholera outbreaks during its rainy season, when flooding is more likely to occur.¹⁷² While Cholera outbreaks do take place countrywide, they typically occur in the northern or central portions of the country.¹⁷³ Niassa and Nampula have been the most affected provinces in

¹⁶⁶ GFDRR, *Financial Protection against Disasters in Mozambique*, 9.

¹⁶⁷ GFDRR, 15.

¹⁶⁸ GFDRR, 16.

¹⁶⁹ World Bank Group, “*Strong but Not Broadly Shared Growth*” *Mozambique Poverty Assessment*, 78.

¹⁷⁰ Neha Wadekar, “Four Ways Mozambique Is Adapting to the Climate Crisis.”

¹⁷¹ Edgar Manuel Cambaza et al., “An Update on Cholera Studies in Mozambique,” in *Healthcare Access Regional Overviews* (London: IntechOpen, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88431>.

¹⁷² P. Cavailler et al., “Feasibility of a Mass Vaccination Campaign Using a Two-Dose Oral Cholera Vaccine in an Urban Cholera-Endemic Setting in Mozambique☆,” *Vaccine* 24, no. 22 (May 29, 2006): 4890–95, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2005.10.006>.

¹⁷³ Cambaza et al., “An Update on Cholera Studies in Mozambique.”

the northern region. Additionally, in the central region, Sofala, with the port city of Beira, is routinely affected by significant cholera outbreaks.¹⁷⁴

C. NATURAL HAZARDS IN CABO DELGADO AS A SOURCE OF GRIEVANCE

Arguably if the public holds the perception that its government has not responded sufficiently to natural disasters, it could lead to their radicalization. Shannon Brincat claims “that the dramatic increase in extreme weather events in this region has produced a nearly permanent humanitarian crisis in recent years” and that the people of Cabo Delgado are “highly vulnerable” to environmental factors due to the population’s dependency on subsistence farming and fishing.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, Meek and Nene’s report for the South African Institute for International Affairs states that Cabo Delgado is susceptible to droughts and floods, making the region’s population possibly aggrieved against the government for its perceived lack of response.¹⁷⁶ This section investigates the potential linkages between environmental factors and the rise of radicalization. To determine these links, I first look at historical weather patterns in Cabo Delgado since 2000. Second, I assess government support to the region. Lastly, I evaluate public perceptions of government response to climate factors.

1. Environmental Impacts on Cabo Delgado

To determine if environmental factors cause grievances in the region, I first review the past two decades of weather that have impacted Cabo Delgado. Between 2000 and 2012, Cabo Delgado experienced 12 natural disasters, the third-fewest among Mozambique’s 11 Provinces.¹⁷⁷ After 2012, only eight natural hazards impacted Cabo

¹⁷⁴ Cambaza et al.; Floriano Amimo et al., “Public Health Risks of Humanitarian Crises in Mozambique,” *Journal of Global Health* 11 (2021): 1, <https://doi.org/10.7189/jogh.11.03054>.

¹⁷⁵ Brincat, “The Insurgency in Cabo Delgado.”

¹⁷⁶ Stephanie Meek and Minenhle Nene, *Exploring Resource and Climate Drivers of Conflict in Northern Mozambique*.

¹⁷⁷ GFDRR, *Financial Protection against Disasters in Mozambique*, 16; EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – *Www.Emdat.Be*, EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – www.emdat.be (Natural, Mozambique, 2000 - 2021), accessed December 24, 2021, <https://public.emdat.be/data>.

Delgado, two of them being cyclones that made landfall in 2019, two years after the first IS-Mozambique attacks. Out of the 20 natural disasters, the most common were floods (10), followed by cholera outbreaks (7). Except for a cholera outbreak in 2013 that resulted in two deaths, none of these events were exclusive to Cabo Delgado; most impacted other provinces in the vicinity.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, these 20 events were spread out over time, with no year having more than two events. Moreover, the death tolls from these events were low, with flooding in 2016 causing 160 deaths regionally, the single highest event. The 2016 flooding took place in multiple provinces, making it unlikely that all deaths occurred in Cabo Delgado.¹⁷⁹

The drought of 2015–2016 was one of the most significant natural disasters to impact the country in terms of human lives lost. Cabo Delgado, however, went relatively unscathed during the drought, and in some of its districts, its agriculture harvest was above average.¹⁸⁰

