



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ENHANCEMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ORGANIZATION IN THE DHS**

by

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September 2022

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ENHANCEMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE DHS

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ABSTRACT

In 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General found that the DHS is ineffective at executing cross-component operations. To address this deficiency, this thesis asks how can DHS special operations teams leverage collective capabilities to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort? The thesis reviews academic literature on organizational integrating mechanisms and comparative case studies of U.S. military special operations forces, Operation Eagle Claw, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint Special Operations Task Force, and Australian Federal Police Specialist Response Group to seek solutions for the DHS. The results show that organizational design, informal networks, and routines have been successfully used by these organizations to achieve collaboration and interoperability. This thesis recommends that the DHS: 1) create a DHS Joint Special Operations Working Group for interoperability recommendations; 2) create a professional forum for DHS special operations personnel to collaborate; 3) initiate joint training programs; 4) establish liaison roles and exchange programs between Component teams; 5) create a DHS Special Operations Command (DHSSOC) as a joint force structure to coordinate and advocate for special operations; and 6) create a Joint Special Operations Directorate within DHSSOC as a standing force to develop integrated routines and equipment.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACT	Australian Capital Territory
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AMO	Air and Marine Office
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
BORSTAR	Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit
BORTAC	Border Patrol Tactical Unit
CAT	Counter Assault Team
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CS	Counter Sniper
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DHSSOC	DHS Special Operations Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DSF	Deployable Specialized Forces
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
ERT	Emergency Response Team
F3EAD	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Act
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JSOD	Joint Special Operations Directorate
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
MSRT	Maritime Security Response Team
MSST	Maritime Safety and Security Team
NSF	National Strike Force
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPSEC	operational security

ORG	Operational Response Group
PSU	Port Security Units
SOF	special operations forces
SOG	Special Operations Group
SOP	standard operating procedures
SRG	Specialist Response Group
SRS	Specialist Response & Security Team
SRT	Special Response Team
TACLET	Tactical Law Enforcement Team
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USBP	U.S. Border Patrol
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USSS	U.S. Secret Service

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis seeks to answer the research question: How can special operations teams in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leverage capabilities towards greater effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort? The project seeks solutions by reviewing academic literature regarding mechanisms organizations can use to increase collaboration. The research finds that organizational design, informal networks, and routines are methodologies for achieving integration. This thesis then analyzes three case studies to determine how organizations used these mechanisms to increase collaboration, effectiveness, and efficiency among disparate special operations teams. The three cases analyzed are:

- Department of Defense—Operation Eagle Claw through the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command
- Department of Defense—the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq from 2003–2007
- Australian Federal Police—Events leading up to the creation of the Specialist Response Group

The thesis synthesizes findings with the academic literature formulating six recommendations for the DHS special operations community to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort. These recommendations exist on a collaboration continuum and are listed below from least to most social capital required to execute.

1. Create and establish a DHS Joint Special Operations Working Group to analyze issues and make recommendations for cross-component interoperability.
2. Create a professional forum for DHS special operations personnel to collaborate and theorize novel solutions.
3. Initiate joint training programs to share best practices and develop a stronger collective group identity and common purpose.

4. Establish liaison roles and exchange programs between Component teams to dispel subunit orientation and foster common purpose.
5. Create a DHS Special Operations Command (DHSSOC) as a joint force structure to coordinate and advocate for special operations teams.
6. Create a Joint Special Operations Directorate within DHSSOC to develop integrated routines and equipment staffed by existing special operations personnel via joint duty mechanisms as a standing response force for national incidents.

The thesis concludes by recommending initial efforts in the department to focus on recommendations one through four because they can be initiated internally through informal networks. Recommendations five and six require far more social and political capital to initiate and sustain, presenting longer-term solutions.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs over 2,300 special operations personnel across 11 teams in four operational Components.¹ In the summer of 2020, 576 of these special operations agents from six teams (three of the Components) responded to civil unrest and protests in Portland, Oregon, to defend the Mark O. Hatfield Federal Courthouse.² This high-profile deployment of special operations police from the DHS immediately brought intense public scrutiny of the tactics, equipment, and procedures used against protesters to protect federal property. These events triggered an investigation by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG). They reported that the DHS was “unprepared to execute cross-component activities...and did not have an established cross-component strategy to ensure effective operations.”³ This indictment by the Office of the Inspector General further detailed inconsistent and incompatible equipment, training, and tactics used by the various teams.⁴ The scenario above is only one example cited in the OIG report. However, there are many similar instances where various special operations teams from DHS deployed to work together in a disjointed fashion. A 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that DHS special operations teams deployed to quell civil unrest in locations such as Buffalo, New York City, Seattle, Washington, DC, Detroit, San Diego, and Tacoma.⁵

¹ The DHS uses the term Component to describe sub-agencies within the department. It will be used throughout this thesis in this context. See Appendix A for a detailed description of these teams including reported staffing levels.

² Special operations personnel deployed from CBP, ICE, and USSS. For a detailed accounting see Joseph Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*, OIG-21-31 (Washington, DC: DHS Office of the Inspector General, 2021), 10, <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-04/OIG-21-31-Mar21.pdf>.

³ Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland*, 11, 14.

⁴ Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland*, 11–15.

⁵ Gretta L. Goodwin, *GAO Report to Congress: Federal Tactical Teams*, GAO-20-710 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020), 58–60, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-710>.

The issues experienced by these special operations teams in the Summer of 2020 are essentially DHS’ “Eagle Claw” incident because they highlight similar problems encountered by the U.S. military during that operation.⁶ Operation Eagle Claw tragically resulted in the deaths of several U.S. service members. The operation was a failed joint attempt by special operations forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to rescue hostages held by Islamic militants in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The operation highlighted that compartmentalized, ad-hoc planning, coordination, and execution of a joint mission using personnel with different tactics, techniques, and procedures can have tragic consequences. Although the DHS did not experience a catastrophic loss of life or materiel in the Summer of 2020, the problems that arose from ad-hoc missions were eerily reminiscent of Operation Eagle Claw.

Special operations units in the DHS routinely work independently within their Components without any overarching coordination, control, or collaboration to address the complex homeland security environment. Nor does a singular, cohesive DHS special operations force exist to respond to and mitigate critical national security incidents. The Federal response to protests and civil unrest over the last several years has brought policing tactics and procedures to the forefront of the national conversation.

The flexibility and specialized capabilities of DHS special operations units offer a unique force multiplier to combat emerging threats in a complex environment such as Portland. Flexibility exists because these personnel are typically non-unionized employees, which makes rapid deployments administratively easier. Special operations capabilities in the DHS run the gambit from police diving, energetic breaching, sniper teams, high-risk warrant service, and advanced tactical medicine support, to name a few. These capabilities exist across several independent teams that operate autonomously but frequently work together, as seen in the Summer of 2020. The DHS’s current hierarchical and reductionist nature creates stove-piping that does not foster the networked relationships required to

⁶ For more information on Operation Eagle Claw, see Richard A. Radvanyi, “Operation Eagle Claw—Lessons Learned” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2002), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA402471>; and Richard Lamb, “This Is What Special Ops Learned 40 Years Ago from Operation Eagle Claw,” *Military Times*, April 24, 2020, sec. Commentary, <https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/24/this-is-what-special-ops-learned-40-years-ago-from-operation-eagle-claw/>.

leverage special operations capabilities with the DHS.⁷ In this manner, the DHS fails to realize the potential force multiplier brought to bear by its most highly trained agents. There is an opportunity to reorganize, network, or adjust routines to further effectiveness and efficiency between special operations teams. Opportunity also exists to forge trust and common purpose so teams can execute future missions requiring joint operations more effectively.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can special operations teams in the DHS leverage capabilities towards greater effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Thus far, no literature has been located specifically addressing special operations integration or coordination within the DHS. As such, this gap appears significant and worthy of further scrutiny. Given this gap, this literature review discusses the writings and analyses of two other mature, multi-divisional organizations, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Accordingly, voluminous literature describes the genesis and evolution of the DOD in the context of unifying special operations forces. The AFP, a federal law enforcement entity, merged disparate units with similar capabilities to increase collaboration and unity of effort. Finally, this review will examine organizational design theories and contingencies from an academic and practitioner perspective. Research for this thesis reviewed several theses, reports, and books describing approaches to organizing the homeland security enterprise.

1. Organizational Design and Doctrinal Change

The book *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change* by Dr. Gareth Jones is a foundational work for this thesis. Dr. Jones is widely known for this work because it brings together organizational theory and organizational change. In his book, Dr. Jones details various organizational designs, from mechanistic structures to large multi-divisional

⁷ James Madia, "Homeland Security Organizations: Design Contingencies in Complex Environments" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 7, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5559>.

organic structures, the latter of which is more applicable to this study. Specifically, this material describes balancing integration and differentiation, integrative mechanisms, centralized versus decentralized authority, and appropriate organizational structure for large organizations.⁸

Dr. Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a renowned researcher studying the changing character of political violence, technology, and strategy. In his book, *Forging the Sword*, Jensen discusses an approach observed in the U.S. Army. He noted that members formed social incubator groups outside the bureaucratic hierarchy to visualize new solutions to problems on the horizon. These members then circulate these new ideas through advocacy networks to senior leaders who champion the emerging initiatives. Jensen argues that organizational change occurs due to endogenous forces rather than external stimuli. Jensen's approach to organizational change in a bureaucratic structure contradicts prevailing wisdom but is grounded in broader research.⁹

Thomas H. Stanton was a senior fellow at John Hopkins University Center for the Study of American Government. In his report *Moving Toward a More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design*, Stanton describes basic means of improving performance in public organizations. Stanton also describes circumstances surrounding the decision to change organizational structure and discusses options for optimal organizational solutions. Stanton's work contains a section akin to frequently asked questions surrounding public organizational issues and provides insights toward finding relevant solutions.¹⁰

James Madia, in his master's thesis *Homeland Security Organizations: Design Contingencies in Complex Environments*, takes a broad look at the homeland security

⁸ Gareth R. Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2007), chaps. 1, 4, 6.

⁹ Benjamin M. Jensen, *Forging The Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 15–22.

¹⁰ Thomas H. Stanton, *Moving Toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design* (Arlington, VA: Center for the Business of Government, 2002), 26–33, <https://www.hsd1.org/?abstract&did=457048>.

enterprise in the United States through the lens of organizational design. Madia notes that the homeland security environment is

increasingly unstable, dynamic, and complex, yet many U.S. homeland security organizations are designed around a 19th-century model created for the Industrial Age. Information Age challenges demand new ideas for organizational design. Traditional mechanistic and hierarchical bureaucracies must be reexamined.¹¹

While broad, the principles and conclusions drawn from his work are directly applicable to the narrower issue presented in this thesis.

In his master's thesis *Applying the Combatant Command Construct to the DHS*, John Morris argues that the current command structure in the DHS is dysfunctional and does not adequately provide a unified effort to secure the homeland. In his thesis, he explored the organizational design of the DOD after 1986. He concluded that the problems faced by the DOD prior were remarkably similar to those faced by DHS. Morris argues that the Combatant Command organizational structure is an excellent construct for the DHS to adopt.¹²

Drs. David Alberts and Mark Nissen's article, *Toward Harmonizing Command and Control with Organization and Management Theory*, create a figurative Rosetta Stone to assess concepts and variables across domains and create a common approach space.¹³ Thus, organizational structures and approaches can be examined together in a three-dimensional graphical space.¹⁴ Their approach provides two- and three-dimensional representations of organizations in a helpful way for further analysis.

¹¹ Madia, "Homeland Security Organizations," 7.

¹² John R. Morris, "Applying the Combatant Command Construct to the DHS Command Structure" (master's thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2012), 6.

¹³ David S. Alberts and Mark E. Nissen, "Toward Harmonizing Command and Control with Organization and Management Theory," *International C2 Journal*, The International C2 Journal, 3, no. 2 (2009): 1, <https://www.hSDL.org/?abstract&did=11689>.

¹⁴ Alberts and Nissen, "Toward Harmonizing Command and Control," 1.

2. Department of Defense Special Operations

Retired U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal served as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force early in the Iraq War. His book *Team of Teams* elaborates that the modern world is complex and requires adaptability and resilience to achieve operational effectiveness and success.¹⁵ McChrystal describes his command experience in changing how his task force operated to integrate disparate elements such as intelligence, various special operations units, federal partners, the CIA, and the NSA, among others, into an effective organization by building trust and common purpose between the various groups. His premise is that the U.S. military is a siloed and hierarchical entity designed on reductionist approaches to organizational management. This approach favored efficiency over adaptability and resilience. His task force was ineffective against Al Qaeda, which proved to be resilient and agile.¹⁶ McChrystal elaborates how he reorganized his task force to create an environment of trust, common purpose, and shared consciousness to network a team of teams to combat Al Qaeda. The principles and lessons from McChrystal's experience can be analyzed and adapted into a construct for the DHS.

John Hamre, the CEO and President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, discusses the events leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, including the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in Iran and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.¹⁷ Further, in his thesis "Optimization of Special Operations Command," U.S. Navy Lieutenant Robert Davis continues to describe the results from the Holloway Commission. Davis also elaborates on the failed Operation Eagle Claw in Iran that initiated special operations reforms in the U.S. military.¹⁸

In 2006, Bob Woodward cited a memo from then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that called for reforms to the homeland security segments of the federal

¹⁵ Stanley A. McChrystal, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 74–80.

¹⁶ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 76.

¹⁷ John Hamre, "Reflections: Looking Back at the Need for Goldwater-Nichols," Defense360, January 27, 2016, <https://defense360.csis.org/goldwater-nichols-2016/>.

¹⁸ Robert Davis, "Optimization of Special Operations Command" (master's thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, 2019), 30.

government.¹⁹ Daniel Prieto, a Senior Fellow at the Global Leadership Initiative and The Reform Institute, supports federal coordination. However, he points out that the DHS chain of command to the president is not nearly as direct as in the DOD, and reform would not be nearly as straightforward.²⁰

In the book *Beyond 9/11*, Alan Cohn and Christian Marrone devote chapter three to describing the DHS's organizational challenges. Cohn and Marrone directed the DHS towards the DOD's successful experience as a sizeable multi-divisional entity that achieved operational and management integration.²¹ This book provides a comprehensive and foundational research base from many perspectives, including the genesis of the DHS and its evolution.

Christine Wormuth, the U.S. Secretary of the Army, acknowledges that Goldwater-Nichols can ultimately provide goals and a basic framework for the DHS. However, she elaborates that the homeland security enterprise is more complex than that faced by the military, making it unrealistic to copy and paste reforms.²² U.S. Air Force Colonel Michael Edwards holds a somewhat similar viewpoint. He argues that manufactured and natural threats to the homeland require an integrated and synergistic response from the federal government. Like Wormuth, Edwards suggests that cabinet-level departments should join together in reform similar to, but not exactly like, Goldwater-Nichols.²³

¹⁹ Bob Woodward, "The World According to Rummy," *Washington Post*, August 10, 2006, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2006/10/08/the-world-according-to-rummy/3e5bcbec-285a-48bd-b912-aa6c8a37b1f1/>.

²⁰ Daniel B. Prieto, "Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security: Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare," in *Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century*, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006), 88–89, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=236353>.

²¹ Chappell Lawson, Alan Douglas Bersin, and Juliette N. Kayyem, eds., *Beyond 9/11: Homeland Security for the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020), 62.

