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COMBATING PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES OF THE YAOUNDÉ ARCHITECTURE FOR MARITIME SECURITY

by

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Gulf of Guinea (GoG) member nations that signed the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS) in June 2013 must work together to combat piracy and other maritime crimes. Despite international backing for this initiative, maritime security challenges have grown. In the GoG, seafarers are abducted, tortured, and ransomed more often than elsewhere. The regional response to maritime security issues in the GoG has not been effective because of several factors, including the cooperation's non-binding code of conduct, the insufficient implementation and operationalization of YAMS owing to its cumbersome design, and the member states' different interests and limited capacities to support their own maritime security. Drawing on open-source literature, including academic research, newspaper articles, and government reports, this study examines these factors that have hindered swift and effective implementation of YAMS. Through case studies of select member states, the thesis argues that these GoG nations with land-based security challenges must not only direct more resources to their respective navies but also collaborate to enhance YAMS. Piracy knows no borders, and thus, it requires a collective response. The thesis recommends GoG governments to seek regional solutions.

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Gulf of Guinea piracy, member states, interests, capacity, trust, HoS Summit, maritime security, YAMS, Yaoundé Code of Conduct, YCC, Interregional Coordination Center, ICC, CRESMAC, CRESMAO, GoG

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COMBATING PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES OF THE YAOUNDÉ ARCHITECTURE FOR MARITIME SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Gulf of Guinea (GoG) member nations that signed the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS) in June 2013 must work together to combat piracy and other maritime crimes. Despite international backing for this initiative, maritime security challenges have grown. In the GoG, seafarers are abducted, tortured, and ransomed more often than elsewhere. The regional response to maritime security issues in the GoG has not been effective because of several factors, including the cooperation's non-binding code of conduct, the insufficient implementation and operationalization of YAMS owing to its cumbersome design, and the member states' different interests and limited capacities to support their own maritime security. Drawing on open-source literature, including academic research, newspaper articles, and government reports, this study examines these factors that have hindered swift and effective implementation of YAMS. Through case studies of select member states, the thesis argues that these GoG nations with land-based security challenges must not only direct more resources to their respective navies but also collaborate to enhance YAMS. Piracy knows no borders, and thus, it requires a collective response. The thesis recommends GoG governments to seek regional solutions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS	Automatic Identification System
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
CMC	Center for Maritime Coordination
CNS	Cameroon Navy Ship
CPB	Coastal Patrol Boat
CRESMAC	Regional Center for Maritime Security for Central Africa
CRESMAO	Regional Center for Maritime Security for West Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FLEC	Force of Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
FP	Focal Point
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
GoGIN	Gulf of Guinea Information Network
HoS	Heads of State and Government
ICC	Interregional Coordination Center
ICC/IMB	International Commercial Crime Services/International Marine Bureau
IMB/PRC	International Maritime Bureau/Pirate Reporting Center
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
IPV	Inshore Patrol Vessel
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MDAT-GoG	Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MMCC	Multinational Maritime Coordination Center
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOC	Maritime Operations Center
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSCC	Maritime Surveillance and Coordination Center
NEMO	Navy Exercises for Maritime Operations
NN	Nigerian Navy
OE	Obangame Express
OPV	Offshore Operational Vessel
RCMS	Regional Center for Maritime Security
RMAC	Regional Maritime Awareness Capacity
RMSC	Regional Maritime Security Center
RPB	Rapid Patrol Boat
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
VTMIS	Vessel Traffic Management Information System
YAMS	Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security
YARIS	Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System
YCC	Yaoundé Code of Conduct
ZOR	Zone of Responsibility

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

During the early 2010s, countries from West and Central Africa established a framework for international maritime security cooperation in response to the rising threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).[1] Twenty-five heads of state (HoS) and governments from the GoG signed the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC) in June 2013 reaffirming their resolve in principle to eradicate maritime piracy in the region.[2] The framework they crafted at the summit is known as the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS).[3] Despite widespread international support for this initiative, maritime security threats have become more severe in recent years. In contrast to the rest of the world, crews are frequently kidnapped in the GoG and held for ransom.[4]

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[1] Ken Ifesinachi and Chikodiri Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 2015, 54, https://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/view/27092/0; Fru Suh I. Norbert, "Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG): Reinventing the Past to Explain the Origin and Development of Maritime Insecurity," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 4, no. 2 (2017): 33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664152; C. Nna-Emeka Okereke, "Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," in *The Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Usman A. Tar (London and New York: Routledge, 2021), 360–75, https://ebrary.net/148854/political_science/strategic_gulf_guinea.

[2] Gulf of Guinea (GoG) States, "The Gulf of Guinea States: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The Landlocked States Are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger," February 7, 2022, 1; Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)," Readkong, 2013, https://www.readkong.com/page/yaounde-architecture-for-maritime-security-and-safety-5126347; Dryad Global, "Yaounde Code of Conduct Taking Shape in the Gulf of Guinea," 2020, https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/yaounde-code-of-conduct-taking-shape-in-the-gulf-of-guinea; Heads of State Summit GoG, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African on 25 June 2013, on Maritime Safety and Security in Their Common Maritime Domain (GoG)," June 2013, https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/DECLARACAO-DE-YAOUNDE-EN.pdf; Kamal-Deen Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges* (Netherlands: Brill, 2015), act 1.

[3] Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)."

[4] Spyridon Chiotis, "The Grim Realities of a Ship Hijacking in the Gulf of Guinea," *International Journal of Maritime Crime and Security* 02, no. 01 (September 5, 2021), https://doi.org/10.24052/IJMCS/V02IS01/ART-3; ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021," ICC IMB, 2021, https://www.icc-ccs.org/reports/2021_Q1_IMB_Piracy_Report.pdf.

This thesis seeks to answer the question: Why has the threat of piracy continued to grow in the Gulf of Guinea despite the expansion of international cooperation to combat it?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The research is significant for the following reasons. First, the thesis provides the necessary intellectual contribution required to enhance regional maritime security cooperation. A comprehensive and more robust collaborative maritime strategy would serve to secure the GoG from piracy and transnational threats by guaranteeing an enabling environment for peace, stability, and economic development of the region. The rise in piracy and other maritime crimes in the GoG have revealed the region's inadequate maritime domain awareness and calls for effective collaborative multilateral mechanisms to counter these threats. Therefore, building an effective collaborative capacity for the YAMS may go a long way to eradicate piracy in the GoG.

Second, the thesis contributes an original viewpoint to the growing field of maritime security studies. This thesis gives a complete structural, conceptual, and empirical assessment of the many marine security challenges in the GoG, whereas most current maritime literature concentrates on specific concerns.[5]

Third, the thesis stresses a fresh strategy for comprehending maritime security issues in the GoG.[6] This thesis emphasizes the "land-sea nexus" components of maritime security risks, an approach which differs from the popular one. Furthermore, the study's findings will also better prepare policymakers to tackle maritime security issues.[7]

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Before delving into the literature review, I'll discuss trends in maritime threats in the GoG and the challenges of achieving maritime security cooperation.

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[5] Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 16.

[6] Ali, 17.

[7] Ali, 17; Charles Ukeje and Wullson Mvomo Ela, *African Approaches to Maritime Security: The Gulf of Guinea*, 2013, act 13.

1. Trends in Maritime Threats in the GoG

The difficulty and complexity of combating piracy and maritime crimes in the GoG pose an enormous challenge. In 2004, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) rated the GoG "second in the number of piracy attacks only to the Strait of Malacca," and in August of 2011, part of the GoG became classified as "a war risk zone for shipping," achieving the same risk category as Somalia.[8] In November 2011, a UN delegation assessed the threat of piracy in the GoG and made recommendations on combating piracy to the UN; these eventually led to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2018 in 2011 and UNSCR 2039 in 2012, "condemning piracy and armed robbery in the region and calling for a comprehensive strategy among all affected states."[9]

In recent years, piracy in the GoG has been on the rise.[10] The attackers' major objective is money and their modus operandi involves hijacking the ship, kidnapping its crew, seizing cargo, and demanding ransom payment from the shipping company in exchange for the hostages.[11] The GoG registered the highest number of piracy attacks in 2018 compared to other regions in the world.[12] According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International Crisis Group (ICG), these attacks are growing daily

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[8] Matthew Fiorelli, "Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea," KAIPTC, August 2014, 6, https://www.kaiptc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/New%20folder/FiorelliM.2014-PIRACY-IN-AFRICA-THE-CASE-OF-THE-GULF-OF-GUINEA.pdf.

[9] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2018 (2011) On Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6645th Meeting," October 31, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2018; United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2039 (2012) On Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6727th Meeting," February 29, 2012, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/4fbe210f2.pdf.

[10] ICC/IMB 2020 PR, "Gulf of Guinea records highest ever number of crew kidnapped in 2020, according to IMB's annual piracy report," January 13, 2021, https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/gulf-of-guinea-records-highest-ever-number-of-crew-kidnapped-in-2020-according-to-imbs-annual-piracy-report/.

[11] Okereke, "Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 361.

[12] ICC/IMB, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period," 2018, https://www.seafarerswelfare.org/assets/documents/relief-funds/2018-Q1-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf; ICC/IMB, "Gulf of Guinea records highest ever number of crew kidnapped in 2020, according to IMB's annual piracy report"; Curtis Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States.," Stable Seas, November 2021, https://www.stableseas.org/post/pirates-of-the-gulf-of-guinea-a-cost-analysis-for-coastal-states; International Crisis Group (ICG), "The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone," December 12, 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/gulf-guinea-new-danger-zone.

"because of limited maritime security presence," and in 2013, "1,871 seafarers were victims of attacks and 279 were taken hostage," as stated in the report.[13] In 2014 a total of "41 incidents were confirmed to the IMB PRC [Pirate Reporting Center] in West Africa. The target of the hijackings is mainly product tankers from which the cargo is stolen and transshipped to smaller tankers."[14]

Oil theft or illegal "bunkering represents yet another category of threats to the smooth conduct of commerce in the GoG," and the Council of the European Union (EU) estimates that Nigeria loses "100,000 barrels of crude oil per day" due to theft.[15] In addition, the GoG is a "preferred transit hub" in the global trade on drugs.[16]

Incidents of maritime crime are on the rise. In 2020, 27 of the world's 28 recorded maritime kidnappings occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, where 623 seafarers were exposed to kidnapping, while only eight seafarers suffered a similar threat anywhere else.[17] Figure 1 shows trends in the incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the GoG from 2011 to 2020. The GoG has led the world in pirate attacks for about a decade. It is confirmed that out of the 106 incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2020 in the GoG, 50 occurred beyond the territorial waters (47 percent) while only three of Southeast Asia's 103 incidents occurred beyond territorial waters (3 percent).[18]

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[13] International Crisis Group (ICG), "The Gulf of Guinea"; ICC/IMB, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period."

[14] Fiorelli, "Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea," 7; Norbert, "Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)," 46; Tom Connolly, "Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: A Maritime Burden," *Foreign Brief*, September 24, 2019, https://www.foreignbrief.com/africa/piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-a-maritime-burden/.

[15] European Union, "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea: Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Brussels," European Union, March 17, 2014, eu_strategy_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_7.pdf.

[16] European Union.

[17] Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States.," 3.

[18] Bell et al., 3.

Figure 1. Incidents of GoG Piracy and Armed Robbery, 2011–2020.[19]

2. The Challenge of Achieving Maritime Security Cooperation in the GoG

Piracy and maritime crimes are transnational in nature, and these cannot be addressed in isolation but with a holistic approach that considers both the land and the maritime spaces as a unified entity.[20] The geo-strategic importance of the GoG cannot be overstated, with respect to its enormous deposits of natural resources and commerce; however, the dynamic nature of the maritime threat and its detrimental effects on commerce and the economies of member states, warrants a more robust architecture to secure the sea-lanes of communication (SLOC).[21] In line with this argument, C. Nna-Emeka Okereke argues that "the security of the maritime domain has over the centuries been fraught with changing dimensions of threat requiring robust maritime security architecture to safeguard the seaways."[22]

[19] Adapted from Bell et al., 3; ICC IMB, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021."

[20] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea"; Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 375.

[21] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 57.

[22] Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 1.

The GoG is confronted with challenging maritime security issues, and most of the scholarship on these growing security threats concludes that insecurity in the GoG demands an urgent solution that is comprehensive, inclusive, and transcends the current bureaucratic YAMS, which is limited to information sharing.[23]

This section reviews the literature on the weaknesses in this architecture that account for its inability to overcome the growing range of maritime threats in the region. In particular, it reviews four challenges that YAMS faces: diverse interests of member states; a lack of member state capabilities; a shortage of trust among member states; and design features of YAMS that inhibit effective cooperation.

a. Diverse Interests of Member States

The difficulty in the implementation of the YCC rests on the argument that states have competing interests and these interests have direct impacts on the maritime security environment in the GoG and on how to effectively counter piracy.[24] According to Edwin Egede, "the divergence in national strategic interests in maritime security" perceived from a purely nationalistic perspective may push some states to prioritize their maritime security interests in favor of certain maritime crimes while ignoring others in the region.[25] Egede argues, "some states may focus only on the suppression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, for others it may be Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, while for others it may be illicit drug and human trafficking at sea."[26] Some scholarship argues that "the GoG geopolitical, economic, and geostrategic interests regarding maritime security initiatives" are intricately linked to Africa's colonial history, which involves a mixture of cultures of coastal

[23] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 54–57; Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 373–375.

[24] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea."

[25] Edwin Egede, "Balancing Geopolitical Economic and Geostrategic Interests in Maritime Security Initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea – Way Forward: The 3 Cs" (Conference, Global Maritime Security Conference, Abuja, Nigeria, 2019), 2, https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/127234.