In 2019, several weeks after Cyclone Idai struck the center portion of the country, Cyclone Kenneth struck Cabo Delgado and the northern half of Mozambique. Cyclone Kenneth is estimated to have had the most significant impact on those living in poverty, with more than 200,000 people displaced throughout the region. Ultimately, damage from the cyclone is estimated to have cost more than 34% of Cabo Delgado’s GDP.¹⁸¹ Despite the severity of these storms, they did not occur until 2019, two years after the first attacks by IS-Mozambique. It is possible that the storms could have increased grievances and encouraged local populations to join the insurgency; however, they cannot be linked to the start of the violence.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – [Wwww.Emdat.Be](http://www.emdat.be).

¹⁷⁹ EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – [Wwww.Emdat.Be](http://www.emdat.be).

¹⁸⁰ World Bank Group, “*Strong but Not Broadly Shared Growth*” *Mozambique Poverty Assessment*, 78.

¹⁸¹ The World Bank, *Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Kenneth Emergency Recovery and Resilience Project*, PIDA26977 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2019), 7.

¹⁸² Stephanie Meek and Minenhle Nene, *Exploring Resource and Climate Drivers of Conflict in Northern Mozambique*.

Cholera outbreaks in 2008, 2011, and 2013 are the only natural disasters that have been directly linked to violence in Cabo Delgado. Approximately 19,952 people were affected by the disease, resulting in 170 deaths.¹⁸³ In some instances, residents of Cabo Delgado, out of distrust of health workers based on false information, rioted each time there was a cholera outbreak.¹⁸⁴ FRELIMO officials accused RENAMO political opponents from Cabo Delgado of spreading false information during these incidents.¹⁸⁵ The riots were never widespread across the province, however, and while property was damaged, only two fatalities occurred, both of whom were FRELIMO government officials.¹⁸⁶ None of these events were linked to Islamist groups in the area.¹⁸⁷ The implication is that during the lead-up to violence in 2017, most natural disasters in Mozambique neither struck Cabo Delgado nor created an outsized effect in the region.

2. Government Response to Disaster in Cabo Delgado

The second factor assessed is the government response to natural disasters within Cabo Delgado and whether the response has been different from other regions. The National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) centrally manages disaster mitigation in Mozambique.¹⁸⁸ Due to the resource limitations of Mozambique, the responsibilities of the INGC were to both obtain regional support and manage aid from abroad.¹⁸⁹ The INGC designed Local Risk Management Committees (CLGRC) to compensate for the lack of resources by training and equipping locals to assist with disaster preparedness.¹⁹⁰ As of

¹⁸³ EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – *Www.Emdat.Be*.

¹⁸⁴ Clionadh Raleigh et al., *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique*.

¹⁸⁵ “Mozambique: Renamo Accused of Cholera Riots,” *AllAfrica*, Last modified March 16, 2013, sec. News, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201303160094.html>.

¹⁸⁶ Clionadh Raleigh et al., *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique*.

¹⁸⁷ Clionadh Raleigh et al.

¹⁸⁸ World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, *Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000–2013*, Recovery Framework Case Study (World Bank Group, 2014), 4, <https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/publication/rfcs-2014-mozambique.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 6.

¹⁹⁰ World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 13.

2017, Cabo Delgado had 59 CLGRCs with 891 committee members.¹⁹¹ The number of CLGRCs in Cabo Delgado is equal per capita to the rest of the northern region provinces.

With the limited number of natural disasters affecting Cabo Delgado, I used the 2014 World Bank report, “Mozambique Public Expenditure Review,” to provide background information on health and related expenditures to measure government response per region.¹⁹²

The World Bank report compiled data from 2009 to 2012. Per the World Bank report, Cabo Delgado received the highest per capita funds transfer from the central to the provincial government at approximately 2500 metical per capita.¹⁹³ The report indicated that the central government neither limited funds to Cabo Delgado compared to other provinces nor limited their support to the province when a disaster occurred.

Government response to Cabo Delgado does not seem to be limited in any manner that would suggest they are less favored than other provinces. The evidence also suggests that even if Cabo Delgado received less government support, more in line with the provinces around it, this would not be a likely indicator of future violence. As evidenced in the latter part of this chapter, the provinces in proximity to Cabo Delgado historically have less government support while having similar demographics, still without the violence experienced in Cabo Delgado.

