



RESEARCH REPORT

ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR
**GREAT POWER
COOPERATION**
IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS

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About This Report

The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) starts with the assertion that “Interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” Even the NDS acknowledges, however, the need for cooperation with competitors, albeit “from a position of strength and based on our national interests.” As part of a larger study of cooperation in an era of strategic competition, we assessed the potential for cooperation on eight global commons issues. The other volumes in this series are

- *Vanishing Trade Space: Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in an Era of Competition—A Project Overview*, RR-A597-1, by Raphael S. Cohen, Elina Treyger, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Asha Clark, Kit Conn, Scott W. Harold, Michelle Grisé, Marta Kepe, Soo Kim, Ashley L. Rhoades, Roby Valiaveedu, and Nathan Vest
- *Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific*, RR-A597-2, by Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Soo Kim
- *Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in Europe and the Middle East*, RR-A597-3, by Elina Treyger, Ashley L. Rhoades, Nathan Vest, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Raphael S. Cohen, and Asha Clark.

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Summary¹

Issue

If there is a set of issues where we could mostly likely expect great power cooperation, it should be in the global commons. Global commons issues are—by definition—shared by multiple nations. As part of a larger study of cooperation in an era of strategic competition, we assessed the potential for cooperation on eight global commons issues.

Approach

This study sought to understand where the United States, China, and Russia share interests in the global commons, what the obstacles to cooperation are, and where the United States might be able to deepen its cooperation with one or both powers. To do so, the study team drew on primary and secondary source materials in three languages, and more than 40 interviews with government officials, military officers, academics, and think tank analysts.

Conclusions

Overall, the study yielded three major findings:

- Across the board, there is trade space for great power cooperation in the global commons, but it is narrow and usually focused more on civilian aspects of these domains rather than core security matters.
- In general, there is more room for the United States to cooperate with Russia than with China.
- There are significant obstacles to cooperation, including that the costs of cooperation do not always outweigh the likely benefits.

Recommendations

The U.S. government should

- moderate its expectations for cooperation
- expand counterdrug cooperation with China and Russia

¹ This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. It has not been subsequently revised.

- consider expanding counter-violent extremist organization cooperation with both powers in low-priority areas
- consider broadening the different Arctic diplomatic forums to discuss security matters
- expand opportunities for nuclear dialogue.

The Joint Force should

- focus on deconfliction efforts with Russia on countering violent extremist organizations
- increase coordination efforts on counterpiracy and search and rescue
- choose a strategic path in the Arctic and stick with it.

TABLE S.1

Interest in Cooperation on Global Commons Issues

Across a range of global commons issues, the research team found relatively narrow trade space for cooperation and more opportunities for cooperation with Russia than with China. Most of these areas, however, consisted of deconfliction or focused on civilian uses rather than genuine cooperation on military issues.

Issue Area	China			Russia		
	Alignment	Stakes	Cooperate	Alignment	Stakes	Cooperate
Maintaining freedom of access to space	Mixed	High	Low	Mixed	High	Medium
Dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks	Mixed	Low	Medium	Mixed	Low	Low
Countering violent extremist organizations	Mixed	Low	Low	Mixed	High	Medium
Promoting global stability	Yes	Low	High	Mixed	Low	Medium
Preserving access to the air and maritime commons	Mixed	Medium	Medium	Mixed	Medium	Medium
Preventing nuclear arms races	Yes	Medium	Low	Yes	High	Medium
Preventing militarization of the Arctic	Yes	Low	Low	No	High	Low
Maintaining the openness of cyberspace	Mixed	High	Medium	Mixed	High	Low

The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force should

- increase communications over space debris management
- continue and routinize airspace deconfliction to ensure “safe competition.”

Introduction¹

If there is a set of issues where we should be mostly likely to expect great power cooperation, it is the global commons. Global commons issues are—by definition—shared by multiple nations. Theoretically, all great powers should have a vested interest in ensuring that aircraft and vessels can transit air and maritime commons safely, that international terrorism and crime remains in check, and that shared spaces such as the high seas, space, and cyberspace can be used for the common benefit. In practice, however, cooperation in the global commons can prove more difficult. Even seemingly benign issues may have national security implications, and areas where cooperation might seem mutually beneficial can include aspects that are zero-sum. In this volume, we explore the United States', China's, and Russia's equities in eight global commons issues, the obstacles to cooperation, and the second-order effects of cooperating on these issues. In this chapter, we lay out our definitions, methodology, and the data sources we used to produce this analysis, and we offer an overview and thesis of this report.

Definitions and Methodology

What exactly is the global commons? The term itself is amorphous. As political scientists Gabriel Scheinmann and Raphael S. Cohen argue, “Even the term ‘commons’ is defined by what it is not—namely, owned by any one individual—than by what it actually is.”² The term *global commons* originated in the economics and environmental disciplines, where it was used to depict collectively shared resources, such as clean air.³ The use of the term *global commons* as a strategic concept came later. Although the need to police shared spaces—particularly sea lanes—has arguably been part of most maritime powers’ strategies for centuries, the term was

¹ This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. It has not been subsequently revised.

² Gabriel M. Scheinmann and Raphael S. Cohen, “The Myth of ‘Securing the Commons,’” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2012, p. 115.

³ Garrett Hardin famously captured the tensions between individual and collective incentives (Garrett Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” *Science*, Vol. 162, No. 3859, December 13, 1968).

applied to the air, space, and cyberspace domains relatively recently, in Obama-era national security strategies, and continued to be used in the Trump administration's national and defense strategies. In academic discussions of strategy, the term has been used since at least the 2000s and gained prominence in the early 2010s.⁴

There is, however, no consensus on what issues make up the global commons. A United Nations (UN) definition argues that the commons consist of “those resource domains that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any one particular country, and to which all nations have access.”⁵ Others put a more military spin on the term, suggesting that it also applies to areas technically owned by a state, if that state cannot militarily deny access to another state. Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Barry Posen argues, “The ‘commons,’ in the case of the sea and space, are areas that belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the globe. Airspace does technically belong to the countries below it. . . .”⁶ Some more recent mentions of the commons, by contrast, extend the term outside the physical domain to the digital one.⁷ Others attempt to make the term more practical and limit the application of commons as a strategic concept to those areas facing a clear threat and falling outside of traditional definitions of national security.⁸

For the purposes of this volume, we start with a broad definition of the global commons. We base our understanding of the term on the “common domains” listed in the 2017 *National Security Strategy* (NSS)—space, cyberspace, air, and maritime—that are not the sovereign territory of any specific state.⁹ Next, we extended our definition to also encompass “common goods” in the abstract sense—policy objectives shared widely across the international community that are not bound to a specific region or location. Examples of common goods include countering violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal networks, promoting global stability, and preventing nuclear arms races.¹⁰

This broad definition allowed us to shape the focus of this work. We developed a list of U.S. objectives, drawing on major, unclassified United States strategy documents, including the 2017 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the unclassified

⁴ See Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003; The White House, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C., May 2010, pp. 49–50.

⁵ United Nations, *Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the Global Partnership for Development Beyond 2015*, January 2013, p. 3.

⁶ Posen, 2003, p. 8. Both Russia and China's military arsenals include surface-to-air capabilities to the altitude of 15,000 feet.

⁷ For example, see the White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., December 2017, p. 40.

⁸ Scheinmann and Cohen, 2012, p. 116.

⁹ The White House, 2017, p. 41.

¹⁰ In some sense, this is in keeping with Hardin's original writing.

Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).¹¹ Because of time and resource constraints, and the need to balance the depth and breadth of the analysis, we needed to limit the number of the issue areas explored in the study. We selected the issues areas based on four criteria. First, the issue had to be mentioned in multiple U.S. documents and had to endure across presidential administrations, thus ensuring that it has a continuing importance for this research. Second, the issue had to involve military equities (as opposed to falling on other parts of the U.S. government).¹² Third, we tried to minimize the overlap between issues covered in this volume and in the two more geographically focused reports that we also produced as part of this project.¹³ Consequently, the chapter on countering violent extremism has a reduced focus on Iranian proxies and Afghanistan-Pakistan, because they are covered in the reports that focus on the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, respectively, and the maritime commons chapter focuses less on the South China Sea issues, because they are covered in the Indo-Pacific volume. Finally, we refined the list based on priorities of the sponsor of this research, the Headquarters Air Force A-5 Strategy Section.

Ultimately, we settled on eight U.S. objectives in the global commons that, in our view, represent the baseline issues, considering our broad understanding of global commons:¹⁴

1. Maintaining freedom of access to space
2. Dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks
3. Countering violent extremist organizations
4. Promoting global stability
5. Preserving access to the air and maritime commons
6. Preventing nuclear arms races
7. Preventing militarization of the Arctic
8. Maintaining the openness of the cyberspace.

After identifying the list of United States equities, we then needed to understand where American objectives overlap and diverge from Chinese and Russian interests and what interest either power might have in cooperating with the United States on areas of common inter-

¹¹ The White House, 2017; U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, Washington, D.C., January 2018c.

¹² While we included some objectives—such as counter-organized crime and promoting global stability—DoD personnel are still involved in these activities.

¹³ These two reports are Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Soo Kim, *Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A597-2, 2023; and Elina Treyger, Ashley L. Rhoades, Nathan Vest, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Raphael S. Cohen, and Asha Clark, *Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in Europe and the Middle East*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A597-3, 2023.

¹⁴ We recognize that this list may not be a comprehensive list of the possible topics for which the United States could rely on the military or cooperate or compete with China and Russia in the global commons.

est. To achieve this, we assessed four main variables—stakes, alignment, bargaining, and cooperation:

- *Stakes* measures how important the issue is to Russia or China.
- *Alignment* measures Russia's or China's rhetorical alignment on an issue with the United States, and is based only on high-level public statements and official government documents.
- *Bargaining* measures the efforts at an actual dialogue or cooperation, with either concrete results or signs of a proposal/counterproposal dynamics.
- *Cooperation* measures the potential for cooperation—that is, whether countries have demonstrated willingness to commit resources to engage in cooperation and fulfill their commitments.

Table 1.1 further explains how we assessed each of these concepts.

After laying out each of the three powers' interests and potential willingness to cooperate, we tried to understand whether there was trade space. Even if countries share overlapping interests, there may be obstacles to cooperation becoming a reality. As we explain in the overarching companion report in this set,¹⁵ cooperation in the international system is difficult, all the more so when it is between rival states engaged in multidimensional competition.

TABLE 1.1
Measurement Factors

Stakes	Alignment
High: Vital to the state or the regime's survival; a core security concern. Medium: Affects key allies, partners, or economic relationships (but not survival). Low: The issue is peripheral to a state's interests.	Yes: Statements support objectives that are same or harmonious with U.S. objectives. No: Statements support objectives adverse to U.S. objectives. Mixed: Statements express opposing points of view or messages change in public versus private. N/A: Statements are largely silent on the issue.
Bargaining	Cooperation
Yes: There has been an official, meaningful dialogue. No: There has not been an official, meaningful dialogue. Mixed: There has been limited dialogue (e.g., some aspects of the issue are "off the table" or the dialogue is Track 2.5 or 2). N/A: The state has little or no equities in an issue.	High: The state is willing to go to serious effort or to incur costs to achieve a shared goal. Medium: The state has given mixed signals—e.g., it engages in official negotiations but fails to follow through or cooperates in some areas but not others. Low: There are no observable signs that the state will commit substantial resources to the issue. N/A: The state has little or no equities in an issue.

¹⁵ Raphael S. Cohen, Elina Treyger, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Asha Clark, Kit Conn, Scott W. Harold, Michelle Gris , Marta Kepe, Soo Kim, Ashley L. Rhoades, Roby Valiaveedu, and Nathan Vest, *Vanishing Trade Space: Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in an Era of Competition—A Project Overview*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A597-1, 2023.

Thus, we next sought to understand the more practical aspects of the potential for cooperation. In particular, we asked first, *What obstacles can be identified that make cooperation within the trade space difficult?* Our analysis of this question yielded a number of common obstacles across issues sets: a lack of mutual trust between parties with regard to a particular issue; audience costs, or the domestic political costs that a leader is likely to incur were they to cooperate on a particular issue; the presence of third parties, whose participation or consent is important to the fate of cooperative ventures, but whose interests diverge from the competitors' and/or each other; issue linkages, or cases where issues on which cooperation is possible become tied to an issue on which it is not; a lack of perceived immediacy or urgency to address an issue that may be approached cooperatively; and legal constraints that limit the shape that cooperation may take. (For the last obstacle, we considered only legal constraints limiting the menu of actions for the United States and its allies where necessary; we did not conduct an analysis of either the Russian or Chinese legal landscape.)

Even if cooperation is possible, however, it is not necessarily beneficial. While cooperation on any given issue should rightly be evaluated by reference to its direct effects—that is, to what extent will it advance the U.S. objective with respect to that issue—we think it necessary to consider second-order effects on other issues and considerations, as well as on the interests of third parties. Three broad categories of second-order effects should be considered in weighing cooperation possibilities. First, in view of the simultaneous competition with two rivals, we consider the effect of potential cooperation with one competitor on the other—whether these effects blunt or sharpen competition with the other, or boost or undermine the China-Russia strategic partnership. Second, we consider the positive second-order effects, or “externalities,” meaning the positive effects of cooperation on one issue on other issues, or parties other than Russia or China. And third, we examine negative externalities, or the cost to other U.S. goals or objectives of pursuing cooperation on a given issue. Second-order effects are particularly important for cooperative possibilities that in themselves appear of relatively minor value and can either increase or nullify the expected first-order gains from cooperation.

Finally, we make recommendations based on each analysis. In many cases, improving cooperation requires a decision by the U.S. government—rather than the U.S. Air Force (USAF) or U.S. Space Force (USSF)—and requires whole-of-government initiatives. Still, in some cases, the USAF and USSF can contribute to great power cooperation, or at least deconfliction. As a result, we try to draw on our analyses to identify the implications for the United States' policy at large and for the USAF and the USSF in particular.

Data Sources

Great power cooperation on global commons issues can be a deceptively difficult area to study. On the one hand, countries' public statements express a willingness to cooperate on certain topics, especially when abstracted to a high level. After all, most countries—including

the United States, China, and Russia—want to be seen as responsible global actors, and, to a certain extent, the ability to promote such an image depends on the ability to express openness to engage on a range of topics.

By contrast, countries' *actual* willingness to cooperate can vary dramatically. Countries, after all, may be willing to cooperate with their rivals, but only on their terms. Countries may also define issues differently or agree to cooperate in general terms but prove unwilling to budge on specific details. Even if countries do agree on the details, one or more may be unwilling or unable to commit resources behind a general agreement, making the cooperation hollow.

Consequently, we sought to draw from extensive field research across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and, most importantly, from China and Russia themselves. The initial plan was to first understand what Chinese and Russian positions are beyond the public talking points, and then to compare these positions with their actions “on the ground” as seen by experts around the world.

Unfortunately, because of the COVID-19 outbreak and the ensuing travel restrictions, only the Middle East research trip—to Jordan and Israel—was ever completed. During the trip, we interviewed two dozen U.S., Jordanian, and Israeli diplomats, military officers, academics, and think tank analysts about the room for potential great power cooperation in the Middle East and specifically in Syria. Many of those interviews are cited here.

In lieu of the field research, we relied on official policy documents; a range of secondary sources in English, Chinese, and Russian; and, when possible, interviews with experts who agreed to speak with us on the phone. These sources cannot fully compensate for the initially planned methodology, but they still provide some insight into what the U.S., Chinese, and Russian equities are on a given issue, as well these countries' willingness to cooperate in practice.

Thesis and Overview of the Report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In Chapter Two, we describe the United States', China's, and Russia's approaches to the global commons and argue that global commons issues have been bound up in states' views on the international order. This, in turn, limits the willingness of the United States, China, and Russia—all of whom have different conceptions of the international order—to cooperate on global commons issues. In Chapters Three through Ten, we explore in depth the policy trade space, the obstacles to cooperation, and second-order effects of cooperation with China and Russia on eight global commons issues. Ultimately, we find that, despite the fact the United States, China, and Russia often share common interests in these areas, the actual policy trade space is still narrow, and a host of obstacles prevent meaningful cooperation. Finally, in Chapter Eleven, we summarize Chapters Three through Ten and offer recommendations on whether and how the United States could cooperate with China and Russia on these sets of issues.

Ultimately, we find that despite the “global commons” label, potential cooperation on these topics is often constrained. Beyond some rhetorical alignment on the overall importance of these issues, the three powers often have very different equities on these issues, and the potential for cooperation is further inhibited by a series of obstacles. Still, cooperation may be possible on issues that are not central to the national security concerns of the cooperating powers.

The United States', China's, and Russia's Overarching Objectives in the Global Commons

There is an underlying paradox when it comes to great powers and the global commons. At least in theory, the global commons should provide fertile grounds for great power cooperation. After all, these areas are not supposed to be owned by a single nation and are of interest to all. At the same time, strategists have argued for centuries that control of the commons serves as the foundations to empire.¹ There is so-called tragedy of commons at play, as well. Partly because the commons are shared and do not belong to any one state, all states also have an incentive to free-ride off the work of others—for example, to enjoy the benefits of undisturbed maritime commerce while letting other states carry the burden of keeping the sea lanes free from piracy.² Perhaps the latter point is what makes cooperation in the global commons so difficult. The global commons are intertwined into national conceptions of how the international order should be structured. Indeed, as we shall see, China and Russia do not refer to the global commons as a distinct set of issues. As a result, cooperation in the global commons is about much more than simply allocating resources to shared projects; it is about how the world should be run.

The United States' Objectives in the Global Commons

As mentioned in Chapter One, the United States has had a long-standing interest in the global commons, dating at least as far back to the famed 19th century American naval strategist and Naval War College president Alfred T. Mahan and some of the early writing about sea power, which claimed that command of the sea formed the cornerstone to empires. As a term though, *global commons* really enters the U.S. defense policy lexicon starting with the Obama

¹ For example, Posen, 2003, p. 8; Abraham M. Denmark, “Managing the Global Commons,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, July 2010.

² See Hardin, 1968.

administration. Since then, it has been widely used to denote areas that do not form part of any one state but instead make up a “connective tissue of the international system.”³

The United States’ Conception of the Global Commons

A few months after the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 2009, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and her advisor Shawn Brimley published a piece in the Navy’s *Proceedings* magazine arguing that “as rising nations and non-state actors become more powerful, the United States will need to pay more attention to emerging risks associated with the global commons, those areas of the world beyond the control of any one state—sea, space, air, and cyberspace—that constitute the fabric or connective tissue of the international system.”⁴ Flournoy and Brimley’s statements previewed almost verbatim language included in both the 2010 NSS and 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.⁵ The 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance*, perhaps the most influential strategic document of the Obama administration, argues, “The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”⁶

Viewed in this context, these official and unofficial statements tried to define an alternate strategic vision during the first two years of the administration. In this view, rather than using American military power to topple dictators and build democracies in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States should instead focus its resources on the seams in between states—or, in the words of the NSS—“the connective tissue around our globe upon which all nations’ security and prosperity depend.”⁷ And policing these areas can only be successfully done by the United States. As think tank analyst and former U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) official Abraham Denmark similarly argued, “Since the end of World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the openness and stability of the global commons have been protected and sustained by U.S. military dominance and political leadership.”⁸

³ Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons,” U.S. Naval Institute, *Proceedings Magazine*, Vol. 135, July 2009.

⁴ Flournoy and Brimley, 2009.

⁵ The White House, 2010, pp. 49–50; DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, D.C., February 2010, p. 8.

⁶ Emphasis in the original. DoD, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington, D.C., January 2012, p. 3.

⁷ The White House, 2010, pp. 49–50. The United States would later topple Libya strongman Muammar Ghaddafi in 2011 and by 2014, the administration had shifted again to great power competition and conflict after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

⁸ Denmark, 2010, p. 166.

Later under the Obama administration, preserving access to the global commons took on budgetary as well as strategic connotations. Specifically, the Budget Control Act's mandated cuts focusing on preserving access to the global commons—as opposed to engaging in large-scale land wars—were billed as not only as strategically prudent but as a cost-effective strategy. Andrew Krepinevich, then president of the Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments, argued, “A new strategic framework will be needed, one focused less on repelling traditional cross-border invasions, effecting regime change, and conducting large-scale stability operations and more on preserving access to key regions and the global commons, which are essential to U.S. security and prosperity.”⁹

In the second term of the Obama administration, the use of the term became less pronounced. Perhaps because of the changeover in administration figures or shift in the global security dynamics (most notably, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014), the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* contains only one passing reference to the need of American forces to “protect the global commons,” and the 2015 NSS does not mention the issue at all.¹⁰

Although the Trump administration shied away from using the term *global commons*, the concept still runs through the administration's strategic documents, specifically the idea of “freedom” in common domains—air, maritime, cyberspace, and space—as a pillar of American interest. Describing this concept, the 2017 NSS states,

A range of international institutions establishes the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals interact with each other, across land and sea, the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm. It is vital to U.S. prosperity and security that these institutions uphold the rules that help keep these common domains open and free. Free access to the seas remains a central principle of national security and economic prosperity, and exploration of sea and space provides opportunities for commercial gain and scientific breakthroughs. The flow of data and an open, interoperable Internet are inseparable from the success of the U.S. economy.¹¹

These same sentiments are echoed in the 2018 unclassified summary of the NDS, which labels “ensuring common domains remain open and free” a core concern.¹²

The United States' Interests and Objectives in the Global Commons

The United States' specific interests in the global commons vary by domain. Broadly speaking, the United States has four major objectives that have remained relatively constant across

⁹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Assuring Access.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 6, November/December 2012, p. 58.

¹⁰ DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, Washington, D.C., 2014, p. 63; The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015.

¹¹ The White House, 2017, p. 40.

¹² DoD, 2018c, p. 4.

administrations. First, the United States wants to ensure the free flow of commerce across these domains and the ability to develop these domains for its own economic purposes, unhindered by hostile state and nonstate actors. Second and relatedly, the United States often has an interest in keeping the “commons” common—that is, preventing individual states from unilaterally encroaching on these domains and claiming them as their own sovereign territory. Third, to the extent there are disputes between countries about what defines the commons, the United States seeks that these disputes are handled within the framework of international norms, laws, and institutions. Finally, although it tends not to be mentioned explicitly in official documents, the United States also has a vested interest in maintaining freedom of access to the commons for military power projection purposes. As U.S. Navy Captain Mark Redden and USAF Colonel Michael Hughes wrote in *Joint Forces Quarterly* almost a decade ago, “Now more than ever, effective and efficient application of military power in any specific part of the global commons rests upon a foundation of simultaneous access and freedom of action throughout the remainder of the commons.”¹³ This may be even more true today, especially with the growth in importance of space and cyber to military operations.

Sometimes, as will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, these objectives work to cross purposes, creating conflicting policy approaches, particularly when it comes to advancing international laws and institutions governing the global commons. On the one hand, even the conservative, America First–oriented Trump administration espoused a multilateral, rule-bound approach to the global commons. Indeed, the 2017 NSS explicitly states that “The United States will provide leadership and technology to shape and govern common domains—space, cyberspace, air, and maritime—within the framework of international law.”¹⁴ At the same time, the United States has tended to be wary of joining international agreements, fearing that such rules would undermine either American economic or security interests in the global commons.¹⁵

The military dimension of the American approach to the global commons has, in some ways, been more consistent. The United States has routinely tried to demonstrate the “common” aspect of the global commons by maneuvering military forces through contested areas to demonstrate the shared aspect of the space, such as when the United States conducted “freedom of navigation operations” in the Chinese-claimed portions of the South China Sea. Occasionally, the United States has gone beyond just displays of its commitment

¹³ Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes, “Defense Planning Paradigms and the Global Commons,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 60, 1st quarter, 2011, p. 63.

¹⁴ The White House, 2017, p. 41.

¹⁵ Perhaps the best example of the is phenomenon is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, which the United States has yet to join largely because conservatives fear that the convention would harm American economic and military interests. For a discussion of this argument, see Ted R. Bromund, James Jay Carafano, and Brett D. Shaefer, “7 Reasons [Why] U.S. Should Not Ratify UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Heritage Foundation, June 4, 2018.

and used force to ensure access to the global commons. For example, after the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia around 2010, the United States surged naval presence to the region as part of two U.S.- and NATO-led counterpiracy task forces.¹⁶

The United States' View of Cooperation in the Global Commons

At least rhetorically, the United States welcomes cooperation on global commons issues. As detailed above, traditionally, American white papers have encouraged approaching these issues through the lens of international cooperation, international law, and, more generally, preserving the international order. The United States welcomes, at least in theory, all nations working together to tackle common challenges to these issues.

The challenge for cooperation lies in the details. First, despite the rosy rhetoric surrounding the global commons, the United States does have strategic interests in these domains, such as preserving its freedom of access to these spaces while denying access to its adversaries. And, as we shall see, while the United States may view civilian aspects of the global commons as positive-sum and encourage cooperation in those areas, more-strategic issues in the global commons are almost inherently zero-sum.

Second, while the United States has welcomed cooperation on global commons issues, it has tended to do so on its terms. The United States, for example, has refused to join treaties, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), governing the global commons that it views as not conducive to its interest. Moreover, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the United States has taken a rigid definition to what it views as common versus sovereign territory. Given that revanchist states believe that the current order places them at the disadvantage and is inherently unfair, such rigid adherence to the status quo functionally complicates, and in some cases limits, the room for cooperation.

Third, despite being a global superpower, the United States does not have unlimited resources. Issues that are more peripheral to direct American security interests often get short shrift when it comes to resourcing. The NDS says as much explicitly: "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."¹⁷ The same is arguably true for other objectives from promoting global stability to countering transnational crime: Compared with great power competition and preparing for conflict, these missions are secondary priorities and are resourced accordingly.

¹⁶ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Maritime Security: Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments*, Washington, D.C., June 2014, p. 20.

¹⁷ DoD, 2018c, p. 1.

China's Objectives in the Global Commons

China's economic expansion over the past 40 years has increasingly led to deeper Chinese engagement with the outside world. This deeper engagement, coupled with growing Chinese power, has led Beijing to seek to shape the international community in its favor, including issues of the global commons. However, China's engagement with the global commons has always been conditional—one scholar summarized China's view of reciprocity as “I demand freedom from you in the name of your principles. I deny it to you in the name of mine.”¹⁸ In this section, we outline how China views the global commons, China's interests and policy objectives, China's approach to the global commons, and its views of cooperation and competition in these spaces.

China's Conception of the Global Commons

The Chinese leadership has long understood the importance of global spaces and domains beyond the national governance of states, even though Beijing does not commonly use the specific term *global commons* (全球公域 or 全球公地).¹⁹ Rather, Beijing tends to refer to the *international order*, *international system*, and *global governance*. As Kevin Rudd explains, the *international order* or *global order* “refers to a combination of the UN, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the G20 and other global plurilateral or multilateral institutions”; *international system* refers to “the complex web of multilateral institutions which operate under international treaty law and which seek to govern the global commons on the basis of the principle of shared sovereignty”; and *global governance* refers to “the actual performance, for good or for ill, be it effective or ineffective, of the ‘international system’ so defined.”²⁰ Part of China's view of the global commons is the intellectual influence of Mahan, among others, on Chinese military and broader strategic thinking.²¹

¹⁸ Philippe Ardant, quoted by Jerome Cohen on Twitter (Jerome Cohen, “As I have noted before, long ago a jaded French diplomatic expert on China, Philippe Ardant, summarized the PRC idea of reciprocity,” March 23, 2020).

¹⁹ The term has only appeared 12 times in *People's Daily*, and usually in a U.S. context. For a Chinese discussion of the U.S. concept, see 冯东浩 [Feng Donghao], “世界军事变革迈向深水区” [The World's Military Changes Are Moving Towards Deep Water], *People's Daily* [人民日报], March 1, 2016; “‘大国争夺全球公域规则制定权’ [Powers Compete for Global Public Domain Rules],” *People's Daily* [人民日报], May 12, 2014. For a Western analysis of China's approach to the global commons, see Carla Freeman, “An Uncommon Approach to the Global Commons: Interpreting China's Divergent Positions on Maritime and Outer Space Governance,” *China Quarterly*, March 2020. For a contrasting analysis, see Brad Carson, “China Is a Funny Sort of Revisionist Power—A Conversation with Dean Cheng,” *War on the Rocks*, November 13, 2018.

²⁰ Kevin Rudd, “Xi Jinping, China and the Global Order: The Significance of China's 2018 Central Foreign Policy Work Conference,” speech to the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy National University of Singapore, June 26, 2018.

²¹ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*, New York: Routledge, 2008. For a Chinese perspective, see Zhang Wei, “A General Review of the History

Early awareness of the term in China came from the 2010 NSS, but it was never fully adopted as a common term within China's intellectual circles.²² Most importantly, China has always viewed the global commons as an aspect, and even strategy, of U.S. competition against China—whether from Air Sea Battle exploiting open access to the maritime commons for U.S. military operations or Internet Freedom's call for global unrestricted access to the internet as a way to undermine the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

More recently, Chinese thinkers have adopted the term to frame the scope of Beijing's approach to global governance. As one CCP scholar wrote in 2019, "the global commons have gradually become an increasingly prominent issue and the focus of competition among major powers. At present, global commons governance is in a state of unreliability and no rules to follow. . . . The international community urgently needs to establish corresponding governance rules and mechanisms. . . . China needs to grasp the general trend and take the initiative."²³ The author argues that China's solution can be found in Chinese President Xi Jinping's "community of common destiny," and that China will do more for global commons governance, including for cyberspace (information and communications technology [ICT]) and outer space (space exploration), and will lead the developing world. More broadly, it has been one intellectual framing for China's overall engagement in new domains around the world, evident in Chinese writings on Arctic issues that utilizes the "global commons" perspective.²⁴

of China's Sea Power Theory Development," translated by Shazeda Ahmed in *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2015. For a critique, see Dean Cheng, "The Influence of Sea Power on China, or the Influence of Mahan on Yoshihara and Holmes?" *Asia Policy*, Vol. 12, July 2011.

²² For early responses to the U.S. concept of the global commons, see 曹升生 [Cao Shensheng] and 夏玉清 [Xia Yuqing], "全球公域"成为新式的美国霸权主义理论: 评新美国安全中心及其东北亚战略设计 [Global Commons Becomes New-Styled U.S. Theory of Hegemonism: CNAS's Initiative for America's Strategy Toward Northeast Asia], 太平洋学报 [*Pacific Journal*], September 2011; 王义桅 [Wang Yiwei], "美国宣扬"全球公域"的用心: 想玩"巧霸权" [The United States Promotes the Intention of 'Global Commons': Want to Play 'Smart Hegemony'], 中工网 [*China Worker Online*], December 27, 2011; 王义桅 [Wang Yiwei], "美国重返亚洲的理论基础: 以全球公域论为例" [The Theoretical Basis of America's Return to Asia: Taking Global Public Domain as an Example], 国际关系学院学报 [*Journal of University of International Relations*], March 2012; 马建英 [Ma Jianying], "美国全球公域战略评析" [An Analysis of US Global Public Domain Strategy], 现代国际关系 [*Contemporary International Relations*], February 2013; 王义桅 [Wang Yiwei], "打造中国"全球公域"观 [Creating China's 'Global Commons' Perspective], *People's Daily Overseas Edition*, December 11, 2013. For a recent article, see 沈鹏 [Shen Peng], "全球公域治理中的权力与规则: 以美国获取地球静止轨道资源为例" [The Power and Rules in the Governance of Global Commons: In the Case of US's Acquisition of Geostationary Orbit Resources], 太平洋学报 [*Pacific Journal*], July 2019.

²³ 季思 [Ji Si], "积极为全球公域治理贡献中国方案 [Actively Contribute to China's Plan for Global Public Domain Governance], 当代世界 [*Contemporary World*], February 26, 2019.

²⁴ For example, see 邓贝西 [Deng Beixi], "全球公域"视角下的极地安全问题与中国的应对 [Analysis of Polar Security Issues from the Perspective of Global Commons and China's Countermeasures], 江南社会学院学报 [*Journal of Jiangnan Social University*], March 2018.

China's Interests and Policy Objectives

China has three main interests in the global commons: ensuring economic growth, safeguarding Chinese overseas interests, and securing the country's status as a great power. These are all interests that flow from the CCP's five "strategic objectives" that undergird its domestic and foreign policies, as summarized by the Defense Intelligence Agency: (1) perpetuate CCP rule, (2) maintain domestic stability, (3) sustain economic growth and development, (4) defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (5) secure China's status as a great power.²⁵ However, all three of these interests in the global commons are framed through the lens of the CCP's first and foremost priority: staying in power. Ever since the brutal suppression of peaceful protests in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, the CCP has counted on a combination of economic growth and nationalism to maintain control and a semblance of public support. This first component of economic growth thus required external engagement, which developed into overseas interests that must be protected by all means of national power—not only the physical protection of Chinese citizens and property (investments) overseas but also China's broader national interests.²⁶ The second component of nationalism meant emphasizing a national narrative of greatness and, more importantly, a national struggle to regain that once glorious role in the world—"the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and the "China Dream," as Xi puts it.²⁷

However, it is this very engagement with the international community in order to maintain CCP rule that, perhaps quixotically, threatens the CCP's hold on power. Xi and past Chinese leaders have made clear that some of the biggest threats to the regime come from the Chinese people's exposure to the outside world and external actors, often referred to as "hostile foreign forces" and "foreign subversion" in reference to a perceived U.S.-led plot to undermine the CCP.²⁸ This extends to the broader ideological threat of foreign ideas, such as the seven threatening "false ideological trends, positions, and activities" enumerated in

²⁵ Defense Intelligence Agency, *China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win*, Arlington, Va., January 2019, p. 12.

²⁶ Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, *Protecting China's Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-Interference*, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014; Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, *China's Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad*, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015.

²⁷ "Xi Highlights National Goal of Rejuvenation," Xinhua, November 30, 2012.

²⁸ For personal quotes by Xi, see "President Xi Jinping Warns Against Foreign Influence on Religions in China," *The Guardian*, May 20, 2015; Xi Jinping, "在全国宣传思想工作会议上的讲话 [Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference]," August 19, 2013, in 中共中央党史和文献研究院 [CPC Central Committee Party History and Documentation Research Institute], ed., 习近平关于总体国家安全观论述摘编 [*Excerpts from Xi Jinping's Discussion on the Overall National Security Concept*], Beijing, China, March 2018a. For recent writing on this, see Melanie Hart and Jordan Link, "Chinese President Xi Jinping's Philosophy on Risk Management," Center for American Progress, February 20, 2020. For analysis of implications for U.S.-China relations, see Elizabeth Economy, "Poisoning the Well of U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, July 8, 2015.

Document Number 9.²⁹ This means that, in order to tolerate integration, the CCP must change the international community to reduce its threat to the regime.³⁰

China's Policy Approach to the Global Commons

Xi has charted an ambitious course for China's presence in the global commons. In his 2017 speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi stated that since the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) founding in 1949, "it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong," and China is now "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind."³¹ Remarking on the international system, Xi noted that "The trends of global multi-polarity, economic globalization, IT application, and cultural diversity are surging forward; changes in the global governance system and the international order are speeding up; countries are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent; relative international forces are becoming more balanced; and peace and development remain irreversible trends."³² Overall, this means that the international balance of power is shifting away from the United States and that the international system is thus ripe for changes in China's favor.

Xi has led China to take a more active role in global governance.³³ After abandoning Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy principle of "hide and bide" (韬光养晦) to "striving for achievement" (奋发有为) in 2014, Xi called in 2018 for China to "lead the reform of the global governance system," signaling a shift in China's approach.³⁴ This engagement is intended to put Chinese interests first, as Xi stipulated that his diplomats should "take national core interests

²⁹ The seven threatening (largely Western, and thus "foreign") ideas are Western constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, independent journalism, historical nihilism (accurate history against the CCP's narrative), and questioning the Party's commitment to socialism. See ChinaFile, "Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation," November 8, 2013; Chris Buckley, "China Takes Aim at Western Ideas," *New York Times*, August 19, 2013.

³⁰ Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, *Mapping China's Global Governance Ambitions*, Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, February 28, 2019.

³¹ Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," speech at 19th Party Congress, October 18, 2017.

³² Xi, 2017.

³³ Hart and Johnson, 2019; Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, *People's Republic of the United Nations: China's Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations*, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, May 14, 2019.

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing," November 29, 2014c; "Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," *Xinhua*, June 23, 2018. For analysis, see Rudd, 2018; Timothy R. Heath, "China Prepares for an International Order After U.S. Leadership," *Lawfare*, August 1, 2018.

as the bottom line to safeguard China's sovereignty, security and development interests."³⁵ Explaining his goals for global governance reform, Xi said,

China stands for democracy in international relations and the equality of all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. China supports the United Nations in playing an active role in international affairs and supports the efforts of other developing countries to increase their representation and strengthen their voice in international affairs. China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance.³⁶

Under Xi, China's approach to the international community is encapsulated under the concept of "community with a shared future for mankind" (also translated as the "community of common destiny"). Although this slogan may appear mundane, it is a fundamental reimagining of the liberal international order and entails massive changes to global governance. As Liza Tobin explains, this would mean "a global network of partnerships centered on China would replace the U.S. system of treaty alliances, the international community would regard Beijing's authoritarian governance model as a superior alternative to Western electoral democracy, and the world would credit the Communist Party of China for developing a new path to peace, prosperity, and modernity that other countries can follow."³⁷

The Chinese military's own engagement with the world has generally flowed from China's broader national engagement in the economic realm.³⁸ After Hu Jintao gave the People's Liberation Army (PLA) its "New Historic Missions" in 2004, the PLA began dipping its toe in global engagement through military operations other than war.³⁹ This was mostly humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation operations, along with military engagements such as joint exercises and port visits. Most prominently, the PLA Navy has supported the UN-mandated Gulf of Aden antipiracy patrols since 2008, sending 106 vessels and 28,000 troops through 33 deployments as of August 2019.⁴⁰ The PLA has also conducted several noncombatant evacuation operations, including supporting the evaluation of 36,000 Chinese civilians from Libya in 2011 and almost 1,000 civilians from Yemen in 2015.

³⁵ "Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," 2018.

³⁶ Xi, 2017.

³⁷ Liza Tobin, "Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies," *Texas National Security Review*, November 2018b.

³⁸ Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, "The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA and China's Great Leap Outward," in Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow, eds., *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019.

³⁹ James Mulvenon, "Chairman Hu and the PLA's 'New Historic Missions,'" *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 27, Winter 2009.

⁴⁰ "China Sends New Naval Fleet for Escort Mission," *People's Daily Online*, August 30, 2019.

China's 2019 defense white paper emphasizes destabilizing U.S. actions, and ignoring China's actions, while still emphasizing cooperation.⁴¹

China has historically favored strict interpretations of national sovereignty under its principle of “noninterference” and turned to multilateral and global governance structures, such as the UN, for collective management of everything else (e.g., the global commons), while stridently seeking to limit any expansion of states’ powers beyond their borders (for example, opposing the Right to Protect). This rhetoric of noninterference was never borne out in practice and has been increasingly tested as China’s interests and power expand outside its borders.⁴² As a 2019 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report on China’s approach to global governance found, “China is increasingly using its economic, political, and institutional power to change the global governance system from within.”⁴³

China’s objectives in the global commons have remained constant over time, but under Xi its approach has only accelerated in its boldness, scope, and speed.⁴⁴ The 2019 CNAS report found that Beijing’s efforts to transform global governance “transcend China’s traditional defensive posture in international organizations, in which it was careful to avoid confrontation with the United States and instead directed its diplomatic resources toward boxing in Taiwan and preventing criticism of China . . . toward a more confident, activist role.”⁴⁵ Instead, “China is attempting a tricky feat: using the language and levers of existing institutions to reorient them in a direction that is divergent from—if not antithetical to—their historical ethos.”⁴⁶ While all states seek to safeguard their interests in the global commons via the international system, as the CNAS report explains, “[w]hat is unique—and ultimately perilous—about China’s pursuit of its core interests is that its growing activism in the U.N. is rooted in a number of narrow self-interested political purposes that ultimately shore up its power under a single authority: the CCP.”⁴⁷

Beijing is doing this by taking leadership roles in international organizations that govern the global commons, increasing its financial contributions to earn more sway over critical decisions, and increasing its engagement in UN activities—all the while downplaying its

⁴¹ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” July 24, 2019. For analysis, see Michael Swaine, “How China’s Defense Establishment Views China’s Security Environment: A Comparison between the 2019 PRC Defense White Paper and Earlier Defense White Papers,” *China Leadership Monitor*, December 1, 2019.

⁴² Chen Zheng, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2016; Wang Yizhou, *Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy*, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017a; Wang Yizhou, *Creative Involvement: The Evolution of China’s Global Role*, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017b.

⁴³ Lee and Sullivan, 2019.

⁴⁴ Rush Doshi, “‘Hu’s to Blame for China’s Foreign Assertiveness?” Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019.

⁴⁵ Lee and Sullivan, 2019.

⁴⁶ Lee and Sullivan, 2019.

⁴⁷ Lee and Sullivan, 2019.

influence.⁴⁸ Chinese officials have taken the helm at a variety of UN agencies, such as the International Telecommunications Union in 2014, which governs ICT, and Interpol in 2016, which oversees coordination between national police agencies. Leveraging its pocketbook, China became the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping in 2016 and the second-largest financial contributor to the overall UN budget in 2019, overtaking Japan.⁴⁹ China's desire to fill a perceived void for UN leadership has increased as U.S. commitment and funding to the UN has come under greater U.S. domestic debate, though the actual U.S. funding in recent years has remained largely stable.⁵⁰ China has also deepened its participation in the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), becoming the biggest contributor of troops amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Outside the UN, China is also pursuing these goals through other multilateral forums, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in which the latest "Action Plan," from 2018, covers ICT, policing, and cybersecurity, among other topics.⁵¹ Lastly, beyond issues directly related to the global commons discussed in this report, China has also established its own international organizations when its desire for a seat at the table in global governance was not met—as was the case when it created the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank in 2014 as an alternative to the World Bank.⁵²

China's Views of Cooperation

Despite consistent calls for international cooperation, the CCP-state's approach to tangible cooperation has been remarkably zero-sum in its pursuit of its national objectives. In his 2017 speech, Xi said,

China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit and uphold its fundamental foreign policy goal of preserving world peace and promoting common development. China remains firm in its commitment to strengthening friendship and cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and to forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.⁵³

⁴⁸ Lee and Sullivan, 2019.

⁴⁹ "China to Replace Japan as Second-Largest Funder of U.N. Peacekeeping," *Kyodo*, December 22, 2015; "China Rises to 2nd Largest Contributor to UN Budget," *Xinhua*, December 24, 2018.

⁵⁰ Amanda Shendruk, Laura Hillard, and Diana Roy, "Funding the United Nations: What Impact Do U.S. Contributions Have on UN Agencies and Programs?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2020.

⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021)," September 10, 2018b.

⁵² Jane Perlez, "China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks," *New York Times*, December 4, 2015.

⁵³ Xi, 2017.

Win-win cooperation has also been at the center of China's approach to relations with the United States, and it was a prominent component of Xi's proposed framing for U.S.-China relations, "New Type of Great Power Relations."⁵⁴

While decrying zero-sum strategies by others,⁵⁵ the CCP has been consistently unwilling to sacrifice its own interests on issues of common concern, until encouraged or coerced by credible threat of substantial consequences. Xi claimed in his 2017 speech that "Taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization."⁵⁶ However, in reality, China's pledged targets were well within its own existing domestic planning for energy intensity, meaning it was not contributing any more to the international community through negotiation than it already planned. Similarly, while sometimes cooperation with China seems to offer tempting benefits, our subsequent discussion in the report will show that often this cooperation reveals to be more beneficial for the long-term interests of China and a means of exporting PRC influence and values and undermining the Western order.

In the end, the CCP-state will pursue its policies with its own interests in mind. As a 2019 Center for American Progress (CAP) report asserts, "As the largest global economy, China is heavily dependent on the global system. Therefore, it is in China's national interest to work collaboratively with other nations to address challenges that threaten global safety and prosperity."⁵⁷ However, "To be sure, when negotiating in multilateral forums, Chinese diplomats will try to find solutions that are particularly good for China. That is to say, they will try to make commitments that do not exceed what other nations put forward and will be relatively easy for Beijing to meet."⁵⁸

Russia's Objectives in the Global Commons

Russia's objectives in the global commons and the potential for U.S.-Russia cooperation need to be viewed within the context of the Kremlin's conceptualization of Russia's identity, global ambitions, and relationship with the United States. Russia's post-Cold War aim to position itself as a great power with an alternative view of the international order dates back to the then-Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who in 1994 set Russia toward the aim of becom-

⁵⁴ Xi Jinping, "Work Together for a Bright Future of China-US Cooperative Partnership," speech, February 15, 2012.

⁵⁵ Xi Jinping, "Openness for Greater Prosperity, Innovation for a Better Future," speech at 2018 Boao Forum for Asia, April 10, 2018b.

⁵⁶ Xi, 2017.

⁵⁷ Hart and Johnson, 2019.

⁵⁸ Hart and Johnson, 2019.

ing a great power pole in a multipolar world.⁵⁹ According to Russian experts, Russia under President Vladimir Putin's rule has sought to establish equality among countries in a multipolar world, including aiming to have Russia be perceived and treated as an equal partner by the United States and its Western allies.⁶⁰ Russia's Foreign Policy Concept (2016) further acknowledges this aim, noting that globalization has led to an increasingly complex world structure and the emergence of a "multipolar international system,"⁶¹ and in 2019 Putin declared that a unipolar world dominated by the United States no longer exists and has given way to a multipolar world intertwined by economic relations.⁶² This fundamental aim is supported by Russia's need to establish itself as a key player on the global stage. Russia's sensitivity about its own sovereignty and its ongoing concern to maintain the existing power structure is mirrored in its foreign policy, whereby the Kremlin does not seek alliances based on shared values but prefers to engage in transactional relationships. In this section, we outline how Russia views the global commons and describe Russia's interests and policy objectives, its approach to the global commons, and its views of cooperation and competition in these spaces.

Russia's Conception of Global Commons

As noted above, Russia's understanding of the global commons needs to be placed within the broader context of the Kremlin's view of the world and its relations with the United States. This understanding is based on the conceptualization of Russia as great power with global influence in a multipolar world. Russia views the post-Cold War liberal rules-based international world order to be the creation of the United States and its European allies, and a means for the United States to maintain its global political, economic, and even cultural dominance.⁶³ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's leaders initially sought a closer relationship with the West, but over the past few decades Russia's leaders have increasingly settled into the position of viewing the international world order as inherently hostile to Russia and its sovereignty.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Read more about the so-called Primakov Doctrine: Ariel Cohen, "The 'Primakov Doctrine': Russia's Zero-Sum Game with the United States," Heritage Foundation, December 15, 1997.

⁶⁰ "Eksperti Rasskazali, Kak Putin Za 20 Let Izmenil Rol Rossii V Mire [Experts Tell How Putin Has Changed the Role of Russia in the World in 20 Years]," *RIA Novosti*, December 30, 2019.

⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," November 30, 2016.

⁶² "Unipolar World Does Not Exist Anymore, Says Putin," Tass, December 19, 2019.

⁶³ Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, *Russian Views of the International Order*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1826-OSD, 2017.

⁶⁴ Radin and Reach, 2017.

Russia's views on the international order ("the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among the key players in the international environment"⁶⁵) differ from the U.S. ones that are embedded in the notion of democracy and democratic institutions. In a way, this fits the "systematic world order" or a "post-West order" of which Russia seeks to form the core. The Kremlin, specifically under Putin, has increasingly sought to develop itself as the core of an alternative world and international order.⁶⁶ Putin introduced his views on the world order in 2007 at the Munich Conference, elaborating on them at his speeches in the Valdai Discussion Club in 2014 and 2019. In his 2019 speech at the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin spoke of the need to create a "systematic world order" based on (his understanding of) international law and characterized by flexibility and nonlinearity, "which would not mean a rejection of the system but the capability to arrange a complex process rooted in realities, which presupposes the ability to consider various cultural and value systems, the need to act together, dismissing stereotypes and geopolitical clichés. This is the only way to effectively solve the challenges on the global, regional, and national levels." Thus, rather than creating a union based on shared values, the proposed world order is about creating "a network of cooperation in various areas."⁶⁷

Russian strategic documents do not use the concept of global commons in the broad sense that it is used in this volume or in the more traditional understanding used in international law (i.e., the high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica, outer space).⁶⁸ Global commons are also not exactly global or common. The global commons is considered to be a foreign, even American, term, as are such concepts as the international liberal world order. Instead, Russian high-level strategies consider positions on specific issues, such as Russia's interests and presence in the world's oceans, interests in the Arctic, presence in space, and Russia's perception of an ongoing competition with the United States and its allies. Depending on the specific sub-question or type of commons, Russia's approach may be centered on its national interests or a means to gain influence or gather intelligence. Russia's policies toward the global commons are based on the high value that the Kremlin allocates to the "Westphalian" understanding of sovereignty, illustrated by its attempts at the UN to deter international meddling in domestic affairs.⁶⁹ Compared with China and the United States, the Kremlin's interests in the global commons are narrower and more targeted, as Russia is less integrated into the

⁶⁵ Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, *Understanding the Current International Order*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1598-OSD, 2016.

⁶⁶ Roger E. Kanet, "Russia and Global Governance: The Challenge to the Existing Liberal Order," *International Politics*, Vol. 55, 2018; Angela Stent, *Putin's World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest*, Twelve (Hachette Book Group), 2019.

⁶⁷ Vladimir Putin, "Valdai Discussion Club Session," October 3, 2019.

⁶⁸ United Nations, 2013.

⁶⁹ Marcin Kaczmarek, "China and Russia in Global Governance. Long-Term Obstacles to Cooperation," Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper 244, August 2018.

global economy and prioritizes establishing and maintaining influence in territories near its borders and other strategic locations.

Russia's Objectives in the Global Commons

Russia has several cross-cutting objectives in the global commons:

- Promote a multipolar world as an alternative to a unipolar world dominated by the United States.
- Establish Russia as a great power and an honest broker for conflicts in regions beyond its immediate neighborhood.
- Ensure the safety and security of the territory of Russia.
- Achieve supremacy in space, air, and the maritime domains to win in the case of a potential contingency.
- Ensure access to strategic lines of communications and resources.

These objectives stem from Russia's overall foreign policy interests. Radin and Reach identify Russia's underlying foreign policy objectives already since the end of the Cold War to be (1) defense of the country and the regime, (2) influence in the near abroad, (3) a vision of Russia as a great power, (4) noninterference in domestic affairs, and (5) political and economic cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers.⁷⁰ They are also further driven by the aim to ensure the power and continuity of Russia's leadership and the practice of using not only public but also private and underground resources for the purposes of state power. It should be further noted that Russia's foreign policy also often includes a level of theater—some actions or statements may be undertaken to create the illusion of international cooperation on an issue or create an image of a certain foreign policy or military power.⁷¹

The Kremlin seeks to establish Russia as a bulwark against the decline of the international law and usurpation of the West. Putin has said that to face this threatening world, "Russia cannot fall back on diplomatic and economic methods alone to settle contradiction and resolve conflict."⁷² Russia's strategic and policy documents indicate that it seeks to establish a greater presence and weight in the global commons either via economic, military, or scientific leadership. It seeks to ensure access to resources by developing relationships with strategic regional, often authoritarian leaders; denying the ability for the United States and its allies to operate freely in one domain or another; and signaling what the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2015) calls "resolute activity," not only in the maritime but other

⁷⁰ Radin and Reach, 2017.

⁷¹ Stent, 2019.

⁷² Quoted in Bettina Renz, *Russia's Military Revival*, New York: Wiley, 2019.

domains, with the aim to “establish and maintain favorable conditions” for its national interests.⁷³

The Kremlin is first and foremost concerned with the security of its own borders. The Kremlin is strongly interested in combating threats that it sees as destabilizing to the national security and therefore naturally prioritizes issues near its borders. In the domain of global commons, these include nuclear instability, drug trafficking and violent extremist organizations near its borders, and the safety and security of its strategic military assets and the northern border in the Arctic.

The Arctic is a region of high military importance, due to the presence of Russia’s strategic assets in the Kola Peninsula. Here the Kremlin seeks to ensure control over the Russian Arctic and the Northern Sea Route, preserve and defend its strategic assets, and ensure the sovereignty of the Russian borders and safety of the Arctic region.⁷⁴ Being one of the two most powerful nuclear states, Russia relies on its strategic nuclear forces for deterrence and defense and its coercive capability, and emphasizes its interest in ensuring strategic stability and preventing nuclear miscalculation through international nuclear control agreements.⁷⁵ Russia’s strategic documents and official statements also show a concern about nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

Russia is also concerned with asserting control over other common areas near its borders. For example, Russia has long been sensitive to foreign military presence in the Black Sea. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union sparred over the freedom of navigation operations in these waters, culminating in an incident in which Soviet vessels bumped American warships in disputed water off Crimea.⁷⁶ More recently, Russian aircraft often buzz American warships conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Black Sea.⁷⁷ As regards countering maritime piracy, Russia is interested in combating maritime piracy and smuggling in the world’s oceans and has supported the internationalization of maritime piracy under the auspices of the UN and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).⁷⁸ Since the apprehension of two Russian ships by Somali pirates in 2009, Russia has

⁷³ Government of Russia, “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russia Maritime Studies Institute, July 2015.

⁷⁴ Vladimir Putin, remarks at meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic, April 22, 2014; Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment,” Chatham House, June 2019.

⁷⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization*, Washington, D.C., R45861, July 2020d.

⁷⁶ “Navy Ships in Bumping Incident Leave Black Sea,” Associated Press, February 16, 1988.

⁷⁷ Ivan Watson and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian Fighter Jets ‘Buzz’ US Warship in Black Sea, Photos Show,” CNN, February 16, 2017. European security issues are discussed in detail in a separate report from this project (the Treyger et al., 2023).

⁷⁸ Government of Russia, “Countries Need to Make a Joint Legal Response to Piracy Including Through the Possible Establishment of an International Tribunal,” May 4, 2009b.

participated in antipiracy efforts near the Horn of Africa—a key area of transit for commercial shipping.

Russia's priority is to eliminate “hotbeds of tension” in its near abroad.⁷⁹ It is specifically interested in curtailing violent extremist organization activity in Chechnya and the North Caucasus and the transnational spread of extremist ideology, as well as the flow of opioids via the so-called Northern Route from Afghanistan, exacerbating its already dire drug problem.⁸⁰

Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Russia is more selective about its engagements. Its presence in the Middle East, Africa, and South America is motivated by its concerns about the potential extremist spillover into Russia and its neighborhood, and Russia's economic and political interests.⁸¹ Russia's increasing presence in stability-building in these regions has a mercantile undertone, set by the need to prioritize the resources it spends on regions that are not among its top priorities.⁸² Here Russia seeks to enact its understanding of the world order and establish itself as a great power that can act as what it understands to be an honest broker, or provide security assistance without the requests that accompany assistance from the United States or its allies (i.e., to respect democratic power structures, be accountable to the rule of law, and safeguard human rights) in return for gaining more influence or reducing that of the West.⁸³ Russia's aspiration to become an international peace broker is enshrined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2016) that defines the aim of this role to prevent global instability through “promoting partnerships across cultures, religions and civilizations.”⁸⁴ In 2019, Putin further explained Russia's foreign policy by saying “We are not against someone, we are for ourselves.”⁸⁵ Its engagements, customized to the “political, economic, societal, environmental and other characteristics of the state,” are permeated with the conviction about the centrality of states, notwithstanding the regime or other characteristics. Russia clearly positions itself as a different partner than the United States, which, according to the Kremlin, seeks to maintain its dominance by “imposing [its] point of view on global processes and conducting a policy to contain alternative centres of power.”⁸⁶ Russia's engagements are per-

⁷⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Concept of the Russian Federation's State Policy in the Area of International Development Assistance,” April 2014a.