[26] Egede, 2.

and landlocked Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, and Spanish-speaking states, and reflects diversity in language, domestic institutions, and legal framework.[27]

The question of interests is one of the most contested issues among the 25 members states that signed the YCC, which also outlines measures to be adopted in combating threats to their shared maritime domain.[28] The states have different economic and political interests. The quantity of natural resources that each state has is different in terms of oil deposits, minerals, and the coastline. For example, Nigeria and Angola produce about five million barrels of crude per day while some countries with narrow coastlines such as Benin and Togo, for example, do not drill any crude but depend heavily on maritime trade and shipping.[29] The stakes and national priorities of each member state are different. Therefore, the variation in the level of interest of the member states impedes their ability to collaborate effectively and commit to the YAMS.[30]

b. Member State Capacity

The issue of tradeoffs is very important. Moreover, the fact that the GoG is vast, with about 6,000 kilometers of coastline, warrants substantial capabilities.[31]According to Egede, "the complexity with regard to the differing economic capabilities by the various states in the region, with some states being more resource rich than others, thus highlight [s] a divergence in terms of the economic wherewithal to implement maritime security initiatives."[32]

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[27] Egede, 1.

[28] Heads of State Summit GoG, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African on 25 June 2013, on Maritime Safety and Security in Their Common Maritime Domain (GoG)"; Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea."

[29] Christina Barla and Nitin Agarwala, "Comparing Maritime Piracy along the Coasts of Africa: In Search of a Solution for the Gulf of Guinea," *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India* 16, no. 2 (July 2, 2020): 13–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2020.1836774; Barla and Agarwala.

[30] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea"; Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security."

[31] Norbert, "Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG): Reinventing the Past to Explain the Origin and Development of Maritime Insecurity."

[32] Egede, "Balancing Geopolitical Economic and Geostrategic Interests in Maritime Security Initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea - Way Forward," 2.

According to Okereke, the absence of adequate capacity is a major obstacle to implementing YAMS.[33] The author argues, "virtually all the navies of the littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea lack adequate capacities for maritime surveillance and intervention, some do not have basic capacities. Existing variations in the capacities for information sharing, maritime domain awareness (MDA), and enforcement constitute major inhibitions."[34] In line with this argument, ADM John M. Richardson concurs that most member states lack adequate MDA/interdiction capabilities to detect and monitor threats in their territorial waters and EEZ as well as to secure their maritime resources.[35] The United States, European countries (especially France), and the European Union have tried to build partners' capacity, but so far these efforts do not seem to have resulted in major improvements in most states' capabilities.[36]

Some scholarship asserts that the repressive nature of the YCC is a drain on economic resources as some member states are compelled to spend hugely from their meagre resources to procure naval assets and train personnel.[37] Such authors argue "the unprecedented diversion of scarce capital in the budget for the procurement of sophisticated military hardware, thereby denying capital projects in education, health, agriculture, and construction sectors from the needed attention," is having a negative impact on countering piracy.[38]

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[33] Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 373.

[34] Okereke, 373.

[35] Admiral John M. Richardson, "Why ICB Matters for Maritime Security," *Maritime Security*, March 2022, 1, https://instituteforsecuritygovernance.org/documents/113018911/125185574/MarSec+V8.5.pdf/a587ac6b-9a71-8a7d-a5ba-6131df25bf03?t=1611090666550; Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security' A Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency," 373.

[36] Alexander Nicoll and Jessica Delaney, eds., "AFRICOM: The United States' New Combatant Command," *Strategic Comments* 13, no. 2 (March 2007): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1080/13567880701374871; All Africa Global Media, "How Obangame Express Is Helping Keep West African Waters Safe - U.S., Nigerian Navy Chiefs," *AllAfrica*, March 15, 2019, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2191314659/citation/9D88289CB0714BFFPQ/9; European Union, "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea: Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Brussels."

[37] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 56.

[38] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, 56.

c. Trust between Member States

Collaborations such as the YAMS require trust between parties. According to Susan Page Hocevar, "collaboration includes elements of information sharing, coordination, cooperation, and unified action among nations," and she argues that effective collaboration is hindered by "mistrust based on competition over interests, nationalism, lack of resources, and technocratic obstacles to information sharing."[39] The author argues further that "the foundations for mutual trust can be built through the development of symposia for communities of interest, bilateral agreements, regional partnership, and international standards."[40] According to Aaron M. Hoffman, "Trust refers to an actor's willingness to place its interests under the control of others based on the belief that those actors will honor their obligation to avoid using their discretion in a harmful manner."[41] This means trust involves risks and obligations.[42] There is a lack of scholarship on the levels of trust between YAMS member states. However, building on the more general literature, it is possible to note the major areas of focus for YAMS members would include areas of maritime cooperation, bilateral agreements, member states' participation in joint operational exercises like the Obangame Express and Grand Africa Nemo, member states commitment/engagement in regional organizations, absence of territorial disputes, and indicators of peaceful resolution of disputes as a function of trust. More trust would imply more cooperation.

d. Design Features of the International Arrangement

The YAMS of the GoG is an ambitious work of international cooperation whose keystone is the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.[43] According to the HoS summit of June 25, 2013, the leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic

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[39] Susan Page Hocevar, "'Building Collaborative Capacity for Maritime Security.' In Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security," *Georgetown University Press,* no. edited by SCOTT JASPER (2012): 123–26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt578.14.

[40] Hocevar, 123.

[41] Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualisation of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 394, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066102008003003.

[42] Hoffman, 379.

[43] Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)."

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) gathered in Yaoundé to design a regional strategy to prevent and prosecute illicit activities in the GoG's maritime space.[44] Consequently, the YCC, the Heads of State Declaration, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) amongst regional organizations were all established. This process contributed to the elaboration of the YAMS.

This architecture consists of a complex multi-layered construction with the interregional coordination center (ICC), at the strategic level, which is responsible for the coordination and information-sharing structure that connects the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Security for Central Africa (CRESMAC) and the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Security for West Africa (CRESMAO). At the multinational level, there are five multinational maritime coordination centers (MMCC), and these correspond to the five maritime zones (A, B, D, E, F, and G), where each zone represents a group of member states spread along the coastline. Finally, at the state level, there are maritime operations centers (MOC), planned in each nation to include not only the national navies in charge of coordination, but also the primary maritime stakeholders associated with state action at sea (maritime police, customs, fisheries and environment protection, merchant marines), as depicted in Figure 2.[45] These international and domestic bureaucratic structures create a potential heaviness that hinders the development of the architecture due to the lack of development of national capacities, the lack of means, and the parsimonious manner of activating the MMCC, while the lack of will to act effectively renders this architecture powerless.[46]

Researchers agree that YAMS emphasizes information sharing more than any other function. According to Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, the rise in piracy and maritime crime in the GoG has exposed the limited levels of detection capability in the region.[47] The author

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[44] Heads of State Summit.

[45] Heads of State Summit.

[46] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 56.

[47] Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," *Africa Security Brief*, no. 30 (February 2015): 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA618297.pdf.

argues "while progress has been made, stronger political commitment is needed if regional maritime security cooperation plans are to be operationalized."[48] This argument is supported by other authors who assert that, in spite of the efforts made so far by the current GoG security architecture and the regional organizations, maritime security threats in the GoG still pose serious challenges, and the existing security architecture fails to provide a platform for dialogue between the state and the local coastal communities.[49]



Figure 2. YAMS. Gulf of Guinea Information Sharing Framework.[50]

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

From the literature review, three potential hypotheses emerge, which serve as the basis for this thesis:

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[48] Osinowo, 1.

[49] Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea"; Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security."

[50] Source: Raymond Gilpin, and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Africa Center's Assis Malaquias Recognized for Work on Maritime Security," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies* (blog), 30 July 15, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/malaquias-recognized-work-maritime-security/.

H1. Structural characteristics of YAMS: The first hypothesis is that cooperation is limited and ineffective because YAMS facilitates information sharing but not kinetic operations to deter or disrupt piracy. For example, the heaviness in the architecture inhibits timely information sharing to the tactical units. The challenge of network coverage impacts negatively on the effectiveness of the design.

H2. Interests: The second hypothesis is that cooperation between YAMS member states is limited or ineffective because they have divergent interests—economic, political, security, and social—that may impact its effectiveness in combating piracy.

H3. Capabilities: The third hypothesis is that cooperation is limited and ineffective because YAMS members lack the capability, specifically the technical means, to identify threats or take action to counter piracy.

"Virtually all the navies of the littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea lack adequate capacities for maritime surveillance and intervention, some do not have basic capacities."[51] This means the absence of platforms (ships, planes, drones, and MDA-coastal radars) for patrols; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and interdiction operations.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The thesis focuses on the three key hypotheses by examining the type of evidence that will help assess whether the interests, capabilities, or design features of YAMS are undermining its effectiveness. In terms of design features, I examine, for example, the strengths and weaknesses of the of the system with respect to timely information sharing to the tactical units. In terms of interests, I examine, for example, how member states are impacted differently by security threats such as hostage-taking or resource theft, and how member states' different economic activities may produce their different levels of interest in maritime security. In terms of capabilities, I examine, for example, how much each member state is contributing and whether their capacity prevents them from contributing more.

51 Egede, "Balancing Geopolitical Economic and Geostrategic Interests in Maritime Security Initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea - Way Forward," 2.

Throughout the thesis, primary and secondary literature has been identified, collected, reviewed, and analyzed.[52] The basic data for this thesis comes from the official reports and papers of key international and regional organizations, including conventions and agreements. In addition to national legal instruments and policy texts, there are several other primary sources. In the thesis, secondary data sources include books, print and electronic journal articles, newspaper stories and critical commentary, and information from online sources as well as my experience serving in the Cameroon Navy and having been involved with capacity building operations (exercises) in the GoG.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter I, the Introduction, has presented the major research question, its significance, a literature review, the hypotheses guiding the study, and the research design. Chapter II, Building YAMS Institutions, examines the collaboration between members as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the YAMS. Chapter III, Building National Capacity, examines the impact member states' interests and capabilities on the effectiveness of YAMS. Chapter IV, Conclusion and Recommendations, summarizes the findings of this study and makes recommendations.

[52] Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 18.

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II. BUILDING YAMS INSTITUTIONS: THE CHALLENGES

> Our determination, our national and regional capacities, as well as our efforts to eradicate piracy seem inadequate to prevent or effectively stamp out the threat. Therefore, collective effort is a must, for us to avoid a situation where once eliminated in one country or area of the Gulf of Guinea, this scourge would rear the head in another.[53]

A. INTRODUCTION

The Yaoundé architecture for maritime security (or YAMS) is seen as a panacea for the multiple maritime security challenges of the GoG states. The YAMS is an ambitious work of international cooperation focused on coordinating an effective response to combat piracy and other maritime crimes in the GoG.[54] YAMS involves key actors, such as the regional economic communities of Central and West Africa States (ECCAS and ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Although each one has a different political agenda, they are committed to develop the blueprint for a regional strategy to combat and punish illegal activity in the GoG's marine space.[55] I argue that YAMS's structure is incomplete, bureaucratically heavy, and its components have unclear and even divergent goals. As a result, YAMS has been slow to operationalize its institutions, ineffective in sharing information, and therefore unable to achieve its goal of enhancing maritime security in the GoG.

This chapter examines why and how YAMS's incomplete structure has prevented its effectiveness in countering piracy. Specifically, the examination considers how YAMS's structural characteristics undermine its effectiveness, which include its (a) incomplete structure—which means that it cannot do what it was intended to do; lack of funding—which means that it does not have sufficient resources to accomplish its objective; its slow implementation—which means that the operationalization of its

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53 Okereke, "'Gulf of Guinea: Regional Architecture for Anti-Piracy and Maritime Security," 370.

54 Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)."

55 Omar Bongo et al., *Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)* (Libreville, Gabon, 2001), https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/Tratado-EN1.pdf; Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)."

structures is slow and hampers its effectiveness; its inefficient information-sharing capabilities—which means that kinetic response is uncoordinated and inefficient; and (b) its bureaucratic heaviness—which means that its many layers makes it complex and causes it to respond inefficiently; and its unclear goals—which means that it does not provide direction to its members;

B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE YAMS

The Yaoundé HoS summit of June 2013 on maritime safety and security of the GoG, inspired by the UNSCRs 2018 and 2039, put in place three mechanisms that have been used to elaborate the essential components of YAMS.[56] First, there is the HoS Declaration that was signed by the heads of state and government of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC, which reaffirmed their willingness to implement the regional strategy (YAMS) to counter piracy and other maritime crimes that impede maritime trade.[57] Second, the YCC was signed by the maritime or foreign affairs ministers of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC member states to counter piracy.[58] The YCC on the repression of piracy and other maritime crimes against ships was adopted to further foster cooperation efforts on information sharing, interdiction, and prosecution.[59] And third, there is the MoU between regional organizations and signed by the heads of the three regional organizations (ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC) and focused on the nature of the maritime security cooperation which aims at a synergy of action through interoperability and the pooling of

[56] Heads of State Summit, "Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS)"; United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2018 (2011) On Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6645th Meeting,"; United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2039 (2012) On Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6727th Meeting."

[57] Heads of State Summit GoG, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African on 25 June 2013, on Maritime Safety and Security in Their Common Maritime Domain (GoG)"; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, *African Approaches to Maritime Security*, 26.

[58] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea"; Global, "Yaounde Code of Conduct Taking Shape in the Gulf of Guinea."

[59] Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 4; Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea."

resources.[60] Article 2 of the MoU outlines the specific objectives of the cooperation, which include

> The coordination and implementation of joint activities; the promotion of partnership between the parties; regular exchanges of information and the sharing of experiences; the harmonization of procedures for the control of ships, port facilities, seafarers, shipowners and insurers in the field of maritime safety and security; the harmonization of legislation on piracy and other illegal activities committed at sea; the adoption and implementation of an Automatic Ship Notification (AIS) methodology; functioning of cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); and the promotion of the fight against maritime crime.[61]

While Article 2 is focused on objectives, other articles are focused on elements such as cooperation. Article 4 of the MoU lists the areas of cooperation between the signatory states, which include "technical cooperation; training and capacity building; information management and data collection; the mobilization of the resources necessary to achieve the objectives; the coordination of joint actions; management of sea borders; any other area of common interest" while Article 5 creates the ICC to ensure the implementation of the regional maritime safety and security strategy.[62] This implies that the ICC's role is to provide strategic direction to the two regional maritime security coordination centers (CRESMAC and CRESMAO). The regional centers oversee the MMCCs. The MMCCs, in turn, coordinate activities (information sharing, operations) with national MOCs through national focal points.