3. Public Perceptions

Lastly, to assess whether environmental disasters generated grievances among the population, I turn to Afrobarometer data; however, no data exist relating to environmental impacts preceding 2017. In 2018, Afrobarometer surveys covered perceptions relating to climate change, droughts, and flooding.¹⁹⁴ If Cabo Delgado has been experiencing severe

¹⁹¹ The World Bank, *Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Kenneth Emergency Recovery and Resilience Project*, 8.

¹⁹² Enrique Blanco Armas, *Mozambique Public Expenditure Review*, 91153-MZ (The World Bank, 2014), 117, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/677921468275102771/pdf/911530ESW0P1300385389B00PUBLIC00ACS.pdf>.

¹⁹³ Enrique Blanco Armas, 117.

¹⁹⁴ Afrobarometer data.

weather with a limited government response, we should expect to see a high level of grievances related to weather impacts. Overall, the survey data shows that the Cabo Delgado population sees the effects of climate change as less severe than those in other provinces. The opinions of the population in Cabo Delgado, when reviewed in the context of specific weather events, further illustrate that Cabo Delgado is not an outlier compared to the rest of the nation.

Cabo Delgado's respondents' feedback on the effects of climate change on agriculture was in line with the overall national average. National respondents had about 40% favorable responses, and 23% of national respondents responded unfavorably. Comparatively, Cabo Delgado also had about 40% favorable responses, and 19% responded unfavorably (refer to Figure 6).¹⁹⁵ When explicitly asked about droughts over the last ten years, Cabo Delgado's responses were more favorable than national ones. Specifically, 41% of Cabo Delgado respondents said the severity of droughts was either "less severe" or much "less severe" compared to the national average of 31% for the same questions.¹⁹⁶ Inversely, 25% of Cabo Delgado respondents said the severity had gotten worse, whereas nationally, the number was 32%.¹⁹⁷ While Cabo Delgado respondents feel less strongly about droughts than the average national respondents, flooding, however, reflected more negative responses. Flooding responses among the Cabo Delgado population are more negative than national averages, with 54% saying flooding conditions had either stayed the same or had become less severe, compared to 63% nationally.¹⁹⁸ In Cabo Delgado, 28% of residents said that flood conditions have gotten worse, whereas the national average for the same question is 22%.¹⁹⁹


¹⁹⁵ Afrobarometer data.

¹⁹⁶ Afrobarometer data.

¹⁹⁷ Afrobarometer data.

¹⁹⁸ Afrobarometer data.

¹⁹⁹ Afrobarometer data.



R7 2016/2018: 193 participants in Cabo Delgado. 2392 participants in Mozambique.

Figure 6. Effects of Climate on Agriculture compared to 10 years ago²⁰⁰

To better determine if there is mistrust of the central government among the population of Cabo Delgado, I use Afrobarometer’s questions pertaining to “trust in the ruling party,” “trust in the national assembly,” and “trust in the president.”²⁰¹ The responses of Cabo Delgado’s population from 2002 to 2017 for “trust in the ruling party” held steady with positive feedback in the low to mid 80% and positive responses dropping to the low 60% range in the latest 2018 survey (refer to Figure 7).²⁰² Respondents’ reaction to “trust in the National Assembly” follows a similar pattern, with positive responses consistently ranging from 80–90% of respondents and dropping significantly to 49% in 2016 (refer to Figure 9).²⁰³ Respondents’ answers to “trust in the president” are


²⁰⁰ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.

²⁰¹ Afrobarometer data.

²⁰² Afrobarometer data.

²⁰³ Afrobarometer data.

consistently 90% positive and only dropped to 72% in the 2018 survey.²⁰⁴ However, when comparing individual responses from the 2018 survey, the correlation between levels of trust in the president, ruling party, and national assembly and respondents' assessments of the effects of climate change over the last ten years is consistently close to 0 (refer to Table 1).²⁰⁵ The negligible correlation coefficient reinforces the idea that the impact of weather in Cabo Delgado and trust in government do not go hand in hand.




R2 2002/2003: 119 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R3 2005/2006: 96 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R5 2011/2013: 185 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R6 2014/2015: 179 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R7 2016/2018: 190 participants in Cabo Delgado.

Figure 7. Trust in Ruling Party—Cabo Delgado²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ Afrobarometer data.

²⁰⁵ Afrobarometer data.

²⁰⁶ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.