⁸⁰ Sharyl N. Cross, “U.S./NATO-Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Toward Building a Comprehensive Strategy,” *Connections*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 2006, p. 2; Sharyl N. Cross, “Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Social Media: Exploring Prospects for U.S.-Russia Cooperation Beyond the ‘Reset,’” *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2013, p. 8.

⁸¹ Thomas D. Arnold, “The Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies,” *Military Review*, November–December 2019.

⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁸³ Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia's Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁸⁵ Daria Mikhulina, “We Are Not Against Someone, We Are for Ourselves,” TV Zvezda, June 27, 2019.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

meated with conviction about the centrality of states, notwithstanding the regime or other characteristics of the state. This also relates to the kleptocratic and authoritarian character of the Russian state, where the elites perceive themselves to be under threat from foreign powers (specifically the United States) and popular movements supported by them.⁸⁷

However, Russia's approach to the global commons is not always straightforward. Russia's power structure and intelligence agencies are closely interlinked with transnational criminal networks, and Russia has sought to use its intelligence agencies and criminal networks to attack individuals, enterprises, and government institutions of the United States and its allies. Even as Russia's Information Security Doctrine (2016) decries the potential threat of ICT being used against the "sovereignty, political and social stability, [and] the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies," Russia is itself engaged in using ICT for its political aims.⁸⁸ The U.S. Department of Justice has charged Russian citizens of cyber attacks and crimes in the United States, and Russia has been accused of harboring cyber criminals that are wanted abroad.⁸⁹ Russian officials deny the allegations of Russia being a criminalized state. Most recently, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the U.S. Congress's move to include Russia in the list of countries that sponsors terrorism by calling it "very rude."⁹⁰

Under Putin, Russia has been building an ambitious foreign policy. Although Russia continues to prioritize its interests in regions that are near its borders and faces an increasingly difficult relationship with the West, specifically following its annexation of Crimea, Russia has been increasingly tested its ability to project power beyond its immediate neighborhood. It has therefore been increasing its activities in Africa, Central and South America, and the Middle East over the past two decades, which harkens back to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Olivier Schmitt, "How to Challenge an International Order: Russian Diplomatic Practices in Multilateral Security Organisations," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2019.

⁸⁸ Although Russian writings see Russia's adversaries engaging in such operations, this may also be considered a relevant insight into how the Kremlin views the role of information space as a means of achieving political objectives without the use of military force ("Russian Information Security Doctrine," as translated in Quentin E. Hodgson, Logan Ma, Krystyna Marcinek, and Karen Schwindt, *Fighting Shadows in the Dark: Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2961-OSD, 2019).

⁸⁹ John P. Carlin, "Russia Is a Rogue State. Time to Say So," *Politico*, February 27, 2018.

⁹⁰ Marina Aleshina, "Zaharova Nazvala 'Hamstvom' Ideyu Prichislyat RF K Sponsoram Terorisma [Zakharova Called the Idea of Ranking the Russian Federation as Sponsors of Terrorism 'Rude']," RGRU, June 11, 2020.

⁹¹ Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2019.

Russia's Views on Cooperation

Despite Russia's frequent calls for bilateral or multinational cooperation, which often appeal to humanitarian values and international law, its own motivations are highly pragmatic, and its foreign policy is grounded in the realist school of thought. Like China, Russia holds the banner of rhetoric commitment to democracy, rule of law, and global stability and peace. Russia's foreign policy states that it aims to

further promote the efforts to strengthen international peace and ensure global security and stability with a view to establishing a fair and democratic international system that addresses international issues on the basis of collective decision-making, the rule of international law, primarily the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (the UN Charter), as well as equal, partnership relations among States, with the central and coordinating role played by the United Nations (UN) as the key organization in charge of regulating international relations.⁹²

Despite these claims, Russia's foreign policy toward global commons is mercantile, or even zero-sum. Its support for multinational cooperation formats, such as the UN and the International Telecommunications Union, as well as its role in the creation and leadership of such regional organizations as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are means for the Kremlin to reassert itself as a global power, exert influence in specific regions in its neighborhood, legitimize its policies (e.g., its basing abroad), and even restrain the other members of the organizations.⁹³ The CSTO, for example, prevents its member states from seeking more U.S. influence in the region, as Russia would have veto power over the decision to, for example, establish a U.S. base similar to Manas Air Base, the United States' former base in Kyrgyzstan.⁹⁴ Olivier Schmitt notes that, within international frameworks, Russia normally opposes "anything that could appear as a potential foreign interference in the affairs of a foreign state" near Russia's borders, and tends to support resolutions/decisions that give it control. For example, in 2018 Russia vetoed a U.S. resolution at the UNSC demanding an investigation of the chemical attack in Syria, but Russia supported a parallel decision that

⁹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁹³ Dmitry Gorenburg, "Russia and Collective Security: Why CSTO Is No Match for Warsaw Pact," *Russia Matters*, May 27, 2020; see also Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolski, "Multipolarity in Practice: Understanding Russia's Engagement with Regional Institutions," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 8, 2020.

⁹⁴ The CSTO member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan handled transit for the U.S. and NATO International Security Assistance Force presence in Afghanistan and a logistics hub for the U.S. Air Force. It was closed in 2014 following the election of a pro-Russian president in 2011 (John Keaney "CSTO: A Military Pact to Defend Russian Influence," *American Security Project*, February 1, 2017).

allowed it to have more impact on the selection of the investigating team and placed the duty of establishing who is responsible for the attack from the investigators to the UNSC.⁹⁵

Multinational formats also help Russia reduce its political isolation. Russia's economy remains highly dependent on its revenues from oil and gas, and Russia has been seen to carry out moves that it sees as geopolitically and economically beneficial. Russia's arms deals, diplomatic presence, and presence of its energy companies in Africa, the Middle East, and South America conform with this.⁹⁶

Mapping the Trade Space in the Global Commons

Ultimately, to understand the trade space of great power cooperation in the global commons, we need to go beyond the talking points. For the most part, as noted above, the United States', China's, and Russia's public rhetoric welcomes great power cooperation, at least in theory. Rather, the challenge to cooperation comes from how the three powers define the global commons in practice. All three countries view these issues as more than just coordinating air traffic, minimizing space debris, or countering criminality and terrorism. Drawing a page from Mahan, all three powers view these issues as bound up in the broader question of how the international order is shaped and who, ultimately, is calling shots.

In the following chapters, we see a similar pattern play out. Many aspects of the global commons seem to have some space for cooperation between the United States and China or Russia, but usually on a tightly defined working level and only to a point. In none of the issues is there now—nor is there likely to be in the future—true and meaningful cooperation among the three powers. In all the cases, there are practical obstacles that get in the way, but also one more macro impediment: fundamentally different conceptions of the international order. And because global commons issues are so interwoven with how the international order at large is structured, there are limits to great power cooperation.

⁹⁵ Schmitt, 2019.

⁹⁶ Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, "Vladimir Putin's Russia Goes Global," *Wall Street Journal*, August 4, 2017.

Issue Area 1: Maintaining Freedom of Access to Space

Maintaining freedom of access to space is a common goal for the United States, China, and Russia. For all three countries, space represents an important means of ensuring access to such vital capabilities as civilian and military communications, navigation, satellite imagery, and weather support systems, as well as bolstering national pride and reputation, countering the military capabilities of adversaries, and facilitating cooperation with foreign partners. Ensuring freedom of access to space today, however, is no longer only about the United States and Russia, as it was in the Cold War: With 13 space-faring countries, along with myriad commercial enterprises and international organizations, ensuring access to space is much more complex than in the 20th century. Access to space has serious implications for a country's ability to use satellite technologies for civil and military communications, weather forecasting, navigation and mapping, and to ensure other services on the ground.¹ In this chapter, we examine the objectives of the United States, China, and Russia in space, emphasizing the goal of maintaining freedom of access to space, and consider opportunities for cooperation.

Understanding the Equities

In this section, we first provide an overview of the objectives of the United States, China, and Russia in space. We then analyze opportunities for cooperation between the three countries.

U.S. Equities

According to Space Policy Directive-4, the foundational document for the U.S. Space Force, space is “integral to our way of life, our national security, and modern warfare,” necessitating that the United States “ensur[e] unfettered use of space for United States national security purposes.”² The three main objectives of the United States in space, as described by the

¹ Cassandra Steer, *Why Outer Space Matters for National and International Security*, Philadelphia, Pa.: Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania, January 2020.

² DoD, *Space Policy Directive-4*, Washington, D.C., February 19, 2019a.

Defense Space Strategy (2020), are (1) maintain space superiority, (2) provide space support to national, joint, and combined operations, and (3) ensure space stability.³ Both the NDS and the NSS emphasize that continuous unconstrained freedom of access to and freedom to operate in space is a vital U.S. interest and that space is a priority domain. The United States does not want space to become a conflict area and seeks “a secure, stable, and accessible space domain,” but it also recognizes that for its adversaries, space is a warfighting domain, and the United States must be prepared to respond. In recognition of this tension, the 2020 U.S. Defense Space Strategy explicitly characterizes space as a warfighting domain.⁴ The United States recognizes that China and Russia, because of their counterspace capabilities and their perceived willingness to enter into a conflict in space, pose the greatest threat to the United States in the space domain.⁵

In light of these equities, the U.S. Defense Space Strategy specifically sets forth a phased approach to respond to the changing space environment by building American leadership and competitive advantage in space; integrating space into national, joint, and combined operations; shaping the strategic environment; and supporting cooperation with allies, partners, and industry and cooperation among U.S. government institutions.⁶ The broad objective of ensuring freedom of access in space encompasses a variety of aims, including maintaining access to space-enabled technologies, preventing the weaponization of space by U.S. adversaries, and ensuring continued American leadership in space exploration.

Maintaining access to space-enabled technologies represents a particularly critical aim, given the role of these technologies in supporting the projection of U.S. power around the world, one of the main tenets of U.S. military strategy.⁷ The dependence of the U.S. military on space-enabled technologies makes these systems an attractive target for exploitation by U.S. adversaries. Both Russia and China have pursued the development of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means of diminishing the ability of the U.S. military to effectively operate in space.⁸ As such, space has been described as both “a powerful enabler for the U.S. military and a critical vulnerability.”⁹

The United States seeks to ensure its leadership in space. Space represents a key arena for the use of soft power in international politics. Historically, the United States has promoted

³ DoD, *Defense Space Strategy Summary*, Washington, D.C., June 2020a.

⁴ DoD, “Department of Defense Releases Defense Space Strategy,” June 17, 2020b; DoD, 2020a.

⁵ DoD, 2020a.

⁶ DoD, 2020a.

⁷ Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, *Space Threat Assessment 2018*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2018. The authors describe global power projection as “something space-based capabilities are uniquely able to support” (p. 1).

⁸ Frank A. Rose, *Safeguarding the Heavens: The United States and the Future of Norms of Behavior in Outer Space*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 2018, p. 2.

⁹ Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, 2018, p. 1.

cooperative research efforts between the United States and civil space agencies around the world as a means of increasing U.S. influence and achieving support for U.S. objectives.¹⁰ Experts have criticized the U.S. approach to cooperation in space exploration, describing it as a “one way street” that is not adequately focused on building capacity of foreign counterparts.¹¹

Chinese Equities

China seeks to become a leading space power and views space not only as a civilian but also as a military domain. China’s pursuit of space exploration mirrors its belief that “great powers are also scientific powers.”¹² China nominally commits itself to freedom of access to space for all countries, but its pursuit of counterspace capabilities reveals that it seeks to limit the use of space by adversary nations, especially during conflict. China is increasingly reliant on space for both civilian and military uses and has invested heavily in commercial space for its civilian economy and space exploration to the moon and beyond, making it of medium importance to China. However, Beijing’s views of space as a warfighting domain and its “active defense” military strategy strongly suggest that it will seek to deny adversaries the use of space during a conflict, if not earlier.¹³ Overall, this means that there is mixed rhetorical alignment between the United States and China on freedom of access to space. Although Beijing has indicated a mixed willingness to engage or bargain on the issue via Track 1 and Track 2 dialogues, it has so far not demonstrated a willingness to commit resources to the issue.

China presents itself as a responsible space power that will share the benefits of space access with all friendly nations. China’s 2016 space white paper states that China pursues the “peaceful development” of space, which includes opposing weaponization and avoiding an arms race, as well as “protecting the space environment to ensure a peaceful and clean outer space and guarantee that its space activities benefit the whole of mankind.”¹⁴ China’s overall goal is to become a “space power,” which it defines in part as promoting “strong and sustained

¹⁰ Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens, and Michael Katz-Hyman, *Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of U.S. Spacepower*, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, May 2007, p. 2. The authors characterize the soft power “aspects of space prowess” as “unbounded,” noting that the “long history of international cooperative research among civil space agencies reflects another element of soft spacepower” (p. 2).

¹¹ Author interview with Victoria Samson, February 26, 2020.

¹² Dean Cheng, quoted in Dennis Normile, “Mars Mission Would Put China Among Space Leaders,” *Science*, June 25, 2020.

¹³ Nicholas Wright, ed., *Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, August 2018.

¹⁴ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016,” December 27, 2016a. For another long overview of China’s views on space, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Statements by Chinese Delegation at the 55th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” February 14, 2018a.

economic and social development” and making “positive contributions to human civilization and progress.” China also supports the “long-term sustainable development” of space and “stable and reliable space infrastructure,” which suggests an interest in continued open access to space.¹⁵ China’s 2019 defense white paper similarly says, “In the interest of the peaceful use of outer space, China actively . . . safeguards space assets, and enhances the capacity to safely enter, exit and openly use outer space.”¹⁶ U.S.-China rhetorical alignment is evident in the June 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue joint statement, which states, “The two sides believe that, as two leading space faring nations and permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States and China have shared interests, objectives, and responsibilities to safeguard space security and stability.”¹⁷

China has a growing dependence on space, and it appears this dependence may have shifted Chinese counterspace capabilities to non-debris-causing (such as reservable jamming and dazzling or co-orbital) attacks. China’s 2016 space white paper acknowledges that space is a driver for future economic growth, and indeed a 2018 Chinese delegation stated that “Satellite applications have become an indispensable means of serving economic and social development.”¹⁸ China’s development of the civilian applications for space is based on a 2015–2025 plan from the National Development and Reform Commission and calls for greater use of space for economic growth.¹⁹ China is also pursuing space exploration, including putting its first human into space in 2003, launching its first space station in 2011, and landing a probe on the moon in 2019, with ambitions to send humans to Mars by the 2030s.²⁰ China is establishing its own independent space-based civilian and military capabilities, and sharing these with partner nations. Since 2000, China has developed and deployed the BeiDou position, navigation, and timing (PNT) system as an alternative to the United States’ GPS system. BeiDou will provide regional coverage along China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by 2020, as part of BRI’s Space Information Corridor, and it is projected to provide global coverage by the early 2020s.²¹ Although the military applications are clear, BeiDou is largely marketed for

¹⁵ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2016a.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,” June 7, 2016b.

¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2018a.

¹⁹ National Development and Reform Commission of China, Ministry of Finance, and State Administration of Science, “国家民用空间基础设施 中长期发展规划 (2015-2025年) [National Medium- to Long-Term Civilian Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015–2025)]”, October 26, 2015.

²⁰ Alexander Bowe, *China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, April 11, 2019.

²¹ Michael S. Chase, “The Space and Cyberspace Components of the Belt and Road Initiative,” in Nadège Rolland, *Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads*, Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2019; Echo Huang, “China Is Building Its New Silk Road in Space, Too,” *Quartz*, June 18, 2018. For a Chinese overview, see Hui Jiang, “Programme

its civilian applications to BRI countries. Beyond BeiDou, China has also deployed several military satellite systems, including Zhongxing for satellite communications and Yaogan for imagery. Combined, these systems provide important support to China's military operations away from the mainland, whether that be over-the-horizon targeting of U.S. aircraft carriers for anti-access/area-denial or supporting peacekeeping and noncombatant evacuation operations in Africa. Clearly, access to space is important for China.²²

In the military realm, however, China seeks to deny the use of space to adversaries under the concept of "command of outer space." Kevin Pollpeter defines this concept as the "ability to freely use space and to deny the use of space to adversaries."²³ Despite China's official support for freedom of access to space, it is not entirely clear this applies to other countries, and its defense white paper also calls for the PLA to "safeguard China's security interests in outer space," which could give it reason to block other's access.²⁴ China's 2007 ASAT test demonstrated China's capability and willingness to deny the use of space to others, and it caused immense debris that negatively affected satellite operations in low earth orbit. Since then, China has been developing a range of nonkinetic counterspace capabilities, including using lasers to either temporarily or permanently dazzle or blind a satellite, using electronic warfare to jam satellite communications or PNT signals, and even co-orbital satellites to interfere with other satellites without creating any debris.²⁵ BeiDou allows China to deny, or destroy, U.S. GPS while still providing PNT to its own forces.²⁶

China has engaged with the United States on the issue of space since 1979 but with very limited discussions.²⁷ Set up in 2015 under the Obama administration's U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the U.S.-China Civil Space Dialogue brings together NASA and its Chinese counterpart, the China National Space Administration. The dialogue meet in 2015, 2016, and 2017, with a meeting rescheduled over 2019–2020 that did not occur.²⁸ Previously,

and Development of the 'Belt and Road' Space Information Corridor," presentation to United Nations Office for Outer Space Operations, April 2019.

²² For a recent overview of China's space capabilities and their role in Chinese warfighting, see Mark Stokes, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein, and Ian Easton, *China's Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities*, Arlington, Va.: Project 2049 Institute and Pointe Bello, March 2020.

²³ Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang, *China Dream, Space Dream: China's Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015.

²⁴ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019.

²⁵ Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenges to Security in Space*, Washington, D.C., February 2019a, pp. 13–22; National Air and Space Intelligence Center, *Competing in Space*, Dayton, Ohio, December 2018.

²⁶ Jordon Wilson, *China's Alternative to GPS and its Implications for the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 5, 2017.

²⁷ Secure World Foundation, *US-China Engagement in Space*, March 29, 2019.

²⁸ Andrew Jones, "U.S., China Set for Spring Civil Space Dialogue on Exploration, Science," *Space News*, January 20, 2020.

the Obama administration held one meeting of the U.S.-China Space Security Talks (also known as the Space Security Exchange) in 2016, with a focus on space debris, but there has not been a second meeting.²⁹ Broader U.S.-China space cooperation is limited by a 2011 law and has been marred over the years by accusations of technology transfer.³⁰ In 2019, a NASA official commented that “low-level bilateral cooperation over the years has likely been mutually beneficial, in terms of scientific gains, including the spread of norms of free and open access to data. That’s something that NASA champions.”³¹

Despite dialogue, China has not demonstrated a willingness to commit resources toward open access to space, in this case defined as demonstrating restraint on capability development or via international agreements. China’s aggressive buildup of counterspace capabilities, covering ground-based and on-orbit as well as kinetic and nonkinetic, clearly reveals a desire to at least have the capability to deny the United States the use of space. China and Russia have jointly pushed international treaties against the militarization of outer space, such as the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, but these are criticized for focusing on U.S. on-orbit capabilities and not China’s and Russia’s ground-based ASATs.³²

Ultimately, it is likely that China will continue to allow unfettered physical access to space for all nations in peacetime, but this may change for wartime. China’s 2016 space white paper states that China seeks the “open development” of space, including “carry[ing] out mutually beneficial international exchanges and cooperation; to have an advanced and open space science and technology industry, stable and reliable space infrastructure” and “striving to promote progress of space industry for mankind as a whole and its long-term sustainable development.”³³ China’s dependence on space for civilian and military uses in peacetime, plus its desire for a positive international reputation, are likely to constrain Chinese efforts to limit or deny physical access to space for the United States, Japan, India, and other rival space powers. However, it is possible that China’s growing non-debris-causing counterspace capabilities will allow China to deny the use of space to rivals in peacetime—for example, jam-

²⁹ Mike Gruss, “U.S., China Will Meet This Year to Talk Space Debris,” *Space News*, September 22, 2016; Frank Rose, “America in Space: Future Visions, Current Issues,” testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology Committee, March 13, 2019. For contemporary comments, see Frank A. Rose, “Strengthening International Cooperation in Space Situational Awareness,” speech at Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, September 22, 2016.

³⁰ China’s space program is essentially run by the PLA, further complicating potential cooperation (see the section titled “Obstacles for Cooperation”). See also Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, *U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China*, U.S. House of Representatives, January 3, 1999; Jeff Foust, “NASA Opens Door to Additional Cooperation with China,” *Space News*, October 1, 2018.

³¹ Patrick Beshar, quoted in Secure World Foundation, 2019.

³² Victoria Samson and Brian Weeden, “US Should Start Space Security Talks with Russia, China,” *Breaking Defense*, May 12, 2020.

³³ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2016.

ming or dazzling military reconnaissance satellites that pass over Chinese territory, or even covertly jamming GPS signals over the South China Sea or Belt and Road Initiative countries to deny U.S. military freedom of operations in these places and simultaneously encourage those countries to adopt BeiDou and other Chinese alternative systems.

Russian Equities

According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), Russia views achieving supremacy in space as critical for winning future conflicts and as part of maintaining its global leadership.³⁴ For Russia, space is a warfighting domain. In “Russia’s Space Activities 2013–2020,” Russia established its aim to “ensure guaranteed access and the necessary presence of Russia in space.”³⁵ In 2010, an earlier iteration of the Military Doctrine predicted that the “securing of supremacy on land, at sea, and in the air and outer space [would] become decisive factors in achieving [defense] objectives.”³⁶

Preventing an arms race in space and weaponization of space permeates Russian foreign policy, security and military strategies as a means of strengthening international security.³⁷ Russia’s strategic documents reveal weaponization of outer space, as well as concerns over disruption of systems of outer space monitoring, to be among Russia’s main external military concerns.³⁸ Russia has advocated for an international treaty on the prevention of placement of any types of weapons in outer space and the adoption of measures of governing the conduct of outer space activities, including safety of outer space activities under the UN.³⁹ In 2008, Russia (together with China) put forward a draft text of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.⁴⁰ Russia has submitted to the UN an annual resolution on “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” every year since 2014.

Furthermore, in 2004 Russia made a political commitment within the First Committee of the 59th session of the UN General Assembly not to place the first weapon in space, and in 2016 Russia and Venezuela released a statement saying that they would not be the first to place

³⁴ Government of Russia, “Vojennaja Doktrina Rosiskoy Federacii [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2014],” December 2014b; Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019.

³⁵ Government of Russia, “Russia’s Space Activities, 2013–2022,” December 28, 2012, quoted in D. R. Biryukova and N. Gahrymanova, “Kosmicheskaya Politika Kaka Odin Iz Mehanismov Obezpechenya Strategicheskikh Interesov Rossii [Space Policy as One of the Mechanisms for Ensuring the Strategic Interests of Russia,]” *Postsoviet Research*, 1-07, 2018.

³⁶ Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, 2018, p. 13.

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

³⁸ Government of Russia, 2014b.

³⁹ Government of Russia, 2014b.

⁴⁰ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Outer Space,” undated.

any type of weapon in space.⁴¹ In 2017, Russia led an effort to create a UN group of experts that would look into the possibility of creating an “international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space,” and during the 75th UN General Assembly in 2020 Putin suggested that the current leading powers conclude a legally binding agreement banning the placement of weapons in outer space and the use of force against objects in space, which would be aimed to benefit the overall strategic stability.⁴² In 2018, Russia voted for and supported four non-legally binding UN resolutions on outer space security—ones on which the United States voted no, thus breaking away from its previous trend of supporting or abstaining on international space-related confidence-building measures.⁴³

Russia views leadership in both military and civilian space as critical. While Russia views military space capabilities as vital for winning future conflicts, it also views civilian space capabilities and Russian contributions to the exploration of space as potent symbols of national pride and a powerful means of bolstering the credibility and legitimacy of the Russian regime.⁴⁴ Russia’s National Security Strategy (2015) shows the intention to strengthen “positions in the sphere of the exploration of space . . . within the broader context of reducing industrial dependence on foreign countries and reviving and improving domestic industries.”⁴⁵ Russia’s civilian space program represents an important example of projecting Russian leadership on the international stage.⁴⁶ Analysts have noted, however, that the fall of the Soviet Union “dealt a blow to the [Russian] space industry,” which had ensured that the Soviet Union was able to engage in a competitive space race with the United States during the Cold War.⁴⁷ In recent years, Russia’s space exploration plans have been hindered by postponed launches, accidents, and corruption.⁴⁸ In light of the recent successes of American commercial space companies, Russian experts have criticized Russia’s own space industry. The head of Russia’s Space Policy Institute, Ivan Moiseev, for example, noted that follow-

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Preventing the Placement of Weapons in Space,” [“Predotvareshkyenie Razmesheniya Oryzhiya V Kosmose”], July 31, 2020b; Paul Meyer, “Washington Sparks a Space Spat at the United Nations,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 11, 2018; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Proposed Prevention of An Arms Race in Space (Paros) Treaty,” April 23, 2020.

⁴² Galina Mislivskaya, “Putin Predlozhit Soglashenye O Zaprete Ha Orzhie V Kosmose [Putin Proposed to Conclude an Agreement on a Ban on Weapons in Space],” *Rossiskaya Gazeta*, September 22, 2020.

⁴³ Meyer, 2018.

⁴⁴ Prague Security Studies Institute, *Evolution of the Counterspace Threat and Strengthening of International Space Partnerships: Fifth PSSI Space Security Conference, June 9–11, 2019 Prague, Czech Republic Conference Summary*, 2019, p. 8.

⁴⁵ Government of Russia, “O Strategii Nacionalnoy Bezopastnosti Rosiskli Federacii [National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation],” December 31, 2015b.

⁴⁶ Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019.

⁴⁷ Biryukova and Gahrymanova, 2018, p. 681.

⁴⁸ Pavel Kotlyar, “Postestnyayutsya Pered kitayem: S Kem Rossiya Poletit K Lune [Shy Before China: With Whom Russia Will Fly to the Moon],” *Gazeta.Ru*, September 17, 2019a.

ing the successful flight of SpaceX's Crew Dragon, Russia has lost its monopoly on space flights to the International Space Station. Other experts have expressed doubts about Russia's grandiose lunar exploration plans, noting deteriorating Russian know-how relating to lunar landing, a lack of funding, and other industrial issues.⁴⁹ Russia's private space sector also appears to be modest, and most successful private endeavors are absorbed by the state-owned Roscosmos, following the model of having all major aerospace industrial players under the surveillance of a government agency.⁵⁰

Russia has lobbied the United States to be able to join its Gateway program, which aims to create an outpost that orbits the moon and is part of NASA's Artemis lunar exploration program. In 2020, Sergey Saveliev, the Deputy Director General for International Cooperation at Roscosmos, said that an "ambitious [U.S.-Russia] project related to exploration of the Moon could become a serious factor in [the] cooperation of the two countries [during this] difficult time."⁵¹ Some analysts suggest, however, that Russia has little to contribute to the program, perhaps with the exception of some space station modules, and that such cooperation could lead to potential future challenges to the dominance of the United States and its allies in space, especially in light of growing Russian cooperation with China in space.⁵² Russian involvement in the program could make it more difficult to "establish a space-commerce regime friendly to free enterprise" and to bolster the dominance of the growing U.S. commercial space industry.⁵³

Russia assigns high priority to maintaining its own access to space-enabled technologies and aims to break away from its dependence on non-Russian capabilities, especially for military purposes. It seeks to preserve early warning satellites and ensure the safety of space sup-

⁴⁹ Pavel Kotlyar, "‘Eto Izdevatel’nost’; Chto Ne Tak S Planamy Roskosmosa [‘This Is Mockery’: What Is Wrong With the Plans of Roscosmos], *Gazeta.Ru*, November 25, 2019b.

⁵⁰ Bruce McClintock, "The Russian Space Sector: Adaptation, Retrenchment, and Stagnation," *Space & Defense*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2017.

⁵¹ "Moon Exploration Projects Could Held Russia-US Cooperation—Roscosmos," Tass, May 16, 2020.

⁵² In 2019, Russia and China signed two cooperation agreements on space: one to establish a Joint Data Center for the Exploration of the Moon and Deep Space, and another to coordinate the Russian Luna-Resource-1 orbiting spacecraft mission and China's Change-7 moon polar exploration mission. This builds on Russia and China's space cooperation programme (signed in 2017 and updated in 2019), which covers cooperation in six areas: exploration of the moon and deep space, space science and technologies, satellites and their use, elemental base and materials, remote sensing data, and other areas. Russia and China have established dedicated working groups on moon and deep space exploration, space debris, rocket engines and launch vehicles, space-based electronic base components, remote sensing of the Earth, and low-orbit satellite communication systems. Roscosmos, "Sptrudnichestvo Rossii I Kitaya V Kosmose; Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Space," July 18, 2019; Roscosmos, "Rossiia i Kitai Obsidili Dvustoronnyu Kooperatsiyu V Kosmose [Russia and China Discussed Bilateral Cooperation in Space]," April 29, 2019a.

⁵³ Taylor Dinerman, "Don't Help Russia Make It to the Moon," *Wall Street Journal*, September 26, 2019; Pavel Luzin, "Prospects for Future US-Russia Space Cooperation," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 17, No. 89, June 22, 2020.

port systems, which it sees as “crucial for the expanding force of Russia’s long-range precision-guided conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles.”⁵⁴ Russia has also created its own global navigation satellite system, GLONASS GNSS, which not only provides an independent satellite navigation system for the Russian military forces but also aims to serve civilian purposes, thus breaking from the Western leaders of global satellite navigation—the American GPS and the European Galileo—as well as China’s BeiDou.

Despite the attempts to prevent an arms race in space described above, Russia has invested considerable resources in the development of counterspace weapons capabilities in the past two decades while simultaneously seeking to prevent the militarization of space by its adversaries, including by the United States.⁵⁵ Russia aims to develop military capabilities that enable it to undermine the space-based and -enabled capabilities of the United States and, at least rhetorically, to interfere with the United States and its allies’ abilities to gain advantage in regional and global conflicts.⁵⁶ This is likely at least partially motivated by the establishment of the U.S. Space Force, as well as years of failed attempts to establish additional limitation to militarization of space (in addition to, for example, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty). Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswomen Maria Zakharova, for example, commented the establishment of the U.S. Space Force: “What makes this piece of news most alarming is the purpose of the instruction was described in very clear terms—dominance in space.”⁵⁷ In a recent example of the tension over space capabilities, a pair of Russian satellites trailed an American spy satellite.⁵⁸ NATO and its partners have also suspected Russia of interfering with NATO satellite signal communications and GPS spoofing during recent NATO exercises.⁵⁹

Russia has been a vocal critic of the United States’ activities in space. Recently, General Valeriy Gerasimov, the head of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, said that the creation of the U.S. Space Force “may lead to an escalation of the military-political situation and emergence of new threats, to which Russia will have to respond with reciprocal and

⁵⁴ Alexey Arbatov, “Arms Control in Outer Space: The Russian Angle, and a Possible Way Forward,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 75, No. 4, 2019.

⁵⁵ For a discussion of this, see Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, p. 23.

⁵⁶ Arbatov, 2019.

⁵⁷ Kyle Rempfer, “Russia Wards on a ‘Tough Response’ to Creation of US Space Force,” *Air Force Times*, June 21, 2018a.

⁵⁸ Besides creating a threat of purposeful interference with a satellite, close proximity operations may also lead to potential collisions (W. J. Hennigan, “Strange Russian Spacecraft Shadowing U.S. Spy Satellite, General Says,” *Time*, February 10, 2020). See also Christopher Ashley Ford, “Wither Arms Control in Outer Space? Space Threats, Space Hypocrisy, and the Hope of Space Norms,” U.S. Department of State, April 6, 2020a.

⁵⁹ John C. K. Daly, “Russia Upgrades GLONASS Satellite Navigation System as Concerns Rise About Its Use in ‘Spoofing’ Incidents,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 16, No. 96, July 8, 2019.

asymmetric measures.”⁶⁰ Upon the publication of the U.S. *Space Defense Strategy* in 2020, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the United States’ interest to ensure superiority in space and misrepresenting Russia’s strategic aims in space which Russia sees as purely defensive.⁶¹ To prevent the militarization of space by the United States and other adversaries, Russia has pursued the enactment of legally binding space arms control agreements. However, the United States views these efforts as aimed at limiting American freedom of operation in space rather than reflecting a true desire for international cooperation on this issue.⁶²

Space for Cooperation

Although the United States, China, and Russia, at least rhetorically, share similar aims when it comes to free access to space, in practice, they each have different understandings of this goal, which makes practical cooperation complicated. Both Russia and China have shown a mixed willingness to bargain, and China has thus far been unwilling to engage in large-scale meaningful space cooperation.⁶³ (See Table 3.1.)

TABLE 3.1
Interest in Cooperation on Maintaining Freedom of Access to Space

	China	Russia
Stakes	High	High
Rhetorical alignment	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	Mixed

⁶⁰ Jason Lemon, “Russia Will ‘Respond’ to ‘New Threats’ Created by Trump’s Space Militarization, Russian Army Official Warns,” *Newsweek*, March 4, 2019.

⁶¹ “Russian Foreign Ministry: U.S. Sees Space as an Arena for Hostilities,” *Kommersant*, June 20, 2020.

⁶² Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, p. 24.

⁶³ However, some exceptions exist. The United States used China launched services for U.S.-made commercial satellites in 1990s, following space shuttle fleet issues in the United States. See Secure World Foundation, 2019; Rose, 2019; Vid Beldavs, “Prospects for US-China Space Cooperation,” *Space Review*, December 7, 2015; Joan Johnson-Freese, “Found in Space: Cooperation,” *China-US Focus*, October 9, 2015; Timothy Yin, “U.S.-China Cooperation in the Final Frontier of Space,” Georgetown University Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, October 7, 2016; Frank A. Rose, *Managing China’s Rise in Outer Space*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 2020; Samson and Weeden, 2020; Pollpeter et al., 2015.

Preventing the Weaponization of Space

Although all three countries acknowledge the need to prevent the weaponization of space, years of failed political attempts on the issue, their shared views of space as a warfighting domain, and recent developments in Russian space capabilities suggest that the United States, China, and Russia are unlikely to engage in meaningful cooperation to prevent the militarization of space. Most recently, the Russia-U.S. talks in Vienna in summer 2020 ended without significant results on the issue of weapons in space: Russia opposed the deployment of space-based antimissile defense systems, while the United States, which spearheaded the creation a legal framework for peaceful space activities during the Cold War, supported the creation of a code of conduct in orbit.⁶⁴

Moreover, the history of cooperation on the issue of arms control in space suggests that there is reason to be skeptical of future prospects for cooperation in this area.⁶⁵ Both Russia and China have invested in the development of counterspace weapons, including ASAT weapons, which contradicts their declared opposition to the weaponization of space. Russia is fielding ground- and air-launched direct-ascent ASAT missiles and may also be fielding co-orbital ASATs. In July 2020, Russia tested a space-based ASAT weapon.⁶⁶ The Russian arsenal also includes missiles that, although not specifically designed as ASAT missiles, can reach objects in space.⁶⁷ China has a range of ASAT systems at its disposal as well.⁶⁸

Russia and China's approaches to the weaponization of space seem to differ from that of the United States. Given that Russia and China have shown a willingness to advocate for international agreements limiting the weaponization of space and simultaneously develop counterspace weapons systems, there is a significant **trust** deficit. It is important for the United States to tread carefully in this area.⁶⁹ Although Russian experts have proposed banning the testing of ASAT systems as a means of "giv[ing] the United States and Russia a practical starting point for future negotiations on arms control in outer space," the United States has expressed concern over Russia's pursuit of space capabilities.⁷⁰ In April 2020, U.S. Space Command commander and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations General John W. Raymond characterized Russia's test of the direct-ascent ASAT missile as "another example

⁶⁴ Ryo Nakamura and Tomoyo Ogawa, "US, China and Russia Lock Horns over Weaponization of Space," *Nikkei Asia*, July 29, 2020; Roald Sagdeev, "United States-Soviet Space Cooperation During the Cold War," NASA, 2008.

⁶⁵ Christopher A. Ford, "Arms Control in Outer Space: History and Prospects," *Arms Control and International Security Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 12, July 24, 2020c.

⁶⁶ Chelsea Gohd, "Russia Has Tested an Anti-Satellite Weapon in Space, US Space Command Says," *Space.com*, July 23, 2020.

⁶⁷ Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, *Space Threat Assessment 2019*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019, pp. 19–20.

⁶⁸ Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, 2019, p. 11.

⁶⁹ Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, p. 7.

⁷⁰ Arbatov, 2019, p. 151.

that the threats to U.S. and allied space systems are real, serious and growing.”⁷¹ This test, as well as the trailing of a U.S. intelligence satellite by two Russian satellites in 2019, shows that Russia may be willing to place active capabilities in space and use them at least as a show of force.⁷²

Interestingly, countering militarization of space represents an area in which Russia has found common ground with China. This is evidenced by the joint Russian-Chinese draft of a Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, which was first introduced at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2008.⁷³ The United States has rejected this draft treaty for multiple reasons, including that it is not effectively verifiable, is silent on the issue of terrestrial-based ASAT weapons, and does not adequately define what constitutes an outer space weapon.⁷⁴ While it has been argued that the U.S. rejection of efforts to pursue arms control treaties in space has “eroded [American] international leadership in this area” and “allowed Russia and China to credibly mischaracterize our stance as provocative and hostile,” the risks associated with acceding to a binding treaty in this area are considerable.⁷⁵ Still, there remains some possibility of productive, nonbinding efforts and dialogue in this area.

Management of Space Debris

Management of space debris represents a more promising opportunity for multilateral cooperation. There have already been significant successes in this area, including the multilateral effort to develop the UN Debris Mitigation Guidelines and their subsequent approval by the UN General Assembly in 2007.⁷⁶ In 2010, building on these guidelines, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) initiated an effort to “develop a broader set of voluntary, best practice guidelines to enhance the long-term safety and sustainability of the outer space environment,” including space debris, space weather, and space operations.⁷⁷ In 2016, the COPUOS Working Group on Long-Term Sustainability agreed on an initial set of 12 guidelines, which were agreed upon by all 84 COPUOS member states and endorsed by

⁷¹ U.S. Space Command, “Russia Tests Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile,” April 15, 2020.

⁷² Hennigan, 2020.

⁷³ Rose, 2018, p. 4.

⁷⁴ Rose, 2018, p. 4.

⁷⁵ Bruce W. MacDonald, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, March 18, 2009, p. 7.

⁷⁶ Rose, 2018, p. 3. The guidelines were based on recommendations developed by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee, which includes representatives from the world’s major space agencies.

⁷⁷ Rose, 2018, p. 3.

the UN General Assembly.⁷⁸ In 2018, an additional set of nine guidelines was agreed upon.⁷⁹ The Obama administration also made significant progress in engaging in bilateral discussions with China on the management of space debris. In 2015, the United States established a direct link between the U.S. Joint Space Operations Center and the Beijing Institute for Telecommunications and Tracking to provide China with more timely conjunction assessment and collision avoidance notifications. The following year, the United States and China convened the first round of the U.S.-China Space Security Talks, during which representatives from both countries discussed the management of space debris, as well as broader efforts to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of miscalculation in space.⁸⁰ These efforts suggest that the management of space debris poses an opportunity for multilateral cooperation.

Civil Space Exploration

Civil space exploration presents another opportunity for greater cooperation. The history of civil space exploration is unique in that it is characterized by cooperation between adversaries.⁸¹ There is a long history of cooperation between the United States and Russia in civil space. The two countries have been cooperating on the International Space Station since 1992–1993, and this has included the creation of a joint Russian-U.S. venture that produced Proton launch vehicles, and a multinational Sea Launch joint venture that produces launch rockets. Since losing space shuttle Columbia in 2003, the United States has been using Russia's spacecraft Soyuz to transport astronauts to the International Space Station.⁸² The two countries continue to “maintain a strong partnership in civil space,” sharing “training, communications, operations, and launch capabilities in support of the [International Space Station].”⁸³ The United States could prioritize maintaining this legacy of cooperation, while also expanding cooperation with new partners in space.⁸⁴ Experts have suggested that there is an opportunity for the United States and China to expand cooperation in civil space.⁸⁵

The proliferation of commercial space enterprises represents both a **capability, capacity, and structural** obstacle and an opportunity for cooperation on civil space exploration. On

⁷⁸ Rose, 2018, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Rose, 2018, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Rose, 2018, p. 6.

⁸¹ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

⁸² Pavel Luzin, “Cooperation in Space Can Still Bridge Differences Between U.S. and Russia,” Wilson Center Kennan Institute, August 29, 2017.

⁸³ Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts, 2018, pp. 12–13.

⁸⁴ Rose, 2018, p. 8. It has been recommended, for example, that the United States should pursue more collaboration with India and the United Arab Emirates.

⁸⁵ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

the one hand, there has recently been a proliferation of American and foreign commercial space capabilities.⁸⁶ American companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin have made significant strides in recent years, which in turn will cause challenges for cooperation. China and Russia will likely view the success of American companies in space as threatening to their national security and international standing.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the U.S. space program has become increasingly less reliant on the supply of Russian made RD-180 rocket engines, as it is preparing to transition to a U.S.-made launch vehicle, while the financial gains that Roscosmos receives from the United States is likely fall because of the new commercial service providers.⁸⁸ At the same time, experts predict that by the end of the year, the number of satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) will double; in a decade, the number of satellites in LEO could increase tenfold.⁸⁹ The proliferation of satellites in LEO will make space more congested, increase the risk of space debris collisions, and make deconfliction more difficult.⁹⁰ This means that cooperation will become even more important. However, so far, the United States' efforts to facilitate international exchange of information and compliance with established safety processes have been unsuccessful: Russia and China are among the few countries that do not participate in the space-track.org notification system, which enables its participants to share information about "anticipated satellite conjunctions."⁹¹ This has led to several incidents in which the maneuvers of Russian satellites have endangered not only Western military but also commercial satellites.⁹² Furthermore, under its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the U.S. government treats private space technologies as sensitive information, restricting whether and how commercial space companies are allowed to do business with non-U.S. entities.⁹³ Thus, in addition to rivalry among the three countries, **legal constraints**, such as ITAR requirements and information and intellectual property concerns, may prevent cooperation between U.S. commercial space companies and the Russian and Chinese space programs.

The Artemis Accords, announced in May 2020, represent a potential vehicle for expanding cooperation between the United States and foreign partners in lunar exploration. The

⁸⁶ Joshua Hampson, "The Future of Space Commercialization," Niskanen Center Research Paper, January 25, 2017; Aaron Bateman, "America Needs a Coalition to Win a Space War," *War on the Rocks*, April 29, 2020.

⁸⁷ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

⁸⁸ Luzin, 2020.

⁸⁹ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

⁹⁰ Thomas Taverney, "Proliferated LEO Is Risky but Necessary," *Space News*, March 5, 2020.

⁹¹ Bruce McClintock, "Space Safety Coordination: A Norm for All Nations," *Small Wars Journal*, April 15, 2019.

⁹² For example, in 2015 a Russian military satellite parked between two Intelsat satellites for five months, without communications before or during the maneuver. See Mike Gruss, "Russian Satellite Maneuvers, Silence Worry Intelsat," *Space News*, October 9, 2015.

⁹³ Tim Fernholz, "Elon Musk Explains Why He Doesn't Hire Much Foreign Talent At SpaceX," Quartz, September 18, 2016.

accords seek to “enhance peaceful relationship[s] between nations”; promote transparency, the interoperability of systems, and deconfliction of operations between spacefaring nations; and encourage the registration of space objects, the public release of scientific data, and the protection of historic sites and artifacts in space.⁹⁴ Similarly, both Russia and China have sought to expand cooperation with foreign space programs around the world. However, this trend toward increased cooperation among countries represents a potential obstacle to continued American supremacy in space, as current U.S. partners may be recruited by Russia and China.⁹⁵ China, for example, has cooperated on space issues with Russia, Germany, France, and the European Space Agency.⁹⁶

At the same time, there are significant legal obstacles to U.S. cooperation with China or Russia. The Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act essentially bans the Secretary of Defense from allowing military cooperation with the PLA in 12 areas, including military space operations and release of classified or restricted information.⁹⁷ The Wolf Amendment, which limits the extent to which U.S. government agencies can work with Chinese commercial and government agencies, makes it especially difficult for Chinese organizations to cooperate with NASA. According to the Wolf Amendment, government funding for NASA, the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, or the National Space Council cannot be used to collaborate with China or Chinese-owned companies without prior certification from the FBI.⁹⁸ The amendment was intended to motivate China to improve its human rights record, but it has achieved limited success in doing so.

The classified nature of space research and decisionmaking represents an additional logistical obstacle to cooperation. For example, classification issues make it more difficult for the United States and Russia to cooperate on the problem of space debris. One expert told us that while high levels of classification “may have made sense back in the day,” this is no longer the case for all space-related matters because “now anyone in their backyard with a telescope can see what’s up there.”⁹⁹

According to experts, it is especially difficult for Chinese stakeholders to obtain visas to visit the United States and engage with their American counterparts on issues related to space. As one expert noted, it is “hard to have bilateral conversations when you cannot even get [your Chinese counterparts] here.”¹⁰⁰ Another expert told us that while the United States

⁹⁴ NASA, “The Artemis Accords: Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future,” May 2020.

⁹⁵ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

⁹⁶ “China Open to Int’l Cooperation in Future Space Missions,” Xinhua, January 15, 2019.

⁹⁷ Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RL32496, October 2014.

⁹⁸ Makena Young, “Bad Idea: The Wolf Amendment (Limiting Collaboration With China in Space),” *Defense 360*, December 4, 2019.

⁹⁹ Author interview with Victoria Samson, February 26, 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Author interview with Victoria Samson, February 26, 2020.

and Russia could have productive conversations about the issue of space debris, Russia “isn’t part of the conversation” because their space scientists find it difficult to obtain visas.¹⁰¹

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

At first glance, space offers few plausible opportunities to play Russia off China through cooperation. On the contrary, Russia and China are moving closer together in space. Although there continues to be distrust between China and Russia, in 2019, the two countries agreed to joint exploration of the moon in the early- to mid-2020s. They also recommitted to previous plans to create a joint lunar and deep space data center with hubs in both countries.¹⁰² Joan Johnson-Freese suggests that for China, the motivation for such cooperation is to become an established space-faring country, whereas Russia is motivated, for the most part, by strategic reasons—to counteract United States and the West in space.¹⁰³ Experts advise, however, that neither country fully understands the goals of the other in space, which limits the extent to which they are able and willing to cooperate.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, cooperation between Russia and China may further increase in the future. One expert suggests that if Russia does not join the Artemis Accords, Russia and China may pursue greater cooperation in civil space.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, should the United States cooperate with one or the other power on debris management, presumably the excluded power also would enjoy the benefits of a less crowded, better-mapped space. The excluded power would also benefit from any bilateral treaty on the militarization of space—even if such an agreement could be negotiated—because the excluded power would remain unconstrained by any international obligation. Of the three areas, civil space exploration may be the closest to a true wedge issue, if U.S.-Russia cooperation in this field strengthens both powers’ relative advantage over China. That said, so far, there seems to be limited evidence of such cooperation materializing, and, even if it did, civil cooperation in space may not affect the overarching balance of power much.

Perhaps, a better question is whether cooperation makes sense for the United States, even if it is not a particularly promising way to leverage Russia or China. The direct benefits of cooperation are straightforward: Cooperation on space debris management and civilian space exploration would presumably make space safer to operate in and easier to commercially exploit, not only for the United States but for its allies as well. There are relatively few

¹⁰¹ Author interview with Victoria Samson, February 26, 2020.

¹⁰² Russia has also provided a generator for China’s Chang’e-4 lunar landing mission, and Russian and Chinese universities are cooperating on research in ultrasonic drilling techniques.

¹⁰³ Andrew Jones, “China, Russia to Cooperate on Lunar Orbiter, Landing Missions,” *Space News*, September 19, 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Author interview with Victoria Samson, February 26, 2020; author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

¹⁰⁵ Author interview with Todd Harrison, February 23, 2020.

risks to cooperation on space debris management, but cooperation on civil space exploration could lead to technology transfer to China and to a lesser extent to Russia. That said, since the United States has already cooperated with Russia in space for so long, this may be a lesser concern.

Cooperation over the militarization of space, by contrast, is harder to achieve and comes with substantially more risks. There are both direct costs (e.g., that the United States may be hamstrung by a treaty that Russia and China are either not party to or else cheat on) and indirect negative externalities. Any agreement on militarization of space may come with costs to American allies. In May 2020, Japan created a new space defense unit, the Space Operations Squadron,¹⁰⁶ and in 2019, France created a space command within its air force.¹⁰⁷ A new international agreement on the militarization of space then may not only constrain U.S. space capabilities, but also its allies as well.

Conclusion

There is room for cooperation with China and Russia in space, but only to a certain extent. Historically, the United States has cooperated with both powers on civilian uses of space, through projects such as the International Space Station, Russian space transit services, and production of engines. These ventures have been robust enough to survive swings in the overall geopolitical relationship. Consequently, one can presume that great powers will be able to continue to cooperate over shared, civilian aspects of space—such as space debris management—even in this new era of great power competition.

By contrast, curbing the militarization of space is not a particularly promising area for cooperation. All three powers have divergent interests and a significant stake in the outcome, and years of diplomacy efforts on prevention of militarization of space and banning weapons in space shows that the three countries struggle to agree on the issue. Other significant obstacles, from legal roadblocks to engrained suspicion, also make cooperation in this area unlikely.

Finally, the case of cooperation on commercial space exploration presents a somewhat middling case. While it is a less sensitive topic than military space, the United States' advantage in commercial space does threaten Chinese and Russian interests at some level. From the U.S. government's perspective, it is not clear what can be gained from cooperation in this area or what leverage the government has, since these are, after all, private companies. Perhaps this will change in time, but for the moment cooperation on commercial space exploration appears unlikely.

¹⁰⁶ Mari Yamaguchi, "Japan Launches New Unit to Boost Defense in Space," *Defense News*, May 18, 2020.

¹⁰⁷ "Macron Announces Creation of French Space Force," *France 24*, July 13, 2019.

Issue Area 2: Dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations/Networks

Transnational criminal networks and organizations (TCNs) continue to be a problem around the world.¹ They inflict serious damage to the global economy and threaten the safety, stability, and national security of the United States and its allies.² In 2017 Global Financial Integrity assessed that the annual revenue from transnational crime was between \$1.6 and \$2.2 trillion, with counterfeiting and drug trafficking being by far the most lucrative crimes.³ Combating transnational organized crime (TOC) has been on the international agenda for many years. Often, the same channels that are used to traffic drugs are also used for human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and the smuggling of counterfeit goods. Criminal networks and supply lines may also be used to support terrorist organizations, as organized crime and terrorist networks both share the need to operate underground in a fluid manner and with flat networks.⁴ The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), for example, has been reported to profit

¹ This chapter considers both transnational criminal networks/organizations and transnational organized crime as a single concept. The term *transnational criminal networks*, or TCNs, is used in the NSS. The FBI defines *transnational organized crime* (TOC) as

those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, and monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. (FBI, “What We Investigate: Transnational Organized Crime,” undated)

² U.S. Southern Command, “United States Southern Command Strategy: ‘Enduring Promise for the Americas,’” May 8, 2019.

³ Global Financial Integrity assessed the overall size of criminal markets in 11 categories and found that counterfeiting and drug trafficking had the highest and second highest values; the other categories were trafficking in small arms and light weapons; human trafficking; organ trafficking; trafficking in cultural property; illegal wildlife trade; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; illegal logging; illegal mining; and crude oil theft (Channing Mavrellis, “Transnational Crime and the Developing World,” Global Financial Integrity, March 2017).

⁴ Christopher Wray, “FBI Oversight,” statement before the House Judiciary Committee, February 5, 2020.

from kidnapping for ransom, illegal oil sales, and trafficking of cultural property.⁵ In Central America, West Africa, and the Sahel, TCNs have been key sources of destabilization and corruption, resulting in the criminalization of states. Thus, TOC is not a threat only in itself but also poses an additional security challenge because of its convergence with terrorist groups, criminalization of states, and undermining of peace and stability.⁶ In this chapter, we examine the objectives of the United States, China, and Russia in dismantling TCNs, with a focus on externally focused interests.

Understanding the Equities

Although rhetorically, the United States, China, and Russia agree on the need to curb crime, they disagree on significant issues surrounding the motivation and means of combating TCNs. The United States, as a liberal democracy, seeks to protect its citizens and allies from the harm originating from crime, whereas China's "rule by law" approach and Russia's acceptance of a symbiotic relationship between politics and transnational crime illustrate very different perspectives. In this section, we provide an overview of the objectives of the United States, China, and Russia related to dismantling TCNs.

U.S. Equities

DoD has recognized the importance of the issue of transnational organized crime (TOC) since the late 1970s. On the strategic level U.S. policymakers first identified TOC as a threat to national security and global stability in the 1990s.⁷ Since then, the recognition of the need to combat TOC has continued through consequent administrations and led to a progressively increased discussion of transnational crime as a strategic stability and security factor. The 2011 U.S. *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* established five objectives to reduce organized crime threat, including defeating the TCNs that pose the greatest threat to national security.⁸ Most recently, in 2017 President Donald Trump issued an executive order to "ensure that Federal law enforcement agencies give a high priority and devote suffi-

⁵ United Nations, "Cutting Off Access to Funds, Bolstering Criminal Justice Responses Key to Severing Terrorism-Organized Crime Link, Experts Tell Security Council," press release, July 9, 2019a.

⁶ Angel Rabasa, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Peter Chalk, Douglas Farah, Gregory Midgett, Howard J. Shatz, *Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1481-A, 2017.

⁷ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, D.C., July 1997; William R. Brownfield, "Our Evolving Understanding and Response to Transnational Criminal Threats," prepared statement Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2016.

⁸ The White House, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, Washington, D.C., 2011.

cient resources to efforts to identify, interdict, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations.”⁹

The United States is concerned about TOC as a domestic and global security threat, and as a tool that is used by some states to enhance their national power. TOC, along with jihadist terrorism, is among the primary threats to Americans.¹⁰ To address the domestic impact of TOC activities (e.g., illicit drug epidemic; drug, human, and bulk cash trafficking; gang violence; cybercrime; contraband; financial fraud), the United States prioritizes improving strategic planning and intelligence capabilities and defending American communities from illicit drugs.¹¹

At the same time, the United States distinguishes the international character of organized crime and the fact that TCNs undermine democratic institutions and enable corruption and terrorist organizations around the world, specifically in its allies and partners.¹² The United States has been long concerned with TCNs in the Western Hemisphere (Central and South America, and the Caribbean) because of their proximity to the U.S. borders and their social, cultural, and economic ties.¹³ In 2014, General Martin Dempsey, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified TOC in the Western Hemisphere as one of the top strategic threats to the United States.¹⁴ The Western Hemisphere is the main source of opioids and stimulants trafficked into the United States, while China and Mexico are the primary sources of synthetic opioids.¹⁵ The TCNs of the region are involved in the production and smuggling of drugs, as well as other crimes (e.g., money laundering, human trafficking and alien smuggling, illegal weapons trafficking).¹⁶ Since the 1980s, the United States has also been increasingly affected by other TCNs, due in part to easier international travel, trade, and financial transactions. African, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Asian, Eurasian, and Italian TCNs are largely

⁹ Executive Order 13773, *Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 9, 2017.