The ICC's objectives are focused on building capacity and promoting standardization and harmonization of texts as stated in the following passage:

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[60] Jens Herpolsheimer, "Transregional Conflicts and the Re-Spatialization of Regions 'at Sea': The Yaoundé Process in the Gulf of Guinea," *Comparativ*, December 8, 2018, 68–89 Pages, https://doi.org/10.26014/J.COMP.2018.06.04; Edwin Egede, "Gulf of Guinea and Maritime (In)Security: Musings on Some Implications of Applicable Legal Instruments," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 46, no. 2 (December 1, 2021): 391, https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol46/iss2/2; Global, "Yaounde Code of Conduct Taking Shape in the Gulf of Guinea."

[61] YAMS, "Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) on Safety and Security of the Maritime Space of the West and Central African States," June 25, 2013, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/27463-wd-memorandum_dentente_-_gulf_of_guinea_summit.pdf.

[62] YAMS.

> Building the capacities of the civilian and military personnel of the regions in maritime law enforcement; coordinate education and training; facilitate information exchange among the navies of the Member States; promote the standardization and harmonization of texts on maritime law enforcement including those relating to the fight against piracy, armed robbery, other illicit acts committed at sea.[63]

In order to effectively carry out its mission, the ICC is organized into five divisions, and these include Political Affairs and International cooperation; Information Management and Communications; Education and Training; Legal Affairs and Judicial Cooperation; and Administrative and Finance. The ICC has a division in charge of Information Management and Communications and the management of the ICC website, which normally falls under the responsibility of this division. I accessed this website with the goal of getting more information about its activities, such as its mission and objectives; unfortunately, none of the links to this information are working. The ICC website looks just like an "empty shell." The ICC, per the objectives identified above, is supposed to facilitate information exchange, but from the condition of its website it would appear the ICC is falling short in this area..

In addition, other relevant articles of the MoU include Article 6, which provides the support for all bilateral and multilateral international strategic partners in the implementation of this memorandum. Partners' support is important in building member states' capacity, especially for those who often lack the wherewithal to do so on their own. Article 7 lays down the rules for amendment, reprimand, and withdrawal. Article 7 is important for growth, adjustments, and for the freedom of action of its members. While these articles are all important, of particular interest to this thesis is Article 5. In addition to the reasons cited earlier, the ICC is the bridge that connects the two regional maritime security centers (CRESMAC and CRESMAO), which were created by ECCAS and ECOWAS, respectively, and form the backbone of this maritime architecture (YAMS) (see Figure 3).[64]

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[63] Yaounde CIC, "Presentation to the Interregional Coordination Center for the Execution of the Regional Strategy on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Yaoundé, July 13, 2017," https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-07-MSS-Cameroon-Bell-Bell-EN.pdf.

[64] Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea*, 2020.

In 2008, ECCAS was concerned about the rapid rise in maritime threats and their impact on commercial shipping within the waters of Central African States, especially within the Cameroon – Equatorial Guinea territorial waters, and felt the urgency to combat these threats.[65] In 2009, the failed attack at the residence of the President of Equatorial Guinea precipitated the ECCAS HoS meeting and the creation of the first regional center for maritime security (CRESMAC).[66] ECCAS adopted a maritime security strategy with the goal of securing sea lanes and offshore resources.[67] According to Article 5 of the ECCAS Protocol on maritime security, CRESMAC is designated as its strategic organ charged with the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of this maritime strategic mission:

> To ensure control of the maritime space of ECCAS members, particularly, the protection of natural resources and local maritime fishing areas; securing maritime routes (SLOC) and the fight against Illegal migration, drug trafficking, fraudulent circulation of small arms and light weapons, piracy and hostage-taking at sea, maritime pollution, and any other mission necessary for the implementation of this strategy.[68]

Even though CRESMAC was created in 2009, it would take at least five years to fully operationalize this important center, including a building, equipment, and international staff.[69]

The ECCAS maritime space is vast and covers an approximate distance of 3,307 kilometers.[70] The challenge of securing these waters for its seven coastal states demands

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65 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 236.

66 Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 267–93; Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 235–38.

67 ECCAS-Heads of State, "Protocol on ECCAS Maritime Security Strategy," October 24, 2009, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30854-doc-eccas_protocol_0.pdf.

68 ECCAS-Heads of State.

69 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 236 (note 61), 246; Séverin Ibara, "Pointe-Noire : Le Siège Du CRESMAC Officiellement Remis à La CEEAC [Official Handing Over of CRESMAC Headquarters to ECCAS in Point Noire, Congo]," October 21, 2014, https://www.adiac-congo.com/content/pointe-noire-le-siege-du-cresmac-officiellement-remis-la-ceeac-22100.

70 ECCAS-Heads of State, "Protocol on ECCAS Maritime Security Strategy," Article 5.

a more robust and inclusive strategy that accounts for issues of states' sovereignty.[71] Under Article 7 of the protocol, ECCAS maritime space is subdivided into three operational maritime zones, A (Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), B (Angola, Congo, Gabon), and D (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tomé and Principe), whose activities are coordinated within the multinational maritime coordination centers (MMCC).[72]

In 2014, ECOWAS developed the "ECOWAS integrated Maritime strategy (EIMS)" that sees the development of the blue economy premised upon a coherent security framework focused on countering piracy and other transnational maritime crimes.[73] ECOWAS also created the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Security in West Africa (or CRESMAO), with headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and subdivided within the regional maritime space into three zones, which consequently led to the creation of MMCC zones E, F, and G (Figure 4).[74] The CRESMAO activities cover three MMCCs. CRESMAO's strategic objectives based on the EIMS include "Strengthening maritime governance; safeguarding and securing the maritime space; managing the maritime environment; optimizing the ECOWAS maritime economy; and finally, promoting maritime awareness and research."[75]

In 2015, the MMCC Zone E composed of Benin, Nigeria, and Togo with headquarters in Cotonou, Benin was activated by the ECOWAS Commission as the pilot zone considered as the most dangerous maritime zone with increased incidents of piracy within the subregion, and this choice was facilitated by the already existing cooperation

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71 ECCAS-Heads of State, "Protocol on ECCAS Maritime Security Strategy."

72 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 237; ECCAS-Heads of State, "Protocol on ECCAS Maritime Security Strategy," Article 7.

73 ECOWAS, "ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy," 2014, https://www.gogmi.org.gh/_files/ugd/a5e83a_0095cc9a873a496ba92c9ffdf398f4f7.pdf?index=true; Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 232–34.

74 Gilpin, and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Africa Center's Assis Malaquias Recognized for Work on Maritime Security."

75 ECOWAS, "ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy," 8; Debi Ahoefa Broohm, Guohua Wang, and Juntao Gao, "Maritime Security: A New Strategy for Merchant Shipping to Avoid Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," *Open Journal of Social Sciences* 08, no. 05 (2020): 392–410, https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2020.85027.

between Nigeria and Benin.[76] According to Kamal-Deen Ali, EIMS mirrored and complemented the "maritime security framework of ECCAS" as a positive development.[77]



Figure 3. Multinational Maritime Coordination Zones in West and Central Africa.[78]

[76] Yaounde CIC, "Presentation to the Interregional Coordination Center for the Execution of the Regional Strategy on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Yaoundé, July, 13, 2017"; Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea."

[77] Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 234.

[78] Adapted from Gilpin, and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Africa Center's Assis Malaquias Recognized for Work on Maritime Security."



Figure 4. Existing Information Sharing Network.[79]

C. INCOMPLETE STRUCTURE

The incomplete operationalization of some components of the YAMS, such as the ICC, Regional Center for Maritime Security (RCMS), and the MMCC zones, has led to the slowness of the implementation of the architecture and creates an impediment to YAMS effectiveness. The main issue is that the regional centers and the MMCC zones are not all fully operational. Furthermore, there are other aspects of the structure that remain incomplete such as international staff, funding, and designation of a national focal point. The failure to implement the entire structure has stymied cooperation among YAMS members to combat the most pressing maritime security threats in the region.

[79] Source: Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas*, 69.

1. Lack of Funding

The lack of funding is an impediment to the operationalization of the Regional Centers for Maritime Security (CRESMAC or CRESMAO) and the MMCCs. Article 8 of ECCAS's Protocol on maritime security makes provision for four sources of funding of the framework: "(i) a region-wide maritime security and safety tax; (ii) a percentage of the financial penalties collected by member States; (iii) contributions from national shipping organizations; and (iv) financial support from donors and international partners."[80] Article 5 of ECCAS Technical Agreement with Zone D member states is very specific on funding, as well as the bonuses to be paid to MMCC personnel, national MOC personnel, and the crew of ships engaged in the operations.[81] The UN Office of Central Africa, in its assessment report on piracy in the GoG to the UN Secretary General, also raised concerns about member states' difficulty of funding the components of the YAMS.[82] According to Curtis Bell et al., YAMS regional information-sharing centers "could make counterpiracy spending more efficient for each nation"; unfortunately, these centers are presently not fully funded.[83] The ECCAS integrated maritime strategy lists basic start-up requirements for an operational center and these include a designated building, standard MOC equipped for communication, "secured and reliable internet connection, telephone, computers and screens, reliable power supply and a standby source of energy," in addition to international staff, and funding.[84] According to Broohm et al., attributing coordinating and operational capacities to a limited number of bodies will reduce the financial burden many GoG States

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[80] Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*; ECCAS-Heads of State, "Protocol on ECCAS Maritime Security Strategy," Article 8.

[81] ECCAS, "Technical Agreement between ECCAS and the States of Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe on the Surveillance Plan for Securing the GoG 'Zone D,'" May 6, 2009, https://cresmac.org/documents/2009-05-06-ACCORD-TECHNIQUE-CMC-ZONE-D-YDE-6-MAI-090001.pdf.

[82] Kofi A. Annan, "Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 24 November 2011)," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 4–6 (2000): 13, https://doi.org/10.1163/187541100X00319.

[83] Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States," 13.

[84] ECCAS, "Technical Agreement between ECCAS and the States of Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe on the Surveillance Plan for Securing the GoG 'Zone D,'" Article 5, Annex A; ECOWAS IMS Strategy, "ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy."

face as members of multiple regional organizations they must fund through national payments.[85]

2. Slow Implementation of the Regional Centers, MMCCs, and MOCs

The slow implementation of both regional centers, MMCCs, and the MOCs renders the YAMS ineffective in carrying out its mission of countering piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Unfortunately, in ECCAS, of the two MMCCs, only MMCC Zone D is fully operational, whereas MMCC Zone A (Congo, DRC, and Angola) is not operational.[86] CRESMAC, created in 2009, went operational in 2014 and coordinates the activities of MMCC Zones D and A (see Figures 2 and 3).[87]

MMCC Zone D is essentially the pilot zone for the entire architecture, by virtue of its operational longevity and strategy used to coordinate counterpiracy efforts for the navies of Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe.[88] MMCC Zone D has a multinational staff of naval officers designated by the different states represented in the zone.[89] These officers facilitate the coordination efforts within Zone D in collaboration with the member states' navies in the areas of anti-piracy operations and information sharing, and have authorized protocols for mutual pursuit of suspect vessels.[90] According to MMCC Zone D standing orders, operational control is executed at the level of the combined task group (CTG) based in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, and the member states' navies constitute the task units (TU), such that TU1, TU2, and TU3 represent designated

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[85] Broohm, Wang, and Gao, "Maritime Security," 401.

[86] Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 237.

[87] Osinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 4.

[88] Broohm, Wang, and Gao, "Maritime Security."

[89] ECCAS, "Technical Agreement between ECCAS and the States of Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe on the Surveillance Plan for Securing the GoG 'Zone D,'" Article 3; Sylvestre Mbah Fonkoua, "Multinational Center of Coordination Zone D: Enhancing Command and Control in African Multinational Operations from Sea," Multinational Center of Coordination, accessed June 6, 2022, http://www.amssa.net/actions/documents/MultinationalCoordinationCenter-ChiefofCenter.pdf.

[90] African Union, "African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) Adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly Lomé, Togo" (Lome, Togo: AU, October 15, 2016), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37286-treaty-african_charter_on_maritime_security.pdf.

naval capabilities by the navies of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, respectively.[91] It is worth noting that every month, these navies designate a ship each for MMCC Zone D operational control and these ships are berthed at the CTG in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, while awaiting orders. The ECCAS modified maritime strategy includes the nonexistence of maritime boundaries for ships of member states assigned under Zone D operational control (OPCON).[92] This means that OPCON units have authority to patrol member states' waters and carryout hot pursuit. In addition, these countries have the same currency, and French is the common and dominant language.

The failure to completely operationalize all the MMCC zones makes YAMS incomplete and therefore ineffective in executing its mission. Zone A's functional systems and communication equipment are not fully operational, which hinders the maritime security cooperation envisioned in the YAMS founding documents. For instance, the ICC and CRESMAC websites that are supposed to offer a place to report piracy-related incidents do not work (https://icc-gog.org/ and https://cresmac.org/).[93] Furthermore, these websites do not offer any information about operational or informational services (https://icc-gog.org/?page_id=1465 and https://cresmac.org/rapports-incidents-fr.html). One of the implications of the ICC's and CRESMAC's malfunctioning websites is that they hinder maritime security operations because these sites cannot be used to report piracy-related activity or to access information about areas with high concentrations of pirate activity. The key issue is that Zone A is not able to meet the founding goals of YAMS based on the equipment it has.

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[91] Sylvestre Fonkoua, "Gulf of Guinea Maritime Situational Awareness Zone D," accessed February 3, 2022, http://www.cjoscoe.org/infosite/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PRESENTATION-CMC-EN-ANGLAIS-USA-2018.pdf.

[92] Fonkoua.