²² Christine E. Wormuth, "Is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security?," in *Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century*, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006), 84, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=236353>.

²³ Michael Edwards, "Goldwater-Nichols Act for Homeland Security," in *Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century*, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership, 2006), 55, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=236353>.

Sean Naylor is an American journalist who covered intelligence and counterterrorism for over 20 years for the *Army Times*. He devoted the first chapter of his book *Relentless Strike* to describing the circumstances that led the U.S. military to develop the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).²⁴ In the rest of his book, Naylor describes the genesis and evolution of implementing joint operations and integration across DOD special operations forces. The Special Operations Forces Reference Manual cited by the Federation of American Scientists further discusses the history and genesis of USSOCOM organizational models and structure.²⁵

3. Federal Law Enforcement in Australia

The book *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons* by Nadav Morag provides background knowledge on Australia, comparing its democratic institutions to those of the United States. This information is required to have an informed discussion regarding Australia's organizational approach to integrative efforts in their homeland security efforts and possible application to the United States. For example, Australia has a bicameral legislative body, powers reserved at the state and federal levels, and state and federal court systems for resolving legal matters. One key difference, however, with the U.S. is that the federal government reserves all powers not explicitly delegated to the states.²⁶

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is Australia's primary national policing organization and, as such, is anecdotal to the DHS in the United States. AFP's official government website provides a wealth of information regarding its role, function, and authority, such as:

²⁴ Sean Naylor, *Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), chap. 1.

²⁵ Federation of American Scientists, *SOF Reference Manual* (Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1/SOFREF_Ch2.htm.

²⁶ Nadav Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2018), 44–45.

The AFP's role is to enforce Commonwealth criminal law, contribute to combating complex, transnational, serious, and organized crime impacting Australia's national security and protect Commonwealth interests from criminal activity in Australia and overseas. The AFP works closely with a range of other law enforcement and government agencies at the state, territory, Commonwealth, and international levels, enhancing safety and providing a secure regional and global environment.²⁷

In 2009, the AFP began a landmark review of federal policing capabilities in Australia appropriately entitled the *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, conducted by Roger Beale of The Allen Consulting Group.²⁸ This review represented a substantial evaluation of policing efforts within the AFP and all other federal entities, such as investigatory, emergency response, and international policing deployments. Such an audit may serve as an example to draw from for application to the DHS. As a result of this audit, the AFP integrated two units to align capabilities, promote tactics standardization, and increase organizational efficiency. The AFP's Specialist Response Group (SRG) is the new amalgamated unit. The incorporated units were the AFP Operational Response Group and the Specialist Response and Security Team from the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) police.²⁹ The Specialist Response Group homepage states that the SRG provides “a more efficient and effective operational model for the delivery of specialist policing services for the AFP.”³⁰

4. Literature Review Conclusion

Ample literature describes DOD pain points over its evolution and the reforms that have taken place to mitigate these issues. Specifically, the literature surrounding catastrophes and reforms in the 1980s—and the results that have come to fruition since then—are plentiful. Sufficient literature compares the DHS to the DOD and

²⁷ Australian Federal Police, “Our Organisation,” Australian Federal Police About Us, February 1, 2016, <https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/our-organisation>.

²⁸ Roger Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities* (Canberra, ACT: The Allen Consulting Group, 2009), <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/new-realities-national-policing-21st-century-federal-audit-police>.

²⁹ Australian Federal Police, “Specialist Response Group,” Australian Federal Police What We Do, April 6, 2016, <https://www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/operational-support/specialist-response-group>.

³⁰ Australian Federal Police, “Specialist Response Group.”

recommends parallel reforms. Significant literature exists documenting the Australian Federal Police and their reorganization process that resulted in the creation of the Specialist Response Group.

However, virtually no literature exists comparing DOD and DHS special operations constructs. Moreover, no literature describes methods for reconstructing DHS special operations units to further operational integration and unity of effort. Many academic and pragmatic works describe organizational and management theory and design, some of which directly correspond to the homeland security enterprise. This thesis thus represents a substantial academic contribution to the body of study.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis addresses the research problem by performing three case studies highly relevant to DHS special operations. They examine their organization and the circumstances that led to their current state. The findings are compared and integrated with research on organizational design to produce a new model for how DHS special operations teams can collaborate and integrate more effectively. This comparative case study approach represents the best manner to leverage decades of experience and lessons learned from complex organizations facing similar challenges combined with a litany of academic literature on the subject. Data for these studies is open source, published material in books, journal articles, websites, and government reports. This work aims to deliver recommendations for the DHS to consider for organic special operations assets to increase their unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness.

II. INFORMED FOUNDATION

This chapter examines three functional mechanisms for achieving coordination, integration, and collaboration within an organization: 1) Organizational Design, 2) Networks, and 3) Routines. Additionally, this chapter describes how doctrinal change has occurred from the ground up in the context of the U.S. Army as an example of a large hierarchical organization similar in magnitude to the DHS. These principles are essential to properly frame and inform the materials presented in subsequent chapters that evaluate successful organizational models and their applicability to the DHS special operations community. Finally, this chapter describes the DHS's current structure to provide the needed context for subsequent chapters.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

Organizational theory is classically understood as the study of how organizations function, affect, and are affected by the environment in which they operate.³¹ Organizations exist to solve a particular problem or set of problems. Therefore, when examining an organization for modification, the question at the forefront of one's mind should always pertain to the issue needing to be solved. The advent of modern communications technology is part of the operational environment. It adds tremendous capacity to an organization to enable change.³² Further, the study of doctrine formation can shine a light on the change process in military organizations, which are bureaucratic institutions.³³

Organizations exist to solve problems and issues by organizing people to create more value working together than separately.³⁴ Dr. Gareth Jones lists these five reasons that organizations create value as opposed to individuals: 1) increased specialization of

³¹ Gareth R. Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall), 2007, 8.

³² Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 270.

³³ Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (1993): 410, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600839>.

³⁴ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 4.

labor; 2) large-scale technology; 3) managing external environment; 4) economizing on transaction costs; and 5) exerting power and control.³⁵ The driving principle underlying this concept is that groups of individuals become more productive when their contributions are coordinated and controlled towards a common operational goal. Dr. Jones defines this structure as a “formal system of task and authority relationships that control how people coordinate their actions and use resources to achieve organizational goals.”³⁶ From this definition, we learn that the relationship between tasks and authorities among people in the organization must align properly to efficiently and effectively achieve the mission. In addition to organizational structure, the culture within the organization shapes and controls behavior. Dr. Jones defines organizational culture as shared values and norms that people in the organization hold that become the organization’s ethics.³⁷ Thus, changing an organization’s structure affects its culture and vice versa.

Organizational design and change are very closely interrelated because organizational change is a re-design process.³⁸ Changes in organizational design occur to induce an organization to a more effective state. Thomas Stanton, from the Center for the Study of American Government at Johns Hopkins University, believes the key to organizational design is finding the most appropriate form to achieve the intended goals.³⁹ Specifically, in the context of designing a more capable government, Stanton provides several sound reasons to create a new organization or reorganize:

1. Combine related programs from disparate governmental units to provide an organizational focus and accountability for carrying out high-priority public purposes
2. Help assure that information flows to the proper level of government for consideration and possible action
3. Change policy emphasis and assure that resources are more properly allocated to support high-priority activities

³⁵ Jones, 5.

³⁶ Jones, 7.

³⁷ Jones, 8.

³⁸ Jones, 9.

³⁹ Stanton, *Moving Toward More Capable Government*, 6.

4. Determine who controls and is accountable for certain governmental activities⁴⁰

Organizational change, by definition, is intended to improve performance and effectiveness. Stanton elaborates that there are six essential means to improve performance in organizations that carry out public purposes. These means are

- redesign program components
- administrative systems
- provide additional resources
- improve the organization's leadership
- improve the coordination of activities of multiple organizations
- redesign the organization entirely⁴¹

The reasons and means that Stanton mentions have direct applicability to the issues that face the DHS in this thesis; however, synthesis is reserved for Chapter 5 in concert with analysis from subsequent chapters. To further comprehend the underpinnings of organizations, some fundamental challenges to consider.

1. Basic Challenges of Organizational Design

The inherent challenges of organizational design relate to balance and differentiation. Before discussing balance, however, let us examine some fundamental concepts and definitions. Organizations function based on the principle of differentiation. Differentiation is an organization's process of allocating resources and people across various tasks under authority relationships.⁴² Within an organization, people have roles that are behaviors related to tasks required in their position. An organization's structure is an authoritative arrangement of positional relationships from one to another.⁴³ These relationships with one another are combined to form an organizational hierarchy. Effective organizational design must balance 1) differentiation and integration, 2) centralization and

⁴⁰ Stanton, 6.

⁴¹ Stanton, 8.

⁴² Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 88.

⁴³ Jones, 91.

decentralization, and 3) standardization and mutual adjustment.⁴⁴ Further, an organizational design must consider the differences in mechanistic and organic structures.

a. *Balancing Differentiation and Integration*

Differentiation can occur both horizontally and vertically across this organizational hierarchy. Vertical differentiation represents the lines of authority between organizational roles and subunits to enable control and management of resources.⁴⁵ Horizontal differentiation groups organizational tasks and roles according to primary task responsibilities, thus creating the division of labor, enabling personnel to specialize and become productive.⁴⁶ The main issue plaguing organizational design is selecting the correct lateral and vertical differentiation variations to accomplish goals through controlling activities. Additionally, integration requires the efficient use of organizational resources for a common purpose. Thus, balancing differentiation and integration is a fundamental consideration when designing an organization.

A significant occurrence is the idea of subunit orientation. Subunit orientation is the tendency of specialized units, or personnel, to only view their role from the perspective of that subunit. Organizations have realized that subunit orientation prevents lateral communication and potential learning.⁴⁷ Jones defines subunit orientation in terms of one's time frames, goals, and interpersonal orientation of one's subunit.⁴⁸ McChrystal summarized this concept less eloquently when he stated that from one's unit looking out, "everyone else sucks."⁴⁹

To avoid this tendency, organizations utilize integrating mechanisms to promote cooperation, coordination, and communication laterally across the functional units.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Jones, 95.

⁴⁵ Jones, 94.

⁴⁶ Jones, 94.

⁴⁷ Jones, 95.

⁴⁸ Jones, 95.

⁴⁹ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 127.

⁵⁰ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 96.

Integrating mechanisms can be as simple as changing authority and hierarchy or complex in the case of liaison roles. However, the overarching idea is simply to get people together, to talk, build relationships and expand perspectives. Another integrating mechanism is task forces, where more than one subunit must work together to solve common problems. Task forces are typically not permanent and scoped to handle a specific problem. Teams are permanent task forces or committees and provide ample opportunity to develop relationships to handle complex issues effectively. Jones notes that teams become ineffective over time when they do not adapt to new problems or if in-groups develop within the team whose power does not contribute toward organizational goals.⁵¹

Large organizations sometimes use a full-time position or positions as integrating roles. Integrating roles differ from liaison roles in that they are full-time and permanent positions explicitly developed to improve communication between divisions.⁵² These persons promote sharing of information and knowledge across the organization to accomplish goals better. Liaison positions, on the other hand, are considered temporary and fulfilled as collateral duty in most cases.⁵³ A complex organization with a high level of differentiation requires sufficient integrating mechanisms to control actions adequately. This balance requires careful consideration when choosing appropriate coordinating mechanisms that allow subunits to cooperate to strengthen core competencies within the organization.⁵⁴

b. Balancing Centralization and Decentralization

The balance of centralized versus decentralized hierarchy and authority is an essential consideration with pros and cons on both ends of the spectrum. Although it affords a greater level of control of activities, a centralized hierarchy tends to lead employees to frequently ask superiors for direction, which stifles risk-taking and innovation.⁵⁵ On the

⁵¹ Jones, 99.

⁵² Jones, 99.

⁵³ Jones, 99.

⁵⁴ Jones, 100.

⁵⁵ Jones, 100.

other hand, a decentralized organization promotes responsiveness and flexibility, allowing managers to demonstrate their aptitude and remain motivated to perform. However, an organization that is too decentralized can be challenging to control and coordinate, especially if managers pursue their own functional goals and objectives.⁵⁶

An ideal balance exists when middle- and lower-level managers have decentralized authority that empowers them to make crucial decisions at the scene of the action. Meanwhile, top-level managers become responsible for a long-term strategy for the organization.⁵⁷ This mix of tactical flexibility and innovation enables a quick response to environmental changes with a strategic outlook on the horizon to aid organizations in remaining effective and achieving their goals. This balance results in a shared consciousness and smart autonomy amongst members of the organization and subunits.⁵⁸ It is important to note that this decision-making balance is a dynamic process and shifts as the organization and operational environment change.⁵⁹

c. Balancing Standardization and Mutual Adjustment

Standardization in an organization results in people's actions becoming routine and predictable as they follow set rules and norms governing specific situations. While predictability is desirable, too many standards stifle creativity and imaginative response to make an organization inflexible and perform poorly.⁶⁰ On the other hand, mutual adjustment allows organization members to use their judgment to address problems, make decisions, and enhance collaboration instead of following strict, standardized rules. Jones states that the correct balance between these concepts "makes some actions predictable so basic organizational tasks and goals are achieved, yet it gives employees the freedom to behave flexibly so they can respond to changes in the environment."⁶¹

⁵⁶ Jones, 100.

⁵⁷ Jones, 100–101.

⁵⁸ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 225.

⁵⁹ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 101.

⁶⁰ Jones, 102.

⁶¹ Jones, 103.

The balance between standardization and mutual adjustment correlates to centralized versus decentralized authority in an organization. When an organization has a high level of formalized rules, the organization will tend to have an implied centralized authority structure.⁶² The opposite tends to hold for decentralized organizations and a higher level of mutual adjustment. The challenge becomes how to use rules and norms to standardize behavior and simultaneously permit members to develop innovative methods to accomplish organizational goals through mutual adjustment.⁶³ It is important to note that organization members facing complex and uncertain situations must rely more on mutual adjustment than on rules to adapt to changes in the operational environment.

d. Mechanistic and Organic Organizational Structures

This discussion would not be complete without addressing basic organizational design structures. The two primary structures discussed in this section are mechanistic and organic. This section also discusses contingency approaches to organizational design. Mechanistic design structures are rigid entities suited for stable, unchanging, and predictable environments.⁶⁴ Mechanistic structure centralizes decision-making, and subordinates are supervised closely through a highly defined vertical hierarchy. These organizations follow written rules and procedures governing employees' actions and behaviors. In his book *Inside Bureaucracy*, Anthony Downs described these types of organizations as being “made of bundles of rituals, SOP, mandates, and bureaucrats focused on turf and budgets—that tend to adapt either incrementally or in response to threats to their autonomy.”⁶⁵

Organic design structures distribute decision-making authority throughout the hierarchy to promote flexibility within the organization and achieve coordination through

⁶² Jones, 102–3.

⁶³ Jones, 104.

⁶⁴ Jones, 107.

⁶⁵ Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 198–200, <https://doi.org/10.7249/CB156>.

mutual adjustment.⁶⁶ These structures develop norms and values that emphasize innovation, personal expertise, and competence over time. Accordingly, creativity and innovation convey status to individual members.