¹⁰ U.S. Southern Command, 2019; Executive Order 13773, 2017.

¹¹ The White House’s Council of Economic Advisers estimate that malicious cyber activity alone cost the U.S. economy between \$57 and \$109 billion in 2016 (Council of Economic Advisers, *The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2018).

¹² The White House, 2017.

¹³ Rabasa et al., 2017; DoD, 2018c.

¹⁴ James Hasik, “Dempsey Calls for Innovation in Defense,” Atlantic Council, May 14, 2014.

¹⁵ Drug Enforcement Agency, *National Drug Threat Assessment: 2019*, December 2019; FBI, undated.

¹⁶ According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and FBI, Mexican TCNs retain control over the most lucrative smuggling corridors and remain “the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States.” Cocaine and heroin is also supplied from Colombia and the Dominican Republic, with their TCNs active in the drug production and supply chain, whereas Asian, specifically Chinese, TCNs are heavily engaged in trade-based money laundering and are the main source of MDMA (which is also known as Ecstasy or Molly) (DEA, 2019; FBI, undated).

involved in financial fraud, smuggling, money laundering, and racketeering in the United States.¹⁷

In Central and South America, the stated U.S. policy is to eradicate TCNs, their leaders, and their support infrastructure and subsidiary networks in partnership with foreign state and nonstate counterparts and international organizations.¹⁸ U.S. defense, security, and law enforcement organizations provide assistance to partner countries' organizations and help them reduce drug trafficking, increase accountability, and build interdiction, law enforcement, and prosecutorial capacities.¹⁹ For example, the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assist Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative, which aims to build interdiction, law enforcement, and prosecutorial capacity.²⁰ In 2019 the INL established a three-year project with the Organization of American States "to strengthen the national and regional systems that combat illegal mining financial structures and to enhance regional collaboration" through "training courses for financial intelligence units, customs and immigration authorities, agencies responsible for admin of seized and confiscated assets."²¹

The United States has recognized that TOC is also used as an instrument of national power, allowing states to carry out unattributable acts of "cyber intrusions, sabotage, theft, and political subversion," and TCNs may be used to support foreign intelligence networks and the criminalization of a state where TOC becomes a part of the government's power.²² This is specifically pertinent to cyber-based crime. Deterring and disrupting increasingly insidious cybercrime is a high-level priority for the United States.²³ During his statement to the House Judiciary Committee on February 5, 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that "virtually every national security threat and crime problem the FBI faces is cyber-based or facilitated."²⁴ According to him, the most dangerous cybercrime activities that the United States faces are "high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers, global organized crime

¹⁷ FBI, undated.

¹⁸ The White House, 2017, p. 11; DoD, 2018c.

¹⁹ Richard H. Glenn, "Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico," statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, February 13, 2020; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply," March 5, 2020.

²⁰ Glenn, 2020.

²¹ Richard H. Glenn, "Illicit Mining: Threats to U.S. National Security and International Human Rights," statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues, December 5, 2019.

²² The White House, 2017, p. 11; Rabasa et al., 2017.

²³ The White House, 2017.

²⁴ Wray, 2020.

syndicates.”²⁵ Some of the most sophisticated cybercrimes originate from Russia.²⁶ Publicly available reports claim that Russia has been making cyber attacks on U.S. civilian infrastructure since at least 2012.²⁷ For example, the United States has sanctioned about 50 Russian persons for malicious cyber activities.²⁸

Finally, the United States seeks to combat TCNs because they may serve as support networks for violent extremism and terrorism. Here, both Africa and South America are of specific interest.²⁹ In Africa, the INL has supported the Central American Regional Security Initiative and the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative to improve local capacity and information sharing, and provided financial assistance to improving rule of law via bilateral assistance to Kenya and South Africa and organizations such as Interpol, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and the World Customs Organization.³⁰

Chinese Equities

China has espoused willingness to combat TCNs, separate from counterterrorism operations, but has so far not shown much willingness to dedicate resources to this effort. China’s “rule by law” approach to its judicial system—in contrast to the Western ideal of “rule of law”—often leaves its anti-crime efforts driven by political interests rather than legal proceedings, and China’s main interest lies in combating organized crime domestically. This makes cooperating with China on this issue difficult, but not impossible. Overall, TOC is of low importance to China, and although Beijing’s rhetoric aligns with Washington’s and Chinese leaders have demonstrated willingness to bargain/cooperate, China has not so far demonstrated a willingness to commit resources of any consequence to the issue.

²⁵ Wray, 2020.

²⁶ National Intelligence Council, “Transnational Organized Crime (TOC),” infographic, undated.

²⁷ Joe Cheravitch, “Cyber Threats from the US and Russia Are Now Focusing on Civilian Infrastructure,” TechCrunch, July 22, 2019.

²⁸ These sanctions are unrelated to interference into the 2016 U.S. presidential elections (Congressional Research Service, *Sanctions on Russia: An Overview*, Washington, D.C., March 23, 2020b).

²⁹ The NDS speaks of the need to counter TOCs in Africa because of their role in increasing instability and supporting networks for violent extremists. At the same time, in 2017 the former vice president of Venezuela, Tareck El Aissami, was indicted as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for drug trafficking. Although the indictment does not specifically address this, El Aissami allegedly also has links to Hezbollah that has an ongoing presence in Venezuela (U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Prominent Venezuelan Drug Trafficker Tareck El Aissami and His Primary Frontman Samark Lopez Bello,” February 13, 2017; Nora Gamez Torres, “U.S. and Latin American Partners to Discuss Hezbollah Presence in Venezuela,” *Miami Herald*, January 20, 2020).

³⁰ William R. Brownfield, “United States Assistance to Combat Transnational Crime,” statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, May 7, 2014.

TOC is an acknowledged problem in China and the focus of occasional and targeted crackdowns.³¹ China is the number one destination in the world for illegal ivory and many other animal goods, driven by demand for Chinese traditional medicine remedies and elite consumption.³² Drug networks proliferate throughout China, connecting it to other hubs in Asia—and the largest drug syndicate in the region, run by a Chinese citizen, is believed by the UN to earn between \$8 billion and \$17 billion a year.³³ Addressing the challenge of crime in China, Xi said in his 2017 Party Congress speech, “We will accelerate development of the crime prevention and control system, combat and punish in accordance with law all illegal and criminal activities such as pornography, gambling, drug abuse, gang violence, kidnapping, and fraud, and protect people’s personal rights, property rights, and right to dignity.”³⁴ However, Xi was talking much more about domestic crime than transnational crime, though the two are naturally interlinked. A recent domestic anti-crime campaign in early 2019 led to 3,000 arrests and over \$700 million in assets seized.³⁵ In February 2020, in response to the coronavirus crisis, the Chinese government banned some parts of the wildlife trade and stressed enforcement, but it is too early to tell whether this will result in a significant crackdown in illegal cross-border animal trade.³⁶ China has been unable, or unwilling, to eradicate some transnational crime being conducted from its territory, such as North Korean cyber-enabled commercial theft that may originate from China.³⁷ We assess that dismantling transnational criminal organizations is a low priority for the CCP.

Compared with Russia, China has fewer ties to TCNs for state-organized activities. The Chinese government has been known to leverage criminal networks abroad for local purposes. For example, Taiwanese gangs have reportedly been employed by Beijing to interfere in Taiwanese politics, including the infamous White Wolf playing a role in China’s 2018 election

³¹ For two overviews, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*, April 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Growth and Impact*, 2019. For a brief history of China’s anti-crime crackdowns, see Choi Chi-yuk, “Detentions, Torture, Executions: How China Dealt with the Mafia in the Past,” *South China Morning Post*, January 26, 2018.

³² For two recent reports on China’s illegal wildlife trade, see World Wildlife Foundation, *Demand Under the Ban: China Ivory Consumption Research 2019*, September 25, 2019; Rachel Nuwer, “The Key to Stopping the Illegal Wildlife Trade: China,” *New York Times*, November 19, 2018.

³³ Tom Allard, “The Hunt for Asia’s El Chapo,” Reuters, October 14, 2019; John Chalmers, “Meth Gangs of China Play Star Role in Philippines Drug Crisis,” Reuters, December 16, 2016.

³⁴ Xi, 2017.

³⁵ “China Punishes 3,000 in Organised Crime Crackdown—State Media,” Reuters, February 1, 2019.

³⁶ James Gorman, “China’s Ban on Wildlife Trade a Big Step, but Has Loopholes, Conservationists Say,” *New York Times*, February 27, 2020.

³⁷ Emma Chanlett-Avery, Liana W. Rosen, John W. Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, *North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2017; David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No More,” *New York Times*, October 15, 2017.

interference.³⁸ Similarly in Hong Kong, triads have reportedly had close ties with the CCP, and local thugs have reportedly been used by Beijing to undermine pro-democracy movements in the territory.³⁹ However, there is limited information that China has coopted ethnic Chinese TCNs around the world, as Russia has with ethnic Russian TCNs, and it appears that most of the CCP's political use of criminal gangs is centered in Asia. Moreover, the Chinese state is often complicit, if not directly responsible for, greater criminal behavior abroad, especially abetting corruption as a means of influence along its Belt and Road Initiative.⁴⁰

Beijing and Washington are rhetorically aligned on dismantling TCNs and cooperating toward this end, but their efforts have produced only mixed results since China has not committed resources. Under the Trump administration, and building on past dialogue and cooperation on the issue, the two sides agreed to establish the U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue as one of four main official Track 1 dialogues.⁴¹ However, the limits of dialogue are evident in the fact that it was only held once, in October 2017, because of the deteriorating relationship.⁴² China's willingness to cooperate or bargain is most evident in Trump's push to have China curtail its role in the fentanyl trade. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), China is the "main source for all fentanyl-related substances trafficked into the United States."⁴³ In 2018, Xi agreed to crack down on Chinese sales of Fentanyl abroad, and in May 2019 did further curtail the legal scope of fentanyl production within China, though enforcement so far has been mixed and Western experts are skeptical of China's commitment.⁴⁴ China has done little to address the issue of drug trafficking in Latin America, where cartels have turned to Chinese companies for raw materials to make

³⁸ Yimou Lee and Faith Hung, "Special Report: How China's Shadowy Agency Is Working to Absorb Taiwan," Reuters, November 26, 2014; "Taiwan Police Target Pro-Beijing 'White Wolf' in Donations Probe," Agence France-Presse, August 8, 2018; Brian Hioe, "Is China Attempting to Interfere in 2018 Taiwanese Elections?" *New Bloom Magazine*, November 22, 2018.

³⁹ Gerry Shih, "China's Backers and 'Triad' Gangs Have a History of Common Foes. Hong Kong Protesters Fear They Are Next," *Washington Post*, July 23, 2019b; Yi-Zheng Lian, "Gangs of Hong Kong," *New York Times*, August 2, 2019; Austin Ramzy, "What Are the Triads, and What Is Their History of Violence?" *New York Times*, July 24, 2019.

⁴⁰ For the transnational crime angle, see Daniel Sprick, "One Belt, One Road: Many Routes for Transnational Crime and Its Suppression in China," in Lutz-Christian Wolff and Xi Chao, eds., *Legal Dimensions of China's Belt and Road Initiative*, Hong Kong: Wolters Kluwer, 2016.

⁴¹ Donald J. Trump and Xi Jinping, "Remarks by President Trump and President Xi of China in Joint Press Statement," U.S. White House, November 9, 2017.

⁴² U.S. Department of Justice, "First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue," October 6, 2017c.

⁴³ DEA, *Fentanyl Flow to the United States*, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-20, January 2020.

⁴⁴ Amir Vera, "China Agrees to Make Fentanyl a Controlled Substance After Talks with US at G20 Summit," CNN, December 2, 2018; Jonathan Landay, "Trade Frictions Raise Questions About China's Fentanyl Promise," Reuters, May 9, 2019a; Jonathan Landay, "Trump Accuses China's Xi of Failing to Halt Fentanyl Exports to U.S.," Reuters, August 2, 2019b.

fentanyl and other opioid drugs.⁴⁵ Drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere has little impact on China.

China has cooperated with some countries to counter transnational crime, but it is often transactional.⁴⁶ The joint action plan adopted with African nations in 2018 says that China and African states “will work together to combat cross-border crimes, and will conduct joint operations under the framework of Interpol” and the African Police Cooperation Organisation to “jointly fight the smuggling of endangered species and their products, counterfeit products, commercial fraud and other crimes.”⁴⁷ With the Philippines, a joint statement issued during President Rodrigo Duterte’s visit to China in 2016 says that the two countries will “enhance cooperation and communication to combat transnational crimes, including telecommunications fraud, on-line fraud, cybercrimes, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and wildlife trafficking.”⁴⁸ Internationally, in May 2018, China and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime agreed to a new joint action plan.⁴⁹ Overall, we do not assess these agreements as a substantial commitment of resources from China.

China’s politicization of anti-crime efforts complicates cooperation. Within China, Xi’s anti-corruption and anti-crime crackdowns have frequently been driven more by political calculations than a desire to eliminate crime and corruption. China’s greatest push for transnational investigative cooperation, Operation Fox Hunt, has arguably been focused more on repatriating Chinese citizens who have run afoul of the CCP for any number of crimes, including political ones, rather than simply following the Chinese legal code.⁵⁰ This is evident in China’s 2019 decision to arrest and prosecute its own citizen—and then head of Interpol—for corruption, without formal notice.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Sean O’Connor, *Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States*, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 1, 2017; Alex Palmer, “The China Connection: How One D.E.A. Agent Cracked a Global Fentanyl Ring,” *New York Times*, October 16, 2019.

⁴⁶ For an earlier review of China’s approach, see Council on Foreign Relations, “The Global Regime for Transnational Crime,” June 25, 2013.

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021),” September 12, 2018c.

⁴⁸ Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,” October 21, 2016.

⁴⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC, China to Strengthen Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice Cooperation Through New Joint Action Plan,” May 15, 2018.

⁵⁰ Lulu Chen and Chloe Whiteaker, “Where Hong Kong and Mainland China Have Extradition Pacts,” Bloomberg, June 11, 2019; Nectar Gan, “Revealed: The Team Behind China’s Operation Fox Hunt Against Graft Suspects Hiding Abroad,” *South China Morning Post*, April 18, 2015; Tom Mitchell and Christian Shepherd, “China Steps Up ‘Fox Hunt’ Campaign,” *Financial Times*, January 28, 2016.

⁵¹ Drew Hinshaw and Bradley Hope, “China Installed Its Top Cop to Steer Interpol. Then He Disappeared,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 6, 2019; Eva Dou, “China Sentences Former Interpol President to 13½ Years for Bribery,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2020.

China's push for "smart cities" and "safe cities" as a way to help other countries fight crime extends China's surveillance state at the cost of personal privacy.⁵² Another consideration is China's support for harsh criminal punishments and tolerance of extra-legal judicial enforcement, such as used by the Philippines.⁵³

Russian Equities

Like China, Russia has demonstrated interest in combating TCNs. However, Russia's political and criminal worlds are highly interlinked, and Russia's attempts to counter TOC is guided more by political interests than the rule of law.⁵⁴ Although organized crime seriously harms Russian economic development, Russia approach to dealing with the issue is based on the view of TCNs as a useful and conveniently deniable tool of domestic and foreign influence and power.⁵⁵ Moreover, Putin's approach to establishing a law-based state (*pravovoye gosudarstvo*) is not based on the Western understanding of rule of law. Rather, it is based on an authoritarian-style use of law, where law and legal institutions are used arbitrarily and to pursue political gains.⁵⁶ At the same time, Russia is interested in dealing with the significant national drug problem and the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan through Russia and to Europe. Drug trafficking is mentioned in Russia's most recent National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine as a key security threat.⁵⁷

Rooted in the history of Soviet shadow economy and black market, organized crime remains a dire problem in Russia. Russia's Foreign Policy Concept (2016) acknowledged the issue of increasing transnational crime and the emergence of new criminal centers of power, which "accumulate significant resources and consequently expand their spheres of influence, including by infiltrating the state structure of different state, financial and economic institutions, establishing links with terrorist and extremist organizations."⁵⁸ According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2018, 58 organized crime groups were operating in Russia, and the true numbers are estimated to be much higher.⁵⁹ Russia is also a key tran-

⁵² Richard Fontaine and Kara Frederick, "The Autocrat's New Tool Kit," *Wall Street Journal*, March 15, 2019.

⁵³ "Beijing Backs Philippine President Duterte's Ruthless Crackdown on Drugs," *Agence France-Presse*, July 20, 2016.

⁵⁴ Alexander Sukharenkom and Eric G. Lesneskie, "Russian Organized Crime," in Mangai Natarajan, ed., *International and Transnational Crime and Justice*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

⁵⁵ Sebastian Rotella, "A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain's Fight Against the Mob Revealed Russian Power Networks," *ProPublica*, November 10, 2017.

⁵⁶ For a more detailed discussion, see Maria Popova, "Putin-Style 'Rule of Law' & the Prospects for Change," *Daedalus*, Spring 2017.

⁵⁷ Government of Russia, 2015b.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁵⁹ Sukharenkom and Lesneskie, 2019.

sit country for human smuggling from China into Europe.⁶⁰ Over the past several years, the Russian government has sought to improve its domestic image as a fighter of crime. For example, the Central Bank of Russia sought to regulate virtual currencies that can be used to launder money or finance terrorism.⁶¹ In 2019, following both domestic and international pressure, Putin dismissed two high-ranking police officials involved in detaining an anti-corruption reporter for fabricated drug charges.⁶² Also in 2019, following the estimate by Russia's Duma that organized crime caused more than 15,000 felonies in 2018, the Russian government introduced a new organized-crime bill whereby creators and senior leaders of organized crime groups could be jailed for up to 20 years.⁶³

Afghanistan is a major motivation for Russia's security thinking and a significant motivation to contribute to anti-ISIS efforts and drug-control in Afghanistan.⁶⁴ Russia is concerned about the trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia, aka the "Northern Route," which makes Russia the largest market for Afghan heroin and contributes significantly to Russia's continuous drug epidemic.⁶⁵ Russia is interested in stopping the drug flow from Afghanistan into Russia and through Russia to Europe, which has been a problem since the 1990s. Counterdrug operation has also been an area for some, albeit fraught, U.S.-Russia cooperation.⁶⁶ Russia has been continually critical of the United States and the coalition forces not sufficiently addressing the issue of drug production in Afghanistan. After the United States and Russia cooperated closely on closing opium labs in Afghanistan in 2010, Russian officials suggested that Afghanistan could be an area for U.S.-Russia cooperation, but, in 2016 a Russian official blamed the U.S. sanctions on Viktor Ivanov, head of Russia's Federal Service for the Control of Narcotics, for shattering potential cooperation on drug enforcement.⁶⁷

Despite this, during the late 2000s and early 2010s Russia and the United States managed to find areas of mutual cooperation on combating drugs in the region, mostly related to intel-

⁶⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013.

⁶¹ Andrey Ostroukh, "Russia to Regulate Bitcoin Market: Finance Minister," Reuters, September 8, 2017.

⁶² "Putin Sacks High-Ranking Police Generals Over Golunov Case," *Moscow Times*, June 13, 2019.

⁶³ "Russian Lawmakers Pass Bill to Punish Organized Crime Bosses," *Moscow Times*, March 27, 2019.

⁶⁴ Ekaterina Stepanova, *Russia's Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts*, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), May 2018.

⁶⁵ Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, "Narcotic Superhighways: Top 5 Routes for Drug Trafficking," undated.

⁶⁶ For example, in 2010 Russia and the United States carried out a joint drug raid on drug laboratories in Afghanistan ("Russia and US Collaborate in Afghanistan Drug Raid," BBC, October 29, 2010).

⁶⁷ Moreover, Zamir Kabulov, the special envoy of the Russian president for Afghanistan, has also claimed that the United States is indirectly responsible for Afghanistan turning into a leading opioid producer, as it weakened the position of the central government following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989. Samuel Ramani, "Russia's Anti-Drug Crusade in Afghanistan," *The Diplomat*, December 28, 2017; Elnar Bainazarov, "30 Let Na Igolkah: Kak Afganistan Stal Osnovnim Postavshchikom Narkotikov [30 Years on Needles: How Afghanistan Became a Major Drug Supplier]," *Izvestiya*, February 15, 2019.

ligence and expertise sharing (from Russia's side). Relevant examples include participation on multinational initiatives to train Afghan security officers and counternarcotics police: Russia's Federal Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN) and the DEA reportedly cooperated on several operations to destroy drug laboratories and seize drugs in Afghanistan by 2013, yet it is also supposedly that Russia's participation in these operations was limited and largely involved an observer status. Notably, Russia has limited its military engagement in Afghanistan, due to its previous Soviet experience there.⁶⁸

Russia prefers to engage in methods of cooperation that give it control over the effort—for example, multilateral or bilateral formats, such as the SCO and CSTO.⁶⁹ Russia has been participating in the annual anti-drug operation “Channel” carried under the framework of the CSTO's Anti-Drug Strategy 2015–2020 and involves members of law enforcement, customs authorities, and security and financial intelligence services of the CSTO member states.⁷⁰ Russia remains suspicious of U.S. and Western counternarcotics and security support for regions near its borders, including Central Asian states, and prefers multinational initiatives with the participation of Russia performed via, for example, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime regional centers.⁷¹ Russia has also supported the UN as the central body for international efforts to combat organized crime, specifically under the auspices of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and its protocol—a set of documents that were developed with Russia's active participation. It has also been signing bilateral agreements on the legal aspects of law enforcement cooperation.⁷²

Criminalization of politics has been reported as a significant hurdle to curtail organized crime across Europe, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates.⁷³ Russian government and intelligence agencies make use of the informal networks and methods available to the underground world. One researcher described the relationship between the Russian state and criminal elites: “Criminal and state actors protect each other from economic competition and political challenges, jointly using their respective resources to reproduce the existing social

⁶⁸ Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, *Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan's Borders*, East-West Institute, April 2015.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Interview by Special Presidential Envoy for International Coordination in Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime Alexander Zmeyevsky to the TASS News Agency, 30 December 2014,” December 30, 2014b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Deyatelnost ODKB [CSTO Activities],” undated-a.

⁷¹ Stepanova, 2018.

⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Rol Rossii V Mobilizatsyy Otpora Vizovy Mezdunarodnovo Terrorisma I Extremisma, V Protivodeistvii Drygim Novim Vizovam I Ygrozam [Russia's Role in Mobilizing Resistance to the Challenge of International Terrorism and Extremism, Countering Other News Challenges and Threats],” undated-b.

⁷³ Sukharenkom and Lesneskie, 2019.

order.”⁷⁴ The UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s report concluded in 2018 that the financial assets of Russian individuals in London could be summoned to “support President Putin’s Campaign to subvert the international rules-based system, undermine our allies, and erode the mutually-reinforcing international networks that support UK foreign policy.”⁷⁵

Russia uses TCNs to achieve its foreign policy aims and does little or nothing to combat Russian organized crime abroad. Russia’s political and criminal worlds are highly interlinked, and Russian organized crime has spread to many regions across the world. The Russian government and its intelligence agencies have reportedly used the assets and networks of organized crime to achieve Russian foreign policy aims—using money-laundered “black cash” to finance Russian operations, carrying out unattributable cyber attacks, and trafficking people and goods.⁷⁶ For example, Maksim Yakubets, the leader of the so-called Evil Corp crime group, known for malicious software Dridex, which makes rogue financial transfers from banks and businesses, and ransomware, is said to have worked with the Federal Security Service (FSB) to steal classified material.⁷⁷

Russia has not only harbored its citizens accused of perpetrating crime in the United States and elsewhere but also accused the United States of going after its citizens. Russia does not have an extradition treaty with the United States, and Russia’s policy is not to extradite its own citizens.⁷⁸ At the same time, Russia uses international frameworks to oppress its political opponents. One such framework is the “Red Notice”—“a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action” that have led to people being wrongly arrested in Europe and the United States.⁷⁹

Despite this, Russia’s officials have tried to promote a narrative of the United States not being able to combat TCNs without the assistance from Russia. In 2014, the Special Representative of the President of Russia on International Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, A. V. Zveevsky, said that “It is important that the interaction between the United States and Russia is maintained at international venues” while also claiming that the United States is not able to “solve a number of practical tasks to combat drug trafficking,” specifically referring to the DEA’s appeal to Russian agencies

⁷⁴ Svetlana Stephenson, “It Takes Two to Tango: The State and Organized Crime in Russia,” *Current Sociology*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2017.

⁷⁵ UK House of Commons, “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK,” UK Parliament, May 21, 2018.

⁷⁶ Mark Galeotti, “Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia’s Criminal Networks in Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 18, 2017.

⁷⁷ “U.S. Cracks Down on Russian ‘Evil Corp’ Cybercrime Group,” Reuters, December 6, 2019.

⁷⁸ Daniel S. Goldman, “Russian Indictment and Extradition,” American Constitution Society, February 28, 2018.

⁷⁹ Patrick Smith, “Interpol Abuse Allows Russia to Export Oppression,” American Security Project, September 18, 2019; Dan Gouré, “How Russia Conducts ‘Lawfare’: The Case of Interpol,” Real Clear Defense, October 31, 2019.

to restrain criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking.⁸⁰ One Russian researcher proposed the restoration of the bilateral U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan (which at some point also took the form of a U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group), arguing for an institutionalized dialogue, and suggested that establishing such an information exchange on illicit financial flows to and from Afghanistan to monitor funds that could be used to fund terrorism could be a first step toward resuming cooperation between Russian and American security services and financial institutions.⁸¹

Space for Cooperation

There has been some cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the United States, China, and Russia, but the relationship has been mutually suspicious and the cooperation sporadic. All three countries have acknowledged the need to combat TOC, and there are a handful of genuine overlapping interests (e.g., countering drug trafficking or illicit trade in goods). Yet, in contrast with the United States, China often uses its judicial system for political interests, as does Russia, where the relationship between the political elite, intelligence agencies, and criminal networks is even more symbiotic and TCNs are used as a foreign policy tool, often against the United States and its allies. We therefore assess the rhetorical alignment between the United States and China and Russia as mixed. Consequently, the areas in which the United States could consider cooperating with China and Russia are limited to sharing intelligence on global drug trafficking and the wildlife trade in Asia and Latin America, and countering drug production and trafficking out of Afghanistan and related illegal financial asset flows—but before such cooperation could be achieved, the powers would need to overcome several challenges.⁸²

First, there is a long history of deeply engrained **mistrust** and accusations of criminal activities by the United States, ranging from intervention into U.S. political processes to robbery, cybercrimes, and racketeering. As an illustration, in 2017 the U.S. Department of Justice charged 33 members and associates of Russian organized crime for carrying out an array of crimes in the United States, and in 2018 it charged officers of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) with hacking, identity theft, and money laundering.⁸³ Furthermore, the long-standing distrust and political rivalry between the United States and Russia and China,

⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014b.

⁸¹ Stepanova, 2018.

⁸² “China, ASEAN Fight Transnational Crimes,” *China Daily*, July 5, 2004.

⁸³ U.S. Department of Justice, “Members and Associates of Russian Crime Syndicate Arrested for Racketeering, Extortion, Robbery, Murder-for-Hire Conspiracy, Fraud, Narcotics, and Firearms Offenses,” June 7, 2017b; U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations,” October 4, 2018.

as well as China and Russia's use of its intelligence agencies as a foreign policy tool against the United States reduces the ability to share intelligence, thus hampering practical cooperation.

Second, the possibilities to cooperate with Russian and China in Central and South America, the priority region for combating transnational crime, are **linked** to the wider scope of Russian and Chinese activities in the region. Since the Monroe doctrine, the United States has long been sensitive to foreign engagement in the Western Hemisphere and remains particularly sensitive about China and Russia's regional engagement today.⁸⁴ Both Russia and China are courting authoritarian and anti-American regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela and promoting unfair business practices and establishing strategic presence and support that could be used to hamper the United States' relations with South America. In the words of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, "Left unchecked, Russian access and placement could eventually transition from a regional spoiler to a critical threat to the U.S. homeland."⁸⁵ The Russian indirect threat to the United States through exploiting South America was also highlighted in 2015 by then-U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander General John Kelly, and warnings about Russia and China's activities in the region are also included in the NSS (2017).⁸⁶ Furthermore, while the United States and China have previously cooperated on counterdrug issues, China continues to deny the U.S. allegation that it is the main source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl substances trafficked into the United States.⁸⁷

Third, there is a lack of international **definition** of *transnational organized crime*. Although multinational agreements on countering TOC exist, such as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2003), which was signed and ratified by all three countries, such treaties lack monitoring mechanisms to enable their implementation, thus shifting the emphasis toward bilateral and regional initiatives.⁸⁸ Multinational cooperation therefore remains at the level of conference reports and information exchange, while actual cooperation is generally achieved on bilateral or coalition level and requires shared "security perceptions and agendas."⁸⁹ Such bilateral and coalition-based cooperation has been fruitful: In 2019, the United States, in cooperation with several European countries, Europol, and

⁸⁴ Roderic Broadhurst, "Getting Organised on Asian Drug Trade," East Asia Forum, January 31, 2017; Jeremy Douglas, "How Can China Help Address Transnational Crime in Asia?" East Asia Forum, September 26, 2017; Prashanth Parameswaran, "What Did ASEAN's Latest Transnational Crime Meeting Achieve?" *The Diplomat*, September 23, 2017; "East Asia Summit Leaders' Statement on Cooperation to Combat Transnational Crime," November 4, 2019.

⁸⁵ Kurt W. Tidd, "Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command, Before the 115th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee," February 15, 2018.

⁸⁶ The White House, 2017.

⁸⁷ "China, U.S. to Disclose Details of Rare Cooperation Against Fentanyl Drug Scourge," Reuters, November 5, 2019.

⁸⁸ Franca van der Laan, *Transnational Organised Crime: Thematic Study Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017*, The Hague: Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), February 2017.

⁸⁹ van der Laan, 2017.

Eurojust uncovered a transnational organized cybercrime network based in Russia that used malware to scam money from victims in the United States and other countries.⁹⁰

Fourth, countering TOC (CTOC) is still a relatively new mission for DoD and not one that it is **structurally** designed to accomplish. The term *CTOC* appears in the National Defense Authorization Act only for the year 2015. This mission differs from the traditional military counternarcotics mission: CTOC seeks to disrupt and dismantle networks responsible for criminal activity, whereas the counternarcotics mission is focused on degrading illegal drug flows into the United States.⁹¹

Fifth, there are **legal constraints**. Despite the existence of a mutual legal assistance agreement between the United States and Russia and the presence of multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance (e.g., the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime), the United States legal systems and priorities are not necessarily compatible.⁹² The execution of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime is prevented in cases where a request for mutual assistance would interfere with the security or other essential interests of the requested party, and it also does not explicitly cover “political offenses.”⁹³ Furthermore, the level of trust required to ensure good cooperation on law enforcement has failed to materialize since the signature of the treaty, and Russia and China’s use of law remains “arbitrary, expedient, and instrumental, rather than predictable and principled.”⁹⁴

Finally, although transnational drug abuse, smuggling, financial crime, and other crimes are problems in all three countries, China and Russia seem to allocate a **low importance** to combating organized crime, specifically beyond their borders, and specifically in cooperation with the United States. They remain reluctant to engage in meaningful cooperation that addresses the transnational crime priorities of the United States with or under the leadership on the United States.

Ultimately, however, the symbiosis of TCNs, the Russian government, and Russia’s foreign policies toward the United States reduces the likelihood and scope and depth of U.S.-Russia cooperation on TOC. Even though some Russian experts have mentioned the potential value of using the U.S. experience in combating organized crime, the current high level of distrust

⁹⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, “GozNym Cyber-Criminal Network Operating out of Europe Targeting American Entities Dismantled in International Operation,” May 16, 2019.

⁹¹ Rabasa et al., 2017.

⁹² Alan McQuinn and Daniel Castro, *How Law Enforcement Should Access Data Across Borders*, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, July 2017.

⁹³ Jennifer K. Elsea, *Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the Russian Federation: A Sketch*, LSB10176, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 24, 2018.

⁹⁴ Popova, 2017; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty with The Russian Federation on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters*, Report to Accompany Treaty Doc 106-22, 107th Congress, December 14, 2001.

and competition between the United States and Russia, prevents the two countries from in-depth cooperation in this domain.⁹⁵

We also assess that, despite China's seeming reluctance to engage with the United States on countering organized crime, and despite the uneven nature of recent U.S.-China cooperation on combating fentanyl smuggling, there may be some opportunities to engage in coordination or cooperation on narrowly defined transnational crime issues (see Table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1
Interest in Cooperation on Dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations/Networks

	China	Russia
Stakes	Low	Low
Rhetorical alignment	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Yes	No
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	No

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

Considering the significant differences in the approach to rule of law and the intersection between politics and combating crime, closer U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on combating TCNs could lead to some serious second-order effects. First, increased U.S. cooperation with China or Russia in this area may harm the United States' reputation as a champion of the rule of law in the eyes of its allies and partners.

On a more positive note, although China remains one of the world's biggest manufacturers of chemical precursors for fentanyl and methamphetamine, U.S. agencies have already embarked on a dialogue to combat the flow of illicit drugs from China into the United States (often via Central America).⁹⁶ For example, the DEA maintains a liaison in China and contacts with the Chinese drug control authorities, and the United States and China also cooperate via the Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group (BDIWG) and two bilateral formats on law enforcement and counternarcotics issues.⁹⁷ Joint counterdrug operations have also

⁹⁵ Dmitri Tishkin, "Gosudarstvennaya Politika Po Borbe S Organizovannoy Prestupnostyu V Rossii: Otsenka Effektivnosti [State Policy for Combating with Organized Crime in Russia: Evaluation]," *Filozofiya Prava*, Vol. 5, No. 78, 2016.

⁹⁶ Paul E. Knierim, "Statement of Paul E. Knierim Before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives for a Hearing Entitled 'Tackling Fentanyl: The China Connection,'" September 6, 2018.

⁹⁷ Knierim, 2018.

yielded results, such as tracing down an international cocaine trafficking case in cooperation with Canada in 2007.⁹⁸

There are, however, limits to such cooperation: Counter-TOC and counterdrug cooperation with China and Russia have never been on the top of the agenda, even though all three countries have recognized the damage that TCNs and drugs have on their respective countries. Furthermore, although we assessed that there may be some possibilities for cooperation with China, as with Russia, a lack of mutual trust may prevent effective intelligence sharing.⁹⁹

Conclusion

The prospects for real cooperation between the United States and China are limited to the common interest area of counterdrug operations. Both China and Russia view the rule of law very differently than the United States does and have shown themselves willing to abuse international rule of law cooperation formats (e.g., Interpol) for their own political interests.

Furthermore, although general trust issues are present in both cooperation with China and Russia, we assess that meaningful cooperation with Russia now is unlikely due to the deterioration of the U.S.-Russia relationship and Russia's use of TCNs as a foreign policy tool against the United States.

⁹⁸ Zhang Yong-an, *Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and U.S.-China Counternarcotics Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, February 2012.

⁹⁹ Zhang, 2012.

Issue Area 3: Countering Violent Extremist Organizations

Even among the global commons issues, countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs) arguably presents one of the most likely places for genuine cooperation between the United States, China, and Russia.¹ All three powers are mutually threatened by violent extremist groups—Salafi-jihadi actors have conducted attacks in all three countries, and U.S., Chinese, and Russian nationals have all traveled to conflict areas to join Salafi-jihadi groups. Therefore, Washington and Moscow—Beijing to a lesser extent—have major equities in this space and have repeatedly committed substantial resources to combating extremist groups. However, the three powers have only mixed rhetorical alignment, and their divergent definitions of who and what actions constitute extremism have, at times, inhibited cooperation and caused tension between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Nevertheless, the United States has periodically cooperated with Russia on niche, tactical issues in this field, particularly in Syria, presenting possible space for cooperation in countering VEOs in the future. In this chapter, we discuss each of the three powers' equities, rhetorical positions, willingness to cooperate, and demonstrated commitments of resources to counter VEOs, assessing the space for future cooperation, the practicalities, and possible second-order effects of such cooperation.²

¹ It is important to note that when discussing VEOs, the NDS, NSS, and other official U.S. strategic guidance documents generally imply VEO to mean Sunni extremist groups. The strategic guidance documents differentiate between Sunni and Shi'a extremist groups, such as Lebanese Hezbollah or Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. Such groups fall under the strategic concern of countering Iran, due to the Islamic Republic's support for the aforementioned Shi'a groups and myriad armed groups in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, VEO does not include far-right, white supremacist extremist groups operating in Europe and North America. As such, when applying the term *VEO*, U.S. strategic guidance documents are referring to Salafi-jihadi actors, such as ISIS, Al-Qa'ida, and Boko Haram, and other radical Sunni groups, such as Hamas.

² For a more in-depth discussion of CVEO in the Indo-Pacific, see another report from this project: Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

Understanding the Equities

The United States, China, and Russia all acknowledge the destabilizing and detrimental effect that VEOs can have on their strategic interests, and, to varying degrees, all have equities in the countering VEOs (CVEO) space. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has waged the so-called Global War on Terror, a far-ranging, multifaceted campaign against VEOs, such as al Qaeda (AQ), ISIS, and their global affiliates. China has dedicated far fewer resources to CVEO efforts, largely concentrating on issues of extremism at home or in its near abroad. However, Beijing applies the term *extremist* more broadly than the United States or its Western partners do, using the label to justify harsh suppression of China's Muslim communities. Similarly, Russia has also broadly labeled nonstate armed groups as extremists or terrorists to justify its military and security campaigns, particularly in Syria. Nevertheless—given Russia's history of Salafi-jihadi and Islamist-linked violence in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, as well as its operations against genuine VEOs in Syria—Moscow also has substantial equities in this field.

U.S. Equities

For much of the past two decades, the Global War on Terror has been one of the foremost strategic priorities for the United States. However, 16 years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS officially redirected U.S. strategic prioritization toward great power competition with China and Russia. Indeed, the NDS affirms that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”³ Nevertheless, the NDS does clarify that “threats to stability remain as terrorist groups with long reach continue to murder the innocent and threaten peace” across the globe.⁴ As such, combating VEOs remains a top security concern for the United States, after competition with China and Russia and countering rogue regimes, namely North Korea and Iran.

Moreover, the CVEO fight is a global one. ISIS alone has attracted foreign fighters from every inhabited continent and has affiliates in three U.S. combatant commands' areas of responsibility (AORs)—U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).⁵ Indeed, each of these combatant commands ranks combating VEOs as one of its strategic priorities in their respective posture statements—first of four, third of three, and fourth of five, respectively.⁶ Furthermore,

³ DoD, 2018c, p. 1.

⁴ DoD, 2018c, p. 1.

⁵ See Joanna Cook and Gina Vale, *From Daesh to 'Diaspora': Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State*, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018.

⁶ Joseph L. Votel, “The Posture of U.S. Central Command,” testimony delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., February 5, 2019, p. 9; Stephen J. Townsend, “A Secure and Stable

the NSS states that VEOs pose the primary transnational threat to the United States, as well as a significant threat in Europe, where ISIS and AQ have conducted or inspired attacks in multiple countries, including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia.⁷

Despite the global scope of combating VEOs, the threat is arguably most prevalent in the Middle East and the CENTCOM AOR, the primary theater for the Global War on Terror since 2001. Indeed, General Joseph L. Votel, former commander of CENTCOM, asserted that “The CENTCOM AOR is the world’s epicenter for terrorism and VEOs.”⁸ In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States and its partners and allies have conducted CVEO operations for nearly two decades, the United States also conducts CVEO activities in Syria and Yemen.

Among the most prominent U.S. efforts has been its counter-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria. Between 2014 and 2019, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and its local Iraqi and Syrian partners liberated much of ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate, which at its height occupied a land mass roughly the size of Great Britain. However, despite ISIS’s territorial defeat, the group still poses a persistent insurgent threat. From March 24, 2019, the day after ISIS lost its last remaining sliver of territory in Syria, to December 31, 2019, ISIS conducted 609 acts of violence in Iraq and Syria.⁹

In addition to ISIS, AQ remains deeply entrenched within the CENTCOM AOR. AQ-linked Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is the dominant armed actor in Idlib Province, the last remaining stronghold of the Syrian opposition. AQ’s official Syrian branch, Hurras al-Din are also prominent armed actors in Idlib. AQ in the Arabian Peninsula is the dominant Salafi-jihadi actor in Yemen, where it has adeptly enmeshed itself in Yemeni tribal politics and local dynamics.¹⁰

Despite two decades of war, the Taliban remains resilient in Afghanistan, where it controls 74 of the country’s 398 districts and approximately 13.7 percent of the population, compared with the government of Afghanistan’s control of 133 districts and approximately 45.98 percent of the population.¹¹ ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) also poses a potent threat in Afghanistan, where

Africa Is an Enduring American Interest,” testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., January 30, 2020, p. 5; Philip S. Davidson, “U.S. INDO-PACOM Command Posture,” testimony delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., February 12, 2019, p. 11.

⁷ The White House, 2017, p. 11.

⁸ Votel, 2019, p. 9.

⁹ ACLED data.

¹⁰ Michael Horton, “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2017, p. 20.

¹¹ In addition to the districts and portions of the population controlled by the Taliban or Afghan government, 190 districts and approximately 40.3 percent of the population are contested by the Taliban or central government. See Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski, “Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan,” *Long War Journal*, Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, undated.

it was involved in 180 acts of violence in 2019 and is one of the group's most active branches.¹² As part of its CVEO fight in Afghanistan, the United States is conducting Operation Freedom's Sentinel to combat ISIS-K and AQ-linked groups operating in Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support to bolster Afghan security forces and promote a political resolution to the ongoing conflict with the Taliban.

The VEOs operating within AFRICOM's AOR have consistently undermined security on the continent. As General Stephen J. Townsend, commander of AFRICOM, stated in his 2020 AFRICOM Posture Statement, "Violent extremist networks are expanding in Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and disenfranchised populations."¹³ Al-Shabaab in Somalia embodies a long-standing VEO threat to regional stability, as well as U.S. interests and presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition to the group's proven ability to conduct horrific, high-casualty attacks in Somalia and neighboring Kenya, the terrorist group also showed itself capable of targeting U.S. military assets in the region, where, on January 5, 2020, al-Shabaab militants attacked a base in Manda Bay, Kenya, and killed three Americans.¹⁴ To combat al-Shabaab and support the Somali government, the United States plays a central role in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), training and equipping the mission's troop contributing countries.

In terms of growing VEO threats, the most worrying region in the world is arguably the Sahel, where VEO violence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger has increased 250 percent since 2018.¹⁵ AQ-affiliated Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS's West Africa Province pose some of the most potent threats to U.S. interests in the region. Both groups have demonstrated a propensity to target Western equities in the Sahel. Such instances include ISIS West Africa's 2017 attack in Tongo Tongo, Niger, that killed four U.S. special forces members and its attacks on Canadian-run gold mines in Burkina Faso, as well as JNIM's attacks on French and other U.S.-partnered forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Mali.¹⁶ One of the United States' primary assets in countering the regional VEO threat is Niger Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger. The \$110 million base, the largest U.S. Air Force-led construction project in history, houses armed unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and hundreds of U.S. military personnel and enables CVEO operations throughout in the Sahel and in North African states, such as Libya.¹⁷

¹² ACLED data.

¹³ Townsend, 2020, p. 5.

¹⁴ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Eric Schmitt, Charlie Savage, and Helene Cooper, "Chaos as Militants Overran Airfield, Killing 3 Americans in Kenya," *New York Times*, January 22, 2020.

¹⁵ Townsend, 2020, p. 14.

¹⁶ See Soufan Group, "The Sahel Is a Growing Arena of Competition for Jihadist Groups," November 18, 2019.

¹⁷ Eric Schmitt, "A Shadowy War's Newest Front: A Drone Base Rising from Saharen Dust," *New York Times*, August 22, 2018; Kyle Rempfer, "Completion of US Drone Base in Niger to Be Delayed," *Air Force Times*, November 19, 2018b.

The VEO threat also stretches far into the INDOPACOM AOR, as ISIS demonstrated in 2017 when its Southeast Asian branch temporarily captured Marawi City in the Philippines. Although Philippine security forces recaptured Marawi from ISIS after five months of fighting, the country still grapples with VEO insurgencies. ISIS-conducted or -inspired attacks have also rocked the region, from Australia to Sri Lanka, where a series of coordinated bombings on Easter 2019 killed 259 in Colombo.¹⁸ Furthermore, INDOPACOM contests a flow of foreign fighters to and from the major VEO battlefields in the Middle East; prior to the group's territorial defeat, more than 1,000 Southeast Asians traveled to join ISIS, approximately 800 coming from Indonesia alone.¹⁹ The NSS established that the United States would "improve law enforcement, defense, and intelligence cooperation with Southeast Asian partners to address the growing terrorist threat" in the INDOPACOM AOR.²⁰

Chinese Equities

China is committed to countering VEOs within China and on its border, but China's definition of VEO and lack of willingness to undertake significant responsibilities outside its immediate neighborhood means that the prospects of cooperation are limited. China has leveraged the Western world's counterterrorism effort to legitimize its own heavy-handed crackdown on domestic dissent and minority citizens under the guise of counterterrorism. Moreover, China's lack of resource commitment—whether manpower or financial—in the Middle East leaves the United States and its allies footing the bill for stability in the region. Overall, we assess that countering VEOs beyond China's immediate neighborhood is of low importance to China, and that rhetorical alignment and its willingness to cooperate is certainly mixed; it has committed no resources to the issue. Of note, China's counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, for which it donated \$70 million and secretly conducted patrols, is outside the scope of this issue and considered separately in *Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation the Indo-Pacific*.²¹

China has long broadcast its desire to counter VEOs, but this has been almost entirely confined to direct threats against the Chinese government. From Beijing's perspective, China has always faced a simmering terrorist insurgency in its western regions and the broader regions of Central and South Asia.²² The outbreak of unrest in the Middle East, especially the Syrian war and Chinese reports that several thousand Uyghurs have joined various groups

¹⁸ Shane Harris, Ellen Nakashima, Souad Mekhennet, and Joanna Slater, "Sri Lankan Easter Bombings, Claimed by ISIS, Show the Group Maintains Influence Even Though Its Caliphate Is Gone," *Washington Post*, April 24, 2019.

¹⁹ Cook and Vale, 2018, p. 18.

²⁰ The White House, 2017, p. 47.

²¹ Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

²² Murray Scot Tanner and James Bellacqua, *China's Response to Terrorism*, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2016. China has occasionally claimed that some of these

there since 2012, brought the dangers of foreign terrorist activity and the risks of returned fighters to the forefront of Chinese concerns.²³ Domestic terrorism concerns were once again highlighted by a wave of attacks over 2013–2015 that include a car bombing in downtown Beijing and mass knife attack in a southern China train station.

Under Xi, Beijing has redoubled its efforts against what it describes as “terrorism.” For many years, China’s domestic counterterrorism efforts struck some balance between a belief in the positive power of economic development and heavy-handed crackdowns. However, in the wake of the 2013–2015 attacks, Xi, early on in his tenure, appointed a new provincial party secretary in Xinjiang in 2016 to implement a massive lockdown on the province that has been declared a “genocide” by both the Trump and Biden administrations, and is estimated to have imprisoned between 1 million and 2 million people.²⁴ Making clear his resolute stance, in his 2017 speech Xi said, “We must rigorously protect against and take resolute measures to combat all acts of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage, as well as violent and terrorist activities, ethnic separatist activities, and religious extremist activities.”²⁵ He acknowledged the global threat of “growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors,” including “unconventional security threats like terrorism.” Xi’s opposition to terrorism is one component of his outreach via the Belt and Road Initiative, of which he has said, “We call on the people of all countries to work together to build a community with a shared future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. . . . [We] oppose terrorism in all its forms.” China’s 2019 defense white paper similarly calls on the PLA to “fulfill [its] international responsibilities and obligations and provide more public security goods,” in part by countering the growing threat of terrorism.²⁶

The United States and China agree that countering terrorism is important, but China, in practice, has not cooperated or bargained much on this issue and has not demonstrated a willingness to commit resources outside its immediate region. For instance, China declined to join the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which comprises 80 countries, whose contributions range from financial support to provision of equipment and trainers to participating in tactical combat operations. This came despite lobbying from the Obama administration, even in-person during then–National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s September 2014

terrorists were trained in Pakistan and other neighboring countries. See Michael Wines, “China Blames Foreign-Trained Separatists for Attacks in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2011.

²³ Jacob Zenn, “An Overview of Chinese Fighters and Anti-Chinese Militant Groups in Syria and Iraq,” *China Brief*, Vol. 14, No. 19, October 10, 2014; Joseph Hope, “Returning Uighur Fighters and China’s National Security Dilemma,” *China Brief*, Vol. 18, No. 13, July 25, 2018; Mathieu Duchâtel, “China’s Foreign Fighters Problem,” *War on the Rocks*, January 25, 2019.

²⁴ Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, “U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide,’” *New York Times*, January 19, 2021.

²⁵ Xi, 2017.

²⁶ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019.

visit to Beijing, and ISIS killings of Chinese citizens and broad threats against the country.²⁷ Although U.S. officials claimed “the Chinese expressed interest” in private, in public, the Chinese Foreign Ministry provided, at best, a tepid endorsement while refraining from any commitment. In September 2014, after U.S. operations had started against ISIS, spokesperson Hua Chunying said, “China consistently and firmly opposes all forms of terrorism, supports and contributes to the global efforts in combating terrorism, including supporting relevant countries’ efforts in upholding domestic security and stability,” but in the next sentence said, “We maintain that the international law, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of relevant countries should be respected in [the] global fight against terrorism.”²⁸ Clearly, Beijing clung to its nominal noninterference policy as justification for lack of military involvement, but in reality it seems more likely the decision was driven by a lack of willingness to exert resources against a real but minor threat (that the United States and others were already addressing) and a lack of tangible military power Beijing could bring in those years.²⁹ As such, despite the growth of both China’s interests in the region and military power abroad, there is little indication that Beijing will substantively cooperate with the United States on CVEO issues from a security standpoint.

In 2017, Trump and Xi “discussed the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other issues, and agreed to deepen cooperation on counterterrorism,” and Trump said that they agreed that “Terrorists are a threat to all of humanity, and we will stop radical Islamic terrorism.”³⁰ However, this was clearly in the context of Afghanistan, reflecting China’s focus. In practice, the United States has strongly criticized China’s conflation of counterterrorism with its domestic crackdown.³¹ China did, however, sell Iraq CH-4B Predator-style unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which Bagdad used to fight ISIS when the United States would not authorize a similar sale of drones.³² Overall, we believe this does not count as a willingness to demonstrate resources toward U.S. goals.

China has increased its counterterrorism efforts abroad in step with Xi’s heavier approach. In 2001, China cofounded with four other states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and

²⁷ William Wan, “U.S. Urges China to help with Islamic State in Iraq,” *Washington Post*, September 9, 2014.

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 23, 2014,” September 24, 2014b. For other related comments, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 11, 2014,” September 11, 2014a.

²⁹ For some analysis, see Shannon Tiezzi, “Will China Join the Fight Against Islamic State?” *The Diplomat*, September 12, 2014; Kor Kian Beng, “Time for China to Do More to Fight Global Terror,” *Straits Times*, November 27, 2015; Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Middle East Policy: The ISIS Factor,” Middle East Policy Council, 2016.

³⁰ Trump and Xi, 2017.

³¹ Lisa Schlein, “US Warns China’s Detention of Uighurs to Counter Terrorism Will Backfire,” *Voice of America*, March 14, 2019.

³² Arnaud Delalande, “Iraq’s Chinese-Made Killer Drones Are Actually Pretty Good,” *War Is Boring*, February 21, 2018.

Tajikistan) the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to bring together China, Russia, and Central Asian states to cooperate on common security concerns, especially China's formulation of "countering terrorism, separatism and extremism."³³ Much of the SCO's activities, especially military exercises such as the China-Russia "Peace Mission" series, were focused on training for a counterterrorism mission, though actual operations were limited. In 2011, China began joint patrols along the Mekong River with Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, though these were not permanent deployments.³⁴ In 2016, however, Beijing took a more active approach when it deployed forces abroad for the first time, sending People's Armed Police to patrol in Afghanistan from new bases in Tajikistan.³⁵ So far, Afghanistan is the PLA's only foreign deployment for counterterrorism, though it is the most frequent topic of Chinese military exercises with other countries.³⁶

However, China's labeling of domestic organizations as "terrorists" and different approach complicate any U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Especially since the 9/11 attacks, China has rebranded its policies and activities against domestic separatists (Uyghurs, Tibetans) as counterterrorism efforts. This led to the U.S. designation of the East Turkmenistan Independence Movement as a terrorist organization in 2002 (repealed in 2020), and the detention of some Uyghurs in Guantanamo.³⁷ In the Philippines, China has supported Rodrigo Duterte's counterterrorism campaign in Mindanao, at least in some part filling the vacuum created when the United States halted cooperation in response to Duterte's counterterrorism approach. For Turkey, China framed the extradition request of a Uyghur dissident under the guise of counter-ISIS counterterrorism cooperation, apparently to avoid the actual political origins of the request.³⁸

Acknowledging the complexity of this topic, one potential area of cooperation between the United States and China is nuclear nonproliferation and stopping nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.³⁹ Although official Chinese government interest on this area is

³³ Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, "General Information," undated.

³⁴ "88th Joint Patrol on Mekong River Completed," Xinhua, November 23, 2019.

³⁵ Charles Clover, "Mystery Deepens over Chinese Forces in Afghanistan," *Financial Times*, February 26, 2017; Gerry Shih, "In Central Asia's Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2019a.

³⁶ Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, *Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, July 2017.

³⁷ Richard Bernstein, "When China Convinced the U.S. That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad," *The Atlantic*, March 19, 2019.

³⁸ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "Documents Show China's Secret Extradition Request for Uighur in Turkey," *Axios*, May 20, 2020.

³⁹ For analysis of U.S.-China cooperation past and future prospects, see Tanner and Bellacqua, 2016; Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RL33001, July 8, 2010; Richard Chang, "U.S.-China Cooperation in Counterterrorism," Georgetown University, September 30, 2016; Council on Foreign Relations, "Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation," April 18, 2018; Daniel L. Byman and Israa Saber,

relatively limited, Chinese academics have proposed and supported this idea. While this most obviously applies to North Korea—an increasingly sensitive area for bilateral cooperation—Iran’s potential resumption of its nuclear program raises new concerns for Middle East proliferation (especially via Iranian proxies). Chinese cooperation on U.S. initiatives for Iran is mixed at best, but China may be interested in low-level nonproliferation cooperation out of concern for regional stability. U.S.-China intelligence-sharing on nonproliferation has a spotty track record but could be a potential avenue for exploration.