[93] Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), "For the Implementation of Regional Strategy for Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa," Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), accessed July 19, 2022, https://icc-gog.org/; CRESMAC, "The CRESMAC at the Heart of the Maritime Security of the Gulf of Guinea," CRESMAC, accessed July 30, 2022, https://cresmac.org/.

Within ECOWAS, CRESMAO was only recently inaugurated in March 2022.[94] This inauguration marks approximately seven years since the regional coordination center, CRESMAO was created, and its slow implementation, which may not be self-imposed, reflects a similar pattern with respect to the inauguration of other centers and thus significantly impedes the effectiveness of YAMS.

By contrast, Zone E, the pilot zone, is fully operational, whereas MMCC Zones F and G are only partially operational. According to the acting director of CRESMAO, the proposed calendar for the full operationalization of Zones F and G was scheduled to start in 2019.[95] Both F and G have signed headquarters agreements with the host countries (Ghana and Cabo Verde); however, they are in the process of staff pledging. Additionally, Ghana has provided interim staff for the MMCC in Accra, and Zone F States signed an MoU for a collaborative operational framework through joint patrols.[96] The Zone F MoU would focus on "collaboration, coordination and the pooling of resources" to secure their maritime space.[97] Unfortunately, these zones are faced with operational startup challenges involving costs that often demand a political decision. MMCC Zone F's refurbished headquarters in Accra, fully funded by the UK government, officially opened its doors on February 10, 2020, by the British High Commissioner to Ghana.[98] The MMCC Zone G is still not operational, and its activities are part of the slow implementation.

The focal points (FP) function as the national link to the rest of the YAMS, and the FPs take their place in the national maritime operation centers. No official documentation

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[94] ECOWAS Commission, "Inauguration: The West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) Headquarters in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)," March 31, 2022, https://maritimafrica.com/en/west-africa-regional-maritime-security-centre-cresmao-headquarters-to-be-inaugurated-in-abidjan-ivory-coast/.

[95] Boniface Konan, "Enhancing Maritime Security in Africa: Whole-of-Africa Maritime Dialogue 2019," slide 18, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019-05-MSS-Namibia-Session-3-Konan-EN.pdf.

[96] Emmanuel K. Dogbevi, "Ghana, Other ECOWAS Countries Sign MoU on Maritime Security," *Ghana Business News* (blog), July 28, 2019, https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2019/07/28/ghana-other-ecowas-countries-sign-mou-on-maritime-security/.

[97] Dogbevi.

[98] Ghana Web, "British High Commissioner Opens New Multinational Maritime Coordination Center in Accra," February 6, 2020, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/British-High-Commissioner-opens-new-Multinational-Maritime-Coordination-Center-in-Accra-858673.

about the designation of FPs exists. The YCC Article II stipulates that each signatory state shall organize a marine security committee to coordinate national efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, the YCC requires member governments to nominate a national FP to ensure "coordinated, effective, and timely information transmission."[99] However, the designated focal points cannot execute their duties effectively insofar as the necessary YAMS structures are not in place

3. Information Sharing

Incomplete structure also impedes the establishment of a seamless information-sharing mechanism. According to the YAMS, the ICC is responsible for the "coordination and information-sharing" structure that connects the two Regional Coordination Centers for Maritime Security (CRESMAC and CRESMAO), followed by the five MMCCs, and finally, the national FP in charge of coordination at the national MOC (Figure 3).[100] The goal of an information-sharing mechanism is to disseminate information in a timely manner to enable an effective response. Unfortunately, the ICC, which is supposed to lead in information sharing within the GoG architecture, has not been able to perform this role and many reasons could account for this lapse.

One external initiative that could be considered as an obstacle to the effectiveness of the YAMS information-sharing mechanism is the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade - Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG), a UK-French piracy reporting entity.[101] MDAT-GoG are the custodians for the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) established in the Gulf of Guinea for voluntary reporting on threats posed to shippers. This center is dedicated to the collection and publication of information for GoG mariners but is completely piloted by Europeans and is manned by British and French military personnel. In addition to the

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[99] Global, "Yaounde Code of Conduct Taking Shape in the Gulf of Guinea."

[100] Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea"; Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas*; Hüseyin Yücel, "Sovereignty and Transnational Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: How a Network Approach Can Strengthen the Yaoundé Architecture," *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* 4, no. 1 (June 11, 2021): 146–57, https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.90.

[101] Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas*; Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States."

fact that GoG countries have no influence over this structure, which manages information that could have negative effects on their economies, the existence of MDAT-GoG potentially weakens structures within the GoG that have the same mission of information sharing, like the ICC and RMSC.

Unfortunately, MDAT-GoG has not shown any signs to relinquish this responsibility to the ICC, which is part of YAMS's strategic structure. The ICC Head of Division for Information Management and Communications has raised concerns and, in a recent webinar with Three Stones International, also reiterated the non-voluntary sharing of information by shippers.[102] According to information found on the MDAT-GoG website, when a target is attacked by pirates, the first phone call should go to MDAT-GoG.[103] Then, shippers are encouraged to report security incidents as soon as possible to allow MDAT-GOG to initiate the appropriate response, which is in keeping with their slogan "timely contact with MDAT-GoG enables quick actions."[104] Although the MDAT-GoG provides a timely response to these threats, its status as a third-party highlights how the YAMS implementation is ineffective. The key issue is that MDAT-GoG's current information-sharing practices place the ICC in a passive role, and this consequently renders it ineffective. According to Charles Ukeje and Wullson Mvondo, "the risk of extraversion of maritime security mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea" impacts negatively on external interference in matters that deal with state security.[105]

The incomplete operationalization of the YAMS, such as the slow activation of some MCCs, primarily results from a lack of funding and the absence of an international staff to liaise with the FP, which impedes both the coordination and information-sharing mechanisms. This slowness could be attributed to a lack of commitment by the member

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[102] *Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security*, Video, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KH0FP9qC8iY.

[103] BIMCO, "MDAT-GoG Establishes New website," BIMCO, accessed June 28, 2022, https://www.bimco.org/news/security/20190927-new-mdat-gog-website.

[104] BIMCO.

[105] Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, *African Approaches to Maritime Security*, 33.

states and signatories to the architecture as reflected in the nonbinding nature of the cooperation agreement.

D. BUREAUCRATIC HEAVINESS

The YAMS is complex due to its multi-layered international and bureaucratic structures, and these create a heaviness that hinders its effectiveness. YAMS's founding documents called for the creation of a complex, multilayered structure that encompassed the entire Gulf of Guinea. From looking at Figure 4, I argue that the heaviness in the YAMS is a result of a duplication in the way the architecture is setup. The regional centers for maritime security (CRESMAC and CRESMAO) do the same thing on a lower scale compared to the ICC and liaise with the MMCC without any added value. For example, information sharing is sluggish due to the complex information-sharing network (Figure 4), especially the sharing of information that is required to activate a response. In this context, consider the possibility that a large collection of small, relatively poor countries cobbled together a loosely organized set of institutions whose aims were grander than the members could afford. The result is an incomplete structure whose operations are almost always ineffective at achieving YAMS's official goals. In addition, the fact that YAMS involves at least 25 member states of the GoG, signatories to the cooperation agreement, pose enormous challenges in finding consensus on issues of maritime security since all the members must agree.[106]

In the case of YAMS components, such as the ICC, CRESMAC, and CRESMAO, unclear goals significantly impede its effectiveness. According to Okafor-Yarwood et al., there has been a failure to clearly define what the RCMS and ICC should actually produce and for whom.[107] For example, despite their similarity in purpose, CRESMAC is explicitly focused on maritime crime, whereas CRESMAO's mandate is more ambiguously worded and focused on maritime governance and safety, with the goal of developing a blue

[106] Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas*; Yücel, "Sovereignty and Transnational Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea," 147; Dirk Siebels, "Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Needs a Radical Rethink," The Conversation, November 18, 2019, http://theconversation.com/fighting-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-needs-a-radical-rethink-127032.

[107] Okafor-Yarwood et al., *Stable Seas*, 79.

economy. This ambiguity and divergence inhibit the architecture's effectiveness. The reality is that neither the RCMS nor the ICC has systematically fulfilled its respective roles in the nearly ten years since the introduction of the Yaoundé Architecture (YAMS).[108]

E. CONCLUSION

With respect to the structural characteristics of YAMS, this chapter has presented evidence that helps to determine whether and to what extent specific characteristics of the YAMS structure make it ineffective in countering piracy. From these sections, we can identify specific characteristics of that structure that hinder its effectiveness in countering piracy; the fact that its structural features are intertwined validates the hypothesis in that YAMS's structure is incomplete, bureaucratically heavy, and its components have unclear and even divergent goals. As a result, YAMS has been ineffective in sharing information and achieving its goal of enhancing maritime security in the GoG.

The slowness in the operationalization of the YAMS should be a wakeup call to the authorities to recognize that there is no magic solution that will circumvent the process but that all components of the architecture must be operationalized for YAMS effectiveness and the eradication of piracy in the GoG.

[108] Okafor-Yarwood et al., 79.

III. BUILDING NATIONAL CAPACITY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines why and how individual interests and inadequate capabilities of member states have impeded the YAMS from becoming more effective in combating piracy. This Examination of YAMS focuses on how interests and capabilities limit its effectiveness. In terms of interests, the chapter considers how member states are impacted differently by security threats such as terrorism, insecurity, political violence, consolidation of power, etc., and how these states' different economic activities may produce different levels of interest in maritime security. In terms of capabilities, the chapter looks at how much each member state is contributing and whether member states' capacity prevents them from contributing more.

B. SECURITY INTERESTS AND MILITARY PRIORITIES IN THE GOG

This section discusses the nature of security interests in GoG and bordering land-locked YAMS states, specifically Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and how GoG states generally prioritize combatting land-based interests over maritime security. In this section, I will argue that it is possible that the GoG states' preoccupation with land-based issues is undermining their participation in the YAMS.

Between 2016 and 2020, there have been more attacks by land-based violent groups in GoG states than by pirates or hostage takers. Figure 5 shows that in six select GoG states—Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal—the number of land-based attacks due to terrorism and insurgency ranges from 596 to 936, whereas the number of piracy attacks ranges from 36 to 70.[109] According to these sources, 2018 saw the most land-based and sea-based attacks in this five-year period. This data suggest that the GoG states are preoccupied

[109] ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results," Global Terrorism Database, September 1, 2022, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1990&dtp2=all&country=37&region=11; Stavrons Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security," 1, 2022, https://issuu.com/spp_plp/docs/the_gulf_of_guinea_gog_and_maritime_security/1.

with land-based security threats, undermining their participation in the YAMS. According to Ali, GoG states "are more concerned with land-based security issues."[110]



Figure 5. Maritime and Land-based Threats: Number of Piracy, Terrorist, and Insurgency Attacks, 2016–2020 for Six GoG Countries (no piracy data for 2016)[111]

1. Land-Centric Security Threats in GoG Region

Security threats posed by neighboring land-locked YAMS states impact the security of GoG states and vice versa. According to SIPRI data, there are "at least 20 states with active armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020" and currently 10 of these conflicts involve high-intensity armed conflicts and include GoG states (Nigeria, the DRC, Mali,

110 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 246.

111 Adapted from ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results"; Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security." The six GoG states represented include Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Also according to the ICC IMB report, piracy attack data for all GoG states ranges from 95–112 attacks per year.

Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Niger).[112] Figure 6 shows how terrorist attacks by two key groups, Boko Haram and ISWA, rose between 2017 and 2021.[113] These groups perpetuated attacks in Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, and Chad. Boko Haram attacks rose from approximately 200 in 2017 to a peak of approximately 450 in 2020. ISWA attacks rose from approximately 125 in 2017 to a peak of approximately 750 in 2021. According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, in the past year, by contrast, the violence caused by militant Islamist groups in the Lake Chad region fell 33 percent, a drop which coincides with the death of the Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau in May 2021.[114]



Figure 6. Trends of Violent Events Linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.[115]

[112] Ian Davis, "Armed Conflict and Peace Processes in Sub-Saharan Africa," SIPRI Yearbook, 2021, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/07.

[113] The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Sahel and Somalia Drive Rise in Africa's Militant Islamist Group Violence," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 9, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sahel-and-somalia-drive-uninterrupted-rise-in-african-militant-islamist-group-violence-over-past-decade/.

[114] The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

[115] Source: The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, since 2019, extremist violence in the Sahel—in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—has quadrupled. The terrorist groups operating in the Sahel are different from those operating around Lake Chad. Sahel threats mostly come from Macina Liberation Front (FLM), which is a component of the Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) (see Figure 7).[116] Over a quarter of Sahel conflict-related deaths in 2022 were civilian (1,847), and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was connected to 63 percent of civilian deaths.[117] Violence committed by militant Islamist groups has increased in the littoral nations of West Africa, where about 20 violent incidents occurred in the GoG coastal states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo during the last year.[118]



Figure 7. Increased Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel 2015–2021[119]

2. Maritime Security Threats in the GoG Region

Figure 8, which draws from a 2022 NATO report, shows that piracy in GoG maritime areas is rising rapidly.[120] In 2016, GoG states experienced 95 piracy attacks and

116 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

117 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

118 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

119 Source: The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

120 Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security."

ended the five-year period in 2020 with 106 attacks. 2018 brought a high of 112 such attacks. Research by Prins et al., revealed that GoG piracy attacks averaged around 60 a year between 2001–2015 before recording this sharp increase between 2016–2020.[121]



Figure 8. GoG Maritime Threats: Number of Piracy Attacks, 2016–2020[122]

3. Comparison of Land-based and Maritime Security Threats in Select GoG Countries

GoG countries appear to have placed a higher priority on addressing their land-based interests than their maritime interests. It appears that this land-centric focus has had a negative impact on the countries' navies and consequently, it is possible that the GoG states' preoccupation with land-based issues is undermining their participation in the YAMS.