R2 2002/2003: 1399 participants in Mozambique

R3 2005/2006: 1198 participants in Mozambique


R5 2011/2013: 2391 participants in Mozambique

R6 2014/2015: 2400 participants in Mozambique

R7 2016/2018: 2358 participants in Mozambique.

Figure 8. Trust in Ruling Party—Mozambique²⁰⁷


²⁰⁷ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.



R2 2002/2003: 119 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R3 2005/2006: 96 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R4 2008/2009: 93 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R5 2011/2013: 185 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R6 2014/2015: 179 participants in Cabo Delgado
 R7 2016/2018: 1192 participants in Cabo Delgado

Figure 9. Trust in National Assembly—Cabo Delgado²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.



- R2 2002/2003: 1399 participants in Mozambique
- R3 2005/2006: 1198 participants in Mozambique
- R4 2008/2009: 1090 participants in Mozambique
- R5 2011/2013: 2397 participants in Mozambique
- R6 2014/2015: 2400 participants in Mozambique
- R7 2016/2018: 2371 participants in Mozambique

Figure 10. Trust in National Assembly—Mozambique²⁰⁹

The compiled data indicates that within Cabo Delgado, there is no clear relationship between climate factors, government response, popular grievances, and the rise of IS-Mozambique (refer to Table 1).²¹⁰ The limited number of natural disasters shows that while Cabo Delgado is vulnerable to natural disasters, the region has generally fared better than most parts of Mozambique. The Mozambique government’s health spending per capita in Cabo Delgado shows that the province receives good support compared to the rest of the country. Public surveys also show that opinions about climate factors in Cabo Delgado were either more positive than the national average or close to it. The same surveys also show the population to be generally supportive of the government (refer to

²⁰⁹ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.

²¹⁰ Afrobarometer data.

Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10).²¹¹ These factors indicate little to no correlation between environmental factors and the start of violence in Cabo Delgado.

Table 1. Correlation Coefficient for 2018 Climate and Trust²¹²

	Trust in President - Cabo Delgado	Trust in National Assembly - Cabo Delgado	Trust in Ruling Party - Cabo Delgado
Climate conditions compared to 10 years ago	r= 0.069	r= 0.077	r= 0.059
Severity of droughts in the last 10 years	r= 0.008	r= 0.079	r= 0.118
Severity of floods in the last 10 years	r= 0.223	r= 0.223	r= 0.195

D. NAMPULA AND NIASSA AND NATURAL DISASTERS

If environmental factors indicate higher probabilities of violence, then it is likely that provinces with similar traits would experience the same type of conflict as Cabo Delgado. I selected Nampula and Niassa as comparable provinces to Cabo Delgado because of their similar demographics and geographic proximity. The three provinces of Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa comprise the northern region of Mozambique. Cabo Delgado and Nampula are the only coastal provinces out of the three.²¹³ In addition to the similarity of their demographics (refer to Table 2), the primary household material of houses in all three provinces is predominantly over 80% thatch roofing with more than 85% mud exteriors.²¹⁴ These statistics show that Cabo Delgado is not unique in its demographics within the northern region of Mozambique.

²¹¹ Adapted from Afrobarometer data.

²¹² Adapted from Afrobarometer data.

²¹³ Mucova et al., “Approaching Sea-Level Rise (SLR) Change,” 5.

²¹⁴ COWI Lda, *Baseline Study Mozambique*, 16027-A (Maputo, Mozambique: Cunguara/YABE/IP CA, 2017), 50.

Table 2. Northern Provinces of Mozambique²¹⁵

Province	Population	Muslim Population	Illiteracy Rate	GDP per capita USD	Salaried Employees per-Household
Cabo Delgado	2.3 Million	59%	66.6%	MZN 4735 (~\$74USD)	1.1%
Nampula	6.1 Million	45%	60.9%	MZN 5984 (~\$94USD)	2.1%
Niassa	1.8 Million	62%	61%	MZN 5004 (~\$78USD)	1.7%
Mozambique	31.2 Million	18%	39.3%	MZN 28729 (\$450USD)	N/A

1. Nampula

Since 2000, Nampula has experienced 29 natural hazard events, of which seven were Cholera outbreaks.²¹⁶ Nampula, like Cabo Delgado, has only experienced violence directly relating to cholera outbreaks.²¹⁷ Approximately 50,669 people were affected by cholera, with 368 deaths. The violence in Nampula corresponded to 2008, 2009, and 2011 cholera outbreaks. The five violent events in 2009–2010 directly related to the cholera outbreak and reflected the same sentiments as in Cabo Delgado with a distrust of medical officials and resulted in 13 fatalities.²¹⁸