Russian Equities

Russia, like the United States, has a strong interest in countering VEOs. Russian CVEO efforts have primarily focused on the threat posed by extremist organizations in Chechnya and the surrounding regions of the North Caucasus.⁴⁰ Dating back to the 1990s, Russia was engaged in domestic counterinsurgency operations in the North Caucasus, where it fought two wars in Chechnya to subdue separatist movements comprising Islamists and Salafi-jihadis. More recently, ISIS claimed responsibility for the 2015 downing of a Russian airliner flying from Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, to St. Petersburg, killing all 224 people on board, 219 of whom were Russian citizens.⁴¹ Today, Russia fears the reemergence of homegrown violent extremists in the North Caucasus region, especially with the possible return of thousands of former insurgents from the conflict in Syria and Iraq.⁴²

According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), VEOs represent both an external and internal threat to Russia. One of the major external threats facing the country is the “growing threat of extremism,” while the “activities of terrorist organizations” are characterized as one of the primary internal threats to Russia.⁴³ Russia’s National Security Strategy (2015) similarly identified the “activities of terrorist and extremist organizations” as representing a major threat to Russian national security, while also expressing an interest in expanding cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism.⁴⁴ Finally, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (2016) characterized the “growing threat of international terrorism” and the “spread of extremist ideology” as among the most dangerous problems facing Russia

Is China Prepared for Global Terrorism? Xinjiang and Beyond, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, September 2019.

⁴⁰ Cross, 2006, p. 2; Cross, 2013, p. 8.

⁴¹ Counter Extremism Project, *Russia: Extremism & Counter Extremism*, 2020, p. 5; Global Terrorism Database, data file on ISIS-linked terrorist events in Russia, downloaded July 20, 2020; “Russian Plane Crash: What We Know,” BBC, November 17, 2015.

⁴² Joshua Sinai, “The Terrorist Threats Against Russia and its Counterterrorism Response Measures,” *Connections*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Fall 2015, p. 95.

⁴³ Government of Russia, 2014b.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015b.

and the international community.⁴⁵ It noted that this threat had become more acute with the emergence of the Islamic State and called for international cooperation in countering terrorism and VEOs.⁴⁶

The United States and Russia differ in the focus of their CVEO efforts. As noted above, Russian CVEO efforts have generally emphasized the threat posed by domestic extremist organizations, whereas the United States has focused on overseas interventions and counter-insurgency operations. Russia also defines *extremism* more broadly, to encompass nearly any activity that destabilizes domestic politics or society.⁴⁷ Although CVEO efforts in the United States and Russia differ considerably, in the years since 9/11 Russia has cooperated with the United States in fighting terrorism. Russia permitted basing access during the first phase of the Global War on Terror, cooperated with the FBI in intercepting weapons transfers, and collaborated with the United States to help disrupt terrorist financing.⁴⁸

Additionally, in 2015 Russia launched a concerted and aggressive air campaign and deployed a few thousand troops to Syria. It did so to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad—which Russian policymakers perceived as months, if not weeks, away from defeat at the hands of the Syrian opposition.⁴⁹ Russia also claimed that its efforts were designed to destroy or evict ISIS from Syria, but a primary driver of Russia's intervention was the Kremlin's fear of losing influence in a post-Assad Syria to Western powers, possibly entailing a loss of access to Russia's Tartous naval base and Hmeimim Air Base.⁵⁰ However, Moscow was also genuinely concerned about the security ramifications that the Assad regime's collapse would have on regional stability and the concomitant ascendancy of anti-regime Salafi-jihadi groups, such as AQ-affiliated HTS (then known as Jabhat al-Nusra) and ISIS.⁵¹ AQ affiliates have generally dominated or been among the most prominent Syrian opposition groups in the country's northwest and southwest, areas that have seen some of the most intense Russian air campaigns. ISIS also had an entrenched presence in the southwestern Yarmouk valley, prior to a Russian and Iranian-backed regime offensive in July 2018. Moreover, Russian private military contractors (PMCs) have partaken in CVEO ground operations since at least 2013.⁵²

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁴⁷ Stepanova, 2016, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Cross, 2006, p. 5.

⁴⁹ Samuel Charap, Elina Treyger, and Edward Geist, *Understanding Russia's Intervention in Syria*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3180-AF, 2019, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Charap, Treyger, and Geist, 2019, p. 4.

⁵¹ Charap, Treyger, and Geist, 2019.

⁵² The Slavonic Corps, a precursor to what is now Wagner Group, was the first reported case of a Russian PMC involved in combat in Syria. Originally contracted by the Syrian government to guard oil facilities in Deir Ezzor Province, more than 250 mercenaries quickly became engaged in firefights with ISIS elements, suffered casualties, and were withdrawn from Syria. In 2016, Wagner Group commanders received the Order of Courage, a Russian medal and commendation for acts of valor, for their roles in liberating Tadmur

Indeed, from Moscow's perspective, Russian security forces, have conducted the lion's share of CVEO operations in Syria, whereas the United States has largely limited its CVEO campaign in Syria to defeating ISIS in the Syria's eastern provinces.⁵³

Russian proxies have conducted military operations under the auspices of combating extremist groups in Africa—particularly in Mozambique and Libya. In the former, 200 Russian PMCs affiliated with the Wagner Group arrived in Mozambique in September 2019 to support the country's Armed Defense Forces to combat a mounting ISIS-linked insurgency in the country's north. In Libya, Moscow had largely balanced its relations between both of the country's rival factions since the onset of civil war in 2014. However, beginning in fall 2019, Russia appeared to shift its favor toward the eastern-based strongman, Khalifa Hifter. Upward of 1,200 Wagner personnel are said to have supported Hifter's offensive to conquer Tripoli.⁵⁴ Hifter has labeled his bid to seize power in Libya as a campaign to rid the country of terrorist groups, though he adheres to a broad definition of terrorism, deeming both moderate and more radical Islamist actors as terrorists.

Space for Cooperation

U.S. Cooperation with China

China has, heretofore, demonstrated only limited interest in combating the global VEO threat, and the space for cooperation with China on countering VEOs is, therefore, limited. China is legitimately concerned with VEO threats to its homeland and was the scene of multiple terrorist attacks in 2013–2015. China, however, does not want foreign powers meddling in its domestic affairs, nor would many in the West be inclined to cooperate with China even if it was asked. China's **definition** of who it labels as terrorists is not the same as the United States', and China's tactics border on what some Western observers would label as genocide. Indeed, China's wide-sweeping and heavy-handed approach to countering violent extremism (CVE) in Uyghur communities is largely anathema to U.S. and Western CVE methodology, which typically favors a community-driven, education-based deradicalization and reintegration approach.⁵⁵

The Chinese government has often taken rhetorical stances against VEOs, and a 2019 Chinese defense white paper called on the PLA to "fulfill [its] international responsibilities"

from ISIS. See Sergey Sukhankin, *Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond*, Jamestown Foundation, December 18, 2019.

⁵³ Author interview with Israeli academic, Tel Aviv, February 17, 2020.

⁵⁴ Michelle Nichols, "Up to 1,200 Deployed in Libya by Russian Military Group: U.N. Report," Reuters, May 6, 2020.

⁵⁵ See Richard C. Baffa, Nathan Vest, Wing Yi Chan, and Abby Fanlo, *Defining and Understanding the Next Generation of Salafi-Jihadis*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-341-ODNI, 2019.

in promoting international security, including with a CVEO vector.⁵⁶ However, Beijing has not committed substantial resources to the broader CVEO issue in areas outside of its near abroad, despite a large contingent of Chinese Uyghurs having traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight for VEOs such as the Islamic State or Turkistan Islamic Party. Instead, China largely relies on the United States', Western, and regional actors' CVEO efforts. China has grown increasingly concerned with VEO threats in its near abroad, with multiple neighbors—Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan—currently experiencing or having long histories of Salafi-jihadi activity. However, China's multilateral cooperation on CVEO issues has primarily vectored through the SCO, excluding the United States, and largely been relegated to joint trainings and insubstantial operations.⁵⁷

Still, one possible area of cooperation with China is addressing some of the socioeconomic factors traditionally associated with driving radicalization. The 2017 NSS affirmed that the United States “will support reforms . . . to address core inequities that jihadist terrorists exploit,” and such reforms include modernizing economies of countries long affected by VEO threats.⁵⁸ China is currently the Middle East's top trade partner and has expansive commercial and development interests in Africa, another hotspot of Salafi-jihadi activity. As such, alleviating economic frustration and disparity, though only one area of myriad drivers of radicalization, offers a possible trade space for U.S.-Chinese cooperation.

Any future cooperation with China in this area would have to overcome **issue linkage**. Chinese commercial and development interests in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia are not strictly or even primarily CVEO efforts and are often bound up in support for authoritarian regimes. In the Gulf states, in particular, China is exporting security technologies, such as artificial intelligence–driven surveillance tools, that could help regimes better monitor and disrupt potential terrorist threats and improve internal security.⁵⁹ However, authoritarian regimes may abuse Chinese security technology to increase repression on their communities, writ large, including would-be terrorists, activists, or journalists. Indeed, the United Arab Emirates government has allegedly used the Emirati-developed messaging app ToTok—whose name is likely inspired by the Chinese app TikTok and possibly based off the same code as Chinese app YeeCall—to spy on users and collect data.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019.

⁵⁷ China has genuine concerns over VEO threats emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Analysis of possible U.S.-Chinese cooperation on AFPAK issues are addressed in the Indo-Pacific component of this study (Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023).

⁵⁸ The White House, 2017, p. 49.

⁵⁹ Steven Feldstein, *The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2019.

⁶⁰ Though ToTok is likely based off of Chinese messaging apps and possibly using Chinese code, the Emirati company that developed the app, Breej Holding Ltd., is reportedly a shell company for the security firm DarkMatter. Based in Abu Dhabi, DarkMatter has employed former intelligence officers, including from the United States and Israel, to conduct hacking operations against political dissidents, journalists, and even U.S. nationals. See Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth, and Ronen Bergman, “It Seemed Like a Popular

U.S. Cooperation with Russia

By contrast, Russia is legitimately concerned with VEO threats to its homeland, as well as to key allies, such the Syrian regime and Central Asian states. Unlike China, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to commit resources to combat VEOs. Russia has also demonstrated its willingness to coordinate and deconflict with the United States on CVEO issues. In particular, Russia and the United States have maintained a 24-hour tactical-level deconfliction hotline between the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar and Russia's Hmeimim Air Base in Syria since 2015. Although Washington and Moscow did not use the hotline to coordinate joint counterterrorism operations, it did allow them to operationally deconflict at the tactical level and generally delineate areas of operation, allowing the USAF to conduct air strikes against ISIS targets and U.S. Syrian partners to combat ISIS on the ground without fear of confrontation with Russian forces.⁶¹ Tellingly, as a testament to the hotline's value and success as a deconfliction mechanism, even amid downturns in U.S.-Russia relations in Syria and Russian Ministry of Defense threats to discontinue the hotline, both parties have maintained its operation.⁶²

Moreover, with its 2015 intervention, Moscow made overtures to Washington to broaden cooperation against ISIS and AQ-affiliated groups, both as a means of expanding genuine counterterrorism operations and rejuvenating its flagging international standing as a responsible state actor, post-Ukraine invasion.⁶³ More recently, the United States has reportedly resumed flying sorties over Idlib Province to conduct counterterrorism operations; Washington had suspended such operations in 2017. According to Syria expert Aaron Stein, Russia, which largely controls Idlib Province and western Syria's air space, has permitted the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations against ISIS targets in the area, stating that "Russia is unlikely to object to U.S. overflight if it is aimed at fighting extremists" and reflecting a mutual interest in CVEO efforts.⁶⁴ As such, continued and future U.S.-Russia cooperation—or at least deconfliction and bargaining on air space and areas of operation—on CVEO operations in Syria remains a distinct possibility.

Whether the United States could deepen its cooperation with Russia in practice, however, depends partly on whether the great power could overcome several obstacles may impede any genuine cooperation.

Chat App. It's Secretly a Spy Tool," *New York Times*, December 22, 2019; Lily Hay Newman, "Uninstall This Alleged Emirati Spy App from Your Phone Now," *Wired*, December 22, 2019.

⁶¹ See Seth Jones, *Moscow's War in Syria*, Washington, D.C.: Center for International Strategic Studies and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, May 2020, p. 57.

⁶² Andrew S. Weiss and Nicole Ng, *Collision Avoidance: The Lessons of U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 20, 2019.

⁶³ Jones, 2020, p. 58.

⁶⁴ Aaron Stein, "The Idlib Model: Securing American Counter-Terrorism Interests in Syria," Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 18, 2020b.

First, there is a **trust** deficit. Counterintelligence concerns, a wariness of Russian intentions, and a concern that Russia might learn from and exploit U.S. intelligence-gathering methods hindered direct U.S.-Russia cooperation on CVEO efforts in Syria. In 2015 and 2016, Russian defense officials made overtures to their U.S. counterparts, proposing arrangements to share intelligence gathered on VEOs active in Syria. However, as terrorism expert Seth Jones states, “U.S. military and intelligence officials were concerned that any U.S.-Russian arrangement to share intelligence and targeting information would pose significant counterintelligence risks if Russian officials sought to collect on U.S. tactics, techniques, procedures, sources, and methods.”⁶⁵ Despite concerns, U.S. officials reportedly did offer intelligence and targeting information on ISIS and AQ affiliates to incentivize renewed Russian support for UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and nationwide ceasefires. However, negotiations failed to revive a cessation of hostilities, scuttling the possibility of intelligence-sharing to combat VEOs in Syria.⁶⁶

Second, there are **definitional** problems about who is a terrorist. The United States has been relatively discriminating in its application of the term in Syria, generally deeming only ISIS, HTS, and other AQ-affiliated groups as extremists. On the other hand, Russia labels all groups opposing the Assad regime, regardless of ideological disposition, as terrorists. Moreover, as mentioned above, Russia and the regime have intentionally targeted the White Helmets, which Russia and the regime consider a terrorist group but are, in actuality, a Western-trained, unarmed first responder organization.⁶⁷ As such, Russia’s CVEO campaign in Syria has been wide-ranging and problematic, targeting genuine Salafi-jihadis, the moderate opposition, and civilian groups, all under the auspices of fighting terrorism.

A broad application of the *extremist* or *terrorist* label has also abetted Russian activities in Libya, complicating any possible U.S.-Russia cooperation against genuine VEO threats in the country. As mentioned above, Russia increased its military support to eastern-based strongman Khalifa Hifter. In fall 2019, Wagner PMC supported his bid to seize Tripoli from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord. Though largely moderate in ideological disposition, Hifter has labeled Tripoli’s defenders as terrorists, despite many of the anti-Hifter forces being the same groups with whom the United States partnered in 2016 to oust ISIS from the city of Sirte, the group’s stronghold on the Mediterranean.⁶⁸ Additionally, Hifter’s offensive forced AFRICOM to withdraw its small contingent of personnel from Tripoli, where they were conducting counterterrorism and building partner capacity opera-

⁶⁵ Jones, 2020, p. 58.

⁶⁶ Jones, 2020, p. 58.

⁶⁷ Janine di Giovanni, “Why Assad and Russia Target the White Helmets,” *New York Review of Books*, October 16, 2018.

⁶⁸ Wolfram Lacher, *Who Is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? How the 2019 Civil War Is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape*, Small Arms Survey, August 2019.

tions in Libya.⁶⁹ Therefore, though Hifter and his Russian backers may attempt to justify their assault on Tripoli as a CVEO operation, they are, in fact, fighting against Libya's most proven counter-ISIS elements and disrupting U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the country.

Third, future U.S.-Russia cooperation on counterterrorism also confront **issue linkage**. CVEO in Syria, for example, is tied to the broader issues of the fate of the Assad regime. Having saved the Assad regime from collapse, Moscow has signaled that the withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, primarily meaning U.S. troops, from Syria is its "ultimate priority," whereas combating VEOs is secondary.⁷⁰ Russia's policy prioritization is evident in its actions in Syria's southern desert region, where the United States maintains a small garrison at al-Tanf, from which it conducts counter-ISIS operations. Rather than pursuing ISIS targets, Russia reportedly harasses the U.S. garrison through Iranian-linked militias in an attempt to pressure the United States to withdraw from the base.⁷¹ Furthermore, Russia has reportedly at times refused the United States permission to strike ISIS fighters operating in regime-controlled areas in southern Syria.⁷²

Additionally, as mentioned above, Wagner PMC personnel have conducted CVEO operations in Mozambique; however, U.S.-Russia cooperation on CVEO activities in the country is unlikely. The Wagner Group is tied to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch under U.S. sanctions for his role in Russia's meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. Moreover, as evidenced by its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Wagner has increasingly served as the vanguard for malign Russian activity and a means of Russia expanding its influence through dubious means while maintaining a degree of deniability. Furthermore, the United States, along with France and Italy, has interests in cultivating influence in Mozambique.⁷³ Subsequently, Western competition with Russia for influence across Africa may preclude cooperation on CVEO issues.

Finally, there are **legal constraints** on any future U.S.-Russia CVEO cooperation. In response to Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014, Section 1241 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015 restricted DoD from militarily cooperating with Russia. In the NDAA, Congress expressly prohibited any "bilateral military-to-military cooperation between the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation" until the former ended its occupation of Ukrainian territory and began abiding by the 2014 Minsk

⁶⁹ U.S. Africa Command, "Declining Security in Libya Results in Personnel Relocation, Agility Emphasis," U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, Stuttgart, Germany, April 7, 2019.

⁷⁰ Dmitry Peskov, quoted in "Withdrawal of Foreign Troops Stationed in Syria Illegitimately Is Priority, Says Kremlin," Tass, October 24, 2019.

⁷¹ Author interview with U.S. Department of State official, Amman, February 12, 2020.

⁷² Lead Inspector General, *Overseas Contingency Operations: Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines*, Washington, D.C., January 1, 2018–March 31, 2018, p. 27.

⁷³ Townsend, 2020.

Protocol.⁷⁴ Because of this, U.S. forces conducting counter-ISIS operations, as well as the occasional strike against AQ-affiliated groups, in Syria were legally prohibited from fully coordinating operations with Russian military counterparts.⁷⁵ Indeed, U.S. General Votel has remarked that the United States subsequently “never really achieved [cooperation with Russia] in a place like Syria”; rather, “the most [the United States] could do was deconfliction.”⁷⁶

Summary

Ultimately, as depicted in Table 5.1, there is limited space for cooperation with China on CVEO. Simply put, despite China’s rhetoric on this issue is not aligned with the United States’, China’s view of which groups are extremist or terrorist does not match that of the United States, and China has not shown much interest in dedicating real resources to CVEO outside its borders. By contrast, there is more space for cooperation with Russia on CVEO. Russia does consider Salafi jihadist groups threats, has shown a willingness to engage the United States on these issues, and has dedicated resources to countering these threats abroad. That said, cooperating with Russia on CVEO comes at cost for the United States—most notably in its influence in the Middle East—and faces real obstacles, so, despite these overlapping interests, U.S.-Russia cooperation on CVEO may still be an uphill struggle.

TABLE 5.1
Interest in Cooperation on Countering Violent Extremist Organizations

	China	Russia
Stakes	Low	High
Rhetorical alignment	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Mixed	Yes
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	Mixed

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

Even in a relatively limited space, U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on countering VEOs has strategic consequences. Tentative cooperation with either power must be carefully cali-

⁷⁴ Public Law 113-291, Title XII, Matters Relating to Foreign Nations, Sec. 1241, Limitation on military cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, December 19, 2014. All subsequent NDAAAs through FY 2020 renewed the restriction on bilateral military-military cooperation between the United States and Russia.

⁷⁵ Jones, 2020, p. 58.

⁷⁶ Joseph L. Votel, *Great Power Competition in the Gulf*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., February 24, 2020.

brated. While cooperation with China or Russia could beneficially impact the security of states and communities afflicted by VEO threats, it could also make the United States indirectly complicit with Chinese and Russian draconian or iron-fisted measures taken under the auspices of combating extremism. Additionally, actively or passively cooperating with China or Russia on CVEO matters may create space for either or both revisionist powers to expand their influence, often at the United States' expense. However, in some instances, the United States may be able to cooperate with one power—understanding that it may grow its security or economic influence—to the detriment of the other revisionist power.

As Russia becomes increasingly active in CVEO operations in Africa, Washington may theoretically consider delegating more CVEO efforts to Moscow. DoD has signaled its intent to draw down its presence on the continent and reallocate AFRICOM resources to more direct arenas of competition with China and Russia.⁷⁷ A partial withdrawal from Africa would cede influence to the United States' great power rivals, who are already highly active on the continent. Additionally, DoD's Office of the Inspector General reported in late 2019 that Russia is attempting to present itself as an "alternative partner to the West," and allowing Russia to entrench in Africa may also position Russia on NATO's southern flank.⁷⁸ Finally, encouraging Russia to play a larger role in Africa also risks upsetting key U.S. allies—most notably France—who have long-standing interests in the continent and potentially undermining their CVEO operations.

However, selectively sacrificing U.S. influence in Africa, thereby providing Russia more room to maneuver and expand its security and economic ties, may eventually engender competition between Moscow and Beijing, the latter of which has long seen Africa as a vital piece of its domestic economic growth and geopolitical expansion. Indeed, upon Wagner's arrival in Mozambique, Russian media outlets heralded the CVEO mission as Russia "threatening both China and the West in Africa."⁷⁹ Such claims proved premature, as Wagner suffered heavy casualties and eventually left northern Mozambique.⁸⁰ However, the media reaction does suggest a potential arena in which the United States can spark competition between China and Russia, if the United States is willing to cede influence in Africa.

A similar set of positive and negative externalities applies to any potential U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Middle East: Although the United States may gain some added capacity in the counterterrorism fight against ISIS, it would come at a direct loss of American influence in the region and, potentially, the second-order effect of sparking future radicalization across the region. The air component of the U.S.-led campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria

⁷⁷ Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage, and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Eyes Africa Drawdown as First Step in Global Troop Shift," *New York Times*, December 24, 2019.

⁷⁸ Lead Inspector General, *East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, October 1, 2019–December 31, 2019*, Washington, D.C., 2020, p. 14.

⁷⁹ Evgeny Krutikov, "Rossiya v Afrike pugayet Zapad i Kitay [Russia in Africa Scares the West and China]," *Vzglyad*, October 24, 2019.

⁸⁰ Al J. Venter, "A Dirty Little War in Mozambique," *Air War Analysis*, No. 386, May 2020, p. 77.

undeniably resulted in civilian casualties and large-scale destruction of property, especially in West Mosul. However, DoD undertakes rigorous measures to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. Moreover, the United States also trains its partners in the law of armed conflict, which may have contributed to the lack of violent reprisals and the humane detention of ISIS fighters as U.S.-partnered Syrian forces cleared the last pockets of ISIS territory in 2019.⁸¹ Conversely, U.S. officials have also voiced their aversion to cooperating with Russia on CVEO issues, given Moscow's "heavy-handed style of fighting terror" and association with the Assad regime's myriad war crimes, all of which may drive future cycles of radicalization in Syria.⁸²

The Russian government's tacit support or even facilitation of Wagner activities will make U.S.-Russia CVEO cooperation difficult, because Wagner commits human rights abuses. Indeed, Russian investigative journalism outlet *Novaya Gazetta* reported in April 2020 of Wagner torturing and beheading civilians in Syria.⁸³ Conventional militaries, are, of course, not innocent of also committing heinous violations of the law of armed conflict. However, Wagner's actions in Syria highlight a risk of relying on armed personnel who are less accountable to military command and control. Should Wagner serve as a CVEO force in the Middle East and Africa, similar abuses or complicity with state security forces' abusive practices may also engender further local grievances and contribute to future radicalization.

As mentioned above, there is a less space to cooperate with China on CVEO. Compared with Russia, China takes an even heavier-handed approach to counterterrorism domestically. China has incarcerated more than 1 million of its Uyghur minority, which the U.S. government has labeled a genocide.⁸⁴ Beyond the moral considerations, encouraging Chinese investments in underdeveloped and developing economies most directly cements China's grasp over these same countries over the long term, even after the CVEO threat diminishes. Moreover, encouraging Chinese surveillance via artificial intelligence-driven technologies would risk giving authoritarian-leaning countries the ability to monitor and suppress activists, journalists, and political dissidents, in addition to bona fide terrorist threats, potentially undermining democracy and human rights-promotion efforts.⁸⁵ Over the long term, such repression may further instill grievances and drive future radicalization. Indeed, the United Nation's 2006 CVE plan of action established "respect for human rights for all and the rule of law" as its fourth programmatic pillar and the "fundamental basis of the fight against

⁸¹ Author interview with DoD official, Tampa, Florida, October 14, 2019.

⁸² U.S. government official, cited in Jack Detsch, "Report: China, Russia Worried About Militants' Return from Syria," *Al-Monitor*, December 2, 2019.

⁸³ Denis Korotkov, "Golovorezy 2.0: Novyye podrobnosti prestupleniya «gruppy Vagnera» v Sirii [Cutthroats 2.0: New Details of the Crime of the 'Wagner Group' in Syria]," *Novaya Gazetta*, April 24, 2020.

⁸⁴ Wong and Buckley, January 19, 2021.

⁸⁵ Daniel Chau of Dahua Technology, cited in Center for Security and International Studies, "China in the Middle East: Part Six," February 25, 2020.

terrorism.”⁸⁶ Therefore, increased repression enabled by Chinese security technology, though used under the auspices of disrupting terrorist threats, may likely be counterproductive to CVE and CVEO efforts.

Conclusion

U.S. cooperation with the China or Russia on CVEO issues is a genuine possibility, albeit less likely with China. All three powers have suffered VEO attacks on their homelands, and scores of U.S., Russian, and Chinese nationals have joined VEOs in Syria and Iraq. As such, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing all have vested interests in combating VEOs, and Washington and Moscow both have substantial equities in this field. Moreover, both powers have already at least deconflicted efforts in combating VEOs operating in Syria, and, despite mounting tensions and opposing strategic priorities, CVEO efforts in Syria present a distinct opportunity for continued deconfliction. Neither genuine cooperation nor deconfliction between the United States and Russia or China is likely to occur in other theaters, however, where competition for influence is equal to or greater than competition in Syria and the broader Middle East.

Moreover, cooperation with either of the revisionist powers comes with moral implications. Moscow has labeled all elements of the Syrian opposition as extremist and indiscriminately prosecutes its bombing campaign in Syria, targeting noncombatants and armed groups alike. Beijing has broadly demonized its Uyghur population as separatist and extremist, implementing oppressive and draconian policies in Chinese Muslim areas.

Should the United States seek to cooperate with Russia or China on CVEO efforts, it will have to carefully calibrate the extent of its cooperation as to not present either revisionist power with more room to maneuver and expand its influence. Additionally, depending on the context, the United States may need to weigh the moral consequences of cooperating with either power, given how both Moscow and Beijing have at times conducted nominally CVEO efforts in manners anathema to U.S. modes of operation. However, this does not mean that the possibility of cooperating to combat extremist organizations should be dismissed out of hand. In particular, and as demonstrated in Syria, deconflicting air campaigns may be prove a constructive means of averting confrontation and delineating areas of operation while effectively conducting CVEO operations against mutual threats, such as ISIS and AQ.

⁸⁶ United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, 2006, p. 8.

Issue Area 4: Promoting Global Stability

Promoting global stability and resolving long-running conflicts presents another space in which U.S. cooperation with China or Russia has, at times, been possible and may also be possible in the future. All three powers have committed diplomatic and military resources to stabilization-related efforts. The United States provides humanitarian aid, development, and stabilization aid to fragile states, and DoD and the U.S. Department of State use security cooperation with armed forces as a tool to, *inter alia*, build partner capacity and promote stability. China is a major troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping forces, and it has also sought to diplomatically resolve long-running conflicts, especially in Africa. For its part, Russia has committed military and diplomatic resources to support embattled governments—in the Central African Republic and Mozambique, for instance. All three powers are also rhetorically aligned in their support for promoting stability.

At the same time, the United States ideologically diverges with China and Russia. In the United States' view, China and Russia often uncritically support oppressive regimes and turn a blind eye to human rights abuses, under the auspices of noninterference in domestic affairs and promoting the stability of central governments. In addition, China and Russia have, at times, sought to “freeze” conflicts—averting state collapse but not fully resolving the conflict—to expand their influence and compound fragile states' dependence on Chinese or Russian support. By contrast, China and Russia view U.S. military intervention and democracy-promotion efforts as fundamentally destabilizing and contrary to norms of state sovereignty. In this chapter, we address the equities that the United States, China, and Russia have in promoting stability, intersecting interests that portend possible cooperation, and countervailing objectives and approaches that might inhibit such cooperation.

Understanding the Equities

The United States, China, and Russia all nominally support promoting stability and have taken rhetorical positions espousing the importance of maintaining stability and ending long-running conflicts. All three powers have equities in this field, both through multilateral bodies and bilateral efforts. As we discuss in the following sections, the United States and China provide substantial support to UN PKOs, and Russia also provides considerable logistical support to such operations. Additionally, the United States promotes stability through

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, as well as building partner capacity of security forces in fragile states. All three powers also promote stability through multilateral and bilateral negotiations, attempting to mediate conflicts. However, China and Russia have also leveraged instability and so-called frozen conflicts and volatile environments to retain or expand their commercial, political, and military influence in fragile states.

U.S. Equities

The United States has major equities in promoting stability and resolving long-running conflicts across the globe and most prominently in three AORs: CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and SOUTHCOM.¹ As reflected in multiple guidance documents, the United States views promoting stability and ending long-running conflicts as a means of strengthening partners, galvanizing economic growth, and cultivating a more prosperous global community, which assist the United States in its pursuit of broader strategic objectives. U.S. stabilization, relief, and capacity-building efforts are multifaceted and exhibit both a civilian-led humanitarian and a DoD-led security approach. For the former, the United States undertakes substantial humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, both unilaterally and in support of multilateral efforts. DoD also promotes stability through humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. Furthermore, it conducts security cooperation activities aiming to strengthen fragile partners and build partner force capacity to foster stability in regions plagued by instability and marred by long-running conflicts.

On the humanitarian aid and stabilization front, the United States government is a major contributor to relief efforts across the globe. For instance, the United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, providing \$1.65 billion and 27.89 percent of the UN's peacekeeping budget for fiscal year 2019.² Additionally, in fiscal year 2019, USAID obligated more than \$21 billion for humanitarian services, which included, *inter alia*, emergency response efforts, HIV/AIDS initiatives, and basic health development. Conflict-affected countries, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, received some of the largest amounts of support.³

Stabilization efforts in such conflict-affected countries, as well as fragile states, serve as an important tool in promoting U.S. strategic objectives; at the same time, instability undermines U.S. strategic interests. Indeed, the NSS affirms that in unstable environments plagued by weak governances and corruption, terrorist and criminal networks thrive, and strategic

¹ The United States also responds to long-running conflicts in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, but those are addressed in two other volumes in this series: Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023, on the Indo-Pacific, and Treyger et al., 2023, on Europe and the Middle East.

² Congressional Research Service, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Washington, D.C., August 14, 2019.

³ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Foreign Aid Explorer," 2020.

competitors exploit instability to expand their influence.⁴ U.S. efforts to end long-running conflicts, provide humanitarian or refugee aid, and stabilize fragile states shrink the space in which U.S. adversaries are able to operate, particularly in a great power competition context.

Unsurprisingly, given that CENTCOM's top priority is countering VEOs, which thrive in destabilized environments, promoting stability is one of the combatant command's four strategic priorities, as defined in its 2019 posture statement. General Votel states that "instability is contagious . . . A stable Middle East underpins a stable world. In an already volatile region, [the United States'] steady commitment to [its] allies and partners provides a force for stability."⁵ The U.S.-Jordanian relationship is a prime example of U.S. support to its allies in the CENTCOM AOR. At approximately \$1.08 billion for fiscal year 2019, Jordan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid in the world, and, of the abovementioned foreign aid, USAID provided Jordan roughly \$750 million, solely to keep its government functioning.⁶ Additionally, the Kingdom also receives substantial U.S. military aid—nearly \$473 million in fiscal year 2019 alone.⁷ Both Congress and DoD generally view Jordan as a vital strategic partner to the United States, providing a stabilizing presence and moderate voice in an unstable region, with the U.S. foreign aid being a small price to pay for maintaining the country's stability.⁸

In Jordan and elsewhere in its AOR, CENTCOM primarily provides support to fragile states and promotes stability via a "by, with, and through" approach. Through this model, CENTCOM partners with regional security actors to combat VEOs and, in long-running conflict zones, achieve conditions on the ground conducive to negotiating resolutions to the conflicts. Indeed, the 2019 CENTCOM posture statement affirms that "employing a 'by, with, and through' operational strategy supports . . . promoting regional stability and security, defeating terrorist threats . . . and ensuring that common domains remain free and open."⁹ Prominent examples of the "by, with, and through" approach include U.S. support to the Iraqi military and Syrian Democratic Forces in the counter-ISIS campaign and Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, through which U.S. military personnel advise and assist Afghan government forces in their fight against the Taliban.

Although not an explicitly stated strategic priority, promoting stability is a prominent theme throughout the 2020 AFRICOM posture statement, which argues that promoting stability on the continent fosters economic growth, mitigates the need for migration, counters

⁴ The White House, 2017, p. 45.

⁵ Votel, 2019, p. 9.

⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, 2020; author interview with U.S. diplomat, Amman, Jordan, February 12, 2020.

⁷ Security Assistance Monitor, "Security Sector Assistance Database," undated, 2020 data files on U.S. security assistance to Jordan.

⁸ Author interview with DoD official, Amman, Jordan, February 12, 2020.

⁹ Votel, 2019, p. 15.

drivers of extremism, and undermines adversaries' ability to exploit instability for their own gain.¹⁰ AFRICOM primarily promotes stability on the continent through building partner capacity initiatives, intended to enable African partners to more effectively provide local security and mitigate destabilizing influences in the region.

U.S. support to AMISOM constitutes one of the United States' largest stabilization, CVEO, and conflict-resolution efforts in Africa. Between 2014 and 2018, DoD provided \$626 million to AMISOM's troop contributing countries, with Section 1206/2282/333 Train and Equip Authorities accounting for \$540 million; additionally, the U.S. Department of State provided \$87.2 million in PKO funding for AMISOM during the same period.¹¹ Furthermore, DoD provided over \$200 million for building partner capacity efforts within Somalia itself, working to enable the Somali National Army—particularly the “Danab” Special Forces Brigade—to eventually assume primary responsibility for combating al-Shabaab and stabilizing Somalia.¹²

Elsewhere in its AOR, AFRICOM aims to promote stability and resolve conflicts to diminish opportunities for U.S. adversaries to cultivate and expand their influence on the continent. In Libya, for instance, General Stephen J. Townsend affirmed the combatant command's continued support for the UN's efforts to resolve the conflict, in which Russian PMCs are increasing their presence on the ground and supported Khalifa Hifter's ill-fated attempt to depose the internationally recognized Government of National Accord.¹³ Another prominent site of U.S. humanitarian relief and stabilization efforts is Mozambique, which was devastated by Cyclone Idai in 2019 and is grappling with a growing Salafi-jihadi insurgency. There, Townsend indicated a desire to grow AFRICOM's security cooperation partnership with Mozambique, building off of USAID's relief efforts in the country.¹⁴ Such efforts may work to hinder Russian expansionism in Mozambique, where Moscow has dispatched PMCs to obtain oil and gas concessions under the guise of conducting CVEO operations.¹⁵ Furthermore, the lead-up to the 2011 operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya showed that, at least at the time, the United States was reluctant to carry out an operation in Africa without allies,

¹⁰ Townsend, 2020, p. 7.

¹¹ Security Assistance Monitor, undated.

¹² Security Assistance Monitor, undated, datafiles on U.S. security assistance to Somalia, 2014–2018; Townsend, 2020, p. 13.

¹³ Townsend, 2020, p. 13.

¹⁴ Townsend, 2020, p. 15. Following Cyclone Idai, which struck Mozambique and other parts of southern Africa in March 2019, USAID provided \$66.8 million in humanitarian relief and disaster recovery funds for FY 2019 alone. See USAID, “Southern Africa—Tropical Cyclones: Fact Sheet #11, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019,” May 9, 2019.

¹⁵ Townsend, 2020, p. 16.

and also revealed that a military engagement by the United States alone might be met with suspicion by at least some African nations.¹⁶

In the Western Hemisphere, SOUTHCOM commander Admiral Craig S. Faller has upheld promoting stability in the Western Hemisphere as critical to maintaining the United States' competitive and strategic edge in its near-abroad.¹⁷ Conversely, exacerbated instability, corrupt governments, and economic stagnation provide Russia and China openings to expand their footprints in Latin America. Faller points to instability in Venezuela, where Moscow has supported the flagging Maduro regime, as a prime example of Russia leveraging political and social upheavals to expand its influence.¹⁸ Continued unrest in Venezuela threatens stability throughout Latin America, with growing levels of refugees straining Venezuela's neighbors—Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador.¹⁹ The United States has imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan government and individuals in response to the activities of the Maduro presidency, which the United States does not recognize, including terrorism, drug trafficking-related sanctions, and sanctions related to “antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, and corruption.”²⁰ Furthermore, the United States has sanctioned subsidiaries of the Russian state-controlled Rosneft Oil Company for their engagement in the export of Venezuelan oil.²¹ As part of U.S. efforts to promote stability and humanitarian relief in the Western Hemisphere, SOUTHCOM has coordinated with Latin American partners to provide medical care in “12 countries, reducing suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela.”²² Moreover, similar to AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM largely seeks to promote U.S. strategic objectives through building partner capacity efforts. In particular, the U.S. National Guard's State Partnership Program and the U.S. Marine Corps' Special Purpose Air-Ground Task Force serve as avenues through which to cultivate U.S. influence, bolster military-military security cooperation partnerships, and enable Latin American militaries to promote regional stability and security.

¹⁶ Joe Quartararo, Michael Rovenolt, and Randy White, “Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control,” *Prism*, Vol. 3, No. 2, October 2013.

¹⁷ Craig S. Faller, “Posture Statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command,” testimony delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., January 30, 2020.

¹⁸ Faller, 2020, p. 5.

¹⁹ Faller, 2020, p. 6.

²⁰ Congressional Research Service, *Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions*, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2020f.

²¹ Congressional Research Service, 2020f.

²² Faller, 2020, p. 7.

Chinese Equities

China nominally supports global stability, including ending long-running violent conflicts and supporting fragile states, but its actions often reveal that its interests are most expeditiously served by exploiting weak states. China has undertaken some initiatives to end long-running conflicts, this has mostly been confined to those conflicts that directly affect Chinese interests, and China's efforts have had limited results. For example, Beijing supported the peace process in South Sudan, but this was due to China's economic stakes in the country. Chinese governance philosophy and interests place strong limits on the extent of practical cooperation possible on this issue. Overall, we assess that the issue is of low importance to China, and although there is rhetorical alignment between the United States and China, China's willingness to bargain or cooperate with Washington is mixed. However, China has committed resources toward this goal.

China supports global stability, though it is usually framed in terms of delivering economic development to alleviate the underlying drivers of conflict. Xi defined global instability as a key challenge for China's national development in his 2017 Party Congress speech, likely because of its potential to undermine Chinese economic growth and jeopardize China's growing global interests.²³ Addressing these problems, Xi in a 2015 speech to the UN called for the international body to take a "central role . . . in ending conflict and keeping peace," and highlighted the nonsecurity dimensions of instability: "We should advance international cooperation in both economic and social fields and take a holistic approach to addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats, so as to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place."²⁴

Beijing, however, has long benefited from ongoing conflicts and weak states. China has supplied arms to one or both sides in several conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq War and more recently in South Sudan.²⁵ Yet, China has also played an integral diplomatic role in promoting the war-torn country's peace process, and the UN PKO in South Sudan comprises more than 1,000 Chinese service members.²⁶ Despite ongoing instability, China has continued to expand its commercial interests in South Sudan, centering on the country's substantial, and largely untapped, oil wealth.²⁷ For instance, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation holds a 40 percent stake in South Sudan's largest oil fields. Additionally, Beijing has invested billions in developing South Sudan's oil-related infrastructure, experiencing

²³ Xi, 2017.

²⁴ Xi Jinping, "Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind," speech to UN General Assembly, New York, September 28, 2015a.

²⁵ Cara Anna, "UN: China Arms Firm Sold \$20M in Weapons to South Sudan," Associated Press, August 25, 2015; United Nations Security Council, *Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015)*, S/2015/656, August 21, 2015.

²⁶ United Nations, "UNMISS Fact Sheet," webpage, March 2020.

²⁷ Austin Bodetti, "How China Came to Dominate South Sudan's Oil," *The Diplomat*, February 11, 2019.

little competition, given other players' hesitance to become involved in a market dogged by corruption and conflict.²⁸

China has exploited other fragile, unstable, or otherwise weak governments for access to their resources, such as its 2007 resources-for-infrastructure deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo, though China's approach to resource-backed loans has evolved in recent years after several high-profile failures.²⁹ Similarly, China has expanded its political influence in states with weak governance, such as Serbia as a gateway to Europe.³⁰ Xi's high-profile Belt and Road Initiative has also pushed unsustainable infrastructure projects to China's strategic and economic gain at the host country's expense, often abetted by corrupt dealings.³¹ Furthermore, these unsustainable infrastructure projects are often executed by Chinese state-owned companies that import their own labor and deliver minimal benefits to the local community, in disregard of norms and some local requirements, and when they do hire local labor, they often violate local regulations.

The United States and China agree in general terms on cooperating to promote global stability, but Beijing has undertaken limited bilateral engagement bargaining, or cooperation on the issue. In 2017, during Trump's visit, Xi said, "We believe that facing the complex and changing international landscape, in maintaining world peace and stability, in promoting global development and prosperity, China and the United States, being two large countries, share more common interests, shoulder greater responsibility, and enjoy broader room for cooperation."³²

However, actual engagement between the two sides has been limited to some Track 1 dialogues on African affairs and Afghanistan and some Track 2 dialogues. On African affairs, one example is a series run by the Carter Center since 2015 that has brought together U.S., Chinese, and UN special representatives for the region and covered Sudan and other issues.³³ In 2019, the two sides held their first consultation on African affairs at the Assistant Secretary

²⁸ Liselotte Odgaard, *Double-Edged Aid: China's Strategy to Gain Influence Through Regional Assistance*, Hudson Institute, March 2020, p. 22.

²⁹ William Wallis and Rebecca Bream, "Alarm over China's Congo deal," *Financial Times*, September 19, 2007; Aaron Ross, "China's 'Infrastructure for Minerals' Deal Gets Reality-Check in Congo," Reuters, July 9, 2015; Scott Wingo, "The Rise and Fall of the Resource-Backed Loan," Center for Advanced China Research, February 18, 2020.

³⁰ Vuk Vuksanovic, "Light Touch, Tight Grip: China's Influence and the Corrosion of Serbian Democracy," *War on the Rocks*, September 24, 2019.

³¹ Christopher Balding, "Why Democracies Are Turning Against Belt and Road: Corruption, Debt, and Backlash," *Foreign Affairs*, October 24, 2018; Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, "China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals," *Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 2019; Jeremy Page and Saeed Shah, "China's Global Building Spree Runs into Trouble in Pakistan," *Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 2018.

³² Trump and Xi, 2017.

³³ Carter Center, "China Program's Africa-US-China Trilateral Cooperation Timeline," July 25, 2019. For an earlier series of dialogues over 2005–2007, see Council on Foreign Relations, "Africa-China-U.S. Trilateral Dialogue: Summary Report," December 2007.

of State level, where they agreed to “maintain consultation, step up dialogue, explore cooperation approach[es], and jointly safeguard stability in Africa.”³⁴ On Afghanistan, China engaged with the United States through the Quadrilateral Coordination Group in 2016, along with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and again in a similar effort with the United States, China, Russia, and Pakistan in 2019, but little progress was made.³⁵

Outside of U.S. engagement, China created a special envoy in 2014 as the United States was withdrawing and has engaged with the Taliban and regional players, but analysts argue that China has not exerted its leverage on Pakistan to move the process forward.³⁶ For Track 2 dialogues, a 2004 discussion of failing states showed early promise, but it appears that even this level of discussion has been sustained—a 2017 Track 2 dialogue on global governance and a 2018 Track 2 dialogue on prospects for cooperation on global issues did not cover ending long-running violent conflict or supporting weak states.³⁷ This limited engagement leaves the results mixed.

To date, substantive Chinese actions have been limited. At the most basic level, China has touted its own success maintaining domestic stability as major contribution to global stability.³⁸ In his 2015 UN address, Xi promised to “establish a 10-year, US\$1 billion China-UN peace and development fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more to world peace and development.”³⁹ So far, the most tangible evidence of fulfilling this pledge is the establishment of the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016, with the contribution goal apparently lowered to \$200 million over ten years.⁴⁰ Moreover, according to China’s September 2020 position paper on the UN, so far the fund has only paid

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China and the United States (US) Hold the First Consultation on the African Affairs at Departmental Level,” August 5, 2019b.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Joint Press Release of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation,” January 11, 2016a; “China, Russia, U.S., Pakistan Hold Talks on Afghan Peace Process,” Xinhua, October 26, 2019. For a recent overview of China’s position in Afghanistan, see “Envoy Elaborates China’s Position on Afghanistan,” Xinhua, November 28, 2019.

³⁶ Ben Blanchard, “China Appoints Special Envoy for Afghanistan,” Reuters, July 18, 2014; Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “Afghanistan’s ‘China Card’ Approach to Pakistan, Part 1: 1991–2014,” *The Diplomat*, April 11, 2019; Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “The Afghan National Unity Government’s ‘China Card’ Approach to Pakistan: Part 2,” *The Diplomat*, April 12, 2019.

³⁷ Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, *U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2004. For the U.S. and Chinese reports on the 2017 dialogue, see Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Joint US-China Think Tank Project on the Future of US-China Relations: An American Perspective*, Washington, D.C., July 2017; Fu Ying and Wang Jisi, eds., *China-US Relations: Exploring a New Pathway to A Win-Win Partnership*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2017. For 2018 dialogue, see Council on Foreign Relations, 2018.

³⁸ Malcolm Moore, “China’s ‘Next Leader’ in Hardline Rant,” *Telegraph*, February 16, 2009.

³⁹ Xi, 2015a.

⁴⁰ United Nations, “United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund,” undated; Michelle Nichols, “China Takes First Step in \$1 Billion Pledge to U.N. to Fund Peace, Development,” Reuters, May 6, 2016.

out \$67.7 million.⁴¹ This follows China's status as the largest peacekeeping force among UN Security Council members, mostly deployed in Africa.⁴² PKOs show China's limits for slow transition to active involvement under even UN auspices; however, despite China participating in UN PKOs since 1990, it only sent combat troops in 2012 to South Sudan and so far has only participated in three UN missions with troops.⁴³ Instead, China has favored financial contributions and training, with Xi's 2015 pledge including targeting \$100 million for African security and increased training and capacity building. This may change though, as Xi also promised to establish a "peacekeeping standby force" of 8,000 troops and join the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System for rapid deployment. In the Middle East, China has appointed a Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue since 2002 and in 2016 created a special envoy for Syria, though its Middle East peace plans from 2013 and 2017 have garnered little momentum in the region.⁴⁴

China's most active efforts have come under Xi. China's first major foray into international mediation was the 2003 North Korean nuclear crisis and the organization of the Six-Party Talks, but that was driven by China's desire to avoid a war on its border and did not end a conflict or improve a weak state.⁴⁵ In South Sudan, China tried to leverage its economic ties, especially dominance of the oil sector, into a leading role to end the post-independence civil war with a brokered peace deal in 2015 and again in 2018.⁴⁶ However, as of early 2020, true peace has yet to materialize, and as one analyst described, "[China's] interest was in the oil

⁴¹ It is unclear whether China plans to spend the rest of the \$1 billion commitment in other ways outside the fund. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Position Paper of the People's Republic of China On the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations," September 10, 2020.

⁴² Ethiopia is the largest contributor of PKO forces globally. See United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troop And Police Contributors," undated-b.

⁴³ United Nations Peacekeeping, "Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post," March 12, 2017. For analysis of China's peacekeeping efforts, see Dennis Blasko, "China's Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations: Understanding the Numbers," *China Brief*, Vol. 16, No. 18, December 5, 2016; Marc Lanteigne, *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in China's Expanding Strategic Interests*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2018; Lucy Best, "What Motivates Chinese Peacekeeping?" Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2020. For China's experience as a combat troop provider, see Jeremy Page and Matina Stevis, "China Discovers the Price of Global Power: Soldiers Returning in Caskets," *Wall Street Journal*, November 15, 2016.

⁴⁴ "Chinese President Makes Four-Point Proposal for Settlement of Palestinian Question," Xinhua, May 6, 2013; "China Appoints First Special Envoy for Syrian Crisis," Reuters, March 30, 2016; "China Seeks Support for Israel-Palestinian Peace Plan," Associated Press, August 1, 2017. For analysis, see Yoram Evron, "China Has a New Middle East Peace Plan," *The Diplomat*, August 14, 2017. For a recent example of Chinese efforts for regional leadership in words not deeds, see "China Committed to Playing Constructive Role in Middle East, Gulf: Envoy," Xinhua, January 7, 2020.

⁴⁵ Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, November 1, 2003.

⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, *China's Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan*, Brussels, Belgium, July 10, 2017; Siobhán O'Grady, "As South Sudan's Conflict Drags On, U.S. Frustrations Mount," *Washington Post*, December 21, 2019; "China Urges South Sudan Parties to Accelerate Peace Implementation," Xinhua, July 31, 2019.

fields and not necessarily in ending the conflict.”⁴⁷ In Myanmar, where the long-running domestic insurgency undermines stability on China’s border, China has taken an active role, starting with the 2013 creation of the Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, exclusively focused on Myanmar.⁴⁸ China supported the national dialogue between the government and insurgents, but its engagement was sporadic, and as one analyst noted, “The level of China’s intervention correlates directly with the intensity of the conflict and its spillover effect on China,” including military attacks on Chinese territory.⁴⁹ Violence has continued, and Beijing’s support for the return of the Rohingya from Bangladesh has been similarly unsuccessful.⁵⁰

One key challenge for cooperation is that China under Xi appears increasingly interested in promoting its China model of governance abroad. This means that as China supports the development of state capacity, it will encourage foreign governments to adopt China’s system instead of democratic forms of government. In his 2017 speech, Xi said that China “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence. . . . It offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind. . . . We respect the right of the people of all countries to choose their own development path.”⁵¹ This is further evident in the China-Africa 2018 joint plan, which says,

China supports African countries in independently exploring development paths suited to their national conditions, and supports their efforts in formulating national development strategies, enhancing capacity building and improving state governance. China is ready to share with African countries the practices and experience of reform and opening-up,” including through personnel training.⁵²

⁴⁷ Denise Hruby, “China Used to Stay Out of Other Nations’ Politics. But Not Here,” *Washington Post*, July 26, 2018. For another view, see Lily Kuo, “There’s at Least One Place in Africa Where China’s ‘Win Win’ Diplomacy Is Failing,” *Quartz*, November 21, 2017. For analysis of how China has navigated the 2019 coup in Sudan, see Laura Barber, *China’s Response to Sudan’s Political Transition*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2020.

⁴⁸ United States Institute of Peace, *China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts*, Washington, D.C., September 2018.

⁴⁹ Yun Sun, *China and Myanmar’s Peace Process*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, March 2017.

⁵⁰ Poppy McPherson, Ruma Paul, and Shoon Naing, “China Struggles in New Diplomatic Role, Trying to Return Rohingya to Myanmar,” *Reuters*, January 20, 2020. For a local perspective, see “Under China’s Direction, Myanmar’s Peace Process Goes Nowhere,” *Irrawaddy*, September 27, 2019.

⁵¹ Xi, 2017.

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2018c.

U.S.-China cooperation on global stability is possible, but the United States must take care to ensure the local countries' interests are placed first and foremost.⁵³ In certain circumstances, the United States and China could agree to condition aid to the parties involved on progress toward a negotiated settlement. Looking long-term to avoid proxy wars, the United States and China could both agree not to arm either side of a conflict (though this would leave the door open for Russian arms sales).

Russian Equities

In a September 2011 address to the UN Security Council, former Russian ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin argued that “Modern conflicts have no military solutions”; rather, conflicts should be resolved through a “collective search for political and diplomatic compromises” and avoid interference in domestic affairs.⁵⁴ Russia sees American military interventions and democracy promotion efforts as fundamentally destabilizing and has argued that the United States should stay out of internal affairs of other states. To an extent, Russia has held to this position itself. Even in conflicts where Russia has militarily intervened—such as in Syria, Libya, and the Central African Republic—Russian security forces were invited to intervene.⁵⁵ Moreover, following Russia’s military intervention in these processes and achievement of its immediate strategic objectives, such as buttressing the Assad regime, Moscow has turned to multilateral, diplomatic means to produce a cessation of hostilities. However, by injecting itself into conflicts, both diplomatically and militarily, Russia is ensuring that it has a seat at the negotiating table. Russia can then leverage its influence on the ground to extract concessions and safeguard its strategic interests, expanding its influence in a conflict-affected country and region.

Russia is selective about its engagements in fragile states in regions that are beyond its immediate neighborhood. In geographically closer areas, such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnistria, its preference has been toward freezing conflicts and gaining more influence through means such as passportization in separatist regions.⁵⁶ Its presence in the Middle

⁵³ For an early look at cooperation prospects, see Garrett and Adams, 2004. For more recent assessments, see Yun Sun “The Limits of U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa,” Brookings Institution, April 6, 2015; Yun Sun, “US-China Cooperation on African Security,” Brookings Institution, November 1, 2016.

⁵⁴ Vitaly Churkin, “Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations H.E. Vitaly Churkin at the UN Security Council Meeting on conflict prevention,” United Nations, September 22, 2011.

⁵⁵ In the case of Libya, eastern-based strongman Khalifa Hifter requested military assistance from Russia, reportedly meeting directly with Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner Group. While Hifter has attempted to seize Tripoli and overthrown the UN-recognized Libyan executive branch, which does not recognize Hifter as the head of Libya’s armed forces, Libya’s internationally recognized legislature has recognized Hifter. See Warsaw Institute, *Civil War in Libya: Russian Goals and Policy*, April 30, 2019.

⁵⁶ This approach in Russia’s neighborhood countries allows Russia to increase its influence through passportization in separatist regions (Philip Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 1, 2019).

East, Africa, and South America (especially Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, South Africa, Central African Republic, and Venezuela) is motivated by its concerns about Chechen and Muslim movements in Russia, the Kremlin's belief in the centrality of the state and the inviolability of Russian sovereignty, economic and political interests, and its tendency to bolster status quo and totalitarian leaders to for its own foreign policy goals.⁵⁷ This approach allows the Kremlin to demonstrate that it can project influence beyond its immediate neighborhood and can be a more successful, understanding, and objective peace broker than the United States and its allies, which often have colonial history in these regions. Furthermore, Russia sees engagements in these regions as a means of weakening the West's global dominance and establishing partnerships through which Russia may gain more influence on the international stage, specifically through developing mutually supporting relations within the UN.⁵⁸

In its the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2016), Russia positions itself as an international actor seeking to prevent global instability through "promoting partnerships across cultures, religions and civilizations."⁵⁹ Although Russia does not use one single concept or doctrine of promoting global stability, its Development Assistance Policy (2014) aspires to develop a strong posture in the world and eliminate current and potential future "hotbeds of tension," specifically in the Russian neighborhood.⁶⁰ Moreover, by providing targeted assistance, tailored to the "political, economic, societal, environmental and other characteristics of the state," Russia explicitly defines itself as a very different partner than the West, which, according to the Kremlin, seeks to maintain its position in the increasingly multipolar world through "imposing [its] point of view on global processes and conducting a policy to contain alternative centres of power."⁶¹ Russia's Foreign Policy Concept (2016) expresses concern that disruption of existing international and domestic power structures, especially as perpetrated by external actors, would only create more instability.⁶² Russian leaders criticize and try to discredit the United States and its allies' attempts to support democratic change in other countries. For example, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev accused the United States and the European Union (EU) of violating UN resolutions and deceiving the UN Security Council to achieve regime change in Libya.⁶³ Russia abstained (rather than vetoed) in the UN

⁵⁷ Russia aims at protecting its economic interests in countries such as Syria (oil and gas), Sudan (gold), the Central African Republic (gold, uranium, and diamonds), and Venezuela (oil, gold, and arms deals) (Arnold, 2019).

⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016; Stronski, 2019.

⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014a; V. N. Konishev, "Problemi Vzaimodeistviya Rosiiskoi Federacii I Organizacii Obedinennih Nacii V Oblasti Mirovotvorchestva [Problems in Mutual Action by the Russian Federation and the United Nations in Peacemaking]," St. Peterburg State University, *Politeks*, 2016.

⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁶³ Louis Charbonneau, "Russia U.N. Veto on Syria Aimed at Crushing West's Crusade," February 8, 2012.

Security Council vote about a statement put forth by the UK, France, and the United States that established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace and paved the way for operation Odyssey Dawn. Since then, Russia has accused the West of misinterpreting UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and acting in bad faith, specifically applying the mandate of civil protection to regime change.⁶⁴ It could be assumed that this feeling of deceit on the part of Russia, even if somewhat naïve, has contributed to Russia's unwillingness to cooperate on, or at least avoid interfering with, the West's attempts to support its version of the international order using military interventions.

Russia is developing its position as a pragmatic international powerbroker that is able and willing to cooperate with all sides, even when this means doing business with the adversaries of its allies and partners.⁶⁵ The Kremlin has repeatedly shown its ability to cooperate with any regime, expressing unconditional support for the longevity of the regime of the partner country, and providing support to several, often conflicting actors. According to Putin, Russia does not “ally with someone against someone else.”⁶⁶ For example, Russia is primarily committed to supporting Assad's regime in Syria but has also readily cooperated with Turkey in Syria, even when this pits Assad and Turkish forces against each other.

In the Middle East, Russia is first and foremost interested in domestic and regional safety, stability, and sovereignty, and Russia's engagement in the region is motivated by a concern that the troubled peace in Chechnya and the North Caucasus could be disturbed by Islamist insurgents prevailing over the Assad regime, the disintegration of Syrian sovereignty, and spillover into the rest of the region.⁶⁷ Additionally, Russia aims to prevent the region's actors from supporting Chechen and other Muslim rebels in Russia or helping them becoming a cause célèbre that unifies Muslims against the Kremlin.⁶⁸ Thus, Russia has courted all major Muslim governments and nationally oriented opposition groups (such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban) and cooperated both with Iran in Syria and Saudi Arabia on oil prices.⁶⁹

Russia's assistance policies are also motivated by its economic interests—such as the presence of its oil, gas, and nuclear industry—and belief in the sanctum of state sovereignty and domestic power structures. Russia has established potentially lucrative mining deals in such

⁶⁴ Christopher S. Chivvis, “Strategic and Political Overview of the Intervention,” in Karl P. Mueller, ed., *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-676-AF, 2015.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁶⁶ Simon Allison, “Russia in Africa: Soft Power Comes with Hard Edges,” *Mail and Guardian*, October 24, 2019.

⁶⁷ Derek Averre and Lance Davies, “Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Syria,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2015.

⁶⁸ Mark N. Katz, “Russian Activities in the Middle East,” in Nicole Peterson, ed., *Russian Strategic Intentions*, NSI, Inc., May 2019.

⁶⁹ Averre and Davies, 2015; Becca Wasser, *The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-340-RC, November 2019.

countries as Angola, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in exchange for military training and equipment, which Russia uses to enter the African energy and mining sectors.⁷⁰

This is also the case in the Central African Republic (CAR), which has grappled with civil war since 2012. At the invitation of the CAR's president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, Russia has expanded its influence through security cooperation, training, equipping, and advising the CAR's armed forces, as well as providing security for CAR leadership. Russian firms are also engaged in mining operations.⁷¹ Russian actors have sought to provide security in both the CAR's government and rebel-held areas, yet achieving an ultimate peace has remained elusive. Additionally, Moscow has leveraged its growing influence in the CAR to embed itself intimately in the country's internal affairs and extract the CAR's natural resources under favorable commercial terms, with Russia possibly looking to establish a military base in the country, as well.⁷²

Russia's increasing presence in the Middle East and Africa illustrates its mercantile approach to stability development, which is largely dictated by the need to prioritize the resources it spends on regions that, in the broad scheme of Russian foreign policy, are not priority areas.⁷³ Its approach to security assistance is not dependent on requests to change domestic power structures and human rights requirements, setting it apart from what Russia portrays as a neocolonialist American approach of promoting stability and making itself a more attractive cooperation partner for authoritarian leaders.⁷⁴

Russia's assistance largely takes the form of arms deals, energy investments, military training, and security services provided via Russian PMCs—such as Wagner Group—as well as through debt-for-development programs.⁷⁵ While it is debatable about how much of the

⁷⁰ For example, Zimbabwe granted cheap platinum mining concession to Russia in exchange for helicopters. Russia has also signed deals with African countries on access to their airbases and seaports. These deals could support Russia's ability to project power into the Middle East by retaining presence in the Horn of Africa and having influence over the Suez Canal by having presence in the Gulf of Aden, as well as retain control and security of its economic deals. Stephen Blank, "Opinion: Russia Returns to Africa," *Geopolitical Intelligence Services*, August 17, 2018.

⁷¹ Russian mining company Lobaye is reportedly linked with the Wagner Group and has been supporting a radio station and produced a cartoon representing Russia as a strong friendly bear (Allison, 2019).

⁷² Vandenbrink, 2019; Andrew Roth, "Central African Republic Considers Hosting Russian Military Base," *The Guardian*, October 25, 2019. Since February 2019, the CAR, United Nations, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and other key players—such as Russia, France, and Sudan—have worked to implement an ECCAS-brokered peace agreement, the eighth peace attempt since 2012. Russia, coordinating with Sudan, had been conducting a peace process parallel to the ECCAS effort; however, the two tracks were eventually combined, culminating in the February 2019 peace deal. See Elizabeth Murray and Rachel Sullivan, "Central African Republic Struggles to Implement Peace Deal," *United States Institute for Peace*, October 17, 2019.

⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁷⁴ Stronski, 2019.

⁷⁵ Although Russia significantly lags behind China and the United States in terms of trade with Africa, it is the largest supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa and is a significant security provider via the use of its pri-

assistance actually contributes to stability, versus creating more chaos, African countries have made use of these opportunities to prop up their own regimes. Sudan, for instance, has called for more arms sales and shown interest in supporting Russian air and naval bases in the country.⁷⁶ Moreover, Russian mercenaries tried to prop the regime of the former Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, and Russian political strategists have reportedly tried to influence the results of presidential elections in Madagascar.⁷⁷

In Mozambique, President Filipe Nyusi's administration requested Moscow's military assistance in combating a mounting Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the country's northern regions. Seeking to leverage the country's security crisis for access to Mozambique's substantial energy reserves and advantageous resource concessions, approximately 200 Wagner mercenaries arrived in the country in September 2019.⁷⁸ However, the Wagner Group produced mixed results, failing to make headway against the insurgents and suffering numerous casualties.⁷⁹

Wagner mercenaries—and more recently fighter jets—have assisted the eastern-based Libyan strongman Khalifa Hifter, despite Russia also officially recognizing the UN-backed Government of National Accord.⁸⁰ By intervening in support of Hifter's bid to seize Tripoli, albeit with PMCs and a patina of plausible deniability, Moscow has been able to gain considerable influence in the conflict. Russia has also helped avert a financial crisis in eastern Libya, injecting 12 billion counterfeit Libyan dinars into Libya's economy, which was already suffering major liquidity challenges.⁸¹ Russia has leveraged its influence to push the two warring parties toward a ceasefire and diplomatic resolution, with Moscow as the primary peace broker. At least in its January 2020 attempt to bring about a political solution to Libya's long-running civil war, Russia failed to orchestrate a ceasefire.⁸² Nevertheless, by continuing to officially recognize the Government of National Accord while expanding ties with Hifter, Russia is able to exert influence over both parties and guarantee an outcome that benefits Moscow, regardless of the conflict's actual outcome.

vate military security companies. It is also involved in some of the most significant nuclear power projects. Ethiopia is one of the latest beneficiaries of the debt-for-development program in Africa: Russia deleted a \$160 million debt in exchange for privileges for Russian business (Benita van Eyssen, "Russia's Comeback in Africa," *DW*, October 23, 2019; Tim Stanley and Barnaby Fletcher, "Russia Steps Up Its Game in Africa," *Moscow Times*, October 18, 2019; Arnold, 2019).

⁷⁶ Allison, 2019.

⁷⁷ Allison, 2019.

⁷⁸ Venter, 2020, p. 76.

⁷⁹ Venter, 2020, p. 77.

⁸⁰ Nichols, 2020; Diana Stancy Correll, "Russian Aircraft Deploy to Libya to Back Private Military Contractors, AFRICOM Says," *Military Times*, May 26, 2020.

⁸¹ Blank, 2018; Jonathan M. Winer, "Seized Russian-Printed Dinars Highlight an Opportunity to Reform Libya's Civil War Economy," Middle East Institute, November 7, 2019.

⁸² "Libya Conflict: Warring Sides Meet in Moscow for Talks," BBC, January 13, 2020.

Russia contributes very few personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (70 people in 2020), yet it is the seventh-largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget.⁸³ Its foreign policy favors a multinational approach to peacekeeping and stabilizing fragile states, with a process that is united under the UN.⁸⁴ In the UN, Russia could benefit from its membership in the UN Security Council and its ability to negotiate favorable voting with other countries in the world.⁸⁵ At the same time, Russia has tried to reduce the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) activities on frozen conflicts and stability in Russia's neighborhood, an area of high priority for Russia, resenting the ODHIR for its criticism of Russian's shortcomings in democratic governance and human rights.⁸⁶

Space for Cooperation

There is some space for U.S. cooperation on global stability with China and Russia concerning UN PKOs. As mentioned above, all three powers, and the United States and China in particular, have committed significant resources to support UN PKOs. In 2019, the United States and China were the top two financial contributors, respectively: China was a top-ten troop-contributing country, and Russia was the eighth-largest financial donor.⁸⁷ Across Africa and in the Middle East, the United States has cooperated with both powers, albeit often indirectly through the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, to support peacekeeping, promote stability, and avert backsliding into conflict. In Lebanon, for instance, China has participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2006 and, as of March 2020, UNIFIL includes 419 Chinese service members, the seventh-largest national contingent.⁸⁸ China, through UNIFIL, is supporting stabilization and peacekeeping roles in Lebanon in coordination with DoD and U.S. Department of State efforts with the Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese government.

⁸³ United Nations Peacekeeping, undated-b.

⁸⁴ Alexander Nikitin, "International Interventions in Conflicts: UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO Peacekeeping Policies," Moscow, Valdai Club, June 2017.

⁸⁵ It should also be noted that Russia does not support the concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) and considers it flawed. One Russian author writes that R2P was politically abused in Libya by the United States and the EU to topple the regime, and that R2P could deform sovereignty and could be abused to influence Russian behavior in the post-Soviet space (Konishev, 2016).

⁸⁶ In 2010, the Russian permanent representative to the OSCE accused it of practicing double standards and using its institutions to plant neoliberal democratic models in post-Soviet and other countries (Schmitt, 2019; Remler, 2019).

⁸⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping, "How We Are Funded," undated-a.

⁸⁸ United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, "UNIFIL Troop-Contributing Countries," webpage, accessed March 31, 2020.

Moreover, there is some record of great power cooperation in this regard. The United States and China have historically diplomatically cooperated through multilateral bodies—such as the UN or African Union—to pursue political resolutions to long-running conflicts. For instance, China has actively engaged with the United States, the African Union, and Western actors to promote a peace process in South Sudan, where Beijing has committed considerable resources in both the country’s political and economic future.

Similarly, Russia engaged the United States, at least indirectly, on ending long-running civil wars. For example, in 2015, Moscow tacitly supported the UN-sponsored Libya Political Agreement, the drafting of which Washington was heavily involved in and which sought to peacefully resolve the country’s civil war, which began in 2014.⁸⁹ Additionally, Moscow hosted Libya’s two main factions in January 2019 in an attempt to broker a ceasefire.⁹⁰ Moscow’s efforts failed in producing a ceasefire, but the summit did galvanize the long-awaited Berlin Conference, in which Putin and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo participated.⁹¹ On the more successful end of the spectrum, the United States and Russia both played supporting roles in CAR peace talks, led by the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, that culminated in a peace agreement in 2019.⁹² And in 2012–2013 the United States cooperated with Russia to secure chemical weapons in Syria—a diplomatic cooperation that also involved the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.⁹³

At the same time, Russia’s and China’s support for PKOs has not been absolute. Beijing’s nominal prioritization of noninterference and sovereignty also colors its support for PKOs, and it has voted to block would-be peacekeeping missions. In 2016, China blocked a PKO in Burundi despite mounting violence over Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial decision to eschew the country’s constitution. China cast its decision through the lens of state sovereignty, but China has also provided funding for the construction of a new Burundian presidential palace and receives duty-free privileges on 97 percent of Burundian exports to China.⁹⁴ Similarly, outside of Libya, the number of cases on U.S.-Russia cooperation on conflict resolution and promoting stability are sparse. Part of the reason for this spotty record is that promoting global stability often faces obstacles—particularly divergent ideologies and views of state purported noninterference—that impede the prospects of genuine cooperation.

To begin with, there is a **trust** gap when it comes to global stabilization. As one Russia expert interviewed for this project framed it, a guiding principle in Russia’s approach in this

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, “The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset,” November 4, 2016.

⁹⁰ “Libya Conflict: Warring Sides Meet in Moscow for Talks,” 2020.

⁹¹ Jeffrey Feltman, “The Berlin Conference on Libya: Will Hypocrisy Undermine Results?” Brookings Institution, January 21, 2020.

⁹² Murray and Sullivan, 2019.

⁹³ Arms Control Association, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2020,” May 2020.

⁹⁴ Odgaard, 2020, pp. 22–24.

sphere is one of “controlled tensions” and “managed chaos.”⁹⁵ Moscow might participate in peace dialogues or make overtures to warring parties and international brokers to resolve conflicts, but these gestures are, at times, hollow and distract from Moscow’s preference to freeze conflicts and leverage them for Russia’s strategic gain. In such an environment, Moscow seeks to exploit competition and tensions among both local, regional, and international stakeholders to expand its influence and preserve its interests in each conflict area, diminishing trust between Moscow and other involved parties and inhibiting prospects for genuine conflict resolution. Russia’s “managed chaos” approach to conflict resolution can be observed in Libya. As mentioned above, Moscow officially supported the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and the UN-sponsored peace process while simultaneously keeping the rival government economically afloat with counterfeit currency and the Wagner Group personnel bolstering the renegade military strongman, Hifter.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, by providing support to and maintaining relations with both sides of the conflict, Russia is able to exert influence over both parties and guarantee an outcome that benefits Moscow, regardless of the conflict’s actual outcome. Moscow has undertaken a similar approach in other African conflicts, such as in the CAR, where Russia has inserted itself as a key security and political broker.

On a higher, strategic level, the goal of global stability often becomes **linked** to more irreconcilable issues, such as sovereignty, democracy, and human rights. Beijing and Moscow’s ideological approaches to promoting stability—uncritically supporting oppressive regimes, opposing inclusive politics, and accepting human rights abuses under the guise of nonintervention in states’ domestic affairs—may be unreconcilable to U.S. ideals and *modus operandi* when providing support to fragile states. Moscow arguably approaches stability promotion in a manner adverse to, and at times directly at odds with, the United States’ democracy- and governance-building as a mechanism for promoting stability. Indeed, Moscow has often condemned U.S. democracy-promotion efforts as destabilizing, as evidenced in the pro-democracy 2011 Arab Uprisings in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.⁹⁷ Instead, Moscow prioritizes state sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, even when dealing with authoritarian regimes.⁹⁸ Such an approach can undermine the predominant U.S. approach of promoting stability through institutional capacity-building and accountability—across the political, social, and security sectors. Additionally, Russia’s approach also, at times, inhibits the United States’ and international community’s ability to promote peace and avert spirals of instability,

⁹⁵ Author interview with Israeli academic, Tel Aviv, February 17, 2020.

⁹⁶ Nichols, 2020.

⁹⁷ Aaron Stein, *Narrowing Interests in the Middle East: Planning for Great Power Competition*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020a, p. 20.

⁹⁸ See Schmitt, 2019.

given Moscow's regular reluctance to support a more active UN peacekeeping mission, due to concerns with states' sovereignty.⁹⁹

Similarly, Beijing is largely averse to Washington's approach to stability promotion and democracy development. As mentioned above, China under Xi seems increasingly keen to export its model of governance abroad. Although China supports the development of states' capacities, it concomitantly encourages foreign governments to adopt Beijing's system instead of democratic forms of government. Such divergent views of democracy and forms of local governance will almost certainly impede any U.S.-Chinese cooperation on issues of stability that entail promoting more effective and inclusive governance.

China has also used its peacekeeping efforts in Myanmar to shield the Myint government from international backlash for its genocidal crackdown of its Rohingya Muslim community, during which Burmese security forces killed thousands of Rohingya and displaced over 730,000 more.¹⁰⁰ Following myriad human rights atrocities, the international community has sought to hold the Burmese government accountable, and many states have suspended their foreign aid to Myanmar. However, China has increased its economic investment in the region, directly tied to the Belt and Road Initiative, cushioning Myanmar's loss of foreign aid.¹⁰¹ To promote its economic interests in the country, China has prioritized stability and noninterference over accountability. In particular, China has heavily invested in Myanmar's Rakhine Province—the epicenter of the Rohingya genocide—where the Kyauk-Phyu port connects oil and gas equities to China's Yunnan Province.¹⁰²

Cooperation on global stability issues can also be stymied when these issues become linked to more hard-power security concerns. As mentioned earlier, Libya presents a possible space for cooperation between Russia and the United States on resolving a long-running conflict and source of instability in North Africa. Moscow's provocative intervention—particularly the deployment of Russian-origin fighter jets to Libya—however, may preclude future U.S.-Russia cooperation on the issue, given concerns that increased Russian military presence in Libya threatens NATO's southern flank. Indeed, General Jeffrey Harrigian, commander of USAF Europe-Africa, has stated that, following Russia's deployment of PMCs and fighter jets, “the next logical step is they deploy permanent long-range anti-access area denial

⁹⁹ In 2018, for example, Russia abstained in the UN votes to maintain the troop level for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts overseeing the sanctions related to illicit export of oil from Libya, extending the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (Schmitt, 2019, p. 17; United Nations, “Paralysis Constricts Security Council Action in 2018, as Divisions Among Permanent Membership Fuel Escalation of Global Tensions,” press release, January 10, 2019b).

¹⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Myanmar: Events of 2018,” 2019a.

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, 2019a.

¹⁰² Odgaard, 2020, p. 19.

(A2AD) capabilities” which would “create very real security concerns on Europe’s southern flank.”¹⁰³

Ultimately, U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on global stability faces major obstacles. Both China and Russia oppose U.S. military interventions and view the United States’ democracy-promotion initiatives as fundamentally destabilizing. Both China and Russia view the U.S. approach to stability-building as one that clashes with their fundamental views on state sovereignty and prevents significant cooperation in promoting stability. Likewise, democracy, transparency, and human rights seem to be less important to China and Russia than the continuance of state structure and power.¹⁰⁴ Still, as captured in Table 6.1, there may be some room for cooperation, albeit with significant caveats. Despite the recent deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations, some experts suggest that joint efforts to improve stability in fragile states could lead to mutual trust-building.¹⁰⁵

TABLE 6.1
Interest in Cooperation on Promoting Global Stability

	China	Russia
Stakes	Low	Low
Rhetorical alignment	Yes	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	Yes	Mixed

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

U.S. security cooperation with China or Russia on promoting stability and ending long-running conflicts will likely have both positive and negative second-order effects on the United States and its partners. Cooperation could engender competition between China and Russia, particularly over access to natural resources in Africa and market shares of the continent’s arms market. Cooperation on promoting stability could alleviate the strain of refugee and migrant crises. The lack of an effective international response to the Libya crisis, in particular, has not only inflicted a serious humanitarian toll but also strained the NATO alliance—pitting NATO’s southern flank (those countries most affected by the refugee flows) and northern European countries.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Correll, 2020.

¹⁰⁴ Maxim Matusevich, “Are the Russians Forging an ‘Empire’ in Africa?” *Africa Is a Country*, July 6, 2019.

¹⁰⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” August 23, 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Sally Hayden, “The U.N. Is Leaving Migrants to Die in Libya,” *Foreign Policy*, October 10, 2019.

At the same time, expanding Russian security presence on the continent of course challenges U.S. influence in Africa. Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter on CVEO issues, yielding ground to Russia and providing Moscow more room to maneuver, vis-à-vis stabilization and conflict resolution, might also engender more Chinese-Russian competition. China is Africa's second-biggest arms supplier, with a 17 percent share of the market, compared with Russia's 35, and as China cultivates its robust commercial interests in Africa, it will likely seek to grow its share of the market, possibly at Russia's expense.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, possible cooperation between the United States and China or Russia could engender competition between the two revisionist powers over access to lucrative natural resources, particularly in Africa. Should the United States seek to cooperate with China or Russia on promoting stability and ending long-running conflicts, either Chinese or Russian influence would likely grow in the countries they seek to support. Both China and Russia are pursuing opportunities to gain more concessions in African countries' natural resource industries and have inserted themselves diplomatically and militarily into conflict-afflicted states that possess substantial natural resource wealth. In the CAR, for instance, where both Washington and Moscow supported the 2019 peace agreement, Russia allegedly has substantial influence in the country's diamond and gold industries.¹⁰⁸ However, China may seek to expand its market share in the CAR and has made overtures to the Touadéra government, which could generate tension between Moscow and Beijing.¹⁰⁹

Cooperation with China or Russia on promoting stability may have an obvious beneficial impact on countries and their neighbors effected by long-running conflicts. For instance, working with China and Russia to stabilize South Sudan and the CAR, respectively, could alleviate sources of regional instability and refugees that tax host nations' infrastructure and stretch their abilities to provide care. Additionally, cooperation between Washington and Moscow to diplomatically resolve the Libyan civil war might also contribute to resolving a source of terrorist activity and migrant flows that have rattled both Libya's North African neighbors and Europe. However, as mentioned above, possible U.S.-Russia cooperation on Libyan issues would likely legitimize Russia's position and entrench its military presence in the country. Such an outcome would threaten NATO's southern flank and, therefore, abrogate the chances of cooperation.

As China continues to support multilateral PKOs with thousands of PLA personnel, its military will also continue gaining more operational experience. Indeed, Elor Nkereuwem posits that gaining combat experience is one of the primary drivers behind China's partic-

¹⁰⁷ Jidefor Adibe, "What Does Russia Really Want from Africa?" Brookings Institution, November 14, 2019.

¹⁰⁸ According to the *Africa Report*, a Russian company has allegedly secured access to CAR's gold deposits (Mathieu Olivier, "Russia's Murky Business Dealings in the Central African Republic," *Africa Report*, August 23, 2019).

¹⁰⁹ Leslie Minney, Rachel Sullivan, and Rachel Vandenbrink, "Amid the Central African Republic's Search for Peace, Russia Steps In. Is China Next?" United States Institute for Peace, December 19, 2019.

ipation in PKOs.¹¹⁰ As with Russia in the CAR, China may seek to leverage security and commercial equities gained through peacekeeping and stabilization efforts to establish other military bases in Africa. Indeed, as China and Russia, under the auspices of promoting stability and even in the rare instances of cooperation with the United States, expand their diplomatic security involvement in conflict-affected areas, they are likely to also expand their military influence and security footprint, which may manifest in new, formalized military bases. Russia will almost certainly look to leverage its growing security footprint in Africa to expand its already sizable share of the continent's arms market, and China may follow suit. Given Russia's less stringent approach to end use monitoring, compared with the United States and its Western partners, the proliferation of Russian arms may fuel further instability and eventually threaten the safety of U.S. service members stationed in Africa.

As noted above, neither China nor Russia support inclusive governance, so substantive U.S. cooperation with either power to alleviate instability in countries such as the CAR, South Sudan, or Libya would likely come at the expense of promoting good governance. Such a consequence would hinder local and international efforts to engender more participatory politics in states long suffering from instability and conflicts. It would also perpetuate many of the root causes of instability and conflict in Libya, whose citizens revolted against the oppressive Gaddafi regime in 2011 to fight for, in part, democratic governance and political agency.

Conclusion

All three powers have notable equities in this field and have committed resources to achieving stability-related objectives, and China, and Russia nominally support promoting stability and ending long-running conflicts. The United States has cooperated with China and Russia on conflict resolution and stabilization in the past, and such cooperation may continue. However, the space for cooperation is largely limited to a select set of issues—such as resolving the Syrian Civil War, which, as with other areas for cooperation, is inhibited by diminished trust between powerbrokers and countervailing strategic priorities.

Other instances of potential cooperation might also be limited to the United Nations and PKOs. At varying levels and through different approaches, all three powers support UN PKOs, and China and Russia may draw direct and indirect dividends from UN PKOs. In particular, China may gain heretofore rare operational experience from its participation in multilateral PKOs and leverage these efforts to expand its influence in destabilized environments. Nevertheless, both China and Russia have also blocked efforts to deploy UN PKOs to fragile states when such a deployment might undermine their strategic interests. Additionally, both powers have, at times, opposed PKO and stabilization efforts when they potentially violate state sovereignty.

¹¹⁰ Elor Nkereuwem, *Nontraditional Actors: China and Russia in African Peace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, March 2017, p. 35.

Despite Beijing and Moscow's purported emphasis on not interfering in other states' domestic affairs and the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty, both powers have, at times, sought to exploit conflicts and state fragility to cultivate and expand their influence. In Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, and multiple other conflicts discussed above, both Beijing and Moscow have militarily or diplomatically intervened under the auspices of supporting state actors and promoting stability. Yet, concomitant with such interventions, state governments often remain fragile and increasingly beholden to Beijing or Moscow, who seek to avert regime change or state collapse but not to strengthen fragile states to the point where they gain more independence. Moreover, Chinese and Russian approaches to promoting stability may run counter to U.S. emphases on respect for human rights and support for inclusive politics, and they generally oppose military interventions that are motivated by these reasons. In addition, Chinese and Russian involvement in promoting stability or ending long-running conflicts may have second-order effects that undermine the United States' ability to pursue its own strategic objectives. Therefore, while a space for cooperation between the United States and China or Russia exists, myriad practical and ideological obstacles limit the actual prospects for genuine cooperation.

Issue Area 5: Preserving Access to the Air and Maritime Commons

States have negotiated with each other over maritime passage for much of recorded history, and over air transit rights for the better part of a century. The maritime commons are critical to seafaring states' economic well-being—providing a means of trade and natural resources from fish to hydrocarbons—and air travel underpins the modern world's interconnectedness. The air and maritime commons also offer nations the ability to communicate with allies and partners and to project military power beyond their immediate neighborhoods. The United States', China's, and Russia's differing conceptions of the air and maritime commons inform their use of and actions in these domains. Neither China nor Russia makes widespread use of the concept of global commons, and they both tend to speak of access to the air and maritime commons using other concepts and terminology. Compared with the United States, China's and Russia's understanding of global commons is therefore more restricted and much more focused on their immediate neighborhoods, their ability to project power in these domains, and their ability ensure the safety of shipping via routes that are of specific importance for their respective economies.

Understanding the Equities

Not all airspace and not all waterways are, in fact, common areas. The international maritime zones and international airspace are defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (aka the "Chicago Convention"). UNCLOS set territorial sea boundaries for 12 miles, exclusive economic zones for up to 200 miles, and rules for extending continental shelf rights up to 350 miles offshore.¹ The Chicago Convention gives a country "complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory," including over its territorial waters.² Even with these jurisdictional guidelines delineated, both the air and maritime commons remain vast

¹ United Nations, "Oceans and the Law of the Sea," undated.

² Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, Ill., December 7, 1944.

spaces, and the United States, China, and Russia have a series of different equities in how these spaces are used and governed.

U.S. Equities

Preserving safe access to the maritime commons has been a core historic security interest for the United States, particularly because of the need to ensure its economic links with the rest of the world. Despite the importance of the issue, the 2017 NSS and the unclassified summary of 2018 NDS stays relatively mum on the topic, while some of the United States key interests in the air and maritime commons—such as ensuring that Americans and American assets can transit unharmed through both domains—are implicit in other aspects of both documents. The 2017 NSS contains a single explicit reference to the maritime commons—“Free access to the seas remains a central principle of national security and economic prosperity, and exploration of sea and space provides opportunities for commercial gain and scientific breakthroughs”³—and no explicit reference to the air commons.

Previous national security strategies, however, have been more explicit about the U.S. interests in these domains and have tended to cluster around five main objectives. First, on the most basic level, as the 2015 NSS argued that “the United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight.”⁴ Roughly 70 percent of American trade over the past several decades has been carried by trans-oceanic shipping or airplanes.⁵ Unsurprisingly then, the United States wants its ships and planes to travel across the seas and through the air unhindered by state or nonstate actors, such as pirates or terrorists. In particular, ensuring free passage through “strategic straits and vital sea lanes” remains a particular concern.⁶ The United States wants global choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca and the Panama and Suez Canals, where maritime commerce must funnel through a relatively narrow area, to remain open to American commerce and vessels.

Second, the United States seeks to ensure that unlawful actors do not have access to these domains. As discussed in Chapter Four, the United States has a long-standing interest in countering organized crime, including in the air and on the sea, such as countering piracy, terrorism, smuggling and other criminal activities that use either domain for their nefarious purposes.⁷ In practice, over the past decade, the U.S. Navy played an active role in combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in Southeast Asia.⁸ Furthermore,

³ The White House, 2017, p. 40.

⁴ The White House, 2015, p. 13.

⁵ Adie Tomer and Joseph Kane, *The Great Port Mismatch: U.S. Goods Trade and International Transportation*, Global Cities Initiative: A Joint Project of Brookings and JPMorgan Chase, June 2015, p. 1.

⁶ The White House, 2010, pp. 49–50.

⁷ The White House, 2015, p. 13.

⁸ Joseph W. Kuzmick, statement of Rear Admiral Joseph W. Kuzmick Director, Operations and Plans, U.S. Navy, before the subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee on Transportation

in April 2020, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard surged presence in the Caribbean as part of a large-scale effort to clamp down on drug-smuggling routes.⁹

Third, one of the challenges of both the air and maritime commons is that multiple nations operate in these domains, sometimes in close proximity. Consequently, the United States has had a general interest in ensuring the safety of navigation and having all actors abide by an implicit or explicit set of rules to safely transit these shared spaces. The 2015 NSS explicitly states, “We insist on safe and responsible behaviors in the sky and at sea.”¹⁰ While the 2017 NSS does not have similar statement, American policy has not changed. The United States routinely protests what it labels as “unsafe” intercepts in the air and sea.¹¹

Fourth, the United States seeks access to the economic resources of the maritime commons. The maritime commons’ value lies not only in being a transit route but also a fishing and oil resource. Particularly with the advances in underwater exploration and deep-sea drilling, the seabed has become an increasingly important potential source of resources. Indeed, some experts believe that the seabeds underneath international waters “contain more valuable minerals than all the continents combined.”¹² Consequently, the 2017 NSS explicitly states the United States’ interest in ensuring that it can fully exploit these resources for commercial and scientific aims.¹³

Finally, the United States has an interest in ensuring that the air and maritime commons remain common and that any territorial disputes regarding what is common versus sovereign assets are resolved peacefully. The United States’ approach is still illustrated by the 2015 NSS, which states, “We reject illegal and aggressive claims to airspace and in the maritime domain.”¹⁴ As discussed in detail in the Indo-Pacific companion volume of this series, this interest is specifically evident when the United States pushes back against China’s claims in the South China Sea, or China’s unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013.¹⁵

Dealing with this last issue is sometimes at least rhetorically difficult for the United States because the United States is not party to all the international treaties governing the air and maritime commons. For example, the United States remains one of the few countries in the

and Infrastructure, U.S. House Of Representatives, on Efforts to Combat Piracy, April 10, 2013.

⁹ U.S. Southern Command, “SOUTHCOM Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations,” undated.

¹⁰ The White House, 2015, p. 13.

¹¹ For example, see U.S. 6th Fleet Public Affairs, “Second Unsafe Intercept by Russia in U.S. Sixth Fleet,” April 20, 2020; Lara Seligman, “Trump Says He told Navy to ‘Destroy’ Iranian Boats Harassing U.S. Ships,” *Politico*, April 22, 2020.

¹² Wil S. Hylton, “History’s Largest Mining Operation Is About to Begin: It’s Underwater—and the Consequences Are Unimaginable,” *The Atlantic*, January/February 2020.

¹³ The White House, 2017, p. 40.

¹⁴ The White House, 2015, p. 13.

¹⁵ Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

world that has not formally ratified UNCLOS, at least partly because of national security concerns raised predominantly by the political right.¹⁶ Still, the United States observes the Law of Sea as customary international law.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the United States often finds itself in the somewhat awkward position of enforcing an international treaty that it itself is not a part of.

Chinese Equities

China has taken an active, if narrow, approach to preserving access to the global air and maritime commons. This is driven mostly by its economic interests in global trade but also by its desire to be seen as providing common goods for the global community as part of its responsibility as a great power. China's most notable action on this front has been its deployment of the Gulf of Aden antipiracy task force since 2008, China's only long-term foreign military operation. However, China's actions in the South China Sea to limit U.S. and other freedom of navigation through Chinese-claimed territory suggest that the prospects for cooperation with the United States on the maritime commons are limited. Overall, we assess that this issue is of medium importance to China, and that U.S.-China rhetorical alignment is mixed, as is Beijing's willingness to bargain or cooperate. However, China's Gulf of Aden deployments indicates that it is willing to commit resources to this issue, whether aligned with the U.S. interests and preferences or not.

As the world's top trader, China has an immense stake in its own access to the global air and maritime commons. Although the percentage of China's GDP derived from foreign trade has declined from a high of 36 percent in 2006 to 20 percent of GDP in 2017, it is still dependent on imported energy, and its foreign trade is a source of foreign influence.¹⁸ China imported 15 percent of its total energy consumption in 2014, the last year of data available from the World Bank, and as of 2018 it imported 71 percent of its oil consumption (20 percent of total global imports) and 44 percent of its natural gas, making it the number one importer for both.¹⁹ Moreover, Xi's Belt and Road Initiative relies in large part on China's economic power, specifically countries' economic dependence on China, for its influence. An end to Chinese global trade would be bad for the Chinese economy but devastating for Chinese influence around the world. Beyond trade, the PLA's growing military presence out-

¹⁶ Law of the Sea, United Nations Treaty Collection, December 10, 1982. For objections to ratifying the Law of the Sea, see Bromund, Carafano, and Schaefer, 2018.

¹⁷ National Ocean Service, "What Is the Law of the Sea?" undated.

¹⁸ World Bank, "Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP): China," undated.

¹⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic Of China 2019*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2019, p. 12; U.S. Energy Information Agency, "China Surpassed the United States as the World's Largest Crude Oil Importer in 2017," February 5, 2018.

side Chinese waters requires access to the air and maritime commons, giving China another stake in the issue.

Within its claimed territory, China holds a different definition of maritime commons than the United States. China is a signatory to UNCLOS but has a different interpretation of the maritime commons than the United States: China claims an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that is larger than the United States agrees to, and China's territorial claims extend far into the South China Sea, which is a root cause of regional tensions and China's justification for objecting to the passage of foreign military vessels there. The United States does not recognize many of China's claims in the South China Sea, including any additional claims generated by what the United States views as illegitimate manmade construction on features (islands).²⁰ In response to U.S. criticism of Chinese interference in the South China Sea, Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2015 said, "China also has a stake in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Most Chinese cargo are shipped through the South China Sea, so freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is equally important to China. China always maintains that countries enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with the international law."²¹ The United States also does not agree with China's interpretation of UNCLOS, signified by U.S. military freedom of navigation patrols.²²

A related issue is China's creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in November 2013.²³ China has claimed that all aircraft traveling through the ADIZ, even those not heading toward China, must self-declare, in contrast with U.S. and broader accepted international norms on ADIZ, which only require notification for aircraft heading toward the country. In practice, however, Beijing has not enforced the ADIZ with much vigor, making it much more a political statement about asserting Chinese claims to the disputed territories in the East China Sea rather than controlling the airspace above the East China Sea.

The mixed rhetorical alignment between Washington and Beijing is most apparent in Beijing's conflicting stance on UNCLOS. China regularly complains about U.S. military activity in its claimed waters, protesting any military operations up to 200 nm from its territory, even to the point of claiming it "expelled" U.S. Navy ships from the South China Sea.²⁴

²⁰ For the most recent U.S. statement on Chinese claims in the South China Sea, see Michael Pompeo, "U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea," U.S. Department of State, July 13, 2020.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Wang Yi on the South China Sea Issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum," August 6, 2015.

²² For one overview, see Congressional Research Service, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, D.C., R42784, October 2020e.

²³ For an overview of China's approach contrasted with broader international norms, see Edmund J. Burke and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, *In Line or Out of Order? China's Approach to ADIZ in Theory and Practice*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2055-AF, 2017.

²⁴ Ryan Browne, Steven Jiang, and Mallory Gafas, "U.S. Navy Warship Challenges Chinese Claims in the South China Sea," CNN, September 13, 2019; Liu Xuanzun, "Chinese Forces Expel US Warship in Xisha

However, China has been operating within U.S. territorial waters (12 nm) off the coast of Alaska, which the Pentagon accepted to be in compliance with UNCLOS.²⁵ In essence, the argument is that Beijing can take advantage of the United States' more generous interpretation of UNCLOS while denying the U.S. military the same actions by claiming a stricter interpretation for itself.

The United States and China have engaged on the issue of access to the air and maritime commons with mixed results. Most prominently, the two countries signed agreements on safety for maritime and air encounters in 2014 and 2015, respectively.²⁶ This builds on the multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), signed in 2014 as part of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), and the bilateral Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (MMCA), signed in 1998. There has been some Track 2 dialogue on the issue as well, including the U.S.-China Track II Dialogue on Maritime Issues and International Law over 2012–2018.²⁷ However, China has not consistently abided by these U.S.-China agreements, making its willingness to bargain mixed.

The Gulf of Aden antipiracy patrol is arguably Beijing's most high-profile and significant contribution to the global commons, demonstrating a willingness to commit resources. From 2008 through 2018, PLA Navy (PLAN) ships escorted more than 4,300 foreign vessels in the Gulf of Aden, reportedly representing roughly half of all ship escorts.²⁸ In his 2017 speech, Xi hailed the "escort services in the Gulf of Aden" as part of China's successful global contributions.²⁹ China asserts that such missions fulfill international obligations as they pertain to

Islands of S. China Sea," *Global Times*, March 11, 2020; Sam LaGrone, "China Says PLA Scrambled Aircraft, Ships to 'Expel' U.S. Warship from South China Sea Island Chain," *USNI News*, April 28, 2020.

²⁵ Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold, "Chinese Navy Ships Came Within 12 Nautical Miles of U.S. Coast," *Wall Street Journal*, September 4, 2015, p. 8.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense and Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters," November 10, 2014; U.S. Department of Defense and Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, "Supplement to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China," September 15, 2015.

²⁷ National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "U.S.-China Track II Dialogue on Maritime Issues & International Law (United States)," updated 2018.

²⁸ "Chinese Naval Fleets Escort 3,400 Foreign Ships over Past 10 Years," *Xinhua*, January 1, 2019. For a review of the PLAN's approach to the mission, see Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, *Six Years at Sea . . . and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China's Maritime Commons Presence*, Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2015.

²⁹ Xi, 2017.

peace, stability, and the protection of major sea lines of communication. However, economic interests have mainly laid the foundation for China's decision to engage in the Gulf of Aden.³⁰

First and foremost, China hopes to secure its shipping lanes against piracy. Every year, more than “1,200 Chinese merchant ships pass through the Gulf of Aden, and 40% of all goods and raw materials are shipped to China.”³¹ Additionally, this transit area is an important sea route for China's oil, grain, and container transportation. Somalia agreed to join the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, so bilateral trade volume between the two countries is expected to increase in the future. China wishes to project itself as a responsible world power and increase its positive image on the world stage. China's antipiracy efforts, along with other actions, such as its rescue missions in Yemen and Libya, signal to the world that China is one of the “leading actors” in promoting maritime security in global waters.³²

Many states, including India, the United States, and Japan, regard the PLAN's growing footprint in the Indian Ocean with concern (especially its naval logistics base in Djibouti).³³ One important reason is China's rapid military modernization efforts—including its efforts to more effectively rival the U.S. Navy. Working with foreign maritime groups enhances the military capacity of China, including the important experience of how to operate in hostile foreign environments. As one analyst put it, “By actively engaging in antipiracy operations, the PLAN not only proved its effectiveness against threats to its national interest, but also enhanced its knowledge of advanced naval tactics and technology.”³⁴ Counterpiracy, the argument goes, teaches the PLAN how to sustain operations a half world away, maintain maritime awareness, and monitor and respond rapidly to naval threats—all skills that could be transferrable to other contexts.

In practice, China's approach to maritime passages under its control is best explained by its embrace of “maritime rights and interests,” where China uses its range of military tools—maritime militia, coast guard, and navy—to assert its control.³⁵ Authoritative Chinese documents make clear that China's activity in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean are a part of a broader attempt to build China into a “maritime great power”

³⁰ Cindy Cheng, “China and U.S. Anti-Piracy Engagement in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean Region,” Carter Center, undated; Joel Wuthnow, *The PLA Beyond Asia: China's Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region*, Washington, D.C.: NDU Strategic Forum, January 2020.

³¹ Cheng, undated, p. 4.

³² Cheng, undated, p. 5.

³³ The United States blocked a similar effort for Russia to open a base in Djibouti, but tried and failed to block a similar effort by China to open a base (Geoffrey York, “Parting the Red Sea: Why the Chinese and U.S. Armies Are Fortifying This Tiny African Country,” *Globe and Mail*, June 6, 2019).

³⁴ Cheng, undated, p. 5.

³⁵ This term was officially coined after Xi's 2014 speech at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, where he highlighted the need to “resolutely safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, safeguard national unity, and properly handle disputes over islands” (Liza Tobin, “Underway—Beijing's Strategy to Build China into a Maritime Great Power,” *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2018a, p. 31).

(海洋强国)—an essential component of its overall strategy to achieve national rejuvenation.³⁶ To reach this “end,” China employs several “ways”—the expansion of the maritime economy, the strengthening of the protection of marine resources and environments, and the safeguarding of maritime rights and interests—and “means,” including all relevant institutions of national power, the media, scientific and technical programs, economic incentives, and legal development.³⁷

U.S.-China cooperation will be most possible in neutral territory, such as preexisting low-level cooperation in the Gulf of Aden.³⁸ In 2003, China joined the Container Security Initiative (launched by the United States), a program that enhances participant countries’ incoming shipment security. China also participated in a similar security initiative launched by the U.S. Coast Guard. These preliminary engagements of low-level cooperation established the basis for future U.S.-China counterpiracy operations, including active cooperation to deter the practice of illegal fisheries, and joint antipiracy drills (in 2012 and 2013, respectively).³⁹ Despite growing U.S.-China tensions over the South China Sea, communication and information-sharing between the two navies over antipiracy cooperation has improved.⁴⁰

Russian Equities

Russia is first and foremost interested in a layered defense of its territory, including its maritime borders. Its limited maritime capabilities are devoted to defensive posture of Russian coasts and waters and Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities.⁴¹ Russia considers the world’s oceans as an increasingly contested area,⁴² where international powers seek economic, military, and scientific leadership and compete for maritime resources and access to key lines of communication.⁴³ Russian strategic and policy documents suggest that its activities in the

³⁶ Tobin, 2018a.

³⁷ Tobin, 2018a, p. 25.

³⁸ Cheng, undated; Brittney Washington, “The Gulf of Aden Needs US-China Maritime Cooperation,” *The Diplomat*, November 6, 2017.

³⁹ Cheng, undated, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Cheng, undated, p. 7.

⁴¹ Michael Kofman, “Russian Maritime ‘A2/AD’: Strengths and Weaknesses,” *Russia Military Analysis*, Vol. 29, January 2020.

⁴² Russian strategic documents do not normally use the concept of global maritime or air commons. Russia’s strategic discourse does not include the concepts of global commons, but rather includes specific positions on related issues, such as Russia’s interests and presence in the world’s oceans, national interests in the Arctic, and perception of an ongoing competition with the United States and its allies.

⁴³ Government of Russia, 2015a. Throughout its history, the Russian Navy has been vital to ensuring access to global communication lines, because of the geographic positioning of the country (Russian Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, “The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition,” December 2014).

global commons are mainly used to achieve a greater global presence, ensure access to key lines of communication, prevent potential aggression toward Russia, and protect national interests in respect of its territorial integrity. In Russia's worldview, the naval domain could harbor multiple threats to its security, sovereignty, and national interests, destabilizing current interstate relations. These threats include, for example, potential deployment of cruise missiles or sea-based ballistic missile defense systems in the waters near Russia, a sudden decline in interstate political-military relations, and the use of military force in violation of international laws that could threaten Russian national interests.⁴⁴

Russia views the world's oceans primarily through the lens of competition against the United States and its allies, which it believes to be its main global and strategic threats.⁴⁵ Ensuring Russian presence in strategically important maritime areas (such as the Arctic, the Atlantic, and the Pacific⁴⁶) through the placement of military assets and access to key global communication lines (e.g., the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap) and resources are key elements of the implementation of Russia's foreign policy by naval means.⁴⁷ Russia's "State Policy in the Field of Naval Operation for the Period Until 2030" sets forth an aspiration for Russia to become the second-largest maritime power.⁴⁸ Today, however, this goal is far from reality, as Russia's limited surface ship capabilities and restricted freedom of movement due to its geographic position provide it with limited ability to contest the United States in the global maritime domain.⁴⁹ Instead, Russia seeks to implement the policy of "resolute activity," with the aim to "establish and maintain favorable conditions" for its national interests, deter potential aggression, intimidate the United States and its allies, test the potential U.S. resolve to respond to aggressive behavior, and interfere with U.S. decisionmaking and risk calculus.⁵⁰ Russia seeks to ensure its own presence in the global maritime commons by denying the

⁴⁴ Government of Russia, "The Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030," translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2017a.

⁴⁵ Frédéric Ramel, "Access to the Global Commons and Grand Strategies: A Shift in Global Interplay," *Etudes de L'Irsem*, No. 30, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), 2014.

⁴⁶ While the Arctic and the Atlantic areas remain strategically significant for the defense of Russia and its ability to deploy its second-strike nuclear capabilities, Russia's Maritime Doctrine also identifies the Pacific, the Caspian, the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic areas among regional priority areas of the National Maritime Policy (Government of Russia, 2015a). Please see Chapter Nine: Preventing the Militarization of the Arctic for a discussion of Russia's military equities in the region.

⁴⁷ Government of Russia, 2017.

⁴⁸ Government of Russia, 2017.

⁴⁹ While Russia may not be able to project power across the global oceans with its military fleets, it does view private vessels sailing under the Russian flag as an extension of the state and seeks to maintain "effective state control and oversight" of such vessels. Russia aims to increase its commercial shipping capabilities by providing long-term state funding (Government of Russia, 2015a; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2020*, London, UK, February 2020).

⁵⁰ Government of Russia, 2015a.

United States and its allies the ability to operate freely and safely in international waters by harassing their military and civilian naval and air assets. Russia has carried out simulated passes near U.S. military ships, without answering attempts to communicate with the planes, thus disrespecting international norms governing militaries that operate in proximity of each other in international waters or airspace and its bilateral agreement with the United States on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas.⁵¹ Russia's actions have created high risks that an accident or other incident might occur and escalate existing tensions. For example, Russian has increasingly skirted the U.S. and allied airspace from the Baltic and Black Sea to the U.S. border in Alaska and Canada since 2007.⁵² In 2014, a Scandinavian Airlines passenger airplane nearly collided with a Russian reconnaissance aircraft that did not transmit its position; in 2015, Lithuania accused Russian military ships' actions of forcing civilian ships in Lithuanian waters and a cable-laying ship to change course; and in 2017 a Russian military harassed a civilian U.S.-flagged cargo ship carrying equipment for Exercise Saber Strike 2017 in the Baltic states.⁵³ Other examples include close plane passes over U.S. missile destroyers in the Black Sea in 2014 and 2015 and provocative air maneuvers against Western aircraft in Syria. Denmark, Sweden, and Turkey have also accused Russian planes of violating national airspace.⁵⁴ Russia, however, denies that these incidents were caused by its actions. For example, after the USS *Chancellorsville*, a guided-missile cruiser, almost collided with the Russian destroyer *Admiral Vinogradov* in the Philippines Sea in 2019, Russia and the United States traded mutual accusations of aggressive maritime practice.⁵⁵

Russia's Arctic policy is closely intertwined with UNCLOS, with Russia's view that national sovereignty that needs to be protected from a Western "encroachment," and with the defense of its strategic capabilities in the Kola Peninsula.⁵⁶ Russia has strategically important

⁵¹ "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas," May 25, 1972; Keir Giles, "Russian High Seas Brinkmanship Echoes Cold War," Chatham House, April 15, 2016.

⁵² Paul McLeary, "Russian Planes Buzz Alaska Four Nights in a Row," *Foreign Policy*, April 21, 2017; Frédéric Lasserre and Pierre-Louis Têtu, "Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty?" in Lassi Heininen, ed., *Arctic Yearbook 2016*, Northern Research Forum and the University of the Arctic Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security, 2016.

⁵³ David B. Larter, "Russian Military 'Harassed' US-Flagged Merchant Ship in the Baltic Ahead of Exercises," *Defense News*, June 27, 2017; Thomas Frear, Łukasz Kulesa, and Ian Kearns, *Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters: Between Russia and the West in 2014*, European Leadership Network, November 2014.

⁵⁴ "US Fighter Planes Intercept Russian Combat Jets Off Alaska, Sweden Protests 'Violation,'" *DW*, September 20, 2014; American Security Project, "Russian Military Incident Tracker," accessed February 19, 2020; "Danes Summon Russian Envoy over Airspace Violation," Associated Press, September 1, 2020.

⁵⁵ Angelina Milchenko, "VMS SSHA Vozlozili Viny Za Morskoi Incident Ha Rosiiskoi Karabl [U.S. Naval Forces Blame Russian Ship for a Maritime Incident]," *Gazeta*, June 7, 2019.

⁵⁶ For a more detailed discussion the military importance of the Arctic region, see Chapter Nine: Preventing the Militarization of the Arctic.

interests in the Arctic—especially access to and exploitation of the natural resources in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, the region is Russia that produces the most of its gas and oil. Russia aims to maintain control of the resources in the region, where it claims to have discovered around 200 oil and gas deposits. Moreover, the melting Arctic ice may lead the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the shortest shipping route between ports in Europe and Asia, to become coveted not only by Russia but by international shippers as well, and easier access to these waters would make Russia's northern border more vulnerable. Furthermore, circum-polar air routes between North American and Asia that would transit Siberian airports could also become more likely and practical because of increased demand, but would require Russia to allow access to its airspace.⁵⁷

Despite the United States not being a signatory of UNCLOS, it has clashed with Russia over application of the convention in such areas as the Kerch Strait and the Japan Sea. Russia claims that it has the right to inspect any vessels that sail through the Kerch Strait, a narrow maritime passage near the Sea of Azov, based on UNCLOS (specifically the articles on the right of a coastal state to provide maritime security) and the claim that the strait forms part of its territorial waters (notwithstanding a 2003 treaty between Ukraine and Russia that defines these waters as shared).⁵⁸ Russia also continues having border disputes with Japan over “the Northern Territories” or South Kurile Islands.⁵⁹

Russia is among the world's largest exporters of oil and gas, much of it transported by sea. The percentage of Russia's GDP derived from foreign trade declined from a high of 44 percent in 2000 to 28 percent of GDP in 2019, but Russia is still dependent on its exports. Raw materials dominate Russia's exports and accounted for 39 percent of export product share in 2018.⁶⁰ According to UN data, Russia's carry capacity for its oil tankers increased by over 50 percent from 2010 to 2018, reflecting Russia's increasing reliance on maritime trade for its exports.⁶¹ Because of this, Russia aims at leveraging its participation in relevant international organizations, such as the UN and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to gain influence over the air and maritime commons.⁶² Russia's strategic documents emphasizes the need to prevent piracy not only near Russian waters but globally, motivated by the need to ensure the

⁵⁷ Boeing, “Polar Routes Offer New Opportunities,” Aero 16, undated.

⁵⁸ “Ukraine-Russia Sea Clash: Who Controls the Territorial Waters Around Crimea?” BBC, November 27, 2018.

⁵⁹ CIA, “World Factbook: Disputes—International,” accessed February 18, 2020.

⁶⁰ World Bank, “Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP): Russian Federation,” undated-b; World Integrated Trade Solution, “Russian Federation Products by Stages of Processing Export Product Share to World in % 2014–2018,” 2020.

⁶¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019.

⁶² For example, Russia's Foreign Affairs Ministry commented that its reelection to the IMO's Assembly in 2019 confirms “Russia's weighty contribution to expanded international shipping and its significance as a leading maritime power” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Press Release on Russian Federation's Reelection to the International Maritime Organisation's Council,” December 5, 2019b).

safety of its commercial shipping assets. In 2009, after two Russian ships apprehended Somali pirates, the Kremlin called for internalization of the issue of piracy.⁶³ Since then, Russia has participated in antipiracy efforts and the prevention of hijacking of civilian vessels near the Horn of Africa, specifically in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, through which around 12 percent of the global volume of sea cargo transits.⁶⁴ Despite this, Russia is predominantly concerned with the security of its own waters and of its national borders, as well as the security of its ships in international waters. For example, in 2013 Russia detained 30 Greenpeace activists, threatening them with a seven-year prison change for hooliganism and piracy, after the crew of Greenpeace's Dutch-flagged *Arctic Sunrise* tried to climb an offshore oil platform to protest the first offshore rig in ice-covered Arctic waters. The Permanent Arbitration Court in the Hague, however, later required Russia to reimburse the Netherlands EUR5.4 million and the legal costs related to this incident.⁶⁵

Overall, Russia is engaged in what could be called “token” cooperation in the global maritime commons. Its Maritime Doctrine bears evidence of Russia's willingness to take part in international conferences and organizations that govern maritime relations between states, and of Russia's officially declared desire to manage environmental, fisheries, and other resource issues in a sustainable manner.⁶⁶ The doctrine also suggests that Russia seeks compliance with universal standards, international law, and treaties in maritime affairs, at least where such compliance supports its national interest. Russia and the United States have had some successful civilian cooperation in the maritime and sea commons. For example, both countries participate in the development of cross-polar commercial flight paths within the Cross Polar Work Group and in the expert level bilateral discussions of Prevention of Incidents on and over the Waters Outside the Territorial Seas (INCSEA).⁶⁷ In 2018, the United States and Russia submitted a jointly developed proposal for a system of two-way routes for vessels in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea (in Russian and U.S. territorial waters) to the IMO—the first internationally recognized ship routing measures in the Arctic approved

⁶³ Government of Russia, 2009b.