According to Ali, GoG states' lack of capabilities can be attributed to "sea blindness."[123] **Sea blindness** is a major challenge that a majority of GoG governments and actors must overcome to combat piracy and other maritime crimes while developing the blue economy. According to Celine Germond-Duret et al., sea blindness is "governments'

121 Princ et al.

122 Adapted from: Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security."

123 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 246.

indifference to the sea and to the resulting challenges faced by navies, an important lens through which we can see beyond the blue economy and inattention to maritime issues and opportunities."[124] By prioritizing land-centric interest over maritime security, sea blindness makes countries unaware of the potential of the maritime domain.

To support these observations, this section includes a select sampling of countries from across the various MMCC Zones (A, D, E, F and G) and identifies and compares each selected country's main internal threats against their respective maritime threats. This section looks at the following countries: Angola, Cameroon, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal.

Trends from Table 1 reveal some inconsistencies, neglect, or mismatches with the system such that GoG states, regardless of the size of their populations and coastlines, have small and inadequate naval strength. This is evident, for example, with Angola and Liberia, and such inconsistencies create an enabling environment for piracy to thrive.[125] The maritime space defined in the context of this thesis consists of the total maritime area of the EEZ as defined by Sea Around Us.[126] Because traditionally defined EEZs overlap in the GoG, maritime space may be smaller for some countries than the EEZ conventionally defined by the International Law of the Sea.[127]

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[124] Celine Germond-Duret and Basil Germond, "Media Coverage of the Blue Economy in British Newspapers: Sea Blindness and Sustainable Development," *The Geographical Journal*, February 20, 2022, 7–9, https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12433.

[125] IISS, "2022 Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa: Regional Trends," *The Military Balance* 122, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 452–502, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2022.2022935; IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Personnel," *The Military Balance* 122, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): acts 5–7, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2022.2022939; "Marine Regions: Towards a Global Standard for Georeferenced Marine Names and Boundaries. Marine Geodesy 37(2): 99–125.," Sea Around Us, 2014, https://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/120?chart=catch-chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10.

[126] Claus et al., "Marine Regions."

[127] UNCLOS, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," 1982, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

Table 1. Country Data, Defense Spending, and Force Strength of GoG States[128]

Table 1. Selected Country data and Defense Spending priorities of Gulf of Guinea States																
GoG States	Pop (million)	Coastline (nm)	EEZ	Defense Budget			Defense Spending (USD millions)								Defense Forces Strength 2022	
			000km^2	(USD millions)			2018		2019		2020		2021			
				2019	2020	2021	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy/CG
Angola	**32**	**1000**	**491**	**1,607**	**1,014**	**956**	**712.33**	**29.48**	**818.45**	**33.86**	**797.21**	**32.99**	**806.35**	**34.07**	**100,000**	**1,000**
Congo	5.5	105	40	300	311	317	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	8,000	800
Drc	87	23	13	337	346	290	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	103,000	6,700
Cameroon	27	250	15	422	407	448	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	25,000	3000
EQ	1.5	184	308	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,100	250
Gabon	2.5	550	192	267	272	315	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3,200	500
Sao Tome	0.22	130	165	n/a	0.561	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	300	50
Benin	12	65	30.3	68	56	228	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6,500	500
Nigeria	**205**	**459**	**216.3**	**1,827**	**2,505**	**2,543**	**534.98**	**231.72**	**554.69**	**247.47**	**1,105.65**	**312.12**	**1217.60**	**324.13**	**100,000**	**25,000**
Togo	8.5	30	15.4	106	116	120	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	8,100	200
Ghana	**31**	**292**	**226**	**244**	**276**	**355**	**70.14**	**25.44**	**84.55**	**32.21**	**102.49**	**39.05**	**95.33**	**36.33**	**11,500**	**2,000**
Côte d'Ivoire	26	281	176.7	538	608	644	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	23,000	1,000
Liberia	5.0	360	246	14	12	20	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,950	60
Sierra L.	8.0	217	159.3	11	7	10	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	8,500	200
Guinea	13	173	109.4	195	211	234	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	8,500	400
*Burkina Faso		0	0	358	388	464	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6,400	0
Cabo Verde	0.70	530	796.6	11	12	12	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,000	100
Senegal	17	286	157.7	342	346	479	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	11,900	950
Gambia	2.5	43	22.65	14	15	16	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3,500	300
Guinea Bissau	2.0	189	105.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	4,000	350
*Mali		0	/	/	787	863	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	19,000	0

a. Angola's Security Issues and Interests

Angola's land-based security interests are more pressing than maritime security interests, even as the number of annual attacks is similar in the two domains. Between 2017 and 2020, there were seven piracy attacks and 8 terrorist attacks.[129] Angola's 2018–2022 National Development Plan (NDP) prioritized improving its cross-border security, internal armed conflict, peacekeeping and joint security initiatives, maritime security and surveillance, and equipment and military infrastructure regeneration.[130] The Angolan Army is battling an insurgency in the oil-rich Cabinda region.[131] The Cabindian separatists

128 Adapted from IISS, "Chapter Nine," 452–502; IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Personnel," acts 5–7; "Marine Regions."

129 GoG report and GTD

130 Janes, "Angola - Defence Budget," Janes, May 4, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JDB_A092-JDB_; IISS, "Chapter Nine," acts 452–453.

131 Janes, "Angola: Threats," Janes, March 4, 2021, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_880?section=military.

are from the Force of Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and have been around since Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975.[132] The Angolan Army is working to contain the spread of both the FLEC beyond Cabinda and agitations related to the unfinished settlement of the civil war. It is possible that Angola's preoccupation with land-based issues (cross border security, Cabinda insurgency, etc.) is undermining their participation in the YAMS.

Angola's reliance on oil and fishing should make marine security an important concern.[133] Yet, economic threats are generally not seen as urgent, piracy attacks rarely result in direct deaths, and thus they are unlikely to attract the same level of attention as deadly terrorist attacks.[134] Maritime threats are also less visible to the general population than are land-based terrorist attacks among the population. As such, Angola's land-based threats are more likely to directly impact the population than maritime threats. Still, according to Janes, the Angola government announced in March 2015 the procurement of the National System of Maritime Surveillance and Security of the Angola Exclusive Economic Zone. This monitoring system helps the navy patrol and safeguard its EEZ. Since then, many navy procurements have been explored, but no contracts have been signed as of 2021.[135]

Angola invests more money into its Army and Air Force than its Navy. Table 1 shows trends of Angola's defense spendings for both the Army and the Navy for three consecutive years (2019, 2020, and 2021) in which the Angola Army receives greater funding compared to that of the Navy.[136] In 2021, for instance, the Army received $806.35 million USD while the Navy received $34.07 million USD, a 97 percent and 3 percent split, respectively. Additionally, Angola's defense spending increased significantly in 2019–

[132] Janes.

[133] Janes.

[134] Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States and Lydelle Joubert, "The State of Maritime Piracy: Assessing the Human Cost, 2020," Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future, 2020.

[135] Janes, "Angola: Threats."

[136] IISS, "Chapter Nine," 452.

2021 over the two years prior, but its budget remains at 3 percent of the state's defense spending.[137] Angola's land-based military-logistics system was modernized to address their respective land-centric threats.[138] According to The Military Balance, "Angola is the only regional state with a strategic airlift.[139] Angola's modernization and equipment-purchasing plans have favored the Army heavily compared to the Navy."[140]

Angola's force structure is land centric, so much so that the Army is larger than the Navy. In addition, strength data indicates that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) are dominated by the Army, with a strength of more than 100,000 members, making it one of the largest standing armies in central or southern Africa, while its naval strength of 1,000, by contrast, is drastically smaller in relation to the size of its coastline vis-à-vis its maritime interests.[141] These figures demonstrate how Angola's defense spending budget prioritizes the Army over the Navy which suggests that Angola's preoccupation with land-based issues is undermining that state's participation in the YAMS.

b. Cameroon's Security Issues and Interests

Cameroon's land-based security interests are also more pressing than its maritime security interests. Between 2017 and 2020, there were 13 piracy attacks and 687 terrorist attacks.[142] Cameroon's priority interest is its internal security and the fight against insurgencies. Cameroon's armed forces are engaged on multiple fronts, such as the cross-border combat against the Islamic sect Boko Haram and countering Anglophone separatists, as well as contributing to peacekeeping efforts.[143] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin is charged with countering the terrorist group

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137 "Defense Budget by Force: Angola," Janes, July 31, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/DefenceBudgets/Guided?view=chart&f=COUNTRY(Angola)&pg=1&template=.

138 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 452.

139 The Military Balance

31 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 452.

32 IISS, 452.

33 Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security."

143 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 458; Janes, "Cameroon," Janes, July 31, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JCIN_153-JCIN.

Boko Haram, and Cameroon's commitment in this theater alone is significant in terms of troops.[144] According to Janes, Cameroon contributes about 2,500 troops to the MNJTF.[145] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Cameroon's monthly expenses related to the operations in the Anglophone regions stand at CFA6 billion ($10 million). In addition, to the Anglophone separatist insurgency in the North West and South West regions, Cameroon's Army is also deployed to the Eastern border with Central African Republic (CAR) to contain rising insecurity resulting from spillover from the CAR crisis.[146] Besides being the seat of the African Union (AU) continental logistics base and a standby force, Cameroon is heavily engaged in peacekeeping as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).[147]

Piracy against Cameroon includes hijackings, hostage-taking for ransom, and armed robbery. Despite the high level of piracy attacks in next-door neighbor, Nigeria, Cameroon's navy has kept its number of piracy attacks low. The number of Cameroon piracy attacks between 2017 to 2020 range from 0 to 7 per year, while the number of terrorists attacks in the same period range from 112 to 283.[148] Cameroon has had hundreds of land-based attacks compared to the sea.

Cameroon invests more money in its Army than it does in its Navy.[149] For the infantry, an increase in effective firepower is paramount; one of the major recorded procurement drives by the land forces has been of heavy artillery systems as well as the acquisition of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFC) and protected patrol vehicles.[150] Cameroon's internal security investments clearly favor their Army over their Navy, which

144 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 458.

145 Janes, "Cameroon."

146 Janes.

147 Janes.

148 Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results."

149 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 458.

150 IISS, 458; Janes, "Cameroon."

suggests that Cameroon's preoccupation with land-centric issues is undermining its participation in the YAMS.

Cameroon's force structure is land-centric, so much so that its Army is larger than its Navy. In addition, as Table 1 shows, in terms of strength and defense spending, the Cameroon Defense Forces (CDF) are dominated by the Army, with a strength of more than 25,000, making it the fourth largest standing army in the GoG, while its naval strength of 3,000, despite being the third largest navy in the region, is modest with respect to its maritime interests.[151] Cameroon's land-centric force structure suggests that it prioritizes addressing land-based security issues over maritime security issues.

c. Benin's Security Issues and Interests

In recent years, Benin has experienced more violence at sea than on land, but they continue to prioritize their land-based security forces. Between 2017 and 2020, Benin experienced 19 piracy attacks (90 percent of combined attacks) and only two terrorist attacks (10 percent).[152] According to The Military Balance, Benin prioritizes land-based border patrols and security because they are increasingly concerned about Islamist groups in the Sahel and the regional threats they pose.[153] Benin's army is deployed over the entire territory in support of internal security such as protection of capital area and its infrastructure, providing support to the conventional security forces, and fighting terrorism, where about 800 troops are currently deployed to combat Boko Haram under MNJTF-LCBC.[154] The threat posed by terrorism is of grave concern to the state. In addition, Benin contributes a troop contingent under the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[155] Benin is ranked fourteenth internationally as a UN

[151] Janes, "Cameroon"; IISS, "Chapter Nine," act 458.

[152] GoG report and GTD

[153] IISS, "Chapter Nine," 453.

[154] Janes, "Benin," Janes, March 2, 2021, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_896; Janes, "The Multi-National Joint Task Force and the Threat of Boko Haram: Military and Security Assessment," Janes, accessed August 12, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/DefenceBudgetsReports/Display/jibr2141-jibr.

[155] Janes, "Benin."

peacekeeping troop contributor.[156] The Benin Army has been involved in MINUSMA since 2013. The evidence just presented suggests that Benin's preoccupation with land-based issues (cross border security, terrorism, etc.) is undermining its participation in the YAMS, even as piracy attacks are much more frequent than terrorist attacks.

Benin has had fewer land-based attacks compared to the sea. The number of piracy maritime attacks between 2017 to 2020 range from 0 to 11, and the number of terrorists attacks in the same period range from 0 to 1.[157] Despite neighboring Nigeria's relatively high level of piracy attacks, Benin has kept the number of piracy attacks relatively low.[158]

Notably, Benin has invested more money in its Army and Air Force than it has in its Navy.[159] The acquisition of heavy artillery systems, IFCs, and protected patrol vehicles has been one of the ground forces' most significant known procurement efforts. In addition, Benin's Army is currently focused on logistics restructuring and communications.[160] A national guard was created in 2020.[161] Meanwhile, Navy procurement and refurbishment are low priorities.[162] Furthermore, Benin's Army is looking at ways to be more adaptable to combating emerging threats. Benin's internal security investments favor its Army over its Navy, which suggests that Benin's leadership is heavily focused on land-centric issues rather than maritime security.

In fact, Benin's force structure is so land centric that its Army is considerably larger than its Navy. The Benin Army has a strength of 6,500 compared with only 500 naval personnel. This disparity in strength between the Army and the Navy is indicative of the intensity of land-centric security challenges (see Table 1).[163] This disparity in strength

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156 Janes.

157 ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results."

158 Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States.," 16.

159 Military Balance

160 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 453–54; Janes, "Benin."

161 "Chapter Nine," 454.

162 "Benin."