The responses of the surveyed populations in Nampula on Afrobarometer are more negative in two environmental categories—floods and impacts of climate change—compared to Cabo Delgado.²¹⁹ Thirty-nine percent of Nampula respondents stated that the severity

²¹⁵ Assembled from Knoema, “Cabo Delgado Província - Mozambique | Data and Statistics”; Knoema, “Niassa Província - Mozambique | Data and Statistics - Knoema.Com,” Knoema, accessed May 16, 2022, <https://knoema.com/atlas/Mozambique/Niassa-provincia>; Knoema, “Nampula Província - Mozambique | Data and Statistics - Knoema.Com,” Knoema, accessed May 16, 2022, <https://knoema.com/atlas/Mozambique/Nampula-provincia>.

²¹⁶ *EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – Wwww.Emdat.Be.*

²¹⁷ Clionadh Raleign et al., *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Africa 1997–2021 Cabo Delgado – Mozambique.*

²¹⁸ Clionadh Raleign et al.

²¹⁹ Afrobarometer data.

of flooding had gotten worse in the last ten years compared to 28% of respondents from Cabo Delgado.²²⁰ Nampula's respondents' responses to overall climate conditions over the previous ten years are slightly more negative yet close to those of Cabo Delgado. Twenty percent of Nampula's respondents say climate conditions have worsened compared to 17% of Cabo Delgado's respondents. The two provinces are similar in their response to droughts, with Cabo Delgado having 25% responding negatively and Nampula having 19% responding negatively.²²¹

According to the World Bank report from 2014, Nampula received approximately 1200 metical per capita less from the government than Cabo Delgado.²²² In addition to less central government spending, Nampula had a higher percentage of those living below poverty than Cabo Delgado.²²³ Nampula also ranks below Cabo Delgado when assessing health-related spending per capita.²²⁴

Nampula's respondents' feedback regarding the central government trend was similar to Cabo Delgado's respondents, with slightly less positive feedback. When responding to "trust in the ruling party," positive responses range from around 65% in 2002, then peaking in 2011 at 79%, and tapering back down to 61% in 2018.²²⁵ Nampula's respondents' positive perceptions of the National Assembly start much lower than Cabo Delgado's; they peak in 2005 and 2008 at 83% and then taper back down to 54% in 2018.²²⁶ When looking at "trust in the president," the responses stay relatively consistent from 2002 to 2014, between 75% and 85%, with the most recent surveys dropping to 68% positive attitudes.²²⁷

²²⁰ Afrobarometer data.

²²¹ Afrobarometer data.

²²² Enrique Blanco Armas, *Mozambique Public Expenditure Review*, 116–17.

²²³ Enrique Blanco Armas, 116–17.

²²⁴ Enrique Blanco Armas, 118.

²²⁵ Afrobarometer data.

²²⁶ Afrobarometer data.

²²⁷ Afrobarometer data.

Nampula, when compared to Cabo Delgado, therefore weakens support for Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 suggests that, based on their demographics, their experience with natural disasters, their receipt of low levels of financial support from the government, and their dissatisfaction with the government, the people of Nampula should be more susceptible to radicalization by an Islamist group than the population of Cabo Delgado. To date, however, the people of Nampula have neither joined IS-Mozambique nor have they been targets of violence.

2. Niassa

While Niassa has experienced four natural disaster events since 2000—two floods, one cyclone, and one cholera outbreak—it suffered no outbreaks of violence.²²⁸ Despite the relatively low number of extreme weather events, Niassa, like Nampula, generally had more negative responses when surveyed on the impacts of natural hazards in their province.²²⁹ Niassa’s residents’ responses to the “impact of flooding” were not as positive as Cabo Delgado’s respondents, nor were their responses as unfavorable, with most responding that the impact “was the same.”²³⁰ The “impact of flooding” was the only category where Niassa was more positive than Cabo Delgado. More than 31% of Niassa’s respondents agreed that climate change had had negative impacts on agriculture compared to 18% of respondents in Cabo Delgado. Niassa respondents were also more negative when assessing the effects of droughts, with 33% saying that droughts had gotten worse compared to 25% in Cabo Delgado responding the same.²³¹ Of note about the question relating to droughts is that Cabo Delgado’s respondents were much more positive, with 41% saying droughts had become less severe. Niassa had 25% of respondents say the same.²³²

²²⁸ *EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – Wwww.Emdat.Be.*

²²⁹ Afrobarometer data.