⁶⁴ Yet, it has recently been reported that Russia will not establish a military base in the Horn of Africa that could support and establish a more persistent Russian military presence there (Johanna Loock, “Unconfirmed. Reports of Russia Abandoning Plans to Build Naval Base in Horn of Africa,” *Maritime Security Review*, February 11, 2020).

⁶⁵ “Greenpeace to Receive \$3 Million in Settlement with Russia,” Reuters, May 17, 2019; Sergey Golubok and Daniel Simons, “Arctic 30 Jailed in Russia Argue Their Case in European Court,” Greenpeace International, July 12, 2018.

⁶⁶ Government of Russia, 2015a.

⁶⁷ U.S. Naval Forces Europe, “INCSEA 2018 Statement,” July 26, 2016.

by the IMO.⁶⁸ Russia is also continually interested in international cooperation in search and rescue and international exchange of information in support of maritime activities.⁶⁹

Russia's Foreign Policy (2016) and Naval Policy (2016) suggest commitment to international naval safety regulations, but the conduct of its naval forces at sea has not been encouraging.⁷⁰ Russia has repeatedly ignored agreements on safety measures with the United States when they are operating in the same airspace.⁷¹ Considering that relevant bilateral agreements and international rules already exist, Russia's interest in creating new international rules suggests that its interest is in increasing its weight in the global maritime commons by seeking influence over the relevant international rules. For example, its Naval Policy (2016) calls for the establishment of international committees on naval operations issues under the leadership of Russia. Considering the environmental changes in the Arctic, Russia is also interested in establishing international cooperation with other border guard services, as well as combating piracy, crime, and smuggling in the world's oceans.⁷² Seeking to internationalize global piracy, Russia has proposed to create a "Structure to Fight Against Maritime Piracy" under the UN, that would, according to the Russian ambassador to the UN, be "a universal and interstate coordinating mechanism" but not be dependent of the existing Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, also created under the auspices of the UN.⁷³

Space for Cooperation

At least in theory, preserving access to the air and maritime commons should be an area for ample great power cooperation. All three actors have a vested stake in this area, but do not view it as a core security interest (see Table 7.1). Moreover, while territorial claims of what define common versus sovereign air and maritime space and economic exploitation of the maritime commons may be zero-sum issues, many of the other subordinate objectives may be positive-sum. After all, preserving the unfettered access of the international air and maritime trade and clamping down on nonstate actors—i.e., pirates and terrorists—who seek to disrupt it should work to everyone's economic benefit. Similarly, at least in theory, all three

⁶⁸ Amy Midgett, "IMO Approves U.S.-Russian Federation Proposal for Bering Strait Routing Measures," Coast Guard Maritime Commons blog, May 25, 2018; International Maritime Organization, "Routeing Measures and Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems," November 17, 2017.

⁶⁹ Government of Russia, 2015a.

⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

⁷¹ For example, in Syria in 2015 Russian pilots practiced aggressive maneuvers against U.S. aircraft, including positioning for simulated attacks (Giles, 2016).

⁷² Government of Russia, 2017.

⁷³ EspanarUSA, "Russia Offers to Create Under the Aegis of the UN a Structure to Fight Against Maritime Piracy," *Maritime Herald*, February 13, 2019.

TABLE 7.1
Interest in Cooperation on Preserving Access to Air and Maritime Commons

	China	Russia
Stakes	Medium	Medium
Rhetorical alignment	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	Yes	Mixed

states may have an interest in preventing collisions and other accidents in the air and on sea. But, in practice, cooperation often faces significant obstacles.

First, in some cases, there are significant **definitional** issues or a disagreement over what is commons versus sovereign territory. Perhaps the most obvious example here is the South China Sea, where China defines its territorial waters—via the so called nine-dash line—differently than the United States does (and other Southeast Asian nations do).⁷⁴ Given that these territorial disputes can come with significant resource implications, these definitional questions are zero-sum games and not conducive to cooperation.⁷⁵

Second, even if the great powers do recognize a given area as common, they may still regard it as strategically sensitive and not welcome other great power participation, particularly if this comes with a military presence. For example, although the United States regards much of the Caribbean as part of the maritime commons, it tends to regard Russian naval presence there with unease.⁷⁶ Similarly, although China does not lay claim to the Straits of Malacca, it also depends on this narrow passage for much of its trade and is wary about American military presence—even under seemingly benign auspices—in the area.⁷⁷

Even if some of the global commons areas are not particularly strategically sensitive, they may be **linked** to more or less positive-sum considerations. For example, some analysts speculate that China's decision to send the PLAN to combat piracy off the coasts of Somalia (theoretically a shared international interest in not a particularly strategically sensitive part of the world) is, in fact, a smokescreen for China to enhance its own power projection capabilities.⁷⁸ As retired American Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt has argued, "PLA Navy leadership

⁷⁴ See Chris Buckley, "Beijing Warns U.S. over Navy Patrol in South China Sea," *New York Times*, August 11, 2017.

⁷⁵ Because if a country owns the waters, it would have exclusive rights to everything contained in and under them.

⁷⁶ For example, see Michael Weissenstein, Andrea Rodriguez, and Vladimir Isachenkov, "What's an Advanced Russian Warship Doing in Havana Harbor?" *Navy Times*, June 24, 2019.

⁷⁷ Ian Storey, "China's 'Malacca Dilemma,'" *China Brief*, Vol. 6, No. 8, April 12, 2006.

⁷⁸ Ankit Panda, "China Dispatches New Naval Fleet for Gulf of Aden Escort Mission," *The Diplomat*, December 11, 2018.

embraced the mission [Somali counterpiracy], publicized it widely within China, and over time has acknowledged that it has been a dramatic “accelerant” in the development of the PLA Navy into a genuine open ocean global naval force.”⁷⁹ From the U.S. Navy’s standpoint, the concern needs to be that capabilities developed through Chinese participation in Somali counterpiracy ultimately are used to help challenge American naval supremacy.

Fourth, there are **structural constraints** on cooperation. Military structures may not be designed to foster cooperation, especially between rival great powers. Ensuring cooperation between allies and partners often proves challenging as militaries work through different national interests, tactics and techniques, and types of equipment. For example, in the case of countering Somali piracy, these challenges led to the creation of four task forces—the EU’s Operation Atlanta, Operation Allied Protector and later, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 150 (dedicated to the Global War on Terrorism) and 151 (dedicated to counterpiracy in particular)—despite the fact that many of the same actors contribute to all missions.⁸⁰

These challenges are only compounded when talking about military cooperation between rival great powers. Intelligence, methods of communications, and operating procedures shared in a seemingly benign context (like counterpiracy) could be exploited by the rival power in the event of hostilities. Unsurprisingly, then, although both China and Russia have participated in counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, they have chosen to remain independent of coalitions, conducting parallel rather than integrated operations.⁸¹

Fifth, there are **legal obstacles** to cooperation. Many of practicalities of cooperation in the air and maritime commons are governed by a series of international agreements, most notably the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the UNCLOS. The United States, China, and Russia are all party to ICAO, but the United States is not party to UNCLOS.⁸²

Finally, coercive signaling should also be mentioned as part of China and Russia’s relations with the United States and its allies. China most notably used coercive signaling when a PLAN Navy J-8 jet collided with a U.S. EP-3E surveillance aircraft in 2001 off of the Hainan Island and at sea when its People’s Maritime Militia trawlers swarmed the USNS *Impeccable* in 2009, also off the coast of Hainan Island.⁸³ Russia has employed coercive signaling with even more regularity as of late. Its aircrafts have buzzed U.S. Navy vessels in the Black Sea when those vessels were perceived as encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence, and

⁷⁹ Dennis C. Blair, testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Military Power Projection and U.S. National Interests,” February 20, 2020, p. 6.

⁸⁰ Neil Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2019.

⁸¹ Melvin, 2019, pp. 3–5, 12–13.

⁸² International Civil Aviation Organization, “List of Member States,” January 10, 2019.

⁸³ Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Plane In China After It Collides with Chinese Jet,” *New York Times*, April 2, 2001; Chris Buckley, “China Says U.S. Naval Ship Broke the Law,” Reuters, March 9, 2009.

Russian aircraft carried out coercive signaling with American P8 surveillance aircraft in the Mediterranean in response to ramped-up U.S. intelligence collection on Russian forces.⁸⁴

From China's and Russia's vantage points, the United States' accusations of unsafe behavior as a rhetorical tool to deflect public attention from the core issue at stake: American intelligence-gathering efforts near politically or strategically sensitive areas. Indeed, the United States often accuses foreign intelligence vessels gathering intelligence off its coast of unsafe behavior.⁸⁵ Whether these accusations are true or not, they cut to the core challenge in cooperation in the maritime and air commons: Every issue can become politically charged, even issues as apparent as safety.

Ultimately, there is some room for space for cooperation in the air commons. There is little disagreement on the use of the air domain for civil (although not for military) aviation. Though still dwarfed in terms of volume and value of goods transported by sea, international air shipping benefits American, Russian, and Chinese commerce and commercial passage travel also benefits all states. As the ICAO's strategic goal of the "Economic Development of Air Transport" states, there is a common "need for ICAO's leadership in harmonizing the air transport framework focused on economic policies and supporting activities."⁸⁶ Because all states have an interest in the safe operation of civilian air traffic worldwide, ICAO provides a risk assessment tool intended to help states fly as safely as possible near or in areas hosting violent conflict.⁸⁷ Military uses of the air commons are inherently more contentious, but they still rely both on international agreements and guidance to help deconflict potential issues. Like civil aviation, military flight requires access to international airspace to move forces, communicate deterrence, and collect intelligence on other states' capabilities.⁸⁸

By contrast, there is somewhat less room for cooperation in the maritime commons. The maritime commons are a resource for transport, fisheries, and petrochemical and other natural resources that support states' economies. Especially because the latter activities are often zero-sum (i.e., resources extracted by one state cannot be used by another), these issues can

⁸⁴ Ivan Watson and Sebastian Shukla, "Russian Fighter Jets 'Buzz' US Warship in Black Sea, Photos Show," CNN, February 16, 2017; U.S. 6th Fleet Public Affairs, 2020.

⁸⁵ Ryan Browne, "Russian Spy Ship off US Coast Operating in 'Unsafe Manner,' Officials Say," CNN, December 17, 2019.

⁸⁶ It further says that economic development of air transport

also refers to fostering the development of an economically viable civil aviation system (airlines, airports, air navigation services providers, etc.) and enhancing its economic efficiency and transparency while facilitating access to funding for aviation infrastructure and other investment needs, technology transfer and capacity building to support the growth of air transport and for the benefit of all stakeholders. (International Civil Aviation Organization, "Economic Development of Air Transport," 2017)

⁸⁷ International Civil Aviation Organization, *Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations over or Near Conflict Zones*, 2nd ed., 2018.

⁸⁸ For example, DoD's *Flight Information Handbook* has a chapter on "Procedures for the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Between the US and Russia" (DoD and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Flight Information Handbook*, St. Louis, Mo.: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2018, Section A-44).

be more complicated. Moreover, while all three states have an interest in maritime trade, their relative stakes on these issues are uneven. China's dependence on petrochemicals delivered via sea is significant, and in 2018 seven of the top ten largest container ports (by volume) were located in China.⁸⁹ In 2015, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ranked China as the third-largest owner of (nonmilitary) fleets in the world.⁹⁰ Per a RAND study, "Cutting off Chinese access to seaborne supplies of oil and liquefied natural gas would have the most dramatic effect."⁹¹ Russia, although primarily a land power with vast energy resources that it exports by pipeline, is also reliant on its maritime capabilities for trade—ITE Transport and Logistics in 2017 reported that as much as 60 percent of Russia's international trade is transported by cargo ships,⁹² and UNCTAD ranked Russia as the twentieth-largest owner of (nonmilitary) fleet—but Russia does not have the same dependencies on maritime trade. Still, the United States, China, and Russia have interest in preventing threats to maritime trade—notably piracy.⁹³ From 2010 to 2019, there were 2,670 recorded piracy events against shipping.⁹⁴ Particularly in non-strategically sensitive areas, all three powers should have a common interest in countering piracy.

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

There are no immediately apparent ways for the United States to play Russia off China or vice versa when it comes to cooperation in the air and maritime commons. On the issues that are most ripe for great power cooperation, the United States stands to gain the most from maximal compliance than rather than cutting separate deals with one or the other power. For example, there is no upside to coordinating with Russia and not China (or vice versa) on Somali counterpiracy, and in other cases—such as air and maritime safety—there is a benefit for all ships and planes, no matter their nationality, to adhere to the same safety protocols. In some cases, trilateral cooperation is not only beneficial but essential. For example, flying between the United States and China often requires overflying the Arctic and transiting Russian airspace.

Other air and maritime common issues do have a more bilateral tone, but that does not necessarily create opportunities to drive a wedge between the China and Russia. For example, although Russia's Rosneft partnered with Vietnam and Philippines to exploit energy

⁸⁹ World Shipping Council, "Top 50 World Container Ports," undated.

⁹⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport*, 2015, 2015.

⁹¹ David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1140-A, 2016.

⁹² ITE Transport and Logistics, "Russia Maritime Freight Update: Smooth Seas From Here on Out?" September 8, 2017.

⁹³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2015.

⁹⁴ Statista, "Number of Pirate Attacks Against Ships Worldwide from 2010 to 2020," 2021.

resources in the South China Sea and theoretically would economically benefit from pushing back on China's claims to the resources of the region, Russia also values its economic and strategic relationship with China.⁹⁵ Consequently, just because Russia may theoretically more align with the United States on its definition of the "common" areas in the South China Sea does not mean it is willing to jeopardize its partnership with China to join with the United States on these issues in practice.

Finally, on other issues, China's and Russia's stances may align. Both countries' militaries have been willing to engage in coercive signaling with American air and naval assets, if it means pushing the United States out of their claimed sovereign territory or other sensitive areas.

Beyond using air and maritime commons issues for leverage against China or Russia, cooperation on the military challenges in the air and maritime commons faces a series of obstacles that reduce the plausible trade space and make cooperation an unlikely venue. Cooperation on the civilian aspects of the air and maritime commons, however, is more plausible and, moreover, would offer more benefits than risks. For example, air and maritime agreements aimed at reducing accidents in these domains would presumably make these domains safer for commerce for all three powers, and for U.S. allies. Cooperation on search-and-rescue operations would similarly produce a common good. Perhaps the most direct risk would be in counterpiracy, where encouraging Chinese involvement in counterpiracy off the Gulf of Aden comes at the cost of building Chinese power projection capabilities. Given China's ongoing naval expansion, however, it is unclear how much more would be lost by increased cooperation in this domain. Overall, while the air and maritime domains may not make for particularly promising wedge issues, there may be some fruitful cooperation in the civilian aspects of these domains.

Conclusion

Ultimately, there is some room for U.S. cooperation with China and Russia over air and maritime commons issues—but not on every issue or all the time. Arguably, the promising issues are the seemingly the most mundane ones, such as ensuring the safe operation of commercial air and maritime traffic daily. Second, there also may be room for at least some deconfliction of military operations in these arenas. After all, while all three powers are willing to push up against one another's space to send strategic signals and advance their own security objectives, at least for the moment, none of them want to start a war. Although close intercepts of military aircraft will likely continue in some form, there may be more room for negotiating how to make these interactions moderately safer. Finally, on a handful of issues (e.g., counterpiracy), there may be some room for "parallel play," if not genuine cooperation, between

⁹⁵ Huong Le Thu and Sunny Cao, "Russia's Growing Interests in the South China Sea," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 18, 2019.

the powers, as all three countries work to similar ends, albeit not in unison or in a wholly coordinated fashion.

At the same time, there are real limits to how far any cooperation can go. Some issues related to defining territorial boundaries and economic rights are zero-sum and not particularly open for cooperation. And cooperation will still be inherently messy. Even seemingly benign issues come with tradeoffs, since encouraging U.S.-China-Russia cooperation on policing the maritime commons also de facto enhances China's and Russia's blue water power projection capabilities and risks revealing valuable operational techniques to potential future foes.

Ultimately, the most promising way for the United States at large and the USAF to successfully cooperate with China and Russia in the air and maritime commons is to start small. Larger issues, such as sovereignty over the South China Sea, are unlikely to be resolved easily or quickly. Instead, by focusing on the smaller issues—such as how American, Chinese, and Russian aircraft and vessels can operate somewhat more safely when in close proximity, knowing full well that coercive signaling will still likely occur—may be more likely to yield successful results.

Issue Area 6: Preventing Nuclear Arms Races

For almost half a century, the United States maintained a nuclear balance with the other major nuclear power, the Soviet Union, and its successor, Russia, via a network of nuclear arms control agreements.¹ In the immediate aftermath the collapse of the Soviet Union, DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program assisted Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in safely transporting, securing, storing, and dismantling their Soviet-era nuclear arsenals and, later, biological and chemical weapons.² The administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all negotiated with Russia about controlling nuclear weapons, albeit with varying levels of interest and varying degrees of success, in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty III (SALT III) framework, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), respectively.³ Even in periods of strategic competition, preventing nuclear Armageddon has been a relative bright spot for great power cooperation.

Since the conclusion of the New START in 2010, however, U.S.-Russia relations have deteriorated. Over the past several years, the international nuclear arms control landscape has followed suit: After the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019, New START (set to expire in 2026) is now the only nuclear arms treaty between the United States and Russia. The imbalance in the nuclear arms race and landscape does not stop there: Nuclear proliferation and the possibility that nuclear weapons or materiel could end up in the hands on a malign third state or actor remains a threat.⁴ In this chapter, we examine the objectives of the United States, China, and Russia in preventing nuclear arms races in a broad sense and consider the more specific issues of international nuclear arms control and nuclear

¹ For an overview of U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, Congressional Research Service, *Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements*, Washington, D.C.: RL33865, March 26, 2020c.

² Congressional Research Service, 2020c, p. 22.

³ Congressional Research Service, 2020c, pp. 13–14, 17–22.

⁴ Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "Nuclear Proliferation Risks New and Old," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Summer 2003.

nonproliferation.⁵ Consequently, a detailed discussion of the issues of nuclear arms control and the collapse of the INF may be found in the companion volume on great power competition in Europe and the Middle East, as can a detailed discussion of nuclear proliferation and Iran.⁶ An in-depth analysis of the policy toward India's nuclear program and the seemingly shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea may be found in the respective chapters on the report on the Indo-Pacific.⁷

Understanding the Equities

In this section, we consider the interests of each of the states in order to identify potential key areas of cooperation.

U.S. Equities

The U.S. seeks to create an environment that is not conducive for a nuclear arms race through supporting a strong and transparent U.S. nuclear policy, verifiable and enforceable nuclear arms control measures that are adhered to by all signatories and countering proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, technologies and knowledge to state and terrorist actors.⁸

Although the United States remains committed to seeking “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” it will continue to remain a nuclear power, enacting the fundamental role of its nuclear enterprise to deter nuclear attacks on the United States, its allies, and its partners.⁹ The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the need to “maintain modern and effective nuclear forces, as well as infrastructure” in the face of the current threat environment, characterized by Russian, Chinese as well as Iranian and North Korean nuclear developments and capability aspirations.¹⁰ In 2019, David Trachtenberg, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, underscored that: “a strong nuclear deterrent also contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals by limiting the incentive for allies to have their own nuclear weapons.”¹¹

⁵ This chapter does not specifically focus on hypersonic missiles and missile defense.

⁶ Treyger et al., 2023, Chapter Three, “Broader Euro-Atlantic Security,” and Chapter Nine, “Countering Iran and Its Proxies.”

⁷ Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

⁸ DoD, *Nuclear Posture Review*, 2018a.

⁹ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues*, Washington, D.C., RL33640, January 2020a.

¹⁰ DoD, 2018a.

¹¹ C. Todd Lopez, “4 Things to Know About the U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 1, 2019.

The United States has led the global efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. It was signatory to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which limited the number of strategic nuclear warheads and shorter-range nuclear weapons; the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, which further lowered the number of strategic nuclear force levels, and New START, signed in 2010. The United States has consistently supported the view that effective nuclear weapon agreements are a means of “codifying mutually agreed-upon nuclear postures in a verifiable and enforceable manners,” which boosts confidence, transparency, and predictability among nuclear adversaries, thus reducing the risk of miscalculation and improving deterrence.¹²

However, the United States is unwilling to reduce its forces without the reciprocation of its adversaries, specifically Russia, and has demonstrated its readiness to withdraw from nuclear arms agreements that are not honored by the other signatories.¹³ According to General John Hyten, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, the United States will reduce its nuclear arms arsenal only in the context of a reduced threat and a renegotiated arms control treaty with Russia.¹⁴ The United States has left several nuclear treaties, either because of its dissatisfaction with the Russian compliance with the treaty or to be able to pursue capabilities needed to address specific security concerns. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because the treaty constrained the testing of nonnuclear missile variants that the United States sought to use against the threat of terrorism and other rogue regimes. In 2019, the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty after accusing Russia of violating the treaty.¹⁵ The United States has also begrudged Russia’s inconsistent implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, signed in 1991, that aimed to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.¹⁶ Currently the United States remains com-

¹² DoD, 2018a.

¹³ William Courtney and Bruce McClintock, “Stabilizing the Nuclear Cold War,” The RAND Blog, February 13, 2020.

¹⁴ Valerie Insinna, “STRATCOM Head on Key Lawmaker’s Arms Control Agenda: ‘If You Want to Save Money, Change the Threat,’” *Defense News*, November 15, 2018.

¹⁵ Following the AMB withdrawal in 2002, the United States rushed to deliver the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system (GMD), which perhaps due to the short delivery timeline, has reached mediocre results in scripted tests. INF was signed between the United States and then Soviet Union with the aim to end the nuclear race in Europe. Some European analysts say that the U.S. withdrawal may diminish European security and the global nuclear order and increase instability. The United States has also used economic measures to react to Russia’s non-compliance of the INF: It sanctioned Russian companies involved in the development and manufacturing of Russia’s cruise missile system (DoD, 2018a; Bryce Farabaugh and Deverrick Holmes, “Did Abandoning the ABM Treaty Make America Safer?” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 27, 2019).

¹⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the CFE and cooperation with China and Russia, see the accompanying volume on great power competition in Europe and the Middle East (Treyger et al., 2023); Eli Corin, “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Project, March 1, 2004; Wolfgang Richter, *The End of the INF Treaty Is Looming: A New Nuclear Arms Race Can Still Be Prevented*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and

mitted to only one nuclear weapons agreement: New START. Signed by the United States and Russia in April 2010, New START reduces each country's number of strategic nuclear missile launchers and calls for a more robust inspection and verification process. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has renewed New START through 2026, but it has been reported that the U.S. administration is interested in expanding the agreement to include China and a wider range of weapons, such as shorter-range, nonstrategic or "tactical" nuclear weapons.¹⁷ A failure to extend the New START or sign a new agreement in its place would have left the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship ungoverned by any mutual restraint and verification agreements for the first time since 1972, and U.S. allies had expressed alarm over this possibility.¹⁸

The United States is concerned about the potential danger of state and nonstate actors acquiring nuclear weapons, a threat that, according to the 2017 NSS, is only increasing. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review singles out nuclear terrorism as one of the most significant threats to the United States, its allies, and its partners. Overall, the main lines of counterproliferation effort established in the Nuclear Posture Review seek to curtail the number of nuclear weapons owned by state and nonstate actors, ensure strict control of nuclear materials and technology, and support arms control agreements that are verifiable and enforceable.¹⁹

The United States views nuclear nonproliferation as problematic because of the current global security environment, where actors such as North Korea and Iran are modernizing and development nuclear capabilities and could become avenues for nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge being funneled into terrorist hands. The United States is concerned about North Korea's employment of nuclear weapons and attempts to sell nuclear technology and expertise to other actors, and the United States advocates for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.²⁰ The United States also remains concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions and its ballistic missiles.²¹ These state-centric nuclear proliferation policies are, however, addressed in more detail in the accompanying regionally focused volumes on the Indo-Pacific and on Europe and the Middle East, respectively.

Security Affairs), January 2019; and Government of Russia, "Information on the Decree 'On Suspending the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements,'" January 14, 2017b.

¹⁷ According to then National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, the administration was keen on having China involved in an arms control negotiation. Rebecca Kheel, "Trump Under Pressure to Renew Last Nuke Treaty with Russian," *The Hill*, February 9, 2020; Nahal Toosi, "Trump Flirts with a New Nuclear Arms Race," *Politico*, February 12, 2020.

¹⁸ Alexandra Brozowski, "Europeans Alarmed as US Mulls Pull-Out of Yet Another Arms Control Treaty," *Euractiv*, December 18, 2019.

¹⁹ DoD, 2018a.

²⁰ See the companion volume on great power competition in the Indo-Pacific for a detailed discussion (Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023, Chapter Seven, "Achieving the Denuclearization of North Korea").

²¹ Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas, *U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R45795, May 8, 2020.

The United States is committed to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided the global security environment allows for that. The 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which covers nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology, remains the basis of the U.S. nonproliferation policy. The NPT has helped prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to state actors and encouraged a security environment conducive to the reduction of global nuclear stockpiles and the mitigation of international nuclear terrorism.²² The United States also supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee, without seeking ratification of the treaty, and will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary.²³ Under the Trump administration, the United States withdrew from agreements with little perceived value. Despite cautiously admitting that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the United States, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany and Iran could constraint Iran's nuclear weapon program, in 2018 the United States abandoned the deal to reinstate sanctions on Iran, citing Iran's violations of the spirit of the deal, support for proxy wars, and working against the U.S. interests in the Middle East and channeling money to terrorist organizations.²⁴ The United States remains open to negotiating a new agreement with Iran.²⁵

Countering nuclear terrorism takes a multilayered approach, which includes preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear-related materials to responding to nuclear incidents and ensuring the necessary capabilities to manage the consequences of a nuclear detonation. The United States' view is that the most effective way of preventing and reducing nuclear terrorism is to ensure the security of nuclear weapons and materials. Considering the global spread of nuclear material, this approach is inherently multinational, and the United States seeks cooperation with the 60 countries that possesses radiation detection technologies.²⁶

Chinese Equities

China seeks to avoid a nuclear arms race but has refused to participate in arms control discussions and is actively building up its nuclear arsenal. China contends that its limited nuclear posture and no-first-use policy means that its nuclear arsenal is not a threat to anyone, but, in practice, China's actions could have the potential to cause a nuclear arms race with the United States and countries in the region. Overall, we assess that preventing a nuclear arms race is of medium importance to China, While the United States and China are rhetorically aligned

²² U.S. Department of State, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," undated.

²³ DoD, 2018a.

²⁴ Michael R. Pompeo, "After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy," speech at the Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018; "Understanding the Iran Deal: What, Why and the Next Steps," Al Jazeera, May 8, 2019.

²⁵ For a more detailed discussion of U.S.-Iranian relations, please see Treyger et al., 2023, Chapter Nine, "Countering Iran and Its Proxies."

²⁶ DoD, 2018a.

on avoiding one, Beijing has demonstrated neither a willingness to bargain or cooperate nor a willingness to commit resources to this shared goal.

On paper, China is very opposed to a nuclear arms race. China has historically sought to avoid an arms race with the United States, having learned the lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union, and views arms control as a means for more powerful countries to have more power over others. The Chinese leadership believes one of the reasons for the fall of communism in Russia was the 1980s U.S.-Soviet arms race, instigated by Washington to bankrupt Moscow through the Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as “Star Wars”). From Beijing’s perspective, China is not the country that should be reducing or even limiting its nuclear weapons to avoid a nuclear arms race. Chinese officials have continually stressed that “there is no victory in nuclear war, and we shall never start a nuclear war.”²⁷ China’s 2006 Defense white paper provides the most authoritative description of China’s nuclear strategy, stating that China pursues a “self-defensive nuclear strategy,” including “no first use” and the declaration that China will “never enter a nuclear arms race.”²⁸ Its 2019 defense white paper says, “International arms control and disarmament efforts have suffered setbacks, with growing signs of arms races. . . . China advocates the ultimate complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.” The paper adds that “China actively participates in international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. China objects to arms race and strives to protect global strategic balance and stability.” China is a party to the NPT and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Despite this rhetorical alignment, China has made clear that it is not interested in engaging in any kind of arms control negotiations with the United States, and its military modernization—specifically nuclear expansion—similarly makes clear that it is not willing to exercise self-restraint on nuclear force structure and capabilities. When the Trump administration pushed for a trilateral arms control agreement to replace New START, Beijing pushed back hard. In August 2019, a foreign ministry official said,

China has no interest in participating in the so-called trilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the United States and Russia. . . . Given the huge gap between nuclear arsenal of China and those of the United States and the Russian Federation, I do not think

²⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019a.

²⁸ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 29, 2006b. Recent U.S. government reports suggest Beijing is at least reconsidering its No First Use policy, perhaps to make it conditional instead of absolute as currently articulated. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2020, p. 86.

it is reasonable or even fair to expect China to participate in any nuclear reduction negotiations at this stage.²⁹

Even in the bilateral context, China similarly has yet to accept a December 2019 U.S. invitation to hold a “strategic security dialogue.”³⁰ Instead, U.S.-China dialogue on strategic issues is largely confined to Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, such as the ongoing U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue hosted by Pacific Forum since the early 2000s.³¹ For more than a decade, the United States has asked for this dialogue to be upgraded to Track 1, but Beijing has steadfastly refused. Although some former U.S. officials leave open the possibility that Beijing could eventually agree to nuclear arms control, the long-standing lack of progress leads us to assess that China is not willing to bargain or cooperate on preventing a nuclear arms race.³²

In practice, China is the only major nuclear state expanding its arsenal, although its stockpile still pales in comparison to either the United States’ or Russia’s. With the United States and Russia constrained by the limits imposed by New START since 2011, China has grown its arsenal from an estimated 240 to 290 over the life of the treaty.³³ The Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated that China will further double its nuclear forces by 2030, though even then it will still have fewer nuclear weapons than Russia or the United States.³⁴ Moreover, China is embarking on an ambitious expansion of its nuclear posture, with the introduction of a nuclear triad over the next decade, centered on the Jin-class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine, the H-20 strategic bomber, and the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This may trigger an expansion of U.S. nuclear forces in response. China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal leads us to assess that China is unwilling to commit resources (in this case, restraint) to avoiding a nuclear arms race.³⁵

Beyond avoiding a bilateral arms race with the United States, China claims nominal support for global nonproliferation norms, but it has a poor track record in this regard and

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Briefing by Mr. Fu Cong, Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” August 6, 2019c.

³⁰ Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Invites China for Talks on Nuclear Arms,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 2019.

³¹ For a review of these unofficial dialogues, see Michael Wheeler, *Track 1.5/2 Security Dialogues with China: Nuclear Lessons Learned*, Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014.

³² James Walker, “U.S.-China Nuclear Arms Deal Could Be Possible in Future Despite Coronavirus War of Words,” *Newsweek*, May 14, 2020.

³³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, Stockholm, 2011, Chapter 7: World Nuclear Forces; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2019*, Stockholm, Chapter 6: World Nuclear Forces, as of January 2019.

³⁴ Hans M. Kristensen, “DIA Estimates For Chinese Nuclear Warheads,” Federation of American Scientists, May 31, 2019.

³⁵ For recommendations for a pathway to cooperation, see Elbridge Colby and Wu Riqiang, “How the US and China Can Talk Each Other Out of a Nuclear Arms Race,” *Defense One*, April 18, 2016; Gregory Kulacki, “China Is Willing to Negotiate on Nuclear Arms, But Not on Trump’s Terms,” *Defense One*, March 30, 2020.

is most verbal about opposing theoretical Japanese proliferation. China was the source of Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s, providing both the designs and nuclear fuel to jumpstart Islamabad's nuclear weapons.³⁶ China has also provided nuclear assistance to Iran, Algeria, and Iraq in some forms, though they may have been NPT-compliant. Beijing only joined the NPT in 1992 and, in response to U.S. pressure, it is generally believed to have stopped explicitly sharing nuclear technology.³⁷ However, China has not acted with much zeal to stop North Korea's nuclear weapon program, notably through poor UN sanctions enforcement, and has continued trading with Iran even as the country pursues nuclear weapons.³⁸ Moreover, China reportedly supports Saudi Arabia's nascent moves toward a nuclear capability through joint exploration for uranium mining and refining.³⁹ Beijing, however, is vocally opposed to Japanese nuclear proliferation. Despite Tokyo only having a civilian nuclear power industry, it does have a large plutonium stockpile that could theoretically be used turned into nuclear weapons.⁴⁰ Chinese officials and analysts are very concerned about this possibility but have so far not suggested Japan join any arms control treaties (because China itself will not join). These concerns also apply to a lesser extent to China's other neighbors in Northeast Asia, South Korea and Taiwan.

Russian Equities

Besides the United States, Russia is the only other nuclear power with a matured nuclear triad and long-standing nuclear policies. Being a nuclear power and being able to play a key role in nuclear nonproliferation is a means for Russia to ensure and maintain a global elite power status on par with the United States, and to reduce uncertainty and unpredictability in international security.⁴¹ Russia relies on its strategic nuclear forces for deterrence and defense, as well as a coercive capability, and therefore pursues a modern and capable nuclear

³⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis*, Washington, D.C., September 1996.

³⁷ Congressional Research Service, 1996.

³⁸ For more details on China's tacit acceptance of the North Korean nuclear program, see Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

³⁹ Warren P. Strobel, Michael R. Gordon, and Felicia Schwartz, "Saudi Arabia, With China's Help, Expands Its Nuclear Program," *Wall Street Journal*, August 4, 2020; Emma Graham-Harrison, Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Julian Borger, "Revealed: Saudi Arabia May Have Enough Uranium Ore to Produce Nuclear Fuel," *The Guardian*, September 17, 2020.

⁴⁰ Robert Windrem, "Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy," *NBC News*, March 11, 2014; Mark Fitzpatrick, *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan*, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2016; Mark Fitzpatrick, "How Japan Could Go Nuclear," *Foreign Affairs*, October 3, 2019.

⁴¹ Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker, *Russia's Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More*, Daedalus, Spring 2020.

arsenal.⁴² These capabilities are meant to deter against the main perceived threat: the United States.⁴³ Russian nuclear policy documents (its Military Doctrine [2014], National Security Strategy [2014], and the 2020 “Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”) and government officials emphasize Russia’s interest in ensuring strategic stability and preventing nuclear miscalculation through international nuclear control agreements. Moscow also indicates a concern about nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorist organizations through various means, including improper nuclear material security procedures.

Nuclear weapons remain the cornerstone of Russian deterrence policy of large-scale military conflicts, a view reconfirmed by a 2012 article by Putin in which he writes that “So long as the ‘powder’ of our strategic nuclear forces, created by our fathers and grandfathers, remains ‘dry,’ no one will dare unleash large-scale aggression against us.”⁴⁴ Russia views the potential threat to the security and functioning of its strategic nuclear forces as one of the main military threats, which it faces through modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal at a level and composition that, according to Russia’s Military Doctrine (2014), would “maintain global and regional stability and the nuclear deterrence potential at a sufficient level.”⁴⁵ However, analysts also note that “The growing importance of non-nuclear deterrence in Russia’s arsenal is in fact making Russia less dependent on nuclear weapons,” while also providing it with a more granular escalation control.⁴⁶

As of 2019, Russia has the largest number of nuclear weapons in the world and is continuing to invest in modern, low-yield weapons, expanding its capabilities for limited nuclear warfare.⁴⁷ Russia’s ongoing nuclear modernization, combined with military exercises and threat-signaling to Western countries, contribute to a perception of mystery and unpredictability of Russian nuclear intentions. While the current nuclear capabilities modernization phase, started in 1998, is only planned to conclude in 2020s, in his January 2020 presidential address Putin announced that “For the first time in the history of nuclear missile weapons, including the Soviet period and modern times, we are not catching up with anyone, but, on the contrary, other leading states have yet to create the weapons that Russia already possesses.”⁴⁸ To add to the flexibility of its nuclear triad, Russia is adding new options to its

⁴² Congressional Research Service, 2020d.

⁴³ Fink and Olikier, 2020.

⁴⁴ Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Moscow, January 15, 2020.

⁴⁵ Government of Russia, 2014b.

⁴⁶ Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 163, No. 2, 2018.

⁴⁷ Russia has 6,490 nuclear warheads, with 1,461 of them strategically deployed on ballistic missiles and heavy bomber bases (Olga Olikier, “Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma. What Is Russia’s Arsenal Really for?” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2018; Arms Control Association, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” July 2019.

⁴⁸ Putin, 2020.

large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.⁴⁹ Russia is replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines, and aircraft, while also developing new delivery systems, adding new types of nuclear systems to its arsenal (such as a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile).⁵⁰ These modernization efforts present a new set of challenges for arms control: They will stop the downsizing of Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. A popular assessment is that the growing arsenal of low-yield weapons and variety of nonstrategic systems could provide Russia with an advantage over the United States and its allies.⁵¹

Russia's 2020 "Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" clarifies its "launch-on-warning" posture on the use of nuclear weapons.⁵² The meaning of Russia's policy on the use of nuclear weapons, although stated in the Russian Military Doctrine (2014) and enforced by official statements, has until recently been vague, and the new document clarifies many aspects.⁵³ This lingering "fog of war" regarding Russia's use of weapons could have negative impacts in a crisis situation and on perpetuating an arms race.

Rhetorically, Russia remains committed to international nuclear treaties and considers them to be instruments of preventing and mitigating potential missile threats.⁵⁴ Reductions in the Russian nuclear forces have been mainly driven by the 1991 START Treaty, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and the 2010 New START Treaty, as well as the replacement of older Soviet missiles with new missiles that can carry fewer warheads.⁵⁵ Russia has expressed support for renewing New START as the last bastion holding back the arms race.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Defense Intelligence Agency, *Global Nuclear Landscape 2018*, Washington, D.C., 2018.

⁵⁰ Congressional Research Service, 2020a.

⁵¹ Zysk, 2018.

⁵² Government of Russia, "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence," June 8, 2020.

⁵³ According to its Military Doctrine (Government of Russia, 2014b), Russia "shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state's very existence has been threatened." Also, in 2016 Russia threatened Norway with nuclear weapons over the deployment of U.S. marines to Vaernes, and in 2019 a Russian official said that the UK is a "nuclear target" because it allows for the stationing of U.S. missiles and that Russian nuclear missiles could reach the UK in minutes (Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Russian Nuclear Forces," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 75, No. 2, 2019; "'Norway Will Suffer': Russia Makes Nuclear Threat over US Marines," *The Local*, October 31, 2016; Ciaran McGrath, "World War 3: UK Is Nuclear Target We Can Hit in Minutes, Warns Russia," *Express*, August 6, 2019).

⁵⁴ Government of Russia, 2014b.

⁵⁵ Congressional Research Service, 2020a.

⁵⁶ In December 2019, the Russian MFA signaled its readiness to include into New START such future systems as *Kinjal* and *Poseidon*, which Russia considers as a significant step forwards to the U.S. Russian media has criticized the U.S. conditions for the renegotiation of START (inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons and China) as unrealistic (Svetlana Bocharova and Gleb Mishutin, "Vashington Ne Poshel Na Predloszheniye

At the same time, Russia considers the West to be hypocritical about the implementation of major arms control agreements, which Russia views as intended to curtail Russian capabilities and undermine Russian security (e.g., Russia interpreted the U.S. move to withdraw from the ABM Treaty as directed against Russia).⁵⁷ The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs has spoken of a threat of a collapse of international legal frameworks of security, in the form of the U.S. withdrawal from arms control regimes and the replacement of international legal frameworks with a “rules-based world order” (a concept that Russian regards profoundly American) as a destabilizing factor.⁵⁸

Russia has also accused the United States of trying to manipulate nonproliferation requirements “in justifying its anti-Iranian course” and pursuing selfish interests.⁵⁹ It has also claimed that the United States and its allies are using “dirty techniques” and spinning stories around noncompliance of nonproliferation in Syria as an example of the U.S. practice of using nuclear agreement processes to “settle political scores.”⁶⁰

U.S. officials have accused Russia of abusing the limits of international and bilateral treaties. U.S. experts have doubted Russian adherence to international agreements on nuclear testing moratorium and suspected Russia of disregarding its arms control obligations under the bilateral INF.⁶¹ While, over the years, the United States has withdrawn from several international nuclear agreements as a protest to Russia’s breaches, Russia tends to use these U.S. withdrawals as a pretext for its own actions and to claim that the United States is not interested in global stability. In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, as well as in 2018, Putin directly linked Russia’s strategic weapons programs to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and a narrative around a perceived growth of American anti-ballistic missiles numbers and quality launch areas, which Russia fears devalue its nuclear capabilities.⁶² Additionally, experts also lament the secrecy surrounding arms control measures. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, for example, does not allow for

Putina No Prodeleniyo Yadernovo Dogovora Rossii I SSHA” [Washington Did Not Accept Putin’s Proposal to Extend the Nuclear Treaty Between Russia and the United States],” *Vedomosti*, October 18, 2020).

⁵⁷ Schmitt, 2019.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s Interview with Kommersant, March 5, 2020,” March 6, 2020a.

⁵⁹ Russian Federation, “Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 2: Non-Proliferation and IAEA Safeguards), New York,” May 3, 2019a.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2019a.

⁶¹ “U.S. Believes Russia Conducting Low-Level Nuclear Tests: Official,” Reuters, May 29, 2019.

⁶² Also note that Russia withdrew from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) one day after the United States formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007; Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018.

reciprocal inspection of subcritical experiments and does not force the experiments above ground, and both Russia and the United States have declined the voluntary mutual inspections that were suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁶³

Despite the above-mentioned exchange of mutual accusations, Russia has shown its interest and willingness to cooperate on nuclear nonproliferation. Historically, this has been an area for ample cooperation between the United States and Russia (and previously the Soviet Union), from drafting the NPT to establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group of nuclear suppliers (previously the London Group) and working together to implement the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reductions programs that helped secure Russia's nuclear materials and infrastructure following the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ More recently, Russia was instrumental in persuading Iran to accept the nuclear program limitations of the JCPOA.⁶⁵

Russia is interested in ensuring that nuclear weapons and materials do not proliferate beyond the five nuclear states, yet Russian generally views nuclear disarmament as a theoretical rather than practical possibility. Russian views nuclear issues largely through the prism of safeguarding Russia's own nuclear capabilities. Internationally, Russia largely prefers to deal with nonproliferation issues in multinational formats, such as the UN Security Council. Russia seems to be first and foremost concerned with nuclear proliferation toward nonstate actors. While it does not support nuclear proliferation in general rhetorically, its actions, such as blocking the U.S. request that the UN declare that North Korea breached its sanctions, have not always followed suit.⁶⁶

Despite the previous examples of cooperation, Robert Einhorn notes that, more recently, Russia and China act more as "nonproliferation opponents" to the United States. This is evidenced by Russia's opposition to the United States' policies on Iran since 2018 (specifically the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-imposition of sanctions). Regarding Syria, Russia has criticized the efforts of the United States and other countries to address Syria's noncompliance with its nuclear weapons nonproliferation obligations, and has defended Syria's rejection of IAEA requests to visit sites suspected of involvement in its nuclear pro-

⁶³ Patrick Malone, "The U.S. Raises Red Flags on Russia's Plutonium Experiments—While Ramping Up Its Own," Center for Public Integrity, June 18, 2019.

⁶⁴ Russia and the United States have also cooperated to secure the Syrian chemical weapons in 2012–2013 (Robert Einhorn, *US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China: A Call for Finding Common Ground with Great Power Rivals*, Monterey, Calif.: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 2020).

⁶⁵ For a more detailed discussion of JCPOA, please see the accompanying volume on great power competition in Europe and the Middle East (Treyger et al., 2023).

⁶⁶ For a detailed discussion of the INF and Iran's nuclear weapon program, see Treyger et al., 2023, Chapter Nine, "Countering Iran and Its Proxies." For a detailed discussion of North Korea, see Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023, Chapter Seven: "Achieving the Denuclearization of North Korea"; Edith M. Lederer, "Russia, China Block UN From Saying North Korea Violated Sanctions," *The Diplomat*, June 19, 2019; and Anastasia Barannikova, "What Russia Thinks About North Korea's Nuclear Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 24, 2019.

gram.⁶⁷ In 2019, Russia and China proposed a UN Security Council resolution that would lift the existing UN sanctions on North Korea.⁶⁸

Russia is concerned about the safety and security of its own nuclear facilities, and about the threat of nuclear weapons, materiel, and systems falling into the hands of terrorist organizations (e.g., ISIS) or “unrecognized nuclear states” with inadequate security and safety protocols.⁶⁹ Russian analysts agree that the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies may negatively affect regional and international security and that the 187 Missile Technology Control Regime⁷⁰ (MTCR) has not been effective, particularly as regards rocket technology transfers to Iran and North Korea, due to several issues.⁷¹ The MTCR is not legally binding, and international information-sharing remains a problem. Russia noted the need to increase the effectiveness of MTCR in 2015, and in the memo accompanying its accession to the regime in 1995 Russia emphasized that “There is an understanding that the decision to transfer technical means is a sovereign decision taken solely by the supplier government,” paving the way for its own missile technology deliveries to Iran.⁷²

Space for Cooperation

On paper, none of the three countries wants a nuclear arms race. Despite the deteriorating and rather cold relations between the United States and the two countries, all three have showed willingness to ensure dialogue via more informal Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues. For example, in 2017–2018 the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a series of strategic dialogues between the United States and Russia, and in 2015 there was a U.S.-China

⁶⁷ For a more in-depth discussion of Russia-U.S. cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation, see Einhorn 2020; Mark Hibbs, *Iran on the Boil in the IAEA Boardroom: Russia, the West, and NPT Obligations*, Global Security Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, February 2020.

⁶⁸ Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Propose Lifting Some U.N. Sanctions on North Korea, U.S. Says Not the Time,” Reuters, December 16, 2019.

⁶⁹ Sergey Oznobishchev, “Ob Ugroze Katastroficheskovo Terrorisma [About the Threat of Catastrophic Terrorism],” in Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., *Policentricheskii Yadernii Mir: Vyzovi I Noviye Mozmoznooschy [Polycentric Nuclear World]*, Carnegie Center Moscow, 2017b.

⁷⁰ MTRC urges its members to restrict exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500kg payload at least 300km or delivering any type of weapon of small destruction (Arms Control Association, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance,” July 2017).

⁷¹ Sergey Oznobishchev, “Kontrol Eksporta Paket I Paketnih Tehnologii [Export Control Package And Package Technologies],” in Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., *Policentricheskii Yadernii Mir: Vyzovi I Noviye Mozmoznooschy [Polycentric Nuclear World]*, Carnegie Center Moscow, 2017a.

⁷² For example, in 2016 Russia delivered S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran. Although Moscow and Tehran are not always on the same side of all arguments, they have found ways how to work through differences and an ally in each other against the perceived U.S. “hegemony” (Oznobishchev, 2017a; Ivan Petrov, “Rossiya Postavila V Iran Kompleksi S-300 [Russia Delivered S-300 Complex to Iran], RG, October 10, 2016).

nuclear dynamics dialogue organized by the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Naval Postgraduate School.⁷³ Despite these overlapping interests and ongoing discussions, achieving genuine cooperation between the powers may prove more difficult, for multiple reasons.

First, China has no **immediate** interest in engaging in nuclear arms control frameworks, as China has a much smaller nuclear arsenal than the United States or Russia and is only now building it up. Additionally, although China and Russia have been pushed to taking action to punish North Korea and Iranian nuclear proliferation, both powers have viewed nuclear proliferation as less of an immediate concern than the United States. The Kremlin generally tolerates, and even accepts, that other countries seek nuclear capabilities to protect their sovereignty.⁷⁴

There is a significant **trust** deficit between the United States and Russia on nuclear issues, stemming from decade's worth of broken arms control agreements. Experts note that there may be little that could be done to change the broader relationship between the United States and Russia on this issue, which Angela Stent considers today to be in the worse state since 1985.⁷⁵ Russia is not shy about the main target of its nuclear arsenal—in 2019, a Russian state television channel listed the alleged U.S. military facilities that the Kremlin would target with a nuclear strike.⁷⁶ When Putin presided over the unveiling of its new generation of ICBMs, he even showed a video of the new missile reaching Florida, perhaps once again creating an external perception of power and decisiveness, and fear of Russia's military might.⁷⁷ At the same time, the United States accuses Russia of cheating on its existing arms control agreements, including developing missiles in excess of the INF ranges and skirting its Threshold Test Ban Treaty notification obligations.⁷⁸

Conversely, Russia might view the United States as an untrustworthy negotiating partner because of its record of withdrawing from international agreements. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the JCPOA in 2018, and the INF Treaty in 2019. The tendency of nuclear stability and nonproliferation issues to become partisan issues in the United States may prevent it from effectively engaging in international frameworks on these issues.⁷⁹

⁷³ Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and David Santoro, *US-China Strategic Nuclear Relations: Time to Move to Track-I Dialogue*, Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, February 2015.

⁷⁴ "Olga Oliker on Russia: Insights and Recommendations," *Russia Matters*, July 16, 2020.

⁷⁵ Angela Stent, "Why Are US-Russia Relations So Challenging?" The Brookings Institution, April 27, 2020.

⁷⁶ "Russia's Putin Unveils 'Invincible' Nuclear Weapons," BBC, March 1, 2018; Andrew Osborn, "After Putin's Warning, Russian TV Lists Nuclear Targets in U.S.," Reuters, February 25, 2019.

⁷⁷ Stent, 2019.

⁷⁸ See Christopher Ashley Ford, "Russian Arms Control Compliance and the Challenge of the Next Agreement," Council on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2020b.

⁷⁹ Heather Williams, "Russia Still Needs Arms Control," Arms Control Association, January/February 2016.

Furthermore, while our research included in the volume on the Indo-Pacific shows that the United States, China, and Russia may share an interest in a denuclearized North Korea, the U.S. vision of how to achieve this aim fundamentally differs from those of China and Russia. While the U.S. approach is more forceful, China and Russia’s actions signal an interest in a dialogue approach, as well as a potential lack of commitment to the goal by, for example, attempts to evade or interfere with existing sanctions.⁸⁰

Arms control agreements, particularly with Russia, are also increasingly mired in **audience costs**. Whereas, traditionally, cooperation on nuclear issues has been mostly removed from domestic politics, today such cooperation is influenced not only by domestic politics but also Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.⁸¹

Ultimately, as depicted in Table 8.1, cooperation in the form of nuclear arms control may be difficult to achieve. China has been reluctant to engage in nuclear arms control agreements with the United States and Russia, both of which have considerably larger nuclear arsenals. Russia, on the other hand, has viewed nuclear arms agreement with the United States as a means of ensuring nuclear stability and as a symbol of the equal standing of the United States and Russia in the international security arena, and been more willing to engage on these issues. Still, negotiating nuclear arms agreements with Russia requires overcoming the trust deficit and audience costs.

Perhaps more promising areas for cooperation are nuclear nonproliferation and ensuring the safety of nuclear materials. Both the United States and Russia are concerned about the potential of nuclear weapons and materials ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations or other malign actors. Russia has stated its commitment to nonproliferation and is a member of key relevant international bodies, namely the NPT, the board of the IAEA, and the UN Security Council. Russia has also been an active participant in the P5+1 talks with Iran and the Six-Party talks with North Korea. Similarly, both the United States and Russia have established records of cooperating on nuclear safety (e.g., safe transport, dismantling and disposal), going back to 1991, when Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor

TABLE 8.1
Interest in Cooperation on Preventing Nuclear Arms Races

	China	Russia
Stakes	Medium	High
Rhetorical alignment	Yes	Yes
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	No	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	Mixed

⁸⁰ Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Kim, 2023.

⁸¹ “Olga Oliker on Russia: Insights and Recommendations,” 2020.

Mikhailov requested U.S. assistance with the safety and security of its nuclear weapons and the safe storage of fissile material.⁸² This request resulted in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program—an effort that helped dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure in the former Soviet Union. The program has since been replaced by cooperation under the Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR).⁸³ And since both nuclear proliferation and nuclear safety are somewhat further removed from core strategic interests, there may potentially be more room for future common endeavors or at least coordination.

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

Preventing nuclear proliferation and arms races offers few opportunities for the United States to play China off Russia or vice versa. As mentioned in the previous section, China has shown little interest in arms control. The U.S. decision in early 2021 to extend New START with Russia arguably helps, rather than hurts, China by placing limits on the two largest nuclear powers the United States and Russia, while leave China unconstrained. Similarly, bilateral cooperation on other nuclear issues—such as nuclear safety or nonproliferation efforts—would likely allow the excluded power to free ride off these endeavors, enjoying the potential benefits of added global nuclear safety and reduced risk of nuclear altercations without paying the costs of such efforts.

While nuclear cooperation may not be a particularly promising wedge issue, it does generate significant positive and negative externalities. American allies around the world rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to guarantee their own security, and on the global nonproliferation regime to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of rogue actors. Consequently, the erosion of the umbrella, the regime, or both—because of a break down in cooperation between the United States, China, and Russia to maintain nuclear stability among themselves or counter proliferation—might prompt American allies to rethink approaches to nuclear capabilities. This, in turn, could set off a wave of nuclear proliferation—as regional actors react to American allies’ development of nuclear weapons.

A nuclear arms control agreement, even if not ideal, helps ensure higher stability and predictability between the United States and Russia, whose relationship is already tense. The extension of New START in early 2021 provides the two countries with a continued channel for exchange of information that could reduce a potential arms race and the emergence of potentially dangerous situations. Consequently, the United States may be wise to ensure that

⁸² Siegfried Hecker and Paul C. White, “U.S.-Russian Teamwork Kept Nuclear Weapons Safe,” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, July 18, 2017.

⁸³ Justin Bresolin and Brenna Gautam, “Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 2014.

it continues to maintain a nuclear weapons agreement with Russia, even if some analysts note Russia's unreliability as a cooperation partner.⁸⁴

Conclusion

There is room for cooperation on nuclear issues between the United States and Russia, despite the deteriorating relations between the two countries. In fact, some level of cooperation on nuclear arms control between the two largest nuclear powers is necessary to ensure global stability and safety. Both countries consider nuclear stability essential, and a history of cooperation and at least deconfliction exists between the two countries.

The United States' and Russia's extension New START through 2026 ensured a certain level of global nuclear stability and preserved verifiable constraints of Russia's nuclear arsenal (which, of course, also limit the size of the U.S. arsenal). The Kremlin has repeatedly shown its eagerness to extend the agreement. That would also allow for more time to potentially negotiate a new arms control regime, with or without other signatories and potentially encompassing weapons that are not currently included in New START. At the same time, such an approach would end the rather one-sided deadlock whereby the United States wants China to become part of the agreement, while China refuses to enter any international arms control agreements.

Nuclear safety is another area for potential cooperation between the United States and Russia. Both countries share a concern that nuclear material could fall into the hands of nonstate actors or third countries with inadequate safety protocols. Moreover, both countries cooperated on the security of Russian nuclear sites for more than 20 years, until such cooperation was severed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.⁸⁵ Experts suggest that at least parts of this cooperation could be resumed with time, specifically technical exchanges and training. However, this change would require several preconditions: an improvement in political relations, reduced antagonism in Russia toward U.S. efforts to increase nuclear safety in Russia and internationally, and that such cooperation would be able to receive funding (considering that U.S. law forbids the National Nuclear Security Administration to fund nuclear security initiatives in Russia).⁸⁶ Furthermore, although cooperation via multinational frameworks would fit the international character of nuclear nonproliferation, Russia's

⁸⁴ Robert Einhorn, "Prospects for U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation," Brookings Institution, February 26, 2016.

