Unraveling Entanglement Policy Implications of Using Non-Dedicated Systems for Nuclear Command and Control

Abstract

The systems used for command and control in the U.S. military are undergoing modernization with an eye toward greater integration and interoperability. Recent arguments have emphasized the increased risk of inadvertent escalation from integrating and comingling systems that support conventional command and control and systems that support nuclear command and control (NC2). We argue that these concerns are overstated and that the risks introduced are manageable. That said, the different risks associated with using non-dedicated systems for NC2 warrant more-focused attention to (1) achieve mission assurance for command and control, (2) retain presidential and senior leader confidence in command and control capabilities even when systems degrade under attack, and (3) control the ability to send and receive signals of resolve and restraint through command and control.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 13, 2023
Accession Number
AD1195549

Entities

People

  • Alexis A. Blanc
  • Don A. Snyder

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Cyber

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Cold War
  • Command And Control
  • Command And Control Systems
  • Control Systems
  • Corporations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Governments
  • Ground Based
  • International Security
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Public Policy
  • Resource Management
  • Security
  • Space Force
  • Strategic Weapons
  • United States
  • Warfare
  • Warning Systems
  • Weapon Delivery
  • Weapons

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • Enterprise Information Systems Architecture and Joint Command Capability Interoperability Support.
  • Systems Analysis and Design

Technology Areas

  • Fully Networked C3
  • Fully Networked C3 - Command and Control