An Automated Post-Exploitation Model for Offensive Cyberspace Operations
Abstract
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses vulnerability assessment tools to identify necessary patches for its many cyber systems to mitigate cyberspace threats and exploitation. If an organization misses a patch, or a patch cannot be applied in a timely manner, for instance, to minimize network downtime, then measuring and identifying the impact of such unmitigated vulnerabilities is offloaded to red teaming or penetration testing services. Most of these services concentrate on initial exploitation, which stops short of realizing the larger security impact of post-exploitation actions and are a scarce resource that cannot be applied to all systems in the DOD. This gap in post-exploitation services results in an increased susceptibility to offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). This thesis expands upon the automated initial exploitation model of the Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT), initially developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, by developing and implementing automated post-exploitation for OCO. Implementing post-exploitation automation reduces the workload on red teams and penetration testers by providing necessary insight into the impact of exploited vulnerabilities. Patching these weaknesses will result in increased availability, confidentiality, and integrity of DOD cyberspace systems.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2022
- Accession Number
- AD1184760
Entities
People
- Ryan Benito
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School