⁸⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Past U.S. Involvement Improved Russian Nuclear Material Security, but Little Is Known About Current Conditions*, Washington, D.C., February 2020.

⁸⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2020.

view that nuclear safety is a responsibility of each state suggests that while multinational-level agreements are essential, bilateral cooperation could yield better results.⁸⁷

However, the United States would need to beware of any negative implications. As discussed in the introduction to this volume, Russia views itself and its multipolar works as a counterpoint to what it understands as the United States and its allies' dominance of the world—one that Russia seeks to break. These politics may also impact nuclear cooperation. One report, for example, notes that the accomplishments of the Nuclear Security Summits, initiated by the Obama administration and bringing together the G7 countries, were at least to some extent affected by Russia's "efforts to undermine anything that would be seen as a Summit legacy, and the false narrative that nuclear security concerns nuclear weapons states only."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ United Nations, "Endorsing Atomic Energy Agency Report, General Assembly Recognizes Its Critical Role in Disarmament, Safeguarding Nuclear Material for Peaceful Uses," UN General Assembly 74th Session 30th Meeting, GA/12214, November 11, 2019c.

⁸⁸ Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly, "The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016," Arms Control Association, July 2018.

Issue Area 7: Preventing Militarization of the Arctic

Ever since the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, the Arctic has been one of the regions where the two countries' interests often intersect.¹ Mainland Alaska and Russia are only 55 miles apart across the Bering Straits, and two small islands—Big and Little Diomedes, owned by Russia and the United States, respectively—are a mere 2.5 miles apart, allowing an individual to theoretically walk between the two countries during winter when the water freezes over.²

During the 20th and 21st centuries, the importance of the Arctic for the United States, China, and Russia has only increased. During World War II, the Arctic became an important maritime supply line for the U.S. supplies to the Soviet Union in the fight against Nazi Germany, and during the Cold War the Arctic became a potential flashpoint for confrontation between the two superpowers as the planned routes for intercontinental bombers and missiles traversed the Arctic circle.³ More recently, as climate shifts mellow the Arctic's harsh climate, the region is of growing economic interest. The Northern Sea Route is becoming trafficable for more of the year, making it more attractive for international trade, and the region's vast resources—estimated to include 13 percent of the world's recoverable oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas, and abundant deposits of nickel, iron and rare earth elements—are becoming easier to mine.⁴ But just because the United States, China, and Russia may share multiple common interests in developing the Arctic does not mean that cooperation will be comprehensive or particularly easy.

¹ History.com, "U.S. Purchase of Alaska Ridiculed as 'Seward's Folly,'" May 13, 2020.

² Alaska Public Land's Information Centers, "How Close Is Alaska to Russia?" undated.

³ Mark L. Evans, "'Convoy Is to Scatter': Remembering the High Cost of the Arctic Convoys," *Naval History and Heritage Command*, December 2016.

⁴ The White House, *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*, May 2013a, p. 6.

Understanding the Equities

Perhaps to a greater degree than any of the other issues discussed in this volume, in the Arctic, there is a mismatch between the willingness and the ability to cooperate. Although China has economic interests in the Arctic and has been inching toward developing security interests there as well, as a non-Arctic country, it has historically not been a central player in determining Arctic policy. By contrast, both Russia and the United States have significant territorial, economic, and security claims to the region, and, as full-fledged members of the Arctic Council, more ability to affect policy in the Arctic. At the same time, partly because the region lies closer to their core interests, they also have potentially more to lose from cooperation.

U.S. Equities

Despite the surge in great power activity in the Arctic, the region has received relatively scant attention in the most recent set of high-level United States strategic documents. The Obama administration published the *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* in 2013, but the Trump administration's 2017 NSS contains only one explicit mention of the Arctic, stating that "a range of international institutions establishes the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals interact with each other, across land and sea, the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm" and that United States has an interest in "keep[ing] these common domains open and free."⁵ The unclassified summary of the NDS contains no explicit reference to the Arctic.⁶ And while the Trump administration did issue a "Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions," it is more narrowly focused on the icebreaker fleet than on guiding U.S. overarching interests in the region.⁷

The Trump administration published more targeted white papers on the region, perhaps most notably the 2019 *Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*. The strategy lays out three overlapping sets of interests. First, as the strategy states, "The Arctic [is at least partly] the U.S. homeland."⁸ The United States has "sovereign territory and maritime claims in the region" that it must protect.⁹ In this regard, the DoD Arctic strategy echoes the earlier Obama administration National Strategy for the Arctic Region's emphasis that "Our highest priority is to protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights, natural resources, and interests of the United States."¹⁰ The congruence between administrations rests on a fundamen-

⁵ The White House, 2013a; The White House, 2017, p. 40.

⁶ DoD, 2018c.

⁷ Donald J. Trump, "Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions," June 9, 2020.

⁸ DoD, *Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*, Washington, D.C., June 2019c, p. 5.

⁹ DoD, 2019c, p. 5.

¹⁰ The White House, 2013a, p. 6.

tal strategic logic. From the United States' standpoint, Alaska's ample natural resources but sparse population (particularly in its the northern reaches), combined with its proximity to Russian, present a strategic challenge for homeland defense.¹¹

The services have also put out their own strategies for the Arctic, which tend to be even more operationally focused on building capabilities and posture, mostly centered around Alaska. For example, the July 2020 *Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy* describes four lines of effort: enhancing vigilance (and particularly missile warning), building power projection capability (by posturing in Alaska and Greenland), strengthening relationships with allies in the region, and increasing training in the region.¹²

The Arctic's strategic and economic importance extends beyond Alaska. The shortest way to attack the continental United States with either ICBMs or bombers is often to fly over the Arctic. Consequently, during the Cold War, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of radars dotted the Alaskan and Canadian landmass to detect an ever-expected salvo of Soviet ICBMs. The same geographical constraints continue today. In 2019, U.S. Northern Command commander General Terrence O'Shaughnessy remarked, "The Arctic is the first line of defense."¹³

Second, DoD's 2019 Arctic Strategy also notes that the "Arctic is a shared region," where there are "shared interests whose security and stability depend on Arctic nations constructively addressing shared challenges."¹⁴ The United States, after all, is one of the eight Arctic states—along with Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. All these countries have territorial claims in the region and their own economic and security interests, which need to be deconflicted. Beyond this, parts of the Arctic fall in the global commons—not owned by any one country. Moreover, some of the Arctic's value inherently comes from its ability to link nations together. Already, some of the quickest and most cost-efficient ways to fly between parts of North America, Asia, and Europe involve flying over the Arctic. Moreover, especially as the polar ice caps melt and the northern sea lanes become trafficable for longer stretches of time, the Arctic will become a shorter and more cost-effective maritime route, reducing by between 25 percent to 50 percent the transit time between key shipping hubs than transiting the Suez or Panama canals.¹⁵ Consequently, as

¹¹ In 2018, for example, federal land in Alaska produced more than 1 million barrels of oil and 15 million metric cubic feet of natural gas, much of it from the territory inside the article circle (U.S. Department of the Interior, Natural Resources Revenue Data, "Alaska," undated).

¹² Department of the Air Force, *The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy*, Washington, D.C., July 21, 2020.

¹³ Kyle Rempfer, "NORTHCOM: Arctic Now America's 'First Line of Defense'" *Defense News*, May 6, 2019.

¹⁴ DoD, 2019c, p. 5.

¹⁵ Yevgeny Aksenov, Ekaterina E. Popova, Andrew Yool, A. J. George Nurser, Timothy D. Williams, Laurent Bertino, and Jon Bergh, "On the Future Navigability of Arctic Sea Routes: High-Resolution Projections of the Arctic Ocean and Sea Ice," *Marine Policy*, Vol. 75, January 2017, p. 301.

the 2013 *National Arctic Strategy* notes explicitly, the United States has an explicit interest in “preserv[ing] Arctic Region freedom of the seas.”¹⁶

Finally, the United States views the Arctic as another forum where the broader great power competition plays out. While the *Arctic Strategy* does not necessarily cast the Arctic as a priority theater for U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia tensions, it notes, “Developments in the Arctic have the potential to directly or indirectly constrain DoD’s ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.”¹⁷ Partly because the Arctic is an important air and maritime transit route, events in the Arctic can have global ramifications for American power projections, forcing American air and maritime assets to take a longer, slower alternative routes.

Ultimately, these three macro-American interests lead to three specific objectives for DoD in the Arctic. First, it must “defend the homeland.”¹⁸ Second, it must “compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power.”¹⁹ And third, the DoD must “ensure common domains remain free and open” and “DoD, in partnership with other Federal departments and agencies and our Arctic allies and partners, should ensure continued access to the Arctic for legitimate civilian, commercial, and military purposes.”²⁰

On face value, both the United States’ interests and DoD’s objectives do not leave much room for cooperation. While there likely is room for the United States to cooperate with other NATO members on protecting the United States’ territorial claims and competing with other rival great powers in the Arctic, both are largely zero-sum issues that seemingly offer little room U.S. cooperation with China or Russia. Of DoD’s three objectives, only the last—ensuring the Arctic remains “free and open”—explicitly offers the possibility for cooperation. By contrast, the second objective—competing to maintain a balance of power—implies an adversarial relationship. While the United States could conceivably cooperate with Russia and China on the first objective—defending the U.S. homeland—to a limited degree (i.e., deconflict of military operations that could conceivably threaten each other territories, mutual assurance measures), the objective itself is a core sovereign interest and ultimately nonnegotiable.

On a deeper level, these three objectives, in some respects, work to cross purposes. Ensuring that the Arctic remain free and open might be best served by demilitarizing the region to reduce great power tensions and minimize any perceived animosity. By contrast, defending the U.S. homeland and maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region necessitates ramping up military presence. Indeed, the *Arctic Strategy* contains an annex on how each service (except the U.S. Space Force, which was not in existence when it was writ-

¹⁶ The White House, 2013a, p. 6.

¹⁷ DoD, 2019c, p. 5.

¹⁸ DoD, 2019c, p. 6.

¹⁹ DoD, 2019c, p. 6.

²⁰ DoD, 2019c, p. 7.

ten) will be able to operate in the Arctic.²¹ More than just lip service, at the end of the 2019, the U.S. Navy announced “full operational capability” for the resurrected 2nd Fleet to focus on “forward operations and the employment of combat ready naval forces in the Atlantic and Arctic.”²² Similarly, the U.S. Army recently introduced an Arctic tab (worn as part of a soldier’s uniform and indicating a particular skill set), signifying the special importance of developing soldiers who can operate in these climes.²³ And the United States is recapitalizing its base at Keflavik to enable enhanced naval presence in the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap and to support allied air policing and strengthen logistical competencies.²⁴

Any U.S. participation in great power cooperation in the Arctic would need to reconcile the United States’ real sovereignty and security interests in the Arctic with its broader desire for peaceful cooperation over shared resources and open access to the region.

Chinese Equities

China is an increasingly prominent player in Arctic affairs and has declared that it has no intent to use the Arctic for military purposes, touting its commitment to preventing the militarization of the Arctic.²⁵ China *currently* has no explicitly military presence in the region, nor any territorial claims; for now, its activities are framed as commercial and scientific.²⁶ Overall, we assess that preventing the militarization of the Arctic is a low priority for China, and while it is rhetorically aligned with the United States, it has not engaged on the issue yet and has not demonstrated a willingness to commit resources.

China has positioned itself as a “polar great power,” in Xi’s words from a 2014 speech, and charted a “polar silk road” to stake its interests in the Arctic.²⁷ Although it does not border the region, it lobbied and received an observer ship in the Arctic Council in 2013, claiming a role as a “near Arctic” nation.²⁸ China’s 2018 Arctic policy reinforces its claims “for the peace-

²¹ DoD, 2019c, pp. 15–18.

²² Joshua Tallis, “While ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ Melts Away, the US Isn’t Sure What It Wants Next” *Defense One*, January 22, 2020.

²³ Kyle Rempfer, “New Arctic Tab Comes with a Ranger Tab Spin to Show Importance of Cold-Weather Fighting,” *Army Times*, April 17, 2020.

²⁴ Paul McLeary, “US Expands Icelandic Airfield For Tankers, Big Cargo Lift,” *Breaking Defense*, July 18, 2019.

²⁵ Somini Sengupta and Steven Lee Myers, “Latest Arena for China’s Growing Global Ambitions: The Arctic,” *New York Times*, May 24, 2019.

²⁶ Sengupta and Myers, 2019.

²⁷ Anne-Marie Brady, *China as a Polar Great Power*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017a; “二论深入学习贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神 [Second Discussion on In-Depth Study and Implementation of the Spirit of Chairman Xi Jinping’s Important Speech],” 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], November 25, 2014.

²⁸ Steven Lee Myers, “Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China,” *New York Times*, May 15, 2013. For U.S. criticism of this position, see Somini Sengupta, “United States Rattles Arctic Talks

ful utilization of the Arctic,” and commits China to maintaining “peace and stability.”²⁹ The policy outlines China’s “four basic policy goals” for the Arctic: to “understand” the Arctic (through scientific research), to “protect” the Arctic (through an active response to climate change), to “develop” the Arctic (through a strengthening of technological innovation), and to “participate” in the governance of the Arctic (via the UN Charter, UNCLOS, treaties, IMO, etc.).³⁰ On paper at least, the United States and China are rhetorically aligned against militarizing the Arctic.

However, while Beijing’s external narrative for its polar engagement is one of commercial and scientific interests, this only partially reveals China’s full plans for the region.³¹ As the Arctic warms twice as fast as the global average, China looks to the region as a key future shipping route and resource-rich target to be exploited. China’s broader interests also extend to the military and political realms, which it sees through the lens of its geopolitical competition with the United States. DoD’s 2019 China report explains the application of this nominally nonmilitary activity: “Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks,” something Chinese military researchers discuss.³² Other experts agree that Chinese naval strategy will likely include official Arctic (and Antarctic) missions in the near future, as the PLAN “has formally decided to incorporate Arctic ambitions into its naval strategy.”³³ Thus, although Beijing under Xi is pursuing its polar interests with great energy, preventing militarization does not appear to be a high priority.

Expert scholarship continues to disagree, however, about the degree to which Chinese military presence may translate into future behavior.³⁴ Some state that China may seek to militarize the Arctic in the future by utilizing the PLAN to protect China’s maritime inter-

with a Sharp Warning to China and Russia,” *New York Times*, May 6, 2019.

²⁹ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018.

³⁰ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018.

³¹ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018. For analysis of China’s lack of transparency, see Jichang Lulu, “The Arctic White Paper and China’s Arctic Strategy,” University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute, February 12, 2018; Anne-Marie Brady, *China as a Rising Polar Power: What It Means for Canada*, Ottawa, Canada: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, December 2019a. For similar criticism of China’s Antarctic policy, see Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Undeclared Foreign Policy at the Poles,” *Lowy Interpreter*, May 30, 2017b.

³² U.S. Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019*, Washington, D.C., May 2019b; Anne-Marie Brady, “Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic,” *China Brief*, Vol. 19, No. 21, December 10, 2019.

³³ Ryan Martinson, “The Role of the Arctic in Chinese Naval Strategy,” *China Brief*, Vol. 19, No. 22, December 20, 2019.

³⁴ Heljar Havnes and John Martin Seland, “The Increasing Security Focus in China’s Arctic Policy,” The Arctic Institute, July 2019.

ests in the Arctic Ocean.³⁵ Recent Chinese military guidance continues to emphasize China's need to protect national security through military struggle in "new domains," including the two poles. Additionally, the Arctic may become an ideal hiding place for strategic nuclear submarines, as ice improves their stealth. Though science and technology involvement by China is touted as "Arctic development," "Chinese scientists and engineers are already conducting the research needed to make possible PLAN operations in the Arctic" a reality.³⁶

So far, there have been limited efforts at engagement on preventing the militarization of the Arctic by China or the United States, and China does not appear willing to commit any resources toward this goal. The main venue for engagement has been the U.S.-China Arctic Social Science Forum, hosted since 2015 at the Track 1.5 and Track 2 level.³⁷ However, while China has not yet deployed troops to the region, it is also clearly pursuing military interests there.

Preventing the militarization of the Arctic is one area that is possible for U.S.-China cooperation. Although China's thinking and development efforts are still not fully known, the Arctic is still relatively demilitarized. Furthermore, China has previously shown "an inclination" toward aligning with the United States on Arctic issues, instead of Russia, "sharing the goal of open trade routes in the region" and the (perceived) sharing of similar concerns regarding the area's militarization.³⁸ Though cooperation between the United States and China on Arctic issues remains possible, public statements from the United States indicate a lack of trust, as well as its relative lack in interest in Arctic commercial opportunities. This reduces "the scope for commercial cooperation with China."³⁹ Additionally, China's desire for increased strategic cooperation with Russia further hinders U.S.-China cooperation possibilities near Russia.⁴⁰

Russian Equities

Russia is interested in defending its strategic military assets in the Arctic and ensuring control over the natural resources in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.⁴¹ Its three main equities in the Arctic are ensuring and maintaining control over the Russian Arctic and the Norther Sea Route, preserving and defending Russian strategic assets in the Kola Peninsula, and ensuring the sovereignty of the Russian borders and safety of the Arctic region. Putin has

³⁵ Martinson, 2019.

³⁶ Martinson, 2019.

³⁷ For an overview of this forum, see Heather A. Conley, *China's Arctic Dream*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2018.

³⁸ Havnes and Seland, 2019.

³⁹ Havnes and Seland, 2019.

⁴⁰ Lyle J. Goldstein, "What Does China Want with the Arctic?" *National Interest*, September 2019.

⁴¹ The Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation includes the coastline from Murmansk Oblast to Chukotka and includes several regions.

described the Arctic region as a “concentration of practically all aspects of national security—military, political, economic, technological, environmental and that of resources.”⁴² Russia’s interests in the Arctic are not strictly regional in character but are closely related to its understanding of the global strategic security environment and its relationship with the West.⁴³

The Arctic is a strategically sensitive region for Russia. It considers bolstering its military capabilities and military construction projects as defensive in character, as they are supposed to ensure air and sea denial and interdiction for its strategic assets in the region.⁴⁴ Russia seeks to preserve a “strategic bastion” around its military base in the Kola Peninsula, which hosts two-thirds of its second-strike sea-based nuclear assets—ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—and offers favorable environment for the deployment of satellite monitoring stations and ASAT capabilities.⁴⁵ Russia also seeks to ensure that its SSBNs are able to access the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, as well as the Atlantic Ocean via the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap.⁴⁶ Furthermore, control of the region and the NSR exit routes into the Atlantic Ocean and the Bering Sea could also ensure more mobility options for its SSBN assets in the Pacific Fleet and boost its anti-access/area denial over the Eastern entrance to the NSR from the Barents Sea.⁴⁷

Aware that the melting sea ice may soon remove a natural layer of protection that prevents its SSBNs from detection and exposes its norther borders, Russia is working toward establishing air dominance in the region: It has built new or refurbished old airbases capable of hosting Tu-142 Bear maritime patrol aircraft, MiG-31 Foxhound long-range interceptors, and Su-34 Fullback combat jets.⁴⁸ These are supported by such anti-aircraft capabilities as S-300

⁴² Government of Russia, “Meeting of the Security Council on State Policy in the Arctic,” April 22, 2014a.

⁴³ Boulègue, 2019.

⁴⁴ Boulègue, 2019.

⁴⁵ The strategic bastion concept stems from the Cold War and represents the aim to ensure the survival of strategic ballistic missile submarines and relevant infrastructure. This is accomplished by using the geographic characteristics (e.g., ice sheet), a layered defense system (Harri Mikkola, “The Geostrategic Arctic: Hard Security in the High North,” FIIA Briefing Paper 259, FIIA, April 11, 2019; Nurlan Aliyev, “Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), June 2019.

⁴⁶ Alexandr Burilkov, “Russian Maritime Strategy Since the Ukrainian Crisis,” in Howard M. Hensel and Arnit Gupta, eds., *Naval Powers in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific*, Routledge, 2018; Jackie Northam, “In a Remote Arctic Outpost, Norway Keeps Watch on Russia’s Military Buildup,” NPR, November 3, 2019.

⁴⁷ Ilya Kramnik, “Visokoshirotnoe protivostojanie [Visokoshirotnoe Opposition],” Russian Council, January 20, 2020.

⁴⁸ Such as the new most northernmost airfield *Nagurskoe* on Alexandra Land (Joseph Trevithick, “Russia Projects Heavy Airpower in the Arctic from Constellation of New and Improved bases,” *The Drive*, January 2, 2019; Hilde-Hunn Bye, “The Natural Protection of Russia’s Vulnerable Flank Towards the USA Is About to Melt,” *High North News*, September 2, 2020.

and S-400 surface-to-air missiles.⁴⁹ The Arctic region is significant for the Russian strategic air force capabilities: It provides relative proximity to significant Western targets—the path of the Russian ICBMs toward the United States would cross the Arctic and the North Pole.

Ensuring control of the NSR,⁵⁰ which is increasingly becoming a viable shipping route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and natural resources in the region, is a high priority for Russia and its ability to remain a “great sea power.”⁵¹ Russian strategic documents, such as the Naval Policy (2017) and the Maritime Strategy (2015), reveal its main perceived threats in the waters adjacent to Russia as coming from “strategic high-precision sea-based non-nuclear weapons systems, as well as sea-based ballistic missile defense systems by foreign states,” along with the U.S. Prompt Global Strike initiative.⁵² These documents also state that the United States and its allies are Russia’s main adversaries in key maritime regions, including the Arctic, as they are perceived as seeking to achieve “overwhelming superiority” and a global appetite for the Arctic natural resources.⁵³

Russia aims to ensure control of the NSR through the presence of military and security forces in key points along the NSR.⁵⁴ It is estimated that between 2013 and 2019 Russia upgraded or built new military bases along the NSR route sporting advanced radar and missile defense systems, such as the S-400 anti-aircraft missile launchers.⁵⁵ With its capabilities in the region including reinforced conventional forces in the Barents region and the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, Russia is able to deny access to or control parts of the Arctic region, including some allied territory (e.g., in Norway).⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Pavel Baev, “Threat Assessments and Strategic Objectives in Russia’s Arctic policy,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2019.

⁵⁰ See a more detailed discussion of NSR in Chapter Seven: “Preserving Access to the Air and Maritime Commons.” NSR would not only provide an alternative shipping route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans but also an additional route for the Trans-Siberian highway in Russia.

⁵¹ Pavel Devyatkin, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Maritime Shipping (Part IV),” The Arctic Institute, February 27, 2018; Government of Russia, “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 20.07.2017 No. 327 Ob Utverzhdenii Osnov Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Oblasti Voenno-Morskoy Deyatel’nosti na Period Do 2030 Goda [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 20 July 2017 No. 327 on Approval of the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period Until 2030],” July 20, 2017c.

⁵² Richard Connolly, “Document Review: Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period Until 2030,” NATO Defense College, Russian Studies Series 2/19, January 22, 2019.

⁵³ Connolly, 2019.

⁵⁴ Government of Russia, “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective,” March 30, 2009a.

⁵⁵ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, “Polar Powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic Ocean,” *Financial Times*, April 27, 2019.

⁵⁶ It is estimated that Russia has 40 icebreakers, including some that are nuclear-powered (Christopher Tremoglie, “Is a Cold War Truly Emerging in the Arctic?” *National Review*, July 9, 2019).

Russia's military buildup along the NSR signals that any passage through those waters or exploration of valuable resources there will take place under Russian control and oversight. Russia has already passed relevant laws: In 2019, it designed new limitations for foreign warships transiting the NSR, requiring them take aboard a Russian pilot and provide 45 days' notice, and threatening to use military force if its demands are not met.⁵⁷

Lastly, Russia is increasingly concerned about the impact of the shrinking ice sheet on the security of its northern borders.⁵⁸ Following the identification of the need to establish an integrated system for the protection of the territory and critical facilities, in 2016 and 2017, Russia designated the FSB (which includes the Border Guard Service and the Coast Guard) as the lead organization to ensure the security of Russian maritime borders, exclusive economic zones and marine resources, and the main law enforcement agency over the NSR.⁵⁹ Since then, Russia has opened new FSB bases in Archangelsk and Murmansk.⁶⁰ This could mean the availability of a wider array of resources for Russia to impose its policies in the NSR and the ability to introduce some ambiguity in purpose, if necessary.

Russia opposes what it calls the "internationalization of military activities" in the Arctic and prefers that any military activities are performed on a national basis.⁶¹ It continues to criticize NATO's exercises in the Arctic and pressurizes Arctic countries not to engage NATO in the region.⁶² For example, in 2018, the Russian Embassy in Norway warned that Norway's invitation to the United States to double the number of marines based in its territory would "not remain without consequences," at the same time justifying its own military actions as being long overdue after years of disregard.⁶³ Russian Arctic Ambassador Nikolay Kortshunov specifically noted that NATO not having an Arctic strategy is considered by the Kremlin as one of the reasons for low tension in the Arctic and having one would "dramatically change the situation in the region."⁶⁴

⁵⁷ "Russia Tightens Control over Northern Sea Route," *Maritime Executive*, March 8, 2019.

⁵⁸ Stephanie Pezard, *The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia's and China's Evolving Role in the Region*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CT-500, 2018.

⁵⁹ Connolly, 2019.

⁶⁰ Atle Staalesen, "New FSB Base Opens Way for More Operations in Arctic," *Barents Observer*, January 3, 2019.

⁶¹ Amund Trellevik, "Russia Invests Heavily in the Arctic, Top Diplomat Denies Military Intentions," *High North News*, February 5, 2020.

⁶² Russia has protested the presence of NATO soldiers in Norway, NATO's exercise Trident Juncture 2019 and the U.S.-funded surveillance radar system in the Norwegian island of Vardo. Norwegian Intelligence Service, *Focus 2019: The Norwegian Intelligence Service's Assessment of Current Security Challenges*, 2019.

⁶³ Jonathan Watts, "Military Buildup in Arctic as Melting Ice Reopens Northern Borders," *The Guardian*, January 24, 2019; Shawn Snow, "Russia Warns of Consequences Following Norway's Call for More Marines," *Marine Times*, June 14, 2018.

⁶⁴ Trellevik, 2020.

Despite this, Russia seems to be interested in preserving stability and security in the region and avoiding confrontation in the Arctic, as the Arctic mostly serves as a staging platform for capabilities that would be used elsewhere. Russia claims that it is interested in working within international laws and cooperating through multinational frameworks to the extent that it benefits its national interests.⁶⁵ Most successful examples of regional cooperation deal with civilian or security issues, such as environment protection, scientific exploration, and search-and-rescue operations.⁶⁶ Russia remains an active participant of the Arctic Council, which addressed such aspects as rescue at sea, environmental protection, and oil spill prevention. While the so-called *peregruzka* of bilateral relations in 2009–2012 led to some increase in search-and-rescue cooperation and the creation of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Northern Chiefs of Defence Conference, the Russia-Ukraine war resulted in the suspension of the West's military cooperation with Russia and Russian withdrawal from the ASFR.⁶⁷ Russia has, however, continued its participation in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, an informal and operationally focused framework, and participated in the forum's live exercise Polaris 2019, aimed at sharing best practices on safer maritime operations.⁶⁸

Space for Cooperation

There is a plethora of forums dedicated to fostering international cooperation in the Arctic. Multiple Arctic specific forums for dialogue, such as the Arctic Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, focus on issues ranging from coordinating environmental and safety policies to planning bilateral and multilateral military exercises.⁶⁹ Many broader international treaties and organizations—such as the UNCLOS and the IMO—also shape Arctic policy.⁷⁰ And there are also more informal Track 2 or

⁶⁵ Russia's 2016 National Security Strategy allows for some "mutually beneficial" international cooperation in the Arctic (Government of Russia, "Strategiya Nacionalnoi Bezopastnosti Rossiiskoi Federacii [Russian Federation's National Security Strategy]," 2016b).

⁶⁶ Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel, and Scott Stephenson, *Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for Regional Change in the Far North*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1731-RC, 2017.

⁶⁷ Duncan Depledge, Mathieu Boulègue, Andrew Foxall, and Dmitriy Tulupov, "Why We Need to Talk About Military Activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct," in Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justine Barnes, eds., *Arctic Yearbook 2020*, Northern Research Forum and the University of the Arctic Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security, 2019.

⁶⁸ Arctic Coast Guard Forum, "Live Exercise Polaris 2019," March 27, 2019.

⁶⁹ Abbie Tingstad, "Today's Arctic Diplomacy Can't Handle Tomorrow's Problems," *Defense One*, January 29, 2020.

⁷⁰ See Pezard et al., 2017, Table 2.1, p. 21.

Track 1.5 dialogues that bring together nongovernmental experts and business leaders to discuss issues.⁷¹

This diplomacy has produced results even during periods of heightened geopolitical tensions, although often not on hard-security issues. In 1973, in the midst of the Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Denmark, and Norway concluded the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears to better protect the species.⁷² More recently, despite ongoing and arguably intensifying standoff between the Russia and the West over the former's invasion of Crimea and interference in Western elections, in 2017, the Arctic Council—which includes both the United States and Russia—concluded the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation “to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge about the Arctic.”⁷³

Despite these successes, however, Arctic experts point to at least two troubling trends that will shape great power politics in the region in the years to come. First, as detailed above, the United States, Russia, and China have all increased their military presence in the Arctic, which could “increase the likelihood of military assets coming into close contact.”⁷⁴ Second, there is “the perception that there's a void in security and stewardship,” which justifies yet more militarization to fill this gap and potentially exacerbates the first trend.⁷⁵ This then raises the question of whether the existing cooperation—which mostly focuses on nonmilitary topics, such as environmental, safety and scientific issues, is sufficient to manage the region.

Whether great power cooperation can extend to military affairs in the Arctic is at best unclear. The primary obstacle to deepening cooperation in the Arctic to include a more military focus can best be captured by the traditional security dilemma. Because states cannot **trust** each other's intentions, they perceive security gains by another state as a detriment to their own. When they try to bolster their own security by expanding their own military **capabilities**, however, their rivals view those actions as similarly threatening, prompting them to make similar investments in their security, setting off an arms race and vicious self-feeding, ultimately self-defeating cycle of action and counterreaction. To a degree, we see these dynamics playing out in the Arctic today.

The United States and its allies regard Russia's military buildup in the region and China's growing interest in the Arctic with unease. As General O'Shaughnessy remarked, “The Arctic is no longer a fortress wall and the Arctic Ocean is no longer a protective moat. They are now

⁷¹ Over the Circle, “The Growing Role of ‘Track II’ Organisations in the Arctic,” May 23, 2018.

⁷² “1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears,” Polar Bears in Canada, undated.

⁷³ Arctic Council, “Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation,” May 11, 2017.

⁷⁴ Tingstad, 2020.

⁷⁵ Tingstad, 2020.

avenues of approach to the homeland.”⁷⁶ American allies also view the increasing Russian and Chinese military intentions with concern. As Danish Defence Intelligence Service Chief Lars Findsen stated, “We have looked at Chinese research activities in the Arctic, and see that the Chinese military is showing an increasing interest in being part of that. . . . It is likely that a part of China’s build-up of knowledge about the Arctic and capacity to operate in the Arctic will take place in a collaboration between civilian and military actors.”⁷⁷

As Russia ramps up its forces in the region, the United States and its allies believe they need to respond in kind. The unclassified 2019 *Department of Defense Arctic Strategy* makes several references to unspecified “capability gaps.”⁷⁸ The strategy is a response to a congressional mandate to create such a report, presumably because some in Congress believed that the region had received insufficient attention.⁷⁹ As RAND Arctic expert Abbie Tingstad testified, “In the Arctic, the term ‘operating blind’ is used to describe the level of awareness: Threats and hazards are often poorly understood, and those that are identified cannot be regularly monitored because the capacity and capability to do so do not exist.”⁸⁰ And the problem is not just awareness and intelligence gathering. As Tingstad noted, “The ability to respond to a threat or hazard in the Arctic is extremely limited and strongly depends on the proximity to the incident location of scarce material assets, people, and supporting infrastructure.”⁸¹

Closing some of these gaps, however, may not necessarily spark concern for China or Russia. For example, the United States has focused recently on expanding its icebreaker fleet.⁸² As Coast Guard Commandant Karl Schultz noted in his state of the Coast Guard speech, “The Coast Guard operates our nation’s only icebreaker fleet countering malign influence as our nation’s most persistent surface military presence at the polar regions. We do this with just two cutters—one heavy and one medium icebreaker. This is a woefully unacceptable level of presence in an area where we must be a leading force.”⁸³ While the Coast Guard has plans to dramatically expand its icebreaker fleet, adding three heavy and three

⁷⁶ David Vergun, “China, a Non-Arctic Nation, Meddling in Arctic, Says DOD Official,” *DoD News*, March 5, 2020.

⁷⁷ “China Mixing Military and Science in Arctic Push: Denmark,” Reuters, November 29, 2019.

⁷⁸ DoD, 2019c, pp. 8, 9.

⁷⁹ DoD, 2019c, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Abbie Tingstad, *Climate Change and U.S. Security in the Arctic*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CT-517, September 19, 2019, p. 6.

⁸¹ Tingstad, 2019, p. 6.

⁸² See Trump, 2020.

⁸³ Connie Lee, “New Coast Guard Icebreaker Remains on Tight Schedule,” *National Defense Magazine*, May 21, 2020.

medium vessels, it would not upset the overall balance in the region.⁸⁴ Russia, by comparison, has 40 Ice Breakers with 11 under construction.⁸⁵

Closing other gaps, however, may prove more sensitive. For example, in May 2020, the U.S. Navy and UK Royal Navy sent multiple *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers and support vessel through the Barents Sea in the first exercise of its kind in the area since the mid-1990s.⁸⁶ Given that the Barents Sea is traditionally home to Russia's nuclear submarine force, sending warships into the region could potentially raise concerns for Moscow.⁸⁷ Indeed, Russia views any ramp-up in NATO presence in the region at large as potentially threatening. As a RAND analysis concluded, "Russia would likely feel threatened by an expansion of NATO's role in the Arctic. The Kremlin has shown consistent hostility to increased support for NATO in Sweden and Finland, and to a larger NATO influence in the region, suggesting that keeping NATO at bay is a solid, and permanent, tenet of its Arctic policy."⁸⁸

A similar potential point of sensitivity might also come from the buildup of high-end American airpower and missile defense in the Alaska, close to Russia's border. As Senator Dan Sullivan remarked in an interview shortly after the Air Force received 53 new fifth-generation fighters in Alaska in May 2020, "With those [new F-35s] and the F-22s we have at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska will have over 100 fifth-generation fighters. There's no other place on planet Earth that has 100 combat-coded fifth-gen fighters."⁸⁹ Similarly, the United States is modernizing its missile defense capabilities in Fort Greely, Alaska.⁹⁰ While from the United States' perspective, both sets of capabilities are necessary to counter Russian long-range bomber flights or advances in its nuclear arsenal, from Russia's standpoint, they are threatening.

China, too, regards the U.S. military actions as part of a broader push to contain its rise. As Swee Lean and Collin Koh argue,

Some Chinese scholars and military strategists, for example, viewed the recent U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and President Donald Trump's interest in purchasing Greenland as part of the broader U.S. strategy to enhance nuclear deterrence, which could envisage the installation of a network of missile defense

⁸⁴ Lee, 2020.

⁸⁵ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Russia Launches New Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker," *The Diplomat*, May 27, 2019.

⁸⁶ Jim Garamone, "U.S.-British Arctic Exercise Shows U.S. Concern for Region," *DoD News*, May 7, 2020.

⁸⁷ Thomas Nilsen, "Northern Fleet Makes Major Investments In Nuclear Submarine Infrastructure. Will Not Repeat Mistakes of the Cold War," *Barents Observer*, May 3, 2020.

⁸⁸ Pezard et al., 2017, p. xv.

⁸⁹ Joe Gould, "Sen. Sullivan of Alaska Talks Military Strength and Strategy in the Arctic," *Defense News*, May 12, 2020.

⁹⁰ Gould, 2020.

and post-INF Treaty offensive missile systems in the Arctic to counter both China and Russia.⁹¹

This creates a vicious cycle in the military aspects of the Arctic policy. The United States and its allies believe they need to increase military capabilities in the region because of growth in the Chinese and Russian military threat. Russia and China, on the other hand, believe the United States’ moves threaten them and demand a more military response. The mutual distrust is leading to a ramping up of capabilities, and arguably tensions in the region. The net result of this security dilemma is that meaningful cooperation on military aspects of the Arctic are limited, as depicted in Table 9.1.

TABLE 9.1
Interest in Cooperation on Preventing Militarization of the Arctic

	China	Russia
Stakes	Low	High
Rhetorical alignment	Yes	No
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	N/A	Partial
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	Limited

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

Partly because China and Russia have different stakes and interests in the Arctic, the United States could potentially play one off the other in the region, but not without accepting potentially serious consequences, and not easily. On the surface, the United States’ position in the region may more neatly align with China’s, rather than with Russia’s. Both the United States and China want free commercial passage through the region and are in favor of more of a shared rather than a sovereign approach to the region. Moreover, given the importance Russia places on its economic and strategic relationship with China, China arguably has more leverage over Russia than the United States does and so is in a better position to pressure Russia to curtail its military buildup and preserve common access to the region.

At the same time, cooperating with China in the Arctic carries significant risks. As mentioned previously, China considers itself a “near Arctic nation” and is building the capabilities to operate in this part of the world. Should the United States legitimize these claims as part of a counter Russia strategy, it may open the door to further Chinese expansion in the region in the future. Beyond this risk, it is not clear that China would be interested in coop-

⁹¹ Swee Lean and Collin Koh, “China’s Strategic Interest in the Arctic Goes Beyond Economics,” *Defense News*, May 12, 2020.

erating with the United States in pressuring Russia in the Arctic. As long as Russia continues to cooperate with China on energy exploitation and shipping, and not impede its scientific/military advances, China may not feel the need to pressure Russia on its Arctic policy.⁹² On the contrary, China may feel that tension between the United States and Russia in Arctic plays to its advantage—giving it room to grow while the two other great powers are at loggerheads.

At the same time, one could equally imagine the United States cooperating with Russia against China in the Arctic. Russia, after all, is both from a geographical perspective and from a military capability perspective far more able to push back against Chinese encroachment into the Arctic. Moreover, over the long term, given how much strategic and economic value Russia places on the Arctic, Russia has interests in ensuring that it retains as much control over the region as possible.

As with trying to play China off Russia, however, playing Russia off China comes with significant downsides. For starters, it would mean that the United States accepts, or even encourages, Russia claims of sovereignty and its militarization of the Arctic as a hedge against China. There is also no guarantee that the strategy would work. For the moment, Russia and China are united by their common adversary (the United States), so it is not clear that Russia would want to help the United States contain China. Even if Russia views growing Chinese influence in the Arctic as a long-term challenge, in the short term, Moscow has sought to partner with Beijing on developing the NSR and exploiting the natural resources in the region.⁹³ Moreover, in the grand strategic picture, Russia has a weaker hand to play than China, so it is not clear that Russia could check Chinese expansion into the Arctic even if it wanted to.⁹⁴

Ultimately, the ability to turn China against Russia or vice versa in the Arctic may not be feasible. For the moment, neither China nor Russia may have the motivation to turn on one another. As the UK's chair of the Defence Select Committee in the House of Commons Tobias Ellwood commented in June 2020, "We cannot distinguish much, as you have arguably two power competitors there, in the American perspective, they should be treated as one alliance [in the Arctic]."⁹⁵

⁹² Lean and Koh, 2020.

⁹³ Ling Guo and Steven Lloyd Wilson, "China, Russia, and Arctic Geopolitics," *The Diplomat*, March 29, 2020.

⁹⁴ For an analysis of the causes and limits of Chinese-Russian rapprochement in the Arctic, see Camilla T. N. Sørensen and Ekaterina Klimenko, *Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation: In the Arctic, Possibilities and Constraints*, Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2017, pp. 23–25.

⁹⁵ Sarah Cammarata, "Russia and China Should Be Viewed as 'One Alliance' in the Arctic, U.K. Defense Official Warns," *Politico*, June 6, 2020.

Conclusion

As a RAND study noted, there is fundamental paradox with the Arctic: The region is “effectively peaceful but routinely described as a potential future ground for conflict.”⁹⁶ Indeed, there has been cooperation in the Arctic on a range of mostly non-hard power security issues. Extending great power cooperation to more hard-power security concerns, however, may be challenging. The Arctic has real strategic value for the United States, China, and Russia. Each country believes that its core interests are threatened by the others’ military buildup in the Arctic, and many of their actions to close these perceived gaps only exacerbate these insecurities. Despite these constraints, there still may be some room for increased great power cooperation in the Arctic in the future.

First, as already mentioned, the United States, Russia, and China share nonmilitary interest in the Arctic on issues such as maritime safety and navigation and historically have brokered agreements, even in periods of intense competition. Today, there are still ways to deepen ties in these more human security aspects.⁹⁷ Cooperation in these areas may accrue more indirect benefits as well, paving the way for a general easing of tensions in the region and allowing for more cooperation on security issues.

A second way to encourage cooperation is to revamp Arctic diplomacy. As some scholars have noted, although there are a plethora of forums dedicated to discussing Arctic issues, most do not talk about security matters, and those that do, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, exclude China, and Russia since its invasion of the Crimea.⁹⁸ Although some Arctic discussions will necessarily need to be exclusive between the United States and its allies, there is an argument for creating forums for military deconfliction among the United States, China, and Russia in the Arctic, either by establishing a new forum, reinvigorating old diplomatic channels such as the NATO-Russia Council, or broadening the Arctic Council to include security issues.

Finally, and perhaps, most relevantly to the USAF, defense planners could tie the United States military’s investments, force structure, and capabilities in the Arctic (specifically in Alaska but potentially in allied Arctic nations as well) to Russian and Chinese actions. The logic would be to offer mutual reductions in conventional forces in the region. Of course, such actions would need to be weighed against the operational utility of placing forces in the Arctic. And any agreement to reduce forces would face the same obstacles of trust and verification, as discussed in the context of other arms control treaties. Still, it is one potential option to minimize the security dilemma in the Arctic.

⁹⁶ Pezard et al., 2017, p. 4.

⁹⁷ For example, see David Balton and Andrei Zagorski, *Implementing Marine Management in the Arctic Ocean*, RIAC (Russian International Affairs Council)/The Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2020.

⁹⁸ Tingstad, 2020.

Issue Area 8: Maintaining the Openness of Cyberspace

Cyberspace is the most recent domain in the global commons and arguably the site of some of the most important cooperation and some of the fiercest competition between great powers. Unlike the older, more established domains of land, sea, and air, cyberspace is a domain without a defined sovereign territory that is recognized by the international community through the United Nations. At its core, the power of the internet comes from the free flow of information across people and borders, enabling the free flow of commerce and ideas. At the same time, cyberspace's very openness and its potential for anonymity can also make it an attractive forum for competition—as a venue to steal secrets, push malicious narratives, and even attack infrastructure. Depending on how much states value the cooperative aspects relative to their fear of the competitive nature of cyberspace, they have different approaches toward cooperation.

Understanding the Equities

At a fundamental level, the United States, China, and Russia disagree over how to govern cyberspace. As a liberal democracy, the United States' core objective for cyberspace is to “preserve the long-term openness, interoperability, security, and reliability of the Internet, which supports and is reinforced by United States interests.”¹ Not all great powers, however, share this perspective. Both China and Russia believe that cyberspace should be treated with borders, so that states can have control over the internet domestically and be able to defend against cyber aggression. China controls its internet and is working with many nations to expand its “Great Firewall”—China's restrictive monitoring and blocking of Chinese citizens' access to the internet—as a tool to achieve the idea of cyber sovereignty.² By the same token, Russia is currently implementing a new Sovereign Internet Bill and sovereign Russian internet network called Rusnet; the former gives Russia full control over its domestic inter-

¹ The White House, *National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2018, p. 24.

² See Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,” undated.

net, while the latter is intended to help separate Russian cyberspace from the international cyberspace framework.³

U.S. Equities

The 2017 NSS sums up the United States' interests in cyberspace: "A strong, defensible cyber infrastructure fosters economic growth, protects our liberties, and advances our national security."⁴ The 2018 *National Cyber Strategy* expands on this idea and lays out four major objectives:

- Defend the homeland by protecting networks, systems, functions, and data.
- Promote American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and fostering strong domestic innovation.
- Preserve peace and security by strengthening the ability of the United States—in concert with allies and partners—to deter and, if necessary, punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes.
- Expand American influence abroad to extend the key tenets of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.⁵

Upon closer examination, each of these four objectives have potential areas for competition and cooperation. The first two objectives seem mostly internally focused, but on closer look also reveal an international dimension. For example, "defend the homeland" mostly focuses on protecting American information technology infrastructure inside government and within critical infrastructure. That said, combating cybercrime also falls under this overarching objective, including cooperating with partner nations to combat transnational cybercrime.⁶ Similarly, the second objective—"promoting American prosperity"—is more international than its name implies. It includes such subordinate objectives as "promot[ing] the free flow of data across borders" and "maintain[ing] a strong and balance intellectual property system" particularly from adversarial nations who seek to pirate American ideas.⁷

The latter two objectives—"preserve peace and security" and "expand American influence abroad"—are internationally focused. The former includes elements that are inherently about cooperation, such as "encourage universal adherence to cyber norms" (although what those norms are exactly is left vague), as well as elements that are inherently about competition, such as "deter unacceptable behavior in cyberspace" and "counter malign cyber influence

³ Human Rights Watch, "Joint Statement on Russia's 'Sovereign Internet Bill,'" April 24, 2019b; Amanda Azinheira, "Is Russia Going to War Against the Internet?" *National Interest*, March 15, 2019.

⁴ The White House, 2017, p. 13.

⁵ The White House, 2018, p. 1.

⁶ The White House, 2018, p. 11.

⁷ The White House, 2018, pp. 15–16.

and information operations.”⁸ By contrast, the latter objective—“expand American influence abroad”—strikes at least on the surface almost an exclusively cooperative tone, stating how the United States will “protect and promote internet freedom,” “promote a multi-stakeholder model of internet governance,” and “promote interoperable and reliable communications infrastructure and internet connectivity.”⁹

DoD plays a key role in achieving many of these objectives, mostly on competitive rather than the cooperative side of cyberspace. Indeed, the unclassified summary of the NDS specifically labels cyberspace as a “warfighting domain.”¹⁰ Similarly, the Joint Staff’s *Description of the National Military Strategy* states, “The Joint Force and its leaders must be as comfortable fighting in space or cyberspace as they are in the other three traditional domains of land, sea, or air.”¹¹ DoD’s 2018 *Cyber Strategy* is even more explicit. It states that “The Department must take action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition to preserve U.S. military advantages and to defend U.S. interests” and calls out China and Russia as the principle “strategic threats to U.S. prosperity and security” in cyberspace.¹² It then describes general missions for U.S. cyber forces—all more competitive rather than cooperative nature—including “conduct[ing] cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military cyber capabilities,” “defend[ing] forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source,” “strengthen[ing] the security and resilience” of DoD networks, and collaborating with partners to advance mutual interests.¹³

Stepping back for a moment from this cursory review of American strategic documents, there are three major implications for the United States’ ability to cooperate versus compete with China and Russia in cyberspace. First, for the most part, many of the United States’ objectives, as stated in the *National Cyber Strategy*, offer opportunities—at least in theory—for great power cooperation (e.g., free flow of information across borders, promotion of global cyber norms or even the prevention of cybercrime). The devil, however, is in the details, and specifics are noticeably absent from the documents themselves. Second, and by contrast, DoD’s focus in cyberspace tends to be more on the competitive aspects of cyberspace, casting the domain specifically as about warfighting and competition with Russia and China—for intelligence and military advantage—rather than cooperation. Finally, even within DoD’s realm, there may still be some room for cooperation. On a macro level, one of the missions for DoD in cyber is deterrence, and deterrence revolves around a mutual understanding between adversaries of what is—and is not—acceptable behavior.

⁸ The White House, 2018, p. 21.

⁹ The White House, 2018, pp. 24–25.

¹⁰ DoD, 2018c, p. 6.

¹¹ Joint Staff, *Description of the 2018 National Military Strategy*, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. 2.

¹² DoD, *Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy*, Washington, D.C., 2018b, p. 1.

¹³ DoD, 2018b, p. 1.

Chinese Equities

China is not committed to maintaining an open global information infrastructure on mutually agreeable terms, except insofar as to enable commerce between different information infrastructure systems between countries. As international policy norms have yet to be established, China seeks partnerships with like-minded countries to promote shared perspectives of internet governance in hopes of creating norms more in line with its interests. Overall, we assess that cyberspace is of high importance to China, but its rhetorical alignment with the United States, willingness to bargain or cooperate, and willingness to commit resources is mixed.

Five main equities can be identified in Chinese strategy and behavior:

- Safeguard CCP regime security by controlling the internet within China and increasing China's influence abroad.
- Normalize CCP cyber policies internationally by promoting favorable norms, such as cyber sovereignty, and exporting related technologies abroad.
- Support development of national champion ITC companies for both ideological and economic security.
- Facilitate continued Chinese economic growth by promoting global interconnectedness with China.
- Oppose the militarization of cyberspace while developing “defensive” capabilities.

Ever since China's adoption of the internet in 1994, the CCP has sought to manage and control China's internet as separate from the Western-led open internet. Beijing has always been concerned about “hostile foreign forces” subverting CCP rule by spreading Western ideas via the internet, and these concerns were magnified with the Arab Spring movement in the early 2010s.¹⁴ In his 2017 speech, Xi called for the CCP to “provide more and better online content and put in place a system for integrated internet management to ensure a clean cyberspace,” which euphemistically means controlling all online discussions.¹⁵ China's creation of its “Great Firewall” in the 1990s has now transformed into an entire bureaucratic structure under the Cyberspace Administration of China, created in 2014 and led by Xi, with an estimated 300,000 people responsible just for shaping conversations and content on the internet and generating an estimated 450 million posts per year—many more people work on censorship and other aspects of internet governance.¹⁶ This control over internet content has been matched with control over internet infrastructure domestically, with the CCP controlling all internet service providers, exerting strong influence over all Chinese tech companies, and

¹⁴ James Fallows, “Arab Spring, Chinese Winter,” *The Atlantic*, September 2011.

¹⁵ Xi, 2017.

¹⁶ Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 111, No. 3, July 2017.

even attempting to require citizens to install monitoring software on all their computers.¹⁷ Seeking to counter Western dominance in ITCs, the CCP has supported indigenous firms, such as hardware producers Huawei and ZTE and the well-known software companies Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba, among others.¹⁸ Clearly, the CCP is very focused on cyberspace as a key issue for critical priorities of economic growth, military power, and, most importantly, regime survival.

China has invested significant effort into normalizing its approach to cyber governance and encouraging other countries to adopt similar internet controls under the concept of “cyber sovereignty.” According to Xi, “cyber sovereignty” is the principle of respecting “the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing.”¹⁹ In its perception of the internet, China views the Western conception of a “free and open” internet infrastructure as a direct threat to its sovereignty in cyberspace. As noted in China’s 2016 “National Cyberspace Security Strategy,” “national sovereignty has extended and stretched into cyberspace; sovereignty in cyberspace has become an important component part of national sovereignty.”²⁰ This extension of sovereignty into the cyber domain thus justifies any domestic control under the pretext of national security and national conditions, invalidating the principles of the free exchange of information and ideas.

This idea of cyber sovereignty has found some support from like-minded countries. China seeks to “strengthen international cyberspace dialogue and cooperation, and to promote the reform of the Internet governance system” under the belief that “respect for sovereignty in cyberspace, safeguarding cybersecurity, seeking common governance, and realizing win-win, are becoming the consensus in international society.”²¹ Beijing frames its engagement in international forums as advancing “international cooperation,” arguing in 2019 that “China has made important contribution[s] to the consensus building.”²² In pursuit of this, the CCP has led and contributed to several cyber policy groups and initiatives, in hopes of building a

¹⁷ Loretta Chao and Sue Feng, “Green Dam Troubles Mount,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 13, 2010.

¹⁸ Louise Lucas, “The Chinese Communist Party Entangles Big Tech,” *Financial Times*, July 19, 2018; Stu Woo, “China Moves to Increase Oversight of Tech Companies,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 23, 2019.

¹⁹ Xi Jinping, “Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At the Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference,” speech at World Internet Conference, Wuzhen, China, December 16, 2015.

²⁰ Cyberspace Administration of China, “National Cyberspace Security Strategy (English Translation),” December 2016.

²¹ Cyberspace Administration of China, 2016. Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and Cyberspace Administration of China, “International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace,” March 1, 2017.

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China and the United Nations: Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” August 18, 2019d.

“cyber coalition” of states that jointly promote its views.²³ In doing so, China has promoted its own standards and norms in global IT forums and UN documents, including the UN Group of Governmental Experts. Buttressing its cooptation of these international forums, it has also created its own platforms such as the World Internet Conference, begun in 2014, and has integrated its Internet and ITC governance into the Belt and Road Initiative through the “Digital Silk Road.”²⁴ China has also begun exporting its internet-based social control technologies, often described as “digital authoritarianism” to other countries, just one aspect of promoting its China model abroad.²⁵ The major common cyber policy themes agreed upon by such groups is the idea that the state has jurisdiction over *any* and *all* cyber infrastructure within its territory—“cyber sovereignty.”

Some amount of rhetorical alignment with the United States can be found in China’s approach to global internet commerce. Despite its opposition to Western norms of a free and open internet, China does seek a common global ITC backbone to facilitate its trade abroad—just on its terms. This is most evident in Beijing’s global push for 5G dominance behind state-backed hardware companies such as Huawei and ZTE, which would allow the CCP to access, monitor, and manipulate all data flows on its systems.²⁶ However, another major benefit for Beijing of a common, if not open, global cyberspace is its continued ability to pursue commercial gain via state-sponsored cyber attacks, IP theft, economic cyberespionage, technology transfer, and market access.²⁷ This means that China is likely to support global interconnectedness at a minimum level on its own terms to maintain its economic growth, insofar as it does not challenge CCP regime security.

Rhetorically, China is open to cooperation with other countries on ensuring an open global cyberspace, but in practice CCP conditions on such cooperation limit any substantive opportunities. In his 2015 speech on global cyber policy, Xi said, “Countries should work together to prevent and oppose the use of cyberspace for criminal activities such as terrorism, pornography, drug trafficking, money laundering and gambling.”²⁸ He added that “We should firmly follow the concept of mutual support, mutual trust and mutual benefit and reject the

²³ Dan Levin, “At U.N., China Tries to Influence Fight over Internet Control,” *New York Times*, December 16, 2015; Anna Gross, Madhumita Murgia, and Yuan Yang, “Chinese Tech Groups Shaping UN Facial Recognition Standards,” *Financial Times*, December 1, 2019.

²⁴ James T. Areddy, “China Delivers Midnight Internet Declaration—Offline,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 2014; Paul Triolo, “China’s World Internet Conference Struggles to Live Up to Its Name,” New America Foundation, November 6, 2018; Ashley Dutta, “Introduction to China’s Digital Silk Road: Economic and Technological Implications,” *Asia Policy*, January 28, 2020.

²⁵ Fontaine and Frederick, 2019.

²⁶ Dan Sabbagh, “Using Huawei in UK 5G Networks Would Be ‘Madness’, US Says,” *The Guardian*, January 13, 2020; Ken Dilanian, “U.S. officials: Using Huawei Tech Opens Door to Chinese Spying, Censorship,” NBC, February 14, 2020.