163 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 453–54; Janes, "Benin."

figures and investment between the Army and the Navy suggest that Benin's preoccupation with land-based issues is undermining that country's participation in the YAMS. Even though maritime security is supposed to be a priority with respect to the benefit enjoyed from maritime trade, a naval strength of just 500 compared to that of the Army's 6,500 is indicative of Benin's priorities being more land centric.

d. Nigeria's Security Issues and Interests

Nigeria's land-based security interests are more pressing than their maritime security interests. Between 2017 and 2020, the country experienced 151 piracy attacks and 2,122 terrorist attacks.[164] The Nigerian Armed Forces are combating a lot of security threats from various fronts, from domestic terrorism to insurgencies in the northeast; communal violence across the northcentral area; and the carnage perpetrated by the herdsmen.[165] According to Janes, terrorist attacks in Nigeria are linked to Al-Qaida and "pose a significant threat to civilians, the military, and infrastructure" in contrast to petro-theft which is economic with no or very limited loss of lives.[166] According to Ifeanyichukwu Abada et al., Nigeria is the principal military power in the GoG and is confronted by "numerous security challenges, including from the Islamic State West African Province."[167] Nigeria prioritizes addressing the following security challenges: the terrorist group Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya (Boko Haram), militants of the Niger Delta, as

[164] Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results."

[165] Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System," Janes, July 30, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JCIN_81-JCIN.

[166] Janes.

[167] Ifeanyichukwu Abada et al., "Separatist Agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and National Question in Nigeria," *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 2 (February 12, 2020): 9, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339200499_Separatist_Agitation_by_the_Indigenous_People_of_Biafra_IPOB_and_National_Question_in_Nigeria_Separatist_Agitation_by_the_Indigenous_People_of_Biafra_IPOB_and_National_Question_in_Nigeria; IISS, "Chapter Nine," 487; Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, "Pirates of the Niger Delta: Between Brown and Blue Waters," Report by Danish Maritime Security Programe, Pirates of the Niger Delta, September 2021, 2, https://www.unodc.org/res/piracy/index_html/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf.

well as the secessionist movement of the Indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB).[168] Nigeria is the lead troop contributor to the MNJTF-LCBC combating Boko Haram (mainstream and dissident factions) and also the key member in the ECOWAS Standby Force.[169] The fight against Boko Haram is a priority for the Nigerian Army's internal security role and has led to the deployment of thousands of troops to northern towns and carrying out patrols and raids.[170] Janes adds that Nigeria's armed forces focus their security efforts "on border and internal-security issues, as well as combating illicit trafficking."[171]

Nigeria has had hundreds of land-based attacks compared to the sea. The number of piracy maritime attacks between 2017 to 2020 ranges from 33 to 48, and the number of terrorists attacks in the same period ranges from 479 to 648.[172] This evidence suggests that Nigeria's land-based threats are more likely to impact a larger proportion of the population than maritime threats. The evidence suggests that Nigeria, like most other members of YAMS, mainly combats land-based threats rather than maritime ones.

Consequently, the Nigerian Army is appropriately armed to deal with militant groups active in the country, such as Boko Haram, militants in the Niger Delta, as well as the secessionist movement, and IPOB.[173] The Army has consistently received significantly more funding than the Navy. In 2021, for instance, the Army received $1,217.6 million USD while the Navy received $324.13 million USD, a 79 and 21 percent split, respectively.[174] Significant acquisitions to equip the Nigerian Army have fractured the Boko Haram terrorist group and the annihilation of its leader. For the infantry, an increase

168 Abada et al., "Separatist Agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and National Question in Nigeria"; IISS, "Chapter Nine," 487; Jacobsen, "Pirates of the Niger Delta," 2.

169 Janes, "The Multi-National Joint Task Force and the Threat of Boko Haram: Military and Security Assessment."

170 Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

171 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 487–89; Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

172 ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results."

173 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 487; Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

174 Janes, "Nigeria."

in effective firepower is paramount; one of the major recorded procurement drives by the land forces has been heavy artillery systems and facilities for manufacturing small arms and protected vehicles.[175] These Nigerian Army investments and their deployment in various operations theaters warrant huge investment that have paid off in combating terrestrial threats from terrorists and insurgents but at the disadvantage of maritime security. Such evidence suggests that Nigeria's preoccupation with land-centric issues may be undermining the country's participation in the YAMS.

Nigeria's force structure is land centric, so much so that the Army is larger than the Navy. In addition, strength data indicates that the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) are dominated by the Army, which has a strength of more than 100,000 members, making it one of the largest standing armies in the GoG, while its naval strength is 25,000 personnel—which is paradoxical for the largest navy in the region (see Table 1).[176] The disparity in these strength figures and the investments between Nigeria's Army and Navy suggest that the country's preoccupation with land-centric issues is undermining its participation in the YAMS.

e. Ghana's Security Issues and Interests

Even though Ghana has prioritized land-based security, they have experienced more maritime attacks than terrorist attacks in recent years. Between 2017 and 2020, the country experienced 23 piracy attacks and 15 terrorist attacks.[177] Yet Ghana's security interests on land are broader than just terrorism. The country especially prioritizes border patrols and internal security because of increased concern over sporadic violence between ethnic groups in the Northern and the Volta regions, which can be attributed to disputes over chieftaincy succession and jurisdiction.[178] In addition, the Ghana Armed Forces are

175 Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

176 Janes.

177 Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security"; "GTD Search Results."

178 "Ghana," Janes, April 7, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_944?section=military.

deployed in multiple UN peacekeeping missions,[179] including the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL), MINUSMA, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).[180] The evidence presented suggests that Ghana places a higher priority on land-based threats than maritime threats, and this shift in priorities is undermining that country's participation in the YAMS and its ability to fight piracy.

As noted, Ghana has experienced fewer land-based attacks than maritime attacks in recent years. The number of piracy maritime attacks between 2017 to 2020 range from 0 to 10, and the number of terrorists attacks in the same period also range from 0 to 10.[181] However, Ghana's land-based threats are more likely to impact the population than maritime threats, because they are more visible and deadly.[182] This, too, suggests that Ghana places a higher priority on land-based threats than maritime threats and this shift in priorities may be undermining their participation in the YAMS.

In keeping with this shift in priorities toward land-based attacks and UN participation, Ghana continues to invest more money into its Army than its Navy. In 2021, for instance, the Army received $95.33 million USD while the Navy received $36.33 million USD, a 72 percent and 28 percent split, respectively.[183] Also according to Jane's and as shown in Table 1, we can observe the upward trend of Ghana's defense budget and spending from 2019 to 2020 that is, from $244 million USD to $276 million USD, to $355 million USD million, respectively. Jane's also reports that the Army's and Navy's share of the defense budget increased each year between 2018–2020 but decreased for both branches in 2021, because the Ghana army is currently focused on logistics restructuring and communications. Even though there has been a progressive increase in the defense

[179] Janes.

[180] Janes.

[181] Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security"; "GTD Search Results."

[182] Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security."

[183] "Defence Budget by Force: Ghana," Janes, accessed August 15, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/DefenceBudgets/Guided?view=chart&f=COUNTRY(Ghana)&pg=1&template=; IISS, "Chapter Nine."

budget, this augmentation does not reflect a corresponding increase in defense spending relative to Ghana's GDP. According to Jane's, Ghana's defense budget remains less than one percent of GDP.[184] Budget priorities reinforce the argument that Ghana's preoccupation with land-centric issues is undermining the country's participation in the YAMS.

Ghana's force structure is so land-centric that its Army is considerably larger than its Navy. The Army has a strength of 11,500 personnel compared with the Naval strength of 2,000 personnel, an 85 and 15 percent split, respectively (see Table 1)[185]; this disparity in strength between the Ghana Army and the Navy is indicative of the lethality and visibility of land-centric security challenges and peacekeeping deployments. The disparity in these strength figures between the Army and the Navy further suggests that Ghana's preoccupation with land-centric issues is undermining its participation in the YAMS and even the Ghana Navy's efforts to combat piracy.

f. Senegal's Security Issues and Interests

Senegal's land-based security interests are more pressing than its maritime security interests. Between 2017 and 2020, the country only experienced one piracy attack and four terrorist attacks.[186] Like Ghana, terrorism is not Senegal's only land-based priority. Senegal focuses most of its security effort on internal and border security as well as combatting insurgency and narcotics trafficking.[187] Senegal prioritizes border patrols and internal security because of increased concern following the regional threat posed by Islamist groups in the Sahel and counterinsurgency in the Casamance region pose by secessionists of the movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC).[188] In addition, Senegal is also highly engaged in foreign peacekeeping missions. Senegalese

184 "Defence Budget by Force: Ghana," Janes.

185 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 473–74; Janes, "Ghana."

186 Karamperidis, "The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and Maritime Security"; "GTD Search Results."

187 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 490.

188 IISS, 490.

troops are deployed as part of the UN Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) with 100 troops and 1,255 troops are deployed in Mali under MINUSMA.[189]

As noted, Senegal has had more land-based attacks compared to the sea. The number of piracy maritime attacks between 2017 to 2020 range from 0 to 1, and the number of terrorists attacks in the same period range from 0 to 3.[190] Senegal's land-based threats, which are more frequent and visible, are more likely to impact the population than maritime threats. This evidence suggests that Senegal's preoccupation with land-centric issues could undermine their participation in the YAMS.

Senegal has invested more money into its Army and Air Force compared to its Navy.[191] The recent acquisition of heavy artillery systems, IFC, and protected patrol vehicles has been one of the ground forces' most significant known procurement efforts. In addition, the Senegal Army is currently focused on logistics restructuring and modernization of its force, particularly its firepower and mobility capabilities.[192] The Army is looking at ways to be more adaptable to combating emerging threats and combating insurgencies. This evidence suggests that Senegal's preoccupation with land-centric issues could be undermining their participation in the YAMS.

Furthermore, Senegal's force structure is so land-centric that the country's Army is considerably larger than its Navy. According to Jane's, the Senegal Army has a strength of 11,900 (93 percent of combined forces) compared with the Navy's strength of 950 (7 percent) (see Table 1)[193]; this disparity in strength between the Army and the Navy is indicative of the lethality and visibility of land-centric security challenges surrounding Senegal. These strength figures also suggest that Senegal's preoccupation with land-centric

189 "Senegal," Janes, July 27, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_1029?section=military.

190 ICC IMB 2021_Q1_PR, "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; Global Terrorism Database, "GTD Search Results."

191 Janes, "Senegal."

192 Janes, "Senegal."

193 IISS, "Chapter Nine," act 490; Janes, "Senegal."

issues could be undermining the country's participation in the YAMS, even as recent data suggest Senegal's Navy has been able to deter piracy.

C. CAPABILITIES

While some of the GoG states have the assets to effectively patrol their respective maritime space, nearly all are severely limited in their ability to contribute to regional maritime security cooperation, which is necessary given overlapping nautical jurisdictions and how problems in one area threaten other countries' passage, especially far from coastlines. According to Ali, "the operationalization of cooperative maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is seriously constrained by the limited capability of the states."[194] The current gap created by the lack of adequate capabilities with respect to incidents of piracy in the GoG is indicative of the challenges posed to the effectiveness of the YAMS. Donald Inwalomhe argues that, despite encouraging progress being made by a few countries in the region, "the Gulf of Guinea remains the world's most dangerous places for ships and seafarers."[195]

The following examples would clearly elucidate the lack of adequate capability, in general, and the need for mutual support. According to Brandon Prins et al., the "January 2021 incident involving the Liberian-flagged ship MV Mozart near São Tomé and Príncipe" which left one seaman dead, and 15 sailors kidnapped who later ransomed for an undisclosed amount, showed the gap in capabilities.[196] The incident in question "occurred approximately 180 kilometers off São Tomé Island and 375 kilometers from Nigeria, making it one of the farthest offshore attacks to date in the Gulf of Guinea."[197] The MV Mozart incident demonstrated the real inadequacies of GoG Navies with respect to their capabilities. In another incident in June 2021, a small craft carrying six pirates attacked a

194 Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 245.

195 Donald Inwalomhe, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *The Sun Nigeria*, August 26, 2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.sunnewsonline.com/maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/.

196 Brandon Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/09/gulf-of-guinea-piracy/.

197 Prins et al.

merchant ship 210 nautical miles (336 km) off the shores of Lagos, Nigeria.[198] Fortunately, the merchant ship "equipped with appropriate vessel hardening was able to prevent the armed pirates from coming" on board.[199] According to IMB, these incidents add to the long list of registered attacks of piracy and armed robbery on ships in the Gulf of Guinea.[200] These incidents demonstrate that lack of suitable capabilities is weakening YAMS anti-piracy operations and the need to acquire enough response capabilities to equal or surpass those of pirates.

According to The Military Balance, for every country in the GoG, the number of military personnel is much smaller for the Navy than the Army and the level of military funding for the Navy is also considerably smaller for the Navy than the overall defense budgets.[201] As shown in Table 2, the percentage of Navy personnel in 2020 ranges from 1 to 20 percent of Army-Navy forces combined and the Army ranges from 80 to 99 percent of these forces.[202] Angola had the smallest Navy at 1 percent of combined Army-Navy forces while Nigeria had the highest at 20 percent. The percentage of Navy funding ranges from 1 to 17 percent of the total defense budget. Angola again had the smallest Navy rate at 1 percent while Equatorial Guinea had the highest at 17 percent. For countries with significantly higher land-based threats, this imbalance is expected.

198 IMB, "IMB: Piracy, Armed Robbery at Sea at Lowest Level in 27 Years – Professional Mariner," Maritime News, July 13, 2021, https://professionalmariner.com/imb-piracy-armed-robbery-at-sea-at-lowest-level-in-27-years/.

199 IMB.

200 ICC/IMB 2020 PR, "Gulf of Guinea records highest ever number of crew kidnapped in 2020, according to IMB's annual piracy report."