The contingency approach is another concept of organizational design that tailors structures to mitigate sources of uncertainty facing the organization. Per contingency theory, an organization must design its structures in alignment with the environment in which it operates.⁶⁷ The ultimate goal is to control the external environment to the greatest degree possible.

Jones cites two specific studies conducted to evaluate organizational structures. A Harvard University study found that organizations in complex, unstable environments were more effective when they were less formalized, decentralized, and reliant on mutual adjustment.⁶⁸ From the Lawrence and Lorsch study, Jones surmised that different departments within an organization must develop different orientations to combat the uncertainty of their specific operational environment to be effective.⁶⁹ Another study, published in the *Economic Journal*, corroborated the Harvard study and found that companies with organic structures tended to be more effective in unstable and changing environments.⁷⁰ Burns and Stalker noted that lower-level employees should be empowered to make on-the-spot decisions in a rapidly changing environment. Jones concludes with an example from the U.S. Army as an organization that allows for emergence and adaptability during uncertain and rapidly changing battlefield conditions.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 107.

⁶⁷ Jones, 108.

⁶⁸ For the specific Harvard study see Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration*, 6th ed. (Boston: Grad. School of Business Administration, Harvard Univ, 1976); Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 108–10.

⁶⁹ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 110; Lawrence and Lorsch, *Organization and Environment*.

⁷⁰ T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, “The Management of Innovation,” *Economic Journal* 79, no. 314 (June 1969): 403, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2230196>; Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 110–12.

⁷¹ Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 111.

2. Specialization and Coordination

An organization's specialized tasks and knowledge can present coordination and communication challenges. Structures must be both productive and achieve organizational goals. This section explores how basic functional structures develop and lead to divisional or multi-divisional structures in large organizations.

a. Functional Structure

The functional structure provides the foundation for horizontal differentiation because it groups people based on common expertise, shared experience, or using the same resources.⁷² These structures provide members a forum to learn from each other and increase productivity. Jones states that "all organizations initially are organized by function because the development of separate functions allows organizations to manage an increase in specialization and the division of labor most effectively."⁷³ Problems arise with communications and coordination to control increasingly complex activities as differentiation occurs. As functional units increase specialization, they develop different subunit orientations necessitating complex integrating strategies to ensure common purpose and achieve organizational goals.⁷⁴ As a functionally structured organization grows, managers can become bogged down in finding solutions to integration and coordination problems, thus neglecting longer-term strategic development.⁷⁵ As a result, complex functional structures should consider more of a divisional structure to solve problems associated with the complexity of specialization, organization of resources, disparity of products, or geographic separation.

b. Divisional Structure

A divisional structure seeks to solve two issues simultaneously, 1) increase managers' control of different subunits to better meet goals, and 2) permit supervisors to

⁷² Jones, 145.

⁷³ Jones, 147.

⁷⁴ Jones, 147.

⁷⁵ Jones, 148.

regulate and integrate the entirety of the organization's operations.⁷⁶ Managing these two issues ensures that all subunits meet organizational goals. A combination of several design choices mitigates these issues. The result is a divisional structure with smaller subunits and increased managerial control:

- Increase vertical differentiation
- Increase horizontal differentiation
- Increase integration⁷⁷

Jones describes three types of divisional structures dependent upon the desired end product. A product divisional structure centralizes support functions for the needs of the organization's various outputs. In a multidivisional structure, support functions are placed in separate divisions to support the specific needs of that subunit. Each division becomes an independent entity in this case and requires new management levels, including integrating roles. Each division can have a different structure than the others to serve that division's specific needs. Multidivisional organizations contain all three corporate, divisional, and functional management levels.⁷⁸ The benefits of a multidivisional structure include a clear division of labor and increased control. The downside of this structure is that coordination problems can arise between divisions. Further, authority delegation versus centralization can make managing the corporate-divisional relationship difficult. Furthermore, they are expensive to operate because support functions can be redundant and duplicate efforts and activities.⁷⁹

Product team structures represent a sort of hybrid between product and multidivisional structures. A product team structure organizes support functions into

⁷⁶ Jones, 149.

⁷⁷ Jones, 149–50.

⁷⁸ Jones, 155–56.

⁷⁹ Jones, 157–58.

development teams that support a particular product. This approach reduces operating costs and redundancy by pulling out common support functions and centralizing their services.⁸⁰

Geographic structures recognize that services or products can be dispersed across broad areas. This divisional structure type allows for some functions to be centralized at a corporate or headquarters level while reserving other functions for the local or regional level. Aligning geographic grouping over functional grouping increases horizontal and vertical differentiation. Further, decision-making authority can be decentralized to regional levels to empower operational flexibility while reserving centralized strategic planning at the corporate level.⁸¹

B. NETWORKS

There are formal and informal networks within an organization. Formal networks refer to the hierarchical structure of the organization and the corresponding lines of authority and reporting relationships among members. Formal networks are typically not complex to maximize the effectiveness of communications.⁸² Formal networks are the organization's skeleton designed for easily anticipated or predictable problems.⁸³ This section will focus on the informal networks that compensate for the shortcomings of the formal network and supplement it to promote enhanced communications and flexibility to be more effective.⁸⁴

Informal networks of people in organizations span hierarchies, functional boundaries, and geography to flatten the organization and push decision-making ability to the lowest possible level. Informal networks foster relationships that accelerate and

⁸⁰ Jones, 159.

⁸¹ Jones, 161–62.

⁸² Xiao Song and Wen Shi, "Impact of Informal Network on Opinion Dynamics in Command and Control Network," *Physica A* 764–765 (2015): 919, <https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.764-765.919>.

⁸³ David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, "Informal Networks: The Company behind the Chart," *Harvard Business Review*, July 1, 1993, 1, <https://hbr.org/1993/07/informal-networks-the-company-behind-the-chart>.

⁸⁴ Song and Shi, "Impact of Informal Network on Opinion Dynamics in Command and Control Network," 919.

enhance response to complex problems where the outcome is unpredictable, requiring collaboration across formal boundaries.⁸⁵ Ram Charan writes in the *Harvard Business Review* that transparency and the simultaneous receiving of information across a network improve the quality of decisions.⁸⁶ Networks are flexible to enable adaptability and speed in a more focused way.⁸⁷ General McChrystal utilized networking as the core solution to the issues he experienced while commanding the Joint Special Operations Task Force in the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq. In McChrystal's terms, providing employees with autonomy in a transparent network fosters trust and common purpose. He termed this combination "empowered execution," and it increased effectiveness by allowing decisions to be made and action taken against complex problems.⁸⁸

With today's communications and information technology, informal networking has tremendous potential to enact change within organizations far quicker than redesigning an organization's formal hierarchy or structure. General McChrystal and General Mattis lauded this concept as making the best decisions at a speed where they were still relevant.⁸⁹ A group of professors in the MIT Sloan Management Review described the U.S Army's network-centric talent practices as successful at leveraging current and past experts' knowledge base in a social forum called Company Command. The forum allows current practitioners access to a broad community to think through situations before encountering them in the field or combat.⁹⁰ The forum also provides a space to capture knowledge and make it available to the entire organization. This informal forum is similar to the Small Wars Journal. The Small Wars Journal is an online idea exchange platform where practitioners and thought leaders can share information to improve capabilities and

⁸⁵ Song and Shi, 920.

⁸⁶ Ram Charan, "How Networks Reshape Organizations—for Results," *Harvard Business Review*, September 1, 1991, 16, <https://hbr.org/1991/09/how-networks-reshape-organizations-for-results>.

⁸⁷ Charan, "How Networks Reshape Organizations—for Results," 1–2.

⁸⁸ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 215.

⁸⁹ McChrystal, 209; Jim Mattis, and Bing West, *Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead* (New York: Random House, 2021), 199.

⁹⁰ Margaret Schweer et al., "Building a Well-Networked Organization," *MIT Sloan Management Review*, December 21, 2011, 25–26, <https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/building-a-well-networked-organization/>.

knowledge in the field.⁹¹ Networks such as the Small Wars Journal and Company Command can also serve as legitimization networks to spread and garner support for innovative ideas. Legitimation, or advocacy networks, are described more in-depth later in this chapter when examining Benjamin Jensen's book *Forging the Sword* about doctrinal change in the U.S. Army.

When understood well, informal networks can solve organizational challenges in place of a formal restructure or complement a restructuring.⁹² Caution must be taken to understand how informal networks might react and respond to formal structural changes, lest the restructuring undermines the informal networks and overall effectiveness suffer.⁹³ To manage people effectively and leverage informal network advantages, McChrystal, Krackhardt, and Hanson agree that managers and leaders must focus more on understanding informal relationships across units and less on the authority conveyed in their title.⁹⁴

C. ROUTINES

Using routines, also known as standard operating procedures (SOP), ensures best practices are adopted across units to increase collaboration and integration. Academic literature defines routines as:

Repetitive patterns of activity of an individual or the entire group...The routinization of activity constitutes the most important form of storage of the organization's operational knowledge—organizations remember by doing. The knowledge stored in routines is context-specific, and there is no need for anyone to be able to articulate or conceptualize the procedures employed by the organization as a whole.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle, "About | Small Wars Journal," About the Small Wars Journal, accessed July 11, 2022, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/content/about>.

⁹² Krackhardt and Hanson, "Informal Networks," 3.

⁹³ Krackhardt and Hanson, 18.

⁹⁴ See McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 232; and Krackhardt and Hanson, "Informal Networks," 18.

⁹⁵ Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 97–99.

This definition tells us that routines arise when the cost of recurrent deliberation becomes too heavy of a burden. SOP rapidly transfers best practices from organizational experience to new experiences as optimal courses of action in a given context.⁹⁶ Thus, institutional knowledge of best practices becomes codified across functional unit boundaries to increase integrated collaboration, continuity, safety, and efficiency.⁹⁷ The U.S. military defines SOP as “a set of instructions applicable to those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without the loss of effectiveness.”⁹⁸ SOP, therefore, institutionalize best practices to improve efficiency and promote integration. When combined with boundary spanning lateral networks, SOP transcends vertical hierarchies and permits smoother integration of units and personnel when needed.

Academic research suggests, and McChrystal’s experience in Iraq confirms, that group identity within an organization strongly affects the effectiveness and retention of routines. McChrystal speaks at length in his book *Team of Teams* about overcoming the cultural barriers of each unit under his command to foster trust and cooperation. Breaking these barriers created a common purpose and shared consciousness for the group.⁹⁹ Loch et al. found that a strong group identity was required when a problem required integrated collaboration among disparate personnel.¹⁰⁰ Conversely, Loch et al.’s study also found that status differences or separate group identities in an organization “directly reduced the stability and retention of routines.”¹⁰¹ From these experiences, it is evident that routines

⁹⁶ Christoph H. Loch, Kishore Sengupta, and M. Ghufra Ahmad, “The Microevolution of Routines: How Problem Solving and Social Preferences Interact,” *Organization Science* 24, no. 1 (February 2013): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0719>.

⁹⁷ Randy James, “Standard Operating Procedures: This Is the Way We’ve Always Done It,” US Army News, September 2, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/238732/standard_operating_procedures_this_is_the_way_weve_always_done_it.

⁹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Land Operations*, Joint Pub. 3-31 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021), 208, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31chl.pdf?ver=SR6LgtBJ_JhcWK2MyJ-FWA%3D%3D.

⁹⁹ For more information regarding breaking down barriers to create trust, common purpose, and a shared consciousness, see McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 127–32, 153.

¹⁰⁰ Loch, Sengupta, and Ahmad, “The Microevolution of Routines,” 111.

¹⁰¹ Loch, Sengupta, and Ahmad, 111.

are powerful integrative mechanisms but require significant managerial input to create a solid collaborative group identity.

D. DOCTRINAL CHANGE IN THE U.S. ARMY

This section will discuss a school of thought described by Benjamin Jensen where endogenous forces are what initiate and legitimate change within an organization. Jensen describes two levels of change, minor and major. He describes minor changes as shifts beneath the operational level, such as adaptations on the battlefield, that do not result in adopting a new policy.¹⁰² Classical organizational theory does not categorize minor changes and routine problem solving as innovative.¹⁰³ Innovation occurs when current problem-solving methods cannot mitigate the organization's challenges.¹⁰⁴ Jensen cites Theo Farrell in describing major changes as anything above the operational level and associated with shifts in the "goals, actual strategies, or structure of a military organization."¹⁰⁵ Because this thesis focuses on structural changes needed in the DHS, this section focuses on how major changes occur.

Doctrine is the means that describes the process of how to fight in a given environment, and studying doctrine bridges the gap between tactics and strategy.¹⁰⁶ Jensen argues that endogenous forces, instead of exogenous, create change from within organizations as professionals seek innovative solutions to new challenges.¹⁰⁷ Jensen developed this principle on the research of Samuel Huntington, Stephen Rosen, and

¹⁰² Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 8.

¹⁰³ James G. March, Herbert A. Simon, and Harold Steere Guetzkow, *Organizations*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 202.

¹⁰⁴ March, Simon, and Guetzkow, 203; Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 8.

¹⁰⁵ Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 4 (2010): 569, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2010.489712>.

¹⁰⁶ Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine," 410; Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

Kimberly Zisk.¹⁰⁸ Jensen's argument for inside-driven change is the opposite of traditional arguments in military innovation. These arguments emphasized that military organizations do not change often. However, when they do, it is mainly because civilian leadership forces change on unwilling military professionals.¹⁰⁹

Change occurs as a result of professionals in the organization anticipating future challenges and imagining creative methods for fighting those wars. The process that Jensen describes requires two institutional mechanisms: "1) Incubators as safe sites to think outside the box; and 2) Advocacy networks to diffuse these new concepts throughout the force."¹¹⁰ Two assumptions from organizational theory, sociology, and policy analysis situate this argument within the context of large, bureaucratic institutional change. First, the military is a profession because it contains specialized knowledge and educational institutions that certify new agents in required skills, fixed doctrine, and identifiable qualifications.¹¹¹ A person recognized by bodies of knowledge and belongs to a larger social construct is known as a professional. Second, professionals seek new means of responding to their environment by scanning the horizon for threats and developing methods to defeat them.¹¹² Competing ideas inside an organization are a product of routine problem solving, core missions, and environmental pressures.¹¹³ Thus, professionals continually seek new theories of victory by compiling their ideas upon reflection on

¹⁰⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning The Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

¹⁰⁹ Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 220–44.

¹¹⁰ Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

¹¹¹ George Ritzer, "Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationalization: The Views of Max Weber," *Social Forces* 53, no. 4 (June 1975): 630–32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2576478>; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8–10; Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

¹¹² Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 16.

¹¹³ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 26; March, Simon, and Guetzkow, *Organizations*, 176.

operational challenges.¹¹⁴ By framing operational dilemmas, professionals develop a schema of interpretation to understand events and interactions to articulate a theory of victory to the problem set.¹¹⁵

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, innovation within an organization requires an incubator and advocacy networks. Incubators provide a safe place outside the institution and a mechanism for members to discuss novel solutions to existing and future challenges.¹¹⁶ The diversity of experience, structure, thought, and personnel in the group combine to intensify organizational complexity, which sociology research tells us increases rates of innovation.¹¹⁷ Incubators are an essential forum to allow professionals in the arena to voice their diverse opinions in search of doctrinal reform. Advocacy networks, a type of informal network, are loose coalitions that circulate innovative ideas from the incubator to championing officials who legitimate emerging initiatives.¹¹⁸ In this capacity, senior leaders become norm entrepreneurs competing to disseminate novel theories of victory through networks across the organization to affect change.¹¹⁹ Simultaneously, advocacy networks legitimate innovation configurations by serving as positive feedback loops.