²³⁰ Afrobarometer data.

²³¹ Afrobarometer data.

²³² Afrobarometer data.

According to the 2014 World Bank Report, Niassa received approximately 1800 metical per capita for disaster response, an amount that is in between those of Cabo Delgado and Nampula. With a poverty rate between the two provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula, the government's per capita expenditure seems realistic and is proportionally better than most of the other provinces in the country.²³³

Like Nampula, Niassa's population expresses lower levels of trust in the central government than does the population of Cabo Delgado. The survey responses from Niassa on the question of trust in the president, national assembly, and ruling party took significant drops in 2014. However, These drops in constituents' trust in the government do not coincide with any recorded natural hazard in the regions. Niassa, like Nampula, weakens the support for Hypothesis 3. Niassa's shared demographics with Cabo Delgado coupled with lower opinions of the government would indicate that Niassa's population would be more likely to radicalize, and like Nampula, this is not the case.

E. CONCLUSION

Hypothesis 3 lacks adequate support as an argument based on environmental grievances. Cabo Delgado has experienced fewer natural disasters than its neighboring provinces and much of Mozambique. The 20 natural disasters that did impact the region over 19 years, apart from the two cyclones in 2019, were minor in scale and only affected a small number of citizens in the province. The drops in trust in the central government do not seem to correlate to any specific natural disaster and may be due to changes in the political makeup of the central government after recent elections. Cyclones negatively impacted Cabo Delgado in 2019; however, these cyclones do not help explain the origins of IS-Mozambique or any of its growth in recruitment in the two years following its initial attacks. The lack of linkages between weather and violence, however, does not mean climate factors will not play a role in further radicalization within the region. As current literature states, the region is vulnerable to the impacts of hazardous weather. If hazardous

²³³ Enrique Blanco Armas, *Mozambique Public Expenditure Review*, 117.

weather becomes more common in the region, it could lead to the government becoming overwhelmed and unable to appropriately support its citizens.²³⁴

An examination of the other two provinces in northern Mozambique, Nampula and Niassa, further undercuts this hypothesis. Specifically, per the hypothesis, Nampula would be a more likely candidate for violence. It shares many of the same demographics as Cabo Delgado, while experiencing a more significant number of adverse environmental impacts. Yet, despite Nampula's larger population, less government funding, and a more substantial number of natural hazards, IS-Mozambique did not originate within the province, nor has it become active there since its founding.

²³⁴ Brincat, "The Insurgency in Cabo Delgado."

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V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to understand the causes of radicalization and the rise of IS-Mozambique within Cabo Delgado. The research investigated two schools of thought—political process and grievance-based theories—to identify the root causes of radicalization. This chapter will review the findings related to each of the three hypotheses, discuss theoretical implications, and provide policy recommendations.

One reason for studying political and economic grievance factors and their impact on the rise of IS-Mozambique is to determine how to allocate limited U.S. assets in ways that may help to stem violence. The preceding analysis shows that political factors represent the largest contributor to IS-Mozambique’s rise. While addressing economic grievances or providing greater safeguards against environmental factors may mitigate some potential recruits from joining IS-Mozambique, the focus of U.S. efforts would be best spent on helping Mozambique become a more democratically inclusive state.

A. FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1: Increased factionalism with a weakening democratic system contributes to radicalization in Cabo Delgado.

For Hypothesis 1, the evidence supports the argument that the Islamist group that eventually became IS-Mozambique was closed out of the political process in ways that very likely contributed to their radicalization and use of violence. In 2013, the renewed conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO would tax the government of Mozambique and provide the Islamists the opportunity to act in pursuit of their goals.²³⁵ Eventually, the mainstream Muslim group—CISLAMO—would label the Islamist sect a threat and work with the FRELIMO-led government to target and imprison members of the Islamist group.²³⁶ The actions of CISLAMO and the government would continue to inflame the Islamist narrative against the state.

²³⁵ Pitcher, “Mozambique Elections 2019,” 468.

²³⁶ Morier-Genoud, “The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique,” 402.

Hypothesis 2: A perceived increase in economic disparity in Cabo Delgado contributes to the radicalization of its local population.