201 Military Balance.

202 Military Balance. Personnel figures for Cameroon came from Jane's.

Table 2. Land-Centric and Maritime Military Capacities in the GoG, 2020[203]

	# Military Personnel 2020*				Military Funding 2020 ($USD millions)^		
GoG Country	**Navy**	**Army**	**Navy and Army Combined**	**Navy % of Total**	**Navy**	**Total**	**Navy % of Total**
Angola	**1,000**	**100,000**	**101,000**	**1%**	**$33.0**	**$1,014**	**3%**
Congo	800	8,000	8,800	9%	$25.0	$313	8%
DRC	6,700	103,000	09,700	6%	$16.0	$321	5%
Cameroon	**3,000**	**25,000**	**28,000**	**11%**	**$24.8**	**$420**	**6%**
E. Guinea	250	1,100	1,350	19%	$1.2	$7	17%
Gabon	500	3,200	3,700	14%	$29.8	$280	11%
STP	50	300	50	14%	N/A	$0.6	N/A
Benin	**500**	**6,500**	**7,000**	**7%**	**$4.0**	**$56**	**7%**
Nigeria	**25,000**	**100,000**	**125,000**	**20%**	**$381.9**	**$2,505**	**15%**
Togo	200	8,100	8,300	2%	$2.8	$120	2%
Ghana	**2,000**	**11,500**	**13,500**	**15%**	**$39.1**	**$276**	**14%**
Liberia	60	1,950	2,010	3%	N/A	$12	N/A
Ivory Coast	1,000	23,000	24,000	4%	$23.0	$630	4%
Sierra Leone	200	8,500	8,700	2%	N/A	$7	N/A
Guinea	400	8,500	,900	4%	N/A	$211	N/A
Senegal	**950**	**11,900**	**12,850**	**7%**	**N/A**	**$346**	**N/A**
Cape Verde	100	1,000	1,100	9%	N/A	$12	N/A
Gambia	300	3,500	3,800	8%	N/A	$15	N/A

* = Includes Navy and Army. Excludes Air Force, gendarmerie, and paramilitary.

^ = Some countries do not include gendarmerie and paramilitary in military budgets.

1. Angola's Capabilities

Angola does not have the assets to effectively patrol its maritime space which severely limits its ability to contribute to regional maritime security. For example, Angola's naval strength of 1,000 personnel is responsible for protecting the country's coastline of

[203] Military Balance. Personnel figures for Cameroon came from Jane's.

1,000 nautical miles.[204] The Angolan Navy is undermanned and inadequate to carryout patrols in its maritime space which spans its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), an approximate area of 491,000 square kilometers (see Table 1). The Angola Navy budget has consistently been the least of the three-armed services (see Figure 9).[205] The Angola naval budget has limited Angola's ability to effectively contribute to regional maritime security, even as it has kept piracy attacks relatively low in its own waters.[206]



Total Defence Budget by Force for Angola.

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Army	709.86	712.33	818.45	797.21	806.35	1,001.40	1,081.58	1,243.25	1,430.43	1,644.99
Navy	29.38	29.48	33.86	32.99	34.07	42.32	45.69	52.54	60.45	69.51
Air Force	220.30	221.07	254.00	247.40	272.56	338.51	365.61	420.25	483.53	556.06
Defence-Wide	19.58	19.65	22.58	21.98	22.72	28.21	30.46	35.03	40.28	46.34

Figure 9. Defense Budget of Angola.[207] Source: Janes

According to Janes, the "amount of equipment possessed by the Angola Navy is very limited."[208] The Angola Navy has been neglected, reduced to "a shore-based force since the mid-1990s" with a small fleet of inshore patrol crafts (IPC) able to engage in

[204] IISS, "Chapter Nine"; Janes, "Angola - Defence Budget."

[205] "Defense Budget by Force: Angola."

[206] Janes.

[207] Janes.

[208] Janes, "Angola - Defence Budget"; IISS, "Chapter Nine," act 452.

limited inshore operations.[209] Most of the inventory in the Angola Navy is owned by the Angola Ministry of Fisheries and the two maritime patrol aircrafts are under the Angola Air Force.[210] The Angola PRONAVAL program intended for the acquisition of surface capabilities, with the goal of boosting the Navy and the long-term goal of securing offshore oil and gas installations and the EEZ, has never been realized.[211]

Unsurprisingly, Angola has contributed little to maritime security in the GoG. Angola is host to the MMCC Zone A, but the center is not yet operational and there is no information about its activities. Unfortunately, of the four categories of capabilities, only two maritime surveillance helicopters were finally delivered in 2017.[212] Nevertheless, Angola has contributed international staff for CRESMAC, and the current Executive Director at the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) is Angolan.

These deficiencies in Angolan maritime capabilities and inadequate naval strength in relation to its maritime space hinders the effectiveness of YAMS. Angola does not have the assets to effectively patrol its maritime space which severely limits its ability to contribute to regional maritime security. Similarly, the Angolan naval budget has severely limited Angola's ability to effectively contribute to regional maritime security.

2. Cameroon's Capabilities

While Cameroon has made significant progress since YAMS was formed, it still does not have the capabilities to effectively patrol its maritime space, which limits the country's ability to contribute to regional maritime security. Cameroon's naval strength is 3,000 personnel to protect, and it has a maritime coastline of 250 nautical miles (see Table 1).[213] Cameroon's maritime space has an approximate area of 15,000 square kilometers

209 IISS, "Chapter Nine"; Ali, *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges*, 236–40.

210 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 452; "Angola - Defence Budget."

211 Janes, "Angola - Defence Budget."

212 Janes.

213 IISS, "Chapter Nine"; Janes, "Cameroon - Navy," Janes, accessed July 18, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JWNA0028-JWNA.

(see Table 1). Cameroon invests more money in its Army, Air Force, and paramilitary (gendarmerie) than in its Navy.[214]

Cameroon's capabilities inventory includes, three offshore patrol vessels (OPV), of which two are 63 meters long (Le NTEM and La Sanaga) and one 52 meters (Dipikar).[215] For coastal patrol vessels (CPV), it has four Aresa 2300 and Aresa 2400, of 32 meters and 24.5 meters, respectively, with a "maximum speed of 30 knots and a range of 750 miles."[216] There are three Boston Whaler inshore patrol vessels (IPV), two mechanized landing crafts (LCM), and a maintenance floating dock from China in 2019 for operational availability, which is the most recent acquisition.[217] Cameroon does not have any maritime surveillance aircraft to enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities.[218]

Notwithstanding the capabilities just enumerated, several factors impede their availability and sustainability for seamless maritime patrols. These factors include downtime for repairs and maintenance, spare parts availability, other operational demands, lack of funding, availability of crew, training, and lack of fuel and lubricants. Cameroon's acquisition of a floating dock is commendable for it would ease availabilities but there is no guarantee that the spare parts will be available at the right time and place, and in the right quantity and quality. The technical capacity of the crew is also important in identifying potential risks and remediating them. In addition, the range, speed, and availability of fuel are all limiting factors in carrying out effective patrols or engaging in hot pursuits. These limiting factors impede YAMS effectiveness.

Overall, Cameroon has exceeded the paltry expected contribution to maritime security in the GoG, in part, because stated expectations were exceptionally low and, in part, because Cameroon has taken its regional leadership role seriously. First, Cameroon is host to MMCC Zone D and ICC. Cameroon has designated one OPV to the MMCC Zone

214 IISS, "Chapter Nine"; Janes, "Cameroon – Navy."

215 Janes.

216 Janes.

217 Janes, "Cameroon."

218 Janes, "Cameroon - Navy."

D OPCON per the Zone ECCAS member states Technical Agreement.[219] Cameroon has also installed the vessel traffic management information system (VTMIS) as well as command and control centers along its coast. In addition, to the VTMIS, Cameroon also has three fully functional maritime operations centers (MOCs) with support from the United States. Cameroon was the first country in Africa to install the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on ships to enhance maritime security.[220] Cameroon has regularly participated in partners' capacity building exercises such as Obangame Express (OE) and the Navy Exercise for maritime Operations (NEMO) to enhance the technical and operational capacity of its personnel as well as interoperability with regional states.[221] With greater capabilities, Cameroon may be able to contribute even more productively to the YAMS.

3. Benin's Capabilities

With piracy attacks (19) widely outstripping terrorism attacks (2) in the past five years, it appears that Benin does not have the assets to effectively patrol its maritime space, which severely limits its ability to contribute to regional maritime security. Benin has a limited coastline of about 65 nautical miles, which should be easy to patrol with existing resources. In 2000, Benin received two 25-meter patrol craft from China, in addition to two 8-meter Defender-27 patrol vessels received from the United States in 2010.[222] In 2013, Benin procured three fast patrol boats (FPB) of 35 meters each from China, the most recent acquisitions in Benin's capabilities inventory.[223] In addition, Benin's coastal surveillance aircraft is operated by its air force.[224] However, the Benin navy has received low priority in terms of acquisition and maintenance, despite mounting threats from piracy and

219 ECCAS, "Technical Agreement between ECCAS and the States of Cameroon, Gabon, Equtorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe on the Surveillance Plan for Securing the GoG 'Zone D.'"

220 Janes, "Cameroon - Navy."

221 Janes.

222 "Benin - Navy," Janes, March 1, 2021, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JWNA0017-JWNA.

223 Janes.

224 Janes.

maritime security challenges.[225] This has led to the deterioration of these assets. As such, Benin now lacks adequate offshore capability to patrol its EEZ, an approximate area of 30,300 square kilometers to secure its extensive economic interests (see Table 1).[226] This lack of adequate maritime capabilities consequently impedes YAMS effectiveness.

While Benin has been the pioneer in getting the United Nations and the international community involved in the GoG and currently hosts the MMCC in Zone E, it has made minimal contribution to providing regional maritime security. As mentioned in Chapter I in the literature review, former Benin president Boni Yayi, brought the issue of the threat posed by piracy in the GoG to the UN's attention in 2011 which led to UNSC resolution 2018.[227] Benin is host to the MMCC Zone E. Benin and Nigeria had already signed a mutual agreement "operation prosperity" for joint patrols of their maritime domains in response to the threat of piracy.[228] Operation prosperity is still in force, and this has helped to secure Benin's maritime space. Members of Zone E states (Benin, Nigeria, and Togo) have signed an MoU to effect joint patrols in their maritime space.[229] Benin has the will to contribute more to maritime security but lacks the wherewithal and faces land-based issues, and these impede YAMS effectiveness.

4. Nigeria's Capabilities

Given the high level of threats, Nigeria does not have the capabilities to sufficiently patrol its maritime space which severely limits its ability to contribute to regional maritime security cooperation. Nigeria has an estimated coastline of 500 nautical miles, and, according to IISS, the Nigerian Navy is "similarly underfunded and has limited capability"

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225 Janes.

226 Janes.

227 United Nations Resolution, "Resolution 2018 (2011) On Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6645th Meeting,."

228 Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 58.

229 "The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Operationalizes an MOU on Implementation of Joint Maritime Patrols in Zone E.," UNODC, December 8, 2021, https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/08-12-2021-the-economic-community-of-west-african-states-ecowas-operationalizes-an-mou-on-implementation-of-joint-maritime-patrols-in-zone-e-.html.

with respect to patrolling its maritime space.[230] Nigeria's naval personnel strength is 25,000—the largest Navy in the Gulf of Guinea.[231] In contrast, the Nigerian naval budget has consistently been the smallest of the country's three armed services **(**see Figure 10**)**.[232] Nonetheless, Nigeria procured "10 patrol boats and patrol crafts from French companies between 2011 and 2017, including two 1,800-tonne offshore patrol vessels (OPV) of the Centenary-class."[233] Nigeria has also received two decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutters of the Hamilton class.[234] Nigeria's naval shipyard in Port Harcourt, the largest in West Africa, is currently partnering with China to increase the shipyard capability and a Naval Dockyard.[235] Despite these procurements, Nigeria lacks the capabilities to meet the challenges in this vast ocean in which pirates have changed their modus operandi with improved capabilities to attack commercial shipping vessels farther offshore in order to circumvent the counterpiracy measures in force.[236] Nigeria's capabilities can secure their maritime waters up to 200 nautical miles, but pirates can now attack commercial shipping much farther out of the EEZ that are headed to Nigeria.[237]

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230 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 487.

231 IISS, 487–89.

232 Janes, "Nigeria: Defense Budget," Janes, accessed August 15, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/DefenceBudgets/Guided?view=chart&f=COUNTRY(Nigeria)&pg=1&template=.

233 Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

234 U. S. Mission Nigeria, "U.S. Boosts Nigeria's Maritime Security with New Surveillance Equipment," U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, December 14, 2020, https://ng.usembassy.gov/u-s-boosts-nigerias-maritime-security-with-new-surveillance-equipment/.

235 Janes, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System."

236 Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?"

237 Jeremy Binnie, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System (C4ISR)," Janes, July 15, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/nigerian-navy-inaugurates-falcon-eye-surveillance-system; Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?"; Francis Ntow, "Nigeria Commissions 'Falcon Eye System' to Curb Maritime Insecurity," The Ghana Report, July 14, 2021, https://www.theghanareport.com/nigeria-commissions-falcon-eye-system-to-curb-maritime-insecurity/.



Total Defence Budget by Force for Nigeria.

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Army	370.76	534.98	554.69	1,105.65	1,217.60	1,224.47	1,347.09	1,440.67	1,658.05	1,789.78
Navy	213.65	231.72	247.47	312.12	324.43	408.16	449.03	480.22	552.67	596.59
Air Force	237.64	267.15	280.04	325.50	334.13	571.42	628.64	672.30	773.75	835.23
Defence-Wide	298.61	341.20	334.82	403.85	428.21	516.99	568.77	608.27	700.06	755.69

Figure 10. Defense Budget of Nigeria.[238]

Nigeria has contributed much to maritime security in the GoG. The inauguration of Nigeria's MDA on July 13, 2021, and the ongoing integration of the Falcon Eye maritime surveillance system and Deep Blue program by the Nigerian Navy and Nigeria's ports authority (NIMASA) have begun to impact positively on the cooperation agreement to counter piracy and maritime robberies in the GoG.[239] According to Vice Admiral Awwal Gambo, chief of the naval staff of Nigeria, Falcon Eye system has already aided in the capture of 70 tankers transporting stolen oil worth USD1 billion, 30 boats involved in illicit fishing, 30 pirates, and 500 suspected smugglers.[240] In addition, the RMAC system was upgraded in 2020 by the United States to enhance the Nigerian Navy's ability to detect and respond to maritime threats in the GoG.[241] In addition to the Falcon Eye and the RMAC systems, Nigeria has also installed the VTMIS as well as command and control centers

238 Source: "Nigeria: Defense Budget."

239 Binnie, "Nigerian Navy Inaugurates Falcon Eye Surveillance System (C4ISR)."

240 Binnie.

241 Nigeria, "U.S. Boosts Nigeria's Maritime Security with New Surveillance Equipment."

along its coast.[242] Nigeria has at least three fully functional MOCs with support from the United States. The MOC monitors and coordinates the activities of shippers in their ZOR.