E. CURRENT DHS SPECIAL OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

Special operations teams within the DHS represent an extension of their disparate parent Components. Many Components, and even sub-agencies, have developed special operations units with capabilities to address their operational domains. Like the U.S. Department of Defense, the DHS is a large, mechanistic organization prone to information silos. Significant overlap exists in special operations team capabilities, domain alignment,

¹¹⁴ Stephen Rosen was the first to use the term “theory of victory” Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 19–20.

¹¹⁵ Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

¹¹⁶ Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 17.

¹¹⁷ Jerald T. Hage, “Organizational Innovation and Organizational Change,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (August 1999): 597–622, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.597>.

¹¹⁸ Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 19.

¹¹⁹ Jensen, 19–20.

and the missions they execute. Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the DHS special operations teams and their capabilities.

The scope of this thesis does not seek to define what characteristics and qualifiers elevate a unit into the realm of special operations in the DHS. Instead, it relies on what the DHS Components currently consider their special operations teams. The organizational chart in Figure 1 shows the structural location of the special operations teams in the DHS. The bottom eight Components are the operational Components, while the remainders are support or strategic Components. This organizational chart is deceiving because it depicts a relatively clean and efficient picture of operations and processes in the DHS. The reality is that each Component has little lateral connectivity.




Figure 1. DHS Organizational Chart, including Special Operations Units¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Adapted from an organizational chart of the Department of Homeland Security that depicts the special operations units described in this text and Component roles. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Public Organizational Chart” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, April 2, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0402_dhs-organizational-chart.pdf.

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed several vital concepts organizations use to achieve collaboration and greater effectiveness. Specifically, organizational design, doctrinal changes processes, networks, and routines will be used as a framework to analyze the case studies presented. These principles and concepts are a critical baseline for this thesis to properly frame the DHS's issues and extract lessons learned from other organizations. The next chapter examines Operation Eagle Claw and subsequent legislation that forced the U.S. Department of Defense to integrate special operations forces into a novel organizational structure. It also examines the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq that used networking and routines to create trust and empowered execution in its fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq.

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III. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The U.S. Department of Defense is a far more mature organization than the Department of Homeland Security and has similarly faced integration and interoperability challenges. This chapter contextualizes two periods in U.S. military history where these challenges were particularly pronounced. This analysis details the military's response to overcome its issues and draws a corollary for the DHS. Moreover, this chapter focuses on the period and events leading up to the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (herein referred to as the Task Force) early in the Iraq War. During these two periods, the conventional structure and operational processes proved insufficient to accomplish the missions they undertook.

A. FROM OPERATION EAGLE CLAW TO USSOCOM

1. Introduction

The authors of *Beyond 9/11* state that the experience of the Department of Defense (DOD) is instructive to the DHS in achieving management and operational integration across a large organization.¹²¹ The circumstances that led to the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are especially relevant to this thesis. This section will explore the chain of events that transformed the U.S. military from disparate units to a unified joint fighting force with Special Operations Forces at the tip of the spear. This section explores Operation Eagle Claw, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to Goldwater-Nichols. These events represent a pivotal point toward integration and interoperability in the United States military. Where appropriate, this section draws parallels to the problem faced in the DHS special operations community to seek practical solutions.

¹²¹ Lawson, Bersin, and Kayyem, *Beyond 9/11*, 62.

2. Background

a. Operation Eagle Claw

In November 1979, some 500 Iranian students lay siege to the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, and took over 60 American hostages captive. Within days, the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, directed the U.S. military to prepare plans for a rescue mission and possible retaliatory strikes if hostages were harmed.¹²² By late November of 1979, the National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense had directed the creation of a Joint Task Force under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate. From November 1979 through March 1980, an ad-hoc planning staff devised a complex and intricate plan to rescue the hostages.

The mission, codenamed Operation Eagle Claw, utilized personnel and equipment from all four service branches and units scattered from Okinawa, Japan, to Arizona.¹²³ More acutely, the mission was an ad-hoc organization of Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters carrying Army commandos in concert with Air Force transport aircraft.¹²⁴ Air Force Scholar Richard Radvanyi summarized the plan as follows:

On the first night, six Air Force C-130s carrying 132 Delta Force commandos, Army Rangers, and support personnel and additional helicopter fuel would fly from the island of Masirah, off the coast of Oman, more than 1,000 miles to Desert One, being refueled in flight from Air Force KC-135 tankers. Eight Navy RH-53Ds would lift off from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz, about 50 miles south of the Iranian coast, and fly more than 600 miles to Desert One.

After refueling on the ground from the C-130s, the helicopters would carry the rescue force to a hideout in the hills about 50 miles southeast of Tehran, then fly to a separate hiding spot nearby. The C130s would return to Masirah, being refueled in flight again. The next night, Delta Force would be driven to the United States Embassy in vehicles obtained by agents that

¹²² Otto Kreisher, "Desert One," *Air Force Magazine*, January 1, 1999, 2, <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0199desertone/>.

¹²³ Radvanyi, "Operation Eagle Claw," 11.

¹²⁴ David E. Hill, Jr, "The Shaft of the Spear: US Special Operations Command, Funding Authority, and the Global War on Terrorism" (USAWC strategy research project, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 6, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA449333>.

were previously placed in country. A team of Army Rangers would go to rescue the three American hostages held in the foreign ministry building.

As the ground units were freeing the hostages, the helicopters would fly from their hiding spot to the embassy and the foreign ministry building. Three Air Force AC-130 gunships would arrive overhead to protect the rescue force from any Iranian counterattack and to destroy the three Iranian Air Force fighters located at the Tehran airport. The helicopters would fly the rescue force and the freed hostages to an abandoned air base at Manzariyeh, about 50 miles southwest of Tehran, which was to be seized and protected by an Army Ranger company flown in on C-130s. The helicopters would then be destroyed and C-141s, flown in from Saudi Arabia, would then fly the entire group to a base in Egypt.¹²⁵

Throughout the planning and rehearsals of this operation, operational security (OPSEC) was paramount and prioritized above all other aspects of the operation. The rescue force required the element of surprise in Tehran for success. OPSEC being such a high priority, caused information and operational plans to be severely compartmentalized. Compartmentalization of the mission occurred because each component had no idea who the other players were or their roles. This occurrence resulted in the various elements of the mission conducting rehearsals and dry runs independently without ever speaking or training with the other elements of the rescue chain. Critical information and training feedback was not allowed to flow between the various components of the rescue force. Each component thus lacked the contextual understanding of the operation as a whole.

Air Force scholar Richard Radvanyi described the actual execution of Operation Eagle Claw as:

The mission began on the evening of 24 April, with the C-130s departing Masirah and heading into Iran for their refueling rendezvous with the helicopter force at Desert One. At about the same time, the helicopter force of eight RH-53Ds lifted off from the deck of the U.S.S. Nimitz and began heading for the Iranian coast about 60 miles away. About two hours into the mission, helicopter 6 received a warning on its Blade Inspection Method, or BIM system, which indicated a possible impending rotor blade failure. For the Marine pilots, this type of warning indication necessitated an immediate landing; however, the Navy RH-53Ds had a newer BIM system than the

¹²⁵ Radvanyi, "Operation Eagle Claw," 11–13.

Marine CH-53 helicopters, and a BIM warning in the Navy RH-53Ds did not necessitate an immediate landing.

This information was never disseminated to the Marine pilots flying the Navy helicopters, so the Marine crew followed their normal procedures and landed the helicopter. The crew abandoned their helicopter in the desert and climbed aboard another helicopter that had landed with them to help. The helicopter force was now down to seven. Meanwhile the C-130 force, now well into Iran, ran into an area of reduced visibility. This area was caused by a phenomenon of suspended dust particles called a haboob that is common to the Iranian desert. The possibility of this type of weather phenomenon occurring during the mission was known to the Air Force weather forecasters supporting the mission; however, this information was never passed to the aircrews. For the C-130s flying at 2000 feet, it was a minor inconvenience, for the helicopters flying at 200 feet, it was a major obstacle to safe navigation. Later in the flight they encountered a much thicker and more extensive dust cloud, and they tried to contact the helicopter force to warn them; however, communications were never established between the C-130s and RH-53Ds.

The helicopter force entered the dust cloud and continued, despite the debilitating effects of flying in near zero visibility conditions at night while wearing night-vision goggles. Helicopter 5 began experiencing electrical problems while flying in the dust cloud. Because he was ordered to maintain strict radio silence to avoid detection, helicopter 5 was unable to ascertain the location of the other helicopters or determine the extent or duration of the dust cloud. Because of these uncertainties, helicopter 5 elected to turn back and return to the U.S.S. Nimitz. Later it was determined that helicopter 5 was only 25 minutes away from exiting the dust cloud and would have experienced clear conditions the rest of the way to Desert One.

The rescue force was now down to six helicopters, the minimum required to continue the mission. While the helicopters were battling the dust cloud, the C-130s landed at Desert One and were setting up for the ground refueling of the helicopter force. After getting separated in the dust cloud, the helicopters started arriving in groups of ones and twos, and after almost an hour and a half, the remaining six helicopters were at Desert One. The mission was still a go. Shortly after landing, helicopter 2 shut down its engines, having suffered a catastrophic failure of its #2 hydraulic system, a fact which made the helicopter unsafe for further flight operations. There was no chance of repairing it at Desert One.

Without six functioning helicopters at Desert One, the mission would have to be scrubbed. The rescue force was now tasked with something it had never rehearsed, the withdrawal from Desert One. In order to get the C-130s properly aligned for departure, one of the helicopters had to move from its

current location. As the helicopter began to lift-off, it inadvertently slid sideways and into one of the C-130s. The collision ripped open the C-130 and ignited fuel and ammunition.

Eight servicemen died in the inferno, and the rest of the rescue force was forced to evacuate Desert One, leaving the remains of their brave comrades and the wreckage of the remaining C-130 and six helicopters.¹²⁶

The failed mission immediately drew public and congressional attention. A detailed investigation of the failed operation commenced, led by active duty and retired officers. Retired Admiral James L. Holloway III led the group, officially called the Special Operations Review Group.¹²⁷ The review came to be known as the “Holloway Commission” or “Holloway Report,” which identified 23 issues that may have contributed to the outcome of Operation Eagle Claw.¹²⁸ The after-action report asserted how poorly prepared the U.S. military was for joint operations. It further detailed that no single military branch had the requisite resources and capabilities to execute complex integrated missions successfully.¹²⁹ These failures in the field provided the impetus for congressional action and reforms urgently needed in the Department of Defense.¹³⁰ These reforms would come some six years later in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reform act of 1986.

b. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) passed by the 99th Congress in 1986 was the most significant and far-reaching defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947 and was hailed as finally completing President Eisenhower’s vision of unifying the

¹²⁶ Radvanyi, 13–16.

¹²⁷ Radvanyi, 8.

¹²⁸ James L. Holloway, III, *Rescue Mission Report [Iran Hostage]* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Review Group, 1980), <http://public1.nhhcaws.local/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/i/iran-hostage-rescue-mission-report.html>.

¹²⁹ Hamre, “Reflections.”

¹³⁰ Hamre.

armed forces.¹³¹ President Eisenhower had, decades earlier, envisioned strategic and tactical planning processes for combat forces entirely in the form of unified command structures. The impetus for this legislation was the failed joint operation Eagle Claw and subsequent fiascos in Panama and Grenada that highlighted the ineffectiveness of ad-hoc joint military operations. Simultaneously, Congress intensely debated these reforms, and DOD investigations similarly found that the services could not conduct cross-service operations under ambiguous command structures.¹³² The GNA emphasized the integration of capabilities through unified joint action. It ensured that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders, served as the hub to provide their expertise and specialized capabilities.¹³³

The GNA increased the demand for joint capabilities in many ways. First among them, the legislation strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and granted the role of a vice chairman as number two in the Joint Chiefs structure.¹³⁴ Congress utilized the GNA to clarify that the chain of command ran from joint commanders in the field through the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States. This clarification by Congress essentially stripped the service chiefs of any operational warfighting responsibilities.¹³⁵ Finally, the legislation changed promotion requirements for combat specialty officers. Now, personnel could not promote to the flag/general officer rank without preceding tours in joint billets to enable perspective from other services outside their own.

The GNA fundamentally changed the Department of Defense by reshaping organizational structure and relationships to correct the department's administrative and operational deficiencies. Although the GNA educated Congress on the intricacies of DOD

¹³¹ Asad Khan, *The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986: Impact and Implications for the Marine Corps* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, 1998), 5, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA529074>.

¹³² Khan, *The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986*, 14.

¹³³ Khan, *The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986*, 5.

¹³⁴ Hamre, "Reflections."

¹³⁵ Hamre.

organization, they poorly understood the special operations forces (SOF) component. As a result, the GNA left out SOF for fear of derailing the entire legislation. However, the issue caught the attention of two Senators on the Armed Services Committee. Sam Nunn (D-GA.) and William Cohen (R-ME) studied the misuse of SOF in the preceding years and how they were poorly resourced and unable to manage joint operations.¹³⁶ Moreover, the senators recognized that the horizon contained low-level conflict in the developing world—terrorism, insurgency, drug warfare—that SOF would play a pivotal role in combatting. Senators Nunn and Cohen recognized that further reforms were required in the DOD for SOF to develop and deploy joint capabilities effectively.

c. U.S. Special Operations Command is Born

Senators Nunn and Cohen sponsored an amendment to the GNA as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act that officially created the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM became a functional combatant command with responsibilities to provide support, training and resourcing for SOF from all branches of the U.S. military.¹³⁷ The legislation provided USSOCOM a four-star officer position with reporting authority directly to the Secretary of Defense, bypassing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹³⁸ Additionally, SOF gained another advocate on Capitol Hill by establishing an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. This amendment established separate Major Force Program-11 funding for SOF, which had traditionally not fared well under the services.¹³⁹ Direct funding provided timely resourcing for SOF requirements instead of being at the mercy of individual service command leadership.

¹³⁶ Daisy Thornton, “How Setbacks and DoD Reform Led to the Creation of SOCOM,” Federal News Network, April 6, 2018, <https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2018/04/how-setbacks-and-dod-reform-led-to-the-creation-of-socom/>.

¹³⁷ Hill, Jr., “The Shaft of the Spear,” 6.

¹³⁸ Davis, “Optimization of Special Operations Command,” 43.

¹³⁹ Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces In Action: The Challenge Of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Cass, 1998), 198–99.

More importantly, this new command provided the much-needed structure to enable joint capability development and deployment across all SOF, regardless of originating service. USSOCOM enabled relationships and provided for developing commands, mission sets, and joint TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) that still exist today.¹⁴⁰ Because of the GNA and Nunn-Cohen amendment, USSOCOM now provided a much-needed singular voice to represent all SOF and speak for training, resourcing, and operational requirements. Figure 2 displays the overarching structure for USSOCOM. This organizational design provides an integrated hierarchy for SOF to operate more effectively than during Operation Eagle Claw.




Figure 2. USSOCOM Organizational Structure¹⁴¹

3. Analysis

In this case, the primary mechanisms appear to be organizational design or redesign and the development of routines to drive integration and interoperability between the various SOF units. The failures of Operation Eagle Claw prompted a change outside of the

¹⁴⁰ Lamb, “This Is What Special Ops Learned 40 Years Ago from Operation Eagle Claw.”