For Hypothesis 2, there is moderate support for the hypothesis, as the conflict appears to have originated during a time of increased foreign investment and economic development in NG projects within Cabo Delgado. The population has expressed grievances relating to the lack of employment, opportunities going to outsiders, displacement of local people, and a lack of benefits from developing NG projects.

While these developments seem to coincide with growing economic disparity, indicating it may be a condition encouraging radicalization, economic grievances fail to comprehensively explain why less than 0.2% of the population actively participates in the insurgency when these grievances impact so many. The expectation would be that if there were widespread grievances among the population, there would be a clearer link between the aggrieved population and those joining IS-Mozambique.

Hypothesis 3: Environmental crises in Cabo Delgado coupled with an inequitable government response have increased grievances among the population in Cabo Delgado, leading to radicalization.

There is no explicit support for this hypothesis. During the research, I identified no correlation between environmental disasters, government response, and grievances among the population of Cabo Delgado. The lack of linkages between climate factors and violence does not mean climate factors will not play a role in further radicalization within the region.

While Hypothesis 1 has the most robust support as the root cause for the rise of IS-Mozambique, Hypotheses 2 and 3 should not be discounted. Hypothesis 2's moderate support indicates that IS-Mozambique's message of fighting against a corrupt regime may resonate with a portion of the population that could view joining IS-Mozambique as a way to express their grievances surrounding the inequitable development of the NG sector in the region. While Hypothesis 3 lacked explicit support, as of March 2022, there are over

700,000 displaced persons within Cabo Delgado due to weather and violence.²³⁷ Frustration among the people in Cabo Delgado may increase as they become more acutely aware of their exposure to environmental factors and a perceived lack of government response.

B. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The findings in this thesis reinforce the political process school of thought, which specifically states that, in a period of political transition, there is a higher likelihood of violence. Mozambique is neither a strong democracy nor a strong autocracy. It has effectively remained in a period of transition since the end of the civil war in the 1990s. Exclusion from the political process and repression from the state gave IS-Mozambique's members the motivation to act out in violence. The conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO created opportunities for the Islamists to act.

The research in this thesis advances the political process theory, especially in relation to democratizing countries endowed with abundant natural resources. The case of Mozambique suggests democratic development can be a long and arduous process for a country to undertake. As a country reinforces its institutions, the discovery or the development of abundant natural resources can increase the level of competition among political parties. If a country mismanages the developmental aspects of its resource discoveries, conflict could ensue and lead to a breakdown in previous democratic developments. With increased infighting in a country, marginalized groups without a viable political opportunity are likely to resort to other actions to pursue their interests. Future research should focus on the development of insurgency movements that begin concurrently with large resource discoveries in countries that are transitioning to more democratic forms of government.

This thesis found no definitive evidence that collective grievances led to group action. Hypotheses 2 and 3 show that collective grievances do exist, but there was no clear

²³⁷ Tavares Cebola, "Military Intervention Hasn't Stopped Mozambique's Jihadist Conflict," *The New Humanitarian*, March 8, 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict>.

linkage between violence and shared grievances. My analysis of Hypotheses 2 and 3 illustrates a gap in grievance theory in that it fails to fully explain why a grievance may motivate a small portion of a population to act when so many are likely to be affected by the same issues.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

On April 1, 2022, the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency of International Development jointly released the “The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability: Priority Countries and Regions.”²³⁸ This document highlights Mozambique as one of the regions of primary focus.²³⁹ I suggest three policy recommendations to align with the updated U.S. Strategy document.

The first policy recommendation, based on Hypothesis 1, is that with limited political options, and state repression, excluded groups may increasingly resort to violence if there is an opportunity. The U.S. should increase funding to support democracy and better governance within Mozambique, especially at the provincial and local levels. As of 2020, U.S. foreign funding to Mozambique was \$570 million.²⁴⁰ Of the \$570 million in foreign funding, only \$5.3 million was allocated to democracy and governance, which were among the lowest funded priorities to Mozambique.²⁴¹ The U.S. should not become involved with funding specific political parties within Mozambique; however, the U.S. should fund the development of increased government bureaucracies or civil society organizations at the local level to provide an outlet for groups. With expanded financing,

²³⁸ US Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Agency for International Development, *2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Agency for International Development, 2022), <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/apr-1-2022-us-strategy-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability-priority-countries>.