²⁷ The White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World,” June 2018.

²⁸ Xi, 2015b.

old mentality of zero-sum game or ‘winner takes all.’ All countries should advance opening-up and cooperation in cyberspace” and “speed up the building of global Internet infrastructure and promote inter-connectivity” in order to ensure that “more countries and people will ride on the fast train of the information age and share the benefits of Internet development.” However, this was all premised on “maintain[ing] cyber security and promot[ing] orderly development,” which is not aligned with U.S. interests on global internet governance.

Internationally, China has opposed the militarization and offensive use of cyberspace, though experts have pointed out this is inconsistent with its own development of cyber forces.²⁹ China began developing its cyber forces in the late 1990s but only openly acknowledged them in 2013, and it has since created the Strategic Support Force (SSF), which brings together the PLA’s cyber, electronic warfare, space, and psychological forces under one service.³⁰ The SSF is estimated to have 175,000 personnel across all functions and is widely believed to have an aggressive cyber strategy for both peacetime and wartime employment.³¹

China’s track record of cooperation with the United States on cybersecurity agreements leaves little hope for enduring future success, making for mixed prospects for both willingness to cooperate and commit resources. After years of complaints from the U.S. government about Chinese cyber industrial espionage against U.S. companies, including the March 2014 indictment of active duty PLA officers for economic espionage, Washington and Beijing in September 2015 agreed to cooperate on countering “malicious cyber activities” and specifically “that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.”³² Both countries also voiced support for a 2015 UN report on cyber norms.³³ However, this accord was only secured after the United States threatened to sanction China for such continued actions, a potentially highly embarrassing turn of events for Xi’s first formal trip to the United States as chairman.³⁴ Alongside this U.S. government

²⁹ Graham Webster, “Observations on China’s New International Cyberspace Cooperation Strategy,” *Lawfare*, March 7, 2017.

³⁰ John Costello and Joe McReynolds, *China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2018.

³¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2019*, London, UK, 2019, p. 262; Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019b. For a Chinese perspective, see Lyu Jinghua, “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” IPI Global Observatory, March 22, 2019.

³² U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,” May 19, 2014; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” September 25, 2015.

³³ United Nations, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” July 2015.

³⁴ David Sanger, “U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and David E. Sanger, “Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cybertheft,” *New York Times*, September 25, 2015; Scott Harold, “The U.S.-China Cyber Agreement: A Good First Step,” *The RAND Blog*, August 1, 2016.

pressure, cybersecurity was a key component of Track 1 engagement under both the Obama and Trump administrations. However, the challenges of dialogue on this issue were evident in the fact that the Trump administration's U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue was held only once, in October 2017.³⁵ This has been accompanied by various Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, such as the U.S.-China Cyber Security Dialogue hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies since 2009 and the U.S.-China Track II Dialogue on the Digital Economy hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations since 2018.³⁶ Revealing the limits of China's willingness to commit resources, China's forsworn conduct returned less than two years later, when President Trump came to office, and has prompted more U.S. indictments, to little effect.³⁷

Russian Equities

Russia has integrated the cyber domain in its strategic thinking as a means of achieving its strategic and political objectives. Russian strategic documents show a broad understanding of the information space and emphasizes the relationship between the information space (which includes both information technology as the means and information as the contents), state sovereignty and international influence.³⁸ Moreover, information forms part of the "whole spectrum of instruments" that Russia uses to achieve international leverage.³⁹ Russia's "Information Security Doctrine" (2016) shows an intrinsic fear of the potential use

³⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, 2017c.

³⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Track 1.5 U.S.-China Cyber Security Dialogue," undated. For an analysis of the dialogues, see Adam Segal, "An Update on U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, November 17, 2017b; National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, updated 2018. For more recent reports, see National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "U.S.-China Track II Dialogue on the Digital Economy: Consensus Agreement," March 10–12, 2019a; National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "U.S.-China Track II Dialogue on the Digital Economy: Consensus Memorandum," December 9–10, 2019b.

³⁷ David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, "After a Hiatus, China Accelerates Cyberspying Efforts to Obtain U.S. Technology," *New York Times*, November 29, 2018; Adam Segal and Lorand Laskai, "A New Old Threat," Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2018; Katie Benner, "U.S. Charges Chinese Military Officers in 2017 Equifax Hacking," *New York Times*, February 10, 2010.

³⁸ This is also reflected in the Russian terminology. Relevant concepts in the Russian language are quite inclusive, such as "information space," "information environment" (*informatsionnoe prostranstvo*), and "information countermeasures" (*informatsionnoe protivoborstvo*) (Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, "Russia's Approach to Cyber: the Best Defence Is a Good Offence," in Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secieru, eds., *Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions: Russian Cyber Strategies*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018; Mari Ristolainen, "Should 'RuNet 202' Be Taken Seriously? Contradictory Views About Cyber Security Between Russia and the West," *Journal of Information Warfare*, 2017.

³⁹ President of the Russian Federation, "Uka z Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 31.12. 2015 r. No. 683, O Strategii natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from 31 December 2015, No. 683, About the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation]," December 31, 2015, as translated in Hodgson et al., 2019.

of the information sphere by external forces to challenge the “sovereignty, political and social stability, [and] the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies.”⁴⁰ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014) explicitly notes that ICT may be used to achieve military-political aims and even threaten the territorial sovereignty of states and international peace, security, and stability.⁴¹ This is in line with the Russian generals Gerasimov and Surkov’s views of the use of misdirection and deception about Russian intentions as part of cyber strategy.⁴² We identify the following four key Russian equities in the cyberspace and global information governance domain:

1. Unify international internet governance under the UN and reduce the dominance of individual countries.
2. Achieve sovereignty of the internet.
3. Eliminate dependence on foreign suppliers for information technology.
4. Restrict the use of offensive cyber weapons and the use of such weapons in military conflicts, while ensuring the availability of cyber resources for active measures.

We describe the supporting actions for each of these equities below.

Russia seeks to challenge the international consensus on global internet governance. The Kremlin challenges the current multi-stakeholder character of the internet and considers it an extension of its physical geography, where the traditional understanding of sovereignty, principles of nonintervention, and international laws normally applied to states should be used.⁴³ Russia is trying to shift the character of the cyberspace to a more government-controlled system in which it can prevent foreign actors from interfering in its perceived internal affairs.⁴⁴

Russia aims to institutionalize the internet under the UN, where it may exert more influence, at the same time ensuring its own technical ability to break away from the international internet and therefore the Western influence, or, according to Putin, achieve an internet “that depends on nobody.”⁴⁵ The Kremlin considers the internet a political instrument that is used by the United States to ensure its global dominance, impose its standards, and pro-

⁴⁰ Although Russian writings see its adversaries engaging in such operations, this may also be considered a relevant insight into how Kremlin views the role of information space as a means of achieving political objectives without the use of military force (Russian Information Security Doctrine, as translated in Hodgson et al., 2019).

⁴¹ Government of Russia, 2014b.

⁴² William Chim, “Russia’s Digital Awakening,” *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2018.

⁴³ Julien Nocetti, “Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2015.

⁴⁴ Antonin Plattner, “*The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet*, Estonia: International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), November 2019.

⁴⁵ Bruno Mações, “Why Russia Wants to Break the Internet,” *Moscow Times*, May 14, 2019.

mote its enterprises. Russia seeks to reduce American “cyber stewardship” and make it less West-centric and English-language-dominant by unifying relevant international rules under international organizations, such as the UN and the International Telecommunications Union.⁴⁶

Despite decrying the lack of international policy and institutional governance of the internet, Russia opposes the only legally binding international cybercrime treaty: the Budapest Convention, which sets forth common standards for cybercrime investigations and was drafted with strong support from the United States. Instead, Russia lobbies for an alternative cybercrime treaty at the UN. While critics say that this may help Russia shut down the internet more easily and could lead to the criminalization of ordinary online activities, Russian government representatives claim that the proposal would create an inclusive internet that is respectful of countries’ sovereignty.⁴⁷

Russia aims to develop a sovereign internet that may be cut off from the global internet if necessary. The Russian Information Doctrine (2016) and the Ministry of Communications’ “Information Society” program sets forth the requirements for “a national system of managing the Russian segment of the Internet” and a RuNet system that is not dependent on external networks or servers and is controlled by the state.⁴⁸ According to Russia’s Ministry of Communications, by 2020 Russia aspires to support 99 percent of its internet traffic.⁴⁹

According to Russia’s Information Security Doctrine, the Kremlin is concerned about the influence of online information on moral and spiritual values of its population and as potential source for internal instability.⁵⁰ The internet potentially allows individuals to avoid government-controlled media and disseminate messages that may undermine the current system. Russia has recently implemented a series of legislative changes to give it complete

⁴⁶ For example, by suggesting that the International Telecommunications Union should manage the Domain Name System (DNS) and have legal authority to coordinate global policies in internet governance (Nocetti, 2015; Radomir Viktorovich Boglov, “Dejatelnost OON V Oblasti Informacii I Mezdunarodnie Aspekti Informacionnoi Bezopasnosti” [“UN Activities in the Area of Information and International Aspects of Information Security of Russia,”] *Spravitel'naja Politika I Geopolitika [Comparative Politics Russia]*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2019; Igor Ashmanov, “Novaja kiberstrategia SSHA: O Mirovom Gospodstve Prjamim Tekstom. U.S. New Cyber Strategy: Direct Language about Global Dominance,” RIA, January 21, 2019).

⁴⁷ Shannon Vavra, “The U.N. Passed a Resolution That Gives Russian Greater Influence over the Internet Norms,” *Cyber Scoop*, November 18, 2019; Joe Uchill, “Russia and China Get a Big Win on Internet ‘Sovereignty,’” *Axios*, November 21, 2019.

⁴⁸ Government of Russia, “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” [“Doktrina Informacionnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiskoi Federacii”], December 5, 2016a; Juha Kukkola, Mari Ristolainen, Juha-Pekka Nikkarila, “Game Changer: Structural Transformation of Cyberspace,” Finnish Defence Research Agency, 2017.

⁴⁹ Evgenii Pudovkin, “Javnaja Virtualnaja Ugroza [Obvious Virtual Threat],” *Gazeta*, No. 163, September 22, 2018.

⁵⁰ Government of Russia, 2016a.

control over RuNet.⁵¹ These laws would also mean that such international companies as Google, Twitter, and Facebook would have to place the servers that handle Russian internet traffic in its territory.⁵² In fact, in recent years there have been calls within the Duma for all servers containing personal data of Russian citizens be located in Russia, subjecting them to Russian legislation.⁵³

Russia seeks to eliminate its dependence on external actors for information technology. Thus, for example, in 2016 the city of Moscow started replacing Microsoft programs with domestic software, and Moscow's regional government switched from Oracle database systems to open-source-software (PostgreSQL) maintained by local programmers.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the System for Operative-Investigative Activities (SORM), the government's system for private communications surveillance, in place since 1995, requires all internet service providers to be equipped with rerouting devices that essentially route traffic through the FSB, and, according to one source grant "the agency total access to all communications regardless of legal procedure."⁵⁵

Russia aims at "restricting offensive cyber activity and cyber weapons" out of concern over the threats potentially stemming from the use of cyber technologies for military aims, such as Russia's potential vulnerability to "foreign intelligence services penetrating Russia via technical means."⁵⁶ However, Western experts note that Russia has itself used elements of cybercrime as offensive cyber tools.⁵⁷

Not only does the Kremlin rely on its government resources (including secret services), it is also able to draw on a variety of nongovernmental resources to use as proxies, including

⁵¹ For example, in 2018, Russia banned anonymous messaging apps and the use virtual private networks (VPN) unless their providers block access to sites that are banned in Russia, while web-based writers who have more than 3,000 page views are required to register with the government (David Meyer, "Russia's Latest Internet Crackdown Targets Tools for Avoiding Online Censorship," *Fortune*, June 2019; Ristolainen, 2017).

⁵² Ristolainen, 2017.

⁵³ Nocetti, 2015.

⁵⁴ Bloomberg, "Moscow Drops Microsoft on Putin's Call for Self-Sufficiency," *Straits Times*, September 27, 2016.

⁵⁵ "Russia Will Block VPN Providers Who Don't Comply with a Blacklist Request," *MIT Technology Review*, June 10, 2019; Lily Hay Newman, "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation," *Wired*, January 5, 2020; Zack Whittaker, "Documents Reveal How Russia Taps Phone Companies for Surveillance," *Tech Crunch*, September 18, 2019.

⁵⁶ Government of Russia, 2016a; United Nations General Assembly, "Draft Resolution: Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security," A/C.1/73/L.27, October 22, 2018a.

⁵⁷ Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, *Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare*, Arlington, Va.: CNA, March 2017; Michael Schwirtz and Joseph Goldstein, "Russian Espionage Piggybacks on a Cybercriminal's Hacking," *New York Times*, March 12, 2017.

hackers recruited from criminal underground.⁵⁸ Western intelligence officials and researchers have concluded that Russian state agencies have a close relationship with criminal networks, including cybercriminals, harboring them and making use of them when necessary. For example, Evgeniy Bogachev, wanted by the FBI for stealing millions of dollars from bank accounts, allegedly lives in a town on the coast of the Black Sea.⁵⁹ The U.S. Department of Justice has indicted Russian government officials and their proxies for cybercrimes, such as the 2017 attempt to steal information on 500 million Yahoo accounts.⁶⁰ Moscow also uses private businesses for espionage and access for information and so-called *kompromat*, or compromising information.⁶¹ For example, in 2017 leaked emails and hacks revealed a close cooperation between FSB and Kaspersky, a Russian cybersecurity company.⁶²

Thus, the Kremlin exploits the challenge of attribution in cyber space to deter, compel, coerce, and disorient undermine countries, governments, or institutions that the Kremlin perceives as unsupportive of its policies, all while maintaining plausible deniability.⁶³ During the most recent cases in Ukraine and Macedonia, cyber attacks were timed so that they reinforced anti-Western and anti-NATO policies.⁶⁴ For example, in December 2015, a part of Western Ukraine lost power for several hours, following an anti-Western information campaign, and the U.S. Department of Justice has concluded that Russia used gray-zone methods to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ Soldatov and Borogan, 2018.

⁵⁹ Max Bergmann and Carolyn Kenney, "Acts of an Adversary: Russia's Ongoing Hostilities Toward the United States and Its Allies," Center for American Progress, December 5, 2017.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, "U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts," March 15, 2017a.

⁶¹ Heather A. Conley, James Mina, Ruslan Stefanov, and Martin Vladimirov, *The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2016.

⁶² Jordan Robertson and Michael Riley, "Kaspersky Lab Has Been Working with Russian Intelligence," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, July 11, 2017.

⁶³ Connell and Vogler, 2017; Ristolainen, 2017.

⁶⁴ Alex Kokcharov, "Russian Influence on Operations Highly Likely During Western, Allies' Elections, Undermining Public Confidence and increasing Government Instability," *IHS Jane's*, October 25, 2019.

⁶⁵ Donghui Park and Michael Walstrom, "Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the Ukrainian Power Grid Attacks," University of Washington, October 11, 2017; Robert S. Mueller, *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019; Josh Gerstein, "Justice Department Drops Plans for Trial over Russian Interference in 2016 U.S. Election," *Politico*, March 16, 2016.

Space for Cooperation

Cooperation in cyberspace would likely take the form of some sort of international treaty, under which the United States, China, and Russia would commit to “common rules of the road” for governing the domain and for responding to common threats (e.g., combating cybercrime). Indeed, multiple experts have proposed just that. Robert Papp, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has suggested the need for negotiating a cyber treaty with Russia.⁶⁶ Similarly, scholars Ariel Levite and Lyu Jinghua have suggested negotiating a similar agreement with China. They propose a tacit agreement whereby “the United States would not endorse but would nonetheless explicitly recognize the right of China, as it is presently inclined, to apply what is now a rather intrusive cyber monitoring regime internally in the interest of ensuring domestic stability.”⁶⁷ For its part, China would take “far more assertive measures to enforce its policy of preventing and punishing the use of Chinese territory, by any party, to conduct cyber-attacks against the United States (and others), and to recognize that cyber weapons use in wartime would be governed by the same rules that apply to the employment of other weapon systems in self-defense.”⁶⁸ In practice, however, negotiating such a treaty has proven difficult for several reasons.

First, there is a **trust** deficit. The United States points to several actions—including the alleged Chinese hack of the Office Personnel Management records discovered in April 2015, the Russian interference in the 2016 American elections, and the alleged Chinese breach of Equifax in 2017—as evidence that both China and Russia are actively supporting malign actors in this realm, or even conducting these attacks directly, and therefore cannot be trusted to play by the rules.⁶⁹ In fact, in Russia, the same agency that holds the mandate of combating organized crime and ensuring economic and financial security, both of which are relevant in the case of cybercrime, also has the objective of countering foreign intelligence services.⁷⁰ In 2017, the United States indicted two FSB officers for involvement in the 2014 hacking of Yahoo, and in 2016 FSB was added to the Office of Foreign Assets’ Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, which specifies individuals and organizations whose assets are blocked and with whom U.S. persons are prohibited from

⁶⁶ Robert G. Papp, “A Cyber Treaty with Russia,” *Kennan Cable*, No. 41, Wilson Center, Kennan Institute, March 2019.

⁶⁷ Ariel (Eli) Levite and Lyu Jinghua, “Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace: Toward Collaboration or Confrontation?” *Chinese Military Science*, January 24, 2019.

⁶⁸ Levite and Lyu, 2019.

⁶⁹ Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US Government,” *Wired*, October 23, 2016; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution*, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2017; FBI, “Chinese Military Hackers Charged in Equifax Breach: Intrusion Affected Nearly Half of All Americans,” February 10, 2020.

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks,” March 15, 2018.

dealing with.⁷¹ Furthermore, Cozy Bear, one of the hacker groups that has been identified as responsible for attacking the Democratic National Committee in 2015, has been linked to the Russian intelligence services.⁷²

At the same time, Russia and China likewise view the United States' actions with distrust. They note that the internet remains dominated by the anglophone speakers. By some estimates, 54 percent of the internet is in English, whereas only 6.0 percent of all websites are in Russian and 1.7 percent in Chinese.⁷³ The trend persists even though Mandarin Chinese has the most native speakers (1.3 billion) in the world.⁷⁴ Even Spanish (the second-most popular language in the world, with 442 million speakers in 2019) makes up a mere 5 percent of internet sites.⁷⁵ At the same time, Chinese is assessed as the second-most common language used by internet users (with English ranking at almost 26 percent of users and Chinese at 19 percent), followed by Spanish and Arabic, while Russian speakers make up only 2.5 percent of internet users.⁷⁶

More specifically, Russian officials often criticize American influence in international internet governance frameworks and the dominance of American software, social media, and technology companies.⁷⁷ For example, in 2014 Putin suggested that the internet was created by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and is part of the United States' plan for global dominance.⁷⁸ Following the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command, Russia also accused the United States of militarizing the internet and developing offensive cyber capabilities.⁷⁹ Russian information technology sector representatives also criticized the United States' aim to ensure free access to the internet globally, saying that may lead to "bypassing local providers that legally block undesirable resources."⁸⁰

⁷¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human Readable Lists," August 25, 2020; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Issuance of Amended Executive Order 13694; Cyber-Related Sanctions Designations," December 29, 2016.

⁷² Mike Eckel, "The Return of Cozy Bear: Russian Hackers in the Crosshairs of Western Intelligence Agencies—Again," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 18, 2020.

⁷³ Niall McCarthy, "Two Worlds: Languages IRL and Online," Statista, February 12, 2018.

⁷⁴ McCarthy, 2019.

⁷⁵ McCarthy, 2019.

⁷⁶ Statista, "Most Common Languages Used on the Internet as of January 2020, by Share of Internet Users," June 2020.

⁷⁷ A representative of the Russian IT industry called the U.S. the main cyber threat to the world (Andrei Shitov, "Dve Doktrini: Chem Otlichajutsa Podhodi Rasii i SSHA k Informacionnoi Bezopastnosti [Two Doctrines: What Are the Differences Between the Russian and U.S. Approaches to Information Security]," TASS, November 29, 2018.

⁷⁸ Ewan MacAskill, "Putin Calls Internet a 'CIA Project' Renewing Fears of Web Breakup," *The Guardian*, April 24, 2014.

⁷⁹ Nocetti, 2015.

⁸⁰ Pudovkin, 2018.

China is similarly distrustful of the internet. In August 2013, Xi Jinping argued, “The internet has become the main battlefield for the public opinion struggle.”⁸¹ In line with this vision, China instituted an increasingly restrictive monitoring and blocking of Chinese citizens’ access to the internet (the so-called Great Firewall), but also launched in “Great Cannon” to target sites outside of China with denial of service attacks and redirect them to other more pro-China sites.⁸² China demonstrated the latter capability in spring 2015, when it targeted the U.S. software firm GitHub for allegedly assisting people to circumvent Chinese censorship.⁸³

Finally, there are the perpetual questions about monitoring and verification that revolved around ensuring that whoever does end up signing onto to any cooperative arrangement upholds their end of the bargain. Monitoring and verification prove a difficult enough task with conventional arms control regimes—where there is significant hardware and facilities involved that can be seen and tracked. Cyber capabilities do not have such an extensive physical footprint, so evaluating compliance with cyber agreements may prove more challenging.

Audience costs represent a second and increasingly important obstacle. For better or worse, great power cyber relations are front-page news and, thanks to Russia’s use of the domain for election interference, a hyper-partisan issue in the United States. Self-identified Democrats, in particular, believe that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to aid Trump and are deeply skeptical of Russia’s actions in cyberspace and Republicans’ willingness to block such interference in the future.⁸⁴ Given this context, any form of cooperation between the United States and Russia in the cyber domain under the Trump administration almost certainly would have produced a strong backlash and been politically untenable. The Biden administration has also been skeptical of pursuing cooperation in this area.

Third, many cyber issues—particularly in liberal democracies (including the United States)—straddle the line between private and public interests, leading to **third-party challenges**. For example, the clear majority of critical infrastructure in the democracies around the world is owned or operated by the private sector. In the United States, 85 percent of all critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private entities, and protecting the computer systems also falls mostly to the private sector.⁸⁵ Consequently, any cyber agreement—unlike more military-specific ones—needs to extend beyond just governments, to private companies as well.

⁸¹ Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Great Firewall of China: Xi Jinping’s Internet Shutdown,” *The Guardian*, June 29, 2018.

⁸² Economy, 2018.

⁸³ Economy, 2018.

⁸⁴ See Pew Research Center, “Public Confidence in Mueller’s Investigation Remains Steady,” March 15, 2018.

⁸⁵ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Critical Infrastructure Protection, Information Sharing and Cyber Security,” undated.

Unlike other issues, cyber issues are often transnational in nature, as actors use servers outside the countries in question, posing yet another third-party challenge. As a result, ideally, cyber agreements would be similarly multinational to be comprehensive. That said, the more countries that need to agree for a deal, the more difficult such a deal is to negotiate.

There are also **legal constraints**, as the United States, China, and Russia are part of competing international treaties. The United States is a member of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which has been ratified by currently 65 countries and is the first international and most significant multilateral treaty to facilitate collective transnational cooperation to fight cybercrime within the member nations. It is a tool to advance common objectives in cybersecurity, either bilaterally or multilaterally, among other member nations. In September 2019, the United States and 26 other countries signed a statement appealing to nations to abide by already existing cybersecurity frameworks to ensure greater accountability and stability in cyberspace.⁸⁶ It was meant to send a strong message to Russia on its deployments of ransomware worms that caused significant damage globally, and China on its hacking efforts and economic espionage.

By contrast, China and Russia do not recognize the Convention on Cybercrime, do not share the United States' understanding of the nature of cyber conflict, and have not expressed a willingness to abide by the established cyber norms or the so-called Tallinn Manual, which addresses sovereignty in cyberspace in relation to how it is defined in the other domains.⁸⁷ Instead, both nations have called for a global cybercrime treaty under the UN. In 2018, they successfully pushed a resolution on cybercrime and created an open-ended working group to discuss cyber norms in the UN General Assembly.⁸⁸ In 2019, Russia, spearheaded—backed by with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus—another General Assembly resolution titled “Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes.”⁸⁹ The United States opposed the seemingly innocuous resolution because it did not define “criminal purposes,” leaving human rights groups to question whether the resolution “opens the door to criminalizing ordinary online behavior that is protected under international human rights law.”⁹⁰

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, “Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace,” September 23, 2019.

⁸⁷ Michael N. Schmitt, *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 11–29.

⁸⁸ United Nations General Assembly, “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” A/RES/73/27, December 5, 2018b; United Nations General Assembly, “Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes,” 73/187, December 17, 2018c.

⁸⁹ Ellen Nakashima, “The U.S. Is Urging A No Vote on a Russian-led U.N. Resolution Calling for a Global Cybercrime Treaty,” *Washington Post*, November 16, 2019.

⁹⁰ Nakashima, 2019.

Ultimately, as denoted in Table 10.1, although both Russia and China ascribe—at least on paper—to limiting the offensive use of cyber weapons and unifying international governance of the cyberspace under an international governed body, there may not be much space for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia in cyberspace. Both China and Russia regard control of the domain as critical for their own regime stability (or a “high” level of importance). Indeed, the Defense Intelligence Agency recently assessed that “Moscow perceives the information domain as strategically decisive and critically important to control its domestic populace and influence adversary states.”⁹¹ Consequently, it is unlikely that either regime would be willing to compromise its internet “sovereignty,” given the stakes involved. At the same time, negotiating an agreement for cooperation faces real obstacles. None of them are insurmountable per se. Other agreements have navigated the multinational and public/private divide before (e.g., those surrounding international airline travel). Attribution—though perhaps more challenging—is not impossible in cyberspace, opening the way for successful deterrence and potentially for cooperation.⁹² Still, it does make any comprehensive agreement harder to come by.

TABLE 10.1
Interest in Cooperation on Maintaining the Openness of Cyberspace

	China	Russia
Stakes	High	High
Rhetorical alignment	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to bargain	Mixed	Mixed
Demonstrated willingness to commit resources	No	No

Second-Order Effects of Cooperation

Partly because comprehensive, multinational cooperation between the great powers has been harder to come by, there has been a bifurcation in cooperation agreements between the United States and the other cosignatories of the Budapest Convention on the one hand and China, Russia, and other backers of the UN initiative on the other.

There are few immediately apparent ways for the United States to drive a wedge China and Russia on cyber issues. Not only are the two authoritarian regimes’ interest aligned and both are backing the UN initiative, but the two countries also have their own bilateral cyber-

⁹¹ Defense Intelligence Agency, *Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations*, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 37.

⁹² For example, see Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, August 2013.

security treaties focused on the following issues: (1) combating illegal content on the internet, which proponents of democracy and free speech critique as an attempt to curb internet freedom, (2) agreeing not to hack each other, (3) preventing the use of cyber to “destabilize the internal political and socio-economic atmosphere,” “disturb public order,” or “interfere with the internal affairs of the state,” and (4) exchanging cyber threat data and information technology.⁹³ The irony here is that other countries have often accused both Russia and China of interfering with their internal affairs.

Moreover, it is hard to see how any potential bilateral cooperation with Russia or China on cyber space would affect the other power much one way or the other. For example, even if the United States reached some sort of mutual noninterference pact with one or the other power, the excluded power presumably would be unaffected.

Perhaps, a better question is whether such a bilateral agreement between Russia or China is worth having in its own right. Despite the U.S.-China Cyber Agreement of September 2015, there has been little decline in Chinese constellation of advanced persistent threat (APT) hacking groups connected to its Ministry of State Security and PLA engagement of cyber espionage for industrial, political, and strategic purposes. More than a dozen Chinese APT groups regularly target not only the United States and developed democracies worldwide but also China’s regional competitors in the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific, China’s trade partners, countries that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Road, and international institutions and organizations. In doing so, China undercuts a fair competition in the global economy by stealing its competitors’ intellectual property. For example, the annual costs due to the Chinese cybertheft of U.S. intellectual property currently is between \$225 billion and \$600 billion.⁹⁴

No bilateral cyber treaty exists between the United States and Russia. In 2013, Russia and the United States signed a bilateral agreement on confidence-building in cyberspace. The agreement established a secure Direct Communications Line linking the U.S. Cybersecurity Coordinator and the Deputy Head of the Russian Security Council to help manage any potential ICT-related crises.⁹⁵ The same year, a bilateral presidential group on information security was formed to implement confidence-building measures. Although Russian intervention into Ukraine and meddling in the U.S. elections interrupted any bilateral cooperation, in 2019 Russia announced that it expected to gradually restart bilateral relations on

⁹³ Olga Razumovskaya, “Russia and China Pledge Not to Hack Each Other,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 8, 2015; Nadezhda Tsydenova and Tom Balmforth, “Russia and China to Sign Treaty on Combating Illegal Online Content,” Reuters, October 8, 2019.

⁹⁴ Sherisse Pham, “How Much has the US Lost from China’s IP Theft?” CNN, March 23, 2018.

⁹⁵ The link was first used when Michael Daniel, the Obama administration’s Cybersecurity Policy Coordinator, messaged to Russia about Russian attempts to influence the U.S. Presidential election in 2016. U.S. White House (The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Information and Communications Technology Security,” June 17, 2013b).

cybersecurity.⁹⁶ Some Russian analysts, however, have doubted the ability to reach a mutual understanding between the United States and Russia on cyber-related issues, noting that even if consultations and bilateral agreements are concluded, they may not be implemented as the currently high levels of mutual distrust would prevent meaningful cooperation.

Even if Russia and China complied with their end of the deal, there are also major negative second-order consequences of a bilateral agreement with either agreement, depending on how such a deal was phrased. Such an agreement might cover the United States but not other countries, leaving American allies and partners potentially more vulnerable to Chinese and Russia cyber aggression. It might also stoke fears of abandonment in these countries, should the United States go it alone. More generally, if any agreement between the powers included some sort of noninterference clause, the United States would have to back off the idea of an open internet with information flowing freely across borders and with it, the United States' commitment to freedom of speech as universal right.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the prospects for real cooperation between the United States and China and Russia are dim. Both China and Russia view control over the cyber domain as vital to their own survival and as a potential powerful and cost-effective weapon to wield over the United States, making both unwilling to yield much on the core issues.

Moreover, the policy space for cooperation is rather limited. Although the United States, China, and Russia share some of the same talking points (e.g., on cybercrime), they espouse fundamentally different conceptions of whether the internet should be open across national borders or fundamentally an outgrowth of state sovereignty. And while there has been some willingness to negotiate, both in a multilateral and bilateral setting, many of these initiatives have dubious track records of success and have yet to be backed by real resources.

Finally, there are real practical obstacles. There are the inherent challenges in negotiating multinational agreements that also include the private sector. And there are the added difficulties of monitoring and verifying agreements in cyberspace. Above all, there is the already deep history of distrust between the actors.

Ultimately, cooperation in cyberspace may be rather limited and come at a significant cost. Even advocates for such cooperation recognize that all three great powers would likely continue to conduct cyber espionage and prepare for cyber attacks against military targets.⁹⁷ Any cyber cooperation may come in the form of limiting cyber attacks against civilian targets, such as private companies' economic data, and personal financial data. Such an agreement, however, would likely come at a sacrifice: The United States would most likely have to abandon the 2018 *National Cyber Strategy*'s goal of "protect[ing] and promot[ing] internet

⁹⁶ "Russia Says It Is Starting to Resume U.S. Cyber Cooperation: TASS," Reuters, October 17, 2019.

⁹⁷ Papp, 2019, p. 6.

freedom” and recognize China and Russia’s concept of cyber sovereignty.⁹⁸ Whether or not the United States would be willing to make this trade and whether such an agreement would be upheld and enforced, even if the United States did, remain open questions.

⁹⁸ The White House, 2018, p. 1.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As described in Chapters One and Two, there is a paradox when it comes to cooperation on the global commons. Global commons issues involve, by definition, shared goods, and states should have economic incentives to cooperate with one another to extract these resources. At the same time, command of the commons has also been the key to empire, giving states powerful strategic motivations to compete for control of these shared domains. Ultimately, this report confirms the paradoxical nature of the global commons. Looking across the eight issue areas examined in this volume, there are opportunities for the United States to cooperate with China, Russia or both on most of these issues, but in every case cooperation can only extend to a subset of issues and will only be half-hearted at best. In this chapter, we provide an overview of our findings and outline recommendations for the U.S. government, the Joint Force, and the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force on how to maximize their opportunities to cooperate in this realm.

Cooperation in the Global Commons

Table 11.1 provides the summary our analysis in Chapters Three through Ten, reflecting to what degree the Chinese and Russia positions are aligned with the United States, what their respective stakes are on a given issue, and, most importantly, whether China or Russia have shown a willingness to bargain (an openness to engage in dialogue) or cooperate (by devoting significant resources). Looking across the table and particularly the latter two columns, three key findings emerge.

Across the Board, Trade Space Exists . . .

Our first overarching finding is that, in most cases, the United States, China, and Russia are, at least on a superficial level, open to cooperation in the global commons. Except for preventing nuclear arms races for China and dismantling criminal networks for Russia, all three countries rarely rule out international cooperation on any global commons issues *a priori*. Rather, they welcome dialogue and negotiation. As a result, we see a sea of mostly “yellow” or “limited bargaining” under the willingness to bargain column of Table 11.1. In other words, there is “trade space” or room for negotiations on global commons issues.

TABLE 11.1
Interest in Cooperation on Global Commons Issues

Issue Area	China			Russia		
	Alignment	Stakes	Cooperate	Alignment	Stakes	Cooperate
Maintaining freedom of access to space	Mixed	High	Low	Mixed	High	Medium
Dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks	Mixed	Low	Medium	Mixed	Low	Low
Countering violent extremist organizations	Mixed	Low	Low	Mixed	High	Medium
Promoting global stability	Yes	Low	High	Mixed	Low	Medium
Preserving access to the air and maritime commons	Mixed	Medium	Medium	Mixed	Medium	Medium
Preventing nuclear arms races	Yes	Medium	Low	Yes	High	Medium
Preventing Militarization of the Arctic	Yes	Low	Low	No	High	Low
Maintaining the openness of cyberspace	Mixed	High	Medium	Mixed	High	Low

. . . but the Trade Space Often Is Fairly Narrow and Not Always Backed by Commitments

A second key finding, however, is that while there is some room for cooperation on global commons issue, the policy space is still narrow, and it is not always backed by resource commitments. First, although there is some policy room for cooperation on global commons issues, almost every issue area has aspects that are mostly off the table. Many global commons issues—such as air, maritime, space, and cyberspace management—include both relatively benign civilian aspects (e.g., limiting space debris or commercial airline safety) and core strategic security interests. By and large, there is more room for negotiation on the former set of issues than on the latter.

A second and in some ways more important caveat is that openness to cooperation on a rhetorical level does not always manifest itself in meaningful action, for several reasons. First, talk is cheap, and while China or Russia may, for example, be interested in combating Islamic terrorism or ending long-running conflicts around the world in abstract, they may be less interested in paying for it.

Finally, in other cases, the three great powers may be talking past each other. These countries vary in who they consider as terrorists versus internal dissidents. Consequently, if we compare the willingness to bargain column to the willingness to cooperate column, we see far “not willing to cooperate” in the latter than the former.

There May Be More Room to Cooperate with Russia Than with China

A third key finding comes from comparing the Chinese versus Russian willingness to cooperate on global commons issues. We find that, by and large, there may be more room for cooperation with Russia than with China. Not only has Russia shown more of a willingness to engage on certain issues—most notably arms control—but Russia has also shown more of a willingness to commit resources to cooperation on a host of issues, from counterterrorism to space.

The larger question here is why Russia seems more open to cooperation than China. Some of this may be a function of geography. For better or worse, Russia happens to operate in places, such as Syria and Libya, where both the United States and Russia have interests but not existential ones, making these areas ripe for cooperation. The relatively greater potential for U.S. cooperation with Russia than with China may also partially be a function of history. The United States and Russia, after all, have a long history of cooperating on arms control during the Cold War amid periods of heightened geopolitical competition.

Finally, Russia, in some ways, may be more open to cooperation because it has a fundamentally weaker hand to play. Russia can oppose the U.S.-led international order and act as a spoiler, but it lacks the economic and military capacity to lead that order in its own right. In this respect, Russia is very different than China. Russia can hope to have a proverbial seat at the table for governing the global commons, but it can only hope to govern these issues through some form of cooperation rather than independently.

But Even Here There Are Significant Obstacles to Cooperation . . .

Even when there is trade space, however, it does not mean that cooperation will or even is likely to occur. There are multiple obstacles to cooperation in all eight areas we examined, with the most common being a lack of trust between the parties (see Table 11.2), and, unlike some of the other obstacles that can be solved by narrowing the scope of the agreement, changing laws, or adapting structures, trust cannot easily be overcome except by repeated interaction over time. Consequently, the chances for cooperation may be more daunting than Table 11.1 indicates.

. . . and Significant Downsides

Finally, cooperation in the global commons is not always a clear good. As depicted in Table 11.3, there are relatively few wedge issues—or ways for the United States to play Russia off China or vice versa—in the global commons outside the Arctic, and on practically every issue—except increasing air and maritime safety—cooperation generates both negative and positive externalities. In other words, cooperation comes with tradeoffs, and so the United States must weigh the pros and cons to cooperation as a policy option.

TABLE 11.2

Obstacles to Cooperation in the Global Commons

Issue Area	Trust	Audience Costs	Definitional Problems	Third-Party Problems	Immediacy Problem	Issue Linkage	Legal Constraints	Capacity/Capability/Structural Constraints
Maintaining freedom of access to space	√						√	√
Dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks	√	√	√		√		√	√
Countering violent extremist organizations	√		√		√	√	√	
Promoting global stability	√		√				√	
Preserving access to the air and maritime commons	√		√			√		√
Preventing nuclear arms races	√	√		√	√			
Preventing militarization of the Arctic	√		√	√		√		√
Maintaining the openness of cyberspace	√	√		√		√	√	

Recommendations for the U.S. Government

Despite the limited trade space in the global commons, there are several ways that the United States can make the most of the existing opportunities for cooperation.

Recommendation 1: Moderate Expectations for Cooperation

The first recommendation is more a word of caution. Even if the United States wants to adopt a more cooperation-focused approach than the Trump administration's great power competition-centric foreign policy, it may not necessarily have much room to maneuver. As discussed at length in Chapter Two, China and Russia do not see global commons issues in the same way that the United States does. Indeed, China and Russia see these issues as intertwined with who leads the international order, and they show little inclination in shifting their behavior—at least while their current administrations remain in power. Moreover, in each of these areas, great power competition confronts engrained obstacles that extend beyond any set of policies or set of policymakers. Policymakers do have some options to expand cooperation in certain areas and deepen their relationships in others as will be discussed below, but they should go into such negotiations knowing that such opportunities will remain constrained and seldom be without serious potential drawbacks.

TABLE 11.3
Second-Order Effects of Cooperation in the Global Commons

Issue Area	Impact of Cooperating with One Power on Relations with the Other	Positive Externalities	Negative Externalities
Maintaining freedom of access to space	Increasing U.S.-China cooperation in space could be viewed as a threat to Russian interests	Enhanced ability to manage issue of space debris, prevent weaponization of space	May constrain U.S. freedom of access to greater degree than Russian/Chinese freedom of access
Dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks	None	Potential benefits in select, tightly scoped areas (e.g., drug trade)	May harm the United States' reputation as a champion for the rule of law and affect its cooperation with partners and allies
Countering violent extremist organizations	Expanding Russian influence in Africa by conducting CVEO operations could engender competition with China on the continent	Facilitates economy of force and more efficient CVEO campaigns, and improves security of regional partners	Complicity with or tacit endorsement of heavy-handed methods and broad applications of "extremist" could exacerbate drivers of radicalization
Promoting global stability	Increasing Russian or Chinese influence through engagement on stability promotion could drive competition for natural resource equities, especially in Africa	Addresses instability driving refugee and migrant crises, alleviating pressure on neighboring states	Provides opportunities for China and Russia to expand their influence and military presence; could drive arms proliferation and undermine democracy development
Preserving access to the air and maritime commons	None	Safer air and maritime traffic for anyone transiting the region	None
Preventing nuclear arms races	Focusing on seeking a nuclear arms agreement with China at the expense of continuing an arms control regime with Russia	Ensures that U.S. remains a reliable provider of a nuclear security umbrella for its allies, and reduces the need for European allies to potentially increase their respective nuclear arsenals	Provides clear red lines that Russia and China may seek to work around, while immediately available nuclear arms control agreements may not include the breadth of capabilities that the United States wants
Preventing militarization of the Arctic	Supporting China's bid for more open access to the Arctic could squeeze Russia's interests	None	Bilateral cooperation risks undercutting the other Arctic nations, many of which are U.S. allies
Maintaining the openness of cyberspace	None	None	May diminish the United States' and its allies' leadership of free and open access to internet and independent and objective online information

Recommendation 2: Expand Counterdrug Cooperation Potentially with China

U.S.-China cooperation on countering fentanyl production and trade would align with the two countries' (at least rhetorical) agreement on the need to dismantle transnational criminal networks and the threats that Fentanyl smuggling causes to both countries. Counternarcotics was identified as one of the two remaining areas for cooperation with China by U.S. diplomats in 2018, along with countering wildlife trade.¹ As U.S.-China relations worsen, the two countries may still seek to cooperate on countering narcotics—an issue that causes not only security but also health and economic concerns.

China remains one of the world's biggest manufacturers of chemical precursors for fentanyl and methamphetamine, which seep into the American illicit drug market, and China was the dominant direct exporter of fentanyl and its analogues to the United States in 2019.² However, expansion of U.S.-China cooperation on counternarcotics could be hindered by China's hesitancy to commit meaningful resources and the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. When Trump said that China was not doing enough to combat fentanyl in 2019, Beijing called such accusations "blatant slander."³

Despite the tense relations between the two countries, some cooperation already exists—in 2018, presidents of both countries agreed to clamp down on Chinese sales of fentanyl abroad, and U.S. agencies have already embarked on a dialogue on combating the flow of illicit drugs from China into the United States.⁴ Domestically, since May 2019, China controls all forms of fentanyl as a class of drugs, fulfilling a commitment that it made during the 2018 G-20 summit, thus leading to stricter domestic control measures.⁵ Beijing itself, however, holds that the U.S.-China cooperation on investigating and prosecuting fentanyl smuggling is "limited." Analysis shows that the enforcement of U.S.-China cooperation on countering fentanyl so far has been varied, and Western experts have expressed doubts about China's commitment.⁶ To avoid political issues interfering with practical cooperation on this issue, one expert suggests distancing U.S. counternarcotics policy from rivalry with China.⁷

¹ Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Carol Graham, Keith Humphreys, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Bryce Pardo, Peter Reuter, Bradley D. Stein, and Paul H. Wise, *The Opioid Crisis in America: Domestic and International Dimensions*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 2020.

² U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control*, Washington, D.C., March 2020.

³ "China Says Has Only 'Limited' Cooperation with U.S. on Fentanyl," Reuters, September 3, 2019.

⁴ Knierim, 2018.

⁵ DEA, 2020.

⁶ Vera, 2018; Landay, 2019a, 2019b.

⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Fentanyl and Geopolitics: Controlling Opioid Supply from China," Brookings Institution, July 22, 2020.

Recommendation 3: Consider Expanding Cooperation with Russia and China on CVEO and Ending Long-Standing Conflicts in Low-Priority Regions

Even though both Russia and China have vested interests in combating Islamic terrorism, cooperation with both powers proves difficult. China's counterterrorism operations, in practice, remain mostly focused on domestic threats and too closely linked with its oppression of its own Uyghur Muslim minority—which the United States has condemned as a “rampant abuse of the human rights and religious freedoms”—to allow for much in the way of U.S.-China cooperation in this area.⁸ Russia, by contrast, has been more active internationally on counterterrorism but not always in ways that are supportive to U.S. interests or in a manners that would live up to American standards in terms of minimizing collateral damage.

Despite all this, there may still be some room for U.S.-Russia cooperation on counterterrorism. First, the United States and Russia have done so in the past. As noted in Chapter Five, they deconflicted operations in Syria and shared intelligence in the aftermath of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and the two powers should be able to continue such lesser forms of cooperation going forward. Moreover, as also noted in Chapter Five, one of the principal drawbacks to cooperating with Russia on counterterrorism in places such as Africa is a loss of American influence. If, however, the United States is serious about the NDS's statement that “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security” and that certain parts of the world—including Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East—are tertiary concerns, then the United States may begin to view cooperation with Russia as the lesser evil.⁹ After all, if the United States or its allies is not willing to commit resources to these problems, then the United States will face a choice: Cooperate with Russia on counterterrorism in these regions or let these problems fester.

A similar logic applies to ending long-standing conflicts. As discussed in Chapter Six, China and Russia will never be the United States' preferred partners in ending long-standing civil wars. China and Russia would also only participate in such an effort if they stood benefit economically or strategically from the endeavor, and the United States, by definition, would lose control over the outcome if it invited a rival great power participation. Still, if the United States is serious about disengaging or at least minimizing its investments from such efforts, then cooperation with Russia or China may be the least bad option.

⁸ Scott Simon and Adrian Zenz, “China Suppression of Uyghur Minorities Meets U.N. Definition of Genocide, Report Says,” National Public Radio, July 4, 2020; David J. Ranz, “Confronting Atrocities in China: The Global Response to the Uyghur Crisis,” U.S. Department of State, June 6, 2019.

⁹ DoD, 2018c, p. 1.

Recommendation 4: Consider Broadening the Arctic Forums to Discuss Security Issues

Even though the Arctic is routinely referred to as a potential flashpoint for future conflict, historically, it has also been an area for cooperation—even during intense great power competition, as in the Cold War. While the military buildup in the Arctic is bound up in the security dilemma and may prove difficult, or even impossible, to untangle, the United States, China, and Russia can at least ensure that lines of communications about Arctic security matters remain open. This could mean either broadening the agenda existing forums (e.g., the Arctic Council), including Russia and China in existing forums (e.g., the Arctic Security Forum), or expanding traditional forums to include Arctic policy (e.g., the NATO-Russia Council).

Importantly, as seemingly benign as these options are, they are not without their drawbacks. Like with any negotiations, more diplomacy may not necessarily lead to more cooperation. Moreover, expanding diplomacy also risks extending international legitimacy to Chinese and Russian actions. Including China in Arctic discussions risks *de facto* recognizing its claim as “near Arctic” nation and cementing its claim that it should have a say over Arctic affairs. More problematically, perhaps, restarting diplomacy with Russia would functionally mean reversing course on one of the punishments imposed by the West after Crimea. In other words, in Arctic diplomacy, talk may be cheap, but it certainly is not free. Ultimately, it is a judgement call whether the added benefits in terms of whether added stability that comes with a more robust diplomatic effort are worth the downsides.

Recommendation 5: Expand the Opportunities for Nuclear Dialogue

The United States should seek to expand the opportunities for dialogue on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear safety. U.S.-Soviet/Russia nuclear relations have historically proven that the presence of a nuclear dialogue across the Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy spectrum may be helpful in increasing each nation’s understanding of the other’s nuclear stance and bolster strategic stability. Because of the deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations and the system of “personalized rule” in Russia, the channels of political and military dialogue are, according to Angela Stent, scarcer than during the Cold War, increasing the potential for miscalculation.¹⁰

A dialogue with Russia may also help the United States achieve at least some progress on upgrading its nuclear engagement with China from Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues to more formal settings. It could also build on the interest of some Russian security experts to seek a nuclear dialogue between Russia and China, leveraging Russia’s comparatively lesser concern over China’s growing nuclear arsenal and the concerns by some Russian experts about the

¹⁰ Stent, 2019.

threat that China's nuclear weapons could pose to Russia.¹¹ Furthermore, although Russia's Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov has repeatedly expressed support for China's decision not to engage in a trilateral nuclear arms agreement, in 2013 he also recognized that in the future reduction of "strategic offensive weapons" will need to be discussed in multinational formats, at the time commenting on the collapse of the INF and mostly referring to the lack of willingness for further cuts in Russia's own arsenals.¹²

Recommendations for the Joint Force

For the most part, there are fewer opportunities for cooperation in the strictly military context rather than in other areas. Still, even here, there are some more limited opportunities for cooperation.

Recommendation 1: Focus on Deconfliction Efforts with Russia on Countering Violent Extremist Organizations

Russia is a suboptimal partner for the United States to fight VEOs. In Syria, Russia has called legitimate opposition groups to the Assad regime "terrorists," and in Afghanistan it has worked with other terrorist groups, notably to target American soldiers. Even when Russia does go after bona fide terrorist groups, its methods have been brutal and indiscriminate.

That said, the Joint Force still needs to work with—or at least deconflict—its efforts with Russia because Russia remains an actor on the CVEO battlefield, not only in Syria but also across Africa. Given the animosity between both sides and the host of other obstacles to cooperation, the United States and Russia are unlikely to achieve a very close relationship on this issue. Ideally, however, the United States and Russia would be able to, for example, deconflict targeting efforts such that both efforts are complementary. At very least, the United States and Russia need protocols to avoid confrontation by both sides like has occurred periodically in Syria.¹³ And as American and Russian forces find themselves in close proximity, this more tactical form of cooperation will become increasingly important to avoiding accidental conflict.

¹¹ Russia's Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov has repeatedly expressed support for China's decision not to engage in a trilateral nuclear arms agreement (Fink and Oliker, 2020; Vladimir Mukhin, "China's Nuclear Potential Threatens Not Only the United States, but Also Russia," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 17, 2019).

¹² Fink and Oliker, 2020.

¹³ Dan Lamothe, "U.S. Troops Injured in Altercation with Russian Military Patrol in Syria," *Washington Post*, August 26, 2020.

Recommendation 2: Increase Coordination on Counterpiracy and Maritime Search and Rescue

Although the issue has died down somewhat as of late, counterpiracy is another potential area for great power cooperation. All three powers benefit from unmolested maritime trade. Moreover, given the imbalance between warships and aircraft available to patrol pirate invested waters versus the vastness of the maritime domain, there is a strategic logic to cooperation among the three nations. Even here, though, the potential for cooperation faces limitations. As discussed in Chapter Seven, coordinating counterpiracy efforts may be difficult in strategically sensitive areas (e.g., given the strategic sensitivities surrounding the South China Sea, the United States and China may be less inclined to coordinate counterpiracy efforts in that region) and even in relatively neutral regions (e.g., counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden), operational security concerns check the degree of intelligence-sharing and operational deconfliction between the three areas.

Recommendation 3: Choose a Strategic Path for Arctic Force and Stick with It

As discussed in Chapter Nine, the United States and Russia are caught in a security dilemma in the Arctic whereby any military buildup by one provokes a reaction by the other two, creating a vicious cycle of insecurity. Functionally, the United States—and more specifically DoD—has two ways to address this security dilemma. First, it could continue to build up in the Arctic, on the grounds that it would be more able to cooperate from the position of strength and presence in the region. Second, it could limit its own build in the region—particularly of capabilities that would be threatening to the other two powers, such as additional fifth-generation aircraft in Alaska—on the assumption that deescalation would encourage responses in kind.

Both approaches have downsides. Increasing U.S. Arctic capabilities comes with the risks of exacerbating the security dilemma in the Arctic, potentially prompting China and Russia to respond in kind, and potentially sucking the United States into an increasingly costly arms race in the region. Conversely, sticking with the status quo or even reducing U.S. capabilities in the Arctic region could leave the United States' Arctic equities vulnerable, especially since it is highly unlikely that Russia would be interested in reducing its military presence in the Arctic. Moreover, the United States chooses to position aircraft in Alaska not mainly because it wants or believes it needs to fight in the Arctic, but because these bases allow the United States to more easily project power into Asia and to defend the U.S. homeland. This means that a reduction of its presence in the Arctic would be felt beyond just the Arctic.

Ultimately, it is not necessarily clear which of these two approaches will be more successful and which set of risks are more tolerable. Either way, DoD and the Joint Force will need to make a choice between the two mutually exclusive approaches and stick with it.

Recommendations for the Department of the Air Force

Finally, there are even fewer opportunities for cooperation that are specific to the Department of the Air Force—the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Space Force (USSF). Still, a couple do stand out.

Recommendation 1: Increase Communication over Space Debris Management

Although most of the military uses of space remains a strategically sensitive area for all three powers, there could be some room for great power cooperation on space debris. As discussed in Chapter Three, all three powers share an interest in mapping and tracking space debris to ensure that their satellites can avoid it. Eventually, all three powers could consider banning ASAT detonations that can create debris. Given that other countries (such as India) also are developing these capabilities, this would need to be multinational agreement. Moreover, given that both China and Russia view these capabilities as vital to their own defense, finding true common ground may be difficult. Still, it is an opportunity that has some promise, at least in the abstract, and one that the USSF should consider going forward.

Recommendation 2: Continue and Routinize Airspace Deconfliction to Ensure “Safe Competition”

As the USAF bumps up against Russian and Chinese aircraft not only in Syria but also in other regions, there is more of a need to practice “safe competition.” All three powers will continue to press each other’s limits in the air—be it through long-range bomber flights, surveillance flights, or with other aircraft. Still, all three sides have an interest in ensuring that this brinksmanship does not lead to collisions, unintended escalation, or even accidental conflict. Consequently, there is room for tactical cooperation, or at least deconfliction, between the powers to avoid these scenarios or at least act as firebreaks on the escalation chain to prevent tactical mishaps from turning into full-on conflicts.

Final Thoughts

Historically, cooperation in the global commons has come in fits and starts. Interests in topics such as arms control or countering international crime or joint space ventures have waxed and waned over the decades. As of early 2021, we are arguably at a nadir for such efforts. Still, if history is any precedent, cooperation in the global commons is possible even in periods of intense strategic competition, and, at some point, there will once again be more interest in great power cooperation. These ventures, even if they occur, will not upend the era of strategic competition, but perhaps they will make great power relations moderately more stable and more likely to remain peaceful, if tense. And that itself is a worthwhile goal.

Abbreviations

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AOR	area of responsibility
AQ	al Qaeda
ASAT	antisatellite
CAR	Central African Republic
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CNAS	Center for a New American Security
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTOC	countering transnational organized crime
CVEO	counter-violent extremist organization
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EU	European Union
FSB	Federal Security Service
HTS	Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICT	information and communications technology
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSR	Northern Sea Route
NSS	National Security Strategy (U.S.)
ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PMC	private military contractor
PNT	position, navigation, and timing
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TCN	transnational criminal network
TOC	transnational organized crime
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USSF	U.S. Space Force
VEO	violent extremist organization

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If there is a set of issues where great power cooperation could be most likely, it should be in the global commons. Global commons issues are—by definition—shared by multiple nations. As part of a broader study of great power cooperation in an era of strategic competition, the authors assessed the potential for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on eight global commons issues: maintaining freedom of access to space, dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks, countering violent extremist organizations, promoting global stability, preserving access to the air and maritime commons, preventing nuclear arms races, preventing militarization of the Arctic, and maintaining the openness of cyberspace. The authors sought to understand where the United States, China, and Russia share interests on these issues, what the obstacles to cooperation are, and where the United States might be able to deepen its cooperation with one or both powers.

The authors find that the trade space for cooperation is already narrow and usually focused more on civilian aspects of these domains rather than core security matters. In general, there is more room for the United States to cooperate with Russia than with China, and there are significant obstacles to cooperation, with a lack of trust being the most common. Finally, cooperation produces both positive and negative externalities, and the costs of cooperation do not always outweigh the likely benefits.

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