¹⁴¹ Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, Joint Pub 3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

Department of Defense, referred to as exogenous change by Jensen. The GNA and Nunn-Cohen amendment fundamentally transformed the DOD and its operations by redesigning organizational structures, reporting processes, and resourcing pathways in a multi-divisional organization. More specifically, the creation of USSOCOM enabled SOF to develop new routines to standardize joint operational capabilities. With direct funding, USSOCOM could procure standardized gear, equipment, and material for all special operations forces, a critical deficiency during Operation Eagle Claw. Further, having all SOF under the same command increased the consistent and integrated development of the various units' tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The following excerpt by an Army Ranger on the ground during Operation Eagle Claw describes a bleak picture that illustrates integration challenges when equipment and tactics are inconsistent:

Challenges inherent to compartmentalized planning and joint command, control, and communications were critical deficiencies. In the end, disparate training standards, and dissimilar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) within the joint force combined with intelligence gaps and bad weather to doom the mission...We needed to put Army Rangers, on Air Force helicopters, and have them take off and land from Navy aircraft carrier decks. There were different aircraft procedures between the Army and the Air Force, the Air Force pilots were not carrier-deck qualified, our radios did not talk. The Marine pilots were carrier-qualified, but their aircraft did not have the same avionics as the Air Force helicopters. We were unable to refuel mid-air due to the lack of refuel booms. This forced us to land in the desert and refuel on the ground.¹⁴²

The statements above reflect clear parallels to the challenges faced by special operations units in the DHS, which do not operate under a common command structure or TTPs. Reforming a significant government department is exceptionally difficult but was made possible in the 1980s due to massive failures in the field. The deployments of the summer of 2020 highlighted problems with cross-component command and coordination,

¹⁴² Lamb, "This Is What Special Ops Learned 40 Years Ago from Operation Eagle Claw."

similar to Operation Eagle Claw.¹⁴³ A proactive approach is warranted in the DHS not to waste the lessons learned by the DOD. Today, SOF dominates the operational domains in the areas they operate in, a vast difference from the execution of Operation Eagle Claw.¹⁴⁴

B. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE: IRAQ

1. Introduction

In the spring of 2003, the United States military entered Iraq and began a war that would last well over a decade. What began as a search for weapons of mass destruction quickly devolved into a bloody fight against a growing insurgency in a destabilized country. By the fall of 2003, a frustrated Sunni population backed a Jordanian extremist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi.¹⁴⁵ The DOD and USSOCOM tasked the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq to target Zarqawi and the threat posed by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The Task Force coordinated SOF capabilities in-theater to leverage their full potential against AQI. General Stanley McChrystal, a seasoned operator who had spent his career in special operations, took the helm of the Task Force in October 2003. He quickly realized that change was needed within the organization to disrupt and dismantle AQI effectively. After surveying the theater of operations in Iraq, McChrystal noted, “All across the country—in Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, Diyala—we were waging similarly compartmentalized campaigns. It made our hard fight excruciatingly difficult and potentially doomed.”¹⁴⁶

From this observation, McChrystal realized it would take a network to defeat a network such as AQI. He then began a process of organizational changes and adaptations to increase interagency cooperation and collaboration between SOF and conventional

¹⁴³ Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*, 11–14.

¹⁴⁴ Lamb, “This Is What Special Ops Learned 40 Years Ago from Operation Eagle Claw.”

¹⁴⁵ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 2.

¹⁴⁶ Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/21/it-takes-a-network/>.

forces to build a culture of trust and common purpose.¹⁴⁷ This section details the challenges the Task Force confronted in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. Specifically, it describes changes the Task Force made to morph the organization from efficiency toward adaptability, resiliency, and increased effectiveness.

2. Background

Although AQI was perhaps the most prominent and savage terrorist organization in Iraq, it was not an ingenious collection of supermen forged into an elite fighting force. They were, however, flexible, tough, and resilient.¹⁴⁸ AQI emerged in the battlespace at the critical juncture of modern communications technology, benefiting their organization tremendously. AQI presented a different kind of threat than a traditional army. They were small, agile, dispersed, and native to the information-rich, interconnected world that the internet provided in the twenty-first century.¹⁴⁹ Zarqawi used the internet to disseminate bomb-making plans, garner followers, and distribute global propaganda inciting support for the growing insurgency in Iraq. It was more than chat rooms and online videos; AQI's very structure embodied this new world in that it was well-networked and non-hierarchical.¹⁵⁰ The interconnected, fast-paced, and less-predictable twenty-first century provided AQI's structure the operational environment it needed to thrive while bogging down the traditional hierarchy of the Task Force.

The Task Force learned, from intercepted communications and interrogating captured insurgents, that AQI was not arranged according to a rank structure. AQI organized more based on relationships, acquaintances, reputation, and fame, which permitted flexibility and an ability to sustain losses yet continue to grow.¹⁵¹ AQI was a decentralized, self-forming network against a large, well-resourced, highly efficient U.S.

¹⁴⁷ Patrick Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq: Collaborative Warfare in Action* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2011), 10, https://www.academia.edu/9965086/Countering_Al_Qaeda_in_Iraq_Collaborative_Warfare_in_Action.

¹⁴⁸ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 4, 19.

¹⁴⁹ McChrystal, 19–20.

¹⁵⁰ McChrystal, 27–28.

¹⁵¹ McChrystal, "It Takes a Network."

special operations machine. As General McChrystal learned, the enemy’s ability to adapt made it resilient against superior forces. The Task Force would hit terrorist cells and capture high-value targets with extraordinary tactical success but failed to make a strategic difference.¹⁵² The cells quickly reconstituted, and inadvertent collateral damage further alienated local Sunni populations. Figure 3 depicts the enemy the Task Force was designed to fight against versus how AQI presented.




Figure 3. The Enemy the Task Force was Designed to Fight versus the Reality of AQI’s Structure.¹⁵³

The Task Force, an extension of the larger USSOCOM and U.S. military writ large, was a large, institutionalized, and highly disciplined military machine. General McChrystal found himself asking how one should train such an organization to improvise and adapt on the fly. The U.S. military, and most large organizations of the twentieth century, were predicated on an organizational structure that favored efficiency and standardization to achieve a predictable outcome and repeatable at scale. An overall process from start to end was analyzed and reduced to individual steps. Each step was standardized to reduce time, materials, and waste resulting in a predictable end-product. This reductionist mechanism was premised on Frederick Taylor’s theories of scientific management, harkening back to the Industrial Revolution to achieve highly efficient execution of known repeatable

¹⁵² Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, *Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation*, Strategic Perspectives, No. 4 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 9, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/693671/secret-weapon-high-value-target-teams-as-an-organizational-innovation/>.

¹⁵³ Source: McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 25.

processes.¹⁵⁴ The disciplined, stratified reductionist structure and culture of the Task Force had their roots deep in military organizational history.

General McChrystal realized that efficiency was no longer sufficient to counter the threats posed by AQI in the twenty-first century's complex environment. The Task Force was ineffective and needed to change from a model of extreme efficiency to favor adaptability, resiliency, and speed. The question was how. Further compounding the problem was the classic "need to know" OPSEC posture. Compartmentalization, in the name of OPSEC, prevented intelligence from being analyzed and operationalized at a speed where it was still relevant.

General McChrystal realized networking and integration were necessary, but, more specifically, that building trust and common purpose among the various SOF teams and intelligence analysts was the key to success. During 2005 and 2006, innovative leaders within the Task Force, principally General McChrystal, developed a strategy from the ground up that came to be known as collaborative warfare that focused on networking and integration.¹⁵⁵ McChrystal details in his book *Team of Teams* that collaborative suffering and training in rigorous courses forges trust among elite military SOF units. He aimed to extrapolate the trust and decentralized decision-making authority common in teams into the larger Task Force. Therefore, transitioning it away from a classic command hierarchy to form what he called a "shared consciousness" and "smart autonomy" among the interagency cells.¹⁵⁶ Shared consciousness is the merging of trust and common purpose that enables rapid information sharing. Shared consciousness, with systemic understanding and robust lateral connectivity as cornerstones, enabled intelligence to be shared at a speed where SOF teams could act on it while still relevant.¹⁵⁷ Smart autonomy pushed decision-making down to the lowest possible levels so that tactical decisions were made while the intelligence was still relevant.

¹⁵⁴ McChrystal, 52.

¹⁵⁵ Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq*, 9.

¹⁵⁶ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 153, 225.

¹⁵⁷ McChrystal, 187.

The Task Force's first attempt required the co-location of SOF operators and intelligence analysts to sit side-by-side to fuse efforts into unified action.¹⁵⁸ Although this may seem obvious now, it was not during those early days in Iraq. Co-location also meant expanding the physical space into virtual space, as evidenced by the Task Force's weekly Operations and Intelligence forums. During these weekly calls, several thousand interagency partners would dial in securely to discuss recent analyses and operations within the theater. The magnitude of these calls was unprecedented from an OPSEC perspective. However, it proved monumental in connecting the dots between interagency partners to illuminate terrorist plots.

Next, cultural barriers and stereotypes had to be overcome to achieve trust and work together. The bonds between the SOF operators and partner organizations had to become as strong as those between individual operators.¹⁵⁹ The Task Force instituted exchange programs whereby an Army Delta Operator, for example, would be sent to work with a group of analysts or Navy SEALs. The overarching goal was that these personnel could see the work done by others from their position, and personal relationships would develop. These interpersonal relationships would then build trust and appreciation *between* the teams like existed *within* the teams.¹⁶⁰

McChrystal attributes the Task Force's successful transition to two elements; 1) Extreme participatory transparency within the organization and 2) Strong internal connectivity across the teams and partner organizations.¹⁶¹ Christopher Lamb and Evan Munsing from the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University studied the Task Force. They say that interagency teams in the Task Force enabled success through network-based targeting, the fusion of operations with multiple intelligence lines, and the integration of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics warfare.¹⁶² This collaborative warfare strategy enabled the Task Force to become rapidly adaptable to

¹⁵⁸ Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq*, 10; McChrystal, "It Takes a Network," 3.

¹⁵⁹ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 175.

¹⁶⁰ McChrystal, 176.

¹⁶¹ McChrystal, 197.

¹⁶² Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 64.

changes on the battlefield and respond in kind promptly. In a volatile, uncertain operating environment, this adaptability made the organization more effective and resilient in the face of complex and unpredictable threats. Ultimately, McChrystal declared: “To defeat a network, we had become a network. We had become a team of teams.”¹⁶³

3. Analysis

The Task Force was a command hierarchy initially with vertical silos for operations, intelligence, and various interagency partners. This hierarchy favored efficiency, not adaptability and resiliency. It was thus ineffective against AQI in the complex operational environment of Iraq from 2003 to 2007. General McChrystal argues that the hierarchical structure of the U.S. military, and many other modern organizations, is a reductionist relic of the Industrial Age and ill-suited for complex problems faced in the twenty-first century. In a complex problem, solutions cannot be realized by an algorithm or process because it involves so many unknowns and interconnected relationships that make them inherently unpredictable.¹⁶⁴ AQI could adapt so rapidly that their actions were unpredictable and thus resilient against the Task Force. General McChrystal used networking and routines to become adaptable and overcome the complex challenges that the Task Force faced. Twenty-first-century technology facilitated transparency beyond the physical space of the Task Force headquarters, as displayed in the weekly Operations and Intelligence calls of several thousand participants.

The Task Force used networks to achieve the change needed to become adaptable and ultimately effective. The networks came in several forms. Physically and virtually, bringing everyone together for day-to-day operations made networking possible. The proximity of SOF operators, specialists, intelligence analysts, and other partner organizations flattened the Task Force organization. It promoted lateral connectivity outside of established hierarchical silos. The innovative leadership strategy of collaborative warfare required robust communications connectivity, shared consciousness, decentralized

¹⁶³ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 251.

¹⁶⁴ Theodore Kinni, “The Critical Difference Between Complex and Complicated,” MIT Sloan Management Review, accessed June 8, 2021, <https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-critical-difference-between-complex-and-complicated/>.

decision-making, and trust.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, the Task Force increased lateral outreach in their network by embedding personnel in groups outside their organic domain and posting liaison positions between the various SOF, intelligence, and partner elements. These positions added value by garnering not just interpersonal trust but also trust between the teams in the Task Force.

The Task Force's collaborative warfare strategy brought together everyone who had a role in countering AQI. The result was F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate).¹⁶⁶ General McChrystal described this concept in the excerpt below:

The idea was to combine analysts who found the enemy (through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); drone operators who fixed the target; combat teams who finished the target by capturing or killing him; specialists who exploited the intelligence the raid yielded, such as cell phones, maps, and detainees; and the intelligence analysts who turned this raw information into usable knowledge. By doing this, we speeded up the cycle for a counterterrorism operation, gleaning valuable insights in hours, not days.¹⁶⁷

F3EAD, at its core, is a reductionist system to increase efficiency. What it lacked early in the Task Force was contextual understanding from one node to the next in the process.¹⁶⁸ This deficiency caused information to flow that was less useful than it could have been or lacked the context required for operators on the ground to utilize to its full potential. At the heart of this issue was the “need to know” fallacy to preserve OPSEC.¹⁶⁹ McChrystal questioned this logic because it assumes that someone – or some algorithm or bureaucratic process – actually knows who does and does not need to know some piece of information.¹⁷⁰ Of course, this is indeed a fallacy and an issue that McChrystal sought to overcome in the Task Force by making extreme participatory transparency a cornerstone

¹⁶⁵ McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” 3.

¹⁶⁶ Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 41; McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” 4; Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq*, 19.

¹⁶⁷ McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” 4.

¹⁶⁸ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 137–39; Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 41–42.

¹⁶⁹ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 138.

¹⁷⁰ McChrystal, 141.

of his collaborative warfare strategy. The weekly Operations and Intelligence calls were an example of one such tactic where anyone on the call could hear the information being delivered and contribute to the conversation. In this way, intelligence and operations fused so that everyone involved could make the most informed decisions in the fastest time possible. F3EAD represented the culmination of changes in the Task Force, creating rapid adaptability, shared consciousness, transparency, contextual understanding, common purpose, trust, and increased effectiveness and resilience against AQI. The Task Force, using the multi-disciplined F3EAD process, killed Abu Musab al Zarqawi in June 2006, scoring a major operational success.¹⁷¹

In 2020, DHS Secretary Chad Wolf described the complex operating environment, enabled by modern technology, that DHS faces in his State of the Homeland speech. He elaborated that technology allows our enemies to wage disinformation campaigns at scale, instantly communicate on encrypted networks, and fund their plots using cryptocurrency.¹⁷² These circumstances are only one aspect of the threats that DHS personnel face and are akin to the aggravating factors that the Task Force encountered early in Iraq against AQI. Further, domestic violent extremism has come into sharp focus recently. Domestic extremists utilize the internet, encrypted apps, social media, and obscure chat rooms to coordinate plans, attacks, and information campaigns. The tactics are eerily similar to the methods AQI utilized in Iraq. The DHS has addressed domestic violent extremism at least twice thus far in 2022.¹⁷³ One such report noted that significant gaps exist that impede DHS' ability to prevent, detect, and respond to domestic violent

¹⁷¹ For more information on F3EAD and Zarqawi see Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 41.