Nigeria has regularly participated in partners' capacity building exercises such as Obangame Express (OE) and the Navy Exercise for Maritime Operations (NEMO) to enhance the technical and operational capacity of its personnel as well as interoperability with regional states.[243] As mentioned previously, Nigeria and Benin signed in 2011 a mutual agreement, Operation Prosperity, for joint patrols of their maritime domains in response to the threat of piracy.[244] Operation Prosperity is still in force, and Nigeria has helped to secure Benin's maritime space. As a member of Zone E states (Benin, Nigeria, and Togo), Nigeria has also signed an MoU with its partner states to effect joint patrols in their maritime space. Nigeria has contributed significantly to maritime security, but its contribution has not yet been impactful enough. Many of the region's violent actors still originate from the Niger Delta and operate on the high seas.[245] Despite improved capabilities and some collaboration, Nigeria's high level of land-based and maritime threats and other preoccupations have limited the country's ability to sufficiently contribute to broader regional maritime security.

5. Ghana's Capabilities

Like other regional countries, while Ghana has some assets to patrol its territorial waters, its capabilities do not extend as far as pirates have extended their operations. As noted earlier, Ghana experiences more piracy attacks than terrorist attacks.[246] Yet, Ghana's

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242 Ntow, "Nigeria Commissions 'Falcon Eye System' to Curb Maritime Insecurity"; Sulaiman Adenekan, "Piracy: Nigeria Navy Inaugurates Maritime Surveillance System For Gulf Of Guinea," *Shippingposition* (blog), December 13, 2015, https://shippingposition.com.ng/piracy-nigeria-navy-inaugurates-maritime-surveillance-system-for-gulf-of-guinea-2/.

243 Janes, "Cameroon - Navy."

244 Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, "Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea," 58.

245 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, "Pirates of the Niger Delta: Between Brown and Blue Waters," Report by Danish Maritime Security Programe, Pirates of the Niger Delta, September 2021, https://www.unodc.org/res/piracy/index_html/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf.

246 "ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021"; "GTD Search Results."

Navy receives 15 percent of military personnel relative to army and 12 percent of the defense budget.[247]

Figure 11 shows the budget of the Ghana Defense Forces with the Navy having the smallest compared to the Army and the Air Force, indicating land-centric priorities. Ghana's naval strength is 3,000 personnel, and the country has a maritime coastline of 292 nautical miles (see Table 1). Ghana's maritime space, which extends from the coastline out to 200 nautical miles in its EEZ, an approximate area of 226, 000 square kilometers (see Table 1). Ghana's capabilities inventory includes four offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) of 58 meters and four fast attack crafts of 47 meters.[248] The Ghana Navy also received four Snake-class OPVs in early 2012. In addition to its current naval fleet, Ghana has installed radar stations and command-and-control centers along its coastline since 2014.[249] However, these capabilities seem inadequate to fulfill Ghana's diverse maritime interests with a view to guaranteeing security in its EEZ as well as securing its oil platforms.

247 IISS, "Chapter Nine," 473.

248 "Ghana."

249 Janes.



Total Defence Budget by Force for Ghana.

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Army	57.25	70.14	84.55	102.49	95.33	98.22	109.99	118.79	128.38	138.59
Navy	20.77	25.44	32.21	39.05	36.33	37.41	41.90	45.26	48.92	52.81
Air Force	49.21	60.29	80.54	97.62	90.80	93.55	104.76	113.13	122.25	132.00
Defence-Wide	2.60	3.18	4.02	4.88	4.54	4.67	5.24	5.66	6.12	6.61

Figure 11. Defense Budget of Ghana.[250]

Despite constrains, Ghana has found ways to contribute to maritime security in the GoG. First, Ghana is host to the MMCC Zone F. As already mentioned, Ghana has also installed VTMIS as well as command and control centers along its coast. However, the VTMIS is an electronic system exposed to environmental conditions which can cause the system to crash. In addition, to the VTMIS, Ghana has two fully functional MOCs with support from the United States. The MOCs monitor and coordinate the activities of shippers in their zones of operations. Ghana has regularly participated in partners capacity building exercises such as Obangame Express (OE) and the Navy Exercise for maritime Operations (NEMO) to enhance the technical and operational capacity of its personnel as well as interoperability with regional states.[251] Despite having the resources to make a contribution to regional maritime security and YAMS, Ghana's own maritime security challenges have limited its contributions and pace of implementation.

[250] Source: "Defence Budget by Force: Ghana."

[251] Janes, "Cameroon - Navy."

6. Senegal's Capabilities

Like some of the other countries discussed in this chapter, Senegal has experienced more terrorist attacks than piracy attacks between 2016–20, and both are at a low level. Yet, other threats limit the country's ability to effectively patrol its maritime space, which severely limits its ability to contribute to regional maritime security cooperation. Besides piracy and maritime robbery, the Senegal navy must also counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and migration as well as drug trafficking, which overwhelm its current capabilities and ability to contribute to regional maritime security cooperation. Senegal confronts these many challenges with a naval strength of 950 personnel over a coastline of 286 nautical miles and (see Table 1).[252] Its maritime domain spans from the coastline to 200 nautical miles of EEZ, an approximate area of 157,700 square kilometers (see Table 1).

Senegal's capabilities inventory includes two OPVs of 45 and 58 meters in length purchased from Raidco Marine France in 2015 (The Kedougou) and three fast patrol boats (CPB) of 34 meters all acquired in 2019 from France, with a maximum speed of 30 knots, a maximum range of 1,500 nautical miles, and equipped with surveillance and navigation systems.[253] These capabilities are inadequate to patrol its vast maritime space because Senegal's maritime challenges are not limited to maritime piracy but also involve illegal fishing, illegal migration, and drug trafficking.[254] In addition, pirates' current modus operandi, bolstered by improved capabilities, include attacking commercial shipping vessels further offshore, which further challenges Senegal.[255] Overall, Zone G's capabilities are limited because of the inadequate capacity of other countries in the zone.

Although Senegal has made limited contributions to maritime security in the GoG so far, Senegal has been an active participant in U.S.-sponsored capacity building initiative,

252 IISS, "Chapter Nine"; Janes, "Senegal."

253 Janes, "Senegal."

254 Janes.

255 Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?"

the Africa Partnership Station (APS).[256] Senegal has also regularly participated in partners capacity building exercises such as Obangame Express (OE) and the Navy Exercise for Maritime Operations (NEMO) to enhance the technical and operational capacity of its personnel as well as interoperability with regional states.[257] These capacity building exercises were initiated after the Yaoundé process to enhance GoG states' interoperability.

In addition to other issues raised, "navies are multi-mission services," they don't all focus on anti-piracy.[258] Senegal's marine concerns include piracy, illicit fishing, illegal migration, and drug trafficking. Senegal's capacities are insufficient to police its large ocean region. Overall, Zone G's capabilities are constrained by other nations' inadequacies.

D. CONCLUSION

The challenge of boosting naval capabilities in the GoG persists and warrants the collective support of both the local states and international partners.[259] The GoG navies are undermanned and underfunded in relation to the rest of the continent's multi-service armed forces. This low level of the attention underrates maritime threats and prioritizes land-based threats such as terrorism, insurgency, and border security. These navies are placed at a disadvantage with limited financial and human resources. This inadequate attention given to the national navies can also be attributed to sea blindness of the polity, being unaware of the potential of the maritime domain. This lack of interest in the maritime domain, combined with weak maritime capabilities, has prevented YAMS from effectively countering piracy.

256 Janes, "Senegal."

257 Janes.

258 Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States.," 16.

259 Hugo Decis, "Gulf of Guinea: Stepping up to the Maritime-Security Challenge?," IISS, April 17, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/04/gulf-of-guinea-maritime-security-challenges.

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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

The last year and a half has brought decreases in GoG maritime piracy, yet sea-based threats remain a significant GoG problem.[260] Even as Bell et al., of the international research organization Stable Seas, report that the "rates of piracy have been lower this year [2021] than they have been at any point in the last decade," they also recognize that "seafarers working in the Gulf of Guinea face unacceptable and unprecedented piracy and robbery at sea" where "this [GoG] is the world's piracy hotspot."[261] Researchers Prins et al. also found a significant one-year decrease in GoG piracy in 2021, but recognize that the region's trend has been upward, stating, "from 2015 to 2020, piracy incidents increased substantially in the Gulf of Guinea."[262] Despite the recent decline and significant international support for YAMS, GoG maritime security risks remain a concern relative to the rest of the globe, and seafarers are routinely abducted, with some tortured and murdered and others kept for ransom.[263]

This thesis examined the effectiveness of YAMS as an international instrument of cooperation in combatting piracy in the GoG. I argue that YAMS's structure is incomplete, bureaucratically heavy, and its components have unclear and even divergent goals. As a result, YAMS has been slow to operationalize its institutions, ineffective in sharing information, and therefore unable to achieve its goal of achieving maritime security in the GoG as a whole. The capabilities of member states are unlikely to be augmented soon in light of the recent rise in the region's terrorist and insurgency attacks and other land-based priorities.

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260 Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States;" and Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?"

261 Bell et al., "Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States," 4.

262 Prins et al., "Analysis | What Will Keep Ships — and People — Safer in the Gulf of Guinea?"

263 Chiotis, "The Grim Realities of a Ship Hijacking in the Gulf of Guinea"; Jacobsen, "Pirates of the Niger Delta," 11.

Some experts and analysts claim that piracy in the GoG, if not addressed comprehensively, risks increasing other concerns, such as a spike in terrorism, a return of military coups, and the deteriorating impact of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic.[264] GoG states are heavily dependent upon safe commercial shipping at sea for solid economic performance, which can affect state's funding levels and ability to govern.

B. FINDINGS

Three hypotheses were examined in this thesis: the structural features of YAMS, diverse interests of GoG member states, and the lack of capabilities as causative variables that restrict YAMS's effectiveness. The first hypothesis examined whether YAMS's structure makes it inefficient against piracy. This research concludes that YAMS's structure hinders its anti-piracy efficacy. Incomplete structural arrangements, bureaucratic heaviness, and varied and ambiguous aims are structural features of YAMS. YAMS's operationalization and information sharing are sluggish. Thus, GoG member state collaboration and YAMS's ability to improve maritime security and eradicate piracy are hindered.

Second, the extent to which divergent interests hinder cooperation between YAMS member states and limit its effectiveness were explored. Findings reveal the six GoG states examined—Angola, Cameroon, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal—have both divergent and similar concerns, because security threats are dynamic and affect neighboring states. Two countries, Cameroon and Nigeria, have faced the largest number of land-based attacks, but all six countries are now threatened by regional terrorist groups. Angola, Benin, Ghana, and Senegal experience very small numbers of land attacks, although Senegal has four times the number of terrorist attacks than piracy attacks. In two of the states, Benin and Ghana, piracy attacks are more common than terrorist attacks. It should be noted that Nigeria is facing significant land-based threat, which spills over to other states, and is the

[264] Edith M. Lederer, "UN Condemns Piracy in World's Hotspot -- the Gulf of Guinea," *Washington Post*, May 31, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-condemns-piracy-in-worlds-hotspot----the-gulf-of-guinea/2022/05/31/9fca1e80-e145-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62_story.html; Broohm, Wang, and Gao, "Maritime Security."

main source of piracy in the region. These states also contribute resources to combatting other land-based threats through regional and UN missions.

Third, the thesis found that some YAMS member states do not have sufficient maritime capabilities to sufficiently regulate their own maritime domain and combat piracy in the region. For several years up to 2020 maritime attacks across the GoG trended upward. Over the same time period, land-based attacks have also trended upward but at a slower rate. Because many states invest more heavily in land-based fighting capabilities, individual member states do not have sufficient resources to increase YAMS's capacities. Member nations' weak capacities hinder the amount and quality of anti-piracy and maritime crime-fighting activities.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are three recommendations to remedy the problems identified in this thesis. First, sluggish and incomplete YAMS components hinder its effectiveness. Although the operationalization of YAMS must adhere to the Yaoundé rules, reducing the structure to alleviate its bureaucratic heaviness would aid in improving its agility and responsiveness in terms of coordination and information exchange.

Second, GoG governments must grasp the importance of maritime security, recognize the rising levels of maritime threats, and enhance naval attention. They should educate against piracy. Increasing navy personnel strength and devoting proper resources to marine threats will help eradicate piracy and other maritime crime.

Third, GoG governments must acquire necessary response capabilities to improve the efficiency of their navies. GoG states are challenged with capability acquisition and costs. States can meet African challenges with African solutions. Buying cheaper, better-adapted homemade platforms might help other GoG governments close the capability gap with pirates.

D. AREA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

YAMS collaborations demand trust. Trusting relationships improve GOG collaboration. Trust and information sharing require effective collaboration. Without

confidence, members won't exchange sensitive intelligence or allow joint patrols in their respective waters. Hoffman says, "Trust is an actor's readiness to entrust its interests under the control of others based on the confidence that other actors would uphold their commitment to avoid using their discretion harmfully." Trust implies risks and responsibilities. Future study should examine if and how trust affects YAMS members' capacity to collaborate on maritime security. This would determine if trust issues impact maritime security cooperation.

E. CONCLUSION

Maritime security is a critical area that requires a strong commitment from the members of YAMS to create safety in the GoG region. The concept of maritime security cooperation has proven to be effective in many regions of the world. The GoG concept of YAMS, once it is reconceptualized and fully operationalized, has the potential to significantly ameliorate the maritime security situation as well as the capacity to effectively secure the region's resources in the GoG states. Finally, countering piracy in the GoG remains a transnational phenomenon and no single country has the necessary wherewithal to counter it alone. The threat, therefore, demands collective responsibility and response.

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