²³⁹ US Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Agency for International Development, 2.

²⁴⁰ USAID, U.S. State Department, “ForeignAssistance.Gov,” USAID, U.S. State Department, accessed April 7, 2022, <https://foreignassistance.gov/>.

²⁴¹ USAID, U.S. State Department.

local governments could expand their bureaucracies to support the creation of civilian-led organizations to represent minority groups that otherwise would not have a political voice and can help address specific concerns among the community. An increase in funding from the U.S. that focuses on improving governance throughout Mozambique would be in line with the 2019 Global Fragility Act and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.²⁴² Additionally, this would likely have the most significant impact on reducing violence long-term as more equitable governance is established.

The second policy recommendation is based on the findings of Hypotheses 2 and 3. While economic and environmental factors are not the primary drivers of violence within Cabo Delgado, they should not be ignored. Continued economic development and disaster resilience will reduce current and future grievances against the Mozambique government. U.S. Foreign Assistance in support of Humanitarian Assistance, Economic Development, and Education Services was approximately \$124 million in 2020, and U.S. funding should remain at this level.²⁴³ Specifically, the U.S. should seek ways to help Mozambique stand up localized training programs that encourage learning technical skills required in the growing NG industry. In addition to more open elections, the U.S. should support increased legal recourse between populations and companies working in Mozambique. The financial settlement paid by Gemfields along with the grievance panel near the ruby mines of Montepuez is an example of offering greater accountability at a more local level. Using the ruby example, the employment of locals in the ruby industry for tasks suitable to their skill levels also likely limited widespread grievances against development. The U.S. should encourage the government of Mozambique to either find ways to directly employ locals in the NG industry according to their skill sets or use proceeds from the NG to employ them on infrastructure projects within the province. By improving the economic situation in Cabo Delgado, less of the population will be dependent upon subsistence farming or fishing, and better diversify the economy to handle shocks to the region.

²⁴² US Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Agency for International Development, *2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*, 1, 5.

²⁴³ USAID, U.S. State Department, “ForeignAssistance.Gov.”

The third policy recommendation is to limit U.S. military involvement within Mozambique. This recommendation is based on the findings of Hypothesis 1, which suggest that the core issue is political. United States involvement in combat operations would likely prove counterproductive and could support an IS-Mozambique narrative that the U.S. is supporting a corrupt government. Currently, Rwanda and South African Development Community forces directly support combat operations against IS-Mozambique.²⁴⁴ If the U.S. conducts military actions alongside Mozambican forces or other supporting African nations, they would be working with militaries facing human rights accusations, which are at odds with U.S. policy and can exacerbate grievances among the local populations.²⁴⁵ While the conflict in Mozambique is likely due to the political process, the lack of professionalism within Mozambique's security forces continues to fuel the narrative of state repression. If there were an improvement in Mozambique's armed forces' professionalism, human rights violations could be mitigated and help combat IS-Mozambique's narrative against the state. In October 2021, the EU committed to sending a two-year, 140-person training mission to Mozambique. The forces' mission is to increase the proficiency of Mozambique's military.²⁴⁶ The EU states it is open to third-party participation, and future U.S. missions should integrate within this EU mission.²⁴⁷ United States' forces integrating into the EU mission will maximize the assets employed, reduce duplicate efforts, and would distance U.S. military involvement from direct combat operations.

The findings of the thesis also provide insights into the risk IS-Mozambique presents to Southeast Africa and the most cost-effective means for the U.S. to address this

²⁴⁴ "Winning Peace in Mozambique's Embattled North," Crisis Group, February 10, 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/b178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north>.

²⁴⁵ "Mozambique: Civilians Killed as War Crimes Committed by Armed Group, Government Forces, and Private Military Contractors – New Report," Amnesty International, March 2, 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/>.

²⁴⁶ "EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique Set to Start Its Operations," Council of the EU - Press Release, October 15, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/15/eu-military-training-mission-in-mozambique-set-to-start-its-operations/>.

²⁴⁷ Council of the EU - Press Release.

threat. Currently, the sea lines of communication along the coast are not at risk as regional partners help Mozambique defeat IS-Mozambique militarily. This thesis shows that the threat of IS-Mozambique, or groups like it, is not likely to go away from the region until Mozambique improves its governance throughout the country, increases democratic participation among its population, and improves the economic prospects of those living in the region.

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