¹⁷² Chad Wolf, "2020 State of the Homeland As Delivered by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf," Department of Homeland Security News Archive, September 9, 2020, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/09/09/2020-state-homeland>.

¹⁷³ For more information see National Terrorism Advisory System, "Summary of Terrorism Threat to the United States," National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, June 7, 2022, <https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-june-7-2022>; and Office of the Chief Security Officer, *Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2022), <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-report-domestic-violent-extremism-internal-review>.

extremism threats and recommended intra-and inter-agency collaboration and information sharing to foster an integrated approach.¹⁷⁴

C. CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense suffered catastrophic failures during Operation Eagle Claw due to the lack of coordination, collaboration, transparency, and unified efforts. Those failures spurred lawmakers into action to fundamentally reform the organization of the U.S. military toward joint force efforts. This unification brought service special operations forces under the U.S. Special Operations Command. Under USSOCOM, SOF developed standardized gear and equipment to facilitate joint operations. Further, USSOCOM developed TTP to enhance interoperability between the various units. The Joint Special Operations Command, a sub-unified command within USSOCOM, was designed to study SOF requirements, techniques and ensure interoperability and equipment standardization.¹⁷⁵

Early in the Iraq War, the Joint Special Operations Task Force faced a complex problem and had to adapt their organization to be more adaptable and resilient in the fight against AQI. General McChrystal leveraged modern technology to make structural changes to the Task Force. These changes enabled it to become a highly integrated, transparent network that rapidly fused operations with intelligence. The interagency nature of the Task Force turned the tide in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. Eventually, it resulted in the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and gained broad support as a successful model.¹⁷⁶

The cases presented in this chapter show that the DOD used organizational design, networks, and routines to overcome problems faced when disparate units had to work together in an ad-hoc manner. Each DOD service contributes unique SOF operational capabilities and experience in the same manner special operations teams in the Components

¹⁷⁴ Office of the Chief Security Officer, *Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations*, 3, 17.

¹⁷⁵ John Alvarez et al., *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 4th ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2015), 36, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA625223>.

¹⁷⁶ Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 64.

could contribute to the overall mission of the DHS. However, the DHS' current disparate hierarchical organization of special operations teams renders it not only inefficient but ineffective at conducting cross-component operations.¹⁷⁷ The current organization of these units does not foster the networked relationships required to leverage the sum potential of special operations capabilities within the DHS.¹⁷⁸ Like the DOD, the complex problem and operational environment faced by the DHS requires an approach that can rapidly adapt operations and intelligence across multiple DHS Component teams and domains to address threats in real-time. The flexibility and specialized capabilities that DHS special operations units offer are a unique force multiplier to combat emerging threats and can bring a level of resilience to the department. The next chapter will synthesize the findings from these cases to discover applicable elements for the DHS.

¹⁷⁷ Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*, 14.

¹⁷⁸ Madia, "Homeland Security Organizations," 7.

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IV. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in a comparative approach to discern how their organization overcame challenges of policing redundancy and a lack of collaborative efforts. The Australian experience is relevant because their methods of governance are similar enough to the United States that parallel solutions may be more readily applicable. Like the DHS, the AFP is a multi-faceted federal police force with investigative and enforcement responsibilities for terrorism, air, maritime, and border security, among others.¹⁷⁹ Particularly relevant to this thesis project, the AFP has direct experience evaluating special operations units' capabilities and realigning efforts to increase collaboration and integration. This chapter provides background and analysis to contextualize the AFP experience for subsequent application to the DHS in the next chapter.

B. BACKGROUND

1. Australian Federal Police Post-9/11

The six years from 1999 to 2005 saw rapid changes that affected national policing in Australia, such as the advent of internet communication and a global war on terrorism. Bombings in Bali, Jakarta, and the attacks of September 11 and ensuing interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq all underscored the increasingly complex security environment Australia faced.¹⁸⁰ Rapidly accelerating global changes impacted all levels of policing in Australia that demanded novel approaches, particularly at the national level. The Australian Federal Police responded in kind and developed effective strategies and capabilities to counter-terrorism, support restoration of law and order, bolster civil governance, and take

¹⁷⁹ For a more in-depth description of AFP capabilities and operational domains, see Australian Federal Police, "Our Organisation."

¹⁸⁰ Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, 7.

the lead to police the aviation and maritime domains.¹⁸¹ These new abilities also maintained AFP's existing roles in countering organized crime and community policing.

The AFP successfully transitioned from the outskirts to the center of government in that timeframe.¹⁸² However, by the election campaign season of 2006, it became apparent that significant overlaps in capabilities and duplication of efforts had taken place during this rapid ascent. In 2007, Kevin Rudd of the Australian Labor Party promised a "full and detailed reassessment of Australia's strategic circumstances."¹⁸³ By 2008, an Australian Government report indicated that modern globalization magnified persistent threats to the homeland and created new ones.¹⁸⁴ During his tenure as the Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010, Kevin Rudd directed a Federal Audit of Police Capabilities as part of a broader five-point plan for the AFP. The following section details key concepts and findings from the audit.

2. The Federal Audit of Police Capabilities

The Australian Minister for Home Affairs appointed Roger Beale of the Allen Consulting Group to conduct the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities, commonly known as the Beale Review, after the author's namesake. The review assessed Australia's overall stance regarding policing, realizing it required a greater degree of coordination among entities country-wide. The review focused in part on federal policing and law enforcement arrangements. The following excerpt from the review summarizes its aim:

Gaps / Overlaps in federal policing capabilities pertaining to opportunities for improvement in AFP strategic, operational, and corporate capabilities to deliver required functions and services in an efficient and effective manner. How AFP's capabilities relate to other Commonwealth agencies and State

¹⁸¹ Beale, 8.

¹⁸² Beale, 8.

¹⁸³ Kevin Rudd, Joel Fitzgibbon, and Alan Griffin, *Labor's Plan for Defence* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Labor Party, 2007), 2, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/partypol/HMW06%22>.

¹⁸⁴ Ric Smith, *Summary and Conclusions: Report of the Review of Homeland and Border Security* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Government, 2008), 2, <http://ict-industry-reports.com.au/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2013/10/2008-Review-Homeland-and-Border-Security-Ric-Smith-June-2008.pdf>.

and Territory police services, including in areas of joint or intersecting activities between the AFP and those agencies.¹⁸⁵

The Beale Review summarizes that national policing in Australia is a central component of national security that requires a whole-of-government and federation-wide strategy to counter crime and radicalization. It further elaborates that Australia requires a “capacity to ‘act together’ domestically in terms of cross-agency and cross-jurisdictional cooperation.”¹⁸⁶ The following findings and recommendations from the Beale Review are relevant to this thesis and discussion.

Finding 4.2: No framework exists to coordinate the full range of Commonwealth criminal law enforcement authorities, their relationship to other policies and measures and to allocate scarce resources, although certain specific priorities, such as national security and border protection, are now being managed in a more coherent way at the policy level.¹⁸⁷

Recommendation 4.1: The scope and breadth of the National Security strategic planning, budget and other complementary processes should take a broad approach to considering the National Interests that are vulnerable to criminality as a basis for driving priority setting. It would be desirable to develop whole of government plans dealing with strategies over the short, medium, and longer terms. Priorities for these whole of government plans should include flexibility to respond to changes in the environment. Strategic Policing Objectives, associated capabilities and budgets should be considered iteratively against the background of these strategies.¹⁸⁸

Recommendation 4.3: Greater clarity concerning the links between budget, capabilities and performance in the law enforcement and national security environment should be achieved through a closer and more structured dialogue between the Government, its principal policy advisers, and the AFP.¹⁸⁹

Finding 6.3: At current resourcing levels it is similarly not possible for the Operational Response Group simultaneously to provide sustained support for a major domestic emergency and concurrently either lead a major police intervention in the region, while retaining the flexibility to deliver smaller

¹⁸⁵ Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, 8–9.

¹⁸⁶ Beale, 10.

¹⁸⁷ Beale, 104.

¹⁸⁸ Beale, 112.

¹⁸⁹ Beale, 113.

stand-alone deployments, or deploy as part of a joint military/police intervention.¹⁹⁰

Recommendation 6.2: Whilst the AFP Operational Response Group has been recognized as a Police Tactical Group within the National Counter-Terrorism Committee arrangements, and it has good networks with State and Territory-based tactical groups, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee should remain cognizant of the Operational Response Group's priority role as part of the Government's offshore specialist and tactical response capability. Opportunities for utilizing available Operational Response Group capacity to service operational exigencies in the broader AFP, including ACT Policing, should continue to be examined closely and implemented as appropriate.¹⁹¹

The Beale Review references the Review of Homeland and Border Security, which recognized the importance of agencies working together as a "community" to be networked well and to reduce barriers between entities.¹⁹² At least three other reports, specifically concerning law enforcement and cited in the Beale Review, concluded that minimizing cultural and technical barriers provides advantages like sharing skills and experience.¹⁹³ Beale recommends developing broad national capabilities and smooth collaborative systems to link AFP with the Australian Intelligence Community and State/Territory law enforcement agencies.¹⁹⁴

To respond effectively to national and regional crises, Beale recognized that a permanently sustained capability is required. He cited the Operational Response Group (ORG) as one such entity. He argued that reliance on reserve personnel spread across

¹⁹⁰ Beale, 157.

¹⁹¹ Beale, 157.

¹⁹² See Smith, *Summary and Conclusions: Report of the Review of Homeland and Border Security*, 2; and Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, 73.

¹⁹³ See the Street Review, Leahy Review, and government responses to the Clarke Inquiry. Laurence Street, Martin Brady, and Ken Moroney, *Street Review: A Review of Interoperability between the AFP and Its National Security Partners* (Canberra, Australia: Australian Federal Police, 2008), <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/street-review-review-interoperability-between-afp-and-its-national>; and Attorney-General's Department, "Clarke Inquiry into the Case of Dr. Mohamed Haneef: Report of the Inquiry: Government Response to the Clarke Inquiry" (Canberra, ACT: Australian Government, August 26, 2006), <https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/publications/government-response-report-inquiry-case-dr-mohamed-haneef>; and Peter Leahy, "Shifting Priorities in National Security: More Security Less Defence," *Security Challenges* 6, no. 2 (2010): 1–8, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26459932>.

¹⁹⁴ Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, 73.

regional areas or different units makes it difficult to maintain essential skills and effectively respond. It also decreases the potential for collaboration and increases response times.¹⁹⁵ Beale found the potential to increase efficiencies between the AFP and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Policing by aligning functions and capabilities between the two entities. Specifically, Beale recommended that the ORG absorb ACT Specialist Response and Security Teams (SRS) since the teams maintain similar tactical capabilities.¹⁹⁶ This finding (Finding 6.3) and recommendation (Recommendation 6.2) eventually led to the amalgamation of disparate units to create the AFP Specialist Response Group.

3. Specialist Response Group Is Formed

The results from the Beale Review spurred the AFP and ACT to initiate Project Komet. Project Komet identified methods to enhance interoperability between the ORG and SRS but also realized there was much more potential for the units beyond simply cooperating.¹⁹⁷ As a result of Project Komet, the AFP Specialist Response Group (SRG) was formed in July 2012 by joining two existing organizations from the AFP and ACT Policing: 1) the SRS from ACT Policing and 2) the ORG from the AFP International Deployment Group.¹⁹⁸ This change to the Australian federal policing model realized efficiencies for both organizations by reducing duplication of efforts for similar capabilities.¹⁹⁹ The description from the SRG homepage is summative: “The formation of the SRG provides the AFP and ACT Policing, with a centrally managed, one-stop-shop for mutually supportive specialist policing capabilities, including a coordination point for associated part-time capabilities across the AFP.”²⁰⁰ AFP Commissioner Tony Negus

¹⁹⁵ Beale, 151.

¹⁹⁶ Beale, 151.

¹⁹⁷ Interview by Platypus Magazine with SRG Commander Clive Murray discussing the newly formed unit. Australian Federal Police, “SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra,” *Platypus Magazine*, October 2012, 26, <https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/Platypus/platypus112.pdf>.

¹⁹⁸ Australian Federal Police, *Australian Federal Police Annual Report 2012-13* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Federal Police, 2013), 66, <https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/Reports/afp-annual-report-2012-2013.pdf>.

¹⁹⁹ Canberra Times, “Elite Police Super Group,” *Canberra Times*, February 2, 2012, <https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6177332/elite-police-super-group/>.

²⁰⁰ Australian Federal Police, “Specialist Response Group.”

described this genesis by stating that “The creation of the SRG will provide an enhanced operational model for all AFP business and provide a more effective capability to meet AFP operational responses locally, nationally, and internationally,”²⁰¹ Going even further to describe the role of the SRG, then-commander Clive Murray described the integration efforts as a “one-stop shop that delivers support to all AFP operations. There is one point of referral and one system to provide specialist operational support...whereas before July 2012, there were two disparate functions doing very similar business.”²⁰²

The Specialist Response Group comprises 26 teams across 15 disciplines that are rapidly deployable nationally and internationally. Some examples of the capabilities these teams provide are:

- Specialist Policing Command and Coordination
- Specialist Response
- Targeted Operations and Tactical Response
- Hostage Negotiation
- Tactical Police
- Crisis/Disaster Response
- Public Order Management
- Maritime Enforcement
- Search and Rescue
- Police Diving
- Canine Services²⁰³

The creation of the SRG provided the Australian government with increased flexibility and operational focus to effectively carry out specialized policing functions. Additionally, the merger realized significant efficiencies and economies for the AFP and ACT Policing.²⁰⁴ Another benefit of the new group is that it now provides additional career

²⁰¹ Australian Federal Police, “SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra,” 25.

²⁰² Australian Federal Police, 26.

²⁰³ Australian Federal Police, *Australian Federal Police Annual Report 2012-13*, 67; and Australian Federal Police | Australian Capital Territory, *Australian Federal Police Policing Annual Report 2012-13* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Capital Territory Policing, 2013), 14, 37, <https://www.police.act.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/act-policing-annual-report-2012-13.html>.

²⁰⁴ Australian Federal Police | Australian Capital Territory, *Australian Federal Police Policing Annual Report 2012-13*, 37.

paths for specialists in the AFP.²⁰⁵ This occurrence is significant because specialist operations traditionally represent a small workforce segment, thus limiting upward mobility.

C. ANALYSIS

National policing in Australia experienced a rapid expansion of operational requirements in the early 2000s. This rapid rise created inefficiencies and unnecessary redundancy, causing the Australian government to conduct a national review of policing capabilities. The resulting reports prompted structural changes to the national policing model in Australia. The AFP and ACT Policing were the two organizations in primary focus due to federation-wide capacity and authority. The new model in the SRG affords all specialized units a shared, centralized command structure that reinforces collaborative efforts. Although organizational redesign was the primary mechanism for integration, the SRG model afforded the consolidation and development of standardized routines and TTP to increase operational effectiveness. Before the SRG, disparate entities with different SOP procured non-uniform training and equipment.²⁰⁶

As an organization, the AFP and ACT Policing have roles and responsibilities similar to those of the DHS, such as intelligence, investigations, enforcement operations, and crisis response. Likewise, the breadth of special operations capabilities is similar, including the types of national and international deployments undertaken.²⁰⁷ Before creating the SRG, AFP specialist policing capabilities existed under hierarchical silos, similar to the current state of the DHS special operations teams. Also, prior to the SRG, AFP and ACT Policing specialist teams reported to regional governances instead of a centralized command structure. As various reports and command personnel noted, this structure proved ineffective, inefficient, and inflexible in meeting Australia's complex

²⁰⁵ Canberra Times, "Elite Police Super Group."

²⁰⁶ Australian Federal Police, "SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra," 26–27.

²⁰⁷ For an in-depth description of DHS special operations capabilities, see Appendix A.

challenges.²⁰⁸ Before the SRG, the hierarchical model of the AFP and associated challenges were remarkably similar to the issues facing DHS special operations teams. DHS teams currently operate under hierarchical silos spread across decentralized regional commands.

D. CONCLUSION

The experiences and actions taken by the Australian Federal Police to increase effectiveness and efficiency are remarkably similar to the circumstances facing the DHS today. As an example for the DHS, the AFP undertook an organizational redesign process that serves as a successful example of realigning disparate units under a joint command to create collaboration and integration. The DHS can use the Australian experience to realign special operations teams similarly to achieve unity of effort and increase effectiveness. Conducting external reviews of policing capabilities was an integral component for the AFP to determine where overlap and redundancy existed. Without the Beale Review, the AFP would not have been able to simultaneously restructure its formal network and leverage a complementary informal network. Additionally, results from the SRG suggest that newly-developed routines played a significant role in effectively integrating the once-disparate units.²⁰⁹ The next chapter in this thesis synthesizes the findings from the DOD and AFP to find possible solutions to the research problem.

²⁰⁸ See Beale, *Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*; and Australian Federal Police | Australian Capital Territory, *Australian Federal Police Policing Annual Report 2012-13*; and Australian Federal Police, “SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra.”

²⁰⁹ See comments by SRG Sergeant Steve Cooke and SRG Commander Clive Murray at Australian Federal Police, “SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra,” 27–28.

V. FINDINGS AND SYNTHESIS

This chapter distills the analysis from the preceding chapters to provide a synthetic understanding of the DOD and AFP experiences regarding organizational design, informal networks, and routines. This synthesis seeks to create a body of knowledge directly relevant to the DHS's problem to extrapolate possible solutions. Proper synthesis requires keeping the research question in the forefront. How can special operations teams in the DHS leverage capabilities towards greater effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort? For reference throughout this chapter, Table 1 summarizes the findings from the DOD and AFP cases.

Table 1. Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms used by the DOD and AFP

Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms Used			
	<u>Organizational Design</u>	<u>Informal Networks</u>	<u>Routines</u>
<u>Eagle Claw to USSOCOM</u>	Congress exerts exogenous pressures and passes GNA and Nunn-Cohen amendment GNA creates the U.S. Special Operations Command as a joint force structure to integrate/coordinate SOF Clarified chain of command from President to field commanders Made joint duty service experience a requirement for leadership roles	Joint USSOCOM structure uniquely positioned to develop informal networks	USSOCOM develops new routines to integrate SOF effectively Gear, equipment, and TTP aligned amongst SOF
<u>JSOTF Iraq</u>	JSOTF already existed under USSOCOM structure Decision-making authorities pushed down to lowest levels to increase speed	McChrystal exerts endogenous pressures on the JSOTF Extreme participatory transparency (i.e., weekly Operations and Intelligence calls) Liaison positions Personnel exchange programs Trust and Common Purpose Shared consciousness and Empowered execution Incubators: Small Wars Journal & Company Command	Routines are modified to speed up decision making ability Collaborative warfare strategy F3EAD implemented (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate)
<u>AFP Specialist Response Group</u>	The Prime Minister exerts exogenous political pressure for national policing reforms in the AFP Specialist Response Group created as joint force structure to integrate/coordinate all specialist policing capabilities	Joint SRG structure uniquely positioned to develop informal networks	SRG develops new routines to integrate policing capabilities between AFP and ACT Policing Gear, equipment, training, and TTP aligned Consolidation brings new capabilities

A. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Academic literature describes integrating mechanisms to overcome the challenges that subunit orientation creates. Subunit orientation is the tendency of people to view the entire organization solely from their unit's perspective. This tendency does not foster jointness or collaboration because it creates barriers between units as each essentially competes against the others.²¹⁰ Lateral communication and learning suffer as a result. Integrating mechanisms, such as liaison exchanges or task forces, overcome this challenge by bringing people together to foster interpersonal relationships and a common purpose. Focusing on the DOD and AFP, divisional organizational structures seek to solve two issues simultaneously, 1) increase manager's control of different subunits to better meet goals, and 2) allow managers to control and integrate the operation of the whole organization.²¹¹

Prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DOD structure did not include robust integrating mechanisms to foster jointness or collaboration. Subunit orientation contributed to the catastrophic failures of Operation Eagle Claw due to excessive compartmentalized planning and rehearsals. Testimony by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed it was insufficient to have resources without proper structures to develop a proper strategy for full warfighting capability.²¹² The DOD configuration at the time encouraged inter-service rivalry, leading to operational failures.²¹³ Legislators corrected these structural deficiencies with the GNA and Nunn-Cohen amendment. This legislation clarified chains of command from the President to field commanders, creating mechanisms for joint capability requirements and acquisition programs to reduce

²¹⁰ For a complete description of subunit orientation and integrating mechanisms, see Jones, *Organizational Theory, Design, and Change*, 94–100.

²¹¹ Jones, 149.

²¹² James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M Univ. Press, 2007), 13.

²¹³ Kathleen J. McInnis, *Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R44474 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 6, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1013813>.

redundant procurement programs.²¹⁴ Additionally, the GNA required leadership roles to have joint duty experience from other service branches. These structural changes to the DOD fostered collaboration and integration that did not exist during Operation Eagle Claw.

The DOD and AFP used formal organizational design to bring special operations teams under a unified command structure to increase effectiveness and efficiency further. The DOD created U.S. Special Operations Command, and the AFP created the Specialist Response Group. Both organizations aligned capabilities for more effective and efficient operational capacity. McChrystal's Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq only existed because of the GNA and USSOCOM. McChrystal championed liaison roles and exchange programs as integrating mechanisms to break down cultural barriers in the Task Force. Evaluating McChrystal's success in Iraq, Lamb et al. note that "It wasn't magic; it was collaboration...Collaborative organizations are not only powerful but also cost effective."²¹⁵ Aligning capabilities under a joint command structure permits standardized training and resource procurement to create efficiency.

Although the DOD and AFP used organizational design to address collaboration issues, it is worth noting that both required substantial political and legal efforts. The GNA culminated from six years of military failures, congressional investigations, and policy analysis and still only passed the congressional committee by one vote.²¹⁶ Likewise, politicians in Australia requested policing reviews and capabilities audits several years before any actual organizational changes occurred. Jensen describes structural organizational changes as typically requiring pressure from outside of the organization—exogenous changes.²¹⁷ Formal changes to the organizational design make the environment conducive for informal networks and routines to form to drive collaborative efforts, effectiveness, and efficiency.

²¹⁴ McInnis, Goldwater-Nichols at 30, 8.

²¹⁵ Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 58.

²¹⁶ Hamre, "Reflections."

²¹⁷ Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

The DOD and AFP experiences show that organizational redesign processes are monumental undertakings and often require exogenous pressures to take place. DHS special operations deployments in the summer of 2020 highlighted many of the same issues as Operation Eagle Claw did for the DOD. However, the DHS did not experience a catastrophic loss of life or equipment. While the political debate for federal policing reforms existed in 2020, mainly due to the federal response to Portland, pressure has waned since the presidential election. Policing reform, in general, is still a hot topic but likely insufficient to drive structural changes to the DHS organizational model to bring special operations units under a joint command.

B. NETWORKS

Informal networks are the relationships among people in an organization that span formal structural boundaries. Frequently, these informal networks complement the shortcomings of the formal organizational structure and hierarchical reporting authorities to enhance communications and increase flexibility.²¹⁸ Academic literature says that formal organizational structures (i.e., formal networks) mitigate predictable problems while informal networks more effectively deal with unforeseen problems.²¹⁹ Additionally, informal networks break down subunit orientation and barriers by fostering interpersonal trust to create a common purpose within the organization. Ultimately, trust and common purpose between units allow lower-level autonomy to increase the speed of decision-making while information is still relevant.

Research for this thesis did not uncover any data for the AFP or SRG explicitly about the use of informal networks. The Task Force in Iraq provides the most data on using informal networks to achieve collaboration. McChrystal realized that his Task Force was an efficient but lumbering hierarchy that was slow to make decisions and ineffective against AQI. The Task Force had many SOF and intelligence elements under a singular command structure. However, it could not respond fast enough to analyze, synthesize, and

²¹⁸ Song and Shi, “Impact of Informal Network on Opinion Dynamics in Command and Control Network,” 919.

²¹⁹ Krackhardt and Hanson, “Informal Networks,” 1.

operationalize information gathered on the battlefield against the more agile AQI. Looking at the Task Force in Iraq, McChrystal combined trust, common purpose, and smart autonomy into a concept he called shared consciousness and empowered execution.²²⁰ Contextual understanding of the Task Force enabled rapid decision-making at the lowest possible levels on the battlefield. This empowered execution increased the speed of decision-making significantly for the Task Force. McChrystal used informal networking strategies to break down cultural barriers between units in the Task Force. In essence, he institutionalized the benefits of informal networking to enable a successful and innovative collaborative warfare strategy called F3EAD.²²¹

As described in the previous section, the political interest likely does not currently exist for congressional action to restructure the DHS. However, informal networking in an organization is easier and faster to initiate and sustain than a formal organizational redesign. For this reason, using informal networks represents a more practical solution to the problem facing the DHS special operations teams. Jensen believes that internal, endogenous change often occurs in large bureaucratic institutions as professionals seek innovative solutions to new challenges.²²² The process Jensen describes requires two institutional mechanisms: 1) Incubators as safe sites to think outside the box; and 2) Advocacy networks to diffuse these new concepts throughout the force.²²³ Incubators are an external forum where practitioners can innovate new solutions to problems without fear of reprisal. The *Small Wars Journal* is one such example from the U.S. military. Advocacy networks are informal or loose coalitions that circulate innovative ideas from the incubator to championing officials who legitimate emerging initiatives.²²⁴

The DHS can leverage the experience from McChrystal's Task Force and Jensen's concepts on endogenous change to increase collaboration and unity of effort without a

²²⁰ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 215.

²²¹ Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 41; McChrystal, "It Takes a Network," 4; Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq*, 19.

²²² Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 15.

²²³ Jensen, 15.

²²⁴ Jensen, 19.

formal restructuring. Especially given access in the DHS to cloud-based computing and communications platforms, special operations teams already have the tools for collaboration. Collaborative efforts could begin to identify best practices to codify into standardized TTP. Likewise, gear and equipment lists could develop to better foster interoperability. Informal networks in the DHS have the clear potential to identify and institutionalize novel routines for special operations teams to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort.

C. ROUTINES

Routines codify best practices and institutional knowledge in an organization across unit boundaries to achieve integration and collaboration. According to the academic literature, routines rapidly transfer best practices from organizational experience to new experiences as optimal courses of action in a given context.²²⁵ Thus, routines essentially serve as a reservoir of institutional knowledge that personnel from disparate units can employ for effectiveness and efficiency. Academic research also uncovered that group identity in an organization strongly affects routine acceptance and retention. Loch et al. found that a strong group identity was required when a problem required integrated collaboration among disparate personnel.²²⁶

Standard routines between service branches did not exist when the DOD executed Operation Eagle Claw. Subsequent investigations cited the lack of integrating mechanisms, such as standard operating procedures, as contributing factors to the catastrophic failure. Hence the exogenous pressure by Congress to enact structural changes. Bringing SOF under USSOCOM enabled the development of collaborative SOP for all special operations forces. Informal networks were virtually nonexistent prior to USSOCOM to foster endogenous changes. It took action from the outside. The Task Force in Iraq had nearly twenty years of routines established for SOF. However, McChrystal argues that the rapid proliferation of advanced communications technology within AQI rendered existing SOF

²²⁵ Loch, Sengupta, and Ahmad, “The Microevolution of Routines,” 99.

²²⁶ Loch, Sengupta, and Ahmad, 111.

routines obsolete because of slow execution speed.²²⁷ New routines were needed, and McChrystal realized that cultural barriers and disparate group identities within the Task Force hampered their development. His subsequent efforts in the Task Force broke through barriers to create a common purpose so new routines could develop. By 2007, his collaborative warfare strategy centered around the novel cyclical routine to find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate.²²⁸

The Beale Review in Australia forced the AFP to confront ineffective and inefficient routines from overlapping and redundant capabilities in disparate units. Beale realized that at least two units with similar capabilities were performing similar policing duties and that both were spread thin. His recommendations to restructure and align forces resulted in greater effectiveness because of increased response flexibility. The SRG consolidated training, equipment, and SOP for a more efficient and effective operational model.²²⁹ Reports also indicate that members of the SRG supported the new organization, which undoubtedly aided the acceptance and retention of newly developed routines to achieve integration.²³⁰

The DHS special operations units can draw several conclusions from the DOD and AFP experience regarding using routines to achieve integration. First, the DHS special operations teams must overcome cultural barriers to foster a common purpose and new group identity between the teams collectively. Without doing that, each team will likely look outward at the others with a suspicious “they suck” attitude.²³¹ Second, the DHS teams cannot develop collaborative routines without coming together in some form, either under a joint command structure or through informal networking. The scathing report from the DHS OIG indicated that the DHS teams did not have “an established cross-component

²²⁷ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 73–76.

²²⁸ Lamb and Munsing, *Secret Weapon*, 41; McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” 4; Ryan, *Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq*, 19.

²²⁹ Australian Federal Police, “SRG Bursts Into Life In Canberra,” 27.

²³⁰ Canberra Times, “Elite Police Super Group.”

²³¹ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 127.

strategy to ensure effective operations.”²³² This indictment by the Office of the Inspector General further detailed inconsistent and incompatible equipment, training, and tactics used by the various teams.²³³ Therefore, the DHS teams should seek mechanisms to develop a common purpose and standardized routines.

D. CONCLUSION

In the homeland security book *Beyond 9/11*, Alan Bersin et al. do not recommend a top-down restructuring of the DHS. Instead, they endorse consolidating recent integration efforts to increase effectiveness.²³⁴ Bersin et al. also recommend standardization, interoperability, and joint operations as critical areas of improvement. With these recommendations in mind, the DHS special operations teams can draw lessons from the significant experience of the DOD and AFP. The DOD and AFP case studies provide ample relevant material that can be adapted to the DHS to increase interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency through organizational design, networks, and routines. This chapter synthesized analysis from the case studies and combined it with academic research to inform specific recommendations in the next chapter that the DHS can execute.

²³² Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*, 11, 14.

²³³ Cuffari, 11–15.

²³⁴ Lawson, Bersin, and Kayyem, *Beyond 9/11*, 79–80.

VI. CONCLUSION

This chapter makes recommendations to the DHS based upon academic knowledge and the experiences of the DOD and AFP. These recommendations exist on a continuum representing the collaborative capacity of the mechanisms identified in the research. They also account for the realization that changes in an organization require social and political capital to initiate and sustain. Thus, the recommendations are subjectively presented from least to greatest capital required. Figure 4 illustrates these concepts to the reader as a reference for the next section.




Figure 4. Recommendation Summary for the DHS Special Operations Community

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

The ultimate goal is to develop collaborative routines that institutionalize best practices achieving interoperability, common purpose, and trust between the DHS special operations teams. The route to arrive at these routines can be either organizational design changes in the DHS, informal networking processes, or a combination of both. The main differences between the two routes are the amount of time and social and political capital required for execution.

1. Create and establish a DHS Joint Special Operations Working Group.

- a. Develops relationships to build trust between units
- b. Creates a sense of common purpose between DHS Special Operations teams
- c. Analyzes issues and makes recommendations to foster interoperability (i.e., training, gear, equipment)
- d. Identifies and consolidates best practices to codify in routines
- e. Creates advocacy network to socialize novel ideas from incubator forums

2. Create a professional forum for DHS Special Operations personnel.

- a. Provides an incubator for practitioners to discuss and theorize novel ideas to problems facing the special operations community
- b. Similar in concept to the Small Wars Journal or Company Command forums
- c. Fosters common purpose and strengthens group identity

3. Initiate joint training programs.

- a. Develops relationships among operators to create trust
- b. Diffuses subunit orientation
- c. Shares best practices to identify novel or consistent routines, gear, and equipment

4. **Establish liaison roles and exchange programs between Component teams.**
 - a. Fosters transparency
 - b. Builds trust between units
 - c. Diffuses subunit orientations
 - d. Fosters common purpose and strengthens group identity
5. **Create a DHS Special Operations Command (DHSSOC) as a joint force structure.** (Figure 5)
 - a. Similar in concept to USSOCOM to align DHS special operations capabilities
 - b. Strengthens command authorities from the Secretary of DHS to special operations commanders in the field during national response activities (i.e., civil unrest, terrorist incidents, humanitarian response)
 - c. Exercises administrative control over Component special operations teams for budgeting, gear, equipment, TTP
 - d. Reserves tactical control of teams at the Component level for day-to-day operations
 - e. Utilize liaison roles and exchange programs between DHSSOC and Components
6. **Create a Joint Special Operations Directorate (JSOD) within DHSSOC.** (Figure 6)
 - a. Maintains a capable standing force of special operations personnel for a national response to significant incidents while keeping Component-level teams in place for local operations
 - b. JSOD develops and evaluates standardized SOP, TTP, training, gear, and equipment for adoption across Component teams
 - c. Utilize existing DHS Joint Duty mechanisms to solicit existing DHS special operations personnel for 3–5 year details to DHSSOC/JSOD

- d. Joint training and deployments foster trust and common purpose between units as personnel rotate in and out




Figure 5. Notional DHSSOC Organizational Location




Figure 6. Notional DHSSOC/JSOD Organizational Structure

Recommendations one through four should be relatively achievable, provided someone steps forward to champion these innovations. While researching this project, the author socialized these concepts with various leaders in the DHS special operations community. The problems presented are widely acknowledged, but the lumbering DHS bureaucracy has thus far prevented anyone from stepping forward to initiate substantive change. Admittedly, recommendations five and six are daunting challenges requiring vast politicking. Therefore, this paper recommends focusing on informal networking to identify and codify best practices into joint force routines for the DHS special operations community.

B. FUTURE RESEARCH

There is extensive literature researching the DHS organizational structure, but very little exists about integrating civilian law enforcement special operations personnel in the department. This thesis contributes significantly to this narrow body of literature. While researching this project, the author found the following areas that were outside the scope of this thesis.

- Some researchers have compared the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the DHS and found that many challenges exist for similar legislation.²³⁵ Authority relationships and command structures should be studied in the DHS that would permit the creation of DHSSOC like the GNA did for USSOCOM.
- The FBI's Hostage Rescue Team is a civilian law enforcement Tier-1 counter-terrorism asset. Integrating the breadth and depth of special operations capabilities in the DHS could make it a rival to the FBI's team. This potential should be explored, and recommendations made to collaborate and avoid unhealthy rivalry for both teams.

²³⁵ For a robust conversation comparing DHS and DoD authority structures in the context of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Prieto, "Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies"; Wormuth, "Is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security?"

C. CLOSING

This research project aimed to discover strategies the DHS could leverage to integrate special operations capabilities for greater effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort. The summer of 2020 magnified these issues when teams deployed in an ad-hoc manner to civil unrest across the United States. Subsequent investigations by the DHS Inspector General and Government Accountability Office found the DHS ineffective at executing cross-component joint operations.²³⁶ That summer highlighted many of the same issues experienced by the DOD during Operation Eagle Claw, albeit without the catastrophic loss of life or equipment.

Research discovered that the Department of Defense and Australian Federal Police faced similar challenges in the past and successfully overcame them. These organizations used organizational design principles, informal networking, and standardized routines to collaborate and achieve integration for greater effectiveness. Efficiency was a natural by-product when unnecessary redundancies were eliminated. The DHS has a significant opportunity to leverage the lessons learned and build upon the successes of the DOD and AFP. The DHS should take a proactive approach in special operations to prevent the issues it experienced in 2020 and potentially catastrophic failures from repeating.

²³⁶ Cuffari, *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*, 11, 14.

APPENDIX. DHS COMPONENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS

Table 2. DHS Special Operations Personnel by Component,
as of January 2020²³⁷

DHS Special Operations Personnel

U.S. Customs & Border Protection

Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC)	259
Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR)	246
Office of Field Operations Special Response Team (OFO SRT)	143

U.S. Coast Guard

Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT)	307
Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST)	341
Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET)	230

U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Enforcement and Removal Operations Special Response Team (ERO SRT)	251
Homeland Security Investigations Special Response Team (HSI SRT)	303

U.S. Secret Service

Counter Assault Team (CAT)	105
Emergency Response Team (ERT)	94
Counter Sniper Team	62

TOTAL 2,341

A. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a conglomerate of three large sub-agencies, is a Component of the DHS. These agencies are the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), the Office of Field Operations (OFO), and the Air and Marine Office (AMO). The OFO and the USBP are former standalone agencies with longstanding cultures and traditions. This thesis identified three special operations units in CBP. Two units comprise the USBP Special Operations Group and one within the Office of Field Operations.

²³⁷ Promulgated from data in this GAO report. Goodwin, *GAO Report to Congress: Federal Tactical Teams*, 12.

U.S. Border Patrol – Special Operations Group

The Special Operations Group is an integrated organization within the USBP responsible for providing emergency response and law enforcement resolution to various high-risk, unusual, or emergent situations in addition to National Security Special Events. The Special Operations Group provides a highly capable rapid response force to the DHS with two specialized teams.²³⁸ The Special Operations comprises the Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC). Headquartered in El Paso, Texas, with an integrated national team, each geographic sector within the USBP houses a Special Operations Detachment with BORSTAR and BORTAC personnel.

The USBP created BORSTAR in 1998 in response to a growing number of migrant deaths and injuries to Border Patrol agents sustained while defending our borders. BORSTAR provides specialized law enforcement response, advanced medical support, conventional and high-risk search, and rescue response, Federal Emergency Management Agency mission assignments, special security events, and specialized training support directed by the Department of Homeland Security for both domestic and foreign government agencies.²³⁹

BORTAC, established in 1984, provides DHS with an immediate-response capability to emergent and high-risk incidents nationally and internationally.²⁴⁰ BORTAC supports the Border Patrol's mission to secure the border by executing high-risk search and arrest warrants, surveillance, and foreign law enforcement capacity building. BORTAC conducts training and operations with foreign and domestic law enforcement and military entities.²⁴¹

²³⁸ Customs & Border Protection | Office of Public Affairs, "Border Patrol Special Operations Group (SOG)" (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Special%20Operations%20Group.pdf>.

²³⁹ Customs & Border Protection | Office of Public Affairs, "Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR)," March 2014, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Search%2C%20Trauma%2C%20and%20Rescue.pdf>.

²⁴⁰ Customs & Border Protection | Office of Public Affairs, "Border Patrol Tactical Unit," February 2014, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Tactical%20Unit.pdf>.

²⁴¹ Goodwin, *GAO Report to Congress: Federal Tactical Teams*, 30.

Office of Field Operations/SRT

The Special Response Team (SRT) was established in the fiscal year 2009 in response to Hurricane Katrina. CBP officials stated that OFO needed its own tactical response capability to help maintain order during special events and disasters. SRT responds to and counters high-risk, unconventional threats at CBP's ports of entry by conducting national and local special operations. SRT supports large-scale national events, such as National Security Special Events and natural disasters. SRT conducts protection details and supports foreign border security operations, including training and advising foreign law enforcement counterparts.²⁴²

B. U.S. SECRET SERVICE

The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is a DHS Component with three special operations units identified in this research project. Unlike the CBP, the USSS is a singular Component with a long history and culture that has also hampered integration into the greater DHS construct.

Counter Assault Team (CAT)

The mission of the Counter Assault Team, established in 1979, is to divert, suppress, and neutralize an organized attack against a USSS protectee or a protected site. Members provide full-time coverage at the White House complex and Vice President's residence. CAT members protect the President, Vice President, First Lady, and other designated foreign heads of state visiting the United States. Team members also deploy with their protectees while on domestic and foreign trips. The CAT also supports National Special Security Events, such as presidential inaugurations or the Super Bowl.²⁴³

Emergency Response Team (ERT)

The mission of the Emergency Response Team, established in 1985, is to provide an immediate tactical response to a coordinated attack against the middle perimeter of the

²⁴² Goodwin, 31.

²⁴³ Goodwin, 34.

White House, the Vice President's residence, and other temporary locations under the protection of the USSS. The ERT also provides support during National Special Security Events, such as presidential inaugurations, and is deployed full-time to protect these locations.²⁴⁴

Counter Sniper (CS)

The mission of the Counter Sniper unit, established in 1971, is to protect assigned people and places by locating, identifying, and neutralizing long-range threats and coordinated assaults. CS provides real-time intelligence and long-range observation supporting protection details, the Counter Assault Team, and other law enforcement entities. Technicians within the CS unit assist in identifying aircraft, watercraft, and individuals in violation of secure areas. CS members deployed continuously at the White House complex and the Vice President's residence. Team members protect the President, Vice President, First Lady, and other foreign heads of state visiting the United States. The CS unit also supports National Special Security Events.²⁴⁵

C. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a Component within the DHS that contains two special operations units identified throughout this research project. Like the CBP, ICE contains two large operational sub-agencies with operational nexus to USBP and OFO. The two sub-agencies are Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Each operational agency has developed special response teams to address law enforcement issues within their context.

Enforcement and Removal Operations - Special Response Team

Established in 2004, the ERO Special Response Team (ERO/SRT) executes high-risk immigration enforcement operations that require capabilities beyond those of regular ERO officers. ERO identifies, detains, apprehends, and removes foreign nationals who violate the immigration laws of the United States. The ERO/SRT supports this mission by

²⁴⁴ Goodwin, 36.

²⁴⁵ Goodwin, 34.

targeting alleged criminals, conducting high-risk warrant services, and arresting others subject to removal. ERO/SRTs provide security while detainees are transported between facilities and while moving large groups of detainees during air or ground transport. ERO/SRTs also respond to other national activities such as natural disasters. ERO has SRTs based in the 18 units field offices across the United States and a headquarters management office in Washington, D.C.²⁴⁶

Homeland Security Investigations – Special Response Team

The HSI Special Response Team (HSI/SRT), established in 2003 along with ICE, executes high-risk law enforcement operations when the capabilities of regular HSI agents are inadequate to complete the mission. As the investigative arm, HSI investigates and responds to various criminal activities, such as cybercrimes, financial crimes, human and drug trafficking, and immigration fraud.²⁴⁷ HSI/SRTs support this mission by searching for and arresting high-risk individuals, conducting high-risk enforcement operations, such as suspects known to be armed, and using specialized equipment to gain access to areas when serving high-risk warrants. HSI/SRTs also provide cover and quick reaction forces when agents conduct undercover activities. HSI/SRT agents deploy to national incidents and emergencies as needed. HSI bases 20 SRT units in ICE field offices across the United States.²⁴⁸

D. U.S. COAST GUARD

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maintains specialized forces in a branch termed the Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF) with capabilities to conduct counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and other threats in the maritime environment. The principal missions of the DSF focus on anti- and counter-terrorism in the marine environment, protection of commercial and military ports, protection of critical infrastructure and high-value maritime

²⁴⁶ Goodwin, 32.

²⁴⁷ Goodwin, 33.

²⁴⁸ Goodwin, 33.

assets, and counter-drug and counter-piracy operations.²⁴⁹ The USCG uses the DSF as a force multiplier while executing the agency's 11 statutory missions. The following paragraphs describe the five individual teams that comprise the Deployable Specialized Forces.

Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET)

Tactical Law Enforcement Teams in the USCG provide specialized law enforcement and maritime security capabilities to enforce U.S. laws, primarily conducting offshore drug interdiction and vessel interception operations. TACLETs are composed of two units based in California and Florida. The teams trace their origins to the establishment of the Law Enforcement Detachment program in 1982 and consist of detachments of law enforcement boarding officers and airborne precision sharpshooters. TACLET detachments of six to 12 personnel typically deploy aboard U.S. and allied naval vessels for scheduled counterdrug patrols. The teams also train naval, coast guard, and police forces of other countries.²⁵⁰

Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT)

Maritime Security Response Teams are specialized forces for counterterrorism and higher-risk law enforcement operations in the maritime domain, such as short-notice maritime response. Established in 2006, MSRTs provide various capabilities such as boarding vessels by inserting from a helicopter, engaging potentially hostile individuals onboard, and verifying potential threats to the maritime transportation system. MSRT is composed of two units based in Virginia and California. MSRT members are assigned either to boarding teams that lead tactical operations during vessel boarding or boat crews that deliver the boarding team to its target.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Nathan Anderson, *GAO Report to Congress: Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities*, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2019), 5, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-33>.

²⁵⁰ Goodwin, *GAO Report to Congress: Federal Tactical Teams*, 29; Anderson, *GAO Report to Congress: Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities*, 11.

²⁵¹ Goodwin, *GAO Report to Congress: Federal Tactical Teams*, 27; Anderson, *GAO Report to Congress: Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities*, 10.

Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST)

Maritime Safety and Security Teams are a security antiterrorism force that safeguards the public and protects vessels, facilities, ports, harbors, and cargo in the maritime domain of the United States. These teams maintain readiness for incidents such as recovery operations, national security special events, terrorist threats, and the enforcement of security zones surrounding ports and waterways when needed. To carry out these functions, MSSTs maintain boats for deployment and specially trained canines to search for explosives and remotely operated submersible vessels.²⁵²

National Strike Force (NSF)

The National Strike Force comprises three teams: 1) an incident management team, 2) a public information assist team, and 3) a coordination center. The primary function of the NSF is to deploy USCG personnel with incident management skills in response to oil or hazardous pollution incidents. These teams can be a mix of active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel comprising teams that vary in size depending upon the incident and required response.²⁵³

Port Security Units (PSU)

Defense readiness is the primary mission of the PSU to provide shoreside and waterway protection for high-value assets and critical maritime infrastructure. They are reserve units by nature and utilize boats that can be trailered or airlifted based on deployment requirements.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Anderson, *GAO Report to Congress: Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities*, 10.

²⁵³ Anderson, 10.

²⁵⁴ Anderson, 